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Copyright 1992 by Liah Greenfeld
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
s e c o n d p a p e r b a c k p r i n t i n g , 1994
First Harvard University Press paperback edition, 1993
Library of Congress Cataioging~in-Publication Data
Greenfeld, Liah.
Nationalism: five roads to modernity / Liah Greenfeld.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references {p. ) and index*
ISBN 06746031S--4 add~free paper}(cloth)
ISBN 0-674-60319-2 (pbk.)
1. NationalismHistory. 1. Title.
JC311.G715 1992
32Q.5'4f09dc20 92-6990
CIP
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Acknowledgments
T
oday, with nationalism reinvigorated and wreaking havoc in parts
of the globe where it long since has been considered a phenomenon
of the past, I do not feel the need to justify my decision to write a
book about it. The importance of nationalism in our world has been proven
to us again, and it is imperative that we make a new effort to understand it.
My interest in nationalism, however, predates its recent newsworthiness. It
dates back to the fall of 1982, when I made this country my home and
changed nationality for the second time. This change made me acutely
aware of the constructed nature of national identity and the profound differ
ences, reaching to every sphere of social existence, between nations defined
in individualistic and civic termsto use the categories I arrived at later
and those defined as ethnic collectivities.
I began writing this book in the fall of 1987, when a fellowship from the
John M. Olin Foundation allowed me to take a year of leave and devote my
undivided attention to the subject. Another year of full-time research and
writingmade possible in 198990 by the German Marshall Fund of the
United States and a stay at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton,
financed in part by a grant from the MacArthur Foundationallowed me
to complete it.
During these years I have incurred many debts. I cannot adequately ex
press my gratitude to my colleagues, sociologists, historians, and political
scientists, who shared with me their insights and offered support and en
couragement. Daniel Bell spent an entire month in effect editing the manu
script line by line. I would like him to know how touched and honored I felt
by this degree of attention. I am forever in his debt. I am also indebted to
Nathan Glazer for valuable comments on the original manuscript; to David
Riesman for his untiring interest and for being ever willing to give advice;
and to the chairman of the Harvard Department of Sociology, Aage Saren-
sen, for his theoretical sensitivity, intellectual tolerance, and constant per
sonal support. Among the other colleagues at Harvard, Wallace Mac-
Caffrey, Patrice Higonnet, and Richard Pipes read, respectively, chapters on
England, France, and Russia, and shared with me their expert knowledge;
David Landes found time to read the entire book and made useful sugges
viii
Acknowledgments
tions. Members of the Russian Research Center, particularly the Director,
Adam Ulam, have been supportive of my work since I first came to Harvard:
Robert and Jana Kieiy allowed me and my family to spend two relatively
carefree years, during which I began this book, under the roof of Adams
House.
Edward Shils, at the University of Chicago, has been a constant example
of intellectual dedication and integrity. He encouraged me and made me
strive for perfection. I know that the result falls short of this ideal, but I hope
he will approve of what I have done.
At the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, where I spent one of the
mosr productive and intellectually satisfying years of my life, I am particu
larly grateful to Michael Walzer for reading the entire original manuscript
in a remarkably short time and providing detailed comments on it; to Clif
ford Geertz for making most helpful suggestions on the presentation of the
argument; and to Albert Hirschman for a very sensitive, personal reading of
the German chapter. Among scholars elsewhere with whom I had the privi
lege of discussing the subject of this book are the sociologists Bernard Bar
ber, Peter Berger, Daniel Chirot, S. N. Eisenstadt, Peter Etzkorn, Suzanne
Keller, Kurt and Gladys Lang, S. M. Lipset, and Edward Tiryakian; the
scholar of English literature Heather Dubrow; the American historians John
Murrin, Fred Siegel, and Richard John; the historians of Germany Jeffrey
Herf, Thomas Nipperdey, and Peter Paret; and the Russian historians
George Liber and Phillip Pomper. To some of them my debt is not only
scholarly: they have been my friends, and their moral support and personal
concern for me could not be more important. The two anonymous readers
for Harvard University Press also deserve my thanks for their careful and
appreciative readings and detailed comments.
I have greatly benefited from the advice of my colleagues, but in certain
cases 1left some very good advice unheeded. Since the author proposes and
other agencies dispose, my prime consideration in preparing the manuscript
for publication has been reducing its length, while preserving the integrity
of the central argument. For this reason, with very few exceptions, I decided
not to engage in explicit arguments with other scholars who have dealt with
the subjects I treated, and refrained from spelling out the implications of my
treatment for certain, rather important related areas of study. The first
among these implications has to do with the theory of state-formation. If ray
argument regarding the nature and development of nationalism is correct,
much of this theory {as a generous reader indeed remarked), so central in
contemporary sociology and political science, should be subject to revision.
The problem of ethnicity, and its significance in the age of nationalism, also
requires greater articulation. The difference between ethnicity and ethnic
nationalism is largely semantic. In nations defined in ethnic terms, every eth
nic minority is considered a nationality (for this reason, the Soviet Union,
Acknowledgments ix
for instance, never defined itself as a nation, but as a union of nations). Cul
tivation of ethnic identity is the form ethnic nationalism takes in civic na
tions; ethnicity is the name under which the latter is known in them. These
subjects have been touched upon at different points in the book, but I would
like to take them up independently and explore them further at a later time.
Also in the interest of saving space, I have significantly compressed the
original material in the notes, limiting it to essentials and in many cases
combining several references in a paragraph into one. In a few places I did
the same for references spread over several paragraphs, if they referred to
the same source or dealt with the same subject matter. I apologize for any
inconvenience this may have caused.
These acknowledgments would not be complete if I did not mention my
students. The undergraduates Ben Alpers, Phil Katz, and Justin Daniels,
who worked on aspects of Russian, French, and American nationalism re
spectively, under my supervision, forced me to sharpen my ideas both when
they followed my advice and when they disputed it. My graduate students,
always willing to listen, to question, and to offer suggestions, have been a
source of support in many ways. In particular, Marie-Laure Djelic and Paula
Frederick were of great assistance in the final editing of the manuscript and
its preparation for the publisher.
Anna Grinfeld helped in organizing the notes, and Natalia Tsarkova
helped with the index. The printing-out of the final version would have been
impossible without the expertise and patience of Nancy Williamson. Jacque
line Dormitzer made the copy-editing process a pleasure. Some of my earlier
work on nationalism was published in Research in Political Sociology and
Survey. In addition, chapter 1 incorporates portions of my paper Science
and National Greatness in 17th Century England, published in Minerva 25
{Spring-Summer 1987); and a portion of chapter 3 appeared as The For
mation of the Russian National Identity: The Role of Status Insecurity and
Ressentimenf in Comparative Studies in Society and History 32:3 (July
1990), published by Cambridge University Press. The editors of all these
journals made valuable suggestions. My thanks are due to alt of them.
Harvard University
January 1992
/ '"'v
.'-N
Contents
Introduction 1
1. Gods Firstborn: England 27
Reflection of the National Consciousness in Discourse and Sentiment 31
The New Arisrocracy, the New Monarchy,
and the Protestant Reformation 44
The English Bible, the Bloody Regiment of Queen Mary,
and the Burning Matter of Dignity 51
England as Gods Peculiar People, and the Token of His Love 60
The Sound of Their Voices 67
The Changing Position of the Crown atjd Religion
in the National Consciousness 71
A Land of Experimental Knowledge 78
2. The Three Identities of France 89
L The Development of Pre-National French Identity 91
Francea Church, and the Faith of the Fleur de Lys 91
Heresy and Its Child 102
The King and His State 112
II. The Social Bases of the Nationalization of French Identity
and the Character of the Nascent National Consciousness 133
Turns of the Social Wheel: The Plight of the French Aristocracy 133
The Perilous Escape: Redefinition and Reorganization of the Noblesse 145
The Birth of the French Nation 154
Nation, the Supreme Being 167
Competition with England and Ressentiment 177
A Note on Non-Elite Nationalism 184
3. The Scythian Rome: Russia 189
Perestroika in the Eighteenth Century 191
The Crisis of the Nobility 204
The West and Ressentiment 222
The Laying of the Foundations 235
Transvaluation of Values: The Crystallization of the Matrix
of Russian Nationalism 250
The Two-Headed Eagle 260
xii Contents
4, The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 27J
I. The Setting 278
The Conception and Miscarriage of Nationalism
in the Sixteenth Century 278
The Early Evolution of the Concept of the State 284
The Insouciance of German Nobility prior to the Nineteenth
Century 287
Bildungsbiirgertunt: The Dangerous Class 293
II. The Birth of the Spirit: The Preparation of the Mold
for the German National Consciousness 310
Aufklarung 310
Pietism 314
Romanticism 322
III. The Materialization of the Spirit 352
The Impact of the French Revolution 352
The Birth of German Nationalism 358
The Finishing Touch: Ressentiment 371
The Twin Blossoms of the Blue Flower 386
5. In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: The Unfolding
of Nationality in America 397
America as a New England 403
The Separation 411
A Union Begun by Necessity 422
The Tug-of-War: The Persisting Threat of Secession
and the Development of National Unity 431
Inconsistencies and Tensions 449
The Trial and Completion of American Nationality 472
Afterword 485
Notes 493
I N T R O D U C T I O N
his book is an attempt to understand the world in which we live. Its
fundamental premise is that nationalism lies at the basis of this
world. To grasp its significance, one has to explain nationalism.
The word nationalism is used here as an umbrella term under which
are subsumed the related phenomena of national identity (or nationality)
and consciousness, and collectivities based on themnations; occasionally
it is employed to refer to the articulate ideology on which national identity
and consciousness rest, though notunless specifiedto the politically ac
tivist, xenophobic variety of national patriotism, which it frequently desig
nates.
The specific questions which the book addresses are why and how nation
alism emerged, why and how it was transformed in the process of transfer
from one society to another, and why and how different forms of national
identity and consciousness became translated into institutional practices
and patterns of culture, molding the social and political structures of soci
eties which defined themselves as nations. To answer these questions, I focus
on five major societies which were the first to do so: England, France, Rus
sia, Germany, and the United States of America.
The Definition of Nationalism ---------.
The specificity of nationalism, that which distinguishes nationality from \
other types of identity, derives from the fact that nationalism locates the i
source of individual identity within a people, which is seen as the bearer
of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective soli- I
darity. The people is the mass of a population whose boundaries and na- }
ture are defined in various ways, but which is usually perceived as larger \
than any concrete community and always as fundamentally homogeneous,
and only superficially divided by the lines of status, class, locality, and in \
some cases even ethnicity. This specificity is conceptual. The only founda
tion of nationalism as such, the only condition, that is, without which no
nationalism is possible, is an idea; nationalism is a particular perspective or j
4
N A T I O N A L I S M
a style of thought. The idea which lies at the core of nationalism is the idea
of the nation.
The Origins of the I dea of the Nation"
To understand the nature of the idea of the nation, it might be helpful to
examine the semantic permutations which eventually resulted in it, as we
follow the history of the word. The early stages of this history were traced
by the Italian scholar Guido Zernatto.2The origin of the word is to be found
in the Latin natiosomething born. The initial concept was derogatory: in
Rome the name natio was reserved for groups of foreigners coining from the
same geographical region, whose statusbecause they were foreigners
was below that of the Roman citizens. This concept was thus similar in
meaning to the Greek ta ethne, also used to designate foreigners and, specif
ically, heathens, and to the Hebrew amatnim, which referred to those who
did not belong to die chosen monotheistic people. The word had other
meanings as well, but they were less common, and this onea group of
foreigners united by place of originfor a long time remained its primary
implication.
In this sense, of a group of foreigners united by place of origin, the word
nation was applied to the communities of students coming to several uni
versities shared by Western Christendom from looselygeographically or
linguisticallyrelated regions. For example, there were four nations in the
University of Paris, the great center of theological learning: lhonorable
nation de France, la fidele nation de Picardie, la venerable nation de
Normandie, and la constante nation de Germanie" The nation de
France included all students coming from France, Italy, and Spain; that of
Germanie, those from England and Germany; the Picard nation was
reserved for the Dutch; and the Norman, for those from the Northeast. It is
important to note that the students had a national identity only in their sta
tus as students (that is, in most cases, while residing abroad); this identity
was immediately shed when their studies were completed and they returned
home. While applied in this setting, the word nation, on the one hand,
lost its derogatory connotation, and on the other, acquired an additional
meaning. Owing to the specific structure of university life at the time, the
communities of students functioned as support groups or unions and, as
they regularly took sides in scholastic disputations, also developed common
opinions. As a result, the word nation came to mean more than a com
munity of origin: it referred now to the community of opinion and purpose.
As universities sent representatives to adjudicate grave ecclesiastical ques
tions at the Church Councils, the word underwent yet another transforma
tion. Since the late thirteenth century, starting at the Council of Lyon in
1274, the new conceptnation as a community of opinionwas applied
Introduction 5
to the parties of the ecclesiastical republic. Bur the individuals who com
posed them, the spokesmen of various intraecclesiastica! approaches, were
also representatives of secular and religious potentates. And so the word
nation acquired another meaning, that of representatives of cultural and
political authority, or a political, cultural, and then social elite. Zernatto
cites -Montesquieu, Joseph de Maistre, and Schopenhauer to demonstrate
how late this was still the accepted significance of the word. It is impossible
to mistake its meaning in the famous passage from Esprit des lois: Sous les
deux premieres races on assembla souvent ia nation, cest a dire, les sei
gneurs et les eveques; il netait point des communes. 3
The Zigzag Pattern of Semantic Change
At this point, where Zernattos story breaks off, we may pause to take a
closer look at it. To an extent, the history of the word nation allows us to
anticipate the analysis employed in much of the book. The successive
changes in meaning combine into a pattern which, for the sake of formality,
we shall call the zigzag pattern of semantic change. At each stage of this
development, the meaning of the word, which comes with a certain semantic
baggage, evolves out of usage in a particular situation. The available con
ventional concept is applied within new circumstances, to certain aspects of
which it corresponds. However, aspects of the new situation, which were
absent in the situation in which the conventional concept evolved, become
cognitively associated with it, resuiting in a duality of meaning. The mean
ing of the original concept is gradually obscured, and the new one emerges
as conventional. When the word is used again in a new situation, it is likely
to be used in this new meaning, and so on and so forth. (This pattern is
depicted in Figure 1.)
The process of semantic transformation is constantly redirected by struc
tural (situational) constraints which form the new concepts (meanings of the
word); at the same time, the structural constraints are conceptualized, inter
preted, or defined in terms of the concepts (the definition of the situation
changes as the concepts evolve), which thereby orient action. The social po*
tency and psychological effects of this orientation vary in accordance with
the sphere of the concepts applicability and its relative centrality in the ac
tors overall existence. A student in a medieval university, defined as a mem
ber of one or another nation, might derive therefrom an idea of the quarters
he was supposed to be lodged in, people he was likely to associate with most
closely, and some specific opinions he was expected to hold in the course of
the few years his studies lasted. Otherwise his nationalidentity, probably,
did not have much, impact on his self-image or behavior; outside the narrow
sphere of the university, the concept had no applicability. The influence of
the equally transient "national identity on a participant at a Church Coun-
6 N A T I O N A L I S M
Et c.
Figure1 The zigzag pattern of semantic change
ci! could be more profound. Membership in a nation defined him as a person
of very high status, the impact of such definition on ones self-perception
could be permanent, and the lingering memory of nationality could affect
the persons conduct far beyond conciliar deliberations, even if his nation no
longer existed.
From Rabble to Nation
The applicability of the idea of the nation and its potency increased a thou
sandfold as the meaning of the word was transformed again. At a certain
point in historyto be precise, in early sixteenth-century Englandthe
word nation in its conciliar meaning of an elite was applied to the pop
ulation of the country and made synonymous with the word people. This
semantic transformation signaled the emergence of the first nation in the
world, in the sense in which the word is understood today, and launched the
era of nationalism. The stark significance of this conceptual revolution was
highlighted by the fact that, while the general referent of the word people
prior to its nationalization was the population of a region, specifically it
applied to the lower classes and was most frequently used in the sense of
rabble or plebsThe equation of the two concepts implied the elevation
of the populace to the position of an (at first specifically political) elite. As a
introduction 7
synonym of the nationan elitethe people lost its derogatory con- I
notation and, now denoting an eminently positive entity, acquired the mean- /
ing of the bearer of sovereignty, the basis of political solidarity, and the su-j
preme object of loyalty. A tremendous change of attitude, which it latejo
reinforced, had to precede such redefinition of the situation, for with if
members of all orders of the society identified with the group, from which
earlier the better placed of them could only wish to dissociate themselves.
What brought this change about in the first place, and then again and again,
as national identity replaced other types in one country after another, is, in
every particular case, the first issue to be accounted for, and it will be tHe
focus of discussion in several chapters of the book. i ^
^National identity in irs distinctive modern sense is, therefore, an identity ^
which derives from membership in a people, the fundamental character- /
istic of which is that it is defined as a nation. Every member of the S
people thus interpreted partakes in its superior, elite quality, and it is in \
consequence that a stratified national population is perceived as essentially
homogeneous, and the lines of status and class as superficial. This principled
lies at the basis of all nationalisms and justifies viewing them as expressions
of the same general phenomenon. Apart from it, different nationalisms share
little. The national populationsdiversely termed peoples, nations,
and nationalitiesare defined in many ways, and the criteria of member
ship in them vary. The multiformity which results is the source of the con
ceptually evasive, Protean nature of nationalism and the cause of the peren
nial frustration of its students, vainly trying to define it with the help of one
or another objective factor, all of which are rendered relevant to the prob
lem only if the national principle happens to be applied to them. The defini
tion of nationalism proposed here recognizes it as an emergent phenome
non, that is, a phenomenon whose natureas well as the possibilities of its
development and the possibilities of the development of the elements of
which it is composedis determined not by the character of its elements,
but by a certain organizing principle which makes these elements into a
unity and imparts to them a special significance.'
There are important exceptions to every relationship in terms of which
nationalism has ever been interpretedwhether with common territory or
common language, statehood or shared traditions, history or race. None of
these relationships has proved inevitable. But from the definition proposed
above, it follows not only that such exceptions are to be expected, but that
nationalism does not have to be related to any of these factors, though as a
rule it is related to at least some of them. In other words, nationali_$mJs^not^
necessarily a form of particularism. It is a'pollticarideology (or a class of
polm^H^Qtogies^grivin^fromlthe~same basic princtpjfik aixi as ^achit-.
d^Tnotliave tobe jdeiSied.with any particular com muni ty.5A _na.ti o n
coextensive with humanity is in no way a contradiction in terms. The United
8
N A T I O N A L I S M
States of the World, which will perhaps exist in the future, with sovereignty
vested in the population, and the various segments of the latter regarded -as
equal, would be a nation in the Strict sense of the word within the frame
work of nationalism. The United States of America represents an approxi
mation to precisely this State of affairs.
The Emergence of Particularistic Nationalisms
As it is, however, nationalism is the most common and salient form of par
ticularism in the modern world. Moreover, if compared with the forms of
particularism it has replaced, it is a particularly effective (or, depending on
ones viewpoint, pernicious) form of particularism, because, as every indi
vidual derives his or her identity from membership in the community, the
sense of commitment to it and its collective goals is much more widespread.
In a world divided into particular communities, national identity tends to be
associated and confounded with a communitys sense of uniqueness and the
qualities contributing to it. These qualities (social, political, cultural in the
narrow sense, or ethnic)6therefore acquire a great significance in the for
mation of every specific nationalism. The association between the national
ity of a community and its uniqueness represents the next and last transfor
mation in the meaning of the nation and may be deduced from the zigzag
pattern of semantic (and by implication social) change.
The word nation which, in its conciliar and at the time prevalent mean
ing of an elite, was applied to the population of a specific country (England)
became cognitively associated with the existing (political, territorial, and
ethnic) connotations of a population and a country. While the interpretation
of the latter in terms of the concept nation modified their significance, the
concept nation was also transformed andas it carried over the conno
tations of a population and a country, which were consistent with itcame
to mean a sovereign people. This new meaning replaced that of an elite
initially only in England. As we may judge from Montesquieus definition,
elsewhere the older meaning long remained dominant, but it was, eventu
ally, supplanted.
The word nation, meaning sovereign people, was now applied to
other populations and countries which, like the first nation, naturally had
some political, territorial, and/ or ethnic qualities to distinguish them, and
became associated with such geo-political and ethnic baggage. As a result of
this association, nation changed its meaning once again, coming to sig
nify a unique sovereign people. (These changes are shown in Figure 2.)
The last transformation7may be considered responsible for the conceptual
confusion reigning in the theories of nationalism. The new concept of the
nation in most cases eclipsed the one immediately preceding it, as the latter
Introduction
9
Nat i o * a group
of f orei gner s
Nat i on a communi t y
of opi ni on
Nat i on an el i t e
Nat i on a soverei gn
peopl e
Nat i on a uni que
peopl e
Figure 1 The transformation of the idea of the nation
eclipsed those from which it descended, but, significantly, this did not hap
pen everywhere. Because of the persistence and, as we shall see, in certain
places development and extension of structural conditions responsible for
the evolution of the original, non-particularistic idea of the nation, the two
concepts now coexist.
The term nation applied to both conceals important differences. The
emergence of the more recent concept signified a profound transformation
in the nature of nationalism, and the two concepts under one name reflea
two radically different forms of the phenomenon (which means both two
radically different forms of national identity and consciousness, and two
radically different types of national collectivitiesnations).
Types of Nationalism
The two branches of nationalism are obviously related in a significant way,
but are grounded in different values and develop for different reasons. They
10
N A T I O N A L I S M
also give rise to dissimilar patterns of social behavior, culture, and political
institutions, often conceptualized as expressions of unlike national char
acters.
Perhaps the most important difference concerns the relationship between
nationalism and democracy. The location of sovereignty within the people
and the recognition of the fundamental equality among its various strata,
which constitute the essence of the modern national idea, are at the same
time the basic tenets of democracy. Democracy was born with the sense of
nationality. The two are inherently linked, and neither can be fully under
stood apart from this connection. Nationalism was the form in which de
mocracy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a
butterfly in a cocoon. Originally, nationalism developed as democracy;
where the conditions of such original development persisted, the identity
between the two was maintained. But as nationalism spread in different con
ditions and the emphasis in the idea of the nation moved from the sovereign
character to the uniqueness of the people, the original equivalence between
it and democratic principles was lost. One implication of this, which should
be emphasized, is that democracy may not be exportable. It may be an in
herent predisposition in certain nations (inherent in their very definition as
nationsthaHs, the original national concept), yet entirely alien to others,
and the ability to adopt and develop it in the latter may require a change of
identity.
The emergence of the original (in principle, non-particuiaristic) idea of the
nation as a sovereign people was, evidently, predicated on a transformation
in the character of the relevant population, which suggested the symbolic
elevation of the people and its definition as a political elite, in other
words, on a profound change in structural conditions. The emergence of the
ensuing, particularistic, concept resulted from the application of the original
idea to conditions which did not necessarily undergo such transformation.
It was the other, in the original concept accidental, connotations of people
and country which prompted and made possible such application. In both
instances, the adoption of the idea of the nation implied symbolic elevation
of the populace (and therefore the creation of a new social order, a new
structural reality). But while in the former case the idea was inspired by the
structural context which preceded its formationthe people acting in some
way as a political elite, and actually exercising sovereigntyin the latter
case the sequence of events was the opposite: the importation of the idea of
popular sovereigntyas part and parcel of the idea of the nationinitiated
the transformation in the social and political structure.
As it did so, the nature of sovereignty was inevitably reinterpreted. Hie
observable sovereignty of the people (its nationality) in the former case
could only mean that some individuals, who were of the people, exercised
Introduction 11
sovereignty. The idea of the nation (which implied sovereignty of the people}
acknowledged this experience and rationalized it. The national principle
that emerged was individualistic: sovereignty of the people was the implica
tion of the actual sovereignty of individuals; it was because these individuals
(of the people) actually exercised sovereignty that they were members of a
nation. The theoretical sovereignty of the people in the latter case, by con
trast, was an implication of the peoples uniqueness, its very being a distinct
people, because this was the meaning of the nation, and the nation was, by
definition, sovereign. The national principle was coliectivistic; it reflected
the collective being. Coliectivistic ideologies are inherently authoritarian,
for, when the collectivity is seen in unitary terms, it tends to assume the
character of a collective individual possessed of a single will, and someone
is bound to be its interpreter. The reification of a community introduces (or
preserves) fundamental inequality between those of its few members who
are qualified to interpret the collective will and the many who have no such
qualifications; the select few dictate to the masses who must obey.
These two dissimilar interpretations of popular sovereignty underlie the
basic types of nationalism, which one may classify as individualistic-
libertarian and collectivistic-authoritarian. In addition, nationalism may be
distinguished according to criteria of membership in the national collectiv
ity, which may be either civic, that is, identical with citizenship, or eth
nic. In the former case, nationality is at least in principle open and volun-
taristic; it can and sometimes must be acquired. In the latter, it is believed to
be inherentone can neither acquire it if one does not have it, nor change it
if one does; it has nothing to do with individual will, but constitutes a ge
netic characteristic. Individualistic nationalism cannot be but civic, but civic
nationalism can also be coliectivistic. More often, though, coliectivistic na
tionalism takes on the form of ethnic particularism, while ethnic nation
alism is necessarily coliectivistic. (These concepts are summarized in Fig
ure 3.)
It must be kept in mind, of course, that these are only categories which
serve to pinpoint certain characteristic tendencies within differentspe
cificnationalisms. They should be regarded as models which can be ap
proximated, but are unlikely to be fully realized. In reality, obviously, the
Individualistic-libertarian
Collectivistic-authoritarian
Civic Ethnic
Type I Void
Type II Type III
Figure 3 Types of nationalism
12 N A T I O N A L I S M
most common type is a mixed one. But the compositions of the mixtures
vary significantly enough to justify their classification in these terras and
render it a useful analytical tool.
Distinctiveness of National Identity
Nationalism being defined as a specific conceptual perspective, it is evident
that to understand national identity one must explain how this perspec
tivethe fundamental idea of the nation and its various interpretations
emerged. Clearly, national identity should not be confused with other types
of identity which do not share this perspective, and it cannot be explained
in general terms or in terms which may explain any other type of identity.
This point is worth reiterating, for national identity is frequently equated
with collective identity as such.
Nationalism is not related to membership in ail human communities, but
only in communities defined as nations. National identity is different from
an exclusively religious or a class identity. Nor is it a synonym for an exclu
sively or primarily linguistic or territorial identity, or a political identity of a
certain kind (such, for instance, as an identity derived from being a subject
of a particular dynasty), or even a unique identity, that is, a sense of French
ness, Englishness, or Germanity, all of which are commonly associated with
national identity. Such other identities are discussed in this book only if they
influence the formation of national identity and are as a result essential to
its understanding, which is not always the case. Frequently a unique identity
(the character of which, depending on the source of uniqueness, may be re
ligious or linguistic, territorial or political) exists centuries before the na
tional identity is formed, in no way guaranteeing and anticipating it; such
was the case in France and to a certain extent in Germany. In other cases,
the sense of uniqueness may be articulated simultaneously with the emer
gence of the national identity, as happened in England and, most certainly,
in Russia. I t is even possible, though very unusual, for national identity to
predate the formation of a unique identity; the development of identity in
America followed this course. National identity is not a generic identity; it
is specific. Generating an identity may be a psychological necessity, a given
of human nature. Generating national identity is not. I t is important to keep
this distinction in mind.
In ethnic nationalisms, nationality became a synonym of ethnicity, .
and national identity is often perceived as a reflection or awareness of pos
session of primordial or inherited group characteristics, components of
ethnicity, such as language, customs, territorial affiliation, and physical
type. Such objective ethnicity in itself, however,, does not represent an
identity, not even an ethnic identity. The possession of some sort of eth-
Introduction
13
nic endowment is close to universal, yet the identity of a person born in
England of English parentage and English-speaking may be that of a Chris
tian; the identity of a person born and living in France, speaking French,
unmistakably French in habits and tastes, that of a nobleman; their ethnic
ity" being quite irrelevant to their motives and actions, and seen, if at all
noticed, as purely accidental. An essential characteristic of any identity is
that it is necessarily the view the concerned actor has of himself or herself. It
therefore either exists or does not; it cannot be asleep and then be awak
ened, as some sort of disease. It cannot be presumed on the basis of any
objective characteristics, however closely associated with it in other cases.
Identity is perception. If a particular identity does not mean anything to the
population in question, this population does not have this particular iden
tity.
The ethnicity of a community (its being an ethnic community) pre
supposes the uniformity and antiquity of its origins, as a result of which it
may be viewed as a natural grouping and its characteristics as inherent in
the population. Such inherent characteristics do regularly form the basis of
the groups sense of particularity, or what has been here referred to as its
unique identity. Yet ethnicity does not generate unique identity. It does not,
because of the available ethnic characteristics only some are selected, not
the same ones in every case, and the choice, in addition to the availability or
even salience of the selected qualities, is determined by many other factors.
Moreover, no clear line separates selection from artificial construction. A
language of a part may be imposed on the entire population and declared
native to the latter (or, if no part of a population has a language to speak of,
it may be outright invented). An ancestral territory may be acquired in
conquest, common history fabricated, traditions imagined and projected
into the past. One should add. to this that the unique identity of a commu
nity is not necessarily ethnic, because the community may not see any of the
(allegedly) inherent attributes of the population as the source of its unique-
ness, but may concentrate, for example, as was the case in France, on the
personal attributes of the king or on high, academic, culture. Some popula
tions have no ethnic characteristics at all, though this is very unusual. The
population of the United States of America, the identity of which is unmis
takably national and which undoubtedly possesses a well-developed sense
of uniqueness, is a case in point: it has no ethnic characteristics because
its population is not an ethnic community.
National identity frequently utilized ethnic characteristics (this is obvious
in the case of ethnic nationalisms). Yet it should be emphasized that ethnic
ity in itself is in no way conducive to nationality. Ethnic characteristics
form a certain category of raw material which can be organized and ren
dered meaningful in various ways, thus becoming elements of any number
of identities. National identity, in distinction, provides an organizing prin
14 N A T I O N A L I S M
ciple applicable to different materials to which it then grants meaning, trans
forming them thereby into elements of a specific identity.
The Outline of the Argument
The original modern idea of the nation emerged in sixteenth-century Eng
land, which was the first nation in the world (and the only one, with the
possible exception of Holland, for about two hundred years). The individu
alistic civic nationalism which developed there was inherited by its colonies
in America, and later became characteristic of the United States.
Particularistic nationalism, reflecting the dissociation of the meaning of
the nation as a people extolled as the bearer of sovereignty, the central
object of collective loyalty, and the basis of political solidarity, from that of
an elite, and its fusion with geo-political and/ or ethnic characteristics of
particular populations, did not emerge until the eighteenth century. This
happened on the continent of Europe, whence it started to spread all over
the world. Coliectivistic nationalism appeared first, and almost simulta
neously, in France and Russia, then, close to the end of the eighteenth cen
tury and in the beginning of the nineteenth, in German principalities. While
France, from many points of view, represented an ambivalent case (its na
tionalism was coliectivistic and yet civic), Russia and Germany developed
clear examples of ethnic nationalism.
When nationalism started to spread in the eighteenth century, the emer
gence of new national identities was no longer a result of original creation,
but rather of the importation of an already existing idea. The dominance of
England in eighteenth-century Europe, and then the dominance of the West
in the world, made nationality the canon. As the sphere of influence of the
core Western societies (which defined themselves as nations) expanded, so
cieties belonging or seeking entry to the supra-sodetal system of which the
West was the center had in fact no choice but to become nations.9The devel
opment of national identities thus was essentially an international process,
whose sources in every case but the first lay outside the evolving nation.
At the same time, for several reasons, every nationalism was an indige
nous development. The availability of the concept alone could not have mo
tivated anyone to adopt a foreign model, however successful, and be the
reason for the change of identity and the transformation which such funda
mental change implied. For such a transformation to occur, influential ac
tors must have been willing, or forced, to undergo it. The adoption of na
tional identity must have been, in one way or another, in the interest of the
groups which imported it.10Specifically, it must have been preceded by the
dissatisfaction of these groups with the identity they had previously. A
change of identity presupposed a crisis of identity.
Introduction
15
Such was in fact the case. The dissatisfaction with the traditional identity
reflected a fundamental inconsistency between the definition of social order
it expressed and the experience of the involved actors. This could result from
the upward or downward mobility of whole strata, from the conflation of
social roles (which might imply contradictory expectations from the same
individuals), or from the appearance of new roles which did not fit existing
categories. Whatever the cause of the identity crisis, its structural manifes
tation was in every case the sameanomie. n This might be, but was not
necessarily, the condition of the society at large; it did, however, directly
affect the relevant agents (that is, those who participated in the creation or
importation of national identity). Since the agents were different in diiferent
cases, the anomie was expressed and experienced differently. Very often it
took the form of status-inconsistency, which, depending on its nature, could
be accompanied by a profound sense of insecurity and anxiety.
The specific nature of the change and its effects on the agents in each case
profoundly influenced the character of nationalism in it. The underlying
ideas of nationality were shaped and modified in accordance with the situa
tional constraints of the actors, and with the aspirations, frustrations, and
interests which these constraints generated. This often involved reinterpret
ing them in terms of indigenous traditions which might have existed along
side the dominant system of ideas in which the now rejected traditional
identity was embedded, as well as in terms of the elements of this system of
ideas itself which were not rejected. Such reinterpretation implied incorpo
ration of pre-national modes of thought within the nascent national con
sciousness, which were then carried on in it and reinforced.
The effects of these structural and cultural influences frequently combined
with that of a certain psychological facfor which both necessitated a reinter
pretation of the imported ideas and determined the direction of such reinter
pretation. Every society importing the foreign idea of the nation inevitably
focused on the source of importationan object of imitation by defini
tionand reacted to it. Because the model was superior to the imitator in
the latters own perception (its being a model implied that), and the contact
itself more often than not served to emphasize the latters inferiority, the
reaction commonly assumed the form of ressentiment. A term coined by
Nietzsche and later defined and developed by Max Scheler,12ressentiment
refers to a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and
hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings.
The sociological basis for ressentimentor the structural conditions that
are necessary for the development of this psychological stateis twofold.
The first condition (the structural basis of envy itself) is the fundamental
comparability between the subject and the object of envy, or rather the belief
on the part of the subject in the fundamental equality between them, which
makes them in principle interchangeable. The second condition is the actual
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N A T I O N A L I S M
inequality (perceived as not fundamental) of such dimensions that it rules
out practical achievement of the theoretically existing equality. The presence
of these conditions renders a situation ressentimenl-pronn irrespective of the
temperaments and psychological makeup of the individuals who compose
the relevant population. The effect produced by ressentiment is similar to
that of anomie and to what Furet, discussing Tocquevilles argument re
garding the emphasis on equality Ln pre-revolutionary France, calls the
Tocqueville effect.13In all these cases the creative impulse comes from the
psychologically unbearable inconsistency between several aspects of reality.
The creative power of ressentimentand its sociological importance
consists in that it may eventually lead to the transvaluation of values, that
is, to the transformation of the value scale in a way which denigrates the
originally supreme values, replacing them with notions which are unimpor
tant, external, or indeed bear in the original scale the negative sign. The term
transvaluation of values may be somewhat misleading, because what usu
ally takes place is not a direct reversal of the original hierarchy. Adopting
values directly antithetical to those of another is borrowing with the oppo
site sign. A society with a well-developed institutional structure and a rich
legacy of cultural traditions is not likely to borrow lock, stock, and barrel
from anywhere. However, since the creative process resulting from ressenti
ment is by definition a reaction to the values of others and not to ones own
condition regardless of others, the new system of values that emerges is nec
essarily influenced by the one to which it is a reaction. It is due to this that
philosophies of ressentiment are characterized by the quality of transpar
ency: it is always possible to see behind them the values they disclaim.
Ressentiment felt by the groups that imported the idea of the nation and
articulated the national consciousness of their respective societies usually
resulted in the selection out of their own indigenous traditions of elements
hostile to the original national principle and in their deliberate cultivation.
In certain casesnotably in Russiawhere indigenous cultural resources
were absent or clearly insufficient, ressentiment was the single most impor
tant factor in determining the specific terms in which national identity was
defined. Wherever it existed, it fostered particularistic pride and xenopho
bia, providing emotional nourishment for the nascent national sentiment
and sustaining it whenever it faltered.54
It is possible, then, to distinguish analytically three phases in the forma
tion of specific nationalisms: structural, cultural, and psychological, each
defined by the factor dominant in it. The adoption of a new, national iden
tity is precipitated by a regrouping within or change in the position of influ
ential social groups. This structural change results in the inadequacy of the
traditional definition, or identity, of the involved groupsa crisis of iden
tity, structurally expressed as anomiewhich creates among them an in
centive to search for and, given the availability, adopt a new identity. The
v.
Introduction 17
crisis of identity as such does not explain why the identity which is adopted
is national, but only why there is a predisposition to opt for some new iden
tity. The fact that the identity is national is explained, first of all, by the
availability at the time of a certain type of ideas, in the first case a result of
invention, and in the rest of an importation. (It is this dependence on the
idea of the nation, ultimately irreducible to situational givens and solely at
tributable to the unpredictable ways of human creativity, that makes na
tional identity a matter of historical contingency rather than necessity.) In
addition, national identity is adopted because of its ability to solve the crisis.
The variation in the nature of the crises to which all specific nationalisms
owe their inception explains some of the variation in the nature of different
nationalisms.
The adjustment of the idea of the nation to the situational constraints of
the relevant agents involves its conceptualization in terms of indigenous tra
ditions. This conceptualization further distinguishes every national identity.
Finally, where the emergence of national identity is accompanied by res-
sentiment, the latter leads to the emphasis on the elements, of indigenous
traditionsor the construction of a new system of valueshostile to the
principles of the original nationalism. The matrix of the national identity
and consciousness in such cases evolves out of this transvaluation of values,
the results of which, together with the modifications of the original prin
ciples reflecting the structural and cultural specificity of each setting, are
responsible for the unique, distinct character of any one nationalism.
This bare -bones outline should be regarded as but the skeleton of a very
complex story, which can be observed in such stark nakedness only when
stripped of the resplendent historical flesh that covered it. As I tried to reveal
the skeleton in the bookthrough a careful study of detail and comparison
of different casesI made every effort not to reduce the presentation to an
x-ray picture. As much- as was possible within the confines of one volume, I
tried to allow the reader the opportunity to examine the evidence that led
me to these conclusions, and thus to agree or disagree with them after read
ing the book.
The Nature of the Argument
This work belongs to the long tradition of sociological inquiry which seeks
to understand the nature, and to account for the emergence, of modem so
ciety. Among its founders one finds the founding fathers of the discipline of
sociology. Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Ferdinand Toennies, as well as
such great proto-sociologists as Karl Marx and Alexis de Tocqueville. While
I have been, no doubt, influenced by the ideas of all these great men, it is
Webers thought that I find the most congenial. I adopt Webers definition of
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18
N A T I O N A L I S M
social reality as essentially symbolic, of social action as meaningfully ori
ented action, and share his conviction that the study of meaningful orienta
tions, of the motivations of social actors, constitutes the central subject of
sociology.15In this Weberian orientation my book differs from much of the
current sociological literature on modernity as well as on nationalism,
which is commonly regarded as one of the components of the latter.
The focus of the bookthroughoutis a set of ideas or, rather, several
sub-sets of a set of ideas, at the core of which lies the idea of the nation,
which I believe forms the constitutive element of modernity. In this belief, I
reverse the order of precedence, and therefore of causality, which is usually,
if sometimes tacitly, assumed to exist between national identity and nations,
and nationalism and modernity: namely that national identity is simply the
identity characteristic of nations, while nationalism is a. product or reflec
tion of major components of modernization. Rather than define nationalism
by its modernity, I see modernity as defined by nationalism. The Weberian
idea of the social provides a rationale for this view.56
Social reality is intrinsically cultural; it is necessarily a symbolic reality,
created by the subjective meanings and perceptions of social actors. Every
social order (that is, the overall structure of a society) represents a material
ization, or objectivization, of its image shared by those who participate in
it. I t exists as much in the minds of people as in the outside world, and if it
loses its grip on the minds of a sufficient majority, or of a minority with
sufficient power to impose it on others, it cannot be sustained and is bound
to vanish from the outside world as well. The essentially symbolic character
of social reality has to do with the fundamental biological constitution of
the human species. In general, society appears to be a necessary corollary of
life at the advanced stages of biological evolution. The preservation of a
species requires cooperation of its member organisms (often to the detri
ment of the latter). For animals, nature, in the form of instincts, provides
detailed models for17any ordinary activity; thetr ability to cooperate,
their capacity for integration in general and in particular, is inborn. The
cardinal fact of human existence is that humans lack built-in models for
behavior in groups. Social integration and cooperation are necessary for the
preservation of the human species (as well as of its individual members), but
there is no innate knowledge of how this should be accomplished. The lack
of innate knowledge results in the need for models and blueprints, for an
image of order, or created symbolic order, among human beings. Such sym
bolic ordercultureis the human equivalent of animal instincts, and is an
indispensable condition for the survival of the human species as well as of
individuals. The particular image of social order provided by a culture
forms the constitutive element of any given society. Within the limits set by
the physical and psychological parameters of human nature, symbolic or
ders are widely variable, which explains the variability of human societies.
Introduction
19
The recognition that human society is the social aspect of life of a certain
species, and that to study it one must acknowledge this species specificity,
its baggage of biological disabilities (such as the lack of instincts) and abili
ties (for instance, creativity), implies an emphasis on the cultural, subjective,
meaning- and model-creating symbolic elements in social reality, and makes
consideration of the concepts and ideas in the minds of people necessary for
the interpretation of any social phenomenon. In other words, since men (ge-
nerically speaking) happen to be reasoning beings and their reasoning is im
mediately related to their actions, one must take their reasoning into ac
count and look in it for an explanation of their actions. Of course, this
reasoningthe actors ideas, volitions, motivationsis influenced by their
situational constraints, and through these specific situational constraints is
related to the structural macro-social processes. But we can discover the rel
evant structural factors in any given case only if we first concentrate on the
actorsthe creators and carriers of ideasand ascertain the situational
constraints which have a bearing on their interests and motivations,
I have no argument with the claim that structures are an extremely impor
tant component of every social action and should necessarily be considered
as a part of its explanation: a structural analysis is a central part of my
discussion of nationalism. This view does not imply disregard for structures.
What it implies is methodological individualism and, therefore, rejection of
reification, be it of structures or of ideas. For this reason it is equally op
posed to strict sociological structuralism and to idealism, which are akin in
their tendency to reify concepts. Social structures are relatively stable sys
tems of social relationships and opportunities in which individuals find
themselves and by which they are vitally affected, but over which most of
them have no control and of the exact nature of which they are usually un
aware. The essence of sociological structuralism consists in that struc
tures are reified and seen as objective (that is, ontologically independent
of individualsubjectivevolitions) social forces which act through and
move individuals, who are in turn regarded as their vehicles and representa
tives. The behavior of individuals and their beliefs, in this framework, are
determined by this objective reality and acquire the character of epiphe-
nomena. Idealism regards ideas rather than structures as the moving forces
in history. According to it, ideas beget ideas, and this symbolic generation
accounts for the phenomenon of social change. Like reified structures, ideas
act through and move individuals, seen as vehicles or representatives of clus
ters of ideas. Neither structuralism nor idealism recognizes the signifi
cance of the human agency, in which culture and structure are brought to
gether, in which each of them is every day modified and recreated, and only
bynot throughwhich both are moved and shaped, and given the ability
to exert their influence. Both ideas and social structures are only operation
alized in men. Men (to quote Durkheim this time) are the only active ele
r
i
20
N A T I O N A L I S M
ments of society. 18Neither structural constraints nor ideas can beget other
structural constraints and ideas. What they can do is produce different states
of mind in the individuals within their sphere of influence. These states of
mind are rationalized and, if rationalized creatively, may result in new inter
pretations of reality. These interpretations, in turn, affect structural condi
tions, which then can produce other states of mind at the same time as they
directly affect states of mind, and the infinitely complex process is endlessly
and unpredictably perpetuated. Theories of social reality, whether past or
present, which disregard the human agency can never rise above pure spec
ulation. They belong to metaphysics.
Cultural and structural constraints always interact, and because of the
creative nature of the human agency, they rarely interact in predetermined
ways. In most cases one cannot know in advance which factor plays the role
of a cause and which is an effect in a particular stage of social formation and
change. Social action is determined chiefly by the motivations of the relevant
actors. Motivations are formed by their beliefs and values, and at the same
time are shaped by the structural constraints of the actors, which also affect
the beliefs and values. Social action, determined by motivations, creates
structures. It follows from here that the arrow of causality may point both
ways. Moreover, the very same phenomenon at one phase in its development
may be a result, and at anothera primary factor in the social process.
Oniy on the basis of careful examination of all the available evidence can
one establish with certainty its place in the causal chain.
Nationalism, among other things, connotes a species of identity, in the
psychological sense of the term, denoting self-definition. In this sense, any
identity is a set of ideas, a symbolic construct. It is a particularly powerful
construct, for it defines a persons position in his or her social world. It car
ries within itself expectations from the person and from different classes of
others in the persons surroundings, and thus orients his or her actions. The
least specialized identity, the one with the widest circumference, that is be
lieved to define a persons very essence and guides his or her actions in many
spheres of social existence is, of course, the most powerful. The image of
social order is reflected in it most fully; it represents this image in a micro
cosm. In the course of history peoples essence has been defined by different
identities. In numerous societies religious identity performed this function.
In many others an estate or a caste identity did the same. Such generalized
identity in the modern world is the national identity.
A change of the generalized identity (for example, from religious or estate
to national) presupposes a transformation of the image of the social order.
It may be prompted by independent structural changesthat is, the trans
formation of the order itselfeither as a result of the accumulation of min
ute and imperceptible-in~iso!ation modifications, or of a one-time cataclys
Introduction 21
mic eventa major epidemic or war or, alternatively, a sudden emergence
of great economic opportunities and even the appearance of a particularly
strong-willed ruler with peculiar ideas. (The latter, as we shall see, is not
merely a mad supposition: this was what started Russia on its path toward
nationality.) The change in the image of social order may also reflect a desire
to change an order resistant to change. In neither case does the emergent
image simply mirror the transformations already ongoing: there is always a
discrepancy between the image of reality and reality. "Whether or not in
spired and triggered by them, it represents a blueprint of a new order (a
model) and, by motivating actions of individuals harboring it, causes further
transformations and gradually modifies social structure in accordance with
its tenets.
These assumptionswhich allow for the causal primacy of ideas, with
out denying it to structuresare consistent with the course of historical
events in the case of nationalism. Historically, the emergence of nationalism
predated the development of every significant component of modernization.
In interaction with other factors it helped to shape its economic forces, and
stamped its cultural temper. As for the political organization and culture of
modernity, its formative influence was also the controlling one. It is nation
alism which has made our world, politically, what it isthis cannot be put
strongly enough. Within the complex of national phenomena itself, national
identity preceded the formation of nations. These social structures, a tow
ering presence in the life of every conscious individual (and political collec
tivities which are the peculiar mark of modern society), owe their existence
to the individuals belief in it, and their character to the nature of their ideas.
But the ideas of nationalism, which have forged social structures and suf
fused cultural traditions, were also produced by structural constraints and
inspired by traditions that preceded them. Before nationalism was a cause
of certain social processes, it was an effect of others.
The Structure of the Book
The book is divided into five chapters, each dealing with the development of
national identity and consciousness in one of the societies in the sample. The
chapters are organized chronologically, according to the periods crucial for
the evolution of the respective national identities, which are the sixteenth
century in England, the years between 1715 and 1789 in France, the second
half of the eighteenth century in Russia, the late eighteenth and early nine
teenth centuries in Germany, and the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth cen
tury in the United States of America. The discussion does not focus on these
periods exclusively: the consideration of earlier history (in some cases, such
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22 N A T I O N A L I S M
as France and Germany, centuries) is necessary to understand the nature of
the identity that is formed in these years; and of later events, to appreciate
its effects.
The moments of the emergence of nationalism in general and of its spe
cific types can be located in time with a fair degree of precision. The new
concepts are reflected in changes of vocabulary, which may be gauged from
examination of period dictionaries, legal documents, and literature. Several
sections of the book include such analysis and follow the permutation and
development of the relevant political and cultural discourse from its begin
ning until the time when national consciousness, and the respective nations
(the realization that the societies in question were nations), became, in the
opinion of the participants, established facts and were no longer treated by
them as problematic.
The data which make it possible to pinpoint the time when these specific
nationalisms emerged also allow us to identify the agents, or actual partici
pants, in this transformation. These are, in the first place, the people who
came up with, articulated, and popularized the new concepts. This explains
the central role played in the emergence of national identities by intellec
tuals-by definition, articulators and disseminators of ideaswhether or
not professional and whatever their social origins. Conversely, the role pro
fessional intellectuals of middle-class origin played in the formation of na
tional identity in some societies explains the high status they have since then
enjoyed in them.
The influence, if not status, of groups instrumental in bringing national
ism about was great to begin with; groups lacking influence would not be
able to promulgate the new identity within the rest of society. In some
casesnotably in England, where nationality from the start acquired signif
icance for wide sectors of the populationthe influence of certain groups
during the formative stage was due to their numerical strength. More com
monly, those were elites, social, political, and cultural (the key group in Eng
land, France, and Russia was the aristocracy, and in Germany, the middle-
class intellectuals), and their influence derived from various combinations of
status, power, and wealth, and/ or from their control of the means of com
munication. This book, however, concentrates upon the formation of na
tional identity, not its promulgation, and when it analyzes its spread, it ad
dresses the question of the transfer of the idea of the nation from one society
to another, rather than its penetration from the center of each society into
its periphery. The spread of nationalism in the latter case, an important and
interesting topic in itself, doubtless increased the efficacy of national identity
as a force of social mobilization, but it had no significant impact on the
character of specific nationalisms. The character of every national identity
was defined during the early phase, which is here discussed in detail. Its
effects, in the political, social, and cultural constitution of the respective na~
introduction 23
tions, as well as their historical record, are attributable to this original defi
nition which set the goals for mobilization, not to the nationalization of the
masses. Even with regard to its efficiency, nationalism was a potent force
already before it became a mass phenomenon, -simply because it motivated
the elites who held the reins of power and controlled collective resources.
The cases were chosen for several reasons. One was the undisputed cen
trality of each one of them in modern history. Between them they set the
pattern followed by the rest of the planet, and have presided over its devel
opment. The transformations within them, which are the subject of this
book, have repercussions far beyond their borders. In these five societies
were shaped the destinies of our world.
The national evolution of these societies represents one coherent
though exceedingly complexprocess, rather than five discrete develop
ments. For several centuries they have shared the same social space, each
being a significant other for the rest, each influencing the others self
perception, goals, and policies. Neither Russia nor, clearly, the United States
of America was present in the consciousness of sixteenth-century England,
but the impact of the transformation that occurred in sixteenth-century Eng
land on both Russia and the United States is beyond question. The five na
tionalisms are interconnected and, with the exception of the English, none
can be fully understood in isolation from the others. This interconnected
ness lends substantive unity to the book, which complements its theoretical
unity.
Finally, each one of the five cases has a particular analytical significance,
bearing specifically on one or another aspect of the general argument, and
therefore forming an indispensable element in the theoretical structure of
the book. The significance of the English case is obvious. The birth of the
English nation was not the birth of a nation; it was the birth of the nations,
the birth of nationalism. England is where the process originated; its analy
sis is essential for the understanding of the nature of the original idea of the
nation, the conditions for its development, and its social uses. France offers
the possibility of observing the successive evolution of several unique iden
tities within the same political entity, highlighting the specific nature of na
tional identity. It also demonstrates the possible influences of pre-national
identities on nationalism. Russia is an exemplary case of the formative influ
ence of ressentiment, and therefore of external models, on national identity.
The development of nationalism in Germany focuses attention on the im
portance of indigenous traditions which form a mold for national con
sciousness. All these four cases demonstrate the chronological and causal
primacy of structural conditions^the state of anomiein starting off the
process of the transformation of identity. The American case illustrates the
essential independence of nationality from geo-political and ethnic factors
and underscores its conceptual, or ideological, nature. Since national iden-
24
N A T I O N A L I S M
city is the original identity of the American population, which preceded the
formation of its geo-political and institutional framework, the analysis of
American nationalism does not focus on the conditions of its emergence,
which is unproblematic, but rather on its effects, which can in this case be
observed in an almost pure form. Together, the five cases create a compara-
tive perspective which alone makes the understanding of nationalism pos
sible.
The analysis, in each chapter, is conducted on several levels: those of po
litical vocabulary, of social relations and other structural constraints (specif
ically, those affecting key groups in the formation of national identitythe
importance of a group always being defined as a function of the extent of
actual participation of its members in the articulation and promulgation of
national consciousness), and of general educated sentiment. The aim is to
explain the evolution of a particular set of ideas and to show how they per
meate the attitudes of relevant actors. For this reason, certain periods in the
history of a given society, or certain groups, may be considered several times
from different angles, while periods and groups with no bearing on the
problem, however important otherwise, are omitted from discussion. Simi
larly, I have focused on those regions or sections within each population
whose traditions have left a particularly deep imprint on that populations
national identity. This is the reason for the emphasis on the developments in
Protestant as against Catholic Germany (and specifically on Prussia as
against Austria), or on New England as against other regions in the United
States.
My aim was not to write the histories of the five nationalisms, but to
understand the major forces which have shaped our identities and destinies.
Thus I have focused on the commonalities of the developments in the five
cases and on the significant singularities in each that either could illuminate
the nature of the phenomenon of nationalism in general or helped to deter
mine the course of modern history and lay at the roots of the central features
of modernity. The points that I emphasize include not only the interpreta
tions of the sovereignty of the people and the relationship between the indi
vidual and the community, which influenced the fate of democracy and de
fined its political and social alternatives. The discussion of England, in
addition, contains a section on the symbiotic relationship between the
young English nationalism and science, because of which science was fos
tered and launched to become the mighty power it now is. A large section
addresses the equally intimate connection between German nationalism and
Romanticismthe basis of major political ideologies, such as Marxism, on
the one hand, and National Socialism, on the otherwhich has for two
centuries informed our notions of art and human creativity, made us clamor
for openness and for freedom to develop our creative potentials, and, shap
Introduction
25
ing our views of our personalities, to a large extent shaped our personalities
themselves.
Obviously science, though first institutionalized in England, developed in
other countries as well, and Romanticism, though German in origin, had its
representatives outside Germany. The same holds true for the universalistic
and individualistic liberalism which I see as the central feature of English
and American nationalisms, or, for that matter, anti-Semitism, the discus
sion of which completes the analysis of German nationalism. I treated such
international traditions as singular features of particular nationalisms,
first, if as a result of importation a tradition was not significantly modified
(for example, science) or if the modified tradition (for example, English Ro
manticism), in distinction from the original one, did not profoundly affect
the character of modern society in general; and second, if, while it shaped
and was reflected in the nature of a particular nationalism, a tradition, even
though present, in other cases failed to have such a formative influence. The
same tradition, metaphorically, might be a dominant gene in one case, and a
recessive one in another. I am aware of multiple continuities in every one
of the nationalisms I studied. In each, there were defeated traditions and
roads not taken. I did not focus on them because they were not taken.
This leads me to consider one final point that must be raised in the intro
duction. Do the origins of a nationalism which define its natureestablish
ing certain traditions as dominant and suppressing othersalso completely
shape its social and political expressions? Is the conduct of a nationits
historical recorddetermined by its dominant traditions? The answer to
these questions is no. The dominant traditions create a predisposition for a
certain type of action, and a probability that, in certain conditions, such
action will rake place. Without them this would be impossible; ideas of a
certain kind are a necessary condition for certain kinds of social action.
Knowledge of the nature of a specific nationalism should lead us to expect
from the nation in question certain types of behavior, for there is a devel
oped potentiality for some types and not for others. But society is an open
system, and whether or not the existing potentialities are fully realized de
pends on many factors entirely unrelated to the nature of these potentiali
ties.
The scope and the conception of the work prohibited exhaustive treatment,
and much fascinating detail had to be left out. Yet I tried not to oversimplify
and not to generalize for the sake of generalization. My goal was not to
construct a model of reality that could have been, but to explain the reality
that in fact emerged. I wished my analysis to reflect its complexity, even as I
dissected it, and have sought to retain in my descriptions at least some of the
unique flavor of the different times and societies I was describing. I tried to
r
26
N A T I O N A L I S M
get into the shoes of the heroes of my story to understand what was it like
to live the lives they lived and think what they thought, for without doing so
I would not know how and why their experiences were transformed into
forces which affect our lives. And this necessitated immersion in historical
detail.
I based my interpretation on the testimonies of the participants, left by
them in laws and official proclamations, as well as in the works of literature
or scholarshipTthey produced, their diaries and private correspondence. I
tried to rely chiefly on primary sources, using secondary historical analysis
for orientation where my own knowledge of them was insufficient. This sec
ondary literature sensitized me to documents of which I was unaware, and
through them to certain library shelves which would guide me from then on.
Occasionally I used secondary literature as a source of data, quoting obscure
writers and archival or hard-to-situate materials directly from them. Wher-
ever appropriate, I acknowledged my indebtedness to other scholars.
I was bewildered by the complexity of historical evidence and periodically
discouraged by the sheer quantity of the material. At times 1despaired of
my ability not to sin against and yet make sense of it, and questioned the
feasibility of historical sociology (either as historical or as sociology). As I
struggled, buttressed by piles of dictionaries, to present and interpret my
data in English, I was always acutely conscious that this splendid medium
needed a much better master, and was as often frustrated by my insufficient
familiarity with its resources as I was exhilarated by their evident abun
dance.
Yet I was sustained in my determinationby the firm conviction in the
absolute centrality of nationalism in our experience and the vital impor
tance of its understanding today; by the irresistibly fascinating nature of
social processes; and by the example of people I studied, who created a
whole new world, not simply wrote a book about it. From one of them, the
never discouraged American Sam Patch, a lesser version of Davy Crockett, I
borrowed a motto: Some things can be done as well as others. 19
I hope my readers will bear with me.
C H A P T E R
1 -
God's
Firstborn:
England
A multitude held together by force, though under one and the same head, is not
properly united: nor does such a body make a people. It is the social league, confed
eracy, and mutual consent, founded in some common good or interest, which joins
the members of a community, and makes a People one. Absolute Power annuls the
publick; and where there is no publick, or constitution, there is in reality no mother-
Country, or Nation.
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury
O
n May 16,1532, the English clergy formally acknowledged Henry
VIII as the Supreme Head of the Church, and Sir Thomas More
resigned his post as Lord Chancellor. On July 6,1535, after being
tried for treason, the great scholar and author of Utopia was beheaded, in
sisting to the last on the unity of Christendom. His fate was decided to a
great extent by himself. Sir Thomas More was a Christian: he preferred to
die rather than subscribe to the English king's supremacy in the affairs of the
English Church, and deny the authority of the Pope. The reasons for his
conduct were summarized in a letter to Thomas Cromwellthe chief engi
neer of Englands separation from Romeof March 5, 1534. Sir Thomas
wrote: "I never neither read nor heard anything of such effect. . . that ever
could lead me to .. . deny the primacy [of the Pope] to be provided by God,
which if we did, yet can I nothing . .. perceive any commodity that ever
could come by that denial, for that primacy is at the leastwise instituted by
the corps of Christendom and for a great urgent cause in avoiding of schisms
and corroborate by continual succession more than the space of a thousand
year at the least. . . And therefore sith all Christendom is one corps, I cannot
perceive how any member thereof may without the common assent of the
body depart from the common head.
In April that year More was summoned to swear to the Act of Succession,
and, refusing to conform to the denial of papal supremacy implied in the
oath, was committed to the Tower. There was a sincere attempt to persuade
him to give up his opinion and save himself from the royal wrath and its
consequences, but it failed. Already in the Tower, referring to this attempt
Sir Thomas More wrote again: Then said my Lord of Westminster to me
that howsoever the matter seemed unto my own mind, I had cause to fear
that mine own mind was erroneous when I see the great council of the realm
determine of my mind the contrary, and that therefore I ought to change my
conscience. To that I answered that if there were no mo but myself upon my
side and the whole Parliament upon the other, I would be sore afraid to lean
to mine own mind only against so many. But on the other side, if it so be
that in some things for which I refuse the oath, I have {as I think I have)
upon my part as great a council and a greater too, I am not then bounden to
30
N A T I O N A L I S M
change my conscience and confirm it to the council of one realm, against the
genera! council of Christendom. 1
Sir Thomas More was a Christian; this was his identity, and all his roles,
functions, and commitments that did not derive from it (but were implied,
for example, in being a subject of the king of England) were incidental to it.
The view that one realm could be a source of truth and claim absolute
sovereignty was, to him, absurd. Realms were but artificial, secondary
divisions in the ultimately indivisible body of Christendom. It is significant
that the reason for his conduct, as he himself presented it, was not the sal
vation of his soul. His refusal to accept the kings supremacy was based on
something different from devotion to a dogma. It was based, rather, on his
inability to deny what seemed to him plainly evident. Sir Thomas perspec
tive was that of a pre-nationalist era. He found the position of his judges
incomprehensible. He failed to realize that they were already transformed,
that being Englishmen, for them, was no longer incidental to their alle
giances, as it was for him, but had become the very core of their being.
More than four hundred years later, his trial appears profoundly sym
bolic. Here were the two fundamental worldviews, the pre-nationalist and
the nationalist, pitted against each other. And since these worldviews de
fined mens very identities, no intermediate position was possible between
them; there was a cognitive abyss, a clear break in continuity. The unified
world Sir Thomas More saw through his inner vision was a vanishing
world, and he was a lonely figure among the growing numbers of neophytes
of the new, national, faith.
The radical shift in attitude which was expressed in the application of the
word nation to a people, and which in more than one way signified the
beginning of the modern era, was already under way in the 1530s.2 In
the course of the sixteenth century this shift had affected a substantial seg
ment of the English population, and by 1600, the existence in England of a
national consciousness and identity, and as a result, of a new geo-political
entity, a nation, was a fact. The nation was perceived as a community of free
and equal individuals. This was at its core a Humanist notion, and it was
based on several premises. Among these, the principal premise was the belief
in man as an active, essentially rational being. Reason was the defining char
acteristic of humanity. Its possession, namely the ability to consider and
choose between alternatives, entitled one to decide what was best for oneself
and was the basis for the recognition of the autonomy of the individual con
science and the principle of civic liberty. Moreover, since human beings were
equal in this crucial respect, in principle they had the equal right to partici
pate in collective decisions. The fulfillment of human nature thus implied
political participation, active membership in ones political community, or
what we now understand as citizenship. As a result, patriotismthe civic
virtue of the Renaissance and the zealous service of ones political commu
nitycarae to be seen not only as a virtue, but also as a right.
Gods Firstborn: England 31
The concept of the nation presupposed a sense of respect toward the in
dividual, an emphasis on the dignity of the human being. One was entitled
to nationality (membership in a nation) by right of ones humanity. Essen
tially, the nation was a community of people realizing their nationality; the
association of such a community with particular geo-poiitica! boundaries
was Secondary, The love of nationnational patriotism, or nationalism
in this framework meant first and foremost a principled individualism, a
commitment to ones own and other peoples human rights. And so, while
the exaltation of the nation would everywhere be the exaltation of oneself,
in the English case it was the exaltation of oneself as a human beinga free,
rational individualand therefore, the exaltation of human dignity, hu
manity in general.
The correspondence between the concept of the nation and the reality was
not perfect; a perfect fit is seldom the case. Not all the people of England
were actually included in the nation in this first century of its existence
and many would, for a long time, remain outside it. The faculty of reason,
theoretically a necessary concomirant of humanity, in practice was thought
to be developed unevenly, and as a result not everyone deserved enjoyment
of the rights based on this fundamental endowment to the same extent.
Nevertheless, the commitment to the idea of the nation on the part of the
most active and articulate segment of the English population signified a pro
found change in political culture and could not fail to affect reality and even
tually bring the two into closer alignment.
Reflection of the National Consciousness
in Discourse and Sentiment
Changes in Vocabulary
The evolution of the national consciousness was reflected in the changing
vocabulary. In the period between 1500 and 1650 several crucial concepts
altered their meaning and came into general use. These concepts were
country, commonwealth, empire, and nation. The changes in
meaning were concentrated in the sixteenth century. The four words became
understood as synonyms, acquiring the sense which, with slight alterations,
they retained later, but which differed from their separate meanings before.
They came to mean the sovereign people of England. The meaning of the
word people was, of course, changed accordingly.
None of these crucial words appears in the 1499 edition of Promptorium
Parvulorum (first compiled in 1440).3There is, however, an entry common
people, which is translated as vulgus gineu, and "Emperoure, translated
as impemtor. In the sixteenth-century dictionaries the situation is different.
The word countrythe initial meaning of which, according to Perez Za-
gorin,* was county, that is, the administrative unit and the locality in
I
f :
32 N A T I O N A L I S M
which one resided, and which, he thought, changed toward the Interreg
numappears to have become synonymous with the word nation,' and
acquired the connotation of patria already in the first third of the sixteenth
century. The new meaning coexisted with the older one, but was predomi
nant and evidently more important. Already in Thomas Elyots Latin-
English Dictionary of 1538/ patria is translated as a countraye. This is
also the translation of patria in the 1578 edition of Thomas Coopers Thea-
saurus Linguae Romanae et Britannicae (first published in 1565).6Nationes
refinae is translated there as the countreys where resin [reason?] groweth.
John Riders 1589 analytical dictionary Bibliotheca Scholastica7gives the
following meanings for the word country and related terms: a Countie,
or Shierecomitatus; to do after the countrey fashionto behave in a
rustic way; a countreyregio, natio, orbis; our countrey, or native
soylepatria; a lover of his owne countriePhilopolites; countrie
man, or one of the same countrypatriot, compatriot.
Literary sources, too, attest to the change of sentiment and meaning this
word conveyed. "Who is here so vile that will not love his country? Shake
speare has Brutus ask in Julius Caesar, white Marlowe put the same rhetori
cal question into the mouth of the Governor in Tamburlaine: Villaine, re
spects thou more thy slavish life than honor of thy country?8Country
was one of the most evocative terms of the period, and it is clear from the
context of numerous contemporary writings that in saying my country,
sixteenth-century Englishmen did not mean their county. They meant a
great entity to which they owed supreme allegiance, patria, the nation.
While country was defined as nation, nation was defined as
country. In John Riders dictionary, the entry nation starts: a Nation,
or countrie, while the first meaning of the word people, translated as
populo, is that of a nation. Thus the three concepts are equated. There is
also an entry the common people there, which is translated as plebs.
Somewhat more ambivalently Coopers Thesaurus translates natio as a na
tion, which it then defines as a people hauyng their beginnyng in the coun
trey wheare they dwell. Natio me hominis impulit, vt ei recte putarem,
however, is rendered unambivalently as The mans countrey mooued or
forced me. In Elyots dictionary, although most entries are accompanied
by an explanation, natio is simply rendered: a nation. Apparently, this
translation is seen as unproblematic and does not call for a comment.
Populus is translated as people, while commune people is the transla
tion of plebs.
The equation of a country with a nation, which, in turn, is defined as
people, is significant: among other things, it leads one to reinterpret the sym
bolism of the pre-revolutionary conflict between Court and Country, about
which we shall have more to say later. I f country meant nation, this was
not a conflict between urban and rural subcultures, as was claimed,9but an
Gods Firstborn: England
33
explicitly understood conflict over sovereignty between the monarch and the
people.
Such struggle over sovereignty within a polity could have happened only
if the polity itself was considered sovereign. England, indeed, was already
seen by many Englishmen as such. This, too, was a novel perception, and a
transformation in an important concept, empire,10corresponded to it. In
medieval political thought, empire (impertum) was an attribute of king
ship; it was the essence of being an Imperator. An Impemtor possessed sov
ereign power within his realm in temporal matters. Empire, therefore,
was a term for such sovereign power in temporals. It has been claimed that
this meaning was radically and intentionally changed in the 1533 Act of
Appeals, in which the term empirewas extended to include sovereignty in
spiritual matters and employed to denote a political unit, a self-governing
state free from the authority of any foreign potentates ... a sovereign na
tional state. While everyone agreed that the intention and effect of the Act
was to make the crown the head of the spiritual jurisdiction in an unprece
dented way5which could be justified only on the grounds that the term
empire implied such spiritual authoritysome historians believe that the
evidence that the Act extended the meaning of the term was at best equiv
ocal. n
The wording of the Act, it seems, supports the former view. The Act was
drawn in reaction to the appeal from Catherine of Aragon to Rome. Its in
tention was to render further appeals of this nature illegal, thus withdrawing
spiritual authority over English subjects from the Pope and reserving it to
agents within the realm. The justification for this revolutionary measure was
offered in the preamble, which read: Where by dyvers sundrie old authen-
tike histories and cronicies it is manifestly declared and expressed that this
realme of Englond is an Impire, and so hath ben accepted in the worlde,
governed by oon supreme heede and King,12We cannot rely oh the text
alone, of course, since, obviously, it can be interpreted in a number of ways.
But, whether the term empire did or did not radically alter its meaning at
this particular moment, clearly in the course of the sixteenth century it was
increasingly understood to mean a sovereign (though at first not necessar
ily national] polity.
The fact that in the 1499 Promplorium Parvulorum the term Emper-
oure appears, but empire does not, may possibly be explained thus: it
was indeed understood at the time simply as an attribute, an abstract quality
of being an emperor, namely, in its medieval meaning. Elyots dictionary
does not translate Impertum, but defines it as a solemne commaunde-
mente, a preeminence in gouemaunce, autoritie royal. From this we can
infer that in 1538 empire was not a highly significant concept. Yet, and
this is highly significant, Elyots definition does not limit Impertum to tem
porals. Later dictionaries provide some evidence of the growing currency of
34 N A T I O N A L I S M
the term. Coopers Thesaurus, while it borrows Elyots definition of Imper-
ium in its entirety, adds his own translation: power: dominion: empyre.
John Rider also includes empire, which he too translates, as unproble
matic: Imperium, Dominium.
.As late as 1582 it was still thought advisable to articulate and stress the
new meaning of the conceptostensibly its authentic meaningin a hom
ily published for the benefit of the general public. The homily accused the
Pope in usurping against. . . naturatl Iordes the Emperours, as against all
other Christian kings. It seemed to the author more than maruaile, that
any subjects would . . . hold with unnatural forraigne usurpers against their
owne soueraigne lordes, and naturall countray. The fact that they did so he
explained by their ignorance of Gods word, in which the Bishops of Rome
kept the populace by keeping it under the bayie of an unknowen strange
tongue. By such means they "plucked from the sovereigns their ancient
right of Empire, and concealed from the subjects what it was. If the Em
perours subjects had knowen out of Gods worde their duetie to their
prince, read the homily, they would not haue suffered the Bishop of Rome
to perswade them to forsake their soveraigne lord the Emperour against the
oth of fidelitie . . . Had the Emperours subjects likewise knowen, and beene
of any understanding in Gods worde, would they at other times haue re
belled against their Soueraigne Lorde,. . . onely for that the Bishop of Rome
did beare them in hande, that it was symonie and heresie too, for the Emper
our to give any ecclesiasticall dignities, or promotions of his learned Chap-
Iaines, or other of his learned cleargie, which all Christian Emperours before
him had done without controlementf?] 33In short, the true and original
meaning of empire implied both spiritual and temporal authority; this
true meaning was intentionally concealed from the populace by the Bishops
of Rome, who, keeping the people in ignorance of Gods word, were thus
able to usurp the authority in spirituals, and perverted the concept. A polity
which was an empire, accordingly, in truth was a sovereign polity; in both
temporal and spiritual matters it was self-sustaining, a separate entity in the
sense in which no polity under the spiritual jurisdiction of the common head
of all Christendom could be.
The adoption of this novel meaning of empire, as an independent polity,
which, with only slight alterations, is the meaning inherited by us, was of
crucial importance in the evolution of the first nation. The concept now im
plied that the world was divided along political rather than confessional
lines. The separatist tendency, expressed in this concept, was, incidentally,
supported by the religious developments of the age. However, empire im
plied more than belonging to the true religion and opposing the heretical
one; it implied that within the true religion there were totally independent
separate polities, to whose destinies the lives of the people within them were
tied to a much greater extent and in a much more immediate fashion than to
the destinies of their coreligionists.
Gods Firstborn: England
35
Empire never became an exact synonym of nation. The two terms,
rather, referred to different aspects of the same phenomenon. Empire also
never became quite as current as the other closely related terms, and was
generally less evocative than they. This was, probably, due to the fact that it
retained the connotation of royal sovereignty when the idea itself was losing
popularity.
Commonwealth was another term that came into wide use in this pe
riod. It was the exact translation of res publica, but the Latin term could be
variously interpreted. In England of the period it became a synonym for
society. This is the meaning ascribed to the term in both Elyots and Coop
ers dictionaries, Eiyot translates respublica as a publike weak, and
Cooper, as a common weale; a common state. In 1531, in the Boke
Named the Governout, Eiyot interpreted a publike weale as a well-
governed society. Respublica, he wrote, is a body lyuyng, compacte or
made of sondry astates and degrees of men, whiche is disposed by the ordre
of equite and gouerned by the rule and moderation of reason. M In many
Other important cases, such as Sir Thomas Smiths The Commonwealth of
England, the term was neutral. In this sense of a society, ones society, the
word commonwealth was used interchangeably with the terms country
and nation. This was not, however, its initial meaning in sixteenth-
century discourse; the initial meaning was that of public good or com
mon well-being. Promptorium Parvubrum appears to interpret res publica
even more literally; there it is the translation of the comowne thynge; com-
owne good. Later, in many instances, the manner in which the term was
employed was ambiguous and could be interpreted both as a society and
as public good, as, for example, in The Tree of Commonwealth, 1509, by
one of the first servants of the New Monarchy, Edmund Dudley, where he
spoke of the Commonwealth of this Realm.
It is important to note in this context that the word "state (which, in the
phrase a common state, is offered by Cooper as a translation of respub
lica) in all the early dictionaries has none of the political connotations it will
acquire later.15I t means either status (Cooper explains: the condition or
state of ones life or other thing}or estate, that is, property. This term
does change its meaning toward the end of the century, when it becomes
another near synonym for the nation, but it does not have the same evo
cative power and is not employed with the same frequency as the other con
cepts discussed here.
The Language of Parliamentary Documents
The new concepts infiltrated the language of documents gradually and in
conspicuously; there was nothing revolutionary in their introduction, and
as a result it seemed as if they always had been there, that the realities they
referred to had always been a part of the English constitution, that the Eng-
36 N A T I O N A L I S M
Iish constitution, in other words, had always been the constitution of a na
tion. The Parliament followed, rather than led, the shift of sentiment outside
it and adopted the emerging language of national identity slowly and cau
tiously. Yet, in so doing, it gave it official recognition and the aura of law.
These were still, in a way, only changes in vocabulary, but the vocabulary
was that of the Parliament, and when, at last, it was transformed, this meant
change in reality itself.
In the laws of Henry VII, England is referred to as the realm and, less
frequently, as the land in a manner lacking the emotional overtones this
latter term acquires later. In the Statute of Treason, 1495, the subjects of
this [Kings] realm are reminded that they should when needed participate
in the' defence of [their King] and the land of which the King is the Sover
eign Lord. The monarchs rule, however, is justifiedas in the 1485 Act of
Successionon the grounds that it serves the pleasure of Almighty God,
the wealth, prosperity and surety of this realm of England, and the singular
comfort of all the Kings subjects of the same. 56Here the concept of the
public good and common well-being is used, albeit not under the name of
commonwealth. There is also a constant appeal to and reliance on the
laws of the land. Yet the conception of the polity that comes through the
documents of this reign is that of a realm or kingdom, namely of the estate
of the king, the rest of the population being related to it only as occupants
of the land and the kings subjects, and their stake in it being of a utilitarian
and, in a sense, accidental nature.
Documents of the next reign, too, refer to England as this realm, this
noble realm, as in the Tunnage and Poundage Act of 1510, the Act of Ap
peals of 1533, the Dispensation Act of 1534, and others. Yet the understand
ing of the subjects relation to the land changes. The 1534 Act Annexing
Firstfruits and Tenths to the Crown starts with the following assertion: It
is, and of very duty ought to be, the natural inclination of all good people,
like most faithful, loving and obedient subjects, sincerely and willingly to
desire to provide not only for the publick weal of their native country but
also for the supportation, maintenance, and defence of the royal estate of
their most dread, benign, and gracious Sovereign Lord, upon whom and in
whom dependeth all their joy and wealth. The duty of the subjects to their
sovereign is justified on utilitarian grounds, for, presumably, his well-being
means their well-being. But while this duty calls for a justification, the de
sire to provide for the publick weal of their native country is assumed to be
a natural inclination (to which the duty toward the royal estate indeed is
represented as analogous) and does not have to be justified. Here already the
relationship of the population to the land and the polity is seen as an inner
attachment, and their interest in its preservation and prosperity derives from
a natural love. It cannot be said yet that the notion of the polity as pri
marily the property of a king, in which the others have but a limited stake,
completely disappears. The two views seem to coexist. The Third Succession
Gods Firstborn: England 37
Act of 1543, referring to Henrys belligerent intentions in France, represents
the conflict in purely dynastic, and even personal, terms, as a matter not
directly concerning the population- Our said most dread Sovereign Lord
the King ... intendeth by Gods grace to make-a voyage ... into the realm
of France against his ancient enemy the French King* [emphasis added].
There- is also ambiguity in relation to the notion of the commonwealth."
As in the previous reign the kings authority and actions are invariably jus
tified by their presumed contribution to the common good, and the term
commonwealth is sometimes employed to refer to it. In some cases, how
ever, the meaning of the term becomes ambivalent, and it is unclear whether
it denotes public good or a society. For example, in the Statute of Proc
lamations of 1539 it occurs twice in the following passage: For an unity
and concord to be had amongst the loving and obedient subjects of this
[Kings] realm and other his dominions, and also concerning the advance
ment of his common wealth and good quiet of his people ... it is therefore
thought in manner more than necessary that the Kings Highness of this
realm for the time being, with the advice of his honorable Council, should
make and set forth proclamations for the good and politic order and gover
nance of this his realm of England ... for the defence of his regal dignity
and the advancement of his common wealth and the good quiet of his
people.17
The First Treasons Act of Edward VI in 1547, in distinction, certainly
employs commonwealth" in its novel meaning of a society: such times
at some time cometh in the commonwealth that [the sharper laws are nec
essary]. In other Edwardian documents, the term is still used ambiguously.
For example, the 1550 Act Concerning the Improvement of Commons and
Waste Grounds speaks about statutes... beneficial for the commonwealth
of this Realm of England.18But evidence that this word becomes a near
synonym of realmwhich is still very frequently usedis present. The
realm thus acquires the meaning of a polity which is a collective enter
prise, rather than the kings property, a shift in perception called for by Ed
wards minority.
Documents of Marys reign no more than preserve the discourse in the
state it was left by her brother. There is no further development, but it is
significant that the trend is not reversed. Her rule too is justified by its con
tribution to the common wealth of this realm, and the use of the term
common wealth is at rimes ambiguous.
Under Elizabeth the political discourse underwent a fundamental change
which was clearly reflected in the writings of the period, such as Sir Thomas
Smiths Commonwealth of England or Richard Hookers Laws of Ecclesi
astical Polity. Country was used in the same breath with "God; it evoked
religious sentiments and acquired a significance similar to that of a religious
concept. Hie term nation became increasingly widespread. The word
I
|| 38 N A T I O N A L I S M
commonwealth was commonly used to denote the English (or any other)
polity and society. The vocabulary of the Elizabethan documents, however,
while it certainly was in flux, lagged behind the times. The Parliaments use
of the term commonwealth was still at best ambiguous and at that time
already archaic, as if it deliberately refused to commitor to express its
commitmentto the new concept. When new terms were usedand these
included such important additions as, frequently, state and, rarely, na
tionthey were also used in an uncommitted fashion, not in order to
make a statement, but almost as an unreflective concession to the already
conventional language. The concepts and ideas with which these new terms
in time came to be associated denoted a position in the contest over sover
eignty within a polity. Elizabethan Parliaments, however, were more con
cerned about perceived external threats, and were unwilling to engage in
internal strife. Their language, therefore, while vigorously anti-foreign, dis
played a rather striking, by comparison, lack of determination in relation to
internal political matters.
The word state ss used in most cases as a form of estate." The 1559
Act of Supremacy speaks of restoring to the Crown the ancient Jurisdiction
over the State Ecclesiastical and Spiritual; in the 1571 Treasons Act the
phrase comfort of the whole state and subjects of the realm appears,
while in the 1585 Act for the Surety of the Queens Person the same cliche
has the word estate: the good felicity and comfort of the whole estate of
this realm. In the Lay Subsidy Act of 1601, however, the meaning of the
term is different. It occurs there in a preamble: We your majestys humble,
faithful, and loving subjects being here . . . assembled . . . to consult. .. and
provide . . . for all such means as are or may be necessary to preserve both
you and us from those apparent dangers wherein this State may fall. Here
the term is used to make a stand and is intentionally substituted for king
dom or realm, which represent the polity as the personal property of the
monarch. State here is a synonym of commonwealth; it denotes a de
personalized polity in which her Majestys humble, faithful, and loving
subjects have as much share as she does and therefore the same right of
political decision. The Act, in general, was a display of Parliaments flexing
its muscles; the use of the term state in this context was to show that they
realized what their rights were and were going to stand by them. The word
nation, in distinction, is used in Elizabethan acts in a totally neutral man
ner. For example, the Second Treasons Act of 1571 uses it as one possible
characterization in a description of persons: All and every person or per
sons, of what degree, condition, place, nation, or estate soever they be. 15
This Act chiefly refers to Elizabeths subjects, from which we may infer that
nation here probably meant no more than a family of kin.
With the accession of James, both the tone and the vocabulary of the docu
ments change dramatically. In this reign the Parliament was asserting its
Gods Firstborn: England 39
right to an equal share in the government of the country with remarkable
constancy, and this assertion expressed itself in its insistence on the repre
sentative character of its position, and in its changed perception of the refer
ent of its service. This referent, England, was no longer his Majestys
realm (this term lost its proprietary connotations), but our native coun
try, a commonwealthres publicaand a nation.
This point was made clear as early as in the first, peaceful by comparison
with the ones that were to come, documents of the period. The 1604 Act of
Succession, which was a most joyful and just recognition of the immediate,
lawful, and undoubted succession, Descent, and Right of the Crown, told
James about the great and manifold benefits with which Almighty God
blessed this kingdom and nation by the union of the houses of York and
Lancaster. It also reminded him that in Parliament all the whole body of
this realm, and every particular member thereof, either in person or by rep
resentation (upon their own free elections), are by the laws of this realm
deemed to be personally present.20The 1604 Apology and Satisfaction of
the House of Commons also started with a reminder to the king that the
House of Commons represented the English knights, citizens, and bur
gesses, and after complimenting James on his wisdom, told him, an alien in
the country, that no human wisdom, how great soever, can pierce into the
particularities of the rights and customs of people . . , but by tract of expe
rience and faithful report of such as know them. For this reason, stated the
Commons, we have been constrained, as well in duty to your royal Majesty
whom we serve as to our dear native country for which we serve in this
Parliament to give advice to the king. They advised respect and attention
to the rights and liberties of this realm, which more than anything else
meant recognition of the equal, or perhaps more than equal, share of the
Parliament in the government of the country; justified'the expressions of
their discontent with Jamess behavior by their duty unto your Majesty as
to our country, cities and bouroughs, who sent us hither; and in the end
suggested that his Majesty be pleased to receive public information from
[his] Commons in Parliament as to the civil estate and government, for .. .
the voice of the people, in the things of their knowledge, is said to be as the
voice of God. 21This ending, though somewhat specified, was a dramatic
sign of the Parliaments altered perception of its own status and political
reality. The documents of the end of the reign were full of similar assertions.
Interestingly, the spirit of the changing discourse permeated the kings
speeches in Parliament as well. In the 1607 speech Concerning Union with
Scotland, James referred to England and Scotland as two nations and
represented his desire for the union as an intention only to advance the
greatness of your Empire seated here in England. In the 1610 speech "Con
cerning Regal Power, he again justified his desires by the appeal to the
honor of England, spoke of state of the commonwealth, the ancient
form of this State, and the laws of this Kingdom, and consented that Parlia
40 N A T I O N A L I S M
ment represented the body of the people and was the representative
body of the whole realm.22Even in the 1621 letter to the House of Com
mons, where James expressed his discontent with the House, he wrote, cer
tainly believing that ruling England was the exclusive prerogative of kings:
None therein [House of Commons] shall presume henceforth to meddle
with anything concerning our government or deep matters of the State. In
using this new and depersonalized concept of the polity, James could not
have wanted to emphasize that this was indeed a shared enterprise in which
many parties had stakes, but the view that a country was simply the Crowns
property was already inconceivable, the political reality was not what it
had been before, and new concepts were needed to express ones thoughts
about it.
The parliamentary reinterpretation of political realitywhich was shap
ing it in no less direct and material a manner than any economic or political
revolutionwas only continued under Jamess unfortunate son, Charles I.
Kingdom and commonwealth were used in one breath. Whoever did
something against their, or rather its, presumed good was to be reputed a
betrayer of the liberties of England, and an enemy to the same; the Grand
Remonstrance of 1641 was motivated by the desire to restore and establish
the ancient honor, greatness, and security of this Crown and nation. The
king himself, in the Writ for the Collection of Ship Money, appealed to the
ancient habits of the English nation.15
While the conflict betwix the king and his people was not inevitable,
the assertion of the national character of the polity, after this new perspec
tive had developed uninterrupted for nearly a century and a half, was. The
conflict triggered such assertion; it assumed the character of a civil war and
was reflected in, among other things, the language of the documents of the
Interregnum period. These documents are characterized by an unequivo
cally nationalist position in the interpretation of the polity, which was this
time unambiguously defined as a nation. The word itself was used with ex
traordinary frequency and constancy; it became the main term for Eng
land. The term realm, in contrast, appeared only rarely. The synonyms
of nation were people and commonwealth; the latter, however, was
defined rather more specifically after the abolition of kingship.
The changed tone of official documents became evident immediately. In
1644 the Parliamentary Ordinance Appointing the Committee for Cooper
ation with Scotland spoke of the management of the affairs of both nations
in the common cause, according to the ends expressed in the late Covenant
and treaty between the two nations of England and Scotland (although the
Covenant actually was between the two kingdoms). The Heads of Proposals
in 1647 promised the king that, in case of acceptance and the things here
before proposed being provided, for settling and securing the rights, liber
ties, peace and safety of the kingdomhis Majestys person, his Queen, and
Gods Firstborn: England 41
royal issue, may be restored to a condition of safety, honour and freedom in
this nation.14
Understandably, this language was at its clearest and most vigorous in the
documents of 1649: in the acts Abolishing the-House of Lords, Abolishing
Kingship, Establishing the Commonwealth, and Erecting a High Court of
Justice for the Trial of Charles I. The House of Lords was abolished, accord
ing to the first Act, because it was useless and dangerous to the people of
England. z>The Act Erecting a High Court of Justice for the Trial of Charles
I was similarly justified. The king, it claimed, not content with those many
encroachments which his predecessors had made upon the people in their
rights and freedoms, has had a wicked design totally to subvert the ancient
and fundamental laws and liberties of this nation .. . [and] levied and main
tained a cruel war in the land against the Parliament and Kingdom. There
fore, and for prevention [of any further attempt] to imagine or contrive the
enslaving or destroying of the English nation, it was ordained that he
should be brought to trial. The Act Abolishing Kingship, passed two months
later, stated that it is and has been found by experience that the office of a
King in this nation and Ireland . . . is unnecessary, burdensome, and danger
ous to the liberty, safety, and public interest of the people. It therefore en
acted that the office of a King in this nation shall not henceforth be,
whereas a most happy way [was] made for this nation . . . to return to its
just and ancient right of being governed by its own representatives. The
government, it proceeded to say, was now settled in the way of a Common
wealth. Commonwealth here acquired a new meaning, namely that of
a republican government. There was still confusion between the several
terms which were used as near synonyms of nation. The Act Establishing
the Commonwealth declared that the people of England, and of all domin
ions and territories thereunto belonging, are and shall be, and are hereby
constituted, made, established, and confirmed, to be a Commonwealth and
Free State, and shall from henceforth be governed as a Commonwealth and
Free State by the supreme authority of this nation, the representatives of the
people in Parliament.26While commonwealth clearly meant a repub
lic {in distinction from monarchy), itand the statewere still equated
with the people of England. A people was certainly not a form of govern
ment, and the terms could be equated only because they all implied a new
form of politythe nation.
The conjecture that the vocabulary of the parliamentary documents was
changed consciously, although it was not created by the Parliament, but ex
isted as a part of the general political discourse, is supported by the fact that
the earlier formulations returned with the Restoration. England again be
came a realm (though it was rather clear that it was not the same sort of
realm it had been before), and the crucial word nation, while it did not
altogether disappear, was used inconspicuously, in contexts where it could
42 N A T I O N A L I S M
not convey much. The word is present, however, in its more evocative mean
ing in the secret letter of invitation sent to William and Mary in 1688 and in
the Bill of Rights of 1689, These facts suggest, on the one hand, that those
concerned clearly understood the philosophies the different terms implied,
and, on the other, that the partial return to the older rhetoric signified a
cosmetic rather than fundamental change in discourse: there was no return
to the pre-nationalist conception of polity.
Early Expressions of National Sentiment
It is possible to locate the emergence of national sentiment in England in the
first third of the sixteenth century. This sentiment manifested itself in several
ways. On a popular level there was a strong anti-alien feeling. In 1517 it
found expression in a violent riot against foreign artisans resident in Lon
don, suppressed by Cardinal Wolsey. Foreign artisans represented a signifi
cant portion of Londons population at that time, and Edward Hall claimed
in his Chronicle that their competition barely allowed native Englishmen in
the city to earn a living.27But it was exactly during this period that the influ
ence of foreigners in England was diminishing, and Hall felt that the xeno
phobia of his compatriots was explained by the foreigners contempt for the
English, rather than by exclusively economic factors.
Whether foreigners indeed felt any such contempt is immaterial. What
was new and important was that the English became exceedingly sensitive
and vulnerable to offenses of such nature. This sensitivity was clearly ex
pressed in the writings of the two most prominent of the early English na
tionalists: John Bale and Roger Ascham. Both vehemently defended England
from the alleged slights by foreigners. Bale, in 1544, would not forgive Poly-
dore Vergilthe first systematic English historianwhom he called this
Romish gentleman, the popes collector, for his lack of recognition of the
intellectual riches of England. In Bales opinion, Polydore was polluting
our english Chronicles most shamefully with his Romish lies and other Ital-
ish beggarys. Bale insisted there were most excellent fresh wits in Eng
land and, as he could not think of a more necessary thing to be laboured to
the honour of God, beauty of the realm, erudition of the people, and com
modity of other lands, next to the sacred scriptures of the Bible, than that
work would be, he urged learned Englishmen to set forth the English
Chronxchtes in their right shape.28
I t did not matter whether the offender was dead or alive. Ascham, in his
later book, The Scholemaster, ridiculed Cicero, whose opinion of England,
apparently, was not very flattering, for having such poor judgment. Look
here, master Cicero, he wrote, blessed be God, I say, that sixten hundred
yeare after you were dead and gone it may trewly be sayd, that for silver
there is more cumlie plate in one Citie of England than in four of the proud
Gods Firstborn: England
43
est Cities in all Italie, and take Rome for one of them. And in regard to
learning, beside the knowledge of all learned tonges and liberal! sciences,
even your owne bookes, Cicero, be as well read, and your excellent elo
quence is as well liked and loued, and as trewlie followed in England at this
day, as it is now, or euer was, sence your owne tyme in any place of Italie.13
Both Ascham and Bale constantly compared England to other societies,
ancient and contemporary. Hardly any sphere of life was left out of these
comparisons. The ArtiSlarie of England, wrote Ascham in 1545 in Tosro-
philuSy farre excedeth all other realms. Bale, in the Examinations of Anne
Askew in 1547, compared Anne to Biandina, a martyr of 'the primitive
spring of . . . Christianity, described by Eusebius. He took some pains to
show that Anne Askew resembled Biandina in every aspect of her martyr
dom, the strength and purity of her spirit, and even her physical appearance,
a proof that English martyrs were the equals of any whom Christianity pro
duced.30In Bales writings patriotism and religious zeal were curiously con
fused. In the Chronicle of. . . J ohn Oldecastell he compared Christian mar
tyrs to those which have either died for their natural country, or dangered
their lives for a commonwealth, and thought them equally worthy of eter
nal memory.31Such comparisons, the equation of service to ones natural
country or people with the service of the church, underlined what was com
mon to them, in Bales eyes, and commendable in ones behavior. Those were
heroes deserving of high praise, who sacrificed their lives or comforts for the
collectivity to which they belonged. Martyrdom thus was not a matter of
religion proper; or, rather, religious communities were seen as a variety of
what were increasingly referred to as nations'.
Cultural creativity in this period was almost invariablyand exclu
sivelymotivated by patriotism. There was a Chaucerian revival; William
Thynne collected, edited, and republished Chaucers manuscripts, the first
folio of which appeared in 1532. Toxophilus was written as a token of the
authors love of and duty toward the king and as a sign of his zeal toward
his country. For this reason too it was written for English men . . . in the
Englyshe tongue. Ascham explained: Though to have written it in an
other tonge, had been so the more profitable for my study, and also more
honest for my name, yet I can thinke my labour wel bestowed, yf wt a little
hynderaunce of my profyt and name, maye come any fourtheraunce, to the
pleasure or commoditie, of the gentlemen and yeomen of Englande, for
whose sake I tooke this matter in hande. Thomas Eiyot, in the Proheme to
the Governour, confessed: I nothing esteme so moche in this worlde as
youre royall astate [the book was dedicated to Henry VI I I ].. . and the pub
like weale of my country. The book was written as a result of his consider
ing the duty he ovyed to my natural! contray, whereby Eiyot was vio
lently stered to deuulgate or sette fourth some part of my studie, trustynge
therby tacquite me of my duties to God, to your hyghness, and this my con-
44
N A T I O N A L I S M
tray, Patriotism, in general, was replacing other forms of loyalty. Sir
Thomas Wyatt, a diplomat and one of the first poets of the century,-which
was in England to become a century of great poets, wrote: My King my
Country alone for whom I lyve; and Thomas Starkey, in his Dialogue in
the 1530s, demanded that Cardinal Pole devote his life to the Common
wealth,32
The New Aristocracy, the New Monarchy,
and the Protestant Reformation
The English were not the first to proclaim their commitment to their politi
cal community and not the only ones to do so in the sixteenth century. Nic-
colo Machiaveili, a near contemporary of the first English nationalists, was
more original than they when he declared that he loved Florence more than
his sou!, and it is evident (both from the nature of the concepts themselves
and from the upbringing of their propagandists) that the English borrowed
heavily from the ideas of the Italian Renaissance. But what happened to
these ideas in England failed to happen at the rime elsewhere, Only in Eng
land a remarkable coincidence, a string of circumstances, in whose happen
ing there was nothing inevitable, sustained and advanced them in the course
of a full century. These circumstances ensured the development and internal
ization of these ideas by growing numbers of people in different social
strata, with the effect that by 1600 they were mere ideas no more, but be
came a reality with the power to breed new ideas and transform social struc
tures. The chief among these circumstancesin the order of appearance
rather than importancewere the transformation of the social hierarchy
and the unprecedented increase in social mobility throughout the sixteenth
century; the character and the needs of the successive Tudor reigns; and the
Protestant Reformation.
History rarely provides us with one-time events which constitute a clean
break from the past and to which one can trace the origins of much that
happens afterward. At least some of the important circumstances which en
sured the emergence of English nationalism and the nation, however, can be
said to originate at Bosworth field, with the final battle in the War of the
Roses and the accession of the Tudor dynasty to the English throne. If little
else, this event added the symbolic finishing touch to the dissolution of the
English feudal order (to whose speedy termination the two Henrys subse
quently contributed) and spurred the reorganization of the social pyramid
along different lines.
The assertion of the nationality of the English polity went hand in hand
Gods Firstborn: England 45
with the insistence on the peoples right of participation in the political pro
cess and government through Parliament. In fact, in this case nationhood,
Englands being a nation, actually meant such participation. The represen
tation of the English people as a nation symbolically elevated it to the posi
tion of an elite which had the right and was expected to govern itself, and
equated nationhood with political citizenship. Such symbolic elevation im
plied a thoroughly changed view of social hierarchy and the traditional class
structure.
Literary sources of the period provide abundant evidence of this change,
which specifically was reflected in new attitudes toward both the upper and
the lower strata of society. They were now treated remarkably alike. On the
one hand, English authors demanded respect toward the common people.
George Gascoigne implored the clergy: Pray/for common people, each in
his degree and said: Behold him [ploughman], priests, and though he
stink of sweat/Disdain him not. For shall 1tell you what?/Such clime to
heaven before the shaven crowns.33On the other hand, noble birth, and
descent in general, were rapidly losing their importance.3'' Nobility was now
defined not by family name, but by the individuals personal qualities and
behavior. John Bale, in the Examination of Anne Askew, devoted a subchap
ter to the subject Nobility, whereof it riseth, and in talking of Anne, de
fined it thus: In Lincolnshire she was born of a very ancient and noble
stock, he wrote. But no worthiness in the flesh, neither yet any worldly
nobleness, availeth to God-ward, afore whom is no acceptation of person
... Only is it faith with his true love and fear, which maketh us accept,
noble, and worthy children unto God. Marlowes Tamburlaine declared:
I am a lord for so my deeds shall prove
And yet a shepherd by my parentage.
Barnabe Googe similarly extended the applicability of the term gentle
man;
For if their natures gentell be
Though birth be never so base
Of gentlemen (for mete it is)
they ought have name and place.
Many were more specific and, like George Chapman, believed that learn
ing makes noble. George Puttenham opposed martial barbarity, which
had traditionally been the hallmark of nobility, to laudable science, while
Henry Peacham considered learning an essential part of nobility.35
Remarkable for its completeness in this respect was the view of Sir
Thomas Elyot, which he elaborated in the Boke Named the Govemoier.
Elyot is sometimes regarded as an advocate of a hierarchical social order,34
which he certainly was, and yet his view of the social hierarchy, Expressed in
0.
46
N A T I O N A L I S M
1531, had very little in common with the concept of the feudal social struc
ture. For him, the basis of hierarchy was natural intelligence, which he
called understanding and which, according to him, could be cultivated by
learning. Understanding, he wrote, is the most excellent gyft that man can
receive in his creation, wherby he doth approche most nyghe unto the simi
litude of god; it is therefore congruent, and accordynge that as one excelleth
an other in that influence [quality of understanding], as thereby beinge next
to the similitude of his maker, so shulde the astate of his person be auanced
in degree or place where understandynge may profite: which is also distrib
uted in to sondry uses faculties, and offices, necessary for the iyuing and
gouernance of mankynde . . . they whiche excelle other in this influence of
understandynge . . . such oughte to be set in a more highe place than the
residue . . . that by the beames of theyr excellente witte, shewed throughe
the glasse of auctorite, other of inferior understandynge may be directed to
the way of vercue and commodious iiuynge. Consequently, only that was a
just and reasonable societya publike wealwhere, like as god hath
disposed the saide influence of understandyng, is also appoynted degrees
and places accordynge to the excellencie thereof. Elyot took to task such
persons among the nobility who, without shame, dare affirme, that to a
great gentiiman it is a notable reproche to be well lerned and to be called a
great clerke. Nobility itself was only the prayse and surname of vertue,
of which understanding and learning provided the foundation.37
Learning, indeed, considerably gained in prestige and importance. While
the picture painted by Elyot in 1531 regarding the appreciation, or rather its
lack, of learning in England was rather gloomy, just fifteen years later Roger
Ascham compared the current situation with our fathers tyme [when]
nothing was read, but bookes of fayned chiualrie, wherein a man by redinge,
shuld be led to none other ende, but onely to manslaughter and baudrye,
and noted that there was a significant difference. In our tyme nowe, he
said, euery manne is gyuen to knowe muche rather than to liue wel. It is
dubious that this was an entirely objective statement of fact, for as late as
1622 Peacham wrote his Complete Gentleman with an intention to re
cover young English gentlemen from tyranny of these ignorant times and
from the common education, which is to wear the best clothes, eat, sleep,
drink much, and to know nothing, Yet there certainly was a noticeable shift
of attitudes: learning was becoming an important value and an attribute of
behavior expected of a gentleman; it was replacing other attributes by which
nobility had been defined earlier. Its name was noble, next to the fear of
God it was considered the fountain of all counsel and instruction, and it
fulfilled a crucial function in the nation: Pray for the nources of our noble
realm, Gascoigne told the clergy; I mean the worthy Universities.38
Literature, in this case, only reflected the tendencies clearly evident in re
ality. In the sixteenth century England underwent a profound social trans
Gods Firstborn: England 47
formation. The period was one of unprecedented mobility, which, owing to
a series of circumstances, was sustained uninterruptedly on a very high level
for a solid hundred years or so. The first of these circumstances was the
extinction of the old nobility, the over-mighty subjects of the late middle
ages, 39which was for all intents and purposes complete by 1540. It was in
the interests of the monarchy, which never missed an opportunity to speed
the process with an execution, a confiscation, an attainder, or a combination
of these, and was on the whole due to the determined policies of the Crown.
Simultaneously with the destruction of the old nobility, a stratum destined
to replace it appeared. The newHenricianaristocracy differed from the
one it replaced both in terms of its functional basis and in terms of the social
profile of its members. It was predominantly an official elite. The massive
creation of peers among deserving royal servants did not commence until
1530/ At this time, however, it coincided with the elimination of clergy
from key positions in the administration,41which made the Crown depen
dent on the services of university-trained laymen. The majority of the new
creations42were people of modest birth but remarkable abilities and educa
tion. They were recruited from the minor gentry or even humbler strata. The
aristocracy, in fact, changed its very nature and became open to talent.
While the elimination of the old nobility freed important positions and
made a certain mobility possible, the character of the new aristocracy virtu
ally invited mobility.
The redefinition of nobility in the literature as a status based on merit,
and not on birth, was a simple acknowledgment of this change, the transfer
of authority from one elite to another, which was virtually happening before
ones eyes. A fundamental transformation of this kind, however, required a
rationalization and a justification which were not to be found in the ac
knowledgment. I t is at this juncture, I believe, that nationalism was born.
The idea of the nationof the people as an eliteappealed to the new ar
istocracy, and the slowness with which the Crown before 1529 confirmed its
status by the granting of titles contributed to this appeal. In a way, nation
ality made every Englishman a nobleman, and blue blood was no longer
necessary to achieve or aspire to high positions in society. The new aristoc
racy was a natural aristocracy, an elite of intelligence and virtue, and its
superior position was justified by the service it, being so endowed, could
render the others.
By the lS30s the idea of service to the nation had entered, or at any rate
was entering, the discourse, as was the concept of England as a separate
entity and as a polity which was not simply a royal patrimony, but a com
monwealth. These ideas are clearly present in the sources. It is certain that
they were in part a modification of certain Renaissance ideals: the idiom of
classical patriotism was frequently used for their expression, and the first
spokesmen of the nascent nationalism were all men of new learning. Yet
48 N A T I O N A L I S M
this definitely was not a case of passive importation and acceptance of for
eign ideas. These ideas, which were like souls hovering in a mythological
limbo 43all over Europe, in England found and entered a body. The need of
the new elite for a view of reality that would bolster, rationalize, and lend
legitimacy to their place in it was at least as important as the borrowed
concepts that went into its making.44
Since the idea of the nation was first appreciated by the new aristocracy,
the segment of the population that needed its rationalizing and legitimating
power and found it appealing was constantly growing. The new aristocracy
was bolstered by the wealth expropriated from the Church at the time of the
break from Rome, which was given away for the benefit of the worthy ser
vants of the Crown, or sold at prices much below the value of the property.
In the 1540s, because of the financial needs of the campaign in France, more
of the Church lands were sold and came into increasing numbers of hands.
The majority of the new landlords came from the gentry and more prosper
ous yeomen, and, solidified by the new wealth, helped to create a large stra
tum, the squirarchy, which was to become the main pool of recruits into-the
ruling elite.
In turn, the squirarchy was supplemented by the winners in the process of
the dissolution of the traditional rural society and the reorganization of ag
riculture that was happening at this time. Paternalistic relationships between
the lord and his tenants, and traditional arrangements for the common use
of the land, were giving way to the arrangements and relationships of the
market. Common and waste lands were enclosed and farms engrossed to
allow a more efficient use of the land, and as a result many people were
driven off the land, creating perhaps the gravest social problem of the time
and becoming the object of much of the sixteenth-century welfare legisla
tion, while many others became landless agricultural laborers. For a smaller
but still significant number, however, enclosures opened a new avenue of
upward mobility; these people improved their situations, became prosper
ous tenants and landowners, and gradually filtered into the gentry.45
The gentry thus grew both in numbers and in wealth. Its growth was com
plemented by parallel developments among the professions, especially the
lawyers and later clergy, and the merchants. Lawrence Stone characterized
these parallel developments as the central fact about English social history
between 1540 and 1640, and in consequence of English political history;46
indeed their significance was tremendous, for they amounted to the creation
of what, sociologically, is defined as the middle class. Not only was this stra
tum literally located in the middle of the social pyramid, but it was broad,
heterogeneous, and achievement-oriented. It was itself in constant flux, with
people in it moving up and down, with new people coming into it from
below and others rising from it into the aristocracy.
While entry from below to the gentry was through ownership of land, the
Gods Firstborn: England 49
professions favored the other avenue of mobility, education. Like the trans
fers of landed property, and perhaps even more so, education was a great
equalizer. In schools, universities, and at the Inns of Court, younger sons of
gentry families prepared themselves for the professions alongside sons of
yeomen, merchants, and artisans. All of them intermixed there with young
squires and aristocrats, since the thin upper layers of society were now ex
pected to consist of men of learning. The aristocracy and the gentry of the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries indeed were remarkably well edu
cated, One example of gentry education was provided by the House of
Commons of 1640, which in terms of formal attendance of its members at
an institution of higher learning, from the perspective of the 1970s, was
the best educated in English history before or since. Just how remarkable
this development in England was becomes clear if one remembers that in the
beginning of the sixteenth century, according to Erasmus estimation, there
were five or six (sic!) erudite people in London, and, according to John Le-
land, one slender library.'17
The decline in the importance of descent and the rise in that of learning as
a criterion of nobility caused a general redefinition of the social hierarchy.
Upper-status categories became very broad, binding together people from
what previously would have been very different walks of life. The noble
name of Knight,/ May comprehend, both Duke, Erie, lorde, Knight, Squire,/
Yea gentlemen, and every gentle borne, wrote Gascoigne. Gendemen in
England were becoming good cheap, absorbing people from ever-
widening sectors of the population. Observers noted the blurring of distinc
tions between previously sharply distinguished strata. [Every] mean gentle
man . . . will fare as well as beforetime were wont princes and lords . . . A
mean man will have a house meet for a prince, wrote Starkey as early as
the 1530s. The social structure appeared for a time remarkably open. This
was a period of self-made men, a spirit of adventure characterized the age,
and ambition reigned supreme. No one seemed to be content with his own
station in life, and everybody aspired to a higher status. [The] husbands-
man gapeth after a degree of a yeoman, the yeoman would bee a gentleman,
the Gentleman a knight, the knight a Lorde, the Lorde a Duke, noticed
John Bate in 1589,48and many contemporary biographies testified that as
nothing, apparently, could prevent ones downfall, nothing stood in ones
way to success and high position in life.
The idea of the nation appealed to the constantly growing middle class,
no less than it did to the new aristocracy. It justified the de facto equality
between the two in many areas, as well as the aspirations of the members of
the former stratum for increased participation in the political process and
more power. It made them proud of their station in life whatever it was, for
they were first and foremost Englishmen, and confident in the possibility of
higher achievements, for being Englishmen gave them the right to be what
ST
t"
\- 50 N A T I O N A L I S M
ever they wished. Many, probably most, of the authors who developed and
propagated nationalist ideas in the latter part of the sixteenth century
(1540s on) came from this middle class. Its representatives, too, sat in the
House of Commons. And while the increasing importance of the Parliament
provided yet another proof that they were indeed representatives of a na
tion, their national consciousness led them to demand more power for the
Parliament. The power of the Parliament and national consciousness thus
fed on each other, and in the process both grew stronger.
Nationalism in England rationalized and provided legitimation to what
Tocqueville later, and in a different context, called democracythat is,
the tendency toward equality of condition among different social strata.
And though the word in application to a political regime of government by
the multitude had an odious sound for the advocates and spokesmen of Eng
lish nationhood, who were not at all sympathetic to the idea, political de
mocracy was exactly what the idea of the nation implied and was eventually
destined to lead toward. Yet, in the sixteenth century English nationalism
mostly centered on the figure of the monarchan important symbol of Eng
lands distinctiveness and sovereignty. The Crown, for its part, favored na
tionalism, occasionally bolstered it with official measures which greatly en
hanced its respectability, and in genera! lent it the sort of support it needed
to develop.
The Tudor rulers of England were time and again placed in a position of
dependence on the good will of their subjects. Henry VII won the crown on
a battlefield, and his authority was based on little more than the willingness
of the people to have him as their ruler. He was also dependent on their
purses, which were controlled by the Parliament. Whatever his inclinations,
therefore, he could not play a despot and had to rule constitutionally, that
is, according to the law of the land. He might have done this reluctantly;
it was said that he used to take the advice of common lawyers obliquely,
and no otherwise than to discover how safe his own designs were, and so
with less danger to vary from them. Nevertheless, it is very important that
he did ask for advice and took care to represent his deviations in such a
way that his actions at home had still, if not their ground, yet at least their
pretext from Common Law. He also took care, as we have seen in the offi
cial documents of his reign, to justify his rule by its contribution to the gen
eral welfare of his people.
Though the position of Henry VIII was stronger than that of his predeces
sor, it was also such as to necessitate a constantly deferential stance toward
the people, its representatives, and the Common Law. It is possible that there
was in him, as in his father, a desire to rule as an autocrat, but again, this
desire never became a reality, at least partly for the fortuitous reason that
too much had to be done in too short a time. 49This, above all, included the
Gods Firstborn; England 51
break from Rome. The separation, although it seemed to be precipitated by
events of a personal, accidental nature, reflected the changing mood and
reality within English society. It is generally correct to assert that when
Henry VIII nationalized the faith, he was carrying out the inarticulate wish
of . . . his people desirous to preserve the essentials of their creed, and in a
moment of growing national consciousness, no less anxious for riddance of
the hated vestiges of foreign intervention.50Whether because Henry failed
to realize this, or because he believed that he would gain further by explicitly
representing his great matter as a cause of the commonwealth, he made
the Parliament a party to it and ensured its active involvement in planning
and carrying out the separation. He flattered his wise, sage, politic com
mons,51 and was not unsympathetic to the national sentiment growing
among them. For his own reasons, he actively supported the growth of the
national consciousness. Even those who refuse to view the Act of Appeals as
the moment of the definitive reinterpretation of the term empire admit
that it was indeed Henrys aim and expressed wish to imply in its application
to England that England was a sovereign polity separate from the rest of
Christendom.52Significantly, Henry wanted or, at any rate, felt compelled to
seek proof of this in the English records, and commissioned historians to
look into them. In this way he inaugurated the study of English antiqui
ties and helped to cultivate what was to become a continuous preoccupa
tion of the century and an important factor in the shaping of the national
identity.
It was also under Henry and with his explicit permission that another
factor appeared, the implications of which for both the development and the
nature of English nationalism were enormous. This was the printing of the
English Bible. Henrys attitude toward it, it is true, was at best ambivalent,53
but this is beside the point. The impact of the translation was unprecedented
in its character and extent, and could not be predicted or even imagined
before it was experienced. Similarly to the Reformation itseSf, the printing
of the English Bible tied Henry, or rather England, to the back of a tiger,54
and as in so many other cases, the extraordinary significance of his action
lay entirely in its unintended consequences.
The English Bible, the Bloody Regiment of Queen Mary,
and the Burning Matter of Dignity
The great importance of Henrys break from Rome consisted in that it
opened the doors to Protestantism, perhaps the most significant among the
factors that furthered the development of the English national conscious
ness-55Protestantism facilitated and spurred its growth in several ways, and
52 N A T I O N A L I S M
had a major impact on its nature, although nationalism predated the Refor
mation and most likely contributed to its appeal in England.
To begin with, the Reformation rendered the break from Rome meaning
ful and sanctioned the development of separate identity and pride.56The
Protestant insistence on the priesthood of all believers reinforced the ration
alist individualism in which the idea of the nation in England was grounded.
The major independent contribution of Protestantism to the development of
EngSish nationalism, however, had to do with the fact that it was a religion
of the Book. The centrality in it of the Old Testament was of crucial signifi
cance, since it is there that one found the example of a chosen, godly people,
a people which was an elite and a light to the world because every one of its
members was a party to the covenant with God. This message was not lost
on England, and it is not coincidental that in the years of the great upheaval
that brought Englishmen to assert themselves as a nation in the Puritan Re
bellion, they believed themselves to be the second Israel, constantly return
ing to this metaphor in parliamentary speeches and pamphlets, as well as
sermons. The Old Testament provided them with the language in which they
could express the novel consciousness of nationality, for which no language
had existed before. This language reached all levels of society and was, as a
result, far more important in its influence than the language of Renaissance
patriotism known only to a small elite.
Still, the significance of the Old Testament as the source of the popular
idiom for the expression of the nascent national consciousness should not
be overestimated. While they were borrowing from the Book, Englishmen
were simultaneously modifying it. There are marked differences among ver
sions of the English Bible, but all of them are characterized by a high degree
of independence from their sources. For example, there are no exact equiv
alents of the word nation (especially in its modern sense) in either Biblical
Hebrew or Greek. Yet all the English Bibles use the word. This could be
easily explained irrespective of the growth of national sentiment if the Latin
natio were used in the same contexts in the Vulgate, with which the transla
tors of all English versions were well acquainted and by which some of them
(notably Miles Coverdale) were influenced. But natio is not used in the Vul
gate in the same contexts. The Authorized Version, or King James Bible, is
particularly remarkable in this respect. To begin with, the word nation
appears in it 454 times, as compared with 100 for natio in the Vulgate.
Moreover, in the Vulgate, natio is invariably used in relation to communities
of kin and language; it has a limited ethnic connotation. In distinction, in
the English translation the word nation has multiple meanings, corre
sponding to the usages of the word in other English sources of the period. It
is used to designate a tribe connected by ties of kinship and language, and a
race, but at least as frequently it is employed as a synonym of a people, a
polity, and even a territory. The King James Bible uses nation as the trans
Gods Firstborn: England 53
lation of the Hebrew uma, got, leom, and am, which in most cases are trans
lated as populus in the Latin version, and of the Greek ethnos and genos, to
render which the Vulgate does employ natio but frequently uses other terms,
such as populus and genus or gens. In one case (Isaiah 37.18) the English
Bible translates as nation the Hebrew aretz, which means "land or
country, and which is correctly rendered terra in the Vulgate.S7The mean
ing of nation is often unmistakably political. While the use of the word in
relation to communities of kin and language could come from the Latin
version of the Bible, its consistent application to polities, territory, and
peoples {which makes of these distinct concepts synonyms) is, clearly, a pe
culiarity of the English translation. And wherever the inspiration for it came
from, it did not, could not, come from the sacred text itself. Instead, the Old
Testament lent itself to a nationally inspired interpretation and helped to
provide an idiom for an independently growing phenomenon.
A nationalism sanctioned by religion and a religious creed which had per
ceptible nationalistic overtones made a powerful combination, but it had to
wait for another development to realize its potential. The affinity between
Protestantism and the idea of the nation guaranteed no more than the lack
of religious opposition to nationalism; perhaps a favorable environment
within which nationalism would grow. The role of religion in the develop
ment of English nationalism, however, was much greater than that of a fa
cilitating condition, because it was owing to the Reformation, more than to
any other factor, that nationalism spread as wide as it did in the sixteenth
century, and a whole new stratum was added to those who could find the
idea of the nation appealing.
Protestantism was able to perform this crucial active role in the furthering
of English nationalism because it, to an unprecedented degree, stimulated
literacy. Its effect was in part due to what it made people read, and to at least
an equal extent resulted from the fact that it required them to read at all. It
should not be forgotten that the printed English Bible was a comparatively
late addition to the vernacular translations of the book. The first English
translation of a part of the Bible appeared in 1525, a complete Bible ten
years later, and only in 1538 was a vernacular Bible actually printed in Eng
land. In France, Italy, and Holland, for example, vernacular translations had
existed much earlier;55in Germany the Scriptures were printed as early as
1466, and fourteen different editions of the Bible in German appeared be
tween this date and 1518. Yet nowhere did the availability of the vernacular
Bible have the effect it had in England.
The reasons for the effect of the English Bible were several. It appeared in
the context of the Reformation, for which literacy was essentially a religious
virtue, an ability necessary for the knowledge of God and a requirement of
the true faith. Secular developmentsthe general state of flux in the social
structure in England and the change of attitude toward educationalso
54 N A T I O N A L I S M
promoted the literacy of the lower strata. Literacy was exceptionally wide
spread in sixteenth-century England; only the bottom of the social ladder
remained unaffected.5* The English, therefore, and in contrast to other soci
eties, were not satisfied with the availability of the vernacular Bible, but
actually read it. Most of them were but barely literate, and in the first half
of the sixteenth century the Bible was not simply a book they all read, but
the only book they read. It was the combination of these factorsthe re
markably widespread literacy, its legitimation and sanctioning by the ac
cepted religious creed, and the exceptional position of the Bible in the early,
crucial periodwhich brought about what at first glance may seem to be
the exclusive effect of the Bible.
Reading is a solitary activity. The Bible could be preached to and learned
by collectiviries, but it was read by individuals. Yet it was the Word, the
Book, the revealed truth. And tens of thousands of, for the first time and
barely literate, common individuals were actually able to read it. Moreover,
they were encouraged to do so by learned and powerful men who insisted
on the right and ability of these common individuals to converse with God,
and claimed that this, in fact, was the only way to His Kingdom.60It was
thus that the reading of the Bible planted and nurtured among the common
people in England a novel sense of humanindividualdignity, which was
instantly to become one of their dearest possessions, to be held dearer than
life and jealously protected from infringement. This was a momentous de
velopment. Not only had it awakened thousands of individuals to senti
ments which common people nowhere had experienced before, and gave
them a position from which they were to view their social world in a new
way, but it opened a new, vast terrain to the possible influence of the national
idea and at once immensely broadened the population potentially suscep
tible to its appeal. For the newly acquired sense of dignity made masses of
Englishmen a part of that small circle of new aristocrats and clergymen, the
men of new learning and new religion, who were already enchanted by the
idea of the people as an elite, and of themselves as members of such a people.
The masses, too, would find in their Englishness the right and -guarantee of
the new status Eo which they were elevated by self-respect, and see their
individual destinies as linked to the destiny of the nation. In turn, this con
sciousness of belonging to the English nation, the national consciousness to
which the reading of the Bible made common Englishmen so receptive, re
inforced the effects of reading and further strengthened the sense of dignity
and respect for the individual which resulted from it.
Martyrdom and Exile as Catalysts of "National Consciousness
Hence, when this dignity and respect were infringed upon, as they were
under Mary, they were nothing to toy with, and it was in part because Mary
Gods Firstborn: England 55
tried unadvisedly to infringe upon the dignity and self-respect of masses of
common Englishmen, when these sentiments were already well developed
among them, that her persecution had the effect opposite to the one she
intended and further strengthened the tendencies she desired to fight.
It was her burning of Protestants which made Queen Marys name. Ac
cording to authoritative estimates,61between February 1555 and November
1558, a week before her death, 275 people were convicted of heresy and
executed. In the light of our centurys experiences and tendency to think in
large numbers, Queen Marys regiment does not seem anything so bloody
and terrible as it evidently appeared to her contemporaries. And yet the
burning of 275 Protestants had a much greater impact on the history of
humanity than atrocities incomparably greater in magnitude, including the
Holocaust, which took the lives of more people than in Marys time consti
tuted the population of England,
This impact, again, was due to the combination of factors of which the
burning of Protestants was only one, rather than to its essence; or, in other
words, this again was the combined effect of one particular action and the
historical circumstances within which it took place. For reasons related to
the nature of the groups Marys policies discriminated against, and to no
small extent due to the shortness of her reign, the effect of the persecution
was to ensure a long-term identification between the Protestant and the na
tional causes, which immensely strengthened nationalism and was, perhaps,
the most important contribution of religion to its development.
Marys anti-Protestant policies directly affected two groups. One was a
segment of the new elite: university-educated, well-positioned people, who
either already enjoyed all the advantages the new definition of the aristoc
racy by education and ability made possible, or had reasons to expect to
enjoy them in the near future. These people were removed from their posi
tions by Mary, and their expectations, which they regarded as nothing but
just, were frustrated. They were accused of heresy, in their opinion an intol
erable affront, and made to suffer, which only fortified their sense of recti
tude. A few of the martyrs burnt at the stake and all the exiles came from
this stratum. The other group, which supplied the great majority of the mar
tyrs, consisted of simple men and women, artisans, merchants, housewives,
who read the Bible and claimed to understand it, and who, under the threat
of death, would not agree to relinquish their right to do so. The first group
waged an ideological struggle against the Marian regime, its main tool the
insistence on the interconnection between the Protestant and the national
causes. When Mary died, this group provided the intellectual and official
leadership in the new reign, and would spare no effort to convince the world
at large about this interconnection and make it a fact. The second group,
antagonized by the attitudes of Mary and her bishops toward the English
Bible, indignant and unwilling to yield, found the claim advanced by the
56 N A T I O N A L I S M
elite most appealing and provided a congenial environment for its speedy
entrenchment.
The interests of the two groups, from which the martyrs and the exiles
under Mary were recruited, and which in fact represented no less than the
Protestant elite and rank and file, converged. For both, in their own ways,
the chief issue was the preservation and guarantee of their newly acquired
status, human dignity, and unhindered ability to be and do what they be
lieved they were entitled to. At the level of the common people this issue
could not be expected to be well articulated,- but its centrality was clearly
manifested in the pattern of behavior which led them to martyrdom. It is
astonishing to realize that the reason why these people consciously and
caimly went to a frightful death was their confidence in being able to think
for themselves. They would not concede that as common people and laymen
they were less able to interpret the law of God, to read and understand the
Bible, than some others, and refused to admit any inequality in this funda
mental regard between different groups of individuals. The questions of doc
trine, which at their interrogations they were commanded to answer, meant
nothing to them. They failed to understand their significance and regarded
them as deliberate attempts to trap them. One of them, George Marsh (who
was burned at Chester in April 1555), loth to answer to the question of
transubstantiation, told his questioners that much: these hard questions,
he said, were but means whereby to bring my body into danger of death
and to suck my blood. The purpose of true religion was to ensure the rule
of Gods law in this world, they thought. What was then the justification of
the "Latin service? What are we of the laity the better for it? asked
Roger Holland, a London merchant tailor, when questioned by Bishop Bon
ner. Wherein shall a young man direct his ways but by the Word of God?
and yet you will hide it from us in a tongue unknown. St. Paul had rather in
the church to have five words spoken with understanding, than ten thousand
in an unknown tongue.62
The martyrs were a peculiar sort of people: they were those for whom a
principle was dearer than life. They would not betray the principle, even
when, in addition to life and freedom, they were offered, as was the appren
tice William Hunter, the opportunity to be set up in business, and even
though the bystanders begged them to conform to save themselves. The by
standers, in distinction, were bystanders because they would and did con
form. But as they watched those obstinate men and women, from their own
midst and so very much like themselves, go to their deaths, not as thieves
or as ones that deserved to die,63but as heroes and saints, they could not
but identify with them and sharevicariously and with a much lesser dis
comfort, but nevertheless sharetheir martyrdom. And so 275 bonfires
continued to burn in the hearts of thousands.
The more articulate and learned among the persecuted Protestants also,
V
Gods Firstborn: England 57
though in their case consciously, avoided the controversial doctrinal ques
tions, and emphasized the legitimacy of their belief in England. Their Prot
estantism was not only the manifestation of a true faith, but also the mani
festation of their being Englishmen. The London preachers who, in January
1555, addressed to Marys government a supplication protesting the perse
cution justified themselves as faithful and diligent subjects who had al
ways acted as the taws of God at all times and the statutes of the realm did
then allow. 64The interrogations of the martyrs from the elite group of ed
ucated and, before their fall, powerful peopleamong whom were such
personalities as Bishop Latimer, the first one to speak of the God of Eng
land, and Archbishop Cranmerfocused on the question of supremacy
and on the legitimacy of papal authority, and therefore tied the question of
doctrine to the issue of Englands political independence and national inter
est. These martyrs were few, but the impact of their martyrdom was enor
mous. It was magnified by the elevated position they had previously enjoyed,
as well as by their extraordinary skill and poise in parrying the attacks of
their judges, and the remarkable courage and dignity with which they car
ried their misfortune and faced death, all of which were carefully recorded
and made public knowledge. The message implied in this connection of
Protestant faith with England as a sovereign polity was not forgotten.
The stories of the martyrs were collected and preserved (and were later
popularized) by the exilesthose members of the displaced elite who were
fortunate enough to escape martyrdom themselves and gathered abroad. A
part of the Protestant elite, the exiles were sympathetic to the idea of Eng
land as a sovereign polity, an empire. They also belonged to the stratum
which was the first to advance the idea of the nation, for it served its objec
tive interest. But whatever national sentiment they had had before the exile,
it was strengthened manifold in it:
The exile also led them to emphasize certain previously attenuated impli
cations of national identity. The new Henrician aristocracy (of which the
exiles were members, descendants, or which they expected to enter) was
' originally attracted to the idea of the nation because national identity made
every fellow national a member of an elite and justified their own being the
elite de facto, though they were not entitled to this by birth; and also be
cause it extolled patriotism, or service to the nation, as the highest virtue, of
which they were, obviously, the chief repository. The idea of the nation,
namely the concept of a people of a certain polity as a nation, implied that a
polity was not simply the patrimony of a monarch, but .acommonwealth, a
community and a collective enterprise of many fundamentally equal partic
ipants. The monarch was a member of the nation and received his authority
to rule from it. He could not do to a nation as to his own property, and ruled
not over a territory, but an elite, in the common interest. So long as the
monarch did rule in the common interest, the rest of the nation owed him or
58 N A T I O N A L I S M
her their gratitude and obedience, but if the trust was betrayed, the monarch
was a tyrant, and could be deposed. It would be foolish to press this point
under Henry or Edward; there was no need for this whatsoever. But the
situation changed dramatically under Mary. For Mary England was not a
nation; it was indeed a patrimony which she wished to rule in the interests
of the Roman Catholic Church. The anti-monarchical implications of na
tional identity, thus, had to be articulated to protect the identity itself- The
exiles emphasized the possibility of unlawful rulers and, as a result, in the
tracts they left, nation was for the first time explicitly separated from
the Crown and represented as the central object of loyalty in its own right.
John Poynet, the sometime Bishop of Winchester, who died in exile in 1556,
wrote in one of the most important of these tracts: Men ought to have
more respect to their country than ro their prince, to the commonwealth
than to any one person. For the country and the commonwealth is a degree
above the king. Kings and princes, he added, be they never so great are
but members, and commonwealths may stand well enough and flourish al
beit there be no kings.65
The English exiles were not the only ones who wrote anti-monarchical
tracts at the time, but if they let themselves be influenced by the ideas of
others, it was because the situation they were in made them exceptionally
susceptible to such influences. Their place in Englands changing social
structure, which opened so many possibilities for men of their condition,
made them receptive to Protestantism. They were Protestants and could re
gain the positions they had lost only if England became Protestant again.
Protestantism was possible in England only if it was an empire. And it was
an empire if (or rather since, for they firmly believed that) it was a nation.
Marys government seemed doubly illegitimate since it was anti-national
and anti-Protestant. And the salvation they could hope for was both Protes
tant and national.
It was, therefore, during the short and unhappy reign of Queen Mary and
largely because of her bloody and terrible regiment that the Protestant and
the national causes became firmly associated and even confused. In the next,
half century, indeed, it would be close to impossible to tell one from the
other. And yet, during Marys reign itself the national sentiment evidently
predominated over the religious one in the popular mind. Already at the
time of Henry VIII, the Venetian Ambassador, Michele, had noted in a re
port to his government that the English would be as Zealous followers of
the Mohammedan or Jewish faith if the King professed either or com
manded them to do so. The doctrinal transformations of his and the fol
lowing reigns did not contribute to the religious zeal of the lay population,
but rather undermined what was left of it.w The self-aggrandizing policies
of the Protestant protectorate under Edward led to the association of Prot
estantism with corrupt government, with the result that the devoutly Gath-
Gods Firstborn: England 59
olic Mary was indeed, in some way, placed on the throne by popular elec
tion . 67The majority of her subjects accepted the return to the most holy
Catholic faith with equanimity if not relief, repenting where necessary
without undue inner strife,63and her House of Commons was characterized
as Catholic in sentiment.69While martyrs underwent their martyrdom,
othef Englishmen watched themthey watched them without pleasure, it is
true, but this was due to their sympathy toward and admiration of the mar
tyrs personalities rather than to the belief in the illegitimacy of persecuting
Protestants for heresy. For this reason, there was no popular protest against
the burnings. It is certain that the lack of such protest can in no measure be
attributed to the fear or inability of the population to voice its opinions, for
on another matter they were dearly expressed.
The rebellion led by Wyatt was a direct effect of Marys refusal to comply
with the petition of the House of Commons of November 16, 3553, to
marry within England, and her insistence on marrying King Philip of Spain.
The appeal of the rebel leaders to those they attempted to incite and draw to
their side left little place for doubt as to the nationalistic nature of their
cause. Because you be our friends, said Wyatt, and because you be Eng
lishmen that you will join with us, as we will with you unto death, in this
behalf. Religion was not the cause of his rising, claimed a dose friend
who defended Wyatts actions in the 1590s, and Wyatt himself instructed a
Protestant supporter: You may not so much as name religion, for that will
withdraw from us the hearts of many. I t is clear from this instruction that
he saw religion as a disuniting rather than a unifying force, and, what is
more important, that national loyalty was and could already be expected
irrespective of confessional affiliation. The force of five hundred Londoners
sent against Wyatt deserted to the rebels, revealingly shouting: We are all
Englishmen! The dangerous potential of the nationalist appeal for the re
gime was clearly recognizable. Mary tried to downplay the national issue in
the rebellion and represent it as a heretical religious uprising for which the
matter of the marriage was but a Spanish cloak to cover their pretended
purpose. At the same time she also took care to pacify the populace by
promising to follow Parliaments advice and marry within the country. In
spite of this, as Wyatt marched on London, the population there remained
indecisive, and although the rising was eventually suppressed, Wyatt came
nearer than any other Tudor rebel to toppling a monarch from the
throne."70The evidence that this explicitly nationalistic cause had some ap
peal in that age when a close-to-universal apathy and indifference could be
expected in relation to political matters, and when there existed a wide
spread popular fear of rebellion for whatever reasons, seems far more signif
icant than the fact that this appeal was uneven and that the rebellion proved
unsuccessful. The absence of a religious agenda in it is equally remarkable.
The year, after all, was just 1554.
60
N A T I O N A L I S M
England as Gods Peculiar People, and the Token of His Love-
It so happened that the hopes of Marian exiles were realized rather soon,
when a Protestant princess, Elizabeth, succeeded her sister on the throne.
When the exiles returned to assume the leading positions in the new regime,
they devoted themselves to the purpose of proving the connection between
Englands national existence and the Protestant faith inseparable and mak
ing sure that it indeed remained such. In 1559 the future Bishop of London
John Aylmer took up Latimers astonishing claim that God had nationality.
In a striking passage in A Harborotve of True and Faithful Subjects . . ., he
declared: God is English and called his countrymen to thank Him seven
times a day that they were Englishmen and not Italians, Frenchmen, or
Germans. Not only was England the land of plenty, abounding in beef and
mutton, butter, cheese, and eggs, beer and ale, besides wool, lead, cloth, tin
and leather, but God and his angels fought on her side against her foreign
foes. For you fight not only in the quarrel of your country, he reminded
his compatriots, but also and chieffye in defense of hys true religion, and of
his deare son Christe. 71
The returning exiles did not restrain themselves to mere displays of elo
quence. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Matthew Parker,72sponsored and
actively aided the research and publication of English history and antiquities
which made it evident that Christianity in England always had a distinct
character, for the English Church was the true apostolic Church. In addition
to serving as the editor-in-chief of the Bishops Bible, assembling a valuable
collection of historical documents, manuscripts, and books (which he be
queathed to Corpus Cristi College at Cambridge), and publishing a history
of the original establishment of Christianity in Britain, Parker was the pa
tron of several important chroniclers, among whom was the author of the
Book of Martyrs, John Foxe.
The Book of Martyrs is the popular shorthand name of Foxes monumen
tal work Actes and Monuments of these latter and perilous dayes, touching
matters of the church, wherein ar comprehended and described the great
persecutions and horrible troubles, that have been wrought and practised by
the Romishe Prelates, speciallye in this Realme ofEnglande and Scotlande,
from the yeare of our Lorde a thousand, unto the tyme notue present. Gath
ered and collected according to the true copies and wrytings certificatorie as
wel of the parties them selves that suffered, as also out of the Bishops Regis
ters, which wer the doers thereof'.7i Faithful to its title, the book was the
most comprehensive and masterful circumstantial account of the sufferings
of Marian martyrs, the great men and simple people alike, presented as just
another expression, the most recent and obvious, of Englands loyalty to the
true religion for which it had suffered many times in the past and which it
Gods Firstborn: England
61
on numerous occasions had been called to defend against ungodly foreign
assailants. The message of the book was that England was in covenant with
God, had remained faithful to the true religion in the past, and now was
leading the world in the Reformation, because it was favored in His sight.
Being English in fact implied being a true Christian; the English people was
chosen, separated from others and distinguished by God; the strength and
glory of England was the interest of His Church; and the triumph of Protes
tantism was a national triumph. Such identification of the Reformation with
Englishness led to the definition of the See of Rome as the prime national
enemy, which implied the exclusion of English Catholics from membership
in the nation. Yet this divisive implication was never articulated. However
critical Foxe was of the behavior of his papist compatriots, it was to unite
in the service of the nation that he called his readers in the dedicatory epistle,
striking an unmistakably conciliatory note. They that be in error, he
wrote, let them not disdain to learn . . . No man liveth in that common
wealth where nothing is amiss; but yet because God hath so placed us Eng
lishmen here in one commonwealth, also in one church, as in one ship to
gether; let us not mangle or divide the ship, which being divided perisheth:
but every man serve with diligence and discretion in his order, wherein he is
called. 74
The status of Foxes book, the influence it was allowed to exert on the
minds of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Englishmen, was far above that
of any other work of the age, and comparable only to that of the Bible. It
went through six editions during Foxes lifetime (1554, 1559, 1563, 1570,
1576, and 1583} and was reprinted four times after his death (in 1596,
1620, 1632, andsignificantly1641). In 1570 that full and perfect
history75was by order of the mayor and corporation of London read in
city orphanages and the halls of city companies; and in 1571 it was decreed
by convocation that a copy of it be set for general use, along with the Bible,
in cathedral churches and residences of archbishops, bishops, archdeacons,
deans, and resident canons. In 1577, according to 'William Harrison, every
office [at the royal court had] either a bible, or the bookes of the acts and
monuments of the church of England, or both, besides some histories and
chronicles lieng therein. 76The popularity of the Book of Martyrs was im
mense and its authority indisputable. The famous chieftan Sir Francis
Drake took the book to sea and colored the pictures.77And even the author
of Principal Navigations . . . of the English Nation, Richard Hakluyt, who
in regard to his rather specific subject (to speak the truth) . . . [had] re
ceived more light in some respects than all our own histories could afford
me in this case, thought Foxe to be an exception.7
The argument of the book was the most articulate statement of the iden
tity of the English national and Protestant interests. For a time English reli
62 N A T I O N A L I S M
gion and nationality were one. In a text as authoritative as The Lau/s of
Ecclesiastical Polity, the Anglican apologist Richard Hooker wrote: We
hold, that seeing there is not any man of the Church of England but the same
man is also a member of the Commonwealth; nor any man a member of the
Commonwealth, which is not also of the Church of England; . . . so albeit
properties and actions of one kind do cause the name of a Commonwealth,
qualities and functions of another sort the name of a Church to be given
unto a multitude, yet one and the selfsame multitude may in such sort be
both, and is so with us, that no person appertaining to the one can be denied
to be also of the other. 7SWhat had driven this point home was the example
of recent martyrs, people so much like the rest that one could not help think
ing that, should their lesson be forgotten, their fate could befall the others.
It was Englands religious standing which was the basis of the nations
distinctiveness and uniqueness. Gods favor and divine trust were evident in
everything. There could be apparently no other reason for such expressions
of Englands prosperity as, for example, the victory over the Armada,80or
Elizabeths continuous good health and stable government, which defied the
intrigues of her enemies. Consequently they were interpreted as signs of di
vine intervention. This interpretation found expression in much of the pop
ular literature of the time. Being chosen to be constantly at the focus of
Gods attention, England both had the security of divine support so long as
she was faithful to the covenant, and was sure to be punished the moment
she relaxed. Her national existence was dependent upon her religious zeal.
Roger Cotton put this argument in verse in a work entitled The Armour of
Proofe, brought from the Tower of Dauid.
If this be true, that all Gods trueth we holde,
What neede we then of Spayne to be afrayde?
For God, I say, hath neuer yet such solde
To sworde of foe; but still hath sent them ayde.
The trueth we haue, yet therein walke not wee;
Whereof oftsmes God hisseth for a bee . ..
O Englande, then consider well thy state;
Oft read Gods worde, and let it beare chiefe sway
Within thy hart: or els thou canst not scape
The wrath of God; for he will surely pay .. .
Remember then thy former loue and zeale,
Which thou to God and to his worde didst beare,
And let them now agayne with thee preuale:
And so no force of forrayne shalt thou beare.81
National identity implied a totally new set of boundaries which separated
England from the rest of the world. But at this period the existence of a
separate entity such as a nation was not self-evident. It was problematic and
needed justification and conceptualization in familiar terms. Thus it was
Gods Firstborn: England 63
only natural that at the time of the. centrality of religion in every sphere of
social existence, nascent nationalism was clothed in religious idiom.
Furthermore, because of the association between the Reformation and Eng
lish national identity, Protestantism not only provided the yet voiceless na
tionalism with a language, but also secured it a sanctuary and protection
which it needed in order to mature, in short, though Protestantism cannot
be said to have given birth to the English nation, it did play the crucial role
of a midwife without whom the child might not have been born.
It was also through the association between Protestantism and national
ism that monarchy again became a major factor in the development of na
tional consciousness. The crowning story of the Book of Martyrs was the
story of Elizabeth, who became the symbol of the link and identity between
the Protestant and national causes. Protestantism and nationalism united in
her person. Foxe was not the only one or the first of the returning exiles to
uphold this view, but through his book it was spread among the people.
The extent and the manner of Elizabeths glorification make many of to
days observers of sixteenth-century England uneasy. These observers are
irritated and ashamed by what, in the light of present-day equality, may look
like a language of undignified and repugnant sycophancy.82What they fail
to see is that, eulogizing Elizabeth, the seemingly sycophantic Englishmen
were in fact giving expression to their increasing self-respect. Elizabeth was
a sign of Gods recognition of the nations goodness, of Englands being a
chosen people. The words of John jewel, who wrote, When it pleased God
to send a blessing upon us, He gave us His servant Elizabeth to be our queen,
and to be an instrument of His glory in the sight of the world, might have
been the fullest and finest expression33of this belief. But the argument
was favored by many authors. In the book entitled A Progress of Piety, John
Norden, a minor author of educational and devotional literature for the
common people, and a layman, included the following Jubilant Praise for
her Majestys most Gracious Government, in which he thanked God for
giving England Elizabeth:
Rejoice, O England blest!
Forget thee not to sing:
Sing out her praise, that brought thee rest
From God thy mighty King!
Our God and mighty King
Our comforts hath renewed
Elizabeth, our Queen, did bring
His word with peace endud . ..
She brings it from his hand;
His counsel did decree,
That she, a Hester in this land,
Should set his children free.
64 N A T I O N A L I S M
None ruleth here but she;
Her heavenly guide doth shew
How all things should decreed be
To comfort high and low.
Oh, sing then, high and low!
Give praise unto the King
That made her queen: none but a foe
But will her praises sing.
All praises let us sing
To King of kings above!
Who sent Elizabeth to bring
So sweet a taste of love.84
This poem demonstrates the triple identification of the nation, godliness,
and the queen. God is praised, significantly, for being good to England, to
whom he gave Elizabeth as a sign of recognition and special favor. But nei
ther God nor Elizabeth is praised for His or her own sake! Both the religious
sentiments of Englishmen at the end of the sixteenth century and their de-'
votion to their monarch are unmistakably nationalistic.
John Phillip, in stanzas from A friendly Larum, or faythfull warnynge to
the trueharted subiects of England, appealed to God with the following
request:
Our realme and queen defend, dere God,
With hart and minde I praie;
That by thy aide hir grace may keepe
The papists from their daie.
Hir health, hir wealth, and vital! race,
In mercy longe increase;
And graurst that ciuill warre and strife
In England still may cease.85
God thus was asked to do service to Elizabeth so that she might be able to
serve England.
Elizabeth was perceived as the symbol of Englands chosenness in the eyes
of God. She was the golden pipe, through which great Jove/ Derivd to us
his blessings manifolde:/ She was the token of his tender love. 86And yet, in
retrospect, this godly queen was remembered for peculiarly mundane
achievements, achievements that were political in nature and increased the
this-worldly glory of England. "When Michael Drayton characterized her
reign in Poly-Olbiont this is what he had to say;
Elizabeth, the next, this falling Scepter hent;
Digressing from her Sex, with Man-like government
This Island kept in awe, and did her power extend
Afflicted France to ayde, her owne as to defend;
Gods Firstborn: England
65
Against the Iberian rule, the Flemmings sure defence:
Rude Irelands deadly scourge; who sent her Navies hence
Unto the Either Inde, and so to that shire so greene,
Virginia which we call, of her a virgin Queen:
In Portugal! gainst Spatne, her English ensignes spread;
Took Cales, when from her ayde the bravd Iberia fled.
Most flourishing in State: that all our kings among,
Scarce any ruld so well: but two that reigned so long.57
Like her father, Elizabeth might not have been much of a nationalist her-
self,55but, like him, she found it in her interests to acquiesce to and support
the growing nationai sentiment. Indeed, without any effort on her part, she
performed for it a most valuable service. For nearly half a century the person
of the Virgin Queen was the chief object on which the national sentiment
focused. Elizabeth was the symbol of Englands uniqueness and greatness.
This fact accounted for the remarkable tranquility of a regime which was
judged as fundamentally unstable in retrospective analysis; it made the dom
inant motivation of the periodpatriotismcoterminous with the devo
tion to the reigning monarch and ensured zealous concern for the preserva
tion of her government. The association of the national sentiment with the
person of the queen attenuated and slowed down the development of the
democratic implications of English nationalism; during most of Elizabeths
reign the Parliament chose not to press its demands for equal share in the
government, or at least chose not 0 press them aggressively. At the same
time, this happy harmony and unity of interest between the Crown and the
nation that it now governed, between the old and the new, the support which
the traditional order gave the one that was just emerging, similarly to Prot
estantism, allowed national consciousness to mature and become a widely
shared, legitimate way to look at the world, which at the end of the century
was already a powerful force with its own momentum. It was allowed to
become embedded in the English culture and could no longer be rooted out.
Elizabeths role in this development was that of an official endorsement of
the English national identity, and it was to no small degree because of it that
by the end of the sixteenth century England did in fact possess a full-fledged
nationalism and enter the modern era.
It has been argued against the view that these attitudes signified and pro
moted the development of the English national identity, that the emerging
identity was religious, Protestant, rather than national.89This argument,
however, is based on the misunderstanding of the nature of nationalism and
on a mistaken equation of national identity with ethnicity. English nation
ality at this time certainly was not defined in ethnic terms; it was defined in
terms of religious and political values which converged on the rational
and therefore entitled to liberty and equalityindividual. The dissident
character of the Reformation and the congruence of Protestant theology ac
66 N A T I O N A L I S M
cepted in England with values of rationalist individualism rendered Protes
tantism a perfect ally for the nascent national sentiment. Owing to unique
historical circumstances, especially those of Marys reign, the two; religion
and national sentiment, became identified. The English nation, therefore,
was a Protestant nation. Bat it is essential to realize that it is the noun and
not the adjective which makes all the difference in this case. Protestant or
not, England was a nation. It was a nation because its people was symboli
cally elevated to the position of an elite, and this elevation created a new
type of collectivity and social structure unlike any other, and a novel, at that
time unique, identity.
Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the secular nation was claiming
the loyalty of already great and growing numbers of Englishmen, and reli
gion was increasingly relegated to the periphery. Those who lived in this age
were aware of that, although we must not underestimate the extent to which
it was difficult to separate the issues at the time. Richard Crompton wrote
in 1599: Though we be divided for religion . . . yet I trust that we will
wholly faithfully, and as we are bound . . . join together in this service of
defence of our Prince and countrey against the enemie. Sir Walter Raleigh
appealed to all Englishmen of what religion soever to join him in the war
against Spain, in which, according to another contemporary, people died
with joyful and quiet mind, [having] ended . . . life as [someone] that hath
fought for his [note the order] countrey, Queene, religion and honour. 9(>In
a reader of Elizabethan devotional poetry, to which we have already re
sorted, we find the following dialogue between a Roman Catholic and a
supporter of the Reformed religion, entitled An Answer to a Romish
Rhyme, by j. Rhodes. In it, the Protestant in a popular language, but skill
fully, parries all the doctrinal propositions of his adversary, proving beyond
doubt the superior reasonableness of his own position. Among other hard-
to-dismiss arguments, he says:
Our Bibles teach all truth indeede
Which every Christian ought to reede:
But Papists thereto wiH say nay;
Because their deedes it doth bewray.
Christ, he the twelue apostles sent;
But who gaue you commandement
To winne and gather anywhere?
To bind by othe, to vowe, and sweare
New proselytes to Popery,
Gainst trueth, our prince, and countrey?51
Apparently, it went against common sense that true religion could imply
anything so unparticularistic.
Gods Firstborn: England 67
The Sound of Their Voices
Whether because of the certainty in the Divine election, or because so many
more people were now committed to the idea-of England as a nation, the
national sentiment of Elizabeths reign asserted itself with a vigor and an
ability it had not known before. It was expressed in sermons, which contin
ued, albeit more openly and insistently, the tradition of the Book of Martyrs.
It was also expressed in secular literature in Englisha dramatic new devel
opment, which laid the foundations of the modern English culture. It is com
monplace in contemporary literary history to note the remarkable, indeed
striking in its omnipresence and intensity, nationalism of Elizabethan litera
ture. This nationalism, however, is not surprising. The secular vernacular
literature was the conspicuous expression of the national consciousness and
identity coming of age in England. It was the realization in written form of
the previously formless, new sentiments of the people intoxicated with the
sound of their own voices. 92It was the first, expressive, act of national self-
assertion.
The Elizabethans purported to realize the cultural aspirations of the first
Henrician nationalists. A whole new class of people emerged whose main
preoccupation was to do research and writechronicles, treatises, poems,
novels, and playsin English about England. This class of authors and
scholars drew for recruits on the peerage as well as the common people and
included Englishmen from every walk of life, with the exception of the low
est strata: the urban and rural poor.93
Everything English became an object of attention and nourished a new
feeling of national pride. The Society of Antiquaries was formed. Holinshed,
Warner, Camden, and others wrote general histories of England and histo
ries of specific periods. Playwrightswhose number included Shakespeare
and Marlowedramatized episodes of national history. The first novelists,
such as Nash, Lyly, and Deloney, and such authors as William Harrison and
Sir Thomas Smith focused on English ways of life. Michael Drayton, in
Poly-Olbion, celebrated the land of England and its rivers, an undertaking
to which Spenser too gave some thought. The new feeling of patriotic love
grew into a passion and was expressed in poetry with exuberance and deep
lyricism heretofore reserved for the sphere of intimate personal relations,
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England,. . . this land of such
dear souls, this dear-dear land94was extolled on all levels, inspiring the
creation of many an exquisite work of art, as well as literary efforts of lesser
aesthetic, but solid documentary, value.
The efflorescence of cultural creativity experienced in England in the six
teenth and early seventeenth centuries was quite unprecedented and sudden,
as those who contributed to it were fully aware. Before their time there was
68
N A T I O N A L I S M
little to speak of in the manner of English Setters. Numerous literary surveys
written by sixteenth-century pioneers acknowledged this. The first of our
English Poets that 1haue heard of, wrote William Webfae in 1586, was
lohn Gower . . . Chawcer was next after if not equall in time to Gower . . .
[then] Lydgate . . . Since these I knowe none other tyll the time of Skelton
who writ in the time of kyng Henry VIH. 91
Yet, discouraged they were not. They were the founders of the national
culture, and their awareness of this lofty role bolstered their sense of self-
importance. We Beginners, wrote Gabriel Harvey in a letter to Spenser,
haue the start and advantage of our Followers, who are to frame and con-
forme both their Examples and Precepts, according to that President which
they haue of vs; as no doubt Homer or some other in Greek, and Ennius or
I know not who else in Latine, did prejudice, and overrule those, that fol
lowed them 9(1In addition to this, the culture they were creating showed
clear signs of superiority and was destined to become the greatest. This the
sixteenth-century men of letters in England believed and never grew tired of
repeating. In navigation, in searching the most opposite corners and quar
ters of the world, and, to speak plainly, in compassing the vast globe of the
earth more than once, the English, thought Richard Hakluyt in 1589,
have excelled all the nations and peoples of die earth. Sir "Walter Raleigh
claimed that the English were much more humane than the Spaniards; Wil
liam Harrison, that the English dergy were considered the most educated.
Somewhat later, Henry Peacham, in The Complete Gentleman, defended
English composers, who, he stated, were inferior to none in the world (how
much soever the Italian attributes to himself) for depth of skill and richness
of conceit. He also believed that the same could be said about English em
blems. n
But most praise in the sixteenth century was showered on the English au
thors. The most was made of Chaucer, whom his grateful compatriots called
our father Chaucer, our worthy Chaucer, Noble Chaucer. The three
old mastersamong whom Chaucer was the most famous and revered
were the English equivalent of the great masters of antiquity. As Greece
had three poets of great antiquity, wrote Francis Meres in the 1598 Com
parative Discourse of Our English Poets with the Greek, Latin, and Italian
Poets, Orpheus, Linus, and Musaeus, and Italy other three ancient poets,
Liuius Andronicus, Ennius, and Plautus, so hath England three auncient
poets, Chaucer, Gower, and Lydgate." To the English Italians who talked
of Petrarche, Tasso, Celiano, with an infinite number of others, Thomas
Nash would oppose Chaucer, Lydgate, and Gower. One thing I am sure
of, he wrote, that each of these three haue vaunted their meters with as
much admiration in English as euer the proudest Ariosto did his verse in
Italian. Sir Philip Sidney drew a similar parallel: So among the Romans
were Liuius, [sic] Andronicus, and Ennius. So in the Italian language the first
Gods Firstborn: England 69
that made it aspire to be a Treasure-house of Science were the Poets Dante,
Boccace, and Petrarch. So in our English were Gower and Chawcer.93
Contemporary authors were celebrated with as much enthusiasm. There
is no end to referenceswhich were self-references in some wayto the
"quick-witted Sir Thomas More, our countryman, the miracle of our age
Sir Philip Sidney, our famous English poet Spenserdiuine Master
Spenser, the miracle of wit, whom Thomas Nash would have brandie line
for line for [his own] life in the honor of England,' gainst Spain, France,
Italie, and all the worlde, "our English HomerWarner, and honey-
tongd Shakespeare, whose fine-filled phraze would muses choose to
speak if they would speak English."
The English language itself was an object of passionate devotion. It was
loved as our mother tongue, but it was cultivated for what it could con
tribute to the nations standingas our best glory. There was nothing that
could nor be achieved or expressed by so copious and fluent a language as
oure English tongue is. Some claimed that it was equal in everything to the
other famous and chief languages, namely Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Syriac,
Arabic, Italian, Spanish, and French. Michael Drayton, in a poem from Eng
lands Heroic Epistles, 1598, wrote:
Though to the Thuscans I the smoothness grant
Our dialect no majesty doth want
To set thy praises in as high a key
As France, or Spain, or Germany, or they.'"
By the majority, however, English was judged as a language far superior
to any other. The consummate expression of this attitude was Richard Car-
ews Epistle on the Excellency of the English Tongue {159596). Carew
wrote this epistle seekinge out with what Commendations I may attire our
english language, as Stephanus hath done for the French and diuers others
for theirs. Such commendations, he found, were several. It was richer than
other tongues, for it had borrowed from several of them: Seeing then wee
borowe (and that not shamfully) from the Dutch, the Breton, the Romaine,
the Dane, the French, Italyan, and Spanyard, how cann our stocke bee other
then exceeding plentiful? And while Carew gave all other languages their
due, or so he thought, he found that English was also sweeter than the
others:
The Italyan is pleasante but without synewes, as to stiliye fleeting water; the
French delicate but ouer nice, as a woman scarce daring to open her lipps for
feare of marring her countenaunce; the Spanish maiesficall, but fulesome, run
ning too much on the O, and terrible like the deuill in a playe; the Dutch man
like, but withall very hoarse, as one ready at every worde to picke a quareli
Now wee in borrowing from them geue the strength of Consonantesto the
Italyan, the full sounde of wordes to the French, the varietye of terminacions to
70
N A T I O N A L I S M
the Spanish, and the mollifieinge of more vowells to the Dutch; and soe (like
bees) gather the honye of their good properties and leave the dreggs to them
selves. And thus, when substantiates combyneth wirh delightfullness, full
ness with fynes, seemlynes with portiynes, and courantnes with staydnes, howe
canne the languadge which consisteth of all these sounde other then most full
of sweetnes?10'
Such a magnificent language could not but be destined to play a great role in
the culture of the world. Samuel Daniel evinced this prophetic vision
shared by manyin his Musophilm:
And who, in time, knows whither we may vent
The treasure of our tongue, to what strange shores
This gaine of our best glory shall be sent
Tinrich vnknowing Nations with our stores?
What worlds in thyet vnformed Occident
May come refind with thaccents that are ours?10-
Princes, nobility, the country, and mankind in general were considered
beholden to the men of letters for the service they performed. Elizabeth,
Spensers Faerie Queene, thought Francis Meres, hath the advantage of all
the queens in the world to be eternalized by so diuine a poet. Ascham was
certain that the learning of Sir Thomas Eiyot in all kynde of knowlege
bringeth much worship to all the nobilicie of England. Ben Jonson ex
pressed his admiration of Camden in the following words:
Camden, most reverend head . . .
to whom my country owes
The great renown and name wherewith she goes.
And Peacham, referring to Sir Robert Cotton, declared that not only Brit
ain, but Europe herself is obliged to his industry, cost, and care in collection
of so many rare [British] manuscripts and other monuments of valuable an
tiquity. 103
"While it gave vent to the sentiments of individual dignity and national
pride accumulated over the previous decades, this literature further devel
oped and spread them. It gave form to and thus established a whole new
dimension of experience; like religion earlier, it offered a language through
which national sentiment could express itself, but in this case, it was nation
alisms own language, no less evocative than, but distinct from religion. It
thus was another, perhaps the last, among the long string of developments
which collectively led to the firm entrenchment of modern, full-fledged, ma
ture nationalism in England already at the end of the sixteenth century. Since
then a major {if not the major) factor in every significant development in
English history was this nationalism itself.
Gods Firstborn: England 71
The Changing Position of the Crown and Religion
in the National Consciousness
In the seventeenth century the supremacy of nationality was manifested in
several ways, some of which, though true to the spirit of Elizabethan nation
alism," differed from the manner in which it was usually expressed. Circum
stances of the early Stuart reigns caused the dissociation between national
and monarchical sentiments. The social and political transformations of the
previous age resulted in a steady and dramatic increase in the actual wealth
and power of the groups represented in Parliament, of which they were
keenly aware. These groups were the vanguard of nationalism, and their
national consciousness grew in proportion to this awareness. The intransi
gence of the Stuarts, who had the misfortune to succeed Elizabeth, and the
stupidity to insist on the divine right of kings, was an intolerable affront to
them. They felt entitled to a greater share in the government of their country
and more respect, and received less than they were accustomed to. The pol
icies of James and Charles, and their inability to realize the implications of
Englands definition as a nation, seemed to threaten the very existence of
Englishmen as Englishmen, their being what they believed they were, and
contradicted the peoples very identity. These policies interfered with the lib
erty of being English, of realizing ones membership in a nation, and thus
were perceived as an assault on English liberties. It was this inability to be
English in England that forced some sixty thousand people to Leave the
country during this period. Twenty of these sixty thousand went to North
America, a momentous move whose significance was not to be appreciated
until two centuries later.w
In a way, the early Stuarts repeated the mistake of Queen Marys reign.
They offended a significant segment of the population in its national con
sciousness, the consciousness that elevated masses o Englishmen to the po
sition of an elite and gave to each one among them that sweet feeling of
dignity which, since they had known it for but a short time, had not yet lost
for them any of its taste. The reaction to this offense was, as it was under
Mary, the accentuation of the anti-monarchical implications of the national
idea and the reinterpretation of the nation as the only source of authority.
The groups that had by this time acquired national identity stilland
deeplyfelt loyalty toward a political entity of which they were a part, but
the king was no more the focus of this loyalty. The very existence of a mon
arch was rendered superfluous and menacing. The democratic and libertar
ian connotations of nationality were strengthened.
The policies of the Stuarts offended the specifically religious sentiments of
the people as well, which was almost unavoidable since the nation whose
nationality they failed to appreciate was at that time a Protestant nation.
The protest against these policies, similarly to the opposition to Marian gov
72 N A T I O N A L I S M
ernment, was therefore entangled with the religious protest and used the
available idiom of the Protestant religious opposition, the Puritans. Puritan
ism was an Elizabethan development. The immediate reason for the emer
gence of the movement was probably the shortage of prestigious positions
for the clergy combined with the rapidly growing numbers of university-
trained, sophisticated people prepared and able to fill them.105The Puritan
state of mind, however, was but a logical development of the national con
sciousness which was growing stronger each day and outgrowing the com
placently monarchical clothes that had served it so well in the early years.
While Elizabeths accession led the returning exiles to downplay the re
publican implications of the national definition of the English polity, these
implications were not forgotten. Hooker, in The Laws of Ecclesiastical Pol
ity: wrote that where the King hath power of dominion . . . there no foreign
state, or potentate, no state or potentate domestical, whether it consist of
one or of many, can possibly have. . . authority higher than the King. On
the other side, he added, the King alone hath no power to do without
consent of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament: the King of
himself cannot change the nature of pleas, nor courts . . . because the law is
a bar unto him. By the end-of the century the parliamentary classes were
powerful and conscious of their power. Sir Thomas Smith wrote in De Re-
publica Anglorum {1589) that the most high and absolute power of the
Realm of England consists in the Parliament. . . The Parliament abrogates
old laws, makes new .. . changes rights, and possessions of private men .. .
establishes forms of religion . . . gives forms of succession to the Crown . . .
For every Englishman is intended to be there present, either in person or by
procuration of attorneys of what prominence, state, dignity, or quality
soever he be, from the prince to the lowest person in England. 106This was
not just a statement of desiderata, but a fairly accurate description of the
current state of affairs. It was because of this that after the greatest parlia
mentary controversy of her reignthe debate on monopolies of 1601the
defeated Elizabeth found it appropriate to thank the Commons for saving
her from error, adding that the State was to be governed for the benefit of
the people and not those to whom it is committed, and appealed to the
loves of her subjects.107
This fundamentally republican position was widely shared as an implicit
understanding, but it took a religious faction to advocate its actual imple
mentation within the social order. At first, this religious faction, which came
to be recognized by the odious name of Puritans, 108demanded a reform
only of the Church according to the allegedly Scriptural model. Puritans
attacked the bishops, insisted on the right and ability of every one to read
and interpret the Bible, and agitated for a presbyterian Church government.
Yet their adversaries were right in pointing out that Puritanisip opened wide
the gates for the reform of society in general, and implied nothing less
Gods Firstborn: England 73
than the destruction of the established order. In the words of Thomas Cart
wright, the leader of the faction, Archbishop Whitgift read the overthrow
of the Princes authority in ecclesiastical and civil matters, Bishop Aylmer
saw in Puritanism the basis for the greater boldness of the meaner sort, 109
and King James I summarized it all in his proverbial no Bishop, no King.
Lawrence Stone has justly defined Puritanism as no more than the general
ized conviction of the need for independent judgment based on conscience
and Bible reading. 110The Puritans were passionate nationalists, and Puri
tanism appealed to different and wide circles; that is why the great social
and political upheaval of the mid-seventeenth century bore the name of the
Puritan Rebellion. This, of course, does not at all contradict the fact that the
original Puritans were, probably, deeply religious people. It is as probable,
though, that their supporters and the members of the opposition to the
Stuarts, who were indiscriminately called and identified as Puritans later,
were not.111But whether or not it was at its core a religious development,
Puritanism was immensely helped by its self-presentation as a religious
movement. Religion still was the most convincing means for justifying social
change of the unprecedented magnitude which was implicit in the definition
of England as a nation. It helped to believe that whatever new reform was
pending, it was demanded by God and derived directly from the role of Eng
land in the religious struggle between the forces of light and darkness. In
November 1640, the Puritan preachers summoned by the Parliament urged
Englishmen to revolt in fulfillment of their religious responsibility. But by
this time the primacy of the political, national concerns over the religious
ones was becoming increasingly evident.
The issue of the revolution, thought Hobbes, was not religion, but that
liberty which the lower sort of citizens under the pretence of religion, do
challenge to themselves. n2 And it was no longer religion, but the national
idea based on the liberty of the rational individuai, which united people. The
switch in the relative centrality of the specifically religious and secular na
tional loyalties had been reflected already earlier in the pliabilityquite ex
traordinary in the sixteenth centuryof the English population during the
numerous changes of faith to which they had been subjected by the turbu
lent history of the period. And amidst the heated public controversy, in the
very years preceding the Puritan Rebellion, the general attitude was that it
is safest to do in religion as most do. 113
This is not the place to engage in a detailed discussion of the causes, pre
conditions, and course of the Revolution, all of which have been discussed
at great length, for the Revolution has been the focus of historical scholar
ship dealing with seventeenth-century England. At the same time, it is
obvious that the discussion of nationalism puts this event in a somewhat
different perspective and in fact necessitates a new interpretation. In this
perspective the Revolution essentially appears to be indeed the conflict be
74
N A T I O N A L I S M
tween the Court and the Country, that is, a confrontation between the
Crown and the nation. It was the act of political self-assertion by the na
tionnamely all those groups which at the time were incorporated into the
political process and possessed national consciousnessand it focused on
the issue of sovereignty.
This interpretation of the English Revolution gives it a reason (a motive),
a necessary element in human action of a similar complexity. It also explains
several problematic characteristics of the Revolution. It explains, for ex
ample, the inactivity and indifference of the rural poor and the urban wage-
earners. They were passive and uninterested in the Revolution because they
were the illiterate, not yet affected by the dignifying influence of the national
identity; they were not yet members of the English nation, and could not be
concerned about the insults to nationality. It also explains the lack of a clear-
cut split within the population actively involved in the conflict. The fact that
representatives of all the participant strata could be found in both camps
reduces the plausibility of explanations in terms of existing stratification
divisions, whether of class or of status.
When analyzed in terms of national sentiments, however, the otherwise
unclassifiable divisions become intelligible. After almost a century and a half
of sustained development, the idea of the nation had been associated with
various factors which through this association acquired an evocative nation
alistic connotation, and could be interpreted in several ways. For a long time
the nation was associated with, indeed personified in, the figure of the Eng
lish monarch; for many, therefore, opposition to royal authority was noth
ing less than anti-national. The predominant view, however, defined the na
tion in terms of the individual dignity, or liberties, of its members, and
anything that inhibited the exercise of these liberties was anti-national. The
two interpretations were available to people in every social group, and one
chose between them sometimes against ones objective interest. The fact
that the rebels view had interest to support it, while the association of the
nation with monarchy was in this sense accidental, was the reason for the
predominance of the former and for the ultimate victory of the Parliamen
tarian (or patriotic, country) cause. The definition of the English nation
without the monarchy, which in the course of its first crucially important
century consistently contributed to its development, however, was very
problematic; in the Restoration the two were linked again, although on dif
ferent terms, and the crown remained an important national symbol.
Nevertheless, the Revolution helped to disentangle the issues historically
associated with the idea of the nation but not essential to it and made it clear
that nationalism was about the right of participation in the government of
the polityit was about liberty, and not monarchy or religion.114These two
earlier indispensable allies were temporarily abandoned. Kingship was abol
ished, while religion was reinterpreted in such a way as to lose most of its
Gods Firstborn: England 75
specifically religious significance. As before, it was identified with the na
tional cause, but while earlier it was the association with religion which
legitimated nationalism, now it was the association with nationalism which
made religion at all meaningful. In An Humble Request to the Ministers of
Both Universities and to All Lawyers in Every Inns-A-Court, 1656, Gerard
Winstanley, the Digger, defined true religion as the possibility of national
existence. True religion, he said, and undefiled, is to let everyone quietly
have earth to manure, that they may live in freedom by their labors. Signif
icantly, the Diggers represented the breakthrough of the national conscious
ness into the lowest, previously unaffected by this development, strata of
society. Winstanleys understanding of nationality was unencumbered by
too great a familiarity with all the complexities of traditions which went
into its making; his simple vision captured its very essence. Being an English
man, for him, meant being fundamentally equal to any other Englishman
and having a right to a share in whatever the nation possessed. I f national
ism of the Parliament did not mean that, it did not mean anything at all, and
the Parliament was betraying the nation. Nay, it is the bottom of all na
tional laws, insisted Winstanley, to dispose of the earth .. . The first Par
liament law, which encourages the poor commons of England, to plant the
commons and waste land, is this; wherein they declare England to be a free
Commonwealth: This law breaks in pieces the kingly yoke, and the laws of
the Conqueror, and gives a common freedom to every Englishman, to have
a comfortable livelihood in this their own land, or else it cannot be a Com
monwealth . . . the justices cannot call these men [Diggers] vagrants . . . for
by the law it is no vagrancy to dig and work . . . They are Englishmen upon
the commons of England 115
Pronouncements of the central actors of the period may lack Winstanleys
directness, but the sway of the national idea in their views is equally appar
ent. The nation (and the related issue of liberty), clearly, was the focus of
Cromwells concerns, and he saw no sharp distinction between the service
of the nation and profession of the true faith. The two greatest Concern
ments that God hath in the world, he said, [are] the one is that of Religion
. . . and also the Liberty of men professing Godliness (under the variety of
forms amongst us) . . . The other thing cared for is the Civil Liberty and
Interest of the Nation. Which though it is, and indeed I think ought to be,
subordinate to a more peculiar Interest of God,yet it is the next best God
hath given men in this world . . . if anyone whatsoever think the interest of
Christians and the Interest of the Nation inconsistent, or two different
things, I wish my soul never enter into their secrets! Religion was put first,
but Cromwells interpretation of the interest of God {in effect religious
liberty) made it just another interest of the nation. Elsewhere Cromwell as
serted: Liberty of conscience and liberty of the subjectstwo as glorious
things to be contended for, as any God hath given us. In his speeches to the
76 N A T I O N A L I S M
Parliament he many times emphasized that it was the liberty of England
(not religion) that he fought for; that the aim of the Revolution was "to
make the nation happy. He proudly asserted his loyalty to the nation and
spoke of True English hearts and zealous affections toward the general
weal of our Mother Country. We are apt to boast that we are English
men, he said, and truly it is no shame to us that we are so; but it is a
motive to us to do like Englishmen, and seek the real good of this nation,
and the interest of it. 116
Whatever Cromwells own nationalism (and it appears to have been gen-
uine and deeply felt), it was his contribution to the strength and glory of the
nation which was emphasized and for which he was praised by Dryden,
Sprat, Pepys, and other contemporary intellectuals. Some three centuries
after his death it seemed apt to call a monograph on Cromwells personality
and social role Gods Englishman, and choose as an epigraph his excla
mation: We are English, that is one good fact. 117
Milton, a leader of the new religion of patriotism, 114is another example
of the increasingly secular nationalism and the accentuation of its libertar
ian implications in the seventeenth century. Like many before him, Milton
believed the English to be the chosen people. He appealed to the Lords and
Commons of England in Areopagitica: Consider what Nation it is whereof
ye are, and whereof ye are the govemours: a Nation not slow and dull, but
of a quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit, acute to invent, suttle and sinewy
to discours, not beneath the reach of any point the highest that human ca
pacity can soar to . . . this Nation chosn before any other . . . [When] God
is decreeing to begin some new and great period . . . What does he then but
reveal Himself . . . as his manner is, first to his English-men? His notion of
the nature and reasons for this election, however, underwent a significant
change in the course of the years. Early in his work, in the tract Of Refor
mation in England (1641), he presented the already familiar apocalyptic
conception, very much in the spirit of Foxe, of Englands leadership in the
Reformation. Later, arguing for different social reforms, such as the reform
in marriage (Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, 164344) and unlicensed
printing (Areopagitica, 1644), he justified them on the grounds that these
reforms were congenial to Englands national character, as well as to its re
ligious and historical destiny. In his History of Britain (1670) he attacked
the organized Church as such, carrying to its logical conclusion the Protes
tant doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, and demanding full equality
for his nation so pliant and so prone to seek after knowledge. His pro
nouncements, full of religious fervor and still employing the authority of
religious texts, became devoid of any religious content. The great and al
most only commandment of the Gospel, is to command nothing against the
good of man, he wrote, and much more no civil command, against his
civil good/ and: the general end of every ordinance, of every severest, di-
Gods Firstborn: England
77
vinest, even of Sabbath, is the good of man, yea, his temporal good not
excluded. Now Englands peculiarity, for him, was reflected in its being
the mansion-house of liberty, the people ever famous, and foremost in
the achievements of liberty. Instead of leading other nations in religious
Reformation, England led them on the way to civil liberty. In that, wrote
Milton, we have the honour to precede other Nations who are now labor
ing to be our followers. 119Liberty became the distinguishing characteristic
of Englishness.
The Revolution helped to conclude the process started a century earlier. It
caused more people to be drawn into political action during the revolution
ary forties and fifties, and brought [them] under the more direct dominance
of London . .. national consciousness ftherefore) was extended to new geo
graphical areas and lower social levels.120Parliamentary statutes, speeches,
and pamphlets separated the issue of nationality from the issues of religion
and the power of the English Crown and clarified the meaning of national
identity. After the Civil War, nation as the primary object of loyalty was
established and ceased to be problematic. As a self-evident fact, it no longer
needed religious or monarchical justification.
The religious idiom in which initially the national ideais had been ex
pressed was soon cast away. This does not imply that people had lost their
faith in God or ceased to practice religionthis would be close to inconceiv
able in the seventeenth centuryrather, religion lost its authority over the
other fields of activity; it ceased to be the source of social values, and instead
of shaping them, had to adapt to social and national ideals. The conditions
which facilitated the acceptance of Protestantism and Puritanism in England
were also the ones that prepared the growth of the English national con
sciousness, for which religion served as a lubricator. It was natural that reli
gious creed, secondary anyway, would be pushed aside when national iden
tity became established as fundamental and the need for justification
diminished.
The fate of the monarchy was not much different. The Restoration did not
restore the old relationship between the Crown and the people. Under
Charles II the Parliament was intent on emphasizing its humility and peace
ful nature and, as we have seen, refrained in the documents from using the
word nation itself. Yet the fundamentally changed position of both reli
gion and monarchy was symbolized and recorded very soon after the kings
return in his Common Prayer' Book. The version of Charles II added to the
volume a whole new section of Prayers and Thanksgivings upon several
occasions^ which included rain, fair weather, war and tumults, common
plague and sickness; among the prayers pertaining to such uncontrollable
expressions of divine wrath or favor there was a A Prayer for the High
Court of Parliament, to be read during their session. The text of the prayer
was subdued; it read:
78
N A T I O N A L I S M
Most gracious God, we humbly beseech thee, as for this Kingdom in general,
so especially for the High Court of Parliament, under our most religious and
gracious King at this time assembled: That thou wouldest be pleased to direct
and prosper all their consultations to the advancement of thy glory, the good of
thy church, the safety, honour, and welfare of our Sovereign, and his Domin
ions; that all things may be so ordered and settled by their endeavours, upon
the best and surest foundations, that peace and happiness, truth and justice,
religion and piety, may be established among us for all generations. These and
all other necessities, for them, for us, and thy whole Church, we humbly beg in
the name and Mediation of Jesus Christ our most blessed Lord and Saviour.
Amen111
The context of the prayerthe place of the Parliament among the evident
expressions of Gods favor and disfavoris revealing, and it is significant
that there was no such prayer for the health or well-being of the king.
A Land of Experimental Knowledge
The sense of the cultural specificity of the nation emerged simultaneously
with its political self-assertion. The tendencies of the Elizabethan age were
continued in the new century. Writers as earlier stressed the merits of the
English language and literature and insisted on their superiority to classical
and French languages and literature, which were considered the standards
of excellence at the time. The most famous expression of this literary patri
otism in the seventeenth century was, probably, found in the works of John
Dryden, who was convinced that English drama far surpassed the French
and demanded that English poets be given their undoubted due, of excel
ling Aeschyllus, Euripides and Sophocles. In Annus Mirabilis Dryden
echoed the optimistic belief of Samuel Daniel in the future greatness of Eng
land:
But what so long in vain, and yet unknown,
By poor man-kinds benighred wir is sought,
Shall in this Age to Britain first be shown,
And hence be to admiring Nations taught.
The reason for his optimism here, however, was not the excellency of the
English tongue or the promise of its literary genius, but science.'23
Already in the early sixteenth century, as we have observed, reasonthe
faculty of understandingwas upheld as a supreme value in England. I t was
mans diuine essence, 123and language itself was believed to be its hand
maiden. Language was reasons medium of expression, which was reason
enough to cultivate it. Indeed this was the first among arguments used by Sir
Brian Tuke to commend to the king Thynnes edition of Chaucers collected
Gods Firstborn: England
79
works, to which he wrote an introduction in 1532.,J4 For Sir Philip Sidney
the kinship between language and reason proved the usefulness of poetry,
and he argued in the Apologie: If Oratio next to Ratio, Speech next to
Reason, bee the greatest gyft bestowed vpon mortalitie, that can not be
praiseSesse which dooth most pollish that blessing of speech.12S
As the notion of the English national character crystallized, rationality
assumed a central place in it. This English intellectual disposition was re
flected in the independence of thinking, a critical mind, an ability to arrive
at decisions on the basis of ones ownpreferably firsthandknowledge
and logical deliberation, a love of (practical) knowledge, a desire to be ap
pealed to in a rational, not emotional and not authoritative, manner, a dis
passionate temper, and a distaste for enthusiasm. From the point of view of
a philosophical purist, the English outlook in the seventeenth century could
be characterized as anti-rational. The distrust of reason, and its relegation
to a position subordinate to the senses, in the writings of Bacon and his
followers was rightly emphasized, as was the popularity enjoyed in this pe
riod by the Skeptics.'^ But whatever its derivation and philosophical purity,
this outlook led to rational conduct. Speculation, theorizing unrelated to
facts, was indeed suspect, but the counterpart of the ubiquitous distrust of
authority was the belief in the reason of the individual. Skeptics reconciled
with authority and lacked this belief.
While the belief in individual reason made for assertiveness vis-a-vis au
thority, skepticism, with its emphasis on the futility of speculation, made
sensory, empirical knowledge the basis for the assertion of reason. From
these diverse elements sprang a unique position, philosophically impure, but
thoroughly systematic in its support of the liberty of individual conscious
ness. Its rationalism implied the right of free thought; its skepticism discred
ited dogmatizing and demanded tolerance of others opinions; its empiri
cism undermined the notion of intellectual aristocracy, making everyone in
possession of normal human senses equally capable of acquiring the true
knowledge on which the progress of humanity was thought to be dependent.
This position, which came to be regarded as inherently English, both em
bodied and provided the conceptual foundation for the democratic tenden
cies of the age, and science was the epitome of this rationalist, empiricist,
skeptical view.
Since Bacon, science was considered the sign of superiority of the moderns
over the ancients, to whom, allegedly, it was unknown. Since Bacon, too, it
was viewed as a sign of a nations greatness, the foundation and guarantee
of its strength and virtue.117In the battle between the ancients and the mod
erns, the English identified with the moderns. The ancients were foreigners
with no connection whatsoever to England, but linked to Italy, France, and
Spain. These three continental countries were the chief cultural competitors
of England. National pride impelled England to claim equality with and
80 N A T I O N A L I S M
even superiority to its competitors. However, in classical learning England
was no match for France and Italy, and to accept the authority of the' an
cients would mean admitting cultural inferiority on its part. Unwilling to do
so, the English espoused a primitive cultural relativism, arguing that what
suited one period and society did not necessarily suit another. This freed
them from competing for intellectual excellence on the arena chosen by
ruinous Athens or decayed Rome n%and rescued Englands national dig
nity. Siding with the moderns enhanced it. Science was a modern activity
and therefore one in which England could compete effectively. At first the
sign of the cultural specificity of the English, it soon became the proof of
their superiority. At the same time the importance of literary preeminence
diminished, because literary accomplishment was considered less expressive"
of the English national genius.
The rise of modern science, announced by the foundation of the Royal
Society of London, has been attributed to the influence of religion, specifi
cally the affinity between the spirit of science and the Protestant ethic.129But
though the infant science undoubtedly profited from the fact that it was con
sistent with the dominant religious belief and therefore was tolerated by re
ligion, on the whole it owed little to the support of the latter. Its increasing
authority in fact was another reflection of the waning influence of religious
faith in society and the already unquestionable dominance of secular na
tional concerns. I t was the importance of science for the English national
identity and the function it performed for the cultural image of England that
created the state of public opinion favorable to its cultivation, encouraging
to those who had the abilities to devote to it, and causing many Englishmen
who knew very little about the substance of scientific knowledge to stand in
reverence before expressions of scientific creativity. It was nationalism that
raised science to the apex of occupational prestige and ensured its institu
tionalization.
The pursuit of science was a matter of national prestige. Accomplish
ments of English scientists were constantly used as a weapon in the cultural
competition with advanced continental nationsthe heirs of classical an
tiquity. Boastfully, John Wilkins called Bacon "our English Aristotle; Dr.
William Gilbert, the author of DeMagnete, was our countryman (admired
by all foreigners). 150Englands scientific leadership was evident (at least to
Englishmen) very early. In 1600, in the first chapter of De Magnete, dealing
with the history of his subject, Gilbert himself wrote: Other learned men
who on long sea voyages have observed the differences of magnetic variation
[were] all Englishmen . , , Many others I pass by purpose: Frenchmen, Ger
mans and Spaniards of recent time who in their writings, mostly composed
in their vernacular languages, either misuse the teachings of others, and like
furbishers send forth ancient things dressed with new names and tricked in
Gods Firstborn: England
81
an apparel of new words as in prostitutes finery; or who publish things not
even worthy of record. 131
National prestige was also the main issue in the controversies over prior
ity in scientific discoveries. John 'Wallis, one of the most prominent mathe
maticians of the age and the author of a treatise on the greatness of English
mathematics, frequently raised the issue in his correspondence. He wished
that those of our own Nation; were a little more forward than I find them
generally to bee (especially the most considerable) in timely publishing their
own Discoveries, and not let strangers reape ye glory of what those amongst
us are ye Authors. 132This, too, was the subject of the first official letter
from the Royal Society to Newton. In it, Henry Oldenburg, the secretary,
informed Newton about the examination of his invention of contracting
telescopes by ye most eminent in Opticall Science and practise and their
opinion that it was necessary to use some means to secure this invention
from ye Usurpation of forreiners. In a letter written later the same year
regarding Newtons discourse on light and colors, Oldenburg again urged:
This discourse should without delay be printed, there being cause to appre
hend that the ingenious and surprising notion therein contained .. . may
easily be snatched from you, and the Honor of it be assumed by forainers,
some of them, as I formerly told you being apt enough to make shew of and
to vend, what is not of the growth of their Country.133
The glory of the nation was also an important reasonprobably the only
one that competed with the personal inclinations of scientiststo proceed
with scientific endeavor at all. In one of the later letters from Oldenburg,
Newton was informed of the acclaim his studies enjoyed abroad, which,
Oldenburg believed, should increase Newtons vigour to prosecute and ad
vance them to the utmost, as well as for your owne as the Nations honor. 134
Edmond Hailey, himself an eminent scientist and Astronomer Royal, used
the same argument upon the publication of Princtpia, to make sure that
Newton would proceed with his work: I hope you will not repent you of
the pains you have taken in so laudable a Piece, so much to your own and
the Nations credit, but rather . . . that you will resume those contempla
tions. 135
Practicing scientists fully shared the opinion of the propagandists or apol
ogists of science, who were not engaged in it themselves, that a major source
of its legitimation was the contribution it made to the national prestige.
Even Newton, in a rare letter not exclusively devoted to the technicalities of
his scientific investigations, concurred in it.13SRecommending another scien
tist, the geographer John Adams, to his cousin Sir John Newton, he pre
sented his work (a geographical survey of England) as a designe for the
credit of the Nation, and thought that this explained that Adams had
"hitherto met with good encouragement. 137Robert Boyle, too, was ob
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N A T I O N A L I S M
viously concerned about Englands superiority in science. He had Olden
burg translate into Latin all his works written in English immediately upon
completion, to protect them from appearing in unauthorized translations in
other European languages and being claimed by foreigners. For his part,
Oldenburg rarely failed to communicate to Boyle what he learned from the
foreign correspondents of the Royal Society about the reactions to English
science abroad. Some of his letters were almost entirely devoted to this sub
ject. It must be said, he would conclude typically, that England has a
large number of learned and inquisitive men, a larger number than is to be
found in all of Europe; and what they produce is solid and detailedthe
world has, for too long, been sufficiently entertained with general theo
ries.
Such expressions of self-praise were more than matched by praise from
foreigners who acknowledged Englands leadership in science and also saw
it as reflecting the greatness of the nation. A German correspondent of the
Royal Society, J . D. Major, wrote in 1664: It seems to be a characteristic of
the remarkable English people to accomplish great things through their pen
etrating and truly unusual ability. Another one compared Englands pre
eminence in medical science to the glory of its navigation: As in the past
maritime exploration has day by day added new islands to the British realm
. . . so their love of inquiry after truth led the illustrious Bacon and Digby,
with the ingenious Harvey, Boyle, Charleton, Highmore, Glisson and Wallis
to throw much new light upon medicine. What may not rightly be expected
from the concourse of so many men of such caliber, and from companions
in letters headed straight for truths Gate! German scientists, he promised,
would not forget their debt to England: [If] Germany can contribute noth
ing else of note to your British ocean, we offer unfailing memory of benefits
received; and such as they are our writings when they appear in time to
come shall testify to the English springs from which we drank our fill. 135
Foreign correspondents noted the pride Englishmen took in the scientific
achievements of their compatriots, the incomparably higher prestige of sci
ence in England, the value assigned to it by society, and the widespread so
cial support it enjoyed. How strikingly different Englands appreciation of
science seemed at the time, compared with that of other countries, can be
gauged from Fontenelles famous Eulogium to Newton. Fontenelle clearly
believed that scientific greatness meant national greatness. In the light of this
belief, the significance of the exceptionally high prestige enjoyed by science
in England, exemplified by the nations appreciation of Newton, was greatly
enhanced. Of the attitude of the English toward their scientists, Fontenelle
wrote:
It was Sir Isaac Newtons peculiar happiness to enjoy the reward of his merit in
his life-time, quite contrary to Des Cartes, who did not receive any honours til!
Gods Firstborn: England 83
after his death. The English do not respect great Geniuss the less for being born
amongst them; and so far are they from endeavoring to depreciate them by
malicious criticism, so far from approving the envy which attacks them, that
they all conspire to raise them; and that great degree of Liberty which occasions
their differences in the most important points, does nor hinder them from unit-
ing.in this. They are all very sensible how much the glory of the Understanding
should be valued in a State, and whoever can procure it to their country be
comes extremely dear to them . . . We must look back to the Ancient Greeks if
we would find out examples of so extraordinary a veneration for learning.140
The admiration of foreigners, mixed as it was with a dose of envy, rein
forced Englands self-definition as the scientific nation. The spokesmen of
the Royal Society used it to ensure further support for science and con
stantly reminded the public that science made England great. The service
science performed for the nation was also evoked by the apologists of sci
ence who had to ward off its still numerous (and, incidentally, inspired by
religion) enemies. Among these apologists, Thomas Sprat is particularly im
portant. His History of the Royal Society was the climax of propaganda
for the new science, the -most elaborate and comprehensive defense of the
Society and experimental philosophy in the seventeenth century, and the
most significant document in all propagandist literature on behalf of
the new science. In addition, it constituted an official statement of the
matter. 141The work had been commissioned by the Royal Society, refereed
by several of its prominent members, and approved by them when com
pleted.
The sentiments to which Sprat appealed almost exclusively were national
pride and loyalty. In writing the H i storyhe declared, he was inspired by
the Greatness of the Design itself and the Zeal which I have for die Hon
our of our Nation. 142Referring to the work elsewhere, he added that he
was trying to represent its [Royal Society] Design to be Advantageous to
the Glory of England;143revealingly, the future Bishop of Rochester did not
mention religion.
Sprat was acutely aware of the English inferiority in matters of ele
gance (which included art and literature), though as a rule he presented it
as an unjust allegation of foreigners and an expression of their arrogance,
rather than a fact. In Observations on Mons. de Sorbiere's Voyage into Eng
land, a profoundly nationalist document, he wrote: The French and the
Italians . . . generally agree, that there is scarce any Thing of late written
that is worth looking upon, but in their own languages. The Italians did at
first endeavour to have it thought that all Matters of Elegance had never yet
pasd over the Alps: But being overwhelmed by Number, they were content
to admit the French and the Spaniards into some share of their Honour. But
they all three still maintain the united opinion, that alt Wit is to be sought
for nowhere but amongst themselves: It is their Established Rule, that Good
84 N A T I O N A L I S M
Sense has always kept near the Warm Sun, and scarce ever dared to come
further than the Forty-ninth Degree Northward. He tried to defend the
honor of English letters, but, clearly, this for him was slippery ground. (In
the first Restoration of Learning the English began to write well as soon as
any, the Italians only excepted; and . . . if we may guess by what we see of
the Italians at this Day, the English have continued to write well longer than
they . . , We have at this Present as many Masters of true and real Wit as
ever Greece produced in any Age, whose Names, though I conceal, yet Pos
terity shall declare.) He also tried to present the apparent deficiencies of the
English culture as a sign of its actual superiority: The Temper of the Eng
lish is Free, Modest, Kind, hard to be provokd. If they are not so Talkative
as others, yet they are more Careful of what they Speak. I f they are thought
by Some of their Neighbours to be a little defective in the Gentleness and the
Pliableness of their Humour, yet that Want is abundantly supplied by their
firm and their masculine virtues: And perhaps the same Observation may be
found true in Men which is in Metals, and that the Noblest Substance are
hardest to be polished.
But it was Englands leadership in science that Sprat cited as the incontest
able proof of his countrys cultural ability: "The Arts that.. . now prevail
amongst us are not only all the useful Sciences of Antiquity, but most espe
cially all the late Discoveries of this Age in the Real Knowledge of Mankind
and Nature. For the Improvement of this Kind of Light the English Disposi
tion is of all the others the fittest.144In comparison with such real knowl
edge, the True Arts of Life, humanistic learning and literature were mere
trifles. Consequently, the History of the Royal Society was permeated with a
sense of confidence in Englands future glory and prosperity: science was
ingrained in the English national character, and its advancement doubly
guaranteed the advancement of the nation. If there can be a true character
given of the Universal Temper of any Nation under Heaven, argued Sprat,
then certainly this must be ascribed to our Countreymen: that they have
commonly an unaffected sincerity; that they love to deliver their minds with
a sound simplicity . . . they ought . . . be commended for an honourable
integrity, for a neglect of circumstances, and flourishes; for regarding things
of greater moment, more than less; for a scorn to deceive as well as to be
deceived; which are ail the best indowments, that can enter into a Philosoph
ical Mind. So that even the position of our climate, the air, the influence of
the heavens, the composition of the English blood; seem to joyn with the
labours of the Royal Society to render our country, a Land of Experimental
Knowledge. The Genius of the Nation itself, he claimed, irresistibly
conspires with the inclination toward science. The success of the Royal
Society was assured, because it embodied the present prevailing Genius of
the English Nation. Having asserted that, the versatile clergyman de
Gods Firstborn: England 85
manded: if the Church of England opposed scientific investigation, how
could it be fit for the present Genius of this Nation?145
Science did not only express the English temper; it could actually re
form minds, contribute to greater rationality, and thereby unite and
strengthen the nation. Sprat thought so, and this was one of Joseph Gian-
vills arguments in Plus Ultra, where he prophesied: [Science] will in its
progress dispose mens Spirits to more calmness and modesty, charity and
prudence in the Differences of Religion and even silence Disputes there. For
the free sensible knowledge tends to the altering the Crasis of mens minds
and so cures the Desease at the root; and true Philosophy is a Specifick
against Disputes and Divisions.144
Through its close identification with the English nation, science acquired
great authority and assumed a central place in the national consciousness.
Other practices and spheres of culture were now measured against science
and had to be proved congruent with it to receive national approbation.
Religion was among practices so reassessed. Enumerating the advantages
which made England the happiest of societies, Sprat, after citing military
strength, political power, and science, mentioned aiso the Profession of
such a Religion, and the Discipline of such a Church, which an impartial
Philosopher would chuse, [and] which , . . has given evident Sign . .. how
nearly its interest is united with the Prosperity of our Country.147Signifi
cantly, religion recommended itself not only by its affinity to the spirit of the
nation and consistency with its interests, but also by being acceptable to
impartial Philosophers, that is, scientists. Science stood guard over the
national interest, and when religious zeal was perceived as a threat to it, its
spokesmen thought it their duty to attack religion, which they did with an
at-the-time remarkable sense of impunity. Sprats History, Glanvills Plus Ul
tra, Drydens Annus Mirabilis, besides being apologies, of science, consti
tuted a part of the offensive against the religious enthusiasm of the Mira
bilis Annus of 1666.us This enthusiasm they held responsible for the
troubles that had befallen England in recent years, and science was opposed
to it as a cure. The general distrust of enthusiasm and religious fervor re
flected a strong and explicit anti-Puritan sentiment. It was expressed in,
among other things, the attack on the Puritan style of preaching which took
place in the' second half of the seventeenth century.149Scientists and scientif
ically inclined clergymen were among the most outspoken assailants. Cen
tral among their criticisms was the familiar egalitarianand nationalistic
argument that heavy reliance on Latin and Greek, and the use of fancy
language, of which they accused the clergy, rendered preaching intelligible
only to the upper strata. The clergy were urged to improve their knowledge
of plain English and use it instead.
The scientific style of preaching soon prevailed in England, and the swift
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N A T I O N A L I S M
success of the attack once again demonstrated the reversal in the importance
of secular and religious concerns in English society. For a time science as
sumed the place in English national consciousness which had previously
been held by Protestantism, It revealed the essence of the English national
identity. One of the effects of this interconnection between the first nation
destined soon to become the mightiest of the world powers and a previously
marginal activity was the tremendous authority of science in modern soci
ety. Because of its association with English nationalism, science became a
cult object long before it could demonstrate its potential, the subsequent
realization of which only partly accounts for its semi-religious status.
The England that emerged from the civic and religious trials of the mid
seventeenth century was a nation. Its formation in the course of the preced
ing century and a half represented a tremendous change in the nature and
pervasiveness of politics and the first major breakthrough toward democ
racy. English national consciousness was first and foremost the conscious
ness of ones dignity as an individual. It implied and pushed toward (though
it could not necessitate the immediate realization of) the principles of indi
vidual liberty and political equality. These notions were primary in the defi
nition of English nationhood. The casting away of the religious idiom did
not change the principles, but only laid them bare. Men were still believed
to have reason because they were created in the image of God; the require
ments of their equality and liberty, therefore, derived from the act of crea
tion. But it was the pride in mans reason and not reverence for its source
which inspired people like Milton after the Civil War; the right of the indi
vidual conscience, the liberty of man, the autonomy of a rational being were
advocated for their own sake, as supreme values. These ideas were in no
way peculiarly English and did not originate in England. Yet in England they
were able to become the content of the peoples very identity, and therefore
rooted so firmly in the consciousness, both individual and collective, and the
culture as to transform the social terrain which nurtured them itself.
This was due to the combined support of several factors. The idea of the
nation was adopted in the first place because of the social transformation in
the course of which one elite was replaced by another, and, the old definition
and justification of the existence of aristocracy becoming obsolete, there was
a need for a new definition and justification. The intense mobility, sustained
for a remarkably long period, and the continuous regrouping of the social
structure which resulted from it brought more and more people within the
sector to whom national identity appealed. For their own reasons, the Tu
dorsall, with the exception of Marywere sympathetic to it too and of
fered it their weighty royal encouragement. The already growing national
consciousness was strengthened manifold when it became confluent with the
Gods Firstborn: England 87
Protestant Reformation. The English Bible and the unprecedented stimula
tion of literacy were functionally equivalent, for a great mass of common
Englishmen, to the effects of the social elevation on the new aristocracy. This
mass of readers, too, was elevated and acquired a totally new dignity, the
sense of which was reinforced by national identity and led them to embrace
it. The counter-Reformational policies of Mary were also anti-national and
succeeded in antagonizing the common people as well as the elite group with
a vested interest in both Protestantism and nationalism. The end of her
reign, which came so soon, made this group, intent on never again allowing
the frustration of its interestswhich it identified with those of England
the ruling group in the country for many years to come and brought
about the close association of the Protestant and national causes. This asso
ciation provided the growing national consciousness with Divine sanction,
represented the national sentiment as religious at a time when only religious
sentiments were self-legitimating and moral in their own right, and secured
it the protection of its own strongest rival. It seemed as if all the important
factors in English history of the time conspired to favor this growth, while
the opposition to it was virtually non-existent. Thus English nationalism
had the time to gestate; it was allowedand helpedto permeate every
sphere Of political and cultural life and spread into every sector of society
except the lowest, and become a powerful force which no longer needed
buttresses to exist. It acquired its own momentum; it existed in its own
right; it was the only way in which people now could see reality and thus
became reality itself. For nationalism was the basis of peoples identity, and
it was no more possible at this point to stop thinking in national terms than
to cease being oneself.
The combination of factors which ensured the development and entrench
ment of nationalism in England and made it possible for England to become
a nation was, of course, unique. It could not possibly be repeated anywhere.
Why, then, did nationalism spread?
C H A P T E R
Behind their faces I see other men and in the same realm another stare. The form
remains, but the interior has been renewed. There has occurred a moral revolution,
a change of spirit.
Guez de Balzac
How the face of this empire has changed! how we have advanced with a giant step
towards liberty! . . . at present . . . the foreigners are going to regret that they are
not French. We shall surpass these English, so proud of their constitution, who
ridiculed our servitude.
Camille Desmoulins
All sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation. No body, no individual can exercise
authority which does not explicitly emanate from it.
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen
T
he unique French identity, the consciousness of being French,
though limited to a narrow elite circle, had existed centuries before
it was reinterpreted as national identity. Made possible by the con
tinuity, independence, and early, albeit relative, centralization of the author
ity of kings who in one form or another adopted the name French, this
consciousness was from very early on articulated by clerics. In their writ
ings, the French identity first acquired the meaning of awareness of the reli
gious, and then of the cultural and institutional, uniqueness of the royal
domain. Later, during the ministry of Richelieu, it was tied to the concept
of the state. But at all timesbefore the advent of nationalism in the
eighteenth centuryit centered on, and derived from the relationship of
dependence on and loyalty to, the king. The evolution of the French iden
tityfrom a religious-Christian to a political-royalist one with only vague
religious overtones, which was in turn supplanted by national identity
implied two successive changes in the ultimate bases of legitimacy or funda
mental values. The divinely appointed French king replaced the Christian
Church, of which he had been the eldest son, and the state (which in France
eventually became coterminous wirh nation) replaced the French king. Each
time, the new identity grew under the auspices of the old one and received
its importance from association with it, yet, in favorable circumstances, it
helped to bring about the neutralization, if not the destruction, of the latter.
Interlinked and gradually shading one into another, the three identities can
be visualized as a set of patricidal nesting dolls, with the important differ
ence that each successive one was more inclusiveand far more insistent on
its inclusivenessthan the one out of which it emerged, and evidently this
was no childs play.
I, The Development of Pre-National French I dentity
Francea Church, and the Faith of the Fleur de Lys
It was not until well into the eighteenth century that a consensus emerged as
to the correct spelling of the word FrenchFrangais. It was originally
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N A T I O N A L I S M
spelled Franqois and pronounced franqoue and then france in Parisian
French. In the seventeenth century, Racine defended the form Franqois; a
century later dAlembert thought that Frances reflected the pronunciation
most accurately, and Voitaire favored the form that was eventually adopted,
Franqais.
The referent of the word Frangoisthat became Franqais and came to
mean Frenchwas, for the authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen
turies, the Franks, those belonging to the Germanic tribe that in the fifth
century a .d . moved into Roman Gaul, whose territory, roughly, was to cor
respond to that of France. A Frankish political identity predated the forma
tion of Francethe domain of the French kingsby several centuries, and
the relationship between the two was hardly one of straightforward conti
nuity. Later architects of German as well as of French identity could claim
Charlemagne as their ancestor, and for equally soundor unsoundrea
sons. In the ninth century, after the partition of the Carolingian Empire, the
Eastern Franks, whose descendants were to become Germans, contested the
exclusive right of the Western Franks, in the domain of Charles the Bald, to
the name Francia. Indeed, only in the eleventh century was Francia reserved
solely for the designation of Francia occidentalis, and other, in future Ger
man, parts of the Carolingian Empire abandoned their French aspirations
and identity. A century later, on the other hand, the name applied only to
the central part of the domain, the Ile-de-France of today, while Francia tota
was used to designate the kingdom as a whole.
The consistent identification of the patrimony of a particular dynasty, that
is, of the territory under its control and the polity it represented, as Fran
ciaFrancedates from 1254, when the title of rex Francorum was offi
cially changed to rex Franciaes from king of the Franks to that of king of
France. The kings knowledge of the extent and the exact contours of their
territory was at that time far from accurate. The name thus did not simply
label an unambiguously circumscribed territorial entity, but rather defined,
that is, created, an image of such an entity, and helped to shape reality.
The identity of the people was no less ambiguous than that of the terri
tory. At the time of the modification of the royal title, the name of Franks
commonly referred to the inhabitants of the Western part of the divided
Carolingian Empire, and had been used this way for several centuries. Yet
these new Franks were thoroughly mixed with, and therefore were, to an.
equal degree, Gauls, who had inhabited the territory before the Germanic
invasion. {In later centuries the theory of the Frankish origin of the French
would be contested and the Gaulsamong some other, less obvious possi
bilitiesproposed as the true ancestors of the latter. During the Revolution
the idea of the Gallic ancestry of the French people would temporarily
triumph, to the extent that virtuous citizens would urge casting aside the
very name France, as expressive and reminiscent of foreign invasion and
The Three Identities of France 93
domination.) In the eleventh century (and probably as late as the thirteenth)
FranksFranciwas the name by which the Arabs of the Holy Land
referred to all Westerners. The vernacular literature of the crusades, such as
the Chanson de Roland, was the first to glorify sweet France. But the
Chanson was written in Anglo-Norman, rather than in the language of Ile-
de-France which was destined to become French, and it is unclear what
the France it sang of wasIle-de-France, the Frankish kingdom, or per
haps Western Christianity.1
Objectively speaking, the Franks were not French. But in defining their
dominions vis-a-vis the great powers of the agethe Papacy and the (Ger
man) Empirethe Capetian kings appropriated and utilized the Frankish
legacy. Claiming to be the legitimate descendants of the Frankish kings and
Emperors, they also claimed to inherit their traditional functionthat of
the defenders of the Church and the Papacy. The fact that Franci, in the
Orient, represented Christianity was interpreted as proof of the superior
piety which distinguished the French and regarded as a reason for a specifi
cally French pride. In the literature of the crusades, the Gesta Dei per Fran
cos of Guibert de Nogent and the History of Jerusalem of Robert de Moine,
the Franks (gens Francorum) are represented as a people who epitomize
Christianity, the most Christian, chosen by God and distinguished among
the nations by the fervour of [their] faith and devotion to the Church.2
Jacques de Vitry in the thirteenth century reiterates: There are many Chris
tian nations, the first among them is France, the French are pure Catho
lics. 3When the Grandes chroniques de France (which, written at St. Denis
under the auspices of the Crown, present the official definition of the collec
tive identity, thus effectively forging it) start to appear at the end of the thir
teenth century, they emphasize the Christian piety of the French and their
special place within Christendom as the distinguishing characteristics of the
kingdom. Ironically, French piety is older than French Christianity; menxe
du temps ou ils etaient dedies a Iidolatrie, ils etaient moult observants
dicelle4; even as pagans the French were characterized by an exceptional
zeal.
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the hereditary Frankish superiority
in piety was seen as an attribute of both the kingdom and the king of France,
but it was the latter who eventually came to epitomize this characteristic.
For that reason the French kings insisted on their exclusive right to the title
of the most Christian kingle roi tres chretienwhich, during most
of the period in question, was applied rather indiscriminately, being a con
ventional form in which the See of Rome expressed its approbation of those
princes of whose services it at different times might have been in particular
need. Toward the end of the Middle Ages, however, the kings of France suc
cessfully arrogated to themselves the designation of tres chretien, and it
became a part of the French royal title. The relative strength of the kingdom
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N A T I O N A L I S M
of France in contemporary politics, the constant menace of the Empire,
which tended to undermine both its own influence and that of the Papacy
which it menaced, forcing the Pope frequently to seek the protection of
France, led Rome to acquiesce to the claims of the Capetians and acknowl
edge their exceptional position within Christendom. The Papacy recognized
that God chose the kingdom of France among all other peoples and in
fact insisted on the Divine election of the French king. In the fifteenth cen
tury the papal nuncio admonished Charles VII in the following words: To
you the most Christian of kings we entrust the common salvation, for by
hereditary right you are the head of the Christian army, and it is to you that
the other princes look up for the salvation of all. Others concurred: You
were the first to be planted on earth by God . . . God fights on your side . . .
God has inclined His face toward you, His hand is on the people he has
chosen.1
To be French in the late Middle Ages, therefore, meant to be a particularly
good Christian. Eventually, though, and starting already in this early period,
the insistence on the special position of the house and the kingdom of France
within the Catholic Church led, however imperceptibly, to the separation
from and even rupture with the latter. The French kings used the distinction
of txes chretien as the ground for demanding the liberty of France from
papal and imperial intervention in its affairs, extending these demands to
both temporal and spiritual matters. The exceptional Catholicism of the
French was interpreted as the proof of a direct link to God that bypassed
His Vicar on Earth. Glad to see the Empire challenged, the Papacyin the
person of Innocent IIIaffirmed that the king of France, like the Emperor,
recognizes no superior in temporal matters. Philip Augustus, however,
would not be satisfied with the concession of his equality to the Emperor
alone and, when Innocent interfered in his quarrel with John Lackland of
England, declared: [Feudal] matters in dispute between kings are no busi
ness of the Pope, Neither did the French Crown stop at the exclusion of
Rome from interference in temporals. At the end of the thirteenth century,
the conflict over matters of taxation which erupted between the Papacy and
Philip IV (le Bel) led this monarch to insist on the exclusion of foreign inter
ference altogether and therefore on his sovereignty in spirituals as well. The
juridical literature of the period maintained that the French king is the Em
peror in his kingdom. 6In the course of the next century the jurists used
several arguments in defense of the sovereign liberty of the king: they
alluded to the obvious meaning of the name France: Franchefree,
which could not but express the essence of the realm that bore it, and was
therefore a proof that France had never suffered domination by any other
power. The revival and creative interpretation of the Salic law gave rise to
the view that France, since its pagan infancy, had lived by its own legislation.
But the central and most persistent argument was religious. Basically, it
The Three Identities of France 95
amounted to the assertion that the French {the special people for the exe
cution of Gods commandments)7were more Catholic than the Pope. The
election of France, and the immediate relationship between the kingdom
and God, was manifested first and foremost in the king. From an exemplary
son of the universal Church, the king became the focus of a new Christian
cult, and Francea Church in its own right.
Soon this cult and this Church developed a ritual peculiar to them and
their own symbolism. Colette Beaune traces the process of the transmission
of grace to and sacralization of the king of France via the fleur de lys
originally the symbol of the Virgin Mary, to whom the French monarchs
professed special devotionwhich became the symbol of royal authority,
thus confounding the images of the Mother of God and the kings of France,
establishing a particular relationship between them, and enveloping the
kings in Marys divinity. The cult of Mary and the cult of royalty fused in
the symbol of the virginal lily, which was at the same time the royal one;
both were represented by and thus identified in it. The coronation at
Rheimsle sacrewhose paraphernalia and instruments were believed to
be supplied from heaven in one way or another, was a sacralization by defi
nition. It reaffirmed the direct bond of the French king with the Lord Jesus
and reinforced the awareness of it at the commencement of each reign.
This was the context of the Hundred Years War, which, therefore, for
participants had a significance very different from the one it seems to have
for a modem observer. It was a religious conflict, rather than a conflict be
tween two nations. For the champions of the Valois, the two claimants to
the French throne, members of the same family, did not represent different
and more or less well reasoned positions regarding the law and custom of
dynastic succession, but were, emphatically, the forces of light and darkness,
of true faith and its Satanic perversion. Only the religious perception of the
kings of Francethe most Christian princes, marked and chosen by
Godmakes it possible to account for the patriotic determination of
Jeanne dArc amidst the wavering loyalties of her compatriots, many of
whom saw nothing wrong in being ruled by the English branch of the royal
family, and for the specific nature of her mission: to ensure the kings coro
nationsacralizationat Rheims.8
God having chosen the house of France for his particular care, the law
of dynastic succession also acquired religious significance. Since succession
was hereditary, the interpretatipn of this law implied, in the phrase of Col
ette Beaune, a political theology of [the royal] blood, which was articu
lated simultaneously with the emergence of the cult of the blood of Christ in
Latin Christianity as a whole. God, apparently, had chosen neither a partic
ular person nor a people or a territory over which he ruled, but a lineage;
persons, people, and territory were sanctified only by association. It was,
therefore, through blood that the sanctity of the French kings was transmit-
96 N A T I O N A L I S M
ced (and only in a certain way: women, for example, from the fourteenth
century on, when the Salic law was reinterpreted in connection with'the
Plantagener claims, were no ionger members of the lineage in the full sense).
Individual kings could be canonized in their own right, as was Louis IX, but
it was blood, not exemplary individual virtues, that ensured the saintliness
of most of the French kings. An impressive amount of effort went into elab
orating what exactly made this blood so potent. It was continuous, perpet
ual, the same blood on the throne of France, even though under different
names, from the Frankish kings and emperors to the Valois; exceptionally
pure in two senses: it was of different consistency from the blood of ordi
nary mortals, transparent and luminous, rather than dark red; and it was
impeccably legitimate, always sanctified by the sacrament of holy matri
mony. There were no bastards by definition among the French kings. For
this reason, adultery, or suspicions thereof, on the part of the queens or prin
cesses of France and their accomplices (which was probably no more un
common than among the womenfolk of any other ruling house) was consid
ered both political treason and sacrilege. In general, the political and
religious spheres were confounded. In the thirteenth century those who
spoke against the king were accused of blasphemy and sacrilege. On the
other hand, it is possible that the extensive legislation against blasphemy
and sacrilege during the reigns of Philip Augustus to Louis XI was but an
early stage in the development of the concept of lese-majeste?
The royal blood was referred torevealingly, for our purposesas the
blood of France, as in the expression: At the kings side were all the blood
of France, namely the grand seigneurs.le The princes of the biood, the top
most rank of the nobility, were the princes of France. They were members
of the sacred lineage and by the right of blood participants in the govern
ment of the kingdom. The princes of the blood were, however, systemati
cally and effectively excluded from participation in the government. By the
sixteenth century their imposing title amounted to little more. Theirs thus
was a situation of extreme status-inconsistency, and they did not hide their
frustration. I t found expression in the notorious radicalism of the members
of the royal familyup to the brothers of the reigning monarchwho tra
ditionally participated in openly treasonous activities. This behavior on
their part was not at all restrained, but indeed reinforced by the fact that
royal blood was taboo; it could not be touched, and thus while their accom
plices frequently suffered cruel torture and ultimate punishment for their
crimes, the princes themselves never did.11They formed a group emphati
cally and consistently opposed to the increasingly centralized (absolute)
rale of their royal kin and were natural leaders of the more general opposi
tion to it.
Because of the sacralization of the French dynasty, service and loyalty to
the king necessarily bore religious meaning. These were matters of Christian
The Three Identities of France 97
piety. The French community was a community unitedcreatedby a cult,
and thus a Church. As it was a Christian Church of sorts, the king, in for
mulating and justifying his demands on the loyalty of his subjects, drew
upon the Western Christian tradition. The expressions of specifically French
loyalty, loyalty to the king of France and to his policies, which certainly had
existed as early as the fourteenth century and appears akin to the later
French patriotism, were but an extension and particularization of tradi
tional expressions of Christian piety. Given the essentially religious percep
tion of the French monarchy, the defensio regnithe defense of the king
dom, whether with goods or with life, and service to the kingwas
unambiguously service to God. It was also, and more directly than in other
countries, a form of religious practice in accordance with the principles of
Christian altruism, of caritas, the service of God through the service of His
creatures.
Medieval amor patriaepatriotism, that iswas a fundamentally Chris
tian sentiment, both, and evidently, when patria was interpreted as "heav
ens and when it referred to the province of ones birth. (During the Middle
Ages patria only very rarely designated the polity, the kingdom in its en
tirety.) Military service, in particular, was seen as a continuation of the cru
sading tradition. The sanctity, the piety of death for ones country was in
creasingly emphasized during the Hundred Years War; the earthly patria
was sanctified by this religious association and couldas it didlater be
come a realm and a source of the sacred in its own right.
The consistently pursued royal policy vis-a-vis the Papacy and the Empire,
and the royal endorsement and promulgation of and participation in the
Christian cult of royalty related to this policy, thus very early established
France as a separate, unique entity and stimulated a specifically French iden
tity (an awareness of belonging to this particular entity and partaking of its
characteristics) and specifically French loyalty, patriotismdevotion to this
entity. Essentially religious at the outset and personified by the king and the
royal lineage, France gradually acquired othercultural and institutional
characteristics and became an image, a person, in its own right, whose exis
tence, though confounded with that of the royal lineage, was not identical
with it.
The most important among the characteristics which distinguished the
French, alongside their superior piety, were the French language, French su
periority in learning and letters, French law, and the constitution of French
society. The choice of these characteristics, similarly to the emphasis on the
superior Christianity of the Franks, was not a result of simple empirical
observation. To begin with, these, emphatically, were not the characteristics
of either the territory or the population of France (though, since some of
them, namely law and constitution, could not be seen as attributes of the
king alone, they were necessarily represented as such). Yet all were within
98
N A T I O N A L I S M
the wide range of the possible signs of French specificity, and were selected
and appropriated from within this range and imaginatively reinterpreted,
for they were points of actual or potential strength for the French culture,
and could be of use in the relationship of France with other powers.
Language
Expressions of pride in the French language abounded already in the thir
teenth century. In the opinion of the writers of that early period, French was
the most beautiful language in the world, the sweetest, la plus delita-
ble a ouir et a entendre. The sweet French tongue, they rhapsodized, is
the most beautiful, gracious and noble language in the world, the best ac
cepted and loved. For God made it so sweet and lovable for his glory and
praise, that it can be compared to the language spoken by the angels in
heaven." The fact of its technical paucity, recognized by the translators of
the time, who were among its chief encomiasts, and put forward as the
ground for the introduction of numerous latinisms, did not at all dampen
the enthusiasm of the linguistic patriots. Eulogies of the tongue continued to
appearsometimes in Latin, as in the case of Jean de Montreuil, who linked
the superiority of French over other European tongues, particularly English
and German, to its purity and originality: it was impervious to foreign influ
ences, which had corrupted the other two. French, therefore, in explicit and
rather ironic distinction from German, was conceived of as an Ur-Spracbe.
Neither were the enthusiasts dismayed by the fact that the French lan
guage they glorified was not the language of France. This language was spo
ken in Paris, indeed; it was the French of Paris. Its origin was francien, the
dialect of Francie, the territory between the Somme and the Loire, which in
the tenth and eleventh centuries constituted the domain of the Counts of
Paris, the progenitors of the Capetian kings. It was neither spoken nor, ap
parently, for a long time written in the other parts of the kingdom of France.
The literary production in the vernacular, according to Suzanne Citron, was
predominantly Anglo-Norman in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and Pi-
carde, Champenoise, and Bourguignonne in the thirteenth to fifteenth cen
turies, depending on the province and native dialect of the authors.
At the same time, from the twelfth century on, the French of Paris was the
international language of the upper classes (which allowed some to claim
that it was a language common to all peoplecommune a totes gens).
As early as 1148 one who [did not know] French was considered a barbar
ian. French was the language of the Crusader State in the Orient, and in the
thirteenth century was spoken at the courts of England, Germany, and Flan
ders. It also became the literary medium for many writers outside France.
Colette Beaune names Brunetto Latini, Martino da Canale, Marco Polo, and
The Three Identities of France 99
Philippe de Novare as examples of Italian men of letters who wrote in
French.
As the language of the upper classes, however, the French of Paris had to
compete with Latina language of sacred texts, which for a long time re
mained the language of scholarship and law, as well as the medium of polite
discourse. In 1444 Jean dArmagnac preferred to negotiate with the English
in Latin, for, as he confessed, he did not know French welt, especially to
write. The Renaissance contributed to the prestige and appreciation of
Latin, so that toward the end of the Middle Ages it seemed further than ever
from being ousted by another tongue.
The linguistic policy of the Crown was not forceful enough. While Philip
the Fair made French the language of royal edicts in the Northern parts of
France (France du Nord), in the South the administration still used Latin.
Two hundred fifty years later the Edict of Villers-Cotterets of 1539, under
Francis I, extended the use of French to all official deeds. But yet another
century had to pass before a Bourbon, Louis XIII, decreed in the Code Mi
chaud of 1629 its use compulsory in the registration of baptisms, marriages,
and burials.
Throughout the Middle Ages the population of France was divided into
at least five linguistic groups (the speakers of langue doil, langue doc,
basque, breton, and fiamand, some of which were subdivided into impor
tant dialects}. This evident lack of linguistic unity, namely the conspicuous
absence of the French language, was, paradoxically, a matter of pride rather
than mortification for linguistic patriots; it was believed to be a reflection of
the imposing size of the kingdom, which compared so favorably with that,
for example, of laughably small England that could boast but of one native
tongue.12This situation, however, in no way prevented the presentation and
celebration of the French of Paris as the French language, which, beginning
in the fourteenth century, and in the atmosphere of growing appreciation for
mother tongues in general, became an object of ardent love among schol
ars and men of lettersthe creators of symbols of collective identityand
as a result a central symbol of the French identity, and eventually an objec
tive characteristic of French ethnicity.
Translatio Studii
The claim of French cultural superiority was likewise bom in the minds of a
few scholarly dreamers. It was predicated on the stature of the University of
Paris in medieval letters and on the related notion of translatio studii. The
schools of Paris, which numbered among the most illustrious centers of
theological studies in the West, were incorporated into a university at the
beginning of the thirteenth century. The teaching was in Latin, and the stu
dents as well as professors were recruited from every part of Western Chris
100 N A T I O N A L I S M
tendom. The institution was one of the most frequented; many of the higher
clergy, at least as often foreign as indigenous, were educated there and later
spread the fame of their alma mater. The notion of iranslatio studii, the
transmission of learning from the centers of classical antiquity to Paris, was
a reflection of the universitys centrality for respublica Christiana. It placed
Paris in a direct line of succession to Athens and Rome, and implied that it
was the New Athens and New Rome. Yet, while heir to the wisdom and
scholarship of the ancients, Paris was the seat of a different culture. Its prov
ince was theology rather than the philosophy and mathematics of Athens,
or lawthe area of Romes excellence. The emphasis on theology (as the
unique strength of the University of Paris) reinforced the collective self
perception of France as the domain of superior piety: the University re
flected the nature of the kingdom within which it dwelt. Conversely, with
the mounting tensions between the kings and the Papacy, the scholars tended
to see the institution {and themselves) as a repository of specifically French,
rather than general Christian, wisdom. Toward the end of the thirteenth
century, their allegiance was unambiguously with the king, and the univer
sity was referred to as the fille du roi. The notion of translatio studii thus
acquired a novel significance: it no longer meant the transmission of learn
ing from venerable but pagan antiquity to Christianity, of which the Univer
sity of Paris happened to be a receptacle, but rather the transmission of the
cultural leadership of Greece and Rome to France. Simultaneously, the defi
nition of French culture as theology changed too, for the Italian Humanists
challenged the view that modern culture was first and foremost religious
learning, and defined it as poetry and rhetoric. The academics of Paris saw
the world of letters through the eyes of Italian Humanists, and were eager to
prove that France was anyones equal, if not superior, in these secular
spheres as well. In the fourteenth century secular letters were in their in
fancy. The competition French intellectuals encountered was stimulating
rather than discouraging. It is true that at first they had few native talents to
oppose to the Italian Dante and Petrarch, but at this barely breaking dawn
of modernity, a dream of cultural superiority was a deed half accomplished,
the gap between the two was nowhere as depressing as it has become since
then, and to honestly desire intellectual excellence was going a long way
toward actually achieving it.
The Salic Law
The language and the leadership in letters have remained with the French
until our day, elevated or transformed as they were on the way from objects
of pre-national to those of national pride. The other two distinguishing
characteristics of France, the territory and the subjects of the kingdom,
namely the Salic law and the constitution of the realm, later lost much of
The Three Identities of France 101
their importance. The Salic lawone of the numerous Germanic iaws dat
ing back to some time between the sixth and the eighth centuriesowed its
exceptional standing to the Hundred Years War. It was known but rarely
evoked until the reign of Charles V (13641380), when in the search for
legal means to render illegitimate the claims of the English Plantagenets to
the French thronea problematic undertakingit was reinterpreted and
presented as the proof of their unlawfulness. The original law did not un
equivocally exclude women from inheritance and was ambiguous as to
whether it referred to royal domain at all. But it possessed several qualities
which endeared it to a monarchy intent on proving its traditional indepen
dence from interference of the great powers and increasingly relying on ju
rists to support its position. These endearing qualities included, first of all,
its ancient birth (believed to have occurred in the fifth century, during the
reign of Pharamondthe first Merovingian king and founder of the French
monarchy), pagan and uninfluenced by Rome, which convincingly proved
the legal independence and maturity of the kingdom from its very founda
tion. The deferencebordering on worshipto this law also endeared it to
the jurists themselves, who, in addition, tended to see in it a flattering-to-
them indication of the early existence in France of a Parlement, for, in draw
ing it, Pharamond was believed to have been advised by a council of wise
men. The fifteenth-century interpretation of the Salic law as the fundamen
tal law of the kingdom, the law of dynastic succession and the legal founda
tion of the legitimacy of the sacred lineage of the French kings (the law of
France, the royal law), contributed immensely to its prestige. To defend
the Salic law was' to fight for ones country, like a Roman soldier,13the
classical expression of classical patriotism.
The I mage of France
In connection with the reinterpretation of the Salic law, scholars in the
fifteenth century thought in addition of the uniqueness and superiority of
the constitution of the French polity (politia nostra}. The members of this
body politicthe king, the Parlement, twelve peers, and three Estatesla
bored in concert, under the rule of law, for the glory of God and the common
good. The domain of the French kings, whose inhabitants were united in a
community of worship, thus became, in the eyes of some of them, an entity
with many admirable qualities of its own. These qualities were first sacral-
ized by association with the most Christian royal lineage, but having been
sacralized could be worshipped and adored independendy. France as a spe
cial entity, the land and the polity, indeed' very early became an object of
tender and deeply felt devotion, though only a few partook in this sentiment.
The authors of the vernacular chansons de geste of the twelfth century ex
pressed their love of France in charming verse. One of them wondered how
102 N A T I O N A L I S M
Jesus could prefer the desert of the Holy Land as his earthly abode, when
He had the choice between it and the provinces of France:
Merveille moi de Dieu le fi] sainte Marie
Qui chi se hebergea en ceste desertie . ..
Miex aim del bore dArras la grant castelerie
Et dAire et de saint Poi k grant caroierie
Et de mes biaus viviers la riche pescherie
Que tote ceste terre . . .
France was also imagined as a person, first manifested in a voice (as in
Alain Chartiers Quadrilogue invectif), then as a beautiful woman, Dame
France, a blond princess clothed in garments adorned with the fieur de fys.
In the early fourteenth century appeared the image of France as a garden, an
earthly paradise, le jardin de Prance. This image was secularized in the
fifteenth centuryor rather the nature of its sanctity was alteredand it
came to reflect the sense of the exceptional beauty and abundance of the
land. France is the ornament of the earth, wrote in 1483 Chancellor Jean
Masselin. The beauty of the country, the fertility of its soil and the salu
brity of its air eclipse all the other countries of the earth IS
To be French in the fifteenth century, for a scholar, a jurist, or an occa
sional nobleman, already meant more than just being a subject of the most
Christian French king, with all the religious implications of this identity. It
also meant speaking or writing French, or at least appreciating this lan
guage; carrying on the cultural tradition of antiquity; a respect for the Salic
law and pride in the constitution of the polity based on it; and an attach
ment to the land of France, whose perfection, one must realize, before the
means of reliable and regular transportation became available, was imag
ined rather than known. The key point of allegiance, the source of the
French identity, however, was still the royal person, the high priest of a
unique religious cult. One became French through the relationship to the
most Christian king. Even when one identified with the territory, the ter
ritory was. defined by the extent of the possessions of the Crown, and that
Crown had a specific religious meaning. Nothing French could conceivably
exist at this time outside of this relationship. This was not a national iden
tity. In the sixteenth century things began to change.
Heresy and Its Child
Tradition and Change in Sixteenth-Century French Patriotism
On the face of it the new century carried on the traditions already crystal
lized toward the close of the old one. In its first half, it would seem, ali it
added to the emerging sense of the French identity and pride in it was sheer
The Three Identities of France 103
volume and a more confident and articulate expression, reflecting the exist
ing sentiment in a new, specific-to-it, vocabulary. In the Middle Ages, the
Latin word patria lost its evocative meaning as the supreme object of loyalty
and pride of the citizens, which it had held within the classical system of
values, and was associated with this lofty import only when referring to the
heavenly Kingdom of God. In other cases it in a matter-of-fact manner de
noted the province of ones birth, pays natal. The word was employed fre
quently and, with the increasing use of the French language, was frenchified
around the middle of the fifteenth century, as patrie.' 6In the first half of the
sixteenth century, as another example of Renaissance, patrie regained its
classical connotations. Denoting the polity as a whole, it again signified the
referent of the most noble devotion and, being used in this sense already in
the 1520s, by the 1540s became a regular element of discourse. The service
of the patrie was praised as a great and indispensable virtue. Ronsard in
sisted that one should put every means ... even one's life to help, support
and serve the P at r i eJoachim du Bellay, in composing his Deffence et illus
tration de la langue franqoyse (1549), was moved by his natural affection
for the p at r i eand believed his work to be a duty which [he owed] to the
pat r i e17The Roman originsand transparently derivative natureof the
new value were resented by some. Charles Fontaine scolded du Beliay
around 1550: He who has a country (pays) has nothing to do with patrie.
Which name pays, derived from Greek sources, ail the ancient French poets
and orators used in that meaning .., But the name patrie has entered
obliquely and arrived only recently, with all the other Italian corruptions.
The ancient [poets] refused to use this word, fearing Latin swindles, and
were content with what was properly their own.18But the champions of
the patrie, du Bellay among them, were as protective as their critics of the
independence and prestige of the French culture. The chief object of their
work was to persuade the world as well as themselves, and to ensure, that
this culture was at least equal in value to the culture of ancient Greece and
Rome, and to that of contemporary Italythe natural heir of antiquity
which at the time convincingly claimed cultural superiority.
The patriotism of the first half of the sixteenth century was less revolu
tionary than its vocabulary would make it appear. First, devotion and ser
vice to the patrie were tightly connected, in fact identical, with traditional
loyalty to the king. In the texts the two are frequently evoked together, often
in the same sentence, and service to the prince is usually mentioned first.
Second, defending the honor of the French patrie, the authors emphasized
the traditional virtues of the most Christian kingdom. The Renaissance
discourse thus did not reflect a new reality. The alteration in the perception
of reality, which it undoubtedly affected (for worship of the patrie implied
both the depersonalization of the traditional loyalty and its de-
Christianization), not made explicit and clearly realized, was therefore but
104 N A T I O N A L I S M
slight. And yet the reality with which this discourse coexisted was under
going a profound transformation.
The most Christian monarchs of France, the eldest sons of the Catholic
Church, were slowiy but surely freeing themselves from the parental cares
of Rome. The bonds that tied them to the respublica Christiana, if this was
to be considered as something other than a loose federation of separate pol
ities, were wearing thin. In 1516 the Concordat of Bologna made the king
of France in fact, though not in name, the head of the Gailican Church.
Turning inward, the resolute Valois determined to add to the independence
from outside interference the liberty from limitations of the roya! power by
what their feudal subjects considered constitutional rights. The military and
economic exigencies of the first two reigns of the Angouleme branch (Fran
cois I and Henri II) prompted a massive reorganization of the administrative
apparatus and the emergence of a professional bureaucracy. While adminis
tration in France had been relatively centralized for a long rime, this central
ization now increased dramatically, and the extent to which previously pow
erful aristocratic families could influence the formation of royal policies
dramatically decreased.
In the course of this reorganization the concept of the stateetat
began to acquire its modern connotations. Originally an estate in the
sense of an orderthe king representing the first of several estates compos
ing the body of French society, according to the constitutional thought of
the period, epitomized perhaps in the Grande monarchie of Claude de
Seyssel19the word was still used in this sense by Francois Hotman in Fran-
cogallia in 1572. Every estate was defined as a body of right, and since the
right of the king, the royal prerogative, was the right of authority, the
state, when employed in association with the king, also denoted author
ity or system of authority. The word was used in 1595 as an exact syno
nym of what Max Weber would call a system of legitimate domination by
Charron, who, like Weber, saw in the organization of relations of authority
the constitutive element of any society. The state [Fetat], that is, the domi
nation, the specific order of command and obedience, is the support, the
cement, and the soul of everything human. I t is the vital spirit that breathes
life into thousands of men, and animates all things,20The name of the
kings council, called now the conseil d' etat; and the titles of secretaires de
tat, given to four of the secretaires du rot by Henri II, possibly emphasized
this abstract aspect of royal authority. In this manner and by association
with the king, the state was acquiring the meaning of the government
and the sphere of politics. 21
The professional officers were gradually yet energetically supplanting the
old nobility in government. Catherine de Medicis, who had control of the
government during the minority of her sons, relied on the officers rather
than the unruly grandees. She formalized the position of the superintendents
The Three Identities of France
105
of finance and established that of provincial intendants, destined to become
an unparalleled source of annoyance for the traditional nobility. The status
of this nobility was in the meantime also being undermined by the sale of
offices on a massive scale, begun under Francois I, and by the sale of noble
titles. The nobility was in a way strengthened by the influx of novi homines,
but it was seen by members of the old aristocracy as an affront and became
a major cause of disaffection among them. In their minds, as in actuality, the
swelling of the ranks of the higher nobility, as a result of the royally spon
sored stampede of low-born officers and men of wealth into it, was con
nected to the concentration of authority in the hands of the king, and they
would oppose the latter all the more because they detested the former.
Between 1494 and 1559 the attention of the general or provincial nobility
was occupied by the Italian wars: military service was not only a noble pur
suit by definition, but also, for many of its members, an economic necessity.
Peace deprived them of an important source of income, and they joined the
ranks of the disaffected. By 1560 the discontent was universal. At the Gen
eral Estates that and the following year, both the nobility and the Third
Estate voiced their sentiments and blamed their unhappiness on the Crown.
The opposition grew bolder. Henri II died in 1559, leaving the government
to a child (Francois II), who followed his father to the grave in a years time
and left the throne to another child (Charles IX); in these circumstances
boldness involved little risk. Notwithstanding the capable diplomacy of the
Queen Mother, or perhaps because of it, power suddenly appeared to be up
for grabs.
The monarchy was in crisis, and it was exacerbated by the. volatile reli
gious situation. The general discontent made wide circles of French society
responsive to the message of the Protestant doctrine. Various sectors of the
urban population, the mainstay of Huguenotism in the beginning, after the
peace treaty of Cateau-Cambresis of 1559 were joined by large numbers of
the nobility. In 1562, two thousand Calvinist churches existed in France.
The spread of Calvinism provided other discontented people with a legiti
mate target of attack, a group on which they could blame their misfortunes
all they wanted and vent their frustrations. Already in the 1560s local Cath
olic leagues appeared, which were combined in 1576 into the Catholic Holy
League, led by the ducal family of Guise. Resentments provoked by the cen
tralizing policies of the Crown and aggravated by the economic difficulties
of several important strata were diverted into a religious conflict. The lead
ers, at least, of both parties regretted the good old days of feudalism. But
instead of openly attacking the' monarchy, which was as yet inconceivable,
they engaged in a savage civil war. It lasted almost forty years (15621598),
and both sides claimed to be defending the true interests of the Crown
against wicked advisers and clamoring for the legitimate successor. The sit
uation, indeed, lent itself to a good deal of clamor, especially as it became
106
N A T I O N A L I S M
increasingly entangled in the complex issues of the nature of French identity.
Two of the last three sickly Valois died one after the other, and the third One
was assassinated childless, though not before he had named as his successor
the leader of the Huguenots, his distant cousin, Henri de Navarre. Was
France to be ruled by a Frenchman, indeed the next in the legitimate line
according to the Salic law, who was not a Catholic, or by a foreigner true to
the professed religion of the most Christian1 kingdom?
The Reformation and its wide appeal in France, although it might have
increased the catholicity of the latter, dealt an irreparable blow to the Cath
olic self-image of the country. French Catholicism grew more and more
idiosyncratic for centuries, and the kings, while flaunting the title of Rex
Cristianissimus, did everything possible to separate themselves from the
Universal Church and its head in Rome. Yet this determined decatholiciza-
tion was never made explicit; if anything it was the Pope who was accused
of being not Catholic enough. The Catholicism of France was, by definition,
impeccable; France, it was said, had never known heresy: Now it knew it
only too well. When the new teaching first reached France in 1519, the
most Christian king Francois I rather lazily flexed his Catholic muscles.
In 1521 he prohibited the publication of Lutheran texts, but he did not con
sider the battles of Rome his own. Still, later, when matters appeared to be
getting out of hand, and anti-Catholic affiches distressed the citizens of
Paris, he began persecution in earnest, and Henri II continued his fathers
high-handed policies. These two strong kings, unable to imagine and un
likely to have their authority assailed, believed they could tell their subjects
what their true identity consisted of. The widow of Henri II, Catherine de
Medicis, no longer believed so. She recognized her own and her minor sons
weakness and prudently relaxed the treatment of Huguenots. However re
luctant a devotee of Dumas may be to abandon the compelling image of the
poisonous queen, the instigator of the St. Bartholomews Day Massacre,
Catherines rule was that of systematic concessions to Protestants. The
Crown, in general, was unsympathetic to the Catholic reaction, and the last
Valois, destined, alas, to be impotent in so many aspects of his life, dissolved
the League in a vain effort to undermine its influence.
An impressive minority of French subjects in ail social strata were here
tics. This, as Oliver Cromwell might have said, was one good fact. Never
theless they were French subjects. And so, in the latter half of the sixteenth
century the heretofore centralreligiouselement in the French identity
was systematically downplayed by the Huguenots, by the Crown, by the
Gallican Catholics and politiques, leaving the League alone to stress Cathol
icism at the expense of Frenchness. The Frenchness of the combatants was
emphasized and appealed to over the differences of religion. Frenchmen
should not think of other Frenchmen as Turks, pleaded the Italian Queen
Mother. There should be brotherhood and love between them. Henri III
The Three Identities of France 107
(who had hastily returned from Polandwhere he was kingupon the
death of his brother to intercept a very possible usurpation of the French
throne) announced: I come with arrns outstretched to receive my subjects
ail alike without distinction. In 1589, Henri.de Navarre, the Huguenot
leader, appealed to him: In the name of all I beg peace from my Lord the
King, ior me, for all the French and for France, and, when already Henri
IV of France, having converted for the sake of political prudence to Cathol
icism (he agreed that Paris.was worth a Mass), he spoke to his people: I
call on you as Frenchmen. I espouse no mans passions . . . I am not blind. I
see clearly. I wish members of the Faith to live in peace in my kingdom . ..
not because they are of the Faith, but inasmuch as they have been loyal ser
vants to me and to the French crown . .. We are all French and fellow-
citizens of the same country.22The French identity was therefore redefined
by defaultfor its previously central element had been taken out of itand
yet left undefined, for it was not dear what was to take its place.
M other France
The Catholic politiques found the position of the League preposterous. The
1593 Dialogue du maheustre et du manant presented it as the pinnacle of
absurdity: If it pleases God to give us a king from the French nation,
blessed be his name; if from Lorraine, blessed be his name; if from Spain,
blessed be his name. I f he is a devout Catholic and sent by God it is a matter
of indifference to us to which nation he belongs. We are not concerned with
the nation but with religion.23For the politiques as for many others, the
question was decidedly of the nation, and that increasingly irrespective of
religion. The word was used in the sense of community of birth. France
was defined as the progenitor of this community, and was in this quality
now worshipped by patriots. They imagined it as a person, a woman and a
mother whose body was lacerated and soul ravaged by the religious strife of
her children, those literally born of her. Contemporary authors constantly
returned to this image of Francethe mother, holding them at her nourish
ing breast:
France, mere des arts, des armes et des losx
Tu mas nourry long temps du laict de ta mame!ie.M
Their patriotic concerns derived quite directly from this filial relation. Ger
ard Francois, the physician of Henri IV, whose profession added poignancy
to the title of his De la maladie du grand corps de la France, wrote in the
dedication to the king: Sire, as God made me by birth and by name a true
Frenchman [pray Franqois}and consequently . .. most devoted to the wel
fare of my own Patrie . . . as I saw it so afflicted . . . I could not do anything
108 N A T I O N A L I S M
short of offering it all the support that every child naturally owes his
mother. 25
This patriotismwhich, paradoxically, assumed a form of mother-
worship, and which was to some extent a result of the Wars of Religion
had little in common with nationalism as it is defined in this book. France,
the devoted daughter of the Catholic Church, graduated to become the
mother of her people, but was far from being a nation. This final transfor
mation of identity would take place two centuries later. Yet, in some ways,
the sixteenth century anticipated it.
Doctrines of Popular Resistance
The religious conflict gave rise to doctrines, constitutional and religious,
which had a distinctly nationalist flavor, for although they did not reach the
conclusions that would allow one to classify them as such without reserva
tion, they tended in the direction of defining France as a sovereign collectiv
ity. These doctrines, fundamentally, were justifications of the opposition to
the reigning monarch, and were first elaborated by Huguenots forced into
such opposition. Calvinism advised passive disobedience to ungodly rulers
and even allowed resistance by inferior magistrates/ 6but it is significant
that the arguments advanced by the Huguenot writers were of a constitu
tional rather than theological nature; namely the grounds for the legitimacy
of resistance they emphasized had to do with the constitution of the French
kingdom, and not with ungodly rule as such.
The two most important treatises of this kind, Frangois Hotmans Fran-
cogallia and Vindiciae contra tyrannos, attributed to du Plessis-Mornay,27
invested the community with sovereign power and the inalienable right to
oppose the unjust ruler who did not recognize or showed no respect for it.
Hotmans method was historical: he reconstructed the ancient constitution
of the kingdom and arrived at the following conclusions. Royal authority in
France, he said, had been delegated to the Crown by the free association of
Franks and Gauls, who, together, elected a king. Succession had been regu
lated by custom (Hotman did not think that the Salic law was of crucial
importance in this respect), and therefore had always been subject to the
tacit agreement of the people, and in a sense an election. The people never
abrogated its sovereignty or ceded its right to control the ruler, which was,
in ancient times, exercised by the council of the realm, the three Estates {the
king, the aristocracy of office, and the people), which represented the com
munity as a whole. The French polity, originally, had been constituted as a
limited monarchy; the Crowns arrogation of autocratic powers was a usur
pation. It was, therefore, in agreement with the French constitution to op
pose an autocratic ruler (a ruler who wished to impose his will on the people
without the latters consentan important point for Huguenots). The king
The Three Identities of France 109
was not the essential element of the community. In a manner closely resem
bling that of-John Poynet, Hotman insisted: A people can exist without a
king . . . whereas a king without a people cannot even be imagined.28Yet
there was a fundamental difference between the author of Francogallia and
his English contemporary. Hotman reifiedand deifiedthe community.
For him, it was not an association of living individuals, but a being with its
own will or spirit, reflected and embodied in its founding, constitutive deci
sion. Its original state reflected its nature, and therefore was to be jealously
preserved in essence if not in exact form, irrespective of the wishes of the
individual members, who were incidental to it.
Mornay also urged adherence to the ancient constitution and saw rule
without consent (specifically in matters of religion) as its betrayal, and there
fore a tyranny, which it was a duty to resist. He postulated the existence of
a double contract, first, between God and both the king and the people,
which acknowledged the Divine sanction of royal power; and second, be
tween the king and the people, which made just rule, that is, rule in accord
ance with the constitutional rights of the people, a condition of the kings
authority. Mornay came closer to the individualist insistence of Marian ex
iles on the right of every subject actively to resist unjust and ungodly rule,
but stopped short of it. While he invested individual magistrates, rather than
the Estates, with the authority to check and oppose tyranny, this authority
belonged to public officers who represented the laws of the community,
rather than to private individuals. Only the community, or the corporate
bodies of which it was composed, could revolt against the higher authority
to which it had consented collectively. The right of private persons to revolt,
on the other hand, spelled anarchy or even greater evils; were such a right
recognized, infinite troubles would ensue even worse than tyranny itself
and a thousand tyrants would arise on the pretext of suppressing one. 25In
short, Protestantism alone was not enough to engender respect for the indi
vidual.
The Divine Right of Kings
Upon the death, in 1584, of the Due dAlen$on, another one of the unhappy
Valois brothers, the Huguenot Henri de Navarre became heir apparent to
the French throne. The situation for the Huguenots changed, and since then
they were mainly preoccupied with proving the legitimacy of Henris succes
sion. At the same time, and for the same reasons, however, the situation also
changed for the supporters of the Catholic League, who found themselves in
imminent danger of being ruled by a heretic. The League, therefore, adopted
the doctrine of popular resistance to ungodly rule at the very moment when
the Huguenots abandoned it. But the Ultramontanist leanings and connec
tions of the League, as well as the populist and frankly demagogical tactics
110
N A T I O N A L I S M
of its leaders, served to antagonize moderate Catholic, that is, predomi
nantly Gallican, opinion; and the League, again, found itself alone fighting
for a lost cause.30At the close of the sixteenth century, France had no use for
anything remotely resembling populism and would have no talk of resist
ance. Yet the idea which came to replace these subversive doctrines, and was
to dominate French political thought for the next century and a half, though
on the face of it diametrically opposed to any kind of popular rights theo
ries, paradoxically also paved the way for national identity. This idea was
that of the Divine Right of kings.
The theory of Divine Right was inspired by the experience of the Religious
"Wars and brought together in a coherent and morally compelling system
several elements which had developed independently, but also were related
to or at least strengthened by this experience. The mob-rousing tactics of the
League and the impressive manifestation of popular appetite for a certain
kind of freedom convinced many among the nobility of the desirability of
strong government. The politiques, in general agreement with the Huguenot
theorists of resistance, were growing increasingly unsympathetic to the
people that like a fierce and savage animal wanted to shake off the yoke
of royal domination, and to replace it by God knows what imaginary liberty,
which, to their utter confusion and dismay, turned out to be a tyranny more
barbarous and cruel than those that were known to the miserable slaves of
the heathens.3 Not the least among the results of the firsthand experience
of these popular inclinations, and the revulsion that developed as a reaction,
was a new respect for educated intellect and discipline in all its forms. An-
other one, of direct political relevance, was the desire for a king who would
give order to all.32
First clearly formulated in De Iautorite du roi by Pierre de Belloy in 1588,
the Divine Right theory drew upon the Gallican assertion of the sovereignty
of the king vis-a-vis the Pope and Bodins theory of sovereignty, which it
bolstered by the immediate Divine sanction. The desire for a strongau
thoritariangovernment was presented as both very reasonable and highly
ethical, for it agreed with political theory and demonstrated admirable obe
dience to the Divine order of things. The king, who received his authority
directly from God, was accountable to God alone; resistance was made
theoretically unjustifiable; a legitimate ruier was by definition just, and the
subjects had no right but to obey. Between 1596 and 1598 the doctrine was
presented in a simplified version by a number of royalist pamphletists. It is
very certain and beyond doubt, wrote one of them, that all power comes
from above, and that to resist it is to resist the commandments and orders
of God . . . by this I mean a true and genuine power, a rule by the grace of
God, and by a legitimate and authentic king, supported by the laws and
constitutions of the realm. I intend to speak here of an absolute and full
power, founded on just laws, divine as well as natural and civil, a worthy
The Three Identities of France
111
ornament of a true king, a power descended from the heavens that cant be
measured by men, nor subjected to their control. From here there was no
difficulty to deduce that tout Roy de la terre est Dieu and que veut le
Roy, si veut la ioy.33
The emphasis on the Divine Right of kings was not new in France. The
French kings for centuries, from the thirteenth century on systematically,
substituted the direct bond with God to that with His Church in order to
escape the limitations on their power implied in the latter allegiance. Neither
was the sanctification of the royal authority and person a novelty, for this
was the essence and the effect of the religion of royalty thatalso for
centurieshad been a centra! element of French Catholicism. By these
means the French Crown had inconspicuously, but by the sixteenth century
effectively, extricated itself from the jealous tutelage of Rome, at the same
time tightening its religiously sanctioned absolutist grip on its subjects. The
novelty of Divine Right theory lay neither in the transcendental nature of
the justification of royal power nor in the appeal to direct Divine sanction.
It lay in the fact that this theory, for once, dispensed with appearances. The
God who authorized the sovereignty of the king was a Christian God, to be
surewhat else could He be? But He was no longer the God of the Catholic
Church; His divinity was, therefore, deconcretized, made abstract. The em
phasis on the abstract Divine Right was a step of fundamental importance
in the decatholicization of royal authority in France, and thus, paradoxi
cally, in its secularization.
Moreover, the increasingly impersonal God of the French, apparently, had
a peculiar penchant for legality. The Divine appointment of the sovereign
prince took the form of birth into the legitimate line, so that his providential
election was simultaneously and necessarily authorized by the Salic law. The
king was divinely appointed, but he acceded according to a decidedly hu
man, constitutional law of the kingdom. Neville Figgis emphasized the
legalistic and secular character of the French variant of Divine Right theory
in his comparison of the French doctrine with its seventeenth-century Eng
lish counterpart.34In His dependence on the Salic law, God Himself was
secularized. Yet this secularization had no element of enlmuberung in it.
The nature of the sacred changed, but it remained sacred. Parallel to the
secularization of divinity, secular authority sanctioned by the fundamental
and nevertheless human law was sacralized, and with it the law, and conse
quently the community of which it was an emanation. The ultimate result
of the doctrine of the Divine Right of kings was the deification of the French
polity.
It was left to the next century to equate the king with the polity, which in
France would first be called the state, and to the century after to transfer
the loyalty from the royal person to that increasingly reified and yet imper
sonal body of authority of which at first he was thought to be both the
112
N A T I O N A L I S M
source and the incarnation. But the stages in this portentous evolution were
implied in the idea of the Divine Right of kings just as the conclusions-of a
syllogism are in its propositions. Some signs of the seventeenth-century de
velopment were already apparent in the 1590s, specifically in the thought of
Charles Loyseau. In Traite des seigneuries (published in 1608) Loyseau rep
resented a polity as sovereignty and the territory within and over which it
was exercised (une terre seigneuriale). Neither of the two could constitute a
polity, a res publica, a social organism, without the other, but while the ter
ritory represented as it were the dead matter, sovereignty or authority pro
vided the spirit which animated it.35Authority was the essence of the polity.
By association with the king and his estate (etat du roi), authority was al
ready referred to as the state. The reconceptualization of authority in
these terms, therefore, could easily result in the parallel reification of the
concept of state and its equation with the res publica or society. For the
proponents of the Divine Right doctrine, the king was sovereign in the strict
sense of the word: the authority of the king knew no bounds within his
realm, besides God and the fundamental law, which in practice meant no
bounds at all. Seventeenth-century thinkers would merely draw from this
the conclusion that the king was the incarnate essence of society, that, in
other words, the king was the state. This radical personalization of the
political community allowed the development of fervent devotion to an ab
straction that by itself would not be able to claim such loyalty. But the redis
tribution of power {and the reorganization of social structure) that it neces
sarily implied bred frustrations which eventually led to a reaction against
royal authority and the transfer of loyalty to the (abstract) community itself.
The King and His State
The seventeenth century concluded the transformation of the French iden
tity (among those who possessed it) from an essentially religious into a po
litical one, which agreed with the lack of religious uniformity and was im
plicit in the concept of Divine Right sovereignty. It also laid the groundwork
for further developments as the articulation of the new character of French
ness gave rise to different ideas as to what constituted a polity. The stages of
this transformation can be clearly distinguished. The substitution of the
worldly allegiance for the transcendental (and of the earthly patrie for the
celestial) took place under that great prince of the Church, Cardinal Riche
lieu. And in the next reign neither Pope nor Christ could challenge the su
premacy of the Sun-King. This clarity is necessarily an advantage of hind
sight; matters did not seem so simple to the participants. I t should be
remembered that religionand in France, Catholicismwas to remain a
factor of crucial importance for a Song time to come. The first half of the
The Three Identities of France
113
seventeenth century witnessed a Catholic Renaissance, which was felt in
France more than in other countries. The Court partook in this revival,
Louis XIII surpassing in piety all French monarchs since the time of Saint-
Louis four centuries earlier. And yet, underneath it all, the relentless thrust
toward the secularization of identity continued. It took a long time before
Frenchmen realized that they were speakingan essentially irreligious
prose. Since the discourse never became profane (for one category of sacred
was merely replaced by another) and since, moreover, its idiom was bor
rowed from the Christian Catholic tradition, this change, possibly, was
practically imperceptible to the participants. But there is no possibility of
mistaking what was happening from our standpoint.
The State-Building Efforts of Cardinal Richelieu
Frenchness was dissociating itself from Catholicism. This was expressed in,
among other things, the self-presentation of the conflicting parties during
Richelieus ministry. Those who stood for the advancement of the particular-
ist interests of France and the war with Spain, which led and represented the
forces of international Catholicism, called themselves bons Francis. Their
opponents, who thought that religious considerations should take prece
dence over everything else, were catholiques zeles or devots.3SOf course, the
bons Franqais never presented their position as irreligious; instead they
claimed that theirs was the true Catholicism, the one that demanded uncon
ditional loyalty and obedience to the commands of the king, for he was the
vicar of God. The bons Franqais were sympathetic to Richelieus efforts
(which twentieth-century observers define collectively as "state-building)
to ensure and .strengthen the absolute authority of the king within the realm
and impress the glory of his state on the world outside it. The Cardinal him
self would side with either of the two parties, as the circumstances required,
but he put the support of articulate bons Franqais (with whom the circum
stances required him to side more often) to good use. The goal of the great
minister in his collaboration with the bons Franqais writers was to defend
his policies, whether anti-Catholic or anti-Protestant, foreign or domestic,
as consistent with religion; its end-result was the establishment of the
earthly polity as the ultimate good and the source of all values. After Riche
lieu, the existence of reason of state and its supremacy over all other con
siderations would be no longer disputed.
As Charles Mcllwain rightly observed many years ago, it was the doctrine
of Divine Right sovereignty which made the argument by reason of state
possible.*7To the bons Franqais writers who defended Richelieus policies
against the accusation of irreligion, the proof of their inherently and unde
niably religious character lay in that Richelieu was the minister and cham
pion of authority of a divinely appointed king, who was placed in his realm
114
N A T I O N A L I S M
above law, and in the world above the universal Church, because of his di
rect relationship to God. The royal authority was the source of all values, as
it was of all law, and loyalty to the king was supreme piety. A classical
expression of this position is found in Catholique destat, an articulate apol-
ogy of Richelieus anti-Hapsburg policies and royal absolutism. It is
because of Gods will and on his authority that kings reign, stated the ded
icatory epistle addressed to Louis XIII; kings are the most glorious instru
ments of divine providence in the government of the world. The ancients
who were not flatterers called you corporeal and living gods, and God him
self has taught men the same language and desires that you be called gods.
And since he calls you this, he wishes that you be gods and detests without
doubt all who seek to tie your hands, diminish your rights, deny your acts
that should be venerated, and attempt to be judges and censors of Your Maj
esty in things where you have only God as your judge. In the body of the
text, the author lamented: Until this miserable time that has befallen us, it
was never a source of blame for a Catholic to love the state in which he was
bom and to desire its preservation and aggrandizement. 3t is a monstrous
thing for Christianity that it is now an insult to call a man a Catholic of state
and politique, for whoever is not is a traitor to his country; he is a hypocrite
and an enemy of God and his word , . . the enemies of our kings are the
enemies of God; they should therefore be ours.38
As is clear from this passage, the borderline between direct Divine sanc
tion and divinity was blurred and easily crossed. Not infrequently the idea
of king as Gods representative was replaced by that of king as Gods earthly
incarnation. One of the more innocent victims of the pitiless process of cen
tralization of power, which pressed on in the name of God, the Marechal de
Marillac, in his parting words on the scaffold, exhorted his nephew after
God to serve the king. A bon Franqais, Paul Hay du Chastelet, took him to
task for that. What did the culpable Marechal mean, indeed, advising his
nephew to serve the king only after God, what but an utterly un-Christian
disrespect for royal authority could hide behind thus belittling the exalted
position of the king? The service of God and the king are indistinguish
able, declared Hay du Chastelet. How should we judge a Catholic speak
ing of his King, reputed to be the most just, pious, and Catholic ruler ever to
hold the sceptre, who recommends serving him with the proviso, after
God? What can we assume but that such a man had conceived a most ma
licious opinion of his princes ardor and piety and that his desire to render
him suspect, a secret hatred, desire for vengeance and conspiracy formed
against him under the pretext of a cabalistic piety had rendered this man so
verbose in death that he took pains to indicate in his last words a distinction
between serving the king and serving God?39Good Frenchmen wished to
dissociate themselves from such cabalistic piety. Increasingly, they served
the king not after, and not even alongside, but rather as God. And as earlier
The Three Identities of France 115
superior Christianity had been the mark of Frenchness, so now to be French
meant to be devoted body and soui to the principles of Divine Right and
royal absolutism. To be French and hate ones king, postulated the author
of Catbolique destat, condemn him, excommunicate him, criticize his re
ligion and that of his council, and seek to destroy his state . . . are things
incompatible. To those who failed to recognize the kings infallibility
quickly enough, Guez de Balzac retorted: Is this the way to be French and
a faithful servant of the king? Is it not to be ignorant of what one treats and
malicious to the utmost point of extreme madness?40
Sacred beings had sacred attributes; the deification of the king implied
eventual deification of the kings state. The concept of the state, originally
the mark of kingship, royal authority, in the early seventeenth century was
multivalent.41It continued to be used in the sense of royal authority, but also
referred to the functions of royal government, as well as the territorythe
realmand the people over which this authority was exercised. Royai au
thority was guided by special laws or motives for territorial expansion and
aggrandizement of status and power; these were the chief reasons of state.
Around 1625, a writer considered majesty, sovereignty, and the govern
ment of the people {VEmpire sur leur peuples} as the most important laws
of states. The king, he wrote, should be more heedful of these laws than
of his own life . . . One would not call him unjust if he extended the bound
aries of his state. He should do so because of reasons of state and the laws
of majesty, and because as soon as he touches the sceptre he swears a solemn
oath, solely because he takes it in his hand, to devote all his strength to the
preservation and growth of his rule. Whoever doubts this truth is very igno
rant in politics. 42These were principles. On a more practical level, Riche
lieu advised their implementation in foreign affairs: We may think of Na
varre and the Franche-Comte as belonging to us, since they are contiguous
to France and easy to conquer whenever we have nothing else to do.
The state was, therefore, possessed of a special, different-from-Christian,
morality. This, again, derived directly from the doctrine of Divine Right sov
ereignty. Since royal authority, or the kings state, was at the same time
Gods, the state necessarily became an end in itself and a source of moral
values. Gods will was inscrutable, but whatever was the interest of the state
was Gods will. And yet the state was clearly a mundane reality. Mans
salvation occurs ultimately in the next world, wrote the Cardinal percep
tively, but States have no being after this world. Their salvation is either in
the present or nonexistent, 43This world was no longer the antechamber to
the one above; the earthly state became the incarnation of the Divine.
Everything that came in contact with the divinely appointed king was sa-
cralized by association with him. All who approach kings, wrote Guez de-
Balzac in a letter appended to Le Prince, should seem to us purer and more
resplendent because of the radiance that they receive from them. The respect
116
N A T I O N A L I S M
that we give them should extend even to their livery-servants and valets, and
all the more to their affairs and their ministers, Balzacs own adulatory
treatise (which makes the most extravagant sycophants of the Elizabethan
Court look like dilettantes) acquired in his eyes the standing of a sacred text
which could not be criticized or contradicted. Those who did not find his
book to their taste, he said, were more enemies of bis subject than of the
work and more hostile to their prince than to his spokesman: Whoever
finds my prose excessive does not understand the duty of the subject and
does not have the opinion that he should have of his prince
This irrefutable reasoning failed to ensure the popularity of Balzacs book.
But the very same argument was used in relation to Richelieus policies. The
minister was not to be contradicted, for an attack on him was, ipso facto,
an attack on the king. What added weight to this argument was that Louis
XIII himself concurred in this opinion. To those who throughout the reign
attacked Richelieu as the despoiler of the kingdom, who gave the king bad
counsel, concealing from him the true state of affairs and otherwise deceiv
ing him, the king answered that Richelieus policies were his own, that he
knew very well indeed what his minister was doing, and that to assume oth
erwise was to take him, the divinely appointed sovereign, for a fool: It is
insufferable that cowardly and infamous persons should . . . be so presump-
tious as to write that i am a prisoner without knowing it, which is to heap
upon me the worst possible insult. **Richelieus supporters among intellec
tuals utilized all the possibilities the royal endorsement offered and articu
lated its implications. Those who attack ministers of state spare the person
of the king on paper but actually censure and offend him, warned one vieil
courtisan desinteresse. The scholar Jean Sirmond drew the ultimate conclu
sion: Ministers are to the sovereign as its rays to the sun. Even the imagi
nation has difficulty distinguishing between them. This, as was immedi
ately recognized, made Richelieu king.46 The process was similar to the
deification of the king as a result of direct Divine sanction. Alongside the
royal person a new reality was coming to existence, a reality which partook
in his sacred character and like him was to be obeyed and worshipped. This
new reality, the state, was intertwined with his being, and yet it was repre
sented by creatures of flesh and blood that were not royal.
The diffusion of the sacred from the person of the king to his affairs and
ministers was reflected in the extension and relative depersonalization of
the concept of lese-majeste, the crime of high treason. In the laws of the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, high treason was essentially de
fined as crimes against the kings person, family, and rule: nostre personne,
nos enfans et nostre posterite, [et] la republique de nostre royaume. In De
la souverainete du roy by the jurist Cardin Le Bret, the most elaborate treat
ment of the crime in the legal scholarship of the Richelieu period, high trea
The Three Identities of France 117
son was defined in a similar fashion. Le Bret divided crimes of lese-majeste
into three categoriesdefamation of the king, attacks on his life, and plot
ting against his statewhich were justified by traditional arguments. Since
kings were divinely appointed, slander against them was blasphemy and
sacrilege: Because sovereign princes being vicars of God, his living images,
or rather gods on earth as Holy Scripture calls them, their persons should be
respected by us as divine and sacred things . . . so that one may say that
when one insults the king, one insults God himself. But the kings life was
unlike that of any other mortal since the prince is the spirit that animates
the body of the state; its loss would mean the destruction of the latter. Le
Brets interpretation of lese-majeste, which still revolved around the person
of the king, therefore already presupposed the existence of another end, an
extension of the king in a sense, and inseparable from him, and yet such for
the existence of which even the king himself was a means.
The Code Michaud of 1629 added to the offenses of lese-majeste the pub
lication and sale of defamatory libels on matters of state, as well as leaving
the country without royal permission, contacts with foreign ambassadors,
calling assemblies and entering into leagues, building fortifications, and pro
ducing or possessing more or heavier weapons than necessary for persona!
protection. Article 179 of the law stipulated:
We forbid . . . all our subjects without any exception . . . to write, print or help
in printing, seil, publish and distribute any books or defamatory and injurious
libels and other writings, either printed or hand-written, directed against the
honour and reputation of persons, including Our own person and Our counsel
lors, magistrates, and officers, as weil as those concerning the public affairs, and
the government of Our state [estat]. We declare all who neglect to comply with
the above mentioned regulations, especially in regard to leagues and associa
tions in and outside of the realm: raising and training of troops: building forti
fications: communications with Our enemies: equipment, gathering and provi
sion of considerable armies and canons [all subjects of Articles 170178]:
defamation of Our government and state, and Our principal officials, guilty of
lese-majeste [and, significantly] traitors to the patrie.*7
This was the letter of the law. In practice, the definition of lese-majeste be
came even more inclusive. In 1627 Francois de Montmorency, Comte de
Bouteville, a nobleman of exalted standing, fought a duel in flagrant disre
gard of the royal edict against duels. For this, he was accused of high trea
son, tried, condemned to death, and executed. Several years later the defini
tion of high treason was expanded on an ad hoc basis to include all those in
any way instrumental and loyal to Gaston dOrleans, the kings brother, and
the Queen Mother, who fled the realm, demanded the deposition of Riche
lieu, and plotted against his government, as well as others who opposed
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N A T I O N A L I S M
Richelieus policies or were associated with those who opposed them.
Charged with lese-majeste, the accused were tried by special commissions,
as a rule found guilty, and condemned to death.
The state, still in the sense of royal authority (necessarily an abstraction),
was thus acquiring an existence separate from the king. It was something
which the king, as well as everyone else, was supposed to serve. The king
was essential to i, but the two were no longer identical. The state was intrin
sically, fundamentally monarchical; it was impossible to oppose the kings
state without opposing the king, while loyalty to the king implied loyalty to
the state. The state was not as yet an independent object of loyalty, but it
was a new object of loyalty nonetheless.
This emergent sphere of the sacred (this new abstract entity) was defined
in a way which can only be characterized negatively. It was diametrically
antithetical to the definition of nation as it had evolved in England. The
service of the state, it must be noted, in this framework did not primarily
denote the service of the general good. Though public interest might be
mentioned among "reasons of state, these usually referred to the majesty,
sovereignty, and glory of the king. It is those ideals that the king was sup
posed to serve, not the general good, or rather, general good was syn
onymous with the majesty, sovereignty, and glory of the king. The good of
the people over whom he reigned was of secondary, if any, importance; the
position was the exact opposite of the,one expressed half a century earlter
by Hotman. Richelieus open and complete indifference to the suffering of
the people as a result of his efforts to benefit the state was striking. The
aversion of the people (les peuples] toward war, wrote the Cardinal, does
not deserve consideration as a reason for making . . . peace, since they are
often sensitive to and complain of necessary evils as readily as those that
may be avoided, and they are as ignorant of what is useful to a state as they
are excitable and quick to bewail the ills that they must endure in order to
avoid greater ones. War was indeed a necessary and useful evil, given the
ministers definition of public utility, The peoples misery is a disadvantage
that passes, advised comfortingly one of his bons Frangais supporters,
Achille de Sancy; a year of peace restores everything. But the gain that has
accrued to the-king in these wars is permanent. He has restored his reputa
tion through Christendom and has brought fear of his arms to those who in
the future would do him violence. *s That misery they dismissed so philo
sophically was not, one should note, a temporary shortage of luxury goods
or suchlike inconveniences. It was a lack of bread continuous enough to
drive people to suicide; in some provinces peasants were reduced to eating
grass.1* But it is incontestable that the glory of the French state grew, and it
was the glory of the state that mattered, not the diet of the rabble.
Because the king and his state were inseparable, and it was impossible to
oppose the good of the state without at the same time opposing the king,
The Three Identities of France
119
those who could not stomach Richelieus methods of serving both attempted
to reinterpret the notion of the good of the state, and in so doing proposed
different definitions of the state itself. The rebellious brother of Louis XIII,
Gaston dOrleans, and his supporters among the intellectuals drew atten
tion both to Richelieus lack of respect toward traditional relations and priv
ileges; which they called liberties, especially those of the nobility, and to
the misery of the people, which they blamed exclusively on his policies, and
seemed to see the state as the polity constituted by these traditional rela
tions, privileges, and people. Related to this tentative redefinition of the state
as a polity were the rare and timid reservations regarding absolute mon
archy. Nobody questioned the Divine appointment of the king and the legit
imacy of absolutism, but those who had not as yet become bons Franqais
wished that the king would temper his absolute power, rather than aggran
dize it, as urged Richelieu, for whom this was the chief interest of the state.
On the whole, the opposition to absolutism, in this early period of its for
mation, had not yet received an articulate expression, but existed as an in
choate sentiment. In the seventeenth century, Richelieus views of the state
and absolute monarchy triumphed over all others. And yet it was Richelieus
invention of the state as an object of loyalty as sacred as the king and exist
ing alongside the king which later helped to undo the absolute monarchy.
Absolute rulers, and their egotistical state, demanded absolute devotion.
The political god was a deity more jealous than the God of Christians, who
peacefully coexisted with scores of lesser idols (such as, among other things,
kings, social orders, and corporations). The state of the absolute kings, by
contrast, wished to rule in the hearts of its subjects alone {that is, the chief
ministers and at least the greatest absolute ruler France was to have thought
it should), and refused to share them even with religion, be it pretended
reformed or the true one. Certainly it had no tolerance for the plethora of
lesser loyalties and identities which constituted the fabric of traditional
French society. The God of Christians had eternity at His disposal, but the
state had no being beyond this world: it had to have all that was its due at
once. Absolutism was an aspiring totalitarianism: absolute rule was possible
only if all sources of independenceand therefore potential opposition
were rooted out, and divided loyalty bred independence.
To be a goodthat is, devoted, patrioticFrenchman was to be a good
subject. To be a good subject meant to be obedient and to leave politics to
the professionals. Obedience is the true characteristic of the subject, wrote
Richelieu. Balzac, who was possibly the most unreservedly euphoric of Ri
chelieus apologists, foresaw the imminent coming of idyllic times when in
novations will be accepted only in colors and fashions of dress. The people
will leave liberty, religion, and the public good in the hands of their superi
ors, and from legitimate government and perfect obedience will come that
felicity which political leaders seek and which is the objective of civil life.50
120
N A T I O N A L I S M
The determined expropriation of political power and of the right to partici
pate in government from those who traditionally had enjoyed such power
and participation, which amounted to the reduction of all to the position of
subjects equal before the king in their submission, was detested and ardently
opposed, and provided the main reason for resisting Richelieu as a tyrant.
This was the chief complaint of Gaston dOrleans and the high nobility in
general, and the meaning of exhortations to return to the monarchy tem
pered by aristocracy. Arrest his ambition, his malice, and his violence,
Great King, Mathieu de Morgues implored Louis XIII, as if royal absolut
ism were nothing but the whim of the upstart Richelieu. Call to yourself
those who by natural right should be near you.51But absolutism consisted
exactly in that authority was to be centralized in one source, and nobody
had a natural right to share in it.
It was during this period that the state in the sense of royalcentral
government took shape and became a tangible reality. Gradual centraliza
tion of authority in France went back to the Middle Ages and had visibly
accelerated already in the first half of the sixteenth century. The Bourbon
rulers inherited the governmental structure built by Francois I and Henri II
and continued their work. By the end of the reign of Heriri i y the king,
increasingly defined as absolute, ruled with the help of what might be called
a small central administration.52It consisted of several councils, or sec
tions, which divided among themselves the extensive judicial, legislative,
and executive responsibilities of the original kings council {Conseil du Roi
or Grand Conseil). The chief personnel of these councils were the chancel
lorthe chief justice; the secretaries of state for foreign, military, and inter
nal affairs; and the superintendent, the comptroller-general, and the inten-
dants of finance. Frequently one person performed several important
functions. The central administration also included numerous lesser func
tionaries such as councillors of state and maitres des requStes, of whom the
former participated in the discussion of policies, while the latter provided
the councils with necessary information. The members of the central admin
istration held no entitlement to their offices, and owed them, ultimately, to
the royal favor. Among other things, this was expressed in their perception
as creatures of the king, who, in turn, was their protector. 53Their well
being {at least in the sense of position and wealth) depended entirely on the
degree to which their services pleased the sovereign, who raised and had the
power to undo them.
Not all of the members of the kings council were thus dependent on him,
though. The great noblesprinces of the blood, cardinals, and peerswere
entitled to participate in it too. Government was their birthright. They did
not necessarily use this right, or at least did not use it systematically, possibly
because the business of government demanded application, which was not
one of the foremost noble virtues. But under Richelieu they were deprived
The Three Identities of France 121
of the very possibility of using it. The grand nobility had independent
sources of status, wealth, and, until recently, power. Its identity was formed
by feudal relationships, and its loyalty to the king, who was for the nobles
just primus inter pares, that is, the first nobleman of the realm, was volun
tary. It had no sympathy for the practice of absolutism (although it came to
accept its theoretical tenets, developed by the more articulate members of
society, and having purely ritual meaning for the rest), andas so many
authors point outit did not understand the concept of the state. For
most of the grands, as, of course, for the overwhelming majority of the
people, the state as an entity in any sense separate from the king and an
object of loyalty, In the first half of the seventeenth century, did not exist.
The nobles had no stake in the aggrandizement of the kings authority, maj
esty, and sovereignty, and so long as they participated in his government, it
was not actually his, and the state in this sense (of a unified central govern
ment) could not emerge. Unlike the grands, Richelieu, who had the ambition
of a great noble, but none of the independent resources which could help to
satisfy it, identified with the kings cause. Service to the king, for him, was
the only way up, and he insisted that it should be so for everyone.54The
king, naturally, was in sympathy with this view. The exclusion of the nobil
ity as such from government was in fact an attempt to redefine a power elite
as a service elite, separate from iineage and wealth (of which it could be
come a source, but could not be a derivative)* and to create a corps of people
whose personal interests would be inseparable from the interests of the
royal authority. (Powerful noblemen could be a part of this elite if they re
nounced their independence and identified with the kingwhich they
would never do.)
Supported by the king and never deviating from the principles of Divine
Right sovereignty, Richelieu set out to realize his vision. In this he was
helped by circumstances. The factious gmndss determined to discredit them
selves by intriguing against the royal authority, which had been their con
stant preoccupation since the assassination of Henri IV, and later specifically
against Richelieu, succeeded in this undertaking and were removed from the
council. Richelieu then replaced them with his creatures, advancing his
relations and friends, and the relations and friends of his friends (that is,
people of similar background), to positions of influence. The creatures
owed him their elevation, and he could count on their loyalty, which was as
firm as his own devotion to Louis XIII. The administrators, linked thus into
one chain of dependence, acted as one body and had one will, their sole
interests being the preservation and aggrandizement of royal authority and
keeping all those with different interests out of the kings sight and proxim
ity. The nobles complained that not only were they prevented from influenc
ing the course of the grandes affaires, but, in addition, that even their tradi
tional right to attend on the king was curtailed. Richelieus councillors stood
122
N A T I O N A L I S M
between the monarch and the rest of the world and jealously watched over
the attentions of their sovereign.-
The trust between Louis XIII and Richelieu, and the kings unqualified
support for the tactics and policies of his favorite, resulted in a de facto
transfer of certain sovereign powers to the principal minister and in an os
tensible confusion of their roles. No such confusion existed either in the
mind of Richelieu or in that of the king, but the impression contributed
toward the collectivization of the concept of sovereignty, its further abstrac
tion from the person of the monarch, and even the idea that it could possibly
exist outside (though not without) him. To the uninitiated it might seem that
there existed side by side two powers (even if these were but reflections of
one), the king and his government or the state, which was represented by
the collective body of ministers with the principal minister as its spirit.
As royal government was transforming from an attribute or an activity of
the king into the state, a collective bearer of sovereignty, it was also becom
ing a pervasive, everyday reality. To the consolidation' of political power in
the center corresponded the administrative centralization of the entire
realm. To carry out the policies decided on by the councils, the kings, before
Richelieu, relied on legions of officials, officiers organized in corporations,
such as Parlements. Officiers, in distinction from the members of the coun
cils (those who were not great nobles), enjoyed considerable independence.
Since the sixteenth century, because of the practice of venality, they owned
their offices, and a law introduced in 1604, the paulette, made the offices in
effect hereditary: payment of an annual fee made it possible to bequeath
them through wills. By the early seventeenth century there were about forty
thousand officiers in France.56The officters were commoners by birth, but
already in this period numerous offices, specifically in sovereign courts,
under certain conditions conferred nobility, and soon this large group was
to develop into a particular category of nobility, the noblesse de robe.
The implementation of royal policies depended on these permanent pro
fessional officials; they were entrusted with the everyday actual work of gov
ernment. But government by officiers, similarly to government by nobles,
was not, strictly speaking, royal government. On the face of it, the officiers
represented the royal authority, but in practice they were proprietors of a
certain function. They paid for a portion of this authority and considered it
theirs to keep and use with profit. Their well-being, in distinction from the
well-being of members of the royal administration, depended first and fore
most on the well-being of their corporations. Their loyalties were at best
divided. Venality of office contradicted the principle of indivisible sover
eignty on which the mental edifice of royal absolutism rested, and the offi
cters had little interest in its development.
If the state referred to royal government, the officiers were not the state.
The Three Identities of France
123
State-building, therefore, in the French case, implied the construction of an
alternative corps of officials. This is indeed what had happened. Richelieu
neither inaugurated this process nor brought it to conclusion, but he ad
vanced it so conspicuously that his ministry has been credited with (or ac
cused of) a revolution in government. His dramatic innovations were not
intended as such; they were conceived as temporary measures and thus
peacefully coexisted with formal traditionalism. But, though the new wine
was served in the old bottles, it nevertheless tasted different, and the officiers
had no difficulty realizing that its taste did not agree with them.
The twin pressures which burdened the reign of Louis XII]the internal
unrest and the conflict with the Hapsburgscompelled Richelieu to seek
ways to increase the efficiency and accountability of government. Among
the methods he resorted to, most had already been tried and all were consid
ered legitimate; what distinguished his ministry was a spectacular in
crease in the use of extraordinary measures, as a result of which they became
normal. The most important and thoroughgoing of the changes that Riche
lieu thus, without intending to do so, introduced was the emergence of the
provincial intendants as the ubiquitous representatives of central authority.
Provincial intendants were originally special commissioners who served at
the kings pleasure and were accountable to his council; they were chosen
from councillors of state and mattres des requites and sent to the provinces
with temporary assignments: to examine the work of a certain court, to put
down a revolt, to supervise and ensure the collection of a tax. It was the
need for a more efficient and reliable collection of taxes due to the escalation
of hostilities with Spain which led to the sharp increase in the use of inten
dants between 1634 and 1637. Since then, according to Roland Mousnier,
the significance of the institution of the intendancy changed. Intendants ef
fectively subordinated or even altogether replaced all financial officials and
ordinary judges. Their powers, within the limits of their commissions, were
absolute. Everyone owed them obedience and assistance, and their decisions
could be appealed only at the kings council.57The officiers kept their offices,
but lost their functions, and with these went income and sources of influ
ence.
In general, the privileged subjects of the French king, great and small, did
not like the state which, helped on its way by Cardinal Richelieu, was
emerging before their eyes: it deprived them of their privileges. Only the
kings power and the fear of punishment caused them temporarily to submit
to this innovation, and while they did so, grumbling unceasingly, they did
not lose hope of returning to the good old days. Richelieus death, in 1642,
was a cause of public rejoicing.58When Louis XIII followed his minister to
the grave a year later, leaving as his successor a little boy, hardly five years
of age, the grands and the officiers rose in revolt.
124 N A T I O N A L I S M
The Fronde
The periods of minority, when authority was exercised by a Regent in the
kings name, rather than by a divinely appointed king, and the government
was by definition provisional, opened cracks in the otherwise impregnable
wall of legitimacy which protected royal absolutism, weakened it, and ex
posed it to attack. The central government and its practices were dissociated
from the person of the king and could be righteously opposed as a usurpa
tion of royal authority and a perversion of just rule, without in any way
implicating in these accusations the young monarch himself (whose inno
cence, in fact, was insisted upon), or questioning the monarchical principle.
Intensified opposition to absolutism during the periods of minority, ex
pressed chiefly in the reassertion of independence by the nobility, was a re
current pattern in absolutist France: it happened during the minority of
Louis XIII and that of Louis XIV, and again, at the beginning of Louis XVs
reign. (One unintended result of this was that all these kings, who, between
them, ruled France for 164 years, learned early in their childhood to recog
nize their enemies, and never forgot who they were, which gave these ene
mies all the more reason to revolt against their successors.) Ideologically,
this opportunistic agitation bore the character of radical conservatism: the
noble rebels called for the re-establishment of their privileges and an end o
pernicious innovations. The Fronde, that momentous expression of aristo
cratic reaction during the minority of Louis XI X differed from the other two
cases only in its scale and intensity. The government temporarily lost con
trol, all its activities were brought to a halt, and the country was plunged
into a state of general turmoil, disorder, and misery. It was the last massivf
rebellion against royal absolutism in the seventeenth century, says W. F.
Church.59
If one is to believe the somewhat romanticized account of Alexandre
Dumas-pere, it must have been fun, if not entirely bliss, to be alive, and even
more so, young, during those exciting times, especially if one was a member
of the Parisian aristocracy. However, besides divertissement for the high-
spirited nobility, the Fronde offerred iittle. The Frondeurs were moved by
the very same particularist motives that in 1789 were to bring what their
descendants, in contrast to them, already considered the old regime to an
end. But they lacked the ideological framework which gave these motives
moral luster and fueled the grand event. The Frondeurs had no ideal to op
pose to absolutism. And thus their revolt remained but a crusade against
all discipline, a period of impetuosity and turbulence that had no crea
tive significance.60It was as if a group of actors, indeed predestined to give
the great performance, tried to stage the French Revolution without bother
ing to look at the text of the play.
Yet, when the actors spokewhich happened rarely, for they were busy
The Three Identities of France 125
making merryrheir words expressed truly revolutionary sentiments and
could be taken from the pages of Hotmans Francogallia or out of the
mouths of the insurrectionists across the Channel who at that very moment
were putting the official seal on their nationality. In his Maximes pour Iin-
stitution du roi, said to be the most important theoretical justification of
the Fronde,61Claude Joly expostulated: Certain persons who are badly in
formed concerning the rights of the sovereign believe that the people were
made for kings, whereas on the contrary it is true that kings were made only
for the people. There have always been people without kings, but never
kings without people. The power of kings, he insisted, is not absolute and
without limits; kings are bound by law, for it is by contract formed by
two equal parts . .. [that] the people submitted to [the king] only on condi
tion that he preserve and maintain the law. The pernicious notion that
kings were absolute masters of the lives and goods of their subjects was
insinuated into their minds by wicked ministers, especially the alien
minister Mazarin, in order to gorge themselves with wealth, raise them
selves to titles of dukes and peers, and do many other things that are entirely
above their birth. These ministers usurped the authority of the kings; they
tricked them into waging unnecessary wars, wishing merely to create con
fusion in order to find excuses to wring taxes from the people, keep the great
nobles away from court in order to be absolute masters there, cause many
quick deaths so as to have many offices to fill, and rid themselves of those
whom they dislike. (Thus Joly identified the chief targets of the ministers
treacheries.) They also propagated the accursed maxims of the reason of
state, as if royal authority had any reason for existence other than the wel
fare of the people, and any morality other than that of the Gospel. For Joly,
the state was not identical with royal authority; nor did he use the term to
refer to the institutions of government. For him it meant the community
over which the king ruled and for the sake of which he was made king,
and he bewailed the many ills that afflicted this state, and the uprisings
which violently agitated it due to the criminal activities of the ministers.62
Louis XI V
But in Louis XI X ^ Dieudonne, the Sun-King and the Grand Monarch,
central authority was dramatically reunited with the royal person, and fur
ther attacks on absolutism became impossible. The king who could with
some reason argue LEtat cest moi used the term state in a relatively
(though not entirely) unambiguous sense, consistent with this pronounce
ment. He was a conscientious ruler, hard-working and devoted to his pro
fession, a truly professional king, one might say, and judging by the pleasure
he derived from hi,s work, an artist of his trade.3In his Memoires he de
clared that the interest of the state should always take precedence over the
126 N A T I O N A L I S M
private pleasure of the king;4public duty and private, so it seemed to
him, in the case of kings, were inseparably connected. From the moment 'he
ceased to be a child and decided to become a ruler, Louis XIV served the
state, yet he was not its servant. In the spirit of Richelieus etatism, the state
was not above him; ir was to him what the Holy Ghost was to God the
Father. The good of the state implied the welfare of the kings subjects
only in the last place, and mostly because a minimal degree of the latter was
necessary for the pursuit of higher ideals: the grandeur, the glory, and the
power, the outward reflection of the kings dignity. Giory was the ultimate
good of the state and the end of all the kings cares; at the same time, it
was the surest means for the further attainment of this end. Reputation
alone often accomplished more than the most powerful armies, noted the
king with surprising sociological acumen. All conquerors have advanced
more with their names than their swords. The needs of the state, that is, of
the grandeur of the kings rule, necessitated absolutism. The interests of his
[the kings] glory and even [emphasis added] of his subjects require, wrote
Louis, that he enforce strict obedience to himself . .. The slightest division
of authority always produces the greatest misfortunes. The chief reason for
that, in the opinion of the king, seemed to be the ambition of the great
[nobles], which, if not suppressed, inevitably led to revolts, civii wars, and
everyday abuses. There is no noble, thought the august author, who does
not tyrannize over the peasants. Thus, if authority is divided, instead of
one king that the people should have, they are ruled simultaneously by a
thousand tyrants. But there is this difference: the commands of the legiti
mate prince are always kind and moderate because they are -founded on rea
son, whereas those of these false sovereigns are always unjust and tyrannical
because they are inspired by unbridled passion.
Contemporaries of the great king, such as the churchman Bossuet or the
jurist Jean Domat, articulated his position, while others, the foremost of
whom was Colbert, helped to implement it. Domats defense of absolutism
was rather unorthodox. It was based on two remarkably modern premises:
one, that all men were created equal; two, that they were assigned to un
equal social positions for their own good, for the satisfaction of everyones
needs necessitated division of labor. The essential reason for absolutism was
functional. It was, however, propped by the will of God. Social hierarchy
and political power were divine institutions, while the equality of men was
merely a creation of nature. In this manner, the traditional considerations of
Divine Right sovereignty and the legitimacy it implied were also brought in.
The logic of Domats argument revealed a gifted legal mind: This necessity
of government over men whom nature created equal but who differ among
themselves according to the diversity that God established in their condi
tions and professions demonstrates that government results from His order
ing. As He is the only natural sovereign over men, it is from Him that all
The Three Identities of France
127
who govern hold their power and authority, and it is God himself that they
represent in their functions . . . Since government is necessary for the com
mon good and God himself established it, it follows that those who are its
subjects must be submissive and obedient. 63 -
Bishop Bossuet addressed Louis XIV and, apparently, all past and future
mondrchs in his person, as gods of flesh and blood, and taught that not
only .. . the rights of royalty are established by His laws but the choice of
rulers is an effect of His providence . . . In order to establish this power,
which represents his own, God places on the foreheads of sovereigns and on
their visages a mark of divinity. Some of the duties of a divinely appointed
king, however, were surprisingly mundane. Carry the glory of your name
and that of France, Bossuet urged the king, to such heights that there may
be nothing for you to desire but eternal felicity.
In this framework, loyalty to the king was piety. But, for Bossuet, pious
behavior in this world included more than loyalty to the king. In his Htstoire
des variations des eglises protestantes, he insisted that Protestantism was
not Christian, since it is faithless to its Princes and to its Country. The
country was becoming sacralized by association with the king. In his eulogy
of patriotism, Bossuet echoed the idealists of earlier times. Human society
requires us to love the land in which we live together, he wrote in his mag
num opus, Politique tiree de VEcriture Sainte; this is what the Romans
called caritas patrii soli, love of country [I'amour de la patrie] . . . It is a
feeling natural to all peoples. The patrie was defined as the altars and the
sacraments, the glory, the wealth, the peace and the security of life; in one
word, the community of all divine and human things. One owed to it, in a
time of need, everything one owned and ones very life. The duties toward
the king were the same, because the king and the patrie were one. One
owes the prince the same services one owes to the patrie . . . the entire State
is in the person of the prince. In him is the power, in him is the will of the
entire people . . . A good man prefers the life of the prince to his own.
The grand siecle indeed considered patriotism a noble sentiment. Its great
poets carried on the tradition of their predecessors and extolled patriotic
sacrifices. Corneille rhapsodized:
Mon cher pais est mon premier amour . . .
Mourir pour le pais est un si digne sort
Quon brigsieroit en foule une si belle mort. . .
Without the patrie life was not worth living. When the country was in peril,
ones life was a small price to pay if this ensured its continued existence. So
at least thought Racine:
Quoi! lorsque vous voyez perir votre patrie
Pour quelque chose, Esther, vous comptez votre vie!67
128
N A T I O N A L I S M
In this poetry, too, service of the patrie was frequently indistinguishable
from devotion to the ruler. Prince and country were often mentioned in One
breath. In times of victory, in particular, French subjects readily identified
with their king, whose glory was that of France, and proudly felt French.
No doubt, not everyone shared in such pride, even among the educated, who
were the most prone to do so. Pascal found patriotism, as it was understood
in his time, absurd, and distinguished between the interests of individual
subjects and those of the king. La Bruyere juxtaposed patrie and absolute
monarchy as mutually exclusive: "There is no patrie under despotism, it is
replaced by other things: interest, glory, the service of the prince. 6i Such
things, however, were not said aloud during the greater part of the reign,
although they became more common as i t drew to its close. Patriotism was
a gratifying sentiment in the latter half of the seventeenth century; it was a
matter of consensus that the age was a grand siecle for France, an age of
glory and grandeur; that Louis XIV was the grand monarch; and that the
patriethe common mother of the king and his subjectsand the kings
state, France and the king, were one.
As long as a polity was defined by the authority it was under, it was in
deed difficult to disengage its image from that of the king who was his own
first minister. Yet Louis XIVs personal government was accompanied by an
accelerated development of the state apparatus, and administrative central
ization found its conspicuous expression in the emergence of a disinterested
(that is, lacking particular interests other than that in the smooth running of
government) bureaucracy. It was by developing the bureaucracy, wrote
Georges Pages, that the Secretaries of State at the center and the intendants
throughout the realm [and, one should add, the king through them] estab
lished their power. The intendants, the thirty maitres des requites sent to
the provinces, on whom depended their success or misfortune, their prosper
ity or sterility,69though long detested, acquired their lasting image of all-
powerful agents of the central government during this period. In distinction
from their predecessors at the time of Richelieu and Mazarin, when they
competed with officiers who still retained important administrative powers,
the intendants of Louis XIV dispossessed the officiers of their functions and
took over the entire administration from the courts. They virtually con
trolled taxation, shared with governors of the provinces (usually the grands)
supervision of the provincial estates, and with bishops, of the Catholic
clergy, and took from the Parlements administrative control of the armies,
management of local communities, appeals from local courts, the execution
of sentences imposed by royal and ecclesiastical courts, evaluation of the
advisability of founding convents, primary schools, high schools, universi
ties and reforming these institutions, the policing of religious dissidents and
the newly converted, and general direction of the poor law administration,
commerce, agriculture, and industry. 70In short, they governed France, and
The Three Identities of France 129
by the same token, deprived potential opposition leaders of their influence
and sources of power. On the whole, the results of the intendants rule were
beneficial. Even Pages, generally unsympathetic to the centralization of au
thority, agreed that with them the realm was better administered, and the
common people gained thereby. Yet his assessment of the ethical signifi
cance of their rule is unequivocal: It was the intendants administration
that acquainted the nation with royal despotism 71
Someones gain is often anothers loss. This was undoubtedly so in the case
of French absolutism. And what someone who gained may have regarded as
an unparalleled condition of civic felicity was indeed seen by many others as
despotism. With Louis XJTV absolutism triumphed, but in its very triumph it
was (to borrow a metaphor from the turbulent history of another embattled
ism) producing its own grave-diggers. Some of them were the victims
of its forcefulvictoriousimposition. The majority, however, were the
beneficiaries of the exceeding self-confidence o its proponents and their
mistaken notion that it did not have to be forcibly imposed in every area to
reign uncontested.
The religious policy of Louis XIV inevitably resulted in the disaffection of
Huguenots. The latter represented a major source of independence in
France, and it is understandable why the king would wish to suppress them.
Given this goal, one can only wonder whether the methods of its achieve
ment coutd have been less abrasive; as it happened, they were brutal. The
alienation of Huguenots was of momentous significance in the development
of the French national idea. An oppressed and threatened minority, they
were, as once before, during the Religious Wars of the sixteenth century,
among the first to indict the system as a whole and to uphold the cause of all
its victims. They represented the discrimination against them as but a spe
cific expression of a general pattern which affected the lives of other groups
as well; identified these other victims of oppression: nobility, Parlements,
peasantry, even the Catholic Church; and stressed the common bond be
tween these groups and themselves. Thus they appointed themselves spokes
men and representatives of the communitythe redefined state and
"people. The state was invested with a profound spiritual, in fact reli
gious, meaning by the Crown itself. I t had been a recognized sphere of the
sacred since the time of Richelieu. Huguenot writers took this creation of
the architects of absolutism, this corollary of the Divine Right of kings, and
turned it against them. They juxtaposed the communitythe victimto
the monarch, the obvious source of their own oppression and, ipso facto,
the victimizer of the community as a whole.
A Huguenot in exile, probably Pierre Jurieu, left a famous testimony of
this revolutionary transformation in the image of social order in a tract en
titled The Sighs of Enslaved France, Who Thirsts for Liberty. The state,
130 N A T I O N A L I S M
France, said the author, as a result of a tyrannical rule, unprecedented in its
claims on the subjects and disregard for the general good (and in compari
son with which, indeed, the ministries of Richelieu and Mazarin looked be
nign), became undistinguishabie from the plebs. The community of France
became identical with the people. It must first be understood, he wrote,
that under the present government, everyone is of the people. We no longer
recognize quality, distinction, merit, or birth. The royal authority has risen
so high that all distinctions disappear and all merit is lost. From the heights
to which the monarch has been raised, all humans are but dust beneath his
feet. By grouping all among the people, oppression and misery have been
extended even to the noblest and highest elements of the state. This, in
itself, was a depressing development, but, having happened, it changed the
nature of discourse and opened important possibilities for opponents of
Louis XIVs policies. The people was ennobled by the elevated character
of those whom royal disregard of privilege made its members. I t received an
infusion of blue blood, and was mere rabble no more. It was on its way
toward sacralization. In this particular case, the de facto equation of the
state with the people allowed the author to represent the misery of the
peoplethat is, of the peasantryas the misery of the state, which had
superb potential as a rhetorical device. The policies of the Sun-King, and
especially his military undertakings, took a heavy toll on the peasantry,
whose prosperity even under lesser exactions rarely transcended bare sub
sistence. Its misery was in fact shocking. But so long as it was the misery of
the peasantry alone, those who, happily for them, were not peasants were
rarely shocked by it. The representation of the misery of the people as com
mon misery transformed it into a concern for all, for it made other groups
aware of what dangers all were exposed to under a government which
treated all alike.
The author of the tract focused on taxation, a burden from which the
peasantry suffered most and in the most convincing manner. He explained
to his dear unfortunate compatriots, who, apparently, did not realize the
degree of their misfortune, how heavy and unnecessary this burden was, for
the money collected in taxes (which in France, according to his estimation,
far exceeded sums collected elsewhere) was used to finance the satisfaction
of the kings selfish interests and the enrichment of low-born tax-collectors.
Such an extortionist policy was unlawful. Kings, argued the author, once
again echoing the sixteenth-century contention, were established by the
people to preserve their persons, lives, liberty, and properties. But the gov
ernment of France has risen to such excessive tyranny that the prince today
regards everything as belonging to him alone. He imposes taxes at will with
out consulting the people, the nobles, the Estates, or the Parlements . . . in
precisely the way that the Moslem princes of Turkey and Persia and the
Great Moghul made themselves sole masters of all property . . . I beg you to
The Three Identities of France
131
realize where you are and under what type of government you live. In a
striking passage the author decisively dissociated the king from the state. It
sometimes happens, he argued, that princes and sovereigns exact levies
that appear excessive and greatly inconvenience individuals, but are re
quired by what are called the needs of the state. In France there is no such
thing . . . The king has taken the place of the state. It is the service of the
king, the interest of the king, the preservation of the provinces and wealth
of the king. Therefore the king is all and the state nothing . .. [The king] is
the idol to which are sacrificed princes, great men and small, families, prov
inces, cities, finances and generally everything. Therefore, it is not for the
good of the state that these horrible exactions are made, since there is no
more state. 71
Two groups remained associated with the king and were also defined as
tyrants and bloodsuckers of the state. The first one was the tax-farmers
and financiers. Their early criminalization in the popular consciousness was
an ominous sign and did not bode well for those new groups whose status
was dependent on their wealth. The second was the upstart ministers whose
elevation implied the humiliation of the aristocracy of the blood, for these
newly great who rise from the dust and climb to places besides the throne,
claimed the author, serve merely to beat down and annihilate the ancient
houses. The state was redefined as the people, and the good of the state
came to mean, emphatically, the public good, yet, clearly, the upright cham
pion of these loftyand radicalideas did not think that rising from the
dust was morally defensible. It was the good old days, when everyone knew
ones place, that he longed for. Public good referred to the preservation of
vested interests. The kings chief crime was that he had no regard for either
of the two. Absolutism was revolutionary, and the old order defended itself
against it. But in its desire to effect a counter-revolution and turn the wheel
back, it prepared a revolution in consciousness which would make return to
the past impossible.
The kings misplaced zeal in the persecution of jansenists, the tactlessness
with which he pursued centralization of authority into the innermost re
cesses of his orthodox subjects consciousness, was potentially more dam
aging to absolutism than the alienation of the Protestant minority, Louiss
motives in this case are harder to explain. If we are to believe the Due de
Saint-Simon, who reports the following anecdote, it was not purity of
faith that the king cared about. When M. dOrleans was about to start for
Spain, he named the officers who were to be of his suite. Among them was
Fontpertius. At that name the king put on a serious look. What! my
nephew! he said. Fontpertius! the son of a jansenist, of that silly woman
who ran everywhere after M. ArnouSd!I do not wish that man to go with
you. By my faith, Sire, replied the Due dOrleans, I know not what the
mother has done; but as for the son, he is far enough from being a Jansenist,
132 N A T I O N A L I S M
Pll answer for it; for he does not believe in God. Is it possible, my nephew?
said the king, softening. Nothing more certain, Sire, I assure you. Well,
since it is so, said the king, there is no harm: you can take him with you. 73
Showing such tolerance toward atheism, the king wished his believing
subjects to believe in complete servility. The obligation to sign the Formu
lary,74indiscriminately required of all clerics, had the effect of converting
many of them to Jansenism and strengthened rather than weakened the in
fluence of the teaching, contributing to the division within the Gallican
Church. This was all the more detrimental to the regime, since Jansenism
became associated with the insistence on the right of the lower clergy to
participate in Church government. It opposed itself to the coalition of Jesu
its and bishops who did not recognize such a right and treated priests as
subordinates without any authority of their own, and were backed by the
king. The involvement of the Jesuits was particularly compromising for the
government because of their ultramontane sympathies: it was now possible
to accuse the kings religion of being anti-French. A dogmatic controversy
was invested with acute political significance and became a struggle over
centralization of authority in religion.
The persecution of Jansenism thus led to the estrangement from the cen
tral government of a very broad and influential part of the population, and,
as a result, the discontent spread far and wide. In the writings of Jansenists
or of churchmen and magistrates who sympathized with Jansenists, true
Christian monarchy was tied to the idea of general good, while the ab
solute monarchy, by opposition to it, was defined as un-Christian. Fenelon,
the disgraced but influential Archbishop of Cambrai, whose brand of heresy
was rather different from that of the Jansenists, also equated the true needs
of the state with the true benefit of the people and treated stateand
people as synonyms. The ominous dissociation between the king and the
state, and the substitution of the state for the king as the central object of
loyalty, which was to be of fateful consequence for the monarchy, was grow-
ing common.
Absolutism encroached on the society of orders and threatened and irritated
those whose well-being was tied to it and who had a vested interest in its
preservation. At the same time, in the state," a new deity which was its
creation and symbolized the newpoliticaluniverse of the sacred, abso
lutism provided its potential opponents with an alternative object of loyalty
and focus of social cohesion. It was a lofty ideal around which they could
rally and in the name of which (rather than in pursuit of their naked parti
cularistic interests) they could fight the kings authority, while enjoying the
agreeable sense of moral rectitude.
The king lived by the laws he had been taught as a child.75He thought it
was his duty to be an absolute ruler, and sincerely believed that his grandeur
The Three Identities of France
133
and glory were indeed the good of the state. Of course, it served his interest
to worship at the altar of his own, inseparable-from-his-person, authority
(although many a prince would find the exactions such worship imposed on
him somewhat excessive). But it also served the- interest of many people who
were not kings but were, rather, ambitious men with no props such as birth
or riches with which to support their ambition. Absolutism was a great
equalizer; it distinguished people by merit among other things and allowed
such men to rise from the dust and above their birth.
But it changed the rules of the game, without changing the stakes in it or
the game itself; the social structure was relatively unaffected by the radical
transformation in the political sphere. The game was zero-sum: if someone
gained power and influence, and through them the ultimate rewardsta
tussomeone else, by the same token, became that much poorer in this
regard. As absolutism created new winners, it also created losers alongside
them. Furthermore, and this was its greatest miscalculation, it put the latter
in a position to feel their losses acutely and left them at liberty, to ruminate
over them. The most formidable opponents of the absolute monarchy were
not the few articulate men who spelled out the implications of etatism, but
the mass of disaffected nobilitywhether of race, the sword, or the robe,
increasingly recruited from among the officierswhose grievances these
men articulated. By wresting power away from the hands of the nobility, the
kings and ministers of seventeenth-century France established absolutism de
facto. But by letting the nobility be and preserving its privileged social posi
tion, they made certain that it would never be accepted willingly. Nobles
were growing painfully conscious of the disconcerting imbalance of their
situation. Their privileges, no longer connected to any useful function and
therefore cut off from the sources of power and influence, seemed to be sus
pended in thin air. Theyfelt threatened and frustrated. It was this affliction
of the proudest order of the French kingdom which led many of its members
to transfer their loyalty from the royal person to the state, and as the reign
of the grand monarch drew to its close, rendered France ready to embrace
the idea of the nation.
I I . The Social Bases of the Nationalization of French Identity
and the Character of the Nascent National Consciousness
Turns of the Social Wheel: The Plight of the French Aristocracy
To say that by the 1780s the nobility had become a marginal minority in
the French society, under sentence, and that in 1789 nobles were the king
doms Jews, as does Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret,76is to go too far. Although
134 N A T I O N A L I S M
legally the second order of the kingdom, the nobility, until the very day of
its abolition on August 4,1789 (and largely on the initiative of its members),
remained the first order in terms of social prestige, the unrivaled elite of the
country, a stratum above the rest. M embership in it continued to be desired
by every socially aspiring individual, and its ways, the model for relentless
imitation by the common multitude.77Yet there is no doubt that in the cen
tury before the Revolution, the nobility as a whole, and most particularly its
upper crust, the aristocracy, was uneasy, threatened, and losing status.
In 1707 Vauban estimated that there were 52,000 noble families in
France, or 260,000 individuals, DHoziers Armorial general listed 58,000
genealogically significant names, including, it is generally agreed, approx
imately three out of every ten noblemen, whose number therefore would be
190,000 persons.74Half a century later, Abbe Coyer believed the nobility to
be twice that large: 400,000- It represented, therefore, between 1 and 2 per
cent of the population of 20,000,000.79According to Chaussinand-Nogaret,
in the course of the eighteenth century 6,500 families were ennobled, and at
least as many had joined the nobility in the seventeenth century.80The psy
chological implications of such increase, both for the older nobility and for
those waiting in the wings, would have been staggering, whatever estimate
one subscribed to. This development certainly could not fail to be destabil
izing in the highest degree for the top echelons of the order, the aristocracy,
that were absorbing most of the new nobility.
Although in principle ail noblemen were equal, and the order was uni
formly deprived of political power, there existed within the nobility vast
differences of status and wealth, and the two hierarchies crisscrossed rather
than overlapped, creating an anomic and psychologically disorienting situ
ation. Noblemen were without doubt the richest of the royal subjects, but a
majority of the nobility were found among the poor, frequently desperately
poor, population. The regulations for the capitation, or poll, tax established
in January 1695 make it possible to form an idea of the economic profile of
the nobility. These regulations divided the population, according to esti
mated ability to pay, into twenty-two groups, regardless of legal status. All
persons in the first group, who owed in taxes 2,000 livres annually, were
nobles, albeit of varied origins, some of them quite recent; they included
princes of the blood alongside ministers and tax-farmers general. But there
were noblemen in group nineteen as well, those without a chateau or a fief,
who had to pay 6 livres, like craftsmen in second-grade towns who have a
shop and employ journeymen.31Paupers were exempt from the payment of
the poll tax; nevertheless, we know that there was blue blood among them,
too. On the basis of the capitation records, Chaussinand-Nogaret divided
the nobility into five broader categories. Those paying 500 livres or more
(the first four groups of the official twenty-two) and enjoying at least 50,000
livres of annual income, were no more than 250 families (1,1001,200 in
The Three Identities of France
135
dividuals, or less than 1 percent), mostly residing in Paris and belonging to
the immemorial as well as the newest nobiiity. The second category, 13 per
cent of the nobility, mostly provincial, had incomes of between 10,000 and
50.000 livres. Twenty-five percent of the noblemen had between 4,000 and
10.000 livres, which still made possible a comfortable life-style. Below this
level'frugality was necessary. Forty-one percent of the nobiiity lived frugally
on 1,000 to 4,000 livres a year. But an additional 17 percent had less, 500
livres, and some as little as 50. The poor gentilhomme de Bauce/ Qui reste
au lit pendant quon raccommode ses chausses was no figment of imagina
tion. Not included in the taxable population, in garrets and poor-houses,
imprisoned for petty debts, or reduced to begging, these nobles led at least
as wretched an existence as the poorest of peasants. What could they have
in common with a Prince de Robecq whose food bill amounted to 58,000
livres a year and who annually spent more than 2,000 on concert subscrip
tions, books, and prints, or with a Mme de Matignon who paid 24,000 a
year to her hairdresser?82
Yet in some ways these noble wretches were superior to many of their
wealthy confreres. Whether rich or poor, ancient or new, the French nobility
found the conditions of its existence oppressive, and it is hard to say which
of the groups that composed it suffered more. While the plight of poor hob-
ereaux was economic, the aristocracy, which bathed in luxury, was subjected
to a most cruel anguish of mind,83the torture of status anxiety. We might
be unable to empathize4with the importance the society of orders attached
to honor. But, clearly, in that social world, status was dearer than life; oth
erwise it is impossible, for example, to explain the nobilitys devotion to
dueling. Only because it conspicuously set them off from the common mul
titude did the nobles insist so vehemently on their right to be killed or
crippled on the slightest pretext; only because of that did they take such
offense at the efforts of the Crown, which they regarded as the surest sign of
despotism, to prevent them from butchering and being butchered by their
equals; only because of that, the moment the government relaxed its grip,
would they rush, their swords unsheathed, and resume this worthy pursuit,
and value nothing more than the liberty to be in constant peril of violent
death and mutilation.4
Not all the nobles were equally noble. To begin with, the Second Estate
was divided into two estates: the gentilshommes and the other nobles.
Only the former were truly noble; they were defined as persons whose an
cestry [had] never included a commoner, but four generations of nobility
were generally accepted as equivalent to eternity. An ennobled person be
came a noble but not a gentilhomme. This exclusive category consisted of
further gradations of prestige. At the highest point of human greatness and
at the summit of the hierarchy of all who are down here on earth35stood
the gentilshommes de nom et darmes, the truly immemorial nobility. The
136
N A T I O N A L I S M
descendants of ennobled persons, who could in the fourth generation be
come gentilsbommes, could never attain the dignity of the gentilsbommes de
nom et darmes. Below them, but still above simple gentilsbommes, were the
gentilsbommes de quatre lignes, persons whose ancestors of both sexes for
three generations at least were gentilsbommes. Three generations of gentil-
bommerie of the male ancestry alone were a requirement for noblesse de
race. By the eighteenth century the immemorial nobility whose beginnings
were lost somewhere before the fifteenth century represented only 5 percent
of the noble population as a whole.86As to less illustrious noblesse de race,
it could probably be met at least as frequently among poor bobereaux in the
provinces as amidst the glitter of the Court.
Professional, or functional, subdivisions within the nobility were orga
nized into another hierarchy of prestige. The significant division was be
tween military nobility, noblesse depee, and judiciary nobility, noblesse de
robe. In general, noblesse depee enjoyed a higher status than noblesse de
robe; it was a truer nobility, yet the poorest sectors of the nobility belonged
to the former. Both these professional divisions were hierarchies of status on
their own right and each had an aristocracy of its own. The aristocracy of
the military nobility was composed of the nobles of the Court, those who
either lived at the Court and performed functions in the household of the
king or the households of the royal family, or those who were presented
to the king at the Court. To be presented, one needed to prove immemo
rial military nobility, at least 300 years in 1732, which increased to 360
years in 1760. However, royal ministers, chancellors, and secretaries of state
were exempt from this requirement, as were the marshals of France and
knights of the Order of the Holy Spirit. Other persons could be presented
if the king so desired. By 178 9, in Mousniers estimate, the Court nobility
counted 4,000 families, or 20,000 individuals. Of them, apparently, only
942 families had the required proofs of ancient nobility.87
The absolutist Court was a creation of the seventeenth century and
reached the fullness of its development in Louis XIVs Versailles. This was a
truly momentous development. The establishment of Versailles, remarked
an astute historian, was more important and had graver consequences than
any of Louis XlVs wars Or all his wars put together.88The Court nobility
was the apex of the social ladder, a world above and apart from the rest; it
was another country into which the other residents of France, who
dreamed, dreamed of immigrating. But the envied residents of this Olympus
led an unhappy life. There is a country, wrote La Bruyere of it, where the
joys are conspicuous but false and the sorrowshidden but real. Who
would believe that the rush for spectacles, the laughter and the ovations at
the performances of Moliere and Arlequin, the banquets, the hunt, the bal
let, the merry-go-rounds, cover so much anxiety, so many cares and such
The Three Identities of France 137
diverse interests, so many fears and hopes, such lively passions and such
serious affairs?5 ss
The Olympians, too, were subject to minute distinctions of rank. At the
very top stood the dukes and peers of France. Of course, there were distinc
tions between them, as well. The princes of the blood, for instance, who
were peers by birch, took precedence over other peers. Originally great feu
dal lords, twelve in number, the group changed its character in the course of
the seventeenth century. By 171J there were fifty-five peerages, most of them
new creations dating since 1600. Promotion to this exalted rank was the
highest honor the king could bestow on a subject, and those promoted in
this fashion usually already belonged to the highest military nobility. In
1650, to the consternation of the grands, the plebeian Chancellor Seguier
was created a duke, and in 1651 his duchy became a duche-pairie. However,
Providence refused to cooperate with such whims of absolutism; the Chan
cellor, although a peer, had no male issue, and his peerage returned to nob
lesse depee.90
Unfortunately, Providential inrervention could not be counted upon at all
times, and the life of a duke and peer was not easy. Peers, like the rest of the
nobility, were powerless against the Juggernaut of absolutism which
stripped them of their influence, leveled their dignities with those of its new
creations, and seemed intent on reducing them to the rest of the human race.
Before 1667 dukes and peers were members of the Conseil des Parties by
right and could participate in government. Then, as Louis XIV was consoli
dating his personal rule, they sat at the Council only if invited. After 1673
they were never invited. The king carried his resolution to deprive his once
most powerful subjects of every vestige of political influence beyond their
removal from his councils. It was indeed the most exalted nobility whom he
systematically deprived of all useful employment. He preferred to give posi
tions of command to persons of smaller consequence (thereby increasing
the latter), or to his illegitimate children, the legitimes, who were entirely
dependent on him. The elevation of the legitimes incensed the princes of the
blood, dukes, and peers more than anything else, and they never tired of
complaining about that. The rank of [the] illegitimate sons was placed just
below that of the princes of the blood, and just above that of the peers even
of the oldest creation. This gave us all exceeding annoyance; it was the
greatest injury the peerage could have received, and became its leprosy and
sore . .. The King was delighted with . . . everything tending to advance his
illegitimate children and to put a slight upon the princes of the blood. The
world [was] scandalized by the determination of the king to marry his
illegitimate daughters to princes of the blood. "When came the turn of the
Due de Chartres (the son of the kings brother and future Regent) to take
one of these maidens in marriage, his father, faced by the indignity of this
138 N A T I O N A L I S M
union, was overwhelmed with shame.91But the king had to be obeyed.
Repulsed by the shameful birth of his wife, the Due de Chartres, so it was
said, found solace in debauchery. Monsieur, his father, blamed this on his
idleness at the Court, the fact that he had no important office to fulfill. He
had wished his son to serve, to keep him out of the way of these intrigues,
and pleaded with the king to that effect, but. . . his demands had been in
vain. In fiis Ulnstruction du Dauphin, Louis admitted: I believed that it
was not in my interest to seek men o f . . . eminent station because . . . it was
important that the public should know, from the rank of those whom I chose
to serve me, that I had no intention of sharing my power with them. 92
Saint-Simon, therefore, had reason to conclude that the best of conditions
in France is to have none at all and to be a bastard.93
Under Louis XIII and Richelieu, and during the Fronde, the aristocracy
still contested the absolute power of the Crown. Under Louis XIV it ad
mitted defeat and focused all its energies on questions of precedence among
the nobles. The irredeemable loss of political influence and standing in the
eyes of the king undermined the status of the grands, and the obsessive
preoccupation of the dukes and peers at the Court of the Sun-King, which
cannot fail to appear to us petty and childish, must be interpreted as an
attempt to compensate for this loss. Precedence, which in these circum
stances had but a ritual value, became the only proof of the nobles exalted
position, and its order had to be adhered to at all costs. The tremendous
significance attached to the order of precedence highlights the situation of
the French aristocracy under absolutism in the fullness of its development.
The great and proud nobles were indeed reduced to the position of children.
Denied all independence and treated without respect, they were expending
their pent-up energies in intriguing against each other and for the attentions
of the ruler whose supreme power over them they no longer dared to con
test, and in fear of displeasing him. Their exaggerated concern over formal
dignities coexisted with pathetically, pitifully undignified behavior vis-a-vis
the king.
Court life was not conducive to proud bearing. A manual for courtiers,
Sieur de Chevignys La Science des personnes de Lacour, advised utter self-
effacement and submission to the will of the sovereign. Among the qualities
most necessary for a courtier, it recommended patience, politeness, and no
will at all; listen to everything, and teil nothing. Always appear to be con
tent. Have a lot of friends and very few confidantslow profile indeed,
hardly compatible with the unconditional and uncalculating independence
implied in the aristocratic notion of honor. La Bruyere had good reason
to remark that there is no one more enslaved than an assiduous courtier, if
not a still more assiduous courtier. Saint-Simon, in the first ranks of those
who basely crouched at the feet of the first nobleman of the realm, noted
with contempt the servile eagerness [of] the greatest people, the highest in
The Three Identities of France
139
power, and the most in favor. The degree of their obsequiousness, to say
the least, is astonishing; they would go to incredible lengths in their volun
tary degradation. Of one Abbe de Polignac, the diligent duke reported the
following: One day when following the Kmg through the gardens of
Marly, it began to rain. The king considerately noticed the Abbes dress,
little calculated to keep off rain. It is no matter, Sire, said de Polignac, the
rain of Marly does not wet, 54
Toward the end of the grand siede La Bruyere commented: A nobleman,
if he lives at home in his province, lives free but without substance; if he lives
at court, he is taken care of but enslaved. He might have been mistaken in
regard to provincial nobility, for there were substantial fortunes among its
members, but his opinion of the Court should be trusted.95The experience
of the Court nobility was that of an indignity as abject as its luxury was
extravagant, I confess, wrote Saint-Simon, summing the situation up, I
can scarce restrain myself when I think on the cruel state to which the late
government reduced the order whence I take my life and honor.
Naturally, the degrade*d dukes and peers had nothing but contempt for
the noblesse de robe. The Due de Coislin, a man of a politeness that was
unendurable and to whose outrageous civilities there was no end, earned
the admiration of many people of consequence for the following deserv
ing action:
M . de Coislin went to the Sorbonne to listen to a thesis sustained by the second
son of M . de Bouillon. When persons of distinction gave these discourses, it
was customary for the princes of the blood, and for many of the Court, to go
and hear them. M . de Coislin was at that time almost last in order of precedence
among the Dukes. When he took his seat, therefore, knowing that a number of
them would probably arrive, he l eft several rows of vacant places in front of
him, and sat himself down. I mmediately afterward, N ovion, Chief President
of the Parleme'nt [a robin], arrived, and seated himself in front of M . de Coislin.
Astonished at this act of madness, M . de Coislin said not a word, but took an
armchair, and while N ovion turned his head to speak to Cardinal de Bouillon,
placed that armchair right in front of the Chief President, in such a manner that
he was, as i t were, imprisoned, and unable to stir, M . de Coislin then sat down.
This was done so rapidly, that nobody saw it until it was finished. When once
it was observed, a great stir arose. Cardinal de Bouillon tried to intervene, M .
de Coislin replied, that since the Chief President had forgotten his position he
must be taught it, and would not budge.
Later, recounts Saint-Simon, on every side M. de Coislin was praised for
the firmness he had shown, and it was easy to comprehend the shame and
despair of Novion, 97Noble deeds of this nature were necessary to lift the
spirit of the exalted nobility, otherwise depressed into a most ignoble servil
ity, and to divert it from the sorry spectacle of its degradation. Where else
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N A T I O N A L I S M
could they parade their dignity, if not in front of a President Novion who
was, perhaps, even more humiliated than they?
For Saint-Simon, in the dawning eighteenth century, the judicial nobility
still remained but viie bourgeoisie, the vulgar rich. The noblesse de robe was
indeed an affluent nobiiity; the rank of the robins was defined by venal of
fices, whose price, as Saint-Simon rightly observed, far outstripped their
yield. The nobility of the noblesse de robe as a group was relatively new. The
edict of 1600 on the taille was the first to stipulate the conditions of heredi
tary transmission of nobility acquired with office: a grandson became a he
reditary noble if his father and grandfather had both died in office, or if they
had held it for at least twenty years each and while in it lived nobly. 91
This judicial nobility, descended from the officiers of the sixteenth century
and as iate as the Estates General of 1614 still associated with the Third
Estate, did not perceive the absolutist aspirations of the Crown as detrimen
tal to its interests until later. Indeed, it was not until later that they became
detrimental to its interests. The magistracy owed its privileges, as did many
newly privileged groups before it, to the determination of the monarchy to
weaken the independent sources of power (that is, first and foremost the
feudal nobility, but also groups which had become independent in the course
of time). To achieve this goal, the Crown used the device of diffusion of
functions and privileges and their redistribution among new elements.55It
was this periodical redistribution which in the end led to the existence of
two parallel and hostile hierarchies in France, one of prestige and the other
of power, and to the malaise of status-inconsistency, and opposition to the
central power responsible for it, among privileged groups which had been
deprived of power. The creation of new layers of nobility, especially when it
happened on a massive scale as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
also necessarily resulted in the inflation of noble dignities, which were losing
value in proportion to their proliferation. This had become evident already
under Richelieu, with titres de fantaisie, Baron and above, becoming in
creasingly common. By the end of the seventeenth century, wrote Saint-
Simon, the titles of Count and Marquis have fallen into the dust because of
the quantity of people . . . who usurp them; and . . . they have become so
worthless, that people of quality who are marquises or counts , . . are silly
enough to be annoyed if those titles are given to them in conversation. 100
This devaluation caused anguish to the old noblesse, which felt dispos
sessed, in fact robbed of status, but initially it benefited the officials.
The vintage nobility, however, was not the only one with problems. As
soon as the unsuspecting commoner joined the Second Estatewhich con
tinued to be the common object of the roturier desirehe left behind what
ever peace of mind he had had before. The less recent members of the stra
tum which he so eagerly entered begrudged him every fragrant particle of
his soap for scum, while the government to which he owed his social ad
The Three Identities of France 141
vancement seemed to amuse itself by keeping him constantly in fear of losing
it. The recency of ones nobility weighed upon the soul of a thus-elevated
person as a badge of shame which invited and justified the most outrageous
abuse. Even the highest reaches of the social hierarchy could not protect the
unhappy new creation from it; it is possible that there one was particularly
exposed to humiliation.
The Crown unscrupulously used the dignity of the nobility as a fiscal re
source in times of need. Letters of nobility had been sold in increasing num
bers since the sixteenth century, but at no other time so cynically or on such
a scale as under Louis XIV. When the funds obtained from the sale were
spent, the new nobles ceased being a source of income for the state and
instead turned into a financial liability, for they swelled the ranks of the
privileged, exempt from payment of certain taxes, most notably the taille.
The kings were always ready to correct this lamentable situation and time
and again annulled recent ennoblements. The victims of this ingenious ex
ercise, though, often were generously given the opportunity to purchase the
right to keep their noble Status (that is, to pay for it twice). In the seven
teenth century this was a regular occurrence. In 159S all ennoblements by
purchased letters parent in the past twenty years were abolished, and then
reinstituted on a second payment in 1606. A 1634 edict again revoked the
ennoblements of the twenty years previous to that date. This did not affect
those who had acquired their status between 1606 and 1614, and in 1638
the number of such fortunate new nobles was supplemented by those who
were created nobles on the occasion of the birth of the Dauphin. Two years
later, however, all ennoblements of the previous thirty years were canceled,
this time affecting both the buyers of letters patent and those ennobled
through other means. In 1656 all ennoblements that had taken place since
1606 were reinstituted on payment of 1,500 livres (not so minor a fortune,
especially by comparison with 50 or 100 livres of annual income of some of
the nobility) each. In 1664 all the enoblements of die previous thirty years,
by purchase or not, were revoked (though some of those granted for merit
were reconfirmed). In 1667 the effect of this revocation was extended to
1611 in most provinces. Many of those thus stripped of their nobility were
reinstated in it on condition of a new payment. In 1715 all ennoblements
since 1689 were annulled. But the same year, already under the Regency, the
nobility of all those ennobled by letters patent between 1643 and 1715 was
confirmed on payment. Under Louis XIV alone there were nine revocations;
his was, admittedly, an unusually long reign, but it was not longer than a
life-span of one generation.1'11A new nobleman, unless exceptionally phleg
matic by temperament, could not escape feeling insecure; this brutal teasing
must have been very unnerving.
Moreover, it was in the nature of things that new nobility became old with
the passage of time, and as it became old, the continued redistribution of
142 N A T I O N A L I S M
privilege, naturally, appealed to it less and less. Soon the judicial aristocracy,
as well as the military, saw new creations as an encroachment on their
rights, or liberties, and an expression, perhaps the expression, of despotism.
By the end of the seventeenth century, in spite of all the confusion which had
resulted from recurrent revocations and subsequent confirmations of enno
blements, there was no doubt that the nobility of the robe, though perhaps
of an inferior kind, was as true as that of the sword. Individual robins were
ennobled as early as the thirteenth century; in the Parlement of Paris the
great majority had been noble since the seventeenth century at least and
many were true gentilsbommes. In fact there were more nobles of ancient
families at the Parlement of Paris (7 percent) than in the noble population as
a whole.102The judicial aristocracy (the haute robe or grands robins)103was
already old enough to treat ennobled bourgeois with contempt, and the
Parlement became increasingly reluctant to admit them as members.
Only the rich could afford ennoblement through the purchase of an office
(that of a kings secretary in the eighteenth century cost 150,000 livres), and
the gentlemen of the magistracy were particularly piqued by the pretensions
of the new rich. The financiersbankers and farmers generalwere
blamed by the robins, whose wealth had been made respectable by age, for
the economic difficulties of the country and, though admitted to high soci
ety, could not marry daughters of the older nobility and were considered by
the aristocrats of the robe as well as of the Court as bourgeois. 104
Nevertheless, the robins did not mix with the noblesse depee. The rela
tionship between the two aristocracies during most of the old regime was
characterized by reciprocal scorn105; they did not unite until later in the
eighteenth century.106Daughters of the great military families rarely married
robins}however rich. La Vrilliere, son of Secretary of State Chateauneuf,
and himself a marquis, upon his fathers death and on condition that the
king would give him his fathers offices, proposed to take in marriage, with
out dowry, a maiden of illustrious birth, but impoverished, Mademoiselle de
Mailly. The king immediately agreed. The maiden, however, was less than
happy. Saint-Simon, who bore witness to the incident, recalled: There was
only one person opposed to the marriage, and that was Mademoiselle de
Mailly. She was not quite 12 years of age. She burst out crying, and declared
she was very unhappy, that she would not mind marrying a poor man, if
necessary, provided he was a gentleman, but that to marry a paltry bour
geois, in order to make his fortune, was odious to her . .. Mile de Mailly
always was sore at having been made Madame de La Vrilliere.107
Robins insisted on the equal worth of judicial and military nobility and
resisted the pretensions of the latter wherever possible. The antagonism be
tween the two nobilities was dramatically manifested in the affair of the
bonnet, which concerned the grave question of whether the president of the
Parlement should take off his hat while addressing a peer, and whether
The Three identities of France
143
the latter could keep his headgear on while giving his opinion. The parle-
mentaires, as could be expected, in both cases thought not.108The dukes and
peers were born councillors in the Parlement, and this ostentatious dis
play of disrespect only served to increase their dislike of the judiciary up
starts.
The noblesse de robe doubtless craved the acceptance of its nobler coun
terpart: without such recognition its own nobility lost much of its luster. For
that reason magistrates added the aristocratic particle de to their names,
took to dueling, and otherwise cultivated the habits of the Court. In 1715
the Parlement of Paris insisted: There is only one nobility. It may be ac
quired differently, by military services or by those of judicature; but the
rights and prerogatives are the same, for the robe has its honors no less than
the sword. There is only one sort of nobility, agreed the grands mock
ingly, which cannot be acquired by judicial services. One may respect merit
when one encounters it in magistrates, but as to birth . - . they will never be
regarded as other than honorable bourgeois who enjoy the privileges of
noblemen.109
Thus fighting on two fronts, against the snobbery of the military aristoc
racy and the impudence of the upstart new nobility, the nobility of the robe
also suffered at the hands of the absolute monarchy. The resolute Louis XIV
deprived it of the possibility of influencing legislation, reducing the right of
remonstrance to that of after-the-fact complaints. In distinction from the
Court nobility, however, it did retain an organizational base. It must also be
added that the robins reacted to inevitable humiliations in a more dignified
manner than the obsequious grands: since, as a matter of ceremony, the king
did not kiss their wives, the magistrates would not appear at the Court.
By the end of the great reign, the aristocracy as a whole had not only lost its
battle against absolutism, but hardly remembered that it ever had had the
audacity to oppose it. It was humbled; it learned to be submissive. The king
to the last piled humiliations upon it. Although exempt from the most oner
ous taxes, the nobles, like everyone else, had to pay the capitation and then
the dixieme; unless they were princes of the blood royal, they had to begin
service in the army in one of the companies of musketeers and afterward
pass through the ordeal of being private or subaltern in one of the regi
ments of cavalry or infantry; finally, they had to bear the burden of paying
for the changes they wished to introduce in their apartments at the Court,
for since 1700 the king refused to cover their cost. In short, to borrow a
phrase from a complaint articulated somewhat later, they were degraded
and reduced to the position of other subjects, confused with the very
people.110Yet the world of the roture remained completely unaware of
their suffering, and there was never a dearth of volunteers to join this op
pressed elite. Robbed of its influence, and threatened by the pressure of novi
144
N A T I O N A L I S M
homines, it squandered its energies in squabbles over worthless dignities in
a vain effort to preserve what remained of its increasingly insecure position.
It cannot be doubted that the preoccupation with status was foremost in
the minds of the French aristocracy as it entered the eighteenth century, and
that it was worn out by the petty jealousies which it invested with such vital
significance. In 1698 Henri Francois dAguesseau painted a grim portrait of
men around him: Man is always unhappy, both because of what he desires
and because of what he possesses. He is jealous of the fortune of others
while he himself is the object of their jealousy, constantly envious and con
stantly envied . . . Such is the dominant character of our century: a general
restlessness felt by all professions; an agitation that nothing can appease,
inimical to rest, and incapable of work, and above all weighted down by a
troubled and ambitious idleness; a universal uprising of men against their
conditiona sort of conspiracy in which all are determined to get out of
their selves. m Louis XIV completed the work of many generations of his
predecessors; there was nothing new in his policies, although he pursued
them more successfully. In general, as J . H. Shennan rightly pointed out,
what took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was another
turn of the social wheel by which new men seized the opportunity to pursue
those dignities and honours held by men who were themselves descendants
of new men. 112Only as the wheel kept on turning, the nobility was broken
on it.
The unique predicament of the French noblesse consisted in that their in
creasingly problematic status was the only problem on which they were al
lowed to focus. They were denied the possibility of nursing other ambitions
or employing their energies in pursuits that were less futile. At the Court, as
well as the sovereign courts of the capital, they lived, like exotic pets, in a
gilded cage, well fed and groomed, but reduced to indolence and boredom,
which drove them to seek diversion in ways which they might otherwise
have renounced. They felt caged. In these circumstances, the preoccupation
with precedence was indeed an attempt to insist on their threatened dignity,
on the fact that they were proud men, and not pets. Some asserted their
independence differently: they escaped into dissipation. Denied liberty to do
or to be anything in the public sphere, they enjoyed'it to the full in the pri
vacy of their bedrooms. There was a definite affinity between the rejection
of the society which humiliated them and sexual license; it expressed the
rejection of the norms (that is, tutelage) of this society in a sphere where
audacity was guaranteed relative impunity.113This association of sexual
freedom and opposition to'absolutism had significant consequences: it was
perpetuated in the values of the new society which succeeded the old re
gime, and sexual freedom remained an important aspect of liberty a la fmn-
gaise. Neither of these ways of coping with the problem, however, was sat
isfactory. It was becoming increasingly onerousindeed ignobleto be
The Three Identities of France
145
noble in France. By the rime the great king died, the situation of the French
aristocracy became insupportable, and many of its members were seeking
for ways to escape it altogether. What they needed was a new identity.
The Perilous Escape: Redef inition and Reorganization
of the Noblesse
Whatever else nobility meant, it stood for social superiority. Yet, defined as
it was by birth, the nobility was bankrupt. The time had come to reconsider
the bases of status. In the eighteenth century, as the outpouring of literature
on the subject testified, the intellectuals among the nobility were doing ex
actly that. The preoccupation with the definition of nobility, in general, was
a response to the growing discomfort caused by the ambiguity of the noble
identity, and an attempt to provide the nobility with a more secure basis for
its status and assuage its anxiety.
The ambiguity, at least, could be dispelled in several ways. As we have
seen, a perfect consensus as to what constituted nobility never existed. Yet it
was possible to pretend that it did, and the primacy of the criterion of birth,
however meaningless (given the constant onslaught of the new' nobles born
bourgeois), was never openly disputed. Birth was not entirely self-sufficient;
its importance lay in that it was the source of virtue. But it might be said
that virtue was generally believed to be biologically determined and, there
fore, could not be found outside a certain genetic pool. This seventeenth-
century view of nobility was articulated by G. A. de La Roque. Already in
the beginning of Louis XIVs reign, Boileau thought virtue as such, whether
or not accompanied by birth, to be the essence of nobility. Around the same
time, La Bruyere reasoned in Les Caractires: If nobility is virtue, anything
that is not virtuous may cause its loss; and if it is not virtue, it is hardly
anything at all. l On the whole, however, the notion that nobility was
based on birth persisted.
In the eighteenth century this view came under vigorous attack, and it is
worth noting that its main assailants were gentlemen of the best breeding.
In the course of this attack, virtue was defined specifically as patriotic virtue,
service to the state, and came to be seen as the sole foundation of the noble
status. It was strongly emphasized even in those theories which defended
hereditary nobility: their authors maintained the traditional view that birth
was the necessary condition for a public spirit and in effect equated nobility
of birth with patriotism. Henri de Boulainvilliers, an impoverished noble
man, but of impeccable birth, in the most impressive restatement of the feu
dal doctrine, argued that the nobility was a race, the descendants of the
Franks, those of the conquerors blood and the Naissance Frangoise. This
146
N A T I O N A L I S M
implied that true nobility could not be acquired, and that it owed nothing to
the favor of princes. The justification for the preservation of the privileges
of the nobility, was, however, not their blood as such, but the services they
for thirteen centuries had rendered to the state. 115
The Chevalier dArc, the illegitimate son of the Comte de Toulouse, the
illegitimate son of Louis XIV, in a book reveaiingly entitled La Noblesse
militaire, ou le patriote franqais, proposed a professional definition: none
but the profession of arms, the traditional basis of nobility, conferred noble
dignity. For dArc, however, heredity alone did not suffice; active service was
an indispensable prerequisite for noble status. Common officers wh<5rose
from the ranks could acquire it and be treated as equal to gentlemen of ex
traction; the latter, on the other hand, however highly born, lost nobility if
they rejected a military career.
Clearly, neither of these positions appealed to the nobility of the office or
those who owed their dignities to anything besides direct descent from Ger
manic invaders or the trade of a soldier. These newer nobles had their own
ideas as to what constituted true nobility. The Chevalier dArcs book, in
fact, was a response to one of their propositions, expounded in another
work published in 1756, Abbe Coyers La Noblesse commerqante. Unlike
his opponent, Coyer did not claim that only commercial nobility was nobil
ity worthy of its name, but he did consider commerce as noble an activity as
the military, for it was as valuable a service to the state. The good of com
merce was the good of France. Besides, most of the nobility, owing to its
indigence, was deprived of the possibility of rendering its country any other
service. Commerce was the best they could do, both for themselves and for
the patrie. The patrie expects your service, the public-minded Abbe ex
horted his well-born, impecunious (but nevertheless reluctant to follow his
advice) countrymen. Become by way of commerce tutelary gods for your
wives and children. Become for the patrie the nurturers of its lands, the life
of the arts, supporters of the population, pillars of the navy, the soul of our
colonies, the nerves of the state, and the instrument of the public wealth.
DArc was incensed by this proposition: Commerce cannot be introduced
into the nobility without shaking the very foundations of monarchical gov
ernment . . . the nobility cannot be made commercial without thereby of
fending the harmonious inequality of ranks . . . and without corrupting the
state . . . French nobles, do you want to be rich? Renounce that luxury that
degrades you . . . Your ancestors, your virtues, the services you render to the
statethat is your true greatness.1,6
Not unexpectedly, it was the poor nobility that was most readily per
suaded by the Chevalier. The hobereaux did not buy Coyers argument for
the simple reason that they could not afford it. The rest detested wealth in
the hands of ignoble bourgeois, who had the cheek to attempt to mix with
them, as if indeed money could buy pedigree, but found nothing degrading
The Three Identities of France
147
in luxury, and, it seems, did not disdain commerce, perhaps because they
believed, not without reason, that rather than disrupting the harmonious
inequality of ranks, commercial success combined with adequately blue
blood could be most instrumental in preserving it.
At the same time, the attitude of the aristocracy toward inequality was
itself'changing. At the end of the old regime, nobility was unequivocally
defined as a reward for service rendered to the state, a quality that the
sovereign power imprints upon private persons, so as to raise them and their
descendants above the ocher citizens. Consequently, wrote a contemporary
expert, all citizens can aspire to nobility. 117Some went further. As early
as 1739, the Marquis dArgenson, in Considerations sur le gouvernement de
la France, proposed to abolish hereditary nobility altogether and substitute
for it a royal democracy. Let all citizens be equal to each other, he
urged. We must in fact move toward a goal of equality where the only
distinction between men is that of personal merit. 118Still later, the aristo
cratic Comte dAntraigues selflessly assevered: Hereditary nobility is a
scourge which is devouring the land of my birth. The Comte had an annual
income of 38,068 livres, but was unable to prove immemorial nobility, and
as a result was denied the right of riding in the kings carriages;119he was
democratically inclined.
The poor nobility resisted attempts to blur the distinctions of birth most
stubbornly. This should come as no surprise, noted the Comte de Segur,
who was by no means poor, reflecting on their pathetic snobbery, for all
these people had were their titles. 120Toward the Revolution, as is clear
from the cahiers, even the hobereaux came around. But so long as the old
regime lasted, the triumph of egalitarianism within the nobility, its elite as
well as rank and file, was not self-evident. In fact, the development of the
egalitarian ideology was accompanied by the rigidification of honorific dis
tinctions in many areas, which has been characterized as the feudal reac
tion. Sovereign courts, most notably the Parlement of Paris, refused to ac
cept newly ennobled persons into their ranks; the royal Court became
subject to new regulations which favored old nobility,121and commissions
in the army were made the virtual monopoly of the noblesse de race.
The legal rigidification of lines separating different groups within the elite
from each other, as well as the ideological attempts to define the noble iden
tity, were so many responses to the fact that the traditional distinctions
could no longer be maintained without legal support, that the traditional
definition was becoming meaningless, and that the identity based on these
distinctions and definition was in crisis. The legal measures, which necessar
ily irritated certain sectors within the nobiiity as they tried to benefit others,
were too late and too little to be able to appease at least some of them. The
nobility was torn by mutual, crisscrossing and conflicting, jealousies, of
which every thinking nobleman was a battleground. In this situation with
148 N A T I O N A L I S M
no solution, to throw a temper tantrum, to say to heli with it all, was as
good a solution as any. In fact, psychologically it was more satisfactory than
any other solution both because of its expressive potential and because by
declaring ones contempt for hereditary status, one subscribed to a most
magnanimous position, thus demonstrating an unmistakable inner nobility.
This momentous change in attitude both reflected and fostered corre
sponding changes in the structure and composition of the nobility. After the
failure of Polysynodie, the high nobility of the Court, with the exception of
a few die-hard peers, joined forces with the nobility of the robe, speeding up
the redefinition of the aristocratic elite along lines which corresponded to
the characteristics of the magistracy.122One of these characteristics, without
which one in fact could not qualify as a member of the noblesse de robe, was
its superior education. In the eighteenth century the aristocracy appro
priated education as a quality peculiar to it. It redefined itself as a cultural
elite. If at the end of the seventeenth century a cultivated prince was a rar
ity,123several decades later schooling became a necessary condition for suc
cess in high society. New social frameworks, literary and political salons,
dining clubs, academies, Masonic lodges, and ail sorts of secret and semi
secret societies emerged, which corresponded to the thus-modified hier
archy. As these frameworks became increasingly central in the life of the
aristocracy, the importance of the Court decreased proportionally. Provin
cial academies (with a composite membership of six thousand) were 37 per
cent noble, those in Paris35 percent; fifty members of the Academie Fran-
gaise were "presented at Court; almost all of the important salons were in
the houses of the nobility; nobles represented 47 percent of the subscribers
to the Mercure de Prance and more than half of those who subscribed to
Expillys Geographical, Historical, and Political Dictionary of France. This
cultural revolution touched only the upper crust of the nobility. Within the
order as a whole, only a small minority was culturally engaged. And yet the
relative weight of this minority within the nobility was incomparably
greater than the relative weight of the analogous minority within the other
participating stratum, the bourgeoisie; the nobility, not the bourgeoisie, was
the educated class in old-regime France. Some of the elite concerns pene
trated to the rank and file of the Order through the Masonic lodges in the
army, where officers recruited from the petty nobility formed the largest
conti ngent.I t certainly was not, as Tocqueville would have it, that middle-
class intellectuals usurped the now vacant place [the nobility] had occupied
in the direction of public opinion, which they were able to do all the more
easily because the French nation was the most literary-minded of all na
tions and intellectually quickest on the uptake. Instead, as Chaussinand-
Nogaret points out, much of the intelligentsia were recruited from the no
bility. Or rather it was more as if the nobility, in this age of doubt and self
questioning, was seeking to redefine itself as an intelligentsia in order to
The Three Identities of France
149
escape the threat of extinction and refound its existence with a new iden
tity. 125
The emphasis on culture as a definitive characteristic of the nobility was
the cause of the social elevation of middle-class intellectuals and the incor
poration of the most successful of them into the aristocracy. The philo-
sophes were at least as often noble as bourgeois in actual status if not origin;
30 out of 160 authors of the Encyclopedie came from the old nobility. Talent
became a ground for ennoblement. Middle-class intellectuals mixed with
grands seigneurs in salons and academies. They enjoyed comfortable in
comes and could marry into respectable circles.126They were pampered by
generous pensions and cultivated by noble admirers: 30 percent of Rous
seaus correspondents, 50 percent of Voltaires, came from the nobility.27
Suard, an editor of the Gazette de France, was a friend of the Prince de
Beauvau, the Marquis de Chastellux, and Mme de Marchais; the first two
sent the pbilosophe and his wife game from their hunts; Mme de Marchais
provided carriages to drive the couple to dinners, where Mme Suard was
well satisfied with the rank and merit of the guests. 128Voltaires apotheo
sis during his tour of Paris in 1778after twenty-seven years of exilewas
just one conspicuous example of the changed attitudes toward men of let
ters. Authors, it was said, acquired a kind of nobility.125The definition of
the intellectuals as an aristocracy was not entirely new. Already La Bruyere
thought that there were, theoretically, two aristocracies, one of birth and the
other of intelligence (both of which, incidentally, he opposed to the
people, ascribing to the word an unmistakable connotation of piebs).130
But in his time this must have been a truly unorthodox thought. In the eigh
teenth century the claim that intellectuals formed a separate elite estate or
a part of the traditional elite became rather common.131
Against another intruder, however, the nobility stood firm. While it came
to recognize culture as ennobling, it would not yield to money. Money could
buy nobility, but it couid not buy social acceptance. The hard work of liv
ing nobly (which in the eighteenth century implied participation in the aris
tocratic culture of the Enlightenment) could earn this, perhaps, but to owe
ones place in the elite to wealth was a social disadvantage not likely to be
forgiven. Unlike the middle-class intellectuals, the gens de finance were par
iahs; they became the incarnation of everything that was evil and impure.
Even when they were pbibsophes themselves, like Helvetius or Lavoisier,
they were compromised by the filthy lucre that passed through their hands,
forever marking them as vile, contemptible characters who could (and
should) be used by but not admitted amidst the righteous.
Money became the focus of all the pent-up irritation of the nobility,
which, having become enlightened, it could not openly express. It became
the symbol of the ignoble, of the invading hords of roturiers, unstoppable
and closely associated with despotism. It was on money that the rich elite
150 N A T I O N A L I S M
concentrated its wounded pride and vented its fears and frustrations. And
this hatred of wealth lost none of its ardor when it happened to coexist,'as
it often did, with the remarkable economic acumen of the noble anti-
capitalists who were busily engaged in capitalist activity.
The aristocratic contempt for vulgar riches capitalized on the long
standing hostility toward tax-collectors among the people, which elite intel
lectuals articulated and fueled. Works of literature, s'uch as Jean-Baptiste
Darigrands LAnti-financier, published in 1763, called financiers blood
suckers fattening themselves off the substance of the people. A very success
ful play by A. R. Lesage, Turcaret, represented them as ruthless, unscrupu
lous, greedy, and, above all, plebeian characters.153By the time of the Revo
lution, tax-farmers were commonly known as those public bloodsuckers
and considered enemies of the people, from whom they were stealing. 133
Out of the impotent ferment of aristocratic reaction one of the most po
tent revolutionary myths was born: the myth of capitalism. The word cap
italist, a French invention, was first used around 1770 in the neutral sense
of a person with capital to invest.134 It entered the discourse, however,
through the work of Louis-Sebastien Mercier. In Tableau de Paris the term
appeared several times and acquired a highly charged derogative meaning.
In 1804, a dictionary, VI mprovisateur franqais, credited Mercier with the
invention of the word and relied on his text for a definition. Capitaliste " it
stated, is a word known only in Paris, and it describes a monster of wealth
who has none but monetary affections [des affections metalliques]. When
people talk about land taxation the capitalist jeers at them: he has not an
inch of land, so how can he be taxed? Like the Arabs of the desert who,
having robbed a passing caravan, wouid bury their loot, out of fear of being
robbed in their turn by other brigands, so our capitalists hide away our
money.133
Of course, these noble sentiments were not entirely disinterested. Some
times plain, common envy mixed with righteous indignation. The men of
money were resented not only by those whom they so insolently insisted on
joining, thereby degrading the very meaning of nobility, but also by those
who nursed the same ambition yet lacked the means to finance their own
ennoblement. After all, just the registration of the letters of merit involved
the round sum of six thousand livres.516Moreover, the rich aristocracy, ea
ger to malign the vulgar rich, could not restrain the rage it unleashed and
sanctioned only to the wealth of others. The most vehement detractors of
capitalism came from among penniless intellectuals who did not make it
into the elite. And they hated the rich whose blood was blue as much as the
rich whose blood was red.
In general, the intellectuals, both those who became members of the aris
tocracy and those who felt entitled to be considered its members, made the
sympathies and antipathies of the nobility their own. The new status came
The Three Identities of France
151
with peculiar-to~it worries. The intellectuals identified with the order they
joined or aspired to join. They also hated independent wealth; they also
wanted an exclusive elite. The vehemence of their loathing of money, the
intensity of their abhorrence, is astonishing. The word fi n an cewrote
tender-hearted Rousseau unkindly in the Social Contract, is a slavish word
. . . I hold enforced labor to be less opposed to liberty. In the Government
of Poland he explicitly identified money with social degeneracy and went to
some length to persuade his audience that this was so: Rich peoples, in
point of fact, have always been beaten and taken over by poor peoples. He
implored: Poles, do this for me: let the others have all the money in the
world . . . Systems of finance produce venal hearts. And, with the authority
and modesty becoming to a philosopher, he declared: Of all interests that
of pecuniary gain is the most evil, the most vile, the readiest to be corrupted,
though alsoin the eyes of one who has knowledge of the human heart (I
reiterate this with confidence and shall always insist upon it)the least im
portant and compelling. 137
Rousseaus concern for the well-being of the serf-owning Polish nobility
was as touching as his detestation of wealth was uncompromising. Above
all, the intellectuals were preoccupied with preserving the harmonious in
equality of ranks. Fifteen pages devoted to noblesse in the Encyclopedic, as
compared with two pages for patrie, two pages for peuple, and thirty-seven
lines of one column for nation, is an eloquent example of the nature of their
concerns. Noblesse litteraire ou spirituelle is duly acknowledged there,
among Noblesse immemoriale, Noblesse militaire, and Noblesse de robe.131
In the history of the members of the Academie Frangaise, dAlembert asked:
Is a great effort of philosophy necessary to understand that in society, and
especially in a large state, it is indispensable to have rank defined by clear
distinctions, that if virtue and talent alone have a claim to our true homage,
the superiority of birth and position commands our deference and our re
spect . . . ? And how could men of letters envy or misconstrue the so legiti
mate prerogatives of ocher estates? 09
The incorporation of the intellectuals was part and parcel of the self
redefinition of the aristocracy, which was no longer satisfied with its tradi
tional identity. Because of it, an articulate segment was added to the em
battled elite, able to spell out, elaborate, and draw conclusions from the
grievances in which it fully shared. Clearly, the self-redefinition of the nobil
ity implied no intention to step down on its part. Its purpose was to re
establish its social superiority on a firmer basis and make it impregnable.
Furthermore, however insecure the aristocracy felt in regard to its status,
this insecurity was entirely an internal matter, an affair between nobles and
nobles. It was the result of the onslaught of absolutism on the rights of the
nobility and of the onrush of the new persons to partake in them; it had
nothing to do with the society at large, and the libertine nobles (and near
152 N A T I O N A L I S M
nobles) who expressed their scorn for the system of which they, however
irksome their experiences as individuals, were tfee chief beneficiaries as a
group perceived no danger in articulating and broadcasting their ideas of its
imperfections.140If they were intellectuals, they participated joyfully in the
business of discrediting and undermining their own position; if they were
not, they gave it their whole, though light-hearted, support. They found new
dignity in their audacity. In a striking passage, the Comte de Segur described
their mood and their reasons:
We deeply respected the remnants of an ancient order whose habits, ignorance
and prejudices we gaily defied . . . We lent enthusiastic support to the philo
sophic doctrines professed by bold and witty scribblers, Voltaire won us over,
Rousseau touched our hearts, and we felt a secret pleasure when we saw them
attack an old structure that appeared to us gothic and ridiculous. So whatever
our rank, our privileges, the remains of our former power eaten away beneath
our feet, we enjoyed this little war. Untouched by it, we were mere onlookers.
These battles were mere pen- or word-play which did not seem to us likely to
affect the worldly superiority we enjoyed and which centuries-old possessions
made us believe indestructible . . . Liberty, whatever its tones, appealed to us
through its courage, and equality through its convenience. I t can be pleasurable
to sink so long as one believes one can rise again at will, and, heedless of the
future, we tasted in one draught patrician advantages and the delights of ple
beian philosophy.141
Enlightenment was noble in more than one sense. I t was as much an expres
sion and an instrument of the feudal reaction as was the attempted aris-
tocratization of the army; only its consequences were infinitely greater.
Following the studies of Ford, Chaussinand-Nogaret, Higonnet, and most
recently Simon Schama,142one should not be surprised that the great Revo
lution which abolished the nobility was the work of the nobility neverthe
less, and that the aristocracy, not the bourgeoisie that remained bourgeoisie,
was the truly revolutionary class. Tocqueville was mistaken in placing the
blame for the Revolution (which, for him, was a calamity) on the bourgeoi
sie and bourgeois intellectuals, as were many others who saw in it a glo
rious, but essentially bourgeois, event. And yet Tocqueville was undoubtedly
right in his analysis of the socio-psychological dynamics that led to the Rev
olution. Like so much of the seemingly inconsistent behavior of the nobility
in the eighteenth century, the Revolution was a result of the Tocqueville
effect, aptly so called by Francois Furet, who recognized in this the very
core of Tocquevilles argument.143The rapid disintegration of the traditional
order threw the social system out of balance, and the strata composing the
elite which were directly affected by it found themselves in a situation of
status-inconsistency. The divisions of the traditional order lost their mean
ing, yet the outward signs of them were jealously preserved. The hierarchy
of prestige no longer corresponded to the hierarchies of wealth, education,
The Three Identities of France
153
and power and bore no relation to the responsibilities of various strata to
ward each other. This growing inconsistency between old and new elements
of the social order made its continued survival intolerable. The frustrations
this structural inconsistency generated among the members of the old nobil
ity, new nobility, and aspirants seeking, and sometimes denied, entrance into
the nobility were of course different. The experience of the old noblesse was
that of threat to its status and fear of losing what it already possessed; that
of the newly ennobled and those waiting to be ennobled, in distinction,
might be the fear of never getting what they could expect to possess, or not
getting all of it at once, that is, the experience of relative deprivation pro
duced by rising expectations. Nevertheless, all were affected and all alike
were suffering from status-insecurity and anxiety. The abolition of the no
bility by the Constituent Assembly was not at all, as Chaussinand-Nogaret
claims, a sign of fusion of the old and new elites, a simple recognition of,
and reconciliation with, an already existing situation. It was, rather, an act
of willful destruction, an expression of unbearable irritation with a system
which made such fusion at all possibleor, on the other hand, allowed only
for an incomplete fusionand thus became psychologically insupportable.
It was the Tocqueville effect in action.
The French Revolutionthat first great revolution in modern his
torywas, therefore, a child of the aristocratic reaction. There is no con
tradiction in this assertion; this kinship only goes to show how violent and
radical indeed this reaction was. (Of course, this does not imply that the
Revolution was only this. Like any child, it soon acquired a character and
life of its own, and moved away from its parent, whom in this case it came
to regard as an enemy.) The aristocracy tried a variety of routes in its at
tempt to escape its predicament. The modernization of the eliteits partic
ipation in non-traditional economic activity, its prominence in the audience
and among the creators of subversive ideology, its support of ostensibly
bourgeois values in art, literature, and philosophyall this was an
expression of its disaffection from and reaction against the modernizing so
ciety and absolutist state which undermined its social preeminence. Even the
cult of sensibility, relying as it did on the English model, so apparently
bourgeois and modern in character, in pre-revolutionary France was a
reactionary phenomenon. The values which it opposed (the calculating, ra
tional behavior) were those of the stilted absolutist Court and the ideal-
typical man of moneythe symbol of the encroaching new men. The values
which it represented perpetuated important elements of the noble code of
behavior, repressed by absolutismthe emphasis on directness, courage,
contempt for consequencesbehavior which was both honorable and im
prudent and was epitomized in the notion of honor. Had the events devel
oped differently, these routes might have led France onto a different course.
In the form it assumed and at the time it occurred, the Revolution was not
154 N A T I O N A L I S M
inevitable. Had there been no fiscal crisiswhich was quite independent of
the crisis of identity among the eliteit might not have happened. But/ in
its plight, the threatened elite developed an idea that provided the inspira-
tion for the Revolution, and none but this idea could make the Revolution
what it was.
The constant threat to its status, undermined by the loss of political influ
ence, the swelling of ranks of the nobility and the inflation of titles, which
could be bought for money and made ancient nobility legally equal to a low
born officier barely washed by his soap for scum, and the contemptuous
attitude of the Crown, had dire consequences for the society whose elite was
affected in this manner. In the eighteenth century, the nobility was prepared
ro renounce the formal dignity which concealed the lack of dignity in fact,
and ready to reorganize and redefine itself. In the process of such redefini
tion, it stumbled upon the idea of the nation. This idea was one of several
devices the members of the order utilized to protect it from further assault.
Once advanced, it acquired a life of its own, and its very success was to
doom its noble champions. France as a nation owes its birth to the nobility,
which was almost immediately sacrificed to and devoured by its ungrateful
offspring. It was hardly possible to foresee that following such an enticing
ideal would bring its advocates onto a suicidal path.
The Birth of the French Nation
The malaise of the French elite was the major factor in the development of
the French national consciousness and the emergence of the French nation.
It made the aristocracy sympathetic to the idea of the people as the bearer
of sovereignty and a fundamentally positive entity. This revolution in atti
tudes was a logical outcome of the situation in which the nobility found
itself by the end of the seventeenth century. Its privileges, the significance of
which lay in their exclusiveness, were becoming less and less exclusive; of
political influence it had as little as any other group in the population; it
perceived itself as degraded, reduced to the people. There were basically
two ways for the nobility to reclaim the status which it was losing: to disso
ciate itself unequivocally from the people, or to redefine the people in
such a way that being of it would become an honor rather than a disgrace.
The nobility never committed itself entirely to either one of these solutions,
pursuing both all through the eighteenth century. But the second solution,
the idea of the nation, had important advantages over the first, and it is not
surprising that in the end it was the one that triumphed. It came with its
own stratification, which reflected a new hierarchy of values. Within the
community defined as a nation, status was based on service to the nation,
merit. Unlike the conflicting criteria of birth or wealth, merit made all the
The Three Identities of France 155
groups within the nobility as well as those aspiring to enter it eligible to
partake in high status, and, unlike culture, service was seif-justifiable.
The realization that the idea of the nation was advantageous in the situa
tion of the nobility brought to the surface and accelerated a subterranean
process which had been going on for generations since the sixteenth century,
at certain moments more visible than at others, but ever in danger of dying
out: the emergence of the state as the sphere of the sacred and the new
focus of loyalty. This idea was articulated and promulgated by the repre
sentatives of the Crown, and by the second half of the seventeenth century
was absorbed by the collective mind of the nobility. At the same time, the
meaning the state had for the authors of the idea, of an attribute and
embodiment of the royal authority, and its virtual identity with the person
of the king, came under attack. During the Fronde and the later years of
Louis XIVs reign, the state was consistently redefined as the native pop
ulation of France, or the French nation (in the neutral, literal sense of the
word). In the early eighteenth century, spokesmen of the French elite joined
to these elements of the indigenous tradition the value attached to the na
tion in England, where it had already become the ultimate source of au
thority and the object of supreme devotion (though without necessarily
adopting the other aspects of the English idea). Thus upgraded, the state,
alias nation, alias people of France, was finally freed from dependence on
the king and became the symbol around which opposition to the Crown
could rally and in the name of which the righting of wrongs could be legiti
mately and righteously demanded. This amalgam of native and imported
concepts became the basis on which the unique idea of the French nation
later developed.
The effect of the idea of the nation was analogous to that of the doctrine
of Divine Right: like the latter, it both caused and signified a dramatic alter
ation in the meaning of French identity and soon changed the reality of the
French polity. Behind their faces I see other men and in the same realm
another state. The form remains, but the interior has been renewed. There
has occurred a moral revolution, a change of spirit. These words of Guez
de Balzac, written when Richelieu first attempted to represent France as a
polity, equally well describe its transformation into a nation. The change
was striking and seemed to have come unannounced. Suddenly, writes
Simon Schama, subjects were told they had become Citizens; an aggregate
of subjects held in place by injustice and intimidation had become a Na
tion. 144In fact, this process had been under way for close to a century, but
it was tortuous, driven more by the desire to escape a certain condition than
by a determination to reach a particular destination; and its final outcome
was at no point predictable. The revolutionary idea itself was not entirely
new. It was superimposed on and incorporated ideas that had constituted
Frenchness earlier. The French identity, which in the eighteenth century be
156 N A T I O N A L I S M
came national, was a layered identity, and the elements that composed dif
ferent layers were not necessarily consistent with each other. Moreover, the
specifically national component of the French identity, namely the specific
meaning attached to nationality in France, was itself a result of a compro
mise, or perhaps only a truce, between different conflicting tendencies.
England as a M odel
The concept nation was imported from England, but it was grafted on a
body of indigenous traditions which gave it a unique twist and led the
French nation away from the example on which it was initially modeled.
The hybrid concept that resulted was further modified by a peculiar tension,
a sense of inadequacy, in the incipient French national consciousness, intro
duced into it by the first nationalists who compared France with England
and stressed the letters superiority.
England was the only nation at the time, and it emphasized its nationality.
It was also a country which offered the unusual spectacle of an almost in
stantaneous transformation from a peripheral, rather backward society torn
by internal conflict into the greatest economic and political power in Eu
rope, stable, proud, and enlightened, a formidable presence. For a while,
around the middle of the eighteenth century, England was an object of gen
eral admiration in France, the state of affairs attested to by Voltaires Lettres
anglaises and other works, as well as by the popularity of English gardens
and tea. The fashionableness of everything English was, with charming na
ivete, expressed by Mile de FEspinasse, who confessed: 11ny a que la gloire
de Voltaire qui pourrait me consoler de ne pas etre nee Anglaise. 14SThe
corollary of this admiration was unremitting self-criticism; some westward-
looking Frenchmen found little if anything to be proud of in the country of
their birth, so much so that sometimes they would rather not consider them
selves a part of it. Inconsolate, they sought escape in cosmopolitanism.
The philosopbes were above particularistic self-content and refused to al
low an accident of birth to dictate to them what their commitments should
be. Voltaire thought that a philosopher has no patrie and belongs to no
faction and that every man is born with the natural right to choose his
patrie for himself. Abbe Raynal believed that the patrie of a great man is
the universe. Great men, explained Duclos, men of merit, whatever the
nation of their origin, form one nation among themselves. They are free of
puerile national vanity. They leave it to the vulgar, to those who, having no
personal glory, have to content themselves with the glory of their country
men. 14S
And yet these were the architects of the French national consciousness,
and it was the nationality of England, the constitution that made it a na
tion, the political culture and institutions of a free people, that excited the
The Three Identities of France 157
admiration of the philosophes. The foundations of English nationalism
the reinterpretation of the people which implied the basic equality of the
great and the small, the glowing symbols of civil and political libertybe
came the values of the French opinion-ieaders "who urged patriotism in the
new, English sense of the word.
Fof a brief period England eclipsed classical antiquity as the model for
France. England was the land of freedom. Even Rousseau, though but in a
footnote and in conspicuous inconsistency with his general opinion of Eng
land, let slip from his pen that the English of today . . . are nearer liberty
than any one else. 147In the eighth of his Lettres anglaises, Sur le parlement
dAngleterre, the more consistent Voltaire hailed England as the paragon
of civic virtues, whose constitution was infinitely preferable to that of Rome.
The essential difference between Rome and England, which gives the ad
vantage entirely to the latter, he thought, was that the outcome of the civil
wars in Rome was slavery, while that of the troubles in England liberty. The
English nation is the only nation upon earth that has been able to limit the
power of kings by resisting them, and which, by joint efforts, has at last
established that wise government where the prince is all-powerful to do
good, and, at the same time, restrained from doing evil, where the nobles
are great without insolence and without vassals, and where the people par
ticipate in government without confusion. Voltaire recognized that the lib
ertyand strengthof England rested on the respect for the people, the
plebeians, who in some crucial respect were treated as equal to the lords.
His admiration was not devoid of an ulterior motive. The perceptive phtlo-
sophe was particularly impressed by the consideration enjoyed by the Eng
lish men of letters. He dwelt on this theme in several of his Lettres anglaises,
noting that this advantage is the necessary result of the form of their gov
ernment, 143and stressed the difference between the dignified position of
English intellectuals and the unenviable-by-comparison state of their
slighted brethren in France.
If Voltaire concentrated upon the civil liberty of the English citizens,
Montesquieu emphasized their political liberty. His opinion of England was
hardly unqualified praise; there is little that is unqualified in Montesquieu.
But he did regard England as the model of the free state. The English consti
tution guaranteed political liberty because of the checks it placed on the
exercise of power. This beautiful system, he claimed, was of Germanic
origin; it was invented in the woods, and therefore originally was as much
French as English. But in France it gave way to absolutism. The English, in
distinction, had preserved it in its pristine form. This implied that the rights
of the aristocracy in England were never infringed upon; respect for its priv
ileges ensured its interest in the liberty of all. In a state there are always
persons distinguished by their birth, riches or honors: But were they to be
confounded with the common people, and to have only the weight of a
158 N A T I O N A L I S M
single vote like the rest, the common liberty would be their slavery, and they
would have no interest in supporting i t. . . The share they have therefore in
the legislature ought to be proportioned to the other advantages they have
in the state; which happens only when they form a body that has a right to
put a stop to the enterprises of the people, as a people has a right to put a
stop to theirs. This was exactly the situation in England. The unchallenged
preeminence of the nobility did not prevent, but in fact was conducive to,
the feeling of fellowship between it and the people. Those dignities, which
make the fundamental parr of the constitution, are more fixed than else
where, Montesquieu thought; but on the other hand, the great in this
country of liberty, are nearer upon the level with the people; their ranks are
more separated, and their persons are more confounded. Of course, the
English had the advantage of an atrocious climate, which made them im
mune to the danger of enslavement. Slavery, argued Montesquieu, is ever
preceded by sleep . . . But a people who find no rest in any situation . . . and
feel nothing but pain, can hardly be lulled to sleep.145Less fortunate na
tions, like France, were an easier prey for tyrants. Nevertheless Montes
quieu believed they ought to make an effort and follow the example of Eng
land, for, among other things, the life of the great in it was great, and this
was worth a little cut in sleep.
The dignity of the elite, whether plebeian or patrician in origin; the
strength of the state; and nationality appeared interrelated. And leaders of
the French elite cast yearning glances at the greener grass of Albion and
popularized the idea of the nation in hope that France would become a na
tion too. The example of England only accelerated the process of the sym
bolic elevation of the people, inspired by the structural changes within
French society; but it was because of England that nation, rather than
state or patrie, the already charged concepts with a much longer history
in France, became the name under which this rising deity was to be wor
shipped.
Nationalization of Patriotism
The substitution of a national identity, whose source was membership in a
civil society composed of citizens, for one derived from being a subject of
the French king was a long and gradual process which proceeded by imper
ceptible stages. The inherited ideas died slowly. In 1715 the image of the
king as the object of supreme allegiance, the embodiment of the sacred, and
the state personified still seemed intact. The king is the visible image of
God on earth, asserted the Parlement of Paris that year. The whole State is
in him, the will of the people is enclosed in his will. Around 1750, wrote
Daniel Mornet, the new ideas had barely penetrated life . .. nothing
seemed to have changed, or so very little. Yet, in 1754, the Marquis
The Three Identities of France
159
dArgenson observed that never before were the names of Nation and State
evoked as often as today. These two words were never pronounced under
Louis XIV, and one hardly knew what they meant. 150
The new concepts that reflected the birth of-a new spirit may be said to
have finally entered the discourse.151The spirit manifested itself in print.
Inspired perhaps by the translation of Bolingbrokes I dea of a Patriot King,
anonymously published in French in 1750 under the title of Lettres sur Ies-
prit de patriotisme et sur Videe dun roi patriots, French writers busily wrote
tracts which exhorted their countrymen to patriotism. The scale of values
changed. In 1751 Rousseau devoted an essay to the subject of virtue most
necessary for heroes, in which he urged the French to abandon the vain
pursuit of glory, and the show of bravery so characteristic of the noble code
of conduct, for 1amour de la Patrie, which alone deserved to be considered
a truly heroic quality. The love of glory is responsible for a great deal of
both good and evil; the love of the patrie is purer in its principle and surer in
its effects, and while the world has been often oversupplied with heroes,
nations will never have enough citizens . . . No, I will not grant the crown of
heroism to the bravery of our fellow citizens who had shed their blood for
their country, but to their ardent love for the Patrie, and to their invincible
constancy in adversity. In his other writings, however, Rousseau saw patri-
otism and glory not as opposed but as inseparably connected. Grimm, too,
regretted that no germ of greatness, no idea of patriotism and true glory,
was to be perceived in the young Frenchmen of his day. This appears to be a
representative position. Glory, a legacy of the kings state, was becoming a
French national characteristic. Ah! a citizen was to exclaim later, how
could one be French and not love it! 152
While some lamented the lack of patriotism among Frenchmen, a certain
Basset de la Marelle, in a work entitled Difference du patriotisme national
cbez les Franqais et chez les Anglais, contended in 1762 that his countrymen
were more patriotic than the English. Some years later C. A. Rossel, the
patriotic lawyer, drew a similar comparison between France and Rome, and
also concluded thatiove of country was more characteristic of the former.153
The humiliating experience of the Seven Years War stimulated the growth
of national patriotism among the French elite and probably contributed to
its deeeper penetration into the hardened hearts of lesser Frenchmen. In the
literature, the sentiment was glorified. In comparison with it, less public vir
tues appeared banal. J think that in establishing the hierarchy of virtues
wrote Condorcet to Turgot in 1773, one has to put justice, charity, Vamour
de la patrie, courage (not that of war, which is characteristic of all the farm
yard dogs), hatred of tyrants, far above chastity, marital fidelity, sobriety.
At about the same time, Rousseau, possibly with an eye to his own immor
tality, advised his Polish audience: Imitate the magnanimity of the Romans
. . . to shower proofs of their gratitude upon those who .. - had rendered
160 N A T I O N A L I S M
them outstanding services: foreigners, Roman subjects, slaves, animals even
. . . The men so distinguished should remain . . . the favorite sons.of the
fatherland .. . even if they happen to be scoundrels. 1S4
Changes in Vocabulary
The change of sentiment was reflected in the change of vocabulary and was
noticeable as eariy as 1715. According to a 'limited but representative
sample of the ARTFL data-base of French literature, between 1710 and
1720, and then again between 1750 and 1760, there occurred a significant
increase in the employment of rhe related concepts nation, peuple, patrie,
and etat, which signified the transfer of loyalty to the community and the
nationalization of discourse.,is
Between 1700 and 1710, the word nation was used in the literature only
45 times, in 7 volumes out of a corpus of 20. In the next decade it was
employed 106 times, in 12 volumes out of 25. Its use steadily increased,
going up sharply between 1751 and 1760, when it appeared in 990 instances
in 43 out of 95 volumes, and thereafter remaining at this high level.156The
word peuple, which was used 376 times between 1701 and 1710 in 12 vol
umes, in the next decade appeared 1,782 times in 19 texts, and after 1760
became even more frequent.157The word patrie jumped from a low of 34
instances {used sparsely in 12 texts) per decade (1701-1710) to 279 in 14
texts between 1711 and 1720; between 1751 and 1760 it appeared 462
times, being employed in 48 volumes; there were 658 instances (in 61 texts)
between 1761 and 1770, and 806 (in 40 volumes) between 1781 and
1790.158A similar increase can be observed in the use of the word etat, al
though in this case, owing to the multiple meanings of the word, plain num
bers are less helpful.159
The four terms were used interchangeably, as near synonyms- In 1690, the
Dictionnaire universel of the Abbe Furetiere defined nation as a collective
name that refers to a great people inhabiting a certain extent of land, en
closed within certain borders, or under the same: authorities. The examples
were the French, the Romans, the Cannibals. Nation thus was closely
akin to people and related to the state (government) and territory. Every
nation, according to Furetiere, had a special character. The dictionary also
mentioned, among other meanings of the word, that of people belonging to
the same profession and nations of the university. The separate entry na
tional defined it as whatever concerns an entire nation. 160The Diction
naire de Trevoiix of 1732 added to this definition but an example of a na
tion of critics, well-known to every author, and an explanation that the
plural nations in the Scriptures refers to infidel peoples who do not rec
ognize the true God.161The 1777 dictionary of the Academy, in its definition
of nation, emphasized the constitutive role of the state. This collective
\
The Three Identities of France 161
term, according to it, applied to all the inhabitants of the same state, the
same country, who live under the same laws, speak the same language, etc.
However, it also defined as a nation inhabitants of the same country,
even if they do not live under the same laws, and are the subjects of different
princes. 162The Nouveau dictionnaire franqois of 1793 reprinted the entry
in the academic dictionary, but made an important addition to it. In
France, it noted, one calls the crime of iese-nation a conspiracy, a plot, or
a criminal attempt against the laws and the constitution of the state. 163
Here nation was made exactly synonymous to the state and its laws. In
terestingly, the illustrious Encyclopedic, that loudspeaker of the Enlighten
ment, in its treatment of nation followed Furetieres definition (of 1690) al
most to the word, investing it with no particular significance and adding
nothing new,164while the historical and critical Dictionnaire universel des
moeurs, published in 1772, did not deem the concept important enough to
be included in it at all.
The word peuple was ascribed two meanings by Furetieres dictionary
the general one, closely related to the concept of nation: the mass of
persons who live in one country, who compose a nation; and the particular
meaning defined by opposition to those who are noble, wealthy, and edu
cated (an implicit recognition of the three bases of elite status). The Dic
tionnaire de Trevoux affirmed this interpretation, paying more attention to
the particular meaning and supporting it with a Latin translation, plebs,
vulgus, and telling quotations from famous authors, such as: There is a
great difference between the populus in Latin, and peuple in French. The
word peuple among us does not usually signify but what the Romans called
plebs, taken from Vaugelas, and the already mentioned opposition of the
peuple to the elites of birth and culture by La Bruyere. It also cited several
proverbs to the same effect, whose message it diligently spelled out: Tout le
monde nest pas peuple; cest-a-dire, tout le monde nest pas sot, ou
duppe. les
The article Peuple in the Encyclopedic, written in 1766, was a con
scious attempt to vindicate the people. I t began by stressing the respect for
the people in classical antiquity and contemporary societies such as England
and Sweden. People, it stated, is a collective name that is difficult to de-
fine since its meaning varies according to ideas, time, place, and the nature
of government. The Greeks and the Romans, who knew much about men,
greatly respected the people. In their midst the people made its voice heard
. . . in all the affairs concerning the major interests of the country . . . in
England the people chooses its own representatives to the House of Com
mons, and in Sweden peasants participate in the national assemblies. The
author of the article (Jaucourt) obviously used the term people to refer to
the rank and file 'of the population, rather than to the whole, thus staying
close to the traditional pejorative meaning of the word. Moreover, following
162
N A T I O N A L I S M
Coyer (a treatise, On the Nature of the People), he observed that in France
the application of the term was further narrowed to include only peasants
and workers. But, while he accepted this definition, his essay did not share
the contempt in which the people thus defined was held in France, but por
trayed it as sober, just, loyal and religious without caring about what it can
gain from i t . . . the largest and the most important part of the nation. lss
In the academic dictionary of 1777, one notes that the emphasis had
changed rather dramatically; the general, previously neutral, meaning of the
word became unmistakably positive, while the particular, derogatory sense,
which had been stressed in earlier dictionaries, all but disappeared. Here,
people denotes a multitude of men from the same country, who live
under the same laws. (The Hebrew people, The Jewish people, The people
of Israel, The Roman people) . . . Sometimes the term refers to a multitude
of men that adhere to the same religion, whether they live in the same coun
try or not. Sometimes it also refers to the least considered part of the popu
lation of a city or a country . . . In this sense one says mean people or
low people [has peuple] . . . I t is often said The voice of the people is the
voice of God, that is to say that ordinarily the common sentiment is founded
on truth.167The entry in the New Dictionary of 1793 was identical. Both
the explicit definition and the examples offered made the people an emi
nently respectable entity. It was constituted by law more than by anything
else and was the source of truth.
I f the people was made worthy of respect, patrie, now closely identified
with the state, became an object of passionate devotion in which the mem
bers of the people were expected to share. Furetieres dictionary methodi
cally recorded various conventional meanings of the word, without invest
ing any one of them with a particular significance. It had no special
relevance; in 1690 patriotism was a sentiment characteristic of the ancients.
Thus the entry Patrie read: the country where one is born, and it refers to
a particular place as much as to the province and the empire or the state
where one was bom . . . the Romans and the Greeks were famous for their
love of the patrie It is sometimes figuratively said that Rome is the patrie
of ail Christians. Heaven is our true patrie, a philosopher is everywhere in
his patrie. Patrie is the place where one feels good. By the 1770s this equiv
ocal and tepid attitude was decidedly abandoned. The academic dictionary
of 1777 ruled confidently: Patrie is the country, the State where one is
bom. The examples of common usage it provided left no doubt as to the
proper sentiments one was to entertain toward it. France is our patrie.
Love of the patrie. For the good of the patrie. In the service of the patrie. To
serve ones patrie. To defend ones patrie. To die for the patrie. The duty to
the patrie is one of the primary duties. The dictionary mentioned that the
word was sometimes applied to provinces and cities and that the heavens
could be referred to as the celeste patrie. The 1772 Dictionnaire bisto-
The Three Identities of France
163
rique et critique des moeurs, on the other hand, omitted all the meanings the
word had had in French earlier and, under the heading Patrie (amour de la)
treated only the Roman virtue, newly reappropriated and held as a model to
the recently-indifferent-to-it Frenchmen. Among other things, the editor of
the dictionary linked patriotism to the condition of freedom. Why, he
asked, did the Greeks triumph over the Persians at Salamis? and an
swered, On the one side was heard the voice of an imperious master driv
ing his slaves to battle, while on the otherthe name of the Patrie that in
spired free men. !SS
Ic was this connection which was emphasized by the Chevalier de jau-
court, who wrote the article Patrie for the Encyclopedic. A vulgar lexicog
rapher, or a geographer not interested but in the location of one or another
place, said the Chevalier, might define the patrie as a place of ones birth, but
a philosopher would recognize that it expresses the significance we attach to
the concepts of family, society, free state, in which we are members, and of
which the laws assure us our liberties and our happiness. There is no patrie
under despotism.
Thus interpreted, the patrie, with its connotations of participation and
liberty, appears to have acquired the meaning corresponding to that of the
free nation in the English sense, although Jaucourt never made the con
nection; it seems to refer to the political system and community in which the
nation, in the English sense, of the self-governing people, is able to exercise
its nationality. The association of patrie and freedom could and did lead to
universalistic, cosmopolitan attitudes. The most perfect form of patriot
ism, wrote Jaucourt, is to be so fully conscious of the rights of humanity,
that one will want to see them respected for ail the peoples on earth.169But
at the same time, patriotism could be particularized. One sees this clearly in
Rousseaus exaltation of national specificity: for this friend of humanity was
as fervent a nationalist as any, without ever being a French patriot. Scores of
lesser luminaries interpreted amour de la patrie as iove of freedom in France,
or even love for France without freedom. Furthermore, even when the pri
macy of liberty as such was emphasized, this notion of political community
still took on meaning incompatible with the values implied in the English
concept of nation. In their devotion to the patrie, French patriots tended
to forget about men. Rousseau excluded them from his definition altogether.
It is neither walls nor men that make a patrie, he explained; it is the laws,
the mores, the customs, the government, the constitution, and the way of
life that ensues from all this. 170
A similar tendencyaway from emphasis on the individualwas evi
dent in the evolution of the concept of state, to begin with much more
emotionally charged in the French context. Furetiere gives Kingdom, coun
try or an extent of land under the same authority as the usual sense of estat;
its other meanings, according to his dictionary, include the manner of gov-
164
N A T I O N A L I S M
eminent in a particular nation, the different orders (estates) of the king
dom, which were sometimes assembled to correct the disorders of the state,
to cure the troubles of the state These estates are the Church, the Nob
lesse, and the Third Estate, which Furetiere defines as bourgeois notables.
The word may also refer to assemblies of the Estates General and to differ
ent degrees or conditions of persons distinguished by their functions, offices,
professions, or occupations. (Here Furetiere adds an interesting note. One
does everything, he says, to sustain ones state, [that is] ones dignity, ones
rank. In France one cannot recognize the state [position] of a person by his
ways, or by his clothes. A comedian or a prostitute has the same dignity as
seigneurs or marquises.) According to the dictionary of the Academie Fran-
gaise of 1694, the word estat applied first of all to the condition of a per
son, thing, affair; among other meanings are found (in this order) dignity
or position, office, government of a people which lives under the authority
of a Prince, or in a Republic, the country itself which is governed by the
same authority, and finally, in France, one calls les estats the three orders
of the Kingdom, that are the clergy, the noblesseand the People [nota bene],
otherwise referred to as the Third Estate. The abridged edition of the Dic
tionnaire de Trevoux of 1762 also defines the state as the empire, king
dom, province, or extent of territory under the same authority and the
manner of government of a nation (adding disrespectfully in this connec
tion: the reason of state is a mysterious reason, invented by politicians to
authorize anything they might do without reason), as well as government
personnel and the three orders. (The Third Estate is defined as bourgeois
notables.)171Curiously, the New Dictionary of 1793 adds to these neutral
and equivocal definitions very little. Its definitions of state as a polity, the
territory or population under the same government, the manner of govern
ment, and government personnel are borrowed from the 1694 academic dic
tionary. In this treatment there is no evidence of the dramatic change in po
litical discourse, or, for that matter, of the Revolution, which in 1793 was
four years old. The article in the Encyclopedic, however, though written in
1756, reflects this transformation and demonstrates the coilectivistic and
abstract character of the new French loyalties.
The Chevalier de Jaucourt, the author of the article LEtat in the Ency-
clopedie, begins by discussing the concept in the sense of the state of na
ture and primitive state of man. Since man is a free being, he can modify
this primitive state, creating thereby secondary states or etats accessoires.
There is no secondary state more important, he rules, than the civil state,
or the state of civil society and government. Jaucourt proceeds to discuss
the state in its political sense. He defines it in genera! terms as a civil
society, in which [or by whichpar laquelle] a multitude of people are
united under the authority of one sovereign, in order to enjoy, thanks to his
protection and care, the security and happiness that are lacking in the state
The Three Identities of France
165
of nature. Among the definitions likely to be known to his enlightened con
temporaries, Jaucourt rejects that of Pufendorf, in which the state is con
founded with the sovereign, and declares his preference for the one proposed
by Cicero: a multitude of people joined together by common interests and
laws, to which they submitted by common accord.
From this Jaucourt jumps to the following momentous conclusion, say
ing: We can consider the state as a moral person whose head is the sover
eign, and whose limbs are the individual citizens: accordingly, we can attrib
ute to this person certain specific actions and rights that are distinct from
those of each citizen, and that no citizen nor group of citizens can arrogate
to themselves . . . the state is a society animated by a single soul that directs
all its movements in a consistent manner, with an orientation toward the
common good. That is a happy state, a state par excellence , , . Thus it is
from a union of wills supported by a superior power that the body politic,
or the state, ensues; and without it a civil society is inconceivable.172This
is a concept of a polity as an autonomous collective being, possessed of an
independent will, different from and superior to the wills of the individuals
who compose it and who constitute but cells in the larger organism. Like
nation in England, it is a polity reinterpreted and glorified, but it is not a
nation as an elite composed of rational individuals. It is a rational individual
itself, a reification of such a nation, an abstraction.
The Death of a King
At first it appeared that the community, which its champions named in the
English manner a Nation, claimed only a portion in the sphere of the sacred
and was content to share it with the king. Patriotism, as of old, was fre
quently confounded with devotion to the Crown. In 1767, Cardinal de Ber-
nis as yet saw no contradiction between a faithful subject and a free and
patriotic citizen. The trust in the sovereign is the true mark of a patriot,
he thought, to obey and represent [the sovereigns will] with respecthere
is the duty of a faithful subject and the way of a free and patriotic citizen.
As late as 1787 Calonne still equated la voix du patriotisme with le sen
timent du au souverain. 173But the borderline between sharing with and the
dispossession of the monarch was little by little obscured, and soon the king
was expelled from the sphere of the sacred of which the Nation became the
sole occupant.
The image of the sovereign Nation, partaking in authority alongside,
rather than in, the king, which the now bold Parlements incessantly evoked
in their remonstrances, presupposed rejection of the Divine Right theory. In
vain did Louis XV fulminate against the arrogance of the robins during the
dramatic Seance de la flagellation in March 1766, trying to reassert the prin
ciples of absolutism and insisting that public order in its entirety emanates
166
N A T I O N A L I S M
from me, and that the rights and interests of the nation, which some would
make a body separate from the monarch, are necessarily joined with mine,
and rest only in my hands.17-5It was to no avail. The Divine Right of kings
made no sense to anyone anymore, and eight years later, when Louis XVs
grandson acceded to the throne, even the new king did not believe in it any
longer.
In the general cahiers of the nobility and the Third Estate only a tiny mi
nority asserted the Divine appointment of the king. Those cahiers which
discussed the question of the ultimate source of authority at all tended to
place it with the nation. The cabier of the Third Estate of Barcelonette did
call Louis XVI a God, but the epithet was used metaphorically, as a compli
ment rather than as an ontological statement, and was more than balanced
by the praise of the Third Estate of Briey, who hailed him as the mosr hu
man of kings. The transfer of divinity from the king to the Nation was
reflected in the use of the word sacred in the cahiers. A significant number
of them concurred that the person of the king is sacred, but an equally
significant number also attributed this quality to the rights of the nation, of
person and of property, as well as to the security against arbitrary arrest,
the inviolability of the post, and the duty of justice that the king owed his
subjects. The noblesse of Dourdan, which recognized the sanctity of the
king, also demanded that a statement of the rights of the nation be depos
ited in the treasury of the Church of Saint-Remi in Rheims, the traditional
place of coronation, with all the dignity of its God-sent and time-honored
paraphernalia.175
The king who had been God was demoted to the post of the first magis
trate of the nation, the foundation stone of the social edifice, then the
citizen-king, and finally was deprived of membership in the nation, and con
sequently of life, as a born traitor. This last degradation was not inevitable;
it was brought on by the logic (or rather the lack thereof) of events. But it
was made possible by the slow transformation of consciousness responsible
for the change in the identity of France and the enthronement of the Nation
as the origin of all values. The Nation replaced the king as the source of
identity and focus of social solidarity, as previously the king had replaced
God. By the time of the Revolution the transformation was complete. Na
tional became the attribute of everything that had before been royal;
there were national guards and national army, national assembly and na
tional education, national domains and national economy, national welfare
and national debt. Lese-nation replaced lese-majeste as the crime of high
treason.176Yet, in a way, the nation France remained faithful to the principle
of medieval and absolute monarchy which proclaimed that the King never
dies. It was only a man who expired on the scaffold on a January morning
of the year 1793. The kings authority was transferred to the Nation, and
The Three Identities of France
167
with it came the attributes ol the kings stateits unitary, abstract character,
the indivisibility of sovereignty. The Nation became King.
Nation, the Supreme Being
In some ways the enthroned nation resembled God even more closely than
its deified predecessor. In distinction from the king, who was after all a con
crete being of flesh and blood, the French nationlike Godwas an ab
straction. It was a supreme rational being, worshipped, but on the whole left
undefined, and thus appropriately inscrutable. In a monotheistic, even
though Catholic, society such as France the coexistence of two supreme de
ities was unthinkable. The erection of the new cult demanded that the old
orie be destroyed. And it is not inconceivable that the iconoclastic tendencies
of the French elite before the Revolution, and specifically its intense anti-
clericalism, had this imperative as their origin.
The concept of the nation was imported from England, but in the pro
cess was transformed. From a politically charged metaphor, a name for the
association of free, rational individuals, it turned into a super-human collec
tive person. In France, the nation inexorably tended toward abstraction
and reification. To some extent this had to do with the sequence of the de
velopment of national consciousness there. If in England nation was a
ride given to a story, in France the title had existed long before the story v^as
written. France {or at least its spokesmen) had wanted.to be a nation long
before it became one. The French elite adopted the idea of the nation not as
an acknowledgment of the changes in social and political structure, which
would necessitate or justify the application of the term to France (as this
happened in England), but because such adoption might be instrumental in
helping it out of its predicament. "We must have a nation for such a grand
undertaking, exclaimed characteristically one enthusiast, and the Nation
will be bom. 177In other words, there was nothing in reality to constrain
the imagination of the aspiring nationalists, no nation out there to impose
its image on their consciousness; the concept was wholly negotiable, and it
tended to remain abstract.
The nature of the needs that the idea of the nation was called upon to
answer in the two countries determined the ideal relationship between the
political community as a whole and the individuals of whom it was com
posed, and had important repercussions for the political culture it helped to
create. In England, it was the dignity of the individuals who composed it
that dignified the collective body (and justified calling it a nation). But in
France it was the dignity of the whole that restored dignity to those who
claimed membership in it. In England, it was the liberty of the individuals
168 N A T I O N A L I S M
who composed it that made the nation free. In France, it was the liberty of
the nation that constituted freedom of the individuals. In England, the
source of authority was the individual, a thinking human being; individuals
delegated their authority to representatives, and thus empowered the nation.
In France, it was the nation from which authority emanated, and it empow
ered individuals.
The N oble Nation and the Exclusion of Nobility
The first attempts to prove that the French nation was an empirical reality
(an identifiable group of individuals that merited the title) were at the same
time attempts of the nobility to monopolize nationality. According to the
these nobiliaire, the nobility was the bearer of the sovereignty of the polity;
it delegated authority to the king, who was subject to the fundamental laws
or constitution of the kingdom, of which the nobility remained the guard
ian.178Absolutism was a usurpation of legitimate authority; it violated the
rights {or liberties) of the nobility, and this violation implied infringement
on the sovereignty of the polity, its enslavement. This identification of the
liberty of the polity with the liberty of the nobility in it was rather common-
place at the time: since tyranny was defined as encroachment on the privi
leges (liberties) of those who traditionally enjoyed them, it followed logi
cally that abstract liberty, its opposite, would be linked with respect to
privilege. The nobility liked to see itself as the traditional, and therefore
legitimate, governing part of the sovereign nation, and as the latter concept
had the connotation of a community of citizens actively participating in gov
ernment, rather than subjects devoid of will, it was easy to confuse and iden
tify representatives with the entity that they represented. Montesquieus
compelling restatement of the these nobiliaire in the Spirit of the Laws, with
its inclusive definition of the nobility that was acceptable to all of its many
sectors, was a case of such identification, and the immense popularity of the
Spirit of the Laws in its day was most probably related to this fact.
Montesquieu, who used the word nation throughout his work, both in
the sense of a community of citizens and as a neutral term for polity, in
several crucial passages made nation synonymous with the nobility. He
defined it in this manner while discussing the Origins and Revolutions of
the Civil Laws among the French: Under the two first dynasties, the na
tion, that is, the lords and the bishops, was often assembled; the common
people were not yet thought of. [Sous les deux premieres races on assembla
souvent la nation, cest a dire les seigneurs et les eveques; il netait point des
communes.] Here the nation and the people were clearly distinguished. Oc
casionally, Montesquieu used the word people, as well as nation, as a
neutral collective term, referring to the political community, but as a rule
people was reserved for the lower classes.
The Three Identities of France
169
An important feature of Montesquieus notion of the nation, undoubtedly
influenced by the fact that it was fashioned on the English experience, but
also related to the confusion between the nation and the aristocracy, was its
concreteness. It was not a reified concept, not the name of an abstract entity;
rather, it referred to an identifiable association of individuals. Their laws
not being made for one individual more than another, wrote Montesquieu
of the English perceptively, each considers himself a monarch; and indeed
the men of this nation are rather confederates than fellow-subjects [conci-
toyens] 175There was no nation beyond the individuals who composed it,
and its will was a product of their wills.
In the torrent of pamphlets produced in the year and a half before the
Revolution, there may be discerned a similar attempt to reserve nationality
to the owners of property (perhaps also manifested in the iater restriction
by the law of December 22, 1789of electoral rights to higher classes of
tax-payers). But the identification of the nation with the Third Estate was of
an entirely different significance.180The Third Estate, as we have seen, could
be defined both as bourgeois notables and as the People. The first defini-
tion might have led to the equation of the nation with the Third Estate, but
would exclude from the nation both the nobility and the people. In distinc
tion, the definition of the Third Estate as the People, paradoxically, allowed
noblemen to identify with it (explaining the. anomaly of aristocratsdepu
ties of the Third), and it was in its quality of the People that the Third Estate
was eulogized and hailed as the Nation by its bourgeois members and
nobility alike. Rousseau identified the Third Estate with public interest.
Rabaut-Saint-Etienne (or de Saint-Etienne) explained: Take away by sup
position the two hundred thousand churchmen in France. The nation still
remains. Take away even all the nobility by further supposition. The nation
still remains . . . But if you take away the twenty-four million Frenchmen
known by the name of Third Estate, nobles and churchmen will remain but
no nation. 181
The People worshipped, however, was not the same as the people actually
existing; it was some otherquite imaginarytwenty-four million French
men. And since both the term people in its new, lofty meaning and na
tion referred to an abstraction, rather than an empirical reality, the glorifi
cation of the People did not necessarily imply a belief in the equal dignity of
all those who composed it, the masses and the elite alike. The tacit accept
ance of fundamental inequality between them was perpetuated in the dis
tinction made between people and Nation, which persisted, perhaps owing
to some kind of linguistic inertia, the lingering memory of the pejorative
connotations of the word people, as late as the inauguration of the Na
tional Assembly,182and could be met with in the most unexpected contexts.
Who would expect to find contempt for the people, for example, in that
harbinger of revolution, the Social Contractf And yet the liberty-loving
170
N A T I O N A L I S M
Jean-Jacques most certainly had no qualms in assigning the masses to the
bottom of the social hierarchy, and no quarrel with hierarchy itself. Thor
ough equality, he pronounced in the Social Contract, would be out of
place, as it was not found even in Sparta. By the social contract, citizens, to
be sure, were all equal.583But, the oft-quoted definition to the contrary,84
not every subject of a State was a citizen. In the Government of Poland, for
instance, writing about that one of the peoples of our day that [made him]
feel closest to the men of old, whom Rousseau so much admired, he iden
tified citizens with only the active members of the republic, that is, those
who are to take part in its government. The Polish Nation, the abstract
Sovereign, it appears, was the Polish nobility: throughout most of the book
Rousseau uses the two words as synonyms. Take away the senate and the
king, he says, the knightly order, and thereby the state and the Sovereign
as well, remain intact. The voice of the Polish nobility is the voice of God
on earth, for the power to make laws belongs exclusively to the knightly
order, and it is law, as we know, that is the expression of general will, or
the will of the nation 155
This usage is not entirely consistent, it is true, and in several places Rous
seau is reminded of the most numerous part of the nation, that is, first of
all, the enserfed peasants, and the burghers of Poland. He believes that to
arouse their patriotism, to tie them to the patrie and to its form of govern
ment by bonds of affection, would be a good idea. For this reason, he even
suggests that Polish nobles think about emancipating their peasants. But he
is by no means an unequivocal advocate of this measure. He is afraid of
the vices and slavishness of the serfs themselves; he cautions: [Do] not
free their bodies before you have freed their souls (and unless compensa
tion is provided to the owners by means of exemptions, privileges, and
other benefits in proportion to the number of their serfs found worthy of
enfranchisement). Freed people would do better service to the Nation, but
masses will always be different from masters. The distinctions of rank
should be preserved. Consider Rousseaus reasons in the following remark
able paean to the virtues of physical education, which anticipates the patri
otic exhortations of Turnvater Jahn:
Because of firearms, bodily strength and skill now play a much lesser role in
warfare than they used to, and so have fallen into discredit. But the result is
that the man who possesses the advantage of good birth can now point to noth
ing within himself that sets him apart from other men and justifies his good
fortune, no mark inseparable from his person that attests to his natural right to
superiorityexcept for the qualities of mind and spirit, which are often open
to dispute [and] turn up often in the wrong place . . . It is important ... that
those who are some day to exercise command over others should prove them
selves, from early youth, superior to those others in every senseor at least try
to. More: ir is a good thing for the people to be thrown with them frequently
The Three Identities of France 171
on occasions set aside for pleasure, to learn to recognize them, to become accus
tomed to seeing them, and to share their amusements with them. Provided only
that distinctions of rank are maintained and that the people never actually
mingle with the rulers [emphasis everywhere added], this is the way to tie the
former to the latter with bonds of affection, and o combine attachment to
them with respect.
For Rousseau, thus, people remained those others, who should be kept
from mingling with the rulers who personified the nation. This attitude
makes less surprising the explicit defense of slavery in the Social Contract,
throughout which slave-holding societies of antiquity are presented as a
shining model to modern nations, which Rousseau sees as degenerate: is
liberty maintained only by the help of slavery? It may be so. Extremes meet
. . . There are some unhappy circumstances .. . where the citizen can be
perfectly free only when the slave is most a slave. Such was the case of
Sparta. As for you, modem peoples, you have no slaves, but you are slaves
yourselves; you pay for their liberty with your own. It is in vain that you
boast of this preference; I find in it more cowardice than humanity.136
As the idea of the nation penetrated into the consciousness of educated
Frenchmen and began to claim their allegiance as the incarnation of the sa
cred, nationality was reclaimed from the nobility, and before long the nobil
ity was deprived of membership in the nation altogether and defined as the
anti-nation. This followed logically from the abstract quality of the French
concept and the tendency to reification, which made the nation as a whole,
rather than its constitutive parts, the source of authority. For this clearly
implied that any authority not immediately delegated by the people was a
usurpation, that historical justification of privilege was inadequate, and a
hereditary right to representation in principle impossible. Logical conclu
sions are not necessarily the same as the conclusions drawn, but in this case
the implications were made explicit. In the first place, there was an interest
on the part of a particular group to do so. Those who did not yet get a
foothold within the elite, though seeking a place in it and believing them
selves worthy to occupy it, or those who had barely got such a foothold,
could save themselves the trouble of fighting for social acceptance if they
defined the people, that is, their generalized selves, as the only locus of au
thority and rejected the claims of the nobility to represent the nation (and
therefore its claims to a superior status) as illegitimate.187Perhaps even more
important was the fact that many of the well-situated members of the elite
took the idea seriously, spelling out its conclusions out of pure idealism. It is
therefore not that surprising to find among the most fervent supporters of
the Third Estate the youthful Comte dAntraigues, who extolled it (earning
the admiration of its electors in Paris, who thought of nominating the patri
cian for their list) while castigating the hereditary nobility whence he came
172
N A T I O N A L I S M
as the scourge devouring the land of his birth. Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, a
scion of a parlementaire (namely robin) family from Dauphine, argued that
the arrogation of the right of representation, and therefore privilege, by the
nobility was a usurpation and tyranny equal in kind to the anti-national
crimes of which heand the nobility in generalaccused absolute mon
archy. Both he and dAntrasgues insisted that nobility, far from being the
core of the nation, was an alien body, an impediment to the nations free
dom, a sort of particular Nation within the Nation. The aristocracy en
dorsed and articulated an idea that doomed it. As was its habit in that cen
tury of frivolous enthusiasm, it stepped out gaily on a carpet of flowers,
little imagining the abyss beneath.lss
In their selfless attack on the second order, the new noble nationalists
were helped by the arguments supplied by those of their fellow-members
who attempted to defend and strengthen it, and by zealots of modest birth
who wished to see it annihilated. Abbe Sieyes, like Boulainvilliers, repre
sented the nobility as a separate race of men, indeed the Germanic Franks,
but drew from this rhe opposite conclusion. In Quest-ce que le Tiers Etat?
he defined the nobility as a people apart, a false people which, unable to
exist by itself for lack of useful organs, latches on to a real nation like those
vegetable growths which can only live on the sap of the plants they exhaust
and suck dry, and asked, why does not the real nation send all these fam
ilies . . . back to the forests of Franconia? Another son of the Gallic race,
J . A. Delaure, in The Critical History of the Nobility:, published in 1790,
commiserated with his unhappy people: You have been trampled under
the feet of barbarians whose ancestors massacred ours. The nobility, for
him, were all foreigners, the savages escaped from the forests of Ger
many.19They were not of the Nation, and there was no place for them
within it.
The Philosophical Basis of the French I dea of the Nation:
Rousseaus Social Contract
The Nation was a hollow, but charged, concept. The image of its referent in
the minds of its worshippers remained foggy, but it was obviously one and
indivisible, the ultimate source of authority, with a claim on the uncondi
tional and total loyalty of its members. (This loyalty was identified with
patriotic virtue and made one eligible for nationality.)
The Nation exists before everything, it is the source of everything,
preached Sieyes in Quest-ce que le Tiers Etat? All sovereignty resides es
sentially in the Nation. No body, no individual can exercise authority which
does not explicitly emanate from it, read Article 3 of the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen.190This revolutionary rhetoric drew on the ideas
developed during several preceding decades; its idiom, specifically, was that
The Three Identities of France
173
of the Social Contract. This work remains the quintessential expression oI
the French nationalist vision on the eve of the Revolution, although Rous
seau was not a French patriot and although the concept nation was never
used there in its evocative seme, and it was not until later, in his advice to
the Poles, that Rousseau translated the original terms Sovereign and gen*
era! will into the language of nation and the will of the nation.
The subject of the Social Contract is society as such. The contract is con
cluded by men when the preservation of the state of nature is no longer
feasible, and society, or civil state, is its product. The clauses of the social
contract, says Rousseau, may be reduced to onethe total alienation of
each associate with all his rights, to the whole community . . . alienation
without reserve, As the personalities of the contracting parties dissolve, at
once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this
act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many
members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving from this act its
unity, its common identity, its life, and its will. This public person, so formed
by the union of all other persons, formerly took the name of city, and now
takes that of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members State when
passive, Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like
itself. Those who are associated in it rake collectively the name of people,
and severally are called citizens, as sharing in sovereign power, and subjects,
as being under the laws of the State. Each of us, says Rousseau, puts his
person and his power in common under the supreme direction of the genera]
will. The exercise of the general will, he defines, is Sovereignty.
The passage from the state of nature to the civil state is the sourceand
meaningof morality. Society (body politic, Republic, State, Sovereign, or
People) is law unto itself. All authority, all values emanate from it. It is, by
definition, infallible. The Sovereign, merely by virtue of what it is, is always
what it should be, says Rousseau. The genera! will is always right. A
piquant corollary of this is Rousseaus acceptance of the reason of state
argumentation: There neither is nor can be any kind of fundamental law
binding on the body of the peoplenot even the social contract itself. As
Rousseau moves toward an essentially conservative and authoritarian posi
tion similar to that of the seventeenth-century advocates of die reason of
state doctrine, he, like- the latter, concludes that obedience is the proper
characteristic of the citizen in his relationship with the Sovereign. Anything
else is simply ruled out. The Sovereign, says Rousseau, being formed
wholly of the individuals who compose it, neither has nor can have any
. interest contrary to theirs; and consequently the sovereign power need give
no guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible for the body to hurt all
its members. And, as behooves a great mind, contemptuous of evidence
(such as divers precursors of the guillotine), he insists that it cannot hurt
any [of its members] in particular either. As to the individual members who
174
N A T I O N A L I S M
fail to appreciate the state of bliss in which they exist, Rousseaus verdict is
unequivocal: Whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled
to do so by the whole body. This means nothing else than that he will be
forced to be free.
The implications of this already alarming statement are even more discon
certing, since the general will, as we learn, is not necessarily unanimous, and
while the people is never corrupted . . . it is often deceived as to what is
good for it. There is often a great deal of difference, cautions Rousseau,
between the will of all and the general will. While general will is the
expression of common interest, the will of all is just a sum of particular
interests. To ensure the expression of the former, rather than the latter,
Rousseau advocates nothing less than a totalitarian state with no interme
diate bodies between the central power and the mass of atomized individu
als: It is . .. essential. .. that there be no partial societies within the State,
and that each citizen think only his own thoughts. It is not difficult to rec
ognize in the obsession of the revolutionary era with unity, in the incessant
calls for the erosion of distinctions between classes and provinces, precisely
this concern of Rousseau.
Sovereigntythe authority of the collective being which is the Stateis
inalienable and indivisible, for the will either is or is not general. For this
reason, it cannot be proposed or even represented by any body which is
smaller than the whole. Rousseau explicitly rejects the idea of representation
as the invention of feudalism, that iniquitous and absurd system which
degrades humanity and dishonors the name of man. Yet, if no amount of
particular wills constitute the general will, how is it to be known? To this
Rousseau gives an answer which would satisfy the aristocracy, for it lets it
in, appropriately defeudalized, through the back, yet capacious, door. First,
he says, the general will is always in the right, but the judgment which
guides it is not always enlightened. It must be made to see objects as they
are, and sometimes as they ought to appear to i t. . . The individuals see the
good they reject; the public wills the good it does not see. All stand equally
in need of guidance. The former must be compelled to bring their wills into
conformity with their reason: the latter must be taught to know what it wills
. . . This makes the legislator necessary. The legislator, whose mission
legislationis at the highest possible point of perfection, is a special per
son, endowed with a great soul and reason above the range of the com
mon herd. He has the capacity to reveal to the multitude the general will
(law being purely the declaration of the general will) and in doing so is
justified even in duping the people and presenting it in a religious idiom as
divine revelation (in order to sustain by divine authority those whom hu
man prudence cannot move). In the service of so great a cause anything is
permissible, for, after all, there are a thousand kinds of ideas which it is
The Three Identities of France
175
impossible to translate into popular language,5 and yet the dumb masses
must be moved.
Second, while representation in legislation is unthinkable, the people may
and should be represented in government. Government is an intermediate
body set up between the subjects and the Sovereign, to secure their mutual
correspondence, charged with the execution oi the laws and the mainte
nance of liberty, both civil and political. The government, like society or
State, is also a moral person endowed with certain qualities; it is on a
small scale what the body politic which includes it is on a great one. The
type of government most perfectly corresponding to the essence of society
would be democracy, but perfection, unfortunately, is not the share of mor
tal men. Where there is a people of gods, decrees Rousseau, their govern
ment would be democratic. So perfect a government is not for men. The
best possible government, he declares, is aristocracy. There are three sorts
of aristocracynatural, elective, and hereditary. The first is only for simple
peoples; the third is the worst of all governments; the second is the best, and
it is aristocracy properly so called. The merits of aristocratic government
are the following: By this means uprightness, understanding, experience,
and all other claims to preeminence and public esteem become so many fur
ther guarantees of wise government. Moreover, assemblies are more easily
held, affairs better discussed and carried out with more order and diligence,
and the credit of the State is better sustained abroad by venerable senators
than by a multitude that is unknown and despised. In a word, it is the best
and most natural arrangement that the wisest should govern the many.191
So much for equality.
Rousseaus concept of society closely corresponded to the concept of the
Divine Right state elaborated under Richelieu; it was its abstract and gen
eralized descendant. The principles of the Social Contract were embraced by
the pioneers of French nationalism lock, stock, and barrel; Rousseau him
self, as was noted above, gave his theory a national flavor in the Govern
ment of Poland. By way of estrangement of a native idea and its return under
a new name, the concept nation was brought and placed solidly within
the fold of the French political tradition; and while the state was national
ized, the nation that emerged was destined to be profoundly etatist.
Through the idea of the indivisible and sovereign general willor the will
of the nationit was conceptualized as an autonomous entity, existing
above and independently of the wills of its individual members and domi
nating their wills. This, in turn, changed the meaning of citizenship, which
could no longer be understood as active participation in the formulation of
the collective policy that presumably expressed the general will, but became
limited to the willingness to carry it out. Good, that is, patriotic, citizens
were those who served their Nation zealously, even if the only zeal its will
176 N A T I O N A L I S M
allowed was rhat of servility. Above all, patriotism implied complete renun
ciation of self, the effacement of the private in front of the pubiic. Civil lib
erty lost much of its meaning, while political liberty, which was emphasized,
came to designate the unobstructed realization of the general will. In the
Social Contract, Rousseau defined civil liberty by opposition to natural
liberty, which was closely related to an unlimited right to everything [an
individual] tries to get and succeeds in getting. The central characteristic of
civil liberty, by contrast, was that it was limited by the general will. This
limitation, however, only increased its value, making liberty moral, which
was liberty proper. We might, over and above all this, add, to what man
acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master
of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a
law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty. i92 The will of the nation was
to preserve itself. In the Social Contract, this self-preservation presupposed
autonomy. But in the Government of Poland, liberty was more specifically
associated with particularism, while the lack of national character fostered
servitude.*53The will of the Nation was to speak through an elite of virtue
the legislator and the elective aristocracy, whom Rousseau sometimes con
fused with the Nation itselfthus modifying the meaning of the concept of
equality as well.
The concept of the elite of virtue, as weil as that of intelligencethe select
few to whom the objective laws of the natural and right social order were
evidentwere contributed to the French national tradition by Physi
ocrats and Neo-Physiocrats, the group that Tocqueville singled out as the
quintessential example of the revolutionary ideology. Both notions appeared
in Condorcet, in an essay written in 1788, Sur la constitution et les fonc-
tions des assemblies provinciales. Condorcets verdict was unequivocal:
the people could not be entrusted with managing its own affairs. Its not in
the least for the benefit of the superior classes, its for the benefit of the
people itself that one should not give positions of critical importance to
those whom we call the bourgeoisie or the Third Estate, because the inter
ests of the people are never defended with more nobility, moderation, and
the least danger to the pubiic tranquility, than when they are confided to
men of a superior class. History offers innumerable proofs of this . . . In one
word, it is for the good of al l . . . to compose assemblies only of men whom
education and personal consideration provide with the best means to do
good.5 154In a nation conceived in this manner, equal right of opinion and
participation made no sense. There was a fundamental inequality between
the elite to which the will of the nation was revealed and the non-elite from
whichowing to either insufficient virtue or ignoranceit was concealed.
Equality thus acquired the meaning of uniformity of the populace, which
was a condition for the unity of the nation, facilitated the expression of the
general will, and therefore ensured its freedom. The apparently contradic
The Three Identities of France
tory insistence of the intellectuals on natural equality and individual liberty,
and characteristic pronouncements such as Turgots there is no greater
enemy of liberty than the people, were not ar all inconsistent, but formed a
coherent authoritarian outlook.
Competition with England and Ressentiment
The idea of the nation took root in France around 1750.IS>J It became an
integral, if not the central, part of the elite discourse and effected a profound
change in mentality. Shortly thereafter it changed its original meaning. Two
successive developments were chiefly responsible for this change. One was
the reclamation of nationality from the nobility (itself, perhaps, a sign of the
elite?s impatience with the status quo and the unconscious substitution of
the change in the cognitive model of reality for the much-more-difficult-to-
achieve change of reality) and the redefinition of the nation, which made it
much more inclusive, but eventually excluded the hereditary aristocracy and
discredited the aristocratic position. The second development followed
upon the success of the first. As the elite converted to national identity, the
preoccupation with status and power struggle within the country was par
tiallyand during the Revolution completelyeclipsed by the concern for
international precedence.
The etatism of the French nationality was not a foregone conclusion. The
idea of the nation, as imported from England, implied commitment to the
values of individual liberty and equality. Within French political thought
itself, etatism espoused and articulated by the agents of absolutism coexisted
with the aristocratic (parliamentarian as well as feudal) tradition of op
position to absolutism, which contained important libertarian elements.
The abandonment of the noble order by its members and the attack on it by
the actual or potential members of the elite who were not noble were par
tially responsible for the preference of the etatist over the libertarian current
in the incipient French national consciousness. The factor which strongly
reinforced this tendency and ensured the ascendancy of the etatist position
was the competition with and changed attitude toward England.
After the death of Louis XIV it became clear that France had lost its pre
ponderance in Europe. This was partly due to the policies of the late king,
who had left the country in a sorry state, but was also highlighted by Eng
lands spectacular rise to centrality. France ceded to England the position of
leadership it had held in the seventeenth century. As the elite came to identify
with the political community as a whole, with France the nation, its mem
bers were increasingly bothered by this changed relationship. French na
tional patriotism was expressed in the burning desire to restore to the nation
the superior status it had lost to England and, with a typically French era-
178 N A T I O N A L I S M
phasis, win back its glory. This was the new meaning assumed by the con
cept of the regeneration of France, which nationalistic and patriotic
Frenchmen professed to be their goal.196
There were two ways to ensure the preeminence and glory of France: one
was to introduce liberal reforms and make France a nation similar to the
English; the other was to degrade this rival power. The first approach, es
poused by, among others, some of the older philosophes, most notably
Montesquieu and Voltaire, and discussed earlier, was based on a firm confi
dence in the ability of France to implement what it had learned from Eng
land and, having done so, easily surpass its model and competitor. This con
fidence was at the basis of the mid-century popularity of England among the
educated French. Comfortable in their self-esteem, they held no grudge
against it, for they were sure that soon there would be no grudge to hold.
We are in many things the disciples of England, wrote the staunchest An
glophile of all, Voltaire; we shall end by being equals of our masters.197
The task proved to be m.ore difficult and promised to take much longer than
was expected. For that reason Anglophilia gradually gave way to Anglo
phobia.
The French aristocractic and intellectual elite in the second half of the
eighteenth century found itself in a position which wasfrom a sociological
point of viewa perfect breeding ground for ressentiment. Drawn into
competition with England by adopting the English national idea as its model
and by the desire to regain its glory, France lacked the social conditions nec
essary for the implementation of this model, thereby making equality with
(even less superiority over) England impossible. It was perceived as essen
tially comparable, equal to England, and at the same time was clearly in
ferior to it.' And the aristocratic-intellectual elite in Francewhose mem
bers now identified their status with that of France as a wholewas in the
position to be personally wounded by the superiority of England and to feel
ressentiment generated by the relative position of the country.
The early French nationalist thought, indeed, displays unmistakable char
acteristics of a philosophy of ressentiment. Significantly, these characteris
tics are more salient in the professedly liberal thought of the period than in
the conservative thought which simply rejected the English values and re
fused to admit that France was in any way comparable to its successful
neighbor.19The liberals resentful of England, in distinction, at least in name
shared the English values. France conceived of itself as a liberal nation. The
rejection of the English model was expressed in the transvaluation of its
values, but also in their emphatic appropriation. In the hands of the lumi
naries who forged the French national consciousness, the concepts of na
tion, liberty, and equality acquired an entirely different meaning, sometimes
diametrically opposed to the one they had in England, but remained tied to
each other and were idolized. They were affirmed in the solemn and ex
The Three Identities of France
179
plicit Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, such as was never
thought of in England, and this Declaration, with its proud slogan, Liberty,
Equality, Fraternity, became the symboi of France, replacing the Marian
fleur de lys. The Nation France was committed-to and worshipped its Holy
Trinity as much as formerly France the community of the faithful wor
shipped another. But, as often as not, the idea of the nation was replaced by
the ideal of national unity, which was called fraternity; equality ex
changed for uniformity; and liberty for sovereignty or freedom of the
general will from constraint by either another sovereign (whether presumed,
such as the king, or real, such as another nation) or any of its members.
Collectivity overshadowed the individual, and his rights, which never before
had been articulated with such circumstance, were pushed into the back
ground.199
Opinions that were both expressly liberal and Anglophobe became in
creasingly prevalent in the latter part of the century, counting among their
advocates Rousseau, Mably, Diderot, dHolbach, and Marat, and were es
pecially influential in the 1780s. For this group of ideologues, England was
no longer the land of freedom, and they found little to admire in its consti
tution. Mably explicitly disputed Montesquieus authority in this matter,
writing that English liberty was but tentative, a half-liberty at best. Many
writers, and the author of The Spirit of Laws, whose authority is so great,
have lavished praises on this constitution; but can one examine it carefully
and fail to see that liberty is only sketched there? . . . they enjoy only a half-
liberty. England was justified in loving it, but it was wrong to regard it as
le modele et le chef-doeuvre de la politique.200Rousseau was adamant
that it should not be so regarded. The example of England should not be
followed, he counseled his Polish audience; it should be a lesson to the
Poles how not to behave: Your constitution is superior to Great Britain.
England lost its freedom, he admonished. I can only record my astonish
ment at the irresponsibility and lack of caution, the stupidity even, of the
English: having lodged supreme power in the hands of their deputies, they
place no limitation on the use these deputies will be able to make of their
power through the seven long years of their mandate. This served England
right, for, as Rousseau noted in the Social Contract, the use it makes of the
short moments of liberty it enjoys shows indeed that it deserves to lose
them.M!
The greatest obstacle for freedom in England was corruption, that
shocking evil . . . which transforms the organ of liberty into that of servi
tude. 202England sold its liberty for thirty pieces of silver, bartered it away
for luxury and monetary profits. Commercial interests ousted its sacred
flame from the English hearts, and nothing but greed reigned therein. The
verdict was clear. The aristocratic contempt for the nouveaux riches, which
among the more methodical intellectuals turned into a consuming hatred of
180
N A T I O N A L I S M
money as such, fused with resentment toward England. Though the judges
might not use the phrase, England, that country which had only des affec
tions metalliques, in their view, was a capitalist society. It was irredeem
able. Mably wrote: Moved by the desire to augment their riches and extend
their empire, [the English] consult nothing but their avarice and ambition
. . . England, mistress of the seas, has nothing to fear from strangers. It is
her own great power, her over-vast colonies, and her over-extended com
merce that she has to beware of. Perhaps she needs to experience disgrace in
order to conserve the greatest of her assets, that is, her liberty; but who can
assure that it will know how to profit from a disgrace that will offend her
avarice and her ambition?203A capitalist society, a nation that was unjust,
avaricious, venal, corrupt, and dominated by commercial interests was no
fit model for France.
The resentment toward England that shaped the ideological foundations
of the French national consciousness at this highest level of intellectual so
phistication was present and contributed to its formation on more popular
levels as well. The Seven Years War of 17561763, we learn from the chron
iclers of French nationalism, aroused considerable national feeling.204In
the popular literature of the time England was styled les sauvages de
FEurope, that abominable country, where reason, humanity and nature
cannot make their voices heard.205This resentment was best reflected in the
immensely popular Le Siege de Calais, a presentation of the traditional hos
tility between France and England in the form of a tragedy, which extolled
the virtues of the former and stressed the vices of the latter. The author,
Pierre de Belloy, was moved to write it by the urge to instill in the nation a
self-esteem and self-respect which alone can make it again what it was for
merly, 20Sthat is, by the desire to see France regenerated, but also by the
perceived necessity to fight Anglophilia, -which apparently still poisoned the
mind of the theater-going public. Imitation of the English, including their
supposed independence, he insisted, could not even earn Frenchmen their
esteem. Nevertheless, de Belloy admitted that something could be learned
from perfidious Albion: patriotism. England was hated, but not ignored,
and its enemies respected it in spite of themselves.
French I nvolvement in the War of American I ndependence and
Its Effects on the Character of French Nationalism
This resentment was also reflected in the enthusiastic support of the edu
cated public for the American War of Independence, the French involvement
in whichboth military and emotionalhad a profound effect on the sub
sequent development and character of French nationalism. The war was one
of the important sources of inspiration for the Revolution,207and the pas
sionate interest of the French elite in the conflict which, objectively speaking,
The Three Identities of France 181
had nothing to do with it may throw some light on the motives which led to
the Revolution as well.
The enthusiasm which the French people exhibited in the matter of the
American War of independence wrote Aulard in the Political History of
the French Revolution, was bom in part of their hatred of England, but
also of their hatred of despotism in general. This diagnosis by the historian
of French patriotism, revealing as it is, still seems to underestimate the share
of Anglophobia in the French pro-American sentiments. The assessment of
Abbe Morellet, when he wrote, in a letter of January 5,1777, to Lord Shel
burne, that enmity toward England was by far a stronger motive among the
Parisian supporters of America than their love of American liberty, is, prob
ably, more accurate.208In fact this moving sentiment was made quite ex
plicit. For volunteers, such as Lafayette and Segur, the chance to contribute
to the humiliation of England was admittedly the paramount motivation.2
These young men, on their own testimony, burned with a desire to repair
the affronts of the last wars, to fight the English and [in the last place] to fly
to help the American cause. Lafayette was persuaded that to harm Eng
land is to serve (dare I say revenge}my country and advised involvement
on the side of the colonists because of that. Upon his return from America
he listed the primary reasons for the part [he] took in the American cause
as my love for my country, my desire to witness the humiliation of her
enemies. The far more consequential motives of the War Minister, Ver-
gennes, were apparently the same, except that he did not pay even lip service
to Liberty, to which aristocratic volunteers declared themselves passionately
attached.210
It was the relationship between England and France, rather than between
England and America, that preoccupied the only seemingly altruistic sup
porters of the latter. It appeared clear that the secession of the colonies
would weaken the "haughty islanders and that this would be to the benefit
of France. The J ournal de Geneve, a voice of the Establishment, asserted in
1778: England in her days of splendour did not believe that her invasions
and conquests must be limited; an immense trade contributed both to her
natural pride and to the audacity bom of her riches . . . finally worn out by
her conquests, by her victories if you will, England thought to find in her
colonies indemnities and inexaustible resources, a blind obedience that no
vexation or the yoke of the heaviest despotism could alter. We have seen the
falsity, the illusion, of this system: her tyranny abhorred, attacked, de
stroyed! And at this very moment, as if it were some kind of see-saw,
France resumes her empire, her former preponderance, or at least returns
to the place she should never have forfeited among the first powers of Eu
rope. On the fringes, Brissot, in Testament politique de VAngleterre, ex
pressed confidence that France, having embraced the cause of the perse
cuted colonists, would fall heir to the grandeur of her rival, who was in the
182 N A T I O N A L I S M
last agonies. Significantly, it was not liberalism, but the nationalistic enmity
toward England, to which appealed the propagandist journal Affaires de
IAngleterre et de IAmerique, edited by, among others, Benjamin Franklin.
It consciously played up Frenchmens wishful thoughts of humiliating Eng
land and thus regaining the place which was properly their own. The sup
port of America, insisted the journal in 1777, offered France the most favor
able opportunity ever given to any nation to increase its own wealth and
power while humiliating and weakening the most formidable, the most in
solent, and the most inveterate enemy.211
The American War of Independence eventually facilitated the identifica
tion of radicalism with nationalism in France and strengthened the appeal
of the coliectivistic {etatist}and undemocraticreinterpretation of the
values of liberty, equality, and nation. The American War dissociated liberty,
and with it equality, patriotism, and nation, from the English example. It
seemed possible now to maintain these ideals without following England,
and yet without giving up hope of triumphing over her on her own ground.
This factual dissociation between the central values of the new canon and
England added legitimacy to the theory of the general will in which such
dissociation was already implied. The most explicitly anti-English works of
its advocates, such as Rousseaus Considerations sur le gouvernement de
Pologne, appeared in print in the 1780s;m the connection between their
brand of liberalism and the self-assertion of France against England seemed
obvious, and they were immensely popular. The cause of this liberalism was
identified with the French national cause; and, as a result, this position was
established as the dominant current within the French liberal tradition.
In addition, as Tocqueville pointed out nearly 150 years ago, the Ameri
can War strengthened the rationalist tendency in French thought and modi
fied this new tradition in a way which further removed it from its English
source.213From the defensibility of disregarding the example of England,
French thinkers derived the justification for disregarding history. American
independence seemed to them to be the result of the right philosophy arrived
at through a purely intellectual effort. Reason, in French-thought, was not
the ability of an individual, any individual in his right mind, to consider and
choose betweeen different alternative ways to achieve the desired goals and
between the goals to desire. From rather early on it had the meaning of the
true philosophy. This view was consistent with and supported the theory of
the general will and the belief in the existence of an elite, whether of virtue
or intelligence, able to interpret it. Now, because of the American Revolu
tion, this reason as the true philosophy, evident to a chosen few (and there
fore the chosen fewthe elite), became all-powerful. France could be
changed, it could be made great again, it could surpass England and become
free, if only it followed the advice of reason.
International competition altered the significance of the struggle for lib
The Three Identities of France
183
erty. For the pre-revolutionary elite, as well as for the political leaders of the
Revolution, at least one important reason for aspiring to it was the existence
of England. Having gained liberty, whichgiven that France possessed the
right philosophywas an easy task, France would regain its position of
leadership, which would instantly become dear to everyone, including its
rival across the Channel. France would be the first to establish real liberty in
Europe. Thus prophesied George "Washington in a French play in 1791,
while admonishing an Englishman:
Peut-etre le Frangais, objet de votre haine,
Sera-t-il ie premier qui brisera sa chains.
Camille Desmoulins, too, in La France libre}expressed similar confidence:
How the face of this empire has changed! how we have advanced with a
giant step toward liberty! . . . at present. . . the foreigners are going to re
gret that they are not French. We shall surpass these English, so proud of
their constitution, who ridiculed our servitude. 2K
Liberty was to humiliate England and restore France to its rightful place.
The elite transferred its vexation with the internal imperfections of French
society, so far as it was concerned, to the threat to the countrys external
standing. Its efforts were redirected. The fight with absolutism became just
a means to a far more glorious end. The sting of aristocratic reaction was
displaced, and the anger that drove it became nationalism.
The surprising quality of French nationalism during revolutionary wars
(which persisted for a long time after) was not so much the increased mili
tancy of an embattled and threatened nation, as the violent and irrational
Anglophobia which possessed it. Statesmen represented England as les
eternels ennemis de rtotre nation."215Poets believed no epithet sinister or
grotesque enough to depict it. To Rouget de Lisle, England was 1affreux
brigand de la Tamise, the origin of all of Frances afflictions (de la France
il fit tous les maux),. artisan des maiheurs du monde. Lebrun called it
the odious Insulary, perfidious and drunk with fortune, the greedy
depredator of land and seas, and the destroyer of peace on earth. The mis
sion of France was to rid the world of this monster. This was easier said than
done, however, and patriotic frustration was poured into wishful and irate
verse:
Au livre des destins la vengeance est ecrite;
Albion expiera les maux de Iunivers.
Avanc que la Tairjise ait compte quelques lustres,
Elle aura vu changer ses triomphes iilustres
En sinistres revers.
Vainement 1tnsolente a sa noble rivale
Croit opposer des flofs 1orageux intervalle;
184
N A T I O N A L I S M
La perfide sepuise en efforts superflus.
Tremble, nouvelle Tyr! Un nouvel Alexandre
Sur londe ou tu regnais va disperser ta cendre:
Ton nom metne nest plus.236
Given the moderation of England in relation to revolutionary France in
comparison with other parties to rhe conflict, especially Prussia, such rage
could be explained by the hostilities but to a minor extent. It reflected deeper
motives, springing from the very core of the new French identity and con
sciousness.
A Note on Non-Elite Nationalism
"While the elite agonized, French people learned to read. The elite general
ized its agony, transforming it into noble indignation with "tyrannies of all
sorts, and fiery patriotic idealism, and as it spared no effort in publicizing
the results of these intellectual exercises, it gave the masses food for thought
and forged the weapons with which they were to be armed. While the elite
was drawn to nationalism, moved by interests peculiar to itself, the rest of
at least the literate and semi-literate population in France, the groups that
constituted the bourgeoisie or the middle class,217the denizens of the cit
ies, were also growing more patriotic, realizing that their personal destinies
depended on the existence of the nation and earnestly striving to help it on
the way to happiness and greatness. But the idea of the nation appealed to
the bourgeoisie for very different reasons.
If the nationalism of the elite originated in the belief that things had
changed for the worse and the desire to arrest this development, to prop and
refound their threatened, but still superior, status, that of the bourgeoisie
was aroused by the unhoped-for possibility of improving their lot and ac
quiring a better status. In a nation, the bourgeoisie could be much more than
it was allowed to be in the kings state and the society of orders. A new
prospect of dignity opened before it. With the development of the ideology
of nationality, the French middle classes found themselves in a potentially
advantageous situation which made their members wish to take full advan
tage of it. They welcomed nationalization of identity. They were receptive to
ideas of active membership in the political community, the guaranteed abil
ity to exert influence on public policy which affected their lives, respect for
themselves as individuals, liberty and equality in the English sense of these
words. A nation defined as a unity of free and equal members both rendered
legitimate these heretofore unthinkable bourgeois aspirations and made
their realization possible.
The bourgeoisie eagerly joined the elite in demands for uniformity of
The Three Identities of France
185
taxation, equality in its assessment, political liberty, individual liberty."288
The English model, the system of values imported from England, appealed
to them and they subscribed to it willingly. In distinction from the aristo
cratic and intellectual elite, however, the interests of the bourgeoisie did not
lead it to identify with France as a whole; the middle classes concentrated
on conditions within France. As a result, the change of the relative standing
of France vis-a-vis other powers (or the other power) was at best of second
ary importance for the middle-class nationalism, and it was much less fueled
by wounded pride and a desire to get even. This nationalism, as expressed
in pre-revolutionary pamphlets and especially in the cahiers de doleances,
from which the anti-English (and anti-foreign in general) sentiment was con
spicuously absent,2151was much closer to the English nationalism than to the
nationalism of the French aristocratic and intellectual elite. Since, unlike the
latter, bourgeois who remained bourgeois rarely articulated their views, we
know much less about what they really thought, but it is still possible to
venture some conjectures. What they read in the definitions provided by var
ious primers in nationalism220 was probably different from what was
stressed by the elite ideologues. The nation they envisioned and wanted to
become was unlikely to be the one emerging in the writings of Rousseau,
Mably, and their followers. But they were prone to welcome the identifica
tion of the nation with the Third Estate, that is, the people alone, against
those who still stuck to their privileges and were reluctant to recognize uni
versal equality. (And yet many would be reluctant to carry this definition to
its logical conclusion and would rather restrict the natural rights of par
ticipation and active membership in a nation to the propertied classes.)
The writers of the bourgeois cahiers would agree that not another nation,
but the despotism in France, the class and provincial divisions and privi
leges, were responsible for its misfortunes, and that not the humiliation of
England, but the victory over and abolition of Frances own deficiencies
would bring the nation happiness. This middle-class nationalism was
inward-oriented and fundamentally constructive. The national cause and
the cause of liberal individualistic reform were interdependent and seemed
identical. Only the elevation of everyone to the lofty position of members of
a nation, sharing in the same interests, brothers and equals, would ensure
the liberty and dignity of every individual Frenchman. And liberty and
equality would contribute to the development among Frenchmen of patri
otism, the secret resource which maintains order in the state, the virtue
which is most necessary for its preservation, its internal well-being, and its
external force and glory, The surest way to light this sacred fire in the hearts
of citizens was "to cater to their interests by rewards and specifically to
offer them equality of opportunity.21The glory of France, according to this
line of argument, depended on the well-being of its members, not the other
way around.
186
N A T I O N A L I S M
The ideals upheld by elite nationalists, which, in their arcane writings
tended to assume a different meaning, easily lent themselves to this simple
interpretation. Individual liberty could be regarded as moral liberty found
in obedience to general will and equality as equality of citizens from which
the masses of the people were excluded, but to find these notions convincing,
one needed to be either very sophisticated (and able to understand them) or
stupid (and thus susceptible to indoctrination), and the French bourgeoisie
was neither. It consisted of a middling sort of people, smart enough to rec
ognize a good opportunity. The elite forged and armed the middle classes
with weapons it had not much use for itself. As the Revolution wrought
havoc in the old social structure, and its elite succumbed to the guillotine or
self-effaced to escape it, a new elite was recruited from the newly empow
ered middle classes and blended with the remnants of the old. Its notions
were added to the national arsenal of ideas and assumed a prominent,
though rarely dominant, place in itto be used when the chance arose.
Tocqueville noted what he thought was the inconstancy of the love for lib
erty among his countrymen and was grieved by it. One could observe in
France, he wrote, the desire for freedom reviving, succumbing, then return
ing, only to die our once more and presently blaze up again, compelling
Frenchmen now and again to try and graft the head of liberty onto a servile
body. 2X1But one could argue that the love of liberty in France was a con
stant, I t was a national trait, an element of the French national identity, only
liberty meant different things to different Frenchmen, and frequently re
ferred to its very opposite. The French national identity was of a mixed
heritage; it was ambivalent. It was woven from threads which came from
disparate sources and brought together independentand sometimes con
tradictorytraditions and interests. The chief factor in the emergence of
this encompassing ideology, which was to become the basis of the social and
political solidarity in France and of the identity of every individual French
man, was the situation of the French nobiiity and later a modified part of it,
the aristocratic cum intellectual elitewhose members were the main prop
agators of nationalismin the course of the eighteenth century. The chief
reason for the adoption of the idea of the nation in France was the fact that
this French elite in the eighteenth century was in a state of crisis, and the
idea of national patriotism offered a means of resolving it. French national
ism was born out of the grievances and frustrations of the most privileged
groups of the society, the final form and channel of the aristocratic reaction.
It was a result of appropriation by irritated lords of the idea of the state
developed and disseminated by agents of the Crown, and its expansion and
reinterpretation in such a manner that it could be turned against the latter.
This idea elevated the selfish interests of the aristocracy, and turned their
The Three Identities of France 187
fight to protect their privileges into a moral crusade. It turned reactionaries
into revolutionaries, transformed them, indeed, into ardent idealists, with
out making them reactionaries any less, or for that matter liberalsin the
original sense of the wordany more.
Then as now liberal democracy was not the only alternative to despotism,
and for a society wishing to exchange its old regime for a new one, it was
a highly unlikely option. Despotism has many forms. The little man could
be respected only in the name of the little man, but trampled upon, over
taxed, starved, guillotined, and otherwise mutilated in the name of thou
sands of lofty ideals; and when it came to this, the kings glory was as good
as the glory of the state or the nation; the God of Christians as demanding
and indifferent as the Supreme Being or abstract humanity. But then, the
idea of the nationthe symbolic elevation of the people to the position of
an elitewas imported from England, and there liberty meant liberty of the
individual, and equality meant equality and not inequality. And there were
a significant number of people in France to whom the arguments of ideo
logues made no sense, but these ideas appealed very much, and who in their
sage innocence saw nothing but these ideas in the arguments of ideologues.
They were pronouncing the same words, but proclaiming different prin
ciples. Yet the flame of French national patriotism burned in the breasts of
them all.
And on top of this confusion there was the baggage of previous existences.
France, the wandering soul, had moved from one domicile to another: from
the temple of God, to the body of the king and his state, and then to that of
the nation, and from each home she leftj she took with her possessions that
made her unique, some furnishings such as her elegant tongue, her brilliant
culture, and her refined manners, her inextinguishable sense of election and
love of glory.
Or perhaps she was a body, a chamber into which three souls came to
dwell in succession, and as each one came, it found the arrangements left by
the previous resident, which it made its own and rearranged, but not too
much, and then left to the one that came to succeed it.
France the nation bore an unmistakable resemblance to France the kings
state and France the Church. It was not the sametwice it had changed its
identityand yet it was France. But whether a wandering soul changing
dwellings, or a body animated by different spirits, France, through its trans
mutations, acquired something of a split personality. In its new self the old
traits persisted, which could only be understood as atavisms from its past
identities. What was France the nation to do with them? What was the place
of Catholicism in its national identity? And what significance was it to at
tach to the memory of its kings? There is no typically French answer to any
of these questions, as there is no typically French answer to the question of
whether France the nation stood for the liberty of man, as did England and
188
N A T I O N A L I S M
America, or for the deified State to which mans liberty was subjugated, (Or
perhaps to each of them there are two mutually exclusive answers which are
equally typical?)
But though the nation France, even as it first asserted itself as such, might
be confused as to which gods it worshipped, it never doubted that its was
the role of the high priest. It was not just a nation, it was the Great Nation,
la Grande Nation, the most national of nations, which carried to perfection
the virtues required by the new cult.1*3And in this, too, France remained
faithful to her heritage. La Grande Nation was the reincarnation of le rot
tres cbritien. Like he of old, the eldest son o the Church, the defender of
Christianity, who spread its message with fire and sword, she carried and
spread the gospel of Nationalityliberty and equalitywith fire and
sword. The crusading nation succeeded the crusading king.
Only the heathen, pre-nationai world did not wait for France, and when
she came she was met by converts to the new faith who would never forgive
her this presumption.
A. Borodin
We too are men.
1.1. Nepiuyev, 1725
We are better men than the Germans.
Denis Fonvisin, 1784
Russia is a European State.
Catherine the Great, 1767
Yes, we are Scythians,
Yes, Asians we are!
Alexander Blok, 1918
We are Europeans.
Michail Gorbachev, 1987
Perestroika in the Eighteenth Century
T
wo autocrats can be held directly responsible for instilling the idea
of the nation in the Russian elite and awakening it to the potent and
stimulating sense of national pride: these were Peter I and Catherine
II. It is not our task to pronounce whether Russia was fortunate or unfortu
nate in having been, within one century, subjected to two rulers of gehius. It
is a fact that it had. Though there is little doubt that in both cases their title
the Great was due at least as much to the habit of open and slovenly
flattery cultivated in their subjects as to the iatters unbiased recognition of
their merit, both Peter and Catherine deserved the superlative designation
by which they are known to posterity. Both were, unquestionably, people of
ambition and energy far exceeding the average. They owed their greatness
to natural intelligence and to the sheer strength of their personalities, and on
their way to personal glory they dragged the reluctant, heavy, quailing Rus
sian society farther than a moderate conviction in the role of the individual
in history would lead one to expect.
The ability of Peter and Catherine to do so was, of course, dependent on
the nature of the relationship between the autocrat and the subjects in Rus
sia, which was the legacy of the Muscovite kingdom, and in which the sub-
jects had neither a will of their own nor the ability to carry such will through
if they had had it. But the direction in which the two monarchs eventually
led this great mass, which they could mold and shape according to their
wishes, was chosen by themselves. The direction was Westward, toward
making Russia a European state to be reckoned with and respected. And the i
model was no longer Poland and Ukraine, as in the days of Peters father, ;
Tsar Alexis, but England, Holland, Germany, and later France: the Europe :
of progress, unlimited possibilities, and national identity, which for some ^
time was to rule the future.
The Transformation of Discourse under Peter I
It was Peter who, as is well known, cut the window into Europe and put
Russia on the map of world politics. Why he chose to do so, why he was not
satisfied with unlimited power within his great Eastern empire, but strove
192 N A T I O N A L I S M
toward glory and recognition in the haughty, alien West, we shall never
know for sure. This choice might have reflected his disgust with the Musco
vite life, cultivated by the traumatic experiences of his childhood and youth;
his fondness for the Moscow German Suburb; and the restlessness of his
fiery spirit not to be soothed by an achievement less difficult. Perhaps it was
only a game, a means to give vent to the playfulness of an energetic tsar, an
autocrat who, within his domain, knew no limits to his wishes and was
bored by the possibilities it offered him. A giant man with a colossal toy. At
any rate, he decided to make Russia a European power.
The most thoroughgoing and radical changes of Peters reign turned out
to be those that had to do with culture, the way in which Russians were
thence to think about themselves. Certainly, the tsar enjoyed the freedom
and vitality of life in the German Suburb and later in'the West: he,under~
stood and could appreciate the new values which were restructuring Euro
pean societies. And yet he was no missionary; his aim .was not to convert
Russians into freedom-lovers; and he regarded the changes in ideas only as
a matter of expediency, necessary for the achievernentj3iij.is._fi.theE, mainly
military, goals. In this regard, the policy of the great Romanov was not
much different from that of a Gorbachev. He set out to transform the way
of his subjects thinking in the same manner in which he approached their
fashions: with threats of cruel punishment (not infrequently demonstrat
ing what exactly he meant by that) and no regard for their own preferences,
circumstances, or considerations. His methods were ruthless. He had none
but slaves to rule over, and he treated them as slaves. His legislation, as one
of his many admirers, though a moderate one, Pushkin, later characterized
it, might have been written by a knout of an impatient and despotic land
lord.1Peter wanted to create a new breed of servantsable to carry out his
will with efficiency and eager to do so whenever callednot a new breed of
men. The new Western learning he forced his subjects to acquire was prac
tical; it was no Bildung he was after, but the training of specialists and tech
nicians. But on occasion, the tsar made use of some of the broad values
which made the West so different from the rest of the world to which
Russia belonged, and slowly , these values started to permeate .the language
of his decrees, and through them, the sleepy consciousness of the people
whom he, knout in hand, tried to whip into feelingor at least actinglike
citizens. These values were all subsumed under the revolutionary, crucial
idea of the nation, which implied the fundamental redefinition of the Rus
sian polity (from the property of the tsar into a common wealth, an imper
sonal patrie or fatherland in which every member had an equal stake and to
which everyone was naturally attached). The effect of this idea, in-Russia as
in other societies, was to transform the slaves into fellow-beings of the au
tocrat, elevating them by this implicit equality to breath-taking heights.
The Scythian Rome: Russia
193
One can observe the gradual evolution of this revolutionary political dis
course in the extensive corpus of Peters decrees (ukazy). One critical con
ceptgosudarstvochanges its meaning, and two othersotechestvo and
general good {obshchee blago)appear and gain prominence, which re
sults in the reinterpretation of the referent of service and loyalty. The trans
formation is tentative and, in the beginning of the Petrine period, at least,
appears to be unintentional.
In the early years of the reign, Russia is defined consistently as the per
sonal domain of the tsar. The service which the decrees demand, determin
ing the manner and conditions under which it is to be rendered, is due to
him personally, as the Great Lord [Gosudar}, Tsar and Great Prince, the
Autocrat of All Russias. The word Gosudarstvo, today the Russian for
state, in those early edicts appears uniformly in its original meaning, as
Lordship or Kingdoma derivation from Gosudar (Great Lord or
Ruler); it means either the Lords (tsars) personal government, the activity
of governing, or his personal property, the domain over which he exercises
his lordship. In this latter sense, Gosudarstvo is the synonym of Tsarstvo
(tsardom); both are extensions of the person of the ruler and have no mean
ing apart from him. Gradually, however, the word changes its meaning and
toward the second decade of the reign acquires the impersonal connotation
of a polity which exists in its own right, a body politic, a state. Interestingly,
this new concept, at that time already well established in European political
discourse, and designated by no longer equivocal terms in English, French,
and German, appears first in those Petrine edicts which are explicitly ad
dressed to foreigners- For example, an edict of 1700 regarding a treaty be
tween Peter and the Ottoman ruler Mustafa II speaks of an independent
and free Muscovite State [Gosudarstvo]' and uses Muscovite people \ na-
rod},! as its synonym. In edicts addressed primarily to the Russian subjects
of the tsar, the word gosudarstvo does not acquire this impersonal meaning
of the body politic until the second decade of the eighteenth century. Since
then, however, it is as a rule used in this new sense. The foremost duty of the
subjects and the object of these decrees, service to us the Great Lord and
OUR Tsarist Majesty,5' is systematically represented also as service to the
State and sometimes even replaced by this new requirement. At the same
time, allusions to state expenses, state interests, and state well-being
appear with increasing regularity. It is those state, and therefore common,
interests to which Peter appeals in the famous ukaze of 1714 regarding the
order of inheritance, and which he uses to justify this very much opposed
innovation.2
The first reference to the concept of general good in Petrine decrees is
also met in an edict addressed to foreigners. This is the Manifesto of April
16, 1702: Regarding Invitation of Foreigners to Russia with the Promise to
194
N A T I O N A L I S M
Them of the Freedom of Religion. The original language of this Manifesto
is Russian, but its idioms and tone are those of its intended Western Euro
pean audience. It reads:
It is sufficiently known in all the lands subjected by God Almighty to o ur Gov
ernment, that since oum accession to this throne, all o ur efforts and intentions
tended to governing this State so that all o ur subjects, through o ur care for
the general good, would more and more improve their situations; for this rea
son WE attempted to guard the internal quiet, protect the State from external
attack and by all means improve and spread commerce. For the achievement of
this goal, w e were compelled to perpetrate in the manner of government certain
necessary changes tending to the well-being of o ur land, so that o ur subjects
would with more comfort acquire that knowledge of which they are still igno
rant, and become more skillful in all commercial arts. For which reason WE .. .
with o ur unending mercy .. . issued and intend to issue in the future all the
commands necessary for the cultivation of commerce with foreigners; since WE
fear that these matters are not yet in the state w e wish to see them, and that
OUR subjects cannot yet enjoy the fruits of o u r labors in perfect peace, w e
thought of other means to secure o ur borders from enemy attacks and preserve
the right and advantage of o u r State and general peace in Christendom, as is
expected of a Christian Monarch. To achieve these worthy goals, w e cared
above all to establish in the best way possible the Military Organization [voen-
nyi shtat] as the stay of o ur State . .. but to perfect this further and to induce
foreigners who can ... be helpful in this perfection, together with other useful-
for-the-State artificers, to come to us and stay both in ous service and on o u r
land, w e commanded to announce this manifesto with the clauses stated below
everywhere, priiit it, and make it public in all of Europe.
Below this statement appear the clauses which promise foreigners entering
Russian service complete freedom of conscience, remarkably tolerant {to
ward them) and libertine in tone.
The Manifesto is revealing in regard to Peters goals, but deceptive in
other respects. The native Russians of 1702 were not thinking in terms of
general good and their welfare; nor did the autocrat at this point In time
intend them to think in those terms. When addressing his subjects, Peter was
unequivocal about the nature of His Tsarist Majestys relationship to
them, and this was not the relationship of people united in their concern for
the general good. In fact, not much earlier than the Manifesto which for
the first time used this novel concept, in the same year 1702, Peter issued an
edict regarding the form of the requests addressed to the Supreme Lord,
which instructed the more-often-than-not illiterate petitioners in the style of
official writing and ordered them henceforth to end their letters with the
eloquent formula: Your majestys lowliest slave Such-and-Such.3A mon
arch seeking to instill in his subjects the spirit of citizenship would hardly be
The Scythian Rome: Russia 195
likely to insist on such a cliche, habitually affirming their inferior status and
lack of will.
This is not a political discourse in which the concept of general good
could have any place or meaning, and this concept, contrary to the accepted
opinion,4did not become the stock-in-trade of the Russian Imperial Gov
ernment until later. It appears very rarely in Petrine edicts of the first dec
ade of the eighteenth century, and almost exclusively in contexts which pre
suppose a foreign audience. Peter, undoubtedly, knew well and understood
the nature of the political discourse in the societies he chose as models, but
not until the second half of his reign did he begin to see in it a spiritual carrot
to supplement the very tangible stick which could induce his native subjects
to perform the tasks he set before them.
A similar pattern can be observed in the adoption by the tsar of other
concepts, which by their very nature were changing the character of the po
litical discourse in Russia and implanting the new way of thinking in those
below him. Some of them, in the beginning, the tsar did not even wish his
subjects to notice. For example, for the Russian public (if this designation
had a referent at that time), Peters tide was modified to include the sonorous
appellation of Emperor only in 1721, when he was humbly asked by the
Senate to accept it and according to his usual and admirable modesty and
moderation for a long time rejected. However, he had been using this tide
with remarkable consistency since 1710 when addressing foreign and newly
conquered European territories.5The imperial title stressed the formal simi
larity of the Russian autocrat to great European potentates and thus, con
ceptually, drew Russia closer to Europe.
The addition of the concept fatherlandotechestvo, otcbiznato the': \
vocabulary of Peters edicts was of utmost significance. The concept fre
quently appeared alongside the word peoplenarodwhich had several
meanings, but became the closest Russian synonym for nation. The idea
of fatherland made possible the exhortation to patriotism of individuals
previously, ignorant of suchlike sentiments.6In Petrine documents, again,
fatherland seems to appear, at first under special circumstances. It is en
countered in the addresses to the Ukrainian, or Little Russian, troops when,
under the leadership of Hetman Mazepa, they revolted against the tsar and
sided with the Swedes, in 1708. In these documents Peter purports to repre
sent Mazepas intentions as anti-national (seeking to wrong the Little Rus
sian people) and anti-Christian, although Mazepas breach of personal loy
alty to the tsar is mentioned in the first place, Peters own motives, by
contrast, being those of altruistic concern for the well-being of the said
people, he exhorts them to think about the good of their fatherland and
forget Mazepa, saying that Mazepas action tended to the injury of Russia
as a whole, the Russian State.7
196 N A T I O N A L I S M
In later years, however, fatherland becomes a regular part of the vocab
ulary of the tsars decrees and in the second half of his reign is met with
increasing frequency. I t too, like the impersonal State (Gosudarstvo), de
notes an impersonal referent of service and implies the existence of a body
politic. Those who fail with due speed to conform to His Majestys orders
are called traitors and betrayers of the fatherland (for example, in #2315,
where the period allowed the potential culprits to show their true nature is
two weeks) and are to be punished accordingly. In the critical edict of 1722
on the Table of Ranks, of which we shall have more to say later, the only
way to achieve a rank, and therefore status, is through service to us and
the fatherland. The Act of 1721, which offered the.Lord Tsar Peter I the
title of the Emperor of All Russias also asked to bestow on him the appel-
iation of the Great and the Father of the Fatherland [Otets Otechestvia
The petitioners, members of the Senate and the Church Synod, explained
their request in the following terms:
. . . to show [His Majesty] their due gratitude for his high favor and Fatherly
solicitude and care for the well-being of the Srate [Gosudarstvo], which he had
deigned to show during the whole duration of his most glorious government
[Gosudarstvovania], and especially during the past Swedish War, thus bringing
the State of AH Russias into such strong and worthy state, and His subject
people into such fame in the eyes of the whole world solely through this His
guidance . . . the decision is made to ask His Majesty in the name of the entire
Russian people to condescend and accept, as do others, the title: Father of the
Fatherland, Emperor of All Russias, Peter the Great... of which appellations
the Imperial title of Your majesty, has been applied to Your worthy ancestors
since the days of most glorious Roman Emperor Maximilian for several centu
ries, and is given by many Potentates today. And the name of the Great, ac
cording to Your Great deeds, is justly applied to You by many . . . As to the
name of the Father of the Fatherland we .. . dare to apply [it] to You, according
to the example of ancient Greek and Roman statesmen [siglitov], who applied
it to their own, famous for their deeds and favor, Monarchs.
The term fatherland, for which the authors of the Act, inexperienced in
national political discourse, chose a form of the word which was not des
tined to remain in the Russian political vocabulary (itself a sign of the nov
elty of the concept), was thus adopted in professed imitation of the classical
model and, implying the notion, of classical patriotism, meant,.t>atrie. This
was as far as the discourseif not yet the consciousness of all those who
were encouraged to use itadvanced under Peter toward the idea of the
nation. The transformation of the vocabulary was significant, and the new
concepts would slowly fitter into the minds of individuals constantly re
minded that they were someones lowliest slaves.
Though Peter was aware of the existence of polities that were nations and
had some direct experience of them, he did not think that Russia was a na-
The Scythian Rome: Russia
197
cion. He did not make any distinction between himself and his State, and
this was so because the State for him was but an extension of his person.
Nor being a nationalist himself, he attempted to make nationalists of his
subjects only to the extent that he believed this would increase their effi
ciency and zeal in his service. Perhaps because in carrying out this task he
lacked the enthusiasm and determination which characterized his other en
deavors, his success in it was moderate. There is indeed something pathetic
in the discrepancy between Peters insistence that his subjects serve the State,
of which they were free-spirited, and therefore zealous, citizens, and their
own firm conviction that they served nothing but Him, their merciful Father,
the Great Lord, Tsar, and Autocrat.9
But, though Peter did not give his subjects the sense of individual dignity
{fundamental to civic nationalism), he made them proud of being the sub
jects of such a strong and famous ruler and memberseven if slavesof a
tremendously powerful empire. He gave them a cause for national pride
which would be put to use by succeeding generations and provide the
seedbed of a most passionate nationalism. His achievement was truly aston
ishing and could not fail to affect those who, under his orders, turned his
fantastic plans into reality. Moreover, being justly proud of the success of
his Herculean labors, Peter wished his subjects to be aware of what Russia
owed him. He constantly drew their attention to his extraordinary exer
tions, and thus to the change in the situation of Russia. In this manner he
fostered national pridepride in the achievements of the polityin his de
crees, in the first Russian newspaper he started to publish in 1703, and in
histories he commissioned of his and previous reigns. To one of the most
important works of the period, The Discourse on the J ust Reasons of the
War between Sweden and Russia, by Pavel Petrovich Shafirov, Peter added a
notably nationalistic conclusion, curiously reminiscent in tone and argu
ment of the writings of later Russian and other nationalists. His aim in it, as
in the work as a whole, which was written before the war was completed,
was to justify the wars continuation primarily to his Russian subjects {al
though this was also a work of international propaganda, as we can judge
from the fact that it was immediately translated into English and German),
and to strengthen their commitment to his enterprise of raising the status of
Russia in the eyes of Europe, in general. To achieve this, he stressed the dif
ference in the situation of Russia underand due tohim and before, and
also the hostility toward it of the foreign powers, who wished to keep the
Russian people in constant humiliation. He wrote:
The past times are not like the present, for then the Swedes thought of us differ
ently and considered us blind .. . And that not only the Swedes, but also other
and remote peoples, always felt jealousy and hatred toward the Russian people,
and attempted to keep the latter in the earlier ignorance, especially in the mili-
198
N A T I O N A L I S M
rary and naval arts. This is clear from . ., the histories of the past centuries
[seculov Hi vekov]. .. you may conclude what was the eternal hostility of these'
neighbors even at the cradle of Russias fame ... all the more now, when the
Lord God [made Russia] so famous, that those, who, it seems, were the fear of
all Europe, were defeated by us. And I can say, that no one is so feared as we
are. For which one shouldthank God, while we, with his help raised onto such
a lofty state (through the wise government and indefatigable labors of our All-
merciful Tsar and Lord, who established and trained in Russia a regular army,
which did not exist before, and buik a navy, of which only a name was known
in Russia in the past) instead of being indignant and weary, should patiently
bear [this lofty state], and zealously strive, with his help, for a beneficial and
secure completion of this war.10
How important Peter considered this argument is clear from the fact that,
in the period when a usual printing of a book was two hundred to three
hundred copies, the third edition of the Discourse, five years after it had first
appeared, came out in the unheard of number of twenty thousand copies.
Their fate underscored the lack of correspondence between the interests of
the Emperor and the concerns of his people: only fifty were sold in the first
three years, while the others were left to rot in the warehouse.11Yet, at least
some of Peters collaborators saw the point as well as he did, and few ex
pressed it as clearly as Count Golovkin in a speech at the ceremony of the
bestowal on Peter of his new title. Only through your indefatigable labors
and guidance, he said, we, Your loyal subjects, are led from the darkness
of ignorance into the theater of glory in front of the whole world, and, so to
speak, from non-existence into being, and into the society of the political
nations, as is known not only to us, but to all the world. 12
The immediate successors of the great tsar Peter were hardly up to his mea
sure, and for thirty-seven years Russia was ruled by monarchs who were, at
best, mediocre. In their legislation they left us a revealing insight into the
concerns that preoccupied their august minds. Anna Ioanovna gave some
thought to hunting regulations and to overspeeding while driving sleds in
the capital. Peters daughter, Elizabeth, was more' interested in fashions and
thought an edict a proper means to record her wish to inspect personally all
the imported silver textiles before they could be sold in her domain. Her
heir, Peter III, the person responsible, so to speak, for giving Russia its sec
ond great ruler, occupied himself with military parades and painting sen
tries, also eternalizing his insights on these matters in the laws.13And yet the
insignificant legislation of the years between the reigns of Peter and Cather
ine the Great preserved the new concepts; they appeared with great consist
ency, alongside the petty decrees, in the occasional edicts of importance
which the monarchs were in one way or another talked into signing, and,
invariably, in their Accession Manifestoes.
The Scythian Rome: Russia
199
I f anything, the novel, revolutionary conception of the polity, defined as a
people or nation, in these documents grew stronger. Anna emphasized that
she was elected to the Russian Imperial Throne by the common wish and
agreement of the entire Russian people. The "Accession Manifesto of the
Duke of Coudand (who ruled for the infant Ivan VI) in 1740 repeatedly
mentioned interest of the State, welfare of the State, and unity of the
State. Elizabeth, whose claim to the throne was securely based upon her
filial relation to Peter, which she, understandably, stressed, nevertheless did
not neglect to allude to the interest of the State either, and bid to represent
her accession as necessary to it. Peter III also dwelt on the legitimacy of his
succession by reason of kinship (to Peter I, who was his grandfather, and
Elizabeth, his aunt, who explicitly designated him as her heir). But he, too,
added to his Manifesto a declaration of his intention to restore the well
being of loyal-to-US sons of Russia. 14More eloquent was the language of
the famous Manifesto on the Liberty of the Nobility, destined to have such
a disconcerting effect on its beneficiaries. The fact that it almost certainly
was not conceived or formulated by His Majesty himself, but by his cour
tiers and advisors,15 does not diminish the importance of the choice of
words, but, on the contrary, increases its significance. It provides some evi
dence that, in 1762, the language of political nations was no longer intel
ligible to the tsar alone, but was already finding its way into and affecting
the thought of the nobility. The Manifesto freed the nobles from compulsory
service to which they were obliged by Peter I, but characterized the regula
tion of the great tsar in sympathetic and patriotic terms. Peter I, it said was
obliged to suffer a great burden and great labors, solely for the good and
advantage of his fatherland, pushing Russia to perfect knowledge of military
and civic, as well as political, matters . . . Every true son of the father
land, it insisted, has to recognize that uncountable advantages followed
[from compulsory service], which educated the Russian nobility so that
now noble thoughts entrenched in all true Russian patriots boundless loy
alty to US and love, great zeal, and worthy eagerness in o u r service. For
this reason the need for it no longer existed. Those who would take the
liberation too literally and indeed choose not to serve at all, however, were,
under imperial orders, to be despised and destroyed as such that do not
care for the general good by all o u r true subjects and true sons of the
fatherland and, as a punishment for the lack of patriotism, would not be
admitted at the Court.16
The Contribution of Catherine the Great
Catherine II found her immediate predecessors unworthy as models and dis
sociated herself from them. In one of the accounts of the events related to
her accession, she reminisced how on the fifth or sixth day upon her being
200
N A T I O N A L I S M
proclaimed Empress she came to the Senate and learned about the extreme
paucity3of the Russian treasury. She wrote [in the third person]: At the
end of her life the Empress Elizabeth stocked as much money as she could,
but kept it to herself, not using it for any of the needs of the empire; these
needs were numerous; almost no one was paid. Peter III acted in a similar
manner. When they were asked to give for the needs of the state, they grew
indignant and would say: Find money elsewhere; but o u r savings belong
to us, Peter, like his aunt, distinguished his private interest from the interest
of the empire. Catherine, learning about these financial difficulties, declared
to the full assembly of the Senate, that as she herself belonged to the State,
she wished that everything she had would belong to the State, and that no
one would hence distinguish between her [personal] and its [general] inter
ests . . . And Catherine supplied the needed funds."17
For such words (which in many, though not all, cases were accompanied
by deeds) Catherine has been endlessly accused of hypocrisy. In fact, if one
were to come up quickiy with a cliche associated with her name in Soviet
historiography, it would probably be the hypocritical Empress Catherine
II, and the Soviet scholars are not alone to arrive at this somewhat too
obvious conclusion. Of course, Catherine was a shrewd ruler, with a cold
and disciplined mind, and much of what she said and did, especially at the
beginning of her reign, was calculated to endear herself to her subjects and
justify the take-over for which there was no traditional legitimation. Her
chief passion, like that of Peter the Great, was most certainly self-
aggrandizement, and she must have greatly admired herself in that virtuous
pose of la reine patriote and enjoyed the admiration this was supposed to
(and did) arouse in others.53But all this does not imply that she did not
believe what she said, did not intend to do what she promised, and carried
out those intentions that she did reluctantly. On the contrary, she probably
was quite sincere. What leads one to think so is not so much the words or
even deeds of the Empress, but the conditions of the country where she ut
tered and performed them. For one has to realize that Catherine was a great
innovator. She based her claim to the Russian throne on the arguments of
modern national patriotism, which she learned from her friends the pbilo-
sophes, as well as from other Western Europeans with whom she corre
sponded, whose books she carefully read and thoughtfully commented
upon, and whose attention and approbation she constantly sought. It is true
that she had little else to support her claims with; in actuality hers was a
usurpation of the Russian throne. But it is also true that national patriotism
made very little sense to most Russians, even within the nobility (it most
certainly did not make any sense to the Guards, who made Catherine an
Empress) and that Catherine took considerable risks in basing her appeal on
it. Moreover, she continued to propagate its ideals consistently throughout
her reign, when her position was already strong and the danger of deposi
tion disappeared. Why would she do so, if she did not believe in it?
The Scythian Rome: Russia 201
Unlike Peter I, Catherine quite probably was a convinced nationalist, and
as such indeed inarched in the avant-garde of the Continental intellectuals.
She might not have loved Russia; she had few reasons indeed for such tender
feelings toward a country where she was brought at the age of fifteen and
spent eighteen years in humiliation, boredom, and unhappiness. Given these
experiences, it is remarkable how little hostility and contempt toward Rus
sia there is in Catherines memoirs,19and equally remarkable are her dill-,
gence and earnest efforts to master its language, and her respectat least
outwardtoward its religious traditions and customs at a time when the
chances of her ever becoming its autocrat hardly existed at all. She might
not have loved Russia, and therefore was not a nationalist by temperament.
But she believed that the world was composed of nations, that Russia was a
nation, that she, Empress Catherine II, therefore, was ruling over a nation,
a body politic, a people in the lofty sense nationalism bestowed on this
word, not over a piece of land. And she thought it a personal disgrace that
Russians, her responsibility in the eyes of the enlightened world, were not
behaving as a nation, and set out to correct this defect.
From one Great monarch to the other, the attitude of the tsars made a
full circle, but with a difference. Peter I did not distinguish between himself
and his State, because he saw the State as the extension of himself. His feeble
successors thought, as Catherine II put it, that the Great Lord has no need
to meddle in the affairs of his Lordship (State) for it manages itself and that
full-bodied and luxuriously dressed, in an armchair with elbow-rests and
under a canopy, they fulfilled their role of monarchs perfectly. For the gen
eral good they could not have cared less.20Catherine II again identified her
interests with the interests of the State. The glory of the country, she de
clared, creates my glory, adding in Nakaz {the Instruction): God forbid!
that after this Legislation is finished, any Nation on Earth should be more
just and consequently should flourish more than Russia; otherwise the In
tention of OUR Laws would be totally frustrated; an Unhappiness which I
do not wish to survive. 21But for her the ruler was the extension of the
governed polity. In the concluding clause of Nakaz, she wrote: AH this will
never please all those Flatterers, who are daily instilling this pernicious
Maxim into all the Sovereigns on Earth, that their Peoples are created for
them only. But w e think, and esteem it OUR Glory to declare, That w e are
created for o u r People.
Catherines tactics were likewise different from those of her venerated
predecessor. Where he resorted to pulling out nostrils, she used her feminine
wiles and fought, so to speak, with words. It was with rhetoric that Cather
ine tried to transform her Empire. The first rule of government, she jotted
down in her private papers, was to enlighten the nation which one governs
.. . every citizen should be educated in the spirit of duty toward the Supreme
Being, toward oneself, toward society She set out to fulfill this mission as
soon as she assumed the imperial power. Her Accession Manifesto appealed
202
N A T I O N A L I S M
to all direct sons of the Russian Fatherland and spoke of the actions and
intentions tending to the injury of the Russian State which moved her to
support the coup detat that led to the deposition of her husband. These
included the threat to the ancient in Russia Orthodox faith and a possi
bility of its replacement by a foreign creed; a blow to the Russian glory,
raised high by its victorious weapons, caused by the peace treaty with the
enemy of Russia, the Prussian king; and internal disorganization endanger
ing the unity of all Our Fatherland. The formula of the oath, customarily
attached to the Accession Manifestoes, also contained a minor, but symbol
ically significant, alteration. AH the previous formulations started from the
emphatic assertion by the person taking the oath that he was His or Her
Majestys slave. In Catherines formula, although not altogether omitted,
the expression appeared only toward the end of the oath, after the enumer
ation of civic responsibilities, and was much less conspicuous.22The Mani
festo on Coronation carried the civic (one could almost say republican)
rhetoric to a further pitch. The reasons for Catherines assumption of the
imperial power, it said, were her ardor in piety, and love for o u r Russian
Fatherland, and in addition the zealous desire of all o u r loyal subjects to see
US on this throne, in order to be delivered and protected, through OUR ef
forts, from all the wrongs and coming dangers to the Russian Fatherland.
Thus, w e accepted the Russian throne and liberated o u r Fatherland from
al! the above mentioned dangers.25The term Fatherland (Otechestvo),
which was later to acquire all the Romantic overtones of the land and the
dead, for Catherine meant la patrie, the nation, as this was understood by
the French. Very possibly, its sense was therefore limited in accordance with
the definition of Catherines avowed teacher, Montesquieu. But one must
remember that even in this limited sense, the concept of the nation was rev
olutionary and almost visionary in Russia, of which, as of Walachia, one
could say in the eighteenth century: There is no Russian nation; there is
only plebs.24The concept of Otechestvo (or Russian nation) had all the
connotations of civic participation, liberty, and dignity the idea of the nation
carried, and it is in this sense that it resounded through the documents of
Catherines reign. Again and again the addressees of her edicts were ex
horted to show true love and loyalty to the Fatherland and the Great Lady
so devoted to it. In the famous Charter of 1785, the nobility was com
mended for its readiness always to stand on guard over the Faith and Fa
therland and . . . against the enemies of Faith, Monarch, and Fatherland
and was reminded that it entirely depended on the security of the Father
land and the throne. 25
Catherine strove to instill in her subjects the elevating sense of national
pride. Like Peter I, she missed no opportunity to draw their attention to the
beneficial results of her own accomplishments which had raised the inter
national prestige of Russia. Herself no less than la passion dominants of
The Scythian Rome: Russia
203
Voltaire, Catherine succeeded indeed in making hernot so long ago bar
baricrealm the model state and a country of Light in the eyes of the
French rulers of opinion 26This was an achievement complementary to
that of Peter the Great, and made Russia a European power in the cultural,
as well as military and political, sense. However, Catherine looked for rea
sons to be proud not only about her own person and helped to propagate
several themes which were to gain prominence in the incipient Russian na
tional consciousness. The Empress chose to start the 1785 Charter with the
following preamble: The All-Russian Empire in the World is distinguished
by the expanse of the lands in its possession . . . comprising within its bor
ders 165 longitudes [and] 32 latitudes . . . in true glory and majesty of the
Empire [w e] enjoy the fruits, and know the results of the actions of the obe
dient, courageous, fearless, enterprising, and mighty Russian people, o u r
subject. . . [whose] labors and love of Fatherland together tend primarily to
the general good. Why would the autocrat choose to open a Charter defin
ing the nature and privileges of the nobility by such a paean to the country
and its people? She wanted to educate her captive audience, to teach it some
thing of which at that time it was, apparently, still not sufficiently aware. She
did the same addressing other strata as well. A Charter on the Liberties of
the Cities also opened with a lesson in national pride. It reiterated the du
bious, but agreeable to the national ego, argument on the origins of the
name Slavs: The ancestors of the Russians, the Slavs, the name derived
from their glorious deeds [from slamglory], wherever their victorious
hand reached, left their traces in cities they founded and adorned by names
in the Slavic tongue. 27
Those were only words. But one should not underestimate the weight
such words might carry when spoken clearly and insistently, amidst what
was at best a conceptual chaos, but, more probably, a primordial silence,
and spoken by rulers who had unlimited power. Peter was the first one to
speak these words. Catherine spoke them with passion and missionary zeal.
And such are the possibilities of autocracy that these two individuals grew
more closely to resemble the Original Author and Creator, God Almighty,
than did any other contemporary monarch. It is indeed disconcerting to re
alize, when one thinks about the huge territory bearing the name of Russia
today, and 150 million people seeing themselves as belonging to it in the
deepest sense of the word, of deriving their very identity from it, that it all
began with two peoplea seven-foot-tall, wild-tempered Russian tsar and
Sophia Augusta Frederika, a comely German princesswho started speak
ing words which few around them understood and drummed them into their
subjects heads.
These were remarkable words; they worked wonders. And yet one should
not overestimate their power. The words would not sink into the conscious
ness of the people until the situations of many of them changed most sub
204 N A T I O N A L I S M
stantially, making them responsive to the message, and learning these words
became their vital interest.
The Crisis of the Nobility
The Russian nobility differed substantially from the parallel strata in other
European societies. Unlike these latter, it was not in its essence a landed
elite, and for this reason its status was much less determined by lineage.
Several scholars have drawn attention to such conspicuous facts of the Rus
sian landscape and language as the absence of feudal castles and of signs of
territorial connection in the family names of most Russian nobles: there was
nothing like de, zu, von, or Lord of Such-and-Such appended to
the names of the nobility, and, with the exception of few ancient princely
families, these surnames provided no clue as to their geographical origins.
In contrast to the nobilities of other countries, the Russian nobility did not
descend from a feudal elite. In fact, Russia hardly experienced feudalism at
all; among the European societies, it was a site of a remarkably precocious
absolutism. The Russian nobility was a service estate. It had been such at
least since the late fifteenth century, when the Princehood of Muscovy under
Ivan III subdued and incorporated most of the Russian principalities (or ap
panages). Ivan IVJ the Terrible, who ruled for several decades in the middle
of the sixteenth century, undermined the remaining power of the appanage
princes and boyars who composed the hereditary land-owning estate, and
built up an alternative service nobility.28
A sector of the land-owning elite originated as a service elite. Those were
the dvoryane, so-called from their connection to the tsars Courtdvor. The
term first appears in the documents of the twelfth century, where it refers to
people residing at the princes Court, including menials and slaves. Already
then, proximity to the central power, living close to the favor (bliz mil-
osti}, attracted to the ranks of the dvoryane the boyars and boyars chil
dren {deti boyarskiea slightly lower status). By the fifteenth century it
was no longer possible to keep all the dvoryane physically at the Court, and
as a result, they were allotted estates on the land of the prince, which they
held on condition of service. In distinction from boyars and boyars chil
dren, whose estates were hereditary, the estates of the dvoryane were not,
and they thus were entirely dependent on the prince for their livelihood. The
appanage princes and boyars also owed service to the Grand Princes of
Muscovy, but before the sixteenth century the conditions of their service
differed considerably from those of the dvoryane in that it was free, that
is, they could freely leave it. This freedom was energetically fought by the
Grand Princes and by the sixteenth century disappeared altogether. The he
reditary estates {sing., votchina) of many were confiscated by the tsar and
The Scythian Rome: Russia
205
replaced by service estates (sing., pomestie), frequently in widely dispersed
localities, which further severed the nobles territorial connections. Every-
one was obliged to serve, and the distinctions between dvoryane and other
servitors were gradually obliterated. Around the same time, apparently, the
designation dvoryane itself sank into oblivion, and the privileged service es
tate acquired the name of serving men by right of inheritance (sluzbilye
liudi po otechestvu), which name they had at the end of the seventeenth
century when Peter I acceded to the throne. Thus, however wild a species
the Russian aristocracy might have been otherwise, it had, in the sardonic
phrase of S. N. Eisenstadt, been domesticated for several centuries prior
to the reforms of the great rsar.2i)
Both the status and the material well-being of a nobleman (especially
nearer to the Court) depended entirely on the extent to which the sovereign
was satisfied with his service. Such dependence made the position of a noble
man highly unpredictable and resulted in a permanent sense of insecurity
and anxiety among the nobility. Seeking to protect their status against pos
sible changes of fortune, the aristocracy adopted the device of mestni-
chestvo, which linked rank in service to the degree of nobility of ones fam
ily, thus guaranteeing a modicum of stability in a constantly threatened
situation. It is dubious that mestnichestvo was ever highly effective.30
(Nevertheless it preoccupied those eligible to participate in mestnichestvo
litigation to such an extent as to eliminate from their minds most other con
cerns, and it is possible that this exclusive preoccupation with the order of
precedence within their ranks was responsible for the failure of the nobility
as a whole to take advantage of the time of troubles, when the central
power was singularly weak, and check the unlimited authority of the tsars.)
Apparently, it also ran counter to the efforts to increase military efficiency,
for which reason Tsar Fyodor decided to abolish it in 1682. Mestnichestvo,
however, must have provided a safety valve which enabled the aristocracy
to vent its anxiety while keeping it out of mischief. The sense of insecurity
among the nobility grew after the abolition of this arrangement. Several ad
ditional factors contributed to this development.
In the course of the seventeenth century the territory of Muscovy in
creased threefold. The growing need for service nobility inevitably led to the
blurring of status distinctions. The nobility expanded. Only its top echelon
(men holding Boyar Council and Moscow ranks) grew from 2,642 in 1630
to 6,000 in 1681. The aristocracy felt threatened by the advance of the new
comers and fought it. Simultaneously with this development, and also in
response to the changing needs of the central power, an alternative hierarchy
of military and civil service emerged. New military formations were orga
nized under foreign command, according to Western European models,
which by the late 1670s outgrew the traditional military organization in
numbers and far surpassed it in importance. The waning of power and influ
206 N A T I O N A L I S M
ence, however little of it there was (and because there was so little of it, it
seemed so precious, and the slightest diminution in it was painfully felt), was
a cause of considerable distress to the aristocracy, whose preserve the tradi
tional military organization was, and it retaliated by denying the new for
mations social acceptance. The civil service also grew rapidly. Though the
aristocracy continued to predominate at the top levels, there were enough
newcomers to cause confusion and concern. Moreover, the aristocracy in
creasingly arrogated to itself positions at the lower levels of administration;
there was, as Meehan-Waters put it, a stampede to bureaucratic offices by
the upper nobiiity.31All this resulted in a measure of integration of the
numerous lower ranks of the nobility with the exclusive higher ranks. This
integration was further promoted by the legal enserfment of the peasant
population in 1649, which united the upper and middle echelons of the no
bility who had the right to use serf labor, and by the gradual obliteration of
distinctions between hereditary and service estates, which made it possible
to redefine the nobility as the land-owning stratum. The swelling of ranks
and simultaneous shifts in the bases of identity could not fail to add to the
sense of precariousness and insecurity which was the more or less perma
nent lot of the Russian nobility.
Thus, when Peter I came to power, he found his aristocracy in a state of
crisis, which was growing increasingly acute-. Though the psychological trib
ulations of his fellow-beings could hardly concern him less, the effects of his
actions were both to temporarily attenuate these tribulations, or rather
move them to the background, and at the same time to aggravate the crisis
and intensify this sense of insecurity. In addition, however, he unwittingly
offered his suffering subjects the means which was eventually to lead them
out of their predicament.
At the time of Peters accession the elite segment of the Russian nobility
consisted of the Boyar aristocracy and the service noblemen of Moscow
(Moskovskie dvoryane). The members of the Boyar aristocracy served in top
positions in the army and administration and had the right to sit in the
Boyar Councilthe closest approximation to a supreme court with some
advisory prerogatives; they were the descendants of the appanage princes
and families which had served the Grand Princes and tsars of Muscovy
(probably the ancient, original dvoryane) since the fourteenth century. The
Moscow dvoryane formed the lower layer of this elite. The elite as a whole
was separated from the rank and file of the stratum, the provincial nobility,
although it was gradually becoming less exclusive, and enjoyed privileged
access to positions of power and influence and to the source of all favors,
the autocrat. The valuable study of Brenda Meehan -Waters shows that, in
this respect, little had changed with the opening of the new era in Russian
history. Though the titles of boyarin and Moskovskii dvoryanin might have
become obsolete (while the collective designation dvoryane eventually re
The Scythian Rome: Russia
207
turned), the top positions in the military and civil service, and the privileges
which went with them, remained the preserve of their descendants. Peter
was more interested in retraining than in replacing the aristocracy. At the
same time, the complaint of Kniaz Kurakin,-that princely names were
mortally despised and destroyed,32against which Meehan-Waters argues,
and which helped to originate the view that the Petrine elite was created by
the tsar from novi homines and eclipsed the traditional aristocracy, may
have more truth to it than she is willing to grant. To those who lived through
the experience of Petrine reforms, the situation most certainly looked as it
did to Kurakin. For there is no doubt that the wild-tempered and determi
nate monarch degraded and terrorized his nobles to an unprecedented de
gree, although, and indeed because, he chose them as the chief means to
carry out his plans. Not satisfied with their being domesticated, Peter set
out to civilize them, and in his determination knew no pity. He had no re
gard for their values and habits, for what they held dear and appropriate.
He shaved their beards, groomed with care and worn with dignity, and
under the threat of cruel punishment ordered them to give up their re
splendent kaftans for funny, outlandish clothes, which made them feel na
ked and brought tears of shame to their eyes. He made them leave their dirty,
cozy, and familiar homes in Moscow and move into the unhealthy climate
of his new city, where, horrified of displeasing their Sovereign Lord, they
built houses with walls quite out of perpendicular, and ready to fall 33and
wasted their wealth on necessities that would have cost them close to noth
ing in Moscow. He decreed that they entertain and pay visits in a civilized
manner (the tsar and his head of police personally drew up the lists of guests
and picked the hosts), talk, dance, and play cards, denying them even the
liberty to pick their noses and ready to teach them manners in no uncertain
terms. He sent them abroad to study and forbade them to marry before they
had satisfied his requirements; if they half-heartedly clung to their chosen
lives, in meek defiance of his commands, his wrath knew no limits, and he
reduced them to nothing. He claimed the bodies and souls of their children,
and early taught them the advantages of keeping a watchful eye over their
neighbors, so that even in their homes and very beds they had no peace and
kept shaking in fear. There was no end to the humiliation Peters most priv
ileged stratum experienced under the tsar whom they were moved to call
the Great, and the domesticating efforts of Ivan the Terrible, which won
that other tsar his eloquent title, appeared lenient in comparison with the
civilizing undertakings of his descendant.
Peters policies aggravated the effect produced by his tactics. They carried
the dependence of the nobility on the royal power to previously undreamed
of degrees. This was achieved with the help of several successfully enforced
path-breaking decrees. The 1714 Decree on Single Inheritance introduced
into Russia the system of entail, which in a stroke deprived younger sons of
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the nobility of landed income and any means either to procure a living or to
attain appropriate status outside state service. At the same time another
edict explicitly forbade the purchase of estates by those who had not served,
making it possible for others only on condition of having served for a
lengthy period.34As scions of ancient families (who, in the case of titled
families, inherited the tides of their fathers) were thus cut off from the land
and made entirely dependent on service, the decree on single inheritance
tended to sever the links to the land and again redefine the nobility as a
whole, undermining its identity once more. For these reasons the entail de
cree was opposed with unusual determination and eventually rescinded by
Anne in 1731.
Of far greater importance was the fateful ukaze #3890 of 1722, the Table
of Ranks, which was never to be rescinded and whose implications were not
to be easily obliterated. The Table of Ranks reinforced earlier laws of oblig
atory universal and permanent service and established two points of crucial
consequence for the nature of the nobility and the existential situation it was
to face after its appearance. The first point was that, with the exception of
princes of the royal blood, everyones social status was to be defined by, and
inseparably linked to, rank in the service hierarchy, which one was able to
achieve, and not by birth. The second point institutionalized ennoblement,
automatically opening the doors and privileges of the nobility to people of
low birth and to foreigners. In military service all ranks carried nobility, and
in civil and Court service the eight upper ranks (out of fourteen) did so.
Noble status acquired by a father in the ranks which carried hereditary no
bility was passed down to the children. Ancient nobilitythat is, descent
from noble families of the pre-Petrine periodwas also respected, but
everyone had to begin at the bottom of the ladder and advanced according
to achievement, not birth. People claiming precedence and deportment not
in accordance with their service rank were to be fined, and although the
nobles of the old stock enjoyed the cumulative advantage of better prepara
tion for service and the all-important contacts (the fact that a father, uncle,
or brother was personally acquainted with the Emperor helped), anyone
achieving a certain rank was to be treated as equal to the best ancient no
bility in all dignities and advantages, even being of a low birth.35
The connection of status to rank separated it from and undermined the
importance of lineage, which was thus stripped from all its worth as a basis
of stability in the life of the nobles'. The automatic ennoblement led to fur
ther swelling in the ranks of the nobility, and cut deeper into its insecure
identity, destroying the boundaries between it and the outer world. Both
effects served to aggravate the sense of insecurity among the nobles, exacer
bate the protracted crisis of identity they had been experiencing, and secure
their inescapable dependence on the central, personal power of the ruler.
This was not only a predicament of the old nobility, for the moment a
The Scythian Rome: Russia
209
low-born person became ennobled, he and his children faced the same
vagueness of (a new) identity and the same insecurity with respect to the
superior, and therefore most precious, status earned by hard labors. Of
course, such a new nobleman could not have resented the Table of Ranks as
did the old nobility, and had no ancestral honor to cling to and feel robbed
of; indeed, there was a conspicuous difference in the way the two sectors of
the nobility reacted to their predicament. But, on the whole, the anxieties of
a new nobleman were similar to those of the class he joined as a whole: the
moment ones identity was transformed into that of a noble, one lived in a
crisis of identity.
The personality of the frightful and wonderful sovereign, the immediate
dangers to life and possessions in which his closest collaborators and ser
vants stood, and the very amount of the tasks they had to accomplish de
prived Peters nobles of the luxury of wallowing in the pain of and ruminat
ing over the experience of status insecurity, alleviated its acuteness, and
delayed the necessity of resolving the crisis. The reigns of Peters feeble suc
cessors, on the other hand, made the crisis itself less urgent: the tsars and
tsaritsas seemed gradually but consistently to give in to the clamor of their
nobility and attend to its psychological needs. The participation of the no
bility in the crises of succession, which became a permanent feature of Rus
sian political life (its only feature, one might add) in the four decades be
tween the death of Peter and the accession of Catherine the Great, when
nobles seemed to hold the destinies of autocrats of All Russias in their own
hands, might have also contributed to a false sense of stability among this
permanently harried stratum.36The period was called that of the gradual
emancipation of the gentry. In 1731 Empress Anne, after graciously con
ceding to accept autocratic power over her people,37abolished the hated law
of single inheritance; soon after, she established the Corps of Cadets, an
exclusive educational institution which allowed noble children to enter the
Guards as officers and skip service in the ranks. In 1736 she repealed the
laws of permanent service for all and reduced it to twenty-five years after
the age of twenty (under Peter it was for life and started at fifteen). In addi
tion, if there were more than one son in a family, one of the sons could be
freed from service entirely to attend to the needs of the family estate. Eliza
beth, who professed devotion to the example set by her father, in practice
followed the example of her cousin. She increased the economic privileges
of the nobility and, having no taste for ruling herself, let the Senate augment
its power. Finally, in 1762, Peter III, urged by love,3signed the already men
tioned edict abolishing compulsory service altogetheralthough there still
was no other way to prestige and position outside its ranks.
Catherine did not approve. She left a rather subdued account of the gen
eral reaction to, and her opinion of, this measure in her Memoirs: Three
weeks after the death.of the Empress [Elizabeth] I went to the body for the
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funeral service. Passing the ante-chamber, I found Prince Michail Ivanovich
Dashkov, who was crying and beyond himself with joy, and running EOme,
he said: 'The Sovereign [Peter III] deserves that we erect a statue of gold for
him; he gave liberty to the entire nobility; and, with this, is going to the
Senate to announce it. I said to him: Is that so? Were you serfs before, to be
bought and sold? What did the liberty consist of? It happened to consist in
that one could serve or not serve according to ones liking . . . All the dvo
ryane rejoiced about this permission to serve or not to serve and for that
hour absolutely forgot that their ancestors acquired dignities and estates
which they now use, through their service.39When her husband was de
posed several months later, Catherine set out to correct the situation. Her
efforts resulted in the intensification of the sense of crisis among the nobility.
This time the chronic condition demanded treatment, and a powerful medi
cine existed which made some healing possible.
Notwithstanding the legal indulgences of the previous reigns, the crisis
could grow more acute even before the accession of the great Empress.
While the objective situation did not change, and even somewhat improved,
there were significant changes in the subjective perception of it. In the sixty
years between the first reference to the general good in a Petrine ukaze
and the accession of the Empress for whom the discourse of the Encyclope
dic was a natural language, the consciousness of the Russian elite underwent
a transformation which paralleled the developments in its nature and posi
tion. The alien concepts which Peter the Great had imported from the West,
alongside technical knowledge, models of military organization, and salted
herring, were slowly but surely finding their way into the curves of the nobie
brains, where they gradually built up, transforming the way in which the
members of the elite related to themselves. The great tsars insistence that
they were serving not only him personally, but something beyond himthe
State, or Fatherlandhis demand that they do this of their free will, his
command to have such free willall this was inconsistent with the sense of
being somebodys (even the Great Lords) slaves. There was something ele
vating in the sense of belonging to a State which one served of ones free will.
There was something elevating too in the consciousness of belonging to a
mighty, colossal power into which Peter had transformed Russia. Many
members of his elite traveled abroad. Some were sent to European courts
with diplomatic missions; they observed the respect with which the nobility
was treated there and the dignity with which it carried itself; they had to
carry themselves with similar dignity. Peters rhetoric was retained and de
veloped by each of his successors. In the reign of Elizabeth, Russia partici
pated in the Seven Years5War. This, in the opinion of one historian, was
possibly the most important aspect of her reign, even from the point of
view of the countrys interior development. . . the officers of her victorious
armies returned to Russia after experiencing at first hand the attractions of
The Scythian Rome: Russia 211
countries on a much higher material and cultural level. Since these officers
were nobles, this episode meant in fact the introduction into the only edu
cated class in society of new, not to say revolutionary ideas.40One may
dispute that from this date there begins the history of Russian intelligent
sia, but it is indisputable that such firsthand experience by a mass of noble
men Of eighteenth-century Europe must have had a shattering impact on
their notions of social relations, in general, and the nature and rights of their
own order, in particular. The permission to travel abroad freely, contributed
to the body of Russian laws by Peter III, diminished the chance that the
lesson they learned would be quickly forgotten. Finally, although to call the
Russian nobility of the Elizabethan reign an educated class is an exagger
ation, since the knowledge noblemen were required to and could acquire in
the existing conditions was almost exclusively technical, and many of them
in the second half of the eighteenth century were still illiterate, even the
simple exercise of mental faculties made necessary by the requirements of
service, and the exposure to the very minimum of Western mores and ideas
in the preparation for it, had their importance, A literate person, able to
dance a minuet, master some French or German on occasion, and talk about
the general good or duty to the Fatherland was likely to find the possi
bility of corporal punishment more revolting than his bearded ancestor who
did not know any better. This development of the mind and the self-respect
accompanying it, the growing ability and the acquisition of the language in
which to conceptualize this self-respect, and the new frame of reference
tended to intensify the sense of crisis in spite of the improvement in the ob
jective situation.
Corporal punishment was a real threat at the time of Catherines acces
sion. The Russian nobility was not exempt from it. In 1730 (!), we are told,
there was some talk of treating nobility with more respect, and in 1750
Count Shuvalov contemplated including the exemption in the Russian law.
In general, legal boundaries between the nobility and other strata were at
the very best vague. I f not bolstered by merit and individual achievement,
nobility in fact meant exceedingly little and, raising the expectations of
those who were born into it, as such offered nothing to satisfy them. Nobil
ity derived its definition from the character of its service obligations, which
were greatly elaborated in Petrine edicts. Noble privileges, in distinction,
received little attention in them. As a result, the only thing that distinguished
nobility as an order from the rest of the Russian people was the nature of
its burdens and bonds. 41
Catherine took the plight of the nobility to heart. I confess, she wrote,
that although I am free of prejudice and of a naturally philosophical frame
of mind, I sense in myself a great tendency to respect ancient families; I
suffer seeing that many of them are reduced to poverty; I would enjoy rais
ing them up again. Many of Catherines policies testify to the sincerity of
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her concern for the nobility (as well as to the exacerbation of the sense of
crisis within it). Her period saw, in a sense, a feudal reaction (howevfcr
inapplicable the word itself is to the Russian conditions) parallel to the feu
dal reaction in eighteenth-century France. Several already traditional ave
nues of ennoblement were curbed by decree. A 1765 edict regarding the
recruitment of young noblemen into civil service ordered their preferential
treatment over non-noblemen, according to their dignity [merit]. A ukaze
in 1766 forbade accepting soldiers sons into positions of chancellery clerks;
another edict in 1769 similarly limited the opportunities of children of cler
gymen.42
The noble estate was finally and conspicuously set apart from the rest of
the population and became distinguished by characteristics other than the
way it was expected to serve. The Legislative Commission of 176768 was
invited to discuss the pressing question of who was to be considered a noble
man. (The identity of the nobility in the 1760s was so vague that even the
Heraldmaster entrusted with the responsibility of keeping a record of the
noble families could not answer it and did not know how many nobles there
were in the country.)43The Charter of Nobility of April 21, 1785, granted,
the order significant personal, economic, and status privileges. In accord
ance with the Manifesto on Noble Liberty of 1762, the freedom of noble
men to serve or not to serve was confirmed, as was the right to enter the
service of friendly European states and travel abroad for the purpose of
study. Also confirmed was the exemption of the nobility from personal tax
ation. Personal taxation was introduced by Peter I, who thus sharply sepa
rated taxable and non-taxable classes. The service nobility was exempt from
taxation; those nobles who were not able to serve, however, were not. Cath
erine made exemption from taxation contingent on the noble status itself.
Nobles were declared exempt from corporal punishment and guaranteed
inviolability of noble dignity: nobility could be lost onty as a result of crimes
contrary to the foundations of the noble status, and that only after the
conviction by peers, confirmed by the sovereign. Nobility was granted the
right of possession of estates. This, again, had previously been contingent
on service, but now became an unconditional privilege of the order. More
over, only hereditary nobles could own populated estatesthat is, had the
right to own serfs. Henceforth, the nobility was protected from the confis
cation of estates and guaranteed security of property; even upon the convic
tion of a nobleman in the case of a grave crime, the estate remained in the
family. In addition, the Charter legally recognized the corporate rights of the
nobility and encouraged its self-government.44
The definition of nobility in the Charter, though, retained the emphasis
on merit and service. Nobility, it declared, was the result of the quality and
virtue of the men in positions of leadership in the past, who distinguished
themselves by service and, turning the service itself into dignity, gained the
The Scythian Rome: Russia
213
title of nobility for their posterity. The Charter also did not limit access to
nobility through the ranks (although as we have seen, access to the enno
bling ranks was limited), and it added to the previously existing avenues of
ennoblementservice and creation by the sovereignnew ones: certain
decorations for merit were to confer nobility as well. Thus the Charter did
not guarantee the exclusivity the nobility was clamoring for.
Not all the policies of the Empress favored the order she wished to elevate
and set apart. She rejected the idea of a permanent council of nobles and
strove to reduce the rather meager-to-begin-with powers of the Senate. In
1763 she called a commission to revise the Manifesto of Peter III on Noble
Liberty on the grounds that it tended to constrain the liberty of the nobility
in a greater measure than may be required by the interest of the Fatherland,
and encouraged voluntary service. Her Legislative Commission of 176768
included 160 noble deputies, but 207 representatives of other groupspos
sibly a reflection of Catherines desire to build up a European middle class-
and the early versions of the Instruction, we are told, can be used to show
that Catherine modified the views of her admitted model, Montesquieu, pre
cisely on the point of the position of the nobility. If one adds to this the
crisis in noble fortunes, which, whether or not connected to her polities,
characterized Catherines reign,'45the period may appear as the golden age
of this unfortunate order only if compared with other periods in its history.
Regrettably, as so often happens, it was not such other periods with which
Catherinian nobles cared to compare their situation.
By far the most pregnant transformation brought about by Catherine be
longed to the sphere of consciousness. She accelerated the revolution in the
subjective perception by the nobility of its situation and quickened the de
velopment of the sense of pride aiid dignity which made the vestiges of the
humiliating practices and social arrangements {however litde remained of
them) and the continuing state of dependence on the royal power most op
pressive. This was the Tocqueville effect again: the maddening itch of in
consistency, of the discrepancy between the possible and the existent, the
frustrating apprehension of unfulfilled opportunity.
Peter gave Russians bodies, wrote the gentleman-poet M. M. Kheras-
kov, and Catherinesouls, and the age of learning dawned on Russia.
Neither the benefactress nor the beneficiaries realized how dangerous was
the gift. Catherines efforts to provide Russia with the most advanced laws,
the best schools, and the most enlightened government, although not
crowned with absolute success, resulted in an improvement of vast magni
tude. The number of educational institutions increased significantly. The no
bility grew more responsive to the need to be educated, and with the active
support of the Empress, set out to conquer the existing institutions of higher
learning. By the end of the 1770s, children of the nobility dominated the
student population of Moscow Universicy, which, since this was at the time
214 N A T I O N A L I S M
the only university in Russia, amounted to the ennoblement or aristocra-
tization of higher education as such. In 1765 Catherine personally assumed
leadership over the St. Petersburg Corps of Cadets, the exclusive school
where young noblemen prepared for military service, changing its curricu
lum to include civic and general education, so that it would serve no longer
only as a military school, but also as a political and civic school.46The
circle of noblemen willing to acquire and encourage their children to acquire
education widened. The status of learning and intellectual activities gained
tremendously. More and more of the middle and lower provincial gentry
were filling the ranks of aspiring intellectuals. Obligatory service being a
matter of the past, members of the nobility were increasingly inclined to
regard education as a possible basis for its privileges.
The Legislative Commission focused on matters of concern to the nobility,
in spite of its being a minority among the deputies. Around 13 percent of
the nobles who signed the instructions to the Commission were illiterate, the
degree of literacy of the others left much to be desired, and the more fortu
nate foreigners regarded the whole affair as a bad joke. And yet participa
tion in it required nobles to think, discuss, have an opinion, and advise the
sovereign regarding issues of national importance. This unique experience
could not fail to bolster the budding self-respect of the order, while excep
tional examples, such as N. 1. Novikov,47testify as to what an inspiration
serving on the Commission could be for the more acute. The incipient, and
immediately flourishing, periodical press, also more or less a creation of the
indefatigable Empress48who fostered it with maternal care, augmented the
effects of these educational measures and experiences. This development of
the spirit was aided by the rousing language of dignity that Catherine used,
her insistent allusions to the honor and virtue of the nobility in the service
of the fatherland, the very belonging to which was elevating and ennobling.
And this time the republican rhetoric of the autocrat of All Russias, who
(before Radishchev) said: Freedomyou [are] the soul of all,43was not
wasted on her subjects: they were becoming culturally alert and acquired
feelings and genera! sensibility, which had been unable to torment them in
the past days of their innocence.
For, of course, this forced civilization could not fail to awaken those
who were touched by it to the degrading inconsistency of their actual posi
tion with the principles of the noble status and their practical implementa
tion in the cases of their counterparts in other European societies. The poli
cies of Catherine were themselves inconsistent; they could not be consistent.
On the one hand, she sincerely wished for the betterment of the nobility. She
wanted to believe and prove to others that Russia was a European state and,
therefore, wanted it to have a respectable European nobility. She was, or at
least cared to pose as, a disciple of Voltaire, to whose views she exposed her
loyal, but not quite awake of their primeval slumber, subjects. She spon
The Scythian Rome: Russia
215
sored the translation of the Encyclopedie, banned in France; she cultivated
civic spirit. Yet she also believed that Russia could not do without autocracy.
She was jealous of the nobles timid efforts to interfere in her government.
Ultimately, she was not ready and could not deliver what she had taught the
nobility to expect,
Eveh the well-intended Charter of Nobility, which finally established this
order as a privileged estate, given its timing, contributed to the intensifica
tion of the sense of anxiety within the nobility, instead of soothing it.'The
privileges of the nobility were confirmed exactly when it had lost the very
basis for them: obligatory service, for which they were a just reward. True,
education offered an alternative basis, but, unlike service, culture was not
self-legitimating. The Russian dvoryanstvo under Catherine found itself in a
situation analogous to that of the French noblesse in the early eighteenth
century, and, like the French noblesse, it was turning into a cultural elite. As
in France, not this would deliver it from its predicament.
Preoccupation with the Crisis of the Nobility and
the Turn to National I dentity
The plight of the nobility was, undoubtedly, the first question seriously to
preoccupy the inchoate Russian intellect. The sense of crisis was pervasive
and manifested itself in many ways. The nobility could not make up its mind
about service. On the one hand, it considered the freedom not to serve as its
greatest privilege. On the other hand, it (at any rate, that sector of it which
did not opt for non-existence and therefore was affected by the crisis) never
used this freedom. Service, or rather rank earned in it, remained the main
road to status until the end of the tsarist regime, and was the only such road
at least until the 1820s. In 1786, a dramatist from the nobility, Ya. B. Kni-
azhnin, wrote: People have all gone wild about ranks . . . And he who
passes his dark life without rank does not seem to us a man at all.The
majority of the nobility, as is clear from the materials of the Legislative
Commission, were concerned less with the necessity to serve as such than
with the lack of guarantees for the distinctiveness of the nobility in service,
which institutionalized its penetrability from below. Some even called for a
return to obligatory service. The representatives of Kashin nobility in
structed the Legislative Commission: Every dvoryanin should serve his fa
therland ten years without respite . . . because the first duty of the dvoryanin
is to demonstrate his merits to his fatherland for all those advantages with
which he is endowed by the sovereign. Alternately, noblemen expressed the
wish for preferential treatment of the nobility when it came to promotions.
While they were willing to serve, they were reluctant to share the privileges
of service with others. A majority was opposed to the Table of Ranks and
thought that service should not automatically ennoble. "As in all European
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states, wrote the representatives of Pustorzheva nobility, non-nobles
reaching the top ranks cannot without a grant of a diploma of nobility as
cribe to themselves Von, De, Don, and similar nobility; in the like manner
we also most humbly ask that the ancient dvoryanstvo . . . be distinguished
. . . from non-dvoryane.31One way or the other, service remained essential
for the definition of nobility.
Service was acquiring the connotation it had had within classical patriot
ism. The rhetoric of the tsars had caught on. The documents of the Legisla
tive Commission are full of references to the beloved fatherland. This is
still little but rhetoric: the fatherland is incessantly reminded that it owes
everything it is to the blood and wounds of its nobility, and the interests
of the two are believed to be identical. The patriotic rhetoric, however, al
lowed the nobility to express its desperate craving for independence from
the autocrat and at least to pose as an indispensable main element of the
body politic. It gave them the possibility of expressing unthinkable, wishful
thoughts, in which some later observers saw a move toward the idea of
Rechtstaat. Whether this is what it was is debatable. At the Legislative Com
mission the mass of the nobility appeared to have but one concern: to distin
guish itself as persuasively as possible from the lower strata and keep it
that way.52
The position of the nobility as a whole was understandably conservative:
the majority, who were essentially inactive, forsaking their own aspirations
of high achievement, wanted to preserve their present status by preventing
its devaluation, which would follow with the ascendancy of their inferiors.
But, apart from the instructions to the Legislative Commission, the majority
was not vocal. The opinion leaders who would soon fashion the ways Russia
thought came from elsewhere. The vocal segment of the nobility, that is, the
first Russian intellectuals, subscribed to two positions regarding the matter
of the nature of nobility and, in particular, service. The first position was
that of the ancient nobility. The other represented the views of Peters
menthose who owed their elevated status to the Table of Ranks and the
spirit of reform. Intellectuals, even if they were of the ancient nobility, rep
resented a novel type of personality in Russia; they were distinguished not
only by their birth, and valued the distinctions which reflected their talent
and education. Most of the intellectuals, however, came from the new or
marginal nobility (such as the nobility of foreign stock), since, not having
the honor of an indigenous ancient lineage to rely upon, they were more
motivated to excel through their own efforts. Not unexpectedly, therefore,
the position of the ancient nobility, which shared the fundamental conserv
atism of the majority, was a minority position in the case of the opinion
leaders, and in addition was less systematically argued.
The most consistent representative of this conservative position was
Kniaz M. M. Shcherbatov, who showed himself to be the staunchest de
The Scythian Rome: Russia
217
fender of the exdusivist interests of the dvoryanstvo at the Legislative Com
mission. He too utilized patriotic rhetoric and justified his demands for the
preservation and protection of the privileges of nobiiity by the service it as
an order, and the ancestors of the present noble families, rendered the fa
therland. For example, regarding the right of the nobility to own serfs, the
comparison of which to tyranny he found outright offensive, he argued:
Did our fathers, who had the honor to marshal their service against com
mon enemies and to defend the Orthodox faith, aspire to receive rewards so
that now their heirs would be compared to tyrants? Will such be your re
ward for the salvation of you and your souls? Some of Shcherbatovs
works, which he carefully preserved for posterity, though they remained
largely concealed from his contemporaries, resound with republican pathos
the like of which can easily be found on the pages of Poynet or Hotman. In
his Comments on the Great Instruction of the Empress Catherine II, the
irreverent prince expressed himself directly: Even though nations are sub
jected to the scepter of the monarchs, yet people belong to God, and God, as
their creator, never loses his right over His creation; and the monarchs are
nothing but magistrates placed [here] for the common good. Yet classical
patriotic outbursts such as this had no democratic overtones, and patriotism
was unquestionably subservient to the interests of the order. The people
Shcherbatov talked about was the ancient nobility. Whatever served its in
terests was patriotic; whatever did notwas despotism. It is the clearest
sign of despotism, the Kniaz wrote, recalling nobles who specialized in
jesting for the benefit of the royal audience, that persons of most noble
families were reduced to such mean position. His identity, which was still
clearly determined by his order rather than nationality, was assaulted and
undermined, as he believed, by the upstarts, and it is against this that the
valiant Kniaz fought. Nothing could be more heinous and despicable, in
his opinion, than a merchant turned nobleman, which brought indignity on
the very names of officer and nobleman; he could not find another epi
thet for the desire of almost all merchants to acquire ranks and nobility,
confessed Shcherbatov, but that of a wicked scourge (vrednaia zaraza}.
Shcherbatovs attitude toward service was logically consistent with his gen
eral outlook. Although service was an attribute of noble status, it was not
its primary basis; therefore, he rejected the Table of Ranks, which institu
tionalized ennoblement. He juxtaposed this arrangement to the times of
Ivan the Terrible, of which he wrote nostalgically: Not only for the rank
were then noblemen respected, but also for their birth, and so the ranks gave
only positions, while birth brought dignity.S3
Few went that far. More often the hesitant defenders of the old restricted
themselves to generalized expressions of elitism and conservatism, fulminat
ing against upstarts and advising everyone to keep to ones place. Such were,
for example, the views of the famous Alexander Sumarokov, one of the first
218 N A T I O N A L I S M
Russian poets, the father of the Russian theater, and a prominent defender
of the interests of the nobility. Himself a nobleman of an old family, whose
ancestors served under Tsar Alexis, Sutnarokov scorned and feared novi
homines. Nobility, the old nobility of birth, was for him the natural elite of
the nation, and he found it absurd and unnatural that it could be challenged
by people from below. In the preface to his play Dmitri the Pretender, he
wrote: A lowly clerk (podyachii) became the judge of the Parnassus and
the arbiter of taste of the Moscow public!. . . Certainly the end of the world
is coming. But nobility derived its superiority from its patriotism, and
thisnot birth as suchjustified Sumarokovs conservatism. In fact, for Su-
marokov, nobility and patriotism were synonymous; he called noblemen
sons of the fatherland. Even beyond that, Sumarokovs conservatism was
not consistent. In the same preface to Dmitri the Pretender, he defined the
concepts of public and plebs in a manner closely reminiscent of La
Bruyere, thus: The word Public, as Mr. Voltaire also agrees, does not de
note a whole society, but only a small part of jt, namely people who are
knowledgeable and have taste . . . The word Plebs3refers to the low people,
not the word Mean people; for mean people are convicts and other con
temptible scum, and not artisans and agriculturists. We here give this name
to everyone who is not noble. Nobility! big deal!. . . Oh, unbearable noble
pride, worthy of contempt and lashing! The real Plebs are ignorants, even
when they have a great rank, the wealth of Croesus, and count among their
ancestors Zeus and Juno, who never existed, the son of Philip, the victor, or
rather, ruiner of the universe, or Julius Caesar, who strengthened the glory
of Rome, or rather destroyed it. He thus opposed formal nobility to the
public, and defined true nobility by culture and intellectual excellence. In
a Satire on Nobility, he presented nobility as a reflection of service to the
nation, although apparendy he still considered people of noble stock the
pool out of which such true noblemen were to be recruited:
I bring this satire to you, dvoryane>
I write for the first members of the fatherland .. .
I should be honored, if I earned respect myself:
And if I have no aptitude for office,
My ancestor is noble, but Imnot."
The position of the vocal majorityrepresented by noble intellectuals
who owed their position in society to Peters reformswas that of unquali
fied support for the Table of Ranks. In it virtuenobility of spirit and be
havior, and especially service to the nationwas regarded as die basis of
the noble status, thus giving this view an unmistakable tint of nationalism.55
Prince Antiokh Kantemir, called the first Russian writer to busy himself
seriously with belles-lettres, was also among the earliest proponents of this
position. Kantemir was the son of a Moldavian (or Wallachian) hospodar
The Scythian Rome: Russia 219
who moved to Russia and became a Russian subject under Peter. The edu
cated, intelligent young Antiokh was a protege of the great tsar and could
expect a bright future, but the tsar died when the youth was only seventeen.
Kantemir, though of an ancient family, was left with no connections among
the Russian nobility and, owing to circumstances in which he could see the
hand' of some Russian grandees, deprived of his inheritance. He began to
write in the period of the temporary ascendancy of the ancient nobility and
their assault against the low-born new nobility, which included newly en
nobled natives, and foreigners now recognized as Russian nobles. His sec
ond satire (1730) was entitled On the Envy and Pride of the Ill-Natured
Nobles. Kantemir wrote in the preface: I do not intend to disparage no
bility, but to oppose the pride and envy of ill-natured nobles, by which
means I defend nobility as such. In this satire I say that the advantage of
nobility is honest, and useful, and glorious, if the nobleman has to his name
honest deeds and is adorned by virtuous behavior, that the darkness of ill-
nature eclipses the brilliance of nobility and that not the one whose name
can be found in ancient scrolls deserves greatest distinctions, but the one
whose good name is commended today; after that I show that pride is inap
propriate to nobility and that it is base for a nobleman to envy the well
being of those of meaner birth, if they achieved honor and glory through
their good deeds, and had to spend their time not in games and self-
pampering, but in earning their glory with sweat and corns for the good of
the Fatherland. J<i
More than half a century later the singer of Catherine, Gavriia Der
zhavin, the first significant lyrical talent in the Russian literature of the
eighteenth century, echoed Kantemir. He devoted to the subject a poem,
The Grandee, and, in it, wrote:
.. . I wish to glorify the honor
Which by themselves they would achieve
As a reward for worthy deeds;
Those who were not adorned from birth
By famous names, luck, or position,
But valiantly earned respect
From their fellow-cirizens.
. .. What is nobility and rank
But excellencies of our spirit?
i am a princeif spirit in me shines.
A masterif I can control my passions;
Boyarinif I am a friend to tsars,
The law, and Church, concerned
About the good and welfare of all.
A nobleman should be the one who has
A healthy reason and enlightened spirit,
220
N A T I O N A L I S M
The one who is a living proof
Of that his rank is truly noble,
That he is but a tool of power,
The fundament of royal building,
His every thought, his words, his deeds
Are thesegood, dignity, and glory.57
Derzhavin was a scion of a modest noble family who owed his position to
his own efforts.
Whatever the position taken, the obsessive preoccupation with the defini
tion of nobility was a sign of the status anxiety and insecurity which plagued
its members. I t continued to plague them until the annihilation of the order
in the final debacle of 1917. The majority persisted in demanding to curb
access to ennoblement, and in the nineteenth century their demands met
with moderate success: the laws of 1845' and 1856 raised the level of ranks
and decorations which carried nobiiity;53a numents clausus for the nobility
was introduced in the universities, which ensured their predominance in
higher education. These alleviating measures were offset by the emancipa
tion of the serfs, which signified the beginning of the speedy destruction of
noble privileges, leaving the nobility a privileged order only in name, and
thereby causing a sudden exacerbation of its chronic crisis. The implications
of this fateful development, and their role in bringing about the Revolution,
are not fully realized, but they form a subject for another book.
The protracted crisis of identity within the nobility, similarly to the devel
opment in other countries, rendered this elite stratum sympathetic to the
nationalist ideas that had been forcefully promoted by Russias energetic
despots, Peter and Catherine the Great. For the great majority of the noble-
men, even by the time of the Legislative Commission, the nationalist ideas
were still nothing but rhetoric, which they used, as they would magical in-
cantations, to appease their godlike rulers. Yet these ideas offered a most
potent remedy for the malady with which the nobility was afflicted. Nation
ality elevated every member of the nation and offered an absolute guarantee
from the loss of status beyond a certainhighlevel. One could be
stripped of nobility, but (unless one rejected it of ones own free will, a pos
sibility which was not to be relevant for Russians) not of nationality. There
was in nationalism the assurance of a modicum of unassailable dignity, dig
nity that was ones to keep. And so, Russian aristocrats were gradually turn
ing nationalist; they were beginning to experience the therapeutic effects of
national pride, and their identity as noblemen was giving way to the na
tional identity of Russians.
It was exactly that sector of the nobility which felt its crisis most
acutelythat is, the service nobility in the capitals, the elite, the aristocracy,
which saw no solution besides total withdrawal and did not wish to with
drawwhich was turning to nationalism. Among this elite rare was a man
The Scythian Rome: Russia
221
who, like Kniaz Shcherbatov, did not escape into the soothing embrace of
the new identity, but persisted1in the desperate, hopeless efforts to salvage
the old. There were some timid nationalists, the descendants of ancient fam
ilies, who had too much to give up with their identity as nobles. They were
quite satisfied with the idiom and limits of classical patriotism, in which the
definition of the nation was narrow and in fact included only the nobility.
This accounts for Sumarokovs use of the term sons of the fatherland as a
synonym of dvoryane. But this notion could not aspire to longevity in Rus
sia: the nobility there simply was not a nation in the sense given to the
concept by Montesquieu, and such wishful thinking flew in the face of real
ity. For the nobility of service, however, classical patriotism was too tight,
and they converted to the new, modern faith with abandon.
For at least half a century the new identity did not entirely eclipse the old,
but existed side by side with it. How closely the two issuesthe crisis of
identity within the nobility and its nationalismwere connected is evident
in most of the contemporary sources. But nowhere are this connection and
the psychological entanglement of the noble nationalists expressed with
greater clarity than in the famous Questions by Denis Fonvisin. answered
by Catherine. Fonvisin belonged to a Liftand knightly family, but his ances
tors, first captives of Ivan IV settled in Moscow. The original faith of his
family was Protestant, his name was spelled fon-Visin, and thus, though
in some way he could be considered of an old noble family, his ancient no
bility was of a peculiar kind.19Fonvisin early became a Russian nationalist,
and greatly contributed to the development of the national consciousness.
In his most famous play, The Minor; Fonvisin defines nobility through a
protagonist, Starodum (Old Thinker), a man of Peters time, who measures
everything by the honest measure of those good old days. According to Star
odum, nobility is earned in service of the fatherland and cannot be acquired
simply by birth. He distinguishes between the true and formal nobility and
says: Honor! Only one sort of honor should be flatteringthe spiritual
one; and only that one deserves a spiritual honor who bought his rank not
with money, and whose nobility is nor just in the rank. I reckon the degree
of nobility according to the amount of services the grandee rendered the
fatherland, and not according to the amount of affairs he grabbed because
of his haughtiness. Starodum is distressed by the lamentable situation of
Fonvisins own time, when real nobility is undervalued and nobles only in
name rule the day. If only people understood the significance of office, he
says, there would be rso such noblemen, whose nobility, one may say, is
buried with their ancestors. A nobleman unworthy to be a noblemanI
know nothing baser than that on earth. 40But, alas, those considered noble
men do not behave like ones, and thus nobility is neglected. The vagueness
and insecurity of the noble status which result from this are the focus of the
Questions.
In the form of open-ended questions Fonvisin, in fact, underscores the
222 N A T I O N A L I S M
chief symptoms of the evil and, by implication, points to the conditions that
should prevail instead. Question #4 is: If nobility is the reward for service
(merit), and service (merit) is open to every citizen, why then are merchants
never ennobled, but only fabricants and monopolists? The meaning is: if
nobility were indeed a reward for service, merchants would be ennobled
too; since they are not ennobled, nobility at present is not a reward for ser
vice, but is something corrupt. Another question (#9) is: Why are noto
rious and evident idlers everywhere received with the same respect as are
honest people [people are, of course, nobility]? The meaning is: unworthy
people are rewarded; we, the worthy ones, not they, should be preferred.
Another question (#13): How can we raise the decaying spirit of the nobil
ity? How can we ban from hearts the insensitivity toward the dignity of the
noble status? How can we make the honorable rank of a nobleman a doubt
less proof of spiritual nobility? The meaning is: the spirit of nobility is in
decay; the noble status has lost its dignity; the honorable rank of a noble
man (formal nobility) is not a reflection of spiritual (true) nobility. But what
is this formal nobility, and who are these idlers who ban the sensitivity to
ward the dignity of the noble status (thus threatening it) from the hearts of
the citizens? These are, of course, the representatives of the ancient families.
While Shcherbatov could not think calmly about the Table of Ranks, which
ennobled merit and thus assailed the exclusivity of the ancient nobility and
undermined it, the new nobility found it impossible to reconcile itself to the
respects still paid to the ancient nobility, for it could never hope to become
equal to the latter in birth and antiquity, and so long as those were legitimate
bases of the noble status, its own identity was insecure. However looked at,
the situation was unsatisfactory. Fonvisin clearly expresses this dissatisfac
tion and is unwilling to accept the situation as it is. He even rationalizes an
escape from it: nobility defined as it is, is corrupt, which is a good reason
for an honest, spiritually noble person not to belong to it. But escape where?
The two last questions (#20 and #21), on the face of it unconnected to the
points raised earlier, pose the alternative: nationality. And question #21
asks pathetically: What does our national character consist of?151It is a
most significant, urgent question. Here, Fonvisin is prepared to trade his
identity as a nobleman for that of a Russian, but what is it? This new entity,
Russian nationality, does not as yet exist.
The West and Ressentiment
The other question#20reflected the instantly torturous character of
Russian nationalism and its frustrating, ambivalent, and ineluctable depen
dence on the West. For the first Russian nationalists found themselves be
tween the hammer and the anvil. In a desperate bid to escape the psycholog
The Scythian Rome: Russia 223
ical agony of the crisis of identity, they threw themselves into the arrns of
ressentiment. Its poisonous vapors would cripple and mutilate their souls,
and work wonders; they would create a fertile soil, a hothouse for the
growth of national consciousness, and, melting'old frustrations and aspira
tions, for long decades, incessantly, indefatigably fuel, nourish, and shape
new passions. And so the Russian nation would be born. Fonvisin asked:
How can we remedy the two contradictory and most harmful prejudices:
the first, that everything with us is awful, while in foreign lands everything
is good; the second, that in foreign lands everything is awful, and with us
everything is good? 62This was the dilemma on which the construction of
the Russian national identity was predicated.
The West as the M odel
The awareness of the "West was forced on Russia by Peter the Great, who, as
in everything he did, allowed no time for getting prepared for the encounter:
the confrontation was sudden and shocking, and evidently signified the be
ginning of a new era. While some boyare bewailed their beards that had to
give way to the importation of Western customs, on the whole, the first re
action to this other world seems to be that of an undiluted admiration. The
reminiscences of the first Russian travelers to the West, who were sent there
by Peter, convey a sense of wonder, of meeting somethinggoodout of
this world. Stolnik Peter Tolstoy admired the temperance of Venetians,
which evidently contrasted with the behavior of his countrymen. Venetian
people are clever, politic, and there are very many educated people; they do
not appear affectionate, but are very hospitable [zelo priyomny] toward for
eigners. They do not like to amuse themselves and do not go to each other
for dinners and suppers, and they are all very sober; you will never ever see
a drunken man here; and with that they have lots of beverages, lots of all
kinds of excellent grape wines . . . but they do not use them much, but rather
drink lemonades, coffee, chocolate [kafy, chekulaty], and others of this sort
which cannot make a person drunk. A. A. Matveev, who visited France in
1705 (and thought that it excels all European peoples), noticed other
things, but was similarly impressed. Verily, he wrote, it deserves to be
mentioned with ineffable astonishment that not one person can be found of
either male or female sex of noble family, who would not be honestly edu
cated and taught. One could still find such expressions of unmarred admi
ration, some twenty years later, in the writings of most educated Russians,
and V. K. Trediakovskii, also enchanted by France, devoted one of the very
first verses in modern Russian to the beautiful place, the dear banks of the
Seine. ci
At this early stage, the West was eagerly accepted as ah absolute and in
contestable model, the only possible standard of behavior. The Honest Mir
224
N A T I O N A L I S M
ror of Youth, the Petrine manual of manners, contains some evidence of this
attitude, uninhibited and un-self-conscious. Instructing its young readers re
garding the appropriate manner of addressing ones parents, it advises: One
should talk to them respectfully, as if one happens to be talking to some
important foreign person. Much later, Sumarokov, in the already quoted
preface o Dmitri the Pretender, in an attempt to teach his audience respect
toward Russian theater, dramatically asks: You, travelers, who visited
Paris and London, tell me! do people there crunch nuts while watching
Drama; and when the performance is on the stage, do they whip drunken
and quarreling coachmen, causing alarm to the floor, balconies, and the
whole theater?64(Of course, nothing of the sort happens in the civilized
world.)
However, more revealing than such explicit references is the widespread
unreflective imitation of Western ways in the everyday life of Moscow and
St. Petersburg nobility, the extent of which can be gauged from the matter-
of-fact descriptions of this life and even more so from the amount of criti
cism of which this imitative behavior became the focus.65The excitement
with everything Western in Russia is reminiscent of the mass Anglophilia in
France in the first half of the eighteenth century, and, if anything, is more
enthusiastic.
The national idea itself is also, in some way at least, a sign of recognition
of the West as a model, and the earliest expressions of Russian nationalism
(in the sense of national patriotism and consciousness) have to do with com
parisons of Russia with the West. Such comparisons remain an important
element of the national lore, but later lose their originally unproblematic,
confident character. The early representatives of Russian nationalism did
not see the West as threatening. The achievement of Peter the Great and the
change in the international position and, in many ways, internal image of
Russia were so tremendous as to border on fantastic, which greatly contrib
uted to the sense of confidence and pride of the first nationalists, all of whom
were Peters men. Russia of their time was indeed a wonder in the eyes of
the world, and they were justifiably proud of belonging to it. They were
proud of Russias greatness, but they defined it as similarity to Europe. Their
confidence was the confidence that Russia was a European state, and this
was the chief foundation of their national pride: they were proud to be up
to the standard. A telling example of the prevalence of this view is the pop
ular Tale of the Russian Sailor Vasilii Koriotski and the Beautiful Princess
I raklia of the Land of Florence. The tale dates to the early eighteenth century
and belongs to the genre representing the favorite reading of the average
eighteenth-century reader.66Its audience is the literate Russian public
noblemen and burghers who, literally, can read. The tale is based on an ear
lier translated story, but is in significant ways a reflection of the Russian
reality of the time. Vasilii is a poor nobleman who goes to St. Petersburg and
The Scythian Rome: Russia
225
becomes a sailor to earn himself a living and glory. From Petersburg he sails
to Holland and Florence, is sent to study abroad, and eventually, after dis
tinguishing himself in every possible way, becomes the king of the land of
Florence. While foreigners cannot find words to praise the remarkable
Russian sailor, Russia throughout the tale is called Russian Europe
(Rossiyskaya Evropia). The term has a peculiar sound and is never repeated
in the later Russian literature, but whether it means the Russian part of Eu
rope, or the European land of Russia, it clearly represents Russia as essen
tially a European state.
This early pride in Russia was frequently associated with the pride in its
unusual monarch. Peter, however, was extolled for his part in increasing the
prestige of Russia; its meteoric rise to equality with the ideal was believed to
have been his doing. One can assume that the admiration for Peter was sin
cere, for it was expressed most forcefully when the tsar died, and the pri
mary motive behind the trenchant panegyrics was likely to be grief rather
than expectation of reward. The pioneers of Russian nationalism mourned
their first and greatest patriot, the author of their glory.67In 1725, upon
receiving the news of the tsars death, the Russian ambassador in Constan
tinople, 1. I. Nepluyev, wrote in his Memoirs: I moistened the letter with
tears . . . and, verily, was unconscious for more than a day and a night; and,
of course, it would be sinful to behave otherwise: this monarch raised our
fatherland to the comparison with others, taught to recognize that we too
are human [emphasis added]; in one word, whatever you look at in Russia,
everything has him as its beginning. 68Feofan Prokopovich, a bishop and
the foremost political propagandist of Peters time, in his dramatic obituary
The Word on the Burial of Peter the Great, was more ornate:
The author of innumerable our advantages and joys, who resurrected Russia as
if from the dead and raised it to such power and glory, or rather the one who
gave birth [to] and educated [it], a veritable patriot [and] father of his father
land [or: a veritable father to the patriots of his fatherlandpryamoi syn ote-
chestvta svoyego otets], .. This is your own, Russia, Samson, whom nobody in
the world expected to appear in you, and when he appeared the world was
astonished. He found in you but a feeble power and turned it into a strong one
like a stone, adamant;. , . When he destroyed those who attacked us, he broke
[the spirit of] those who wished us ill and filling the lips of envy [emphasis
added], ordered the world to glorify himself . . . This is your first, O Russia,
Jafeth . . . he spread your might and glory to the shores of the ocean, to the
limits of your advantage . . . He left us, but not as paupers and wretched: the
immense riches of his power and glory, . . remain with us. As he made his own
Russia, so it will be . . . he made it glorious all over the world, and it will be
glorious forever.65
The incipient national consciousness a the time of Peter utilized the
proto-nationalist, Renaissance vocabulary developed mostly by the
226 N A T I O N A L I S M
Western-oriented Ukrainians and Poles at the Moscow Court of the seven
teenth century. Already then, under the influence of Renaissance notions',
there appeared new concepts which identified the land and the people
and used as synonyms of both such new words and word combinations as
Russia (Rossia, which replaced Rus), Russian state, Russian tsar-
dom, Russian realm. Already then, too, it is possible to find a few ex
amples of poetic glorification of Russia as the extension of the monarch.
This glorification has a formal character and little, if any, relation to existing
reality: it extols Russia according to a Renaissance formula and for what
Russia should have been if it were a Western European state, but clearly was
not. In 1660, Simeon Polozki, the Court poet, wrote: Russia increases its
glory/ Not only by her sword, but also/ By printing everlasting books.70
Thiswhen in the course of the seventeenth century 374 books were
printed in Russia, of which only 19 were of a secular nature.
The nascent civic vocabulary and the borrowed formalistic' traditions
were absorbed by the emergent national thought of Peter's reign, which,
spurred by the example of the great tsar himself, greatly augmented the for
mer and changed the nature of the latter. In the writings of Prokopovich or
Pososhkov, existing civic terms appear with greater frequency and many
new terms emerge: father of the fatherland, glory of the fatherland,
Russian people, sons of Russia. Shafirov, in the Discourse, introduces
the concept son of the fatherland as a synonym of patriot, and Proko
povich, for the first time, uses the word nation (nazia).71Simultaneously
with the development of the vocabulary, instances of glorification and
expressions of pride in Russiaas a polity and/ or a peoplebecame more
frequent and acquired a measure of realism. Russia was belauded not for
printing books, which it did not do, but for what it really was or at the time
gave a reasonable promise of becoming. Such celebrated qualities were the
huge territory which Russia now possessed, and its miraculously increased
prestigeboth to no small extent achievements of Peter. Not unexpectedly,
it was the Great North War which inspired many of these early expressions
of national pride. In 1709, Prokopovich, in the Laudatory Speech on the
Glorious Victory over Swedish Forces, wrote: Were someone to travel, or
rather fly in ones mind over [this territory], starting from our River Dneper
to the shores of the Black Sea . . . from there to the East to the Caspian Sea,
or even to the borders of the Persian kingdom and from there to the remotest
limits of the Chinese kingdom of which we have hardly heard, and from
there . . . to the New Land [Novaya Zemlia] and the shores of the Arctic
Ocean, and from there to the West to the Baltic Sea . . . and [back] to Dne
per: those are the limits of our monarch. In another speech the eloquent
bishop turned to greatness of a different sort: Oh, universal astonishment!
How suddenly and tremendously in this war Russia rose to glory and advan
tage! . . . and the whole world clearly perceived how the Russian people,
The Scythian Rome: Russia
227
when many foretold its ruin, rose higher and as if ascended from disdain to
praise, from contempt to fear, from weaknessto power!72
The relevant other in these early panegyrics is the 'West, which is dearly
recognized as a model. Zhurovskii, in the drama Russian Glory (1724), rep
resented Russia as favored by deities of the Greco-Roman Pantheon: Nep
tune,' Mars, and Athena. While Russia before was miserable, now it is ex
periencing good times: Neptune offers it the seasan allusion to the
creation of the Russian fleet; Mars offers his helpa reference to its victo
rious weapons; but in Athena Russia promises to see a faithful friendthis
is a recognition of the Western hierarchy of values, in which reason and its
achievements represent a sine qua non of national excellency, and a bid to
enter the competition with the West on its terms. The moment the West was
recognized as a modeland this happened simultaneously with the first,
tentative flirtation with national identitythe degree to which this identity
was to be psychologically gratifying hinged on the outcome of the competi
tion with the West,
The Competition with the West and the Build-up of Ressentiment;
The Stages of Reaction-Formation
That competition with the West was indeed the motive force behind the
early achievements of Russian culture and the formation of national con
sciousness is attested by all of eighteenth-century Russian literature as well
as life (and this is true, though in a less simple way, for subsequent centuries
as well). In the late eighteenth century, Nikolai Karamzin, while still in the
optimistic phase of his nationalism, explicitly pointed to the competition
with the Westand a victory in itas the main goal of Petrine reforms and
the natural national motivation. In initiating his reforms, it was as if Peter
had said to the Russians: Look: become equal to them, and then, if you
can, surpass them! Like the reforms, contemporary attitudes were justified
to the extent that they promoted the possibility of winning the competition.
At this stage, Karamzin favored unabashed imitation of the West, for, he
thought, Shouldnt one first become equal in order to surpass?73
This attitude, which, as we see, persisted until the end of the eighteenth
century, very soon created a problem, and in the time of Karamzin, who
several years later abandoned it himself, it was rarely encountered, at least
in the literature, in such an uninhibited, untroubled form. For, after the
death of the great tsar, whose unique personality and truly extraordinary
achievement encouraged unbounded optimism, it became quite clear that
Russia was not on a par with any of the European states it boldly and cheer
fully bid to compare itself with, that it was not at all up to the standard it
had appropriated, that it was, in fact, dearly, painfully, hopelessly inferior.
Nationality saved Russian noblemen from the agony of the noble identity
228 N A T I O N A L I S M
only so that their souls would burn in the consuming flame of the sense of
national inadequacy.
The realization of the discrepancy between the Russian reality and its cho
sen ideal did not come as a shock: it developed gradually, with the growth
of national consciousness itself. In fact, it was an integral part of the na
tional consciousness. But it came early. Already in Pososhkov (1724) one
finds a recognition of the superiority of the foreigners and a certain suspi
cion as to the effects of admiring them.74The recognition of the superiority
of the West gave rise to increasingly complicated attitudes which eventually
built up into ressentiment. The simplest reaction was the acknowledgment
of the fact that comparison with the West in general was unflattering to
Russia. It did not question the view of the West as a legitimate model, an
ideal. One finds examples of this attitude throughout the eighteenth century.
It is very well expressed in a 1763 poem by Sumarokov, A Choir to the
Upside-down World,1 which repeats the theme of Overseas as an ideal
ized contrast with Russia:
To the shore flew a bird, a titmouse
From beyond the midnight sea
From beyond the cold ocean:
She was asked by those who met her here,
What are the overseas customs?
And the visitor-titmouse answered:
Everything there is upside-down.
Overseas, respectable scholars .. .
Never cling to old superstitions,
Never hypocrites, never flatter.
Governors overseas are honest.
Clerks there do not own teams of horses,
Their wives do not display precious stones,
Their children do not ask for gifts and presents.
Overseas the scribes are not cheating .. .
Overseas they are skilled in writing.
Overseas the contracts are honored
Farming revenues is not in fashion,
So that the State does not suffer.
They do not feed plaintiffs with tomorrow.
Overseas, honorable people
Do not make it their habit to be haughty,
And they do not ruin simple people.
Money there is not buried in the ground.
Peasantry is not despoiled there;
Villages are not loss in card-games,
Overseas they do not sell people.
Women in their old age are not squeamish,
The Scythian Rome: Russia 229
Although rosaries they there do not wear,
They do not backbite honest people.
And exorbitant rates on the money
Overseas are against law and order.
Overseas they do not steal the taxes.
Overseas, coquettes to the churches
Do not go to get into mischief.
Idlers overseas are not allowed
in the houses where live honest people.
They do not embarrass people overseas,
Do not wash dirty laundry in public.
Minds there are not drowned in hard drinking;
Those in power do not oppress others;
Overseas, grandees are not worshipped.
All the noble children go to school there;
Their fathers, too, are educated.
Even maidens overseas must have learning;
Overseas they are not ptone to drivel
That a maiden has no need for reason,
That she only needs a skirt and be pretty .. .
Overseas they do not scorn their language,
Only those are scorned who destroy it,
'Who, for no good reason, after travel
Fill their empty heads with foreign air
And then make with it turgid bubbles.
Orators there do not talk nonsense.
Poetasters do not make verses;
Writers overseas have clear thinking,
Speeches of the speakers are coherent:
Overseas, fools do not become writers,
Criticism is not full of poison.
People do not spy on each other,
Overseas the greatest merit is science,
Its loved better than chicanery there. ..
Merchants overseas are not deceivers.
Pride in those lands is hardly suffered,
Flattery is not to be heard there,
And there is no meanness overseas.
Overseas is a Utopia, as is the generalized West; it is an ideal, a stan
dard. And the sad fact is that Russia falls so conspicuously short of this
ideal; in effect, it is the ideal turned upside-down.
Some of the themes in Sumarokovs poem were focal points in the grow
ing nationalistic literature; one finds here the dissatisfaction with the haugh
tiness of the grandees, with honoring nobility without merit, with the atti
tude toward learning and the state of letters, with the attitude toward the
230 N A T I O N A L I S M
native language and self-image, as well asunexpectedly, for Sumarokov
was a defender of serfdoma condemnation of the habit of selling people.
Yet the recognition of the discrepancy between Russia and the West in this
case is diffuse; it does not focus on any one area where the discrepancy is
most pronounced or postulate an organizing principle for it. Several impor
tant authors of the eighteenth century, more sensitive to the original mean
ing of the idea of the nation, regard the social and political conditions in the
country (especially serfdom and the situation of the peasantry) as the es
sence of the difference between Russia and its ideal.
There are two reactions to the recognition ol socio-political reality in Rus
sia as the core problem: shame and denial. Shame is a rare reaction: given
how singularly unpleasant this feeling is, it must be difficult to sustain it over
a period of rime of any length. As a result, this reaction is characteristic only
of one important writer: Alexander Radishchev. Radishchevs genuine ab
horrence of the barbarism of serfdom, and concern for the peasantry, his
understanding and passion for liberty as a right of humans as such, make
him an exception among the creators of the Russian culture. These qualities
also make him the only possible representative of civic nationalism, which
in Russia never took root. Radishchev is also unusual, though not unique,
in that his Western model was not Europe, but the United States of America.
Yet it is significant that even his abhorrence of and shame over this peculiar
Russian reality is expressed and felt as an embarrassment in the presence of
the West; it is a shame that Russia falls short of its Western ideal, as if the
reason for it would disappear were Russia the only country in the world.
Even with Radishchev, this is a matter of the relative position of Russia vis-
a-vis the West. This pervasive relativity is at its most poignant in a passage
from the chapter Mednoe in The Voyage from Petersburg to Moscow.
There Radishchev tells about the harrowing experience of watching a family
of serfs auctioned to separate buyers. Leaving the terrible scene in flight,
Radishchev meets an American friend, to whose inquiry, What happened?
You are crying! he responds: Return . . . do not be a witness of a horrible
disgrace. You who cursed once a barbaric custom of selling black slaves in
remote settlements of your fatherland. Return . . . do not be a witness of our
derangement, and do not tell the story of our shame to your compatriots
when talking to them of our customs.5 7i
The usual reaction, however, was denial. In its early and simple forms it
was very close to a conscious lie. A remarkable example of denial, and al
most unbelievable in its naivete and transparency, is Catherines defense of
Russia in a letter to Voltaire, where she writes that in Russia peasants live so
well that there is no peasant family that does not have a chicken for dinner
and some are so fed up with chickens that they now eat turkeys instead.77
More interesting, among other things because of its precocity, is Antioch
Kantemirs refutation of Locatellis Lettres ntoscovites.
The Scythian Rome: Russia 231
Kantemir was an ambassador in England when Locaceliis book appeared
in Paris in 1735. I t had two editions in France, and then was translated into
English and published in London. For Kantemir, its contents were outright
slander, and so he set out to write a refutation. In his letter of January 6,
1736, to Baron Osterman (another Russian patriot) in St. Petersburg, Kan
temir wrote that he never wanted to write more than on this occasion,
having to defend the fatherland. He also mentioned his intention to write a
refutation in an official dispatch, adding that he conceived of it as a de
scription, both geographical and political, of the Russian empire, similar to
those which exist in all famous states under the title etat present" The
refutation was intended exclusively for the foreign audience and published
in German, being ostensibly written von einem Teutschen,73In the treatise
Kantemir stressed the huge territory of Russia, its enormous natural re
sources, and its momentous rise to prestige under Peter. He commended its
economy, saying, for instance, that textiles manufactured in Ekateringof are
so excellent that they are almost as good as the Dutch. He drew attention
to the nationaluniquecharacter of the Russian people (this is indeed
one of the earliest attempts to define it) and stressed the unending patience
of the peasants and their loyalty to the master. He also emphasized the thirst
for knowledge characteristic of Russians and their extraordinary ability to
learn, both demonstrated by their success in imitating the West during the
period of Petrine reforms.
Of particular interest in the refutation of Lettres moscovites is Kantemirs
depiction of the political values and civic conditions in Russia. He wrote:
Peter the Great and the gloriously reigning Empress Anne made tremen
dous reforms in Russia. [Now] urban artisans and the peasantry suffer no
oppression from the supreme power, and brought eloquent examples to
support his characterization. Indicative of the prevailing appreciation of lib
erty was a Petrine edict forbidding people to fail on their knees before the
tsar, whom Kantemir quoted as saying-in the best tradition of European
humanismI could never think without abhorrence, how much enslaved
rational creatures must long, tremble and groan for freedom, if even crea
tures without reason, as is said in the Scriptures, when under subordination,
passionately strive to be freed from it. The source of the quotation has
never been located, but if Peter indeed had held such enlightened views, this
certainly would have earned him the respect of those Westerners who, in the
eighteenth century, were making such a fuss over freedom. For whatever
insignificant relics of oppression there remained, Kantemir blamed, as one
could expect, the ill-natured, unenlightened nobility, thereby killing two
birds with one shot.
In all these innocent liesand one is tempted to sympathize with them, for
they were made in self-defensethe assumption that the West was the
232 N A T I O N A L I S M
model remained unchallenged. The problem with lies, however, is that the
liar knows chat they are untrue, and thus, while they could, perhaps, con-*
vince some gullible foreigners, they were powerless to make the Russian pa
triots who circulated them believe that Russia was indeed equal to Europe.
The next logical step in the development of the Russian national conscious
ness, therefore, was to present equality as undesirable, and the West as, for
one reason or another, an unsuitable model for Russia. This attitude was
clearly articulated toward the end of the eighteenth century. The exact na
ture of the reaction depended on the acuteness of the sense of discrepancy
between Russia and the West, and the degree to which it was experienced as
painful and reflecting Russias inferiority.
I f the self-dissatisfaction was not acute, the assessment of the West as an
inappropriate model for Russia went hand in hand with the admiration of
the West as such and produced a vague form of cultural relativism. As in
Germany, this was a transient and therefore not a thoroughly argued posi
tion. In Russia it had no consistent representatives, and not even inconsist
ent ones similar to Herder. One finds expressions of cultural relativism in
terspersed with rudiments of other, contradictory positions in numerous
writings of the formative period of Russian nationalism at the end of the
eighteenth century. Karamzins influential Letters of the Russian Traveler
(179192) are characteristic.79The epigraph of the 1797 edition offers a
psychological insight so accurate that it is hard to believe it was chosen un-
self-consciously. I t reads: Who with ones self can live in love and quiet,/
Will love and gladness find in countries all. Contentment with oneself in
creases ones ability to appreciate the merits of others. Karamzin left Russia
in a happy mood, and his letters are indeed full of unqualified and uninhi
bited admiration of the West, which is astounding when compared with the
morose defensive nationalism of his writings just a few years later. When he
left Basel, for example, he jumped out of the coach, fell on the blossoming
shore of the green Rhein, and was ready to kiss the soil in rapture. Later,
kissing soil became exclusively reserved for ones own soil. In the Alps the
traveler experienced a fit of cosmopolitanism: In this way on my own self I
experienced the justice of what Rousseau has to say about the effect of the
mountain air .. . Here a mortal feels his lofty destiny, forgets his earthly
fatherland and becomes the citizen of the world.
Karamzins cultural relativism is evident in his reaction to the Russian
History by RC. Levesque. Referring to it in a letter, he urges the creation of
a Russian History by a Russian which would emphasize the uniqueness of
Russia and show its equality to Europe not because it is like it, but because
there is a distinctively Russian parallel to everything European of note.
What is not important we should cut down, as Hume did in his English
history; but all the features which evince the uniqueness of the Russian
people, the character of our ancient Heroes and famous people . . . describe
The Scythian Rome: Russia
233
vividly, strikingly. We had our own Charlemagne: Vladimirour own
Louis XI : Tsar Ioannour own Cromwell: Godunovand in addition
such a Ruler, whose like is nowhere to be found: Peter the Great.
Karamzins position in this letter (if what we-find in it may be regarded as
a coherent position) is complex. In accordance with the spirit of cultural
relativism, he emphasizes the distinctiveness of Russia and subscribes to the
Romanticavant le nomnotion of the supremacy of inner understand
ing: only a Russian can truly understand Russia. At the same time, he be
lieves that all nations follow the same path, that the West happens to be the
leader and that Russia, therefore, should imitate the West. The firm confi
dence that it can do so, that it is very successful in doing so, allows Kar
amzinwithout the anguish of self-contemptto denounce characteristi
cally Russian traditions which are inconsistent with or even irrelevant to
universal progress: he has not as yet reached the point where what is pecu
liarly Russian becomes a synonym for moral good. This confidence in the
ability of Russia speedily to catch up with the West also finds its expression
in the admiration for the initiator of the process of catching~up, Peter the
Great. In continuation of the quotation above, Karamzin writes:
Is it not necessary to become equal in order to surpass?. . . Germans, French
men, Englishmen, were in front of the Russians by at least six centuries: Peter
moved us with his mighty hand, and we in several years almost caught up with
them. All the pitiful Jeremiads about the alteration of the Russian character,
about the loss of the Russian moral physiognomy, either are nothing but a joke
or derive from the inadequacy of the well-founded thinking , . . Everything na
tional is nothing in comparison with the human. The main thing is to be hu
mans, not Slavs. What is good for humans cannot be bad for the Russians, and
what Englishmen or Germans invented for the good and benefit of man is mine,
for I am human! . . . II est probable, says Levesque, que si Pierre navait pas
regne, les Russes seraient aujourdhui ce quils sont, namely: even if Peter the
Great didnt teach us, we would learn! By which means? By ourselves? . . . Rus
sians were not predisposed, were not ready to become enlightened . . . Only the
zealous, active will and unlimited power of the Russian Tsar could effect such a
sudden, quick alteration . . . As Sparta without Lycurgus, so Russia without
Peter, would not be able to become famous.80
I t is clear from this passage that in this last decade of the eighteenth cen
tury, the belief in the salubrity of Peters reforms, and the superiority of the
West, was already far from universal. Many educated Russians were no
longer in love and quiet with themselves; they were deeply troubled by
the discrepancy between Russia and its model. When they resorted to cul
tural relativism, it was usually in a less cheerful manner than in the case of
Karamzin: rather than believing that equal merit is to be found behind dif
ferent appearances, they found solace in that different customs conceal be
hind them an equally grim reality. Fonvisin, for example, summarized his
234
N A T I O N A L I S M
impressions of foreign travel in the following manner: I saw that in all
countries there is more bad than good, that men are men everywhere; that
intelligent people are everywhere rare, that there are everywhere plenty of
foois, and, in one word, that our nation is no worse than any other. 81While
Karamzin, in his eagerness to see Russia equal to the West, confident that it
could easily become like it, thought Russian customs disposable and not
worth keeping, many of his more pessimistic compatriots thought that these
customs might as well be kept, for they preferred to see the West as not
worth imitating. Karamzin himself, in 1810, in the Memoir of Ancient and
Modem Russia, advised a more discriminating attitude: Two states could
be on the same stage of civic enlightenment and have different mores. A state
may borrow from another useful information, without imitating the others
customs.
The inclination to seek solace in equality (whether of merit or misery) in
difference was not sustained, for there was no equality. And so it gave way
to ressentiment, the rejection of the West based on envy and the realization
of the all-too-evident, and therefore unbearable, inferiority.
It was the recognition of the discrepancy between Russia and its ideal, and
the inferiority of Russia, which led to ressentiment, not the government of
foreigners. 82The anti-foreign sentiment before the reign of Catherine, and
especially under Empress Anne and her German favorites, was essentially
unrelated to the national sentiment. It was motivated by pragmatic group
interests, rather than by a sense of an incipient national identity, and predi
cated on a specific, temporary situation. In conditions of general status in
security and strife between the two sectors of the nobilitythe ancient and
the new, created by serviceforeigners who were brought by Anne from
Courland and gained immediate ascendancy at her Court represented an
other threat, not at all the main threat, but one on which the frustration of
all could focus. Moreover, this threat, unlike the others, could be easily elim
inated, and this ease, which created the illusion that with the elimination of
foreigners the problematic situation would be resolved as a whole, increased
the urgency of this elimination. In other words, this was not a generalized
xenophobia, fired by the desire to protect Russia from what was not Rus
sian, but an effort to ban a group of well-qualified competitors from access
to the limited number of coveted-by-ali positions. Such was the aim of Ar-
temii Volynskii, who suffered for the cause and was posthumously canon
ized as a martyr of Russian nationalism, and such was the aim of the French
man Lestocq, who was a member of Volynskiis circle, and of two prominent
Germans, like Lestocq personally invested in Russia, Ostermann and Muen-
nich, to whom eventually belonged the honor of terminating the German
government when they arrested its incarnationAnnes favorite, Biron.
The Scythian Rome: Russia 235
This anti-foreign sentiment was not long-lived. The reason for it disap
peared, and it burned itseif out in the sanguinary bout of the Guards who,
whether from an overflow of patriotic feelings, a penchant for carnage
which was not likely to be punished, or general playfulness, murdered their
German officers. The sentiment was revived for a short period in 1762, dur
ing the reign of Peter III, who, being enamored with Prussia and deprived by
this passion of the modest amount of good sense with which Nature had
endowed him, threatened again to replace Russian nobles (including those
of non-Russian origin) by Prussian soldiers. The Guards were eager to de
bauch, but the Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst, the clever Catherine, whom they
made Empress, knew how to keep things under control, and the sentiment
was heard of no more.
At the same time, already in the first half of the eighteenth century, the
widespread hostility toward the foreigners who successfully vied with the
Russian nobles for positions and favors now and then merged with and was
used as a pretext for the expression of anti-foreign sentiments of a different
nature. These were sentiments against the generalized foreigner, against the
mythical foreign menace, against the world which, by its very existence,
underscored Russias inadequacy. When Archbishop Amvrosii of Novgorod
accused the foreigners of conspiracy to keep Russia unenlightened and
weak, saying: They spared no means to convict a Russian experienced in
the arts, an engineer, an architect, a soldier . . . to remove him by exile or
execution, simply because he was an engineer or an architect, a disciple of
Peter the Great, 83it is quite clear that the German government was the
least of his concerns. Who were Russian engineers and architects in the
1740s?
It was this sentiment that persisted, for it so happened that the reason for
it never disappeared. But it was not until the age of Catherine that it became
ubiquitous and inescapable, and as a part of the cognitive reality of the Rus
sian elite was able to shape other sentiments and determine the further de
velopment of the national consciousness. In the meantime, while the noble
elite was otherwise engaged, the frail national sentiment found another
abode: it grew and burgeoned in the hearts of the non-noble intellectuals in
Petersburg and Moscow.
The Laying of the Foundations
The Contribution of Non-Noble Intellectuals
Unlike the nobility, the intelligentsia (which indeed appeared before its
name) was created by Peter the Great from scratch.84Before Peter there were
no secular schools in Russia, and the educational needs of the country were
236 N A T I O N A L I S M
satisfied by theological seminaries. The most important of these were the
Kiev Academy, founded in 1632, and the Slav-Greek-Latin Academy in
Moscow, founded in 1687 by one of the Kiev graduates, Simeon Polozki.
The Kiev Academy provided Russia with most of its high clergy well into
the Petrine period. Not until the founding of Moscow University in 1755 did
it lose its position as the largest and most important center of general edu
cation within the empire. Its students were recruited almost exclusively from
the Ukraine, which resulted in the highly significant presence of Ukrainians
among the clerical and, as we shall see instantly, secular intellectuals in
Russia.
The first institutions of secular learning reflected Peters preoccupation
with technical knowledge. In the first quarter of the eighteenth century a
school of mathematical and naval sciences was opened in Moscow, and an
engineering and artillery school and the Naval Academy in St. Petersburg.
At the Admiralty, in 1719, the so-called Russian schools were established
for the children of peasants and artisans recruited to work in the shipyards.
They provided instruction in Russian, arithmetic, and geometry.ss Ten such
schools existed between 1719 and 1734. In 1721, the War College (Chan
cellery) ordered the organization of schools attached to every one of the
forty-nine garrisons then in existence, each of which was to provide educa
tion for fifty soldiers sons, who were divided into four groups according
to abilities and inclinations. Similar schools were established for the chil
dren of those employed at the state stables. Large private schools, such as
the one opened in 1721 by Prokopovich for orphans and poor people of
every condition, also started to appear. Many of the successful products of
these modest schools later continued their education in other institutions.86
In 1732 the first Corps of Cadets was founded in St. Petersburg. This was,
in principle, an educational establishment exclusively for the nobility, but
children of soldiers and shipyard workers were accepted there in special
classes for non-nobles. They were trained for positions of non-commis
sioned officers, and also as lower-grade teachers for the children of the no
bility. The first medical school in Russia was opened in Moscow at the Gen
eral Hospital in 1706 and trained 800 physicians and surgeons in the course
of the century; three more schools were established in 1733, and by the end
of the 1770s there were in Russia 488 physicians and 364 medical practi
tioners at a lower level (podlekari).
The Imperial Academy of Sciences started to function in 1725.87The in
stitution consisted of the Academy proper and the University. A year later a
gymnasium was added to the structure. The Academic gymnasium was the
first secular secondary school with general educational purposes in Russia.
Its curriculum consisted of languages, history, geography, mathematics, and
natural sciences. The term of study was five years. The Academic University
was the first secular institution of higher education. For about twenty years,
The Scythian Rome: Russia
237
mostly because of the lack of adequately prepared students, the institution
lingered between life and death. In 1747 it was given a new reglement which
provided for thirty state scholarships a year for the University and twenty
for the gymnasium, to be given to people of all sorts of ranks, according to
abilities. In 1752 the number of scholarships was increased and was hence-
forth'limited only by the quantity of academic funds. At the same time,
everyone (from the nobility or raznocbinzy) willing to study on his own ac
count could do so. In 1748, there were 48 students in the gymnasium; in
1749, 62; in 1750, 70. In 1753, there were 150 students, one-third of them
state stipendiaries. Between 1756 and 1765, 590 young people were edu
cated there. Out of 429 of these, on whom background data are available,
80 came from noble, but mostly poor, families; 22 were children of mer
chants; 13, children of clergymen; 132 were soldiers sons; more than 80,
children of petty clerks; 50, children of artisans; 66 were freed serfs; fathers
of 9 were medical assistants; 7, watchmen; 4, gardeners; 3, grooms; 2, free
peasants; and 93 were children of foreigners. Most of the students at the
Academy did not go further than the gymnasium, and upon leaving it, as
sumed various clerical and lower-grade teaching positions. Nevertheless,
these people were among the most educated men of their country at the
time, and an important part of the emerging intelligentsia.83
Finally, in 1755, the first Russian university proper was established in
Moscow, The composition of the student population of Moscow University
was similar to that of the Academy, with the difference that, under certain
conditions, even serfs were admitted. Two gymnasia were attached to the
University: one for the children of the nobility, the other for the raznochinzy
In the beginning each one had fifty students supported by state stipends;
later their number increased. As in the Academy, many students, both in the
University and in its gymnasia, paid their own way. In the first twenty years
of its existence, 318 people graduated from the University. The University
was divided into three faculties: law, medicine, and philosophy. The first two
faculties had three professors each (of general law, Russian law, and politics;
and of chemistry, natural history, and anatomy, respectively). The four pro
fessors of the philosophical faculty taught philosophy, experimental and
theoretical physics, rhetoric, and general and Russian history. A remarkable
feature of Moscow University was the lack in it of a theological faculty, a
sine qua non in most European universities.
In 1758, on the grounds that foreign artists invited to Russia did not
transmit their skills to the Russians, the Academy of Arts was founded in St.
Petersburg. Its first students were transferred from Moscow University, and
after twenty years of existence the institution could boast of 180 graduates.
These figures allow one to infer that, by the end of the eighteenth century,
there were in Russia around four thousand people with a university educa
tion, about half of whom were physicians and sub-physicians, and a similar
238
N A T I O N A L I S M
(perhaps somewhat larger) number of persons with advanced secondary
education.85 Although minuscule in a population of many millions, this'
number represented a dramatic improvement compared with the beginning
of the century, when hardly more than half a score of people had a secular
education of any level.
A significant proportion of these newly educated peoplebefore the
1770s a majoritywas of non-noble origin. This group, and not the nobil
ity, was the first group in Russia which, as a whole, could be characterized
as nationalist. The precocious nationalism of the non-noble intelligentsia,
which manifested itself in the middle decades of the eighteenth century
(173 Os-1760s) was all the more remarkable because of the singular ethnic
composition of this group. It is possible that as much as 50 percent of this
first mass of Russian nationalists were Ukrainians.50In itself, this fact would
not be significant, but in Russia, which was to move steadily toward becom
ing one of the model ethnic nations, the prominence of ethnic non-Russians
does indeed add a touch of irony to the story.
The reasons for this odd phenomenon are simple. Through most of the
eighteenth century, the chief educational institutions in Russia, in terms of
their enrollment and impact, were still the clerical seminaries. Not only did
their influence not diminish with the appearance of centers of secular learn
ing, but for some time they continued to grow in numbers and importance.
In the early 1740s there were seventeen clerical seminaries in Russia with a
student population of twenty-five hundred; in 1764, twenty-six seminaries
with six thousand students. The Kiev Academy remained the largest and the
most important of the clerical schools. It also remained the center of learn
ing for the Ukrainians. As such, it gained in importance with the growing
deference toward education among the nobility and the formation of the
Corps of Cadets, since the Ukrainian nobility, if not confirmed by the
achievement of a nobility-carrying rank in the service, was not recognized
as such, and therefore young Ukrainian noblemen were denied admission to
these exclusive educational establishments. The Kiev Academy was the most
advanced of the clerical schools: from early on, in addition to Latin and
Greek, its students were taught modern languages, such as Polish and Ger
man, to which French was added in 1753. Since professors for the newly
established medical schools, as well as for the Academy at St. Petersburg and
Moscow University, were invited from abroad (mostly from Germany), and
the teaching was conducted in Latin, the knowledge of languages was indis
pensable for the students of these secular institutions, and they could not
acquire it outside the seminaries. The first cohorts of non-noble university
students (who were not children of resident foreigners) were thus simply
transferred from the seminaries. The Kiev Academy, from which, only in the
fourteen years between 1754 and 1768, more than three hundred seminar
ists moved to Moscow and St. Petersburg, was the chief source of such re-
The Scythian Rome: Russia
239
cruits. Every seminarist willing to become a physician, for example, was
offered ten rubles for travel and accommodation, and they went, either
moved by poverty or because secular professions and sciences were the
only honest and advantageous way out [of the clergy] for everyone who felt
indisposed to the priesthood, 91In St. Petersburg and Moscow, literally in
the front ranks of the nascent Russian intelligentsia, the humble youths from
Little Russia forged the Great Russian national consciousness.
The non-noble stipendiaries of the Academic and Moscow universities
were brought there to be trained for numerous positions which could not be
filled with the existing human resources. An important minority of these
positions carried with them nobility; almost all were new and, because of
the novelty of secular education (and literacy in general) in Russia and the
respect for this curious importation, had a certain prestige. For some poor
seminarists and gymnasiasts the universities turned out to be the road to
honors, wealth, and influence; they became the first Russian professors,
academicians, high officials. Others spent their lives as copyists, translators,
and petty clerks, more often than not in hopeless misery. All were trans
formed by education. 'Whoever they were before entering the universities
they were no longer; they needed a new identity. They were a new stratum,
and none of the existing definitions fit them. Even those whose social eleva
tion was commensurate with their education and great efforts felt bitterly
humiliated by the traditional definition of status, which, though embattled,
persisted. Those whose status expectations, inflated by learning, were frus
trated found the traditional definition unbearable,92They needed a perspec
tive, an identity, that would confirm their sense of worth, justify their aspi
rations, and condemn the arrangements which left them unfulfilled. The
idea of the nation could answer their needs, and they turned patriots.
-V Patriotism, the desire to do service to the fatherland, to demonstrate
v ~the zeal of love for it, seems to be the chief motivation behind the studies
and labors of the members of this group. A teacher, Stepan Nazarov, toiled
so that the Russian youth could derive benefit from this [his] modest ef
fort. K. Florinskii translated solely to bring some relief to the Russian
youth ignorant of foreign languages and thereby do service to the father
land, L. K. Sichkarev devoted [his] life to literary labors for the sake of
the fatherland 93The contribution of most of these people consisted in lay
ing the foundations and preparing the soil for the future national culture.
They compiled the first dictionaries and grammars; they translated and
propagated the work of others. Only a few of them actually became creators
of culture, but the first literary expressions of the Russian national sentiment
came from these few.
The first one to sing of Russia as a nation, the author of the first lyrical
verses in Russian inspired by the love of country, was V K. Trediakovskii..
The unmerciful editors of a pre-revolutionary anthology wrote that his po-
240 N A T I O N A L I S M
etry was but the first babble of the new Russian muse, in which even at
tentive and sympathetic criticism was not able to discover graceful taste-
and poetic talent. Yet, clumsy as his verses were, they resounded with gen
uine and deep feeling. In 1730, in Paris, Trediakovskii wrote the first lyrics
of this kind, Laudatory Verses to Russia:
0 mother Russia! My light excessive!
Who would not know, in the wide world.
The high nobility of your nature?
You are nobility itself. ..
AH your people are orthodox
And famous for their courage .. .
Always ready to stand up for your defense.
What plenty do you lack, Russia?
Where did you not prove your strength?
You are the treasury of every good,
Ever bountiful, and thus ever glorious.
, .. When I look at Russia from across remote countries,
1need a hundred tongues
To glorify all that I love in you.
The features that Trediakovskii admires in Russia, with the exception of the
orthodoxy of the people, are observations of his inner eye, the figments of a
loving imagination. This early poem articulates a sentiment which is not as
yet focused on anything in particular. In a 1752 poem, Laudations to the
Izherskaia Land and the Reigning City of St. Petersburg, the earlier diffuse
feeling is focused on a real achievement of Russia, so recognized by the rel
evant, that is, Western, world. It is on the basis of this achievement that
Trediakovskii professes and prays for the future glory and superiority of his
country:
O charming shore! Amiable land!
Where moves Neva its current to the ocean:
O wilderness before, inhabited today
We see in you a reigning city.
O! you, Descendants coming after us,
You are to hear laudations
Which to this site the world will sing in raptures.
Italian cities: Venice, Rome
And Amsterdam of Holland; and the British
City great London; Paris,
The Queen or an ideal of all cities.
All those are destinations of our journeys,
The object of desires; their fame and beauty
Attracts and tears us from native shores, ..
But you will see, Descendants, from them all
The Scythian Rome: Russia
241
The visitors will come in immense numbers,
To see and marvel at this city, and proclaim:
This was an empty place, and nowa Paradise . . .
O! Lord, please grant. . . for Russias sake,
That there be under the sun no equal
Among all cities to the Peters City.54
In this poem, Russia is glorified because it compares so well withindeed
in all likelihood promises to become superior tothe West, which is at pres
ent its model. This flattering comparison is due to the achievement of Peter,
the creator of the new Russia.
By far the most prominent representative of the non-noble intelligentsia
of the mid-eighteenth century was Mihailo Lomonosov, Russias first chem
ist, physicist, grammarian, and significant poetthis Pindar, Cicero, and
Virgil, glory of Russians. He was also the intelligentsias most articulate
nationalist. For Lomonosov, too, Peter was a deity on earth, for the glory
of Russia manifested itself only in comparison with the West, and it was
Peter who made this comparison possible:
[The Lord] to Russia sent a man
Whose like the world has never seen;
Through all the obstacles he raised
The head that victories have crowned
And Russia, by barbarity derided,
He raised to glory with himself.
Yet, though Lomonosov recognized in Peter the source of Russias fame, it
is the nation, not the monarch, which is the object of his passion and devo
tion. Peter made Russia a most [the most?uazhtieishii] important mem
ber in the European system, Europe now looked to Russia for the establish
ment of peace, and its fame resounded throughout the world. Lomonosovs
Russia is magnificent:
To lofty mountains alike,
Unshakable, it watches caimly
The darkness of the world beneath.
The wind is powerless to touch it,
By frightful thunder its unmoved
High up in its serene abode
Its feet are trampling upon clouds,
It is contemptuous of storms
And laughing at the bouncing waves.w
But Lomonosov takes pride not only in the military and political strength of
Russia; his nationalism is frequently expressed in the glorification of the
Russian people. Like noble patriots of the Petrine epoch, he marvels at the
abilities of our people, who achieved so much in the span of rime hardly
242 N A T I O N A L I S M
exceeding the life of one generation. The people, or nation, for Lomono
sov, denotes the whole population of native Russiansfrom peasants to'
the royal throne. Thus the nation is not limited, as it was for contemporary
noble nationalists, such as Sumarokov, to a particular order in society; yet
it excludes foreigners in Russian service, or Russians who are not native.9
The democratic, inclusive of every order, definition of the nation was
characteristic of the non-noble nationalist intellectuals in general. They
came from the people, and even those whose material ties with it were
decisively severed would neverin the conditions of eighteenth-century
Russiabe allowed to forget their origins. To ennoble themselves, there
fore, the members of the intelligentsia needed to ennoble the people, and
they insisted indeed that there was no difference between the nobility and
the plebs, that the very designation plebs was illegitimate. Translating
from Latin, Lomonosov used the Russian word rtarod (people or nation) to
render both populits Romanus and populus vulgus, although the latter
would usually be translatedand meantrabble (chern).9dOther mem
bers of the group manifested a similar egalitarianism. The novelist F. A.
Emin asked: Can anything in the world be more noble and reasonable than
the labor of a peasant? N. G. Kurganov insisted: We are all equal by na
ture, and there is not one who is to be honored more than another, because
God loves us all equally.99
This democratic sentiment was also expressed in the stress on merit, par
ticularly intellectual merit. Nikolai Popovskii, in a manner reminiscent of
Sumarokovs definition of sons of the fatherland as nobility, simply identi
fied intellectuals (lovers of science) with true patriots. Intellectual activity,
learning, itself became a virtue. Lomonosov demanded that peasants be ad
mitted to the universities and thought that that student is more noble, who
knows more, and whose son he is, there is no need to care. 100The theme of
learning (or sciencenauka) was, understandably, one of the commonest
themes in Lomonosovs poetry.10* Lomonosov owed his position in society
entirely to his academic achievement and constantly extolled science as the
primary legitimate basis of social status. However, Lomonosov was mainly
interested in learning for Russia, and not for its own sake. Even in his most
esoteric scientific pursuits, the motivation was profoundly nationalistic,
rather than purely academic. For the well-being of sciences in Russia, he
said, if the circumstances will require, I am ready to sacrifice all my earthly
well-being, and even more forcefully (sounding a precociously ominous
note): For the general good, and particularly for the establishment of sci
ences in the fatherland, I do not consider it a sin even to rise against ones
own father. 102
The non-noble intellectuals owed their elevation in Russian society to
their education, yet this was not due to the prestige of learning as such, but
to the function learning performed for the nation: with their learning they
The Scythian Rome: Russia
243
were better able to serve Russia. For this reason they demanded that Russia
recognize them; and for this reason too, they believed that they had more
rights to such recognition than did the foreign scholars in Russian universi
ties. The purpose of developing scholarship in Russia was to prove Russias
equality to the Western nations. Only native Russians could prove that
Russia was able to give birth to Russian Columbuses/ Russian Platos,
and Russian Newtons. In the final analysis, it was native Russianness
that justified the new status (or status aspirations) of the non-noble intellec
tuals, rather than their education. Their main contention was with the no
bility, with the nature of social hierarchy in Russia. They could not forget
(they were not allowed to forget) their origins. To achieve parity with the
nobilityto be simply treated with the respect their education taught them
to craveit was essential for them to define the nation in such a way as to
include in it both the nobility and the populus vulgus. By what right was the
latter to be thus elevated? The only thing it ostensibly shared with the Rus
sian nobility was its nativity. This, as well as the preponderance of for
eigners in the nascent Russian science, explains Lomonosovs bitter and un
justified hatred of German scholars at the Academy, and may help us
understand the nature of scientific preoccupations and some tendencies of
the Russian scientific ethos.
The intellectual pursuits of this first group of Russian men of letters seem
to be motivated by the desire to aggrandize Russian culture and make it
comparable to the cultures of Western Europe. The preoccupation with cul
ture derives from the professional identity of these people; the stress on Rus
sianis an expression of the ascendancy of nationality in their overall iden
tity. The efforts to develop the Russian language attest most tellingly to this
motivation.
In the beginning of the eighteenth century Russia had two languages: the
written Church-Slavonic, remote from everyday life and intelligible only to
a chosen few, and the chiefly spoken language of the mundaneRussian.
Both were inadequate for the expression of the new political and social re
ality; so much so that at some point Peter wanted to make Dutch the official
language of his state. Having, apparently, given this idea up, the great tsar
introduced, in 1700, a new, secular type (grazbdanskaia azbuka) and thus
laid the foundations for modern literary Russian. His decrees and the writ
ings of his close collaborators {for example, Shafirov) offer us a glimpse into
the process of the forced, active formation of the new vocabulary: these doc
uments are interspersed with foreign words with Russian endings and their
explanations in parentheses or on the margins. (Soon, using russified foreign
words, even for concepts for which Russian synonyms existed, became such
a vogue that Peter actually ordered one of such linguistic neophytes among
his high-placed servants to write all the official letters in pure Russian.) For
at least half a century the infant language, devoid of agreed-upon orthogra
244
N A T I O N A L I S M
phy and limited in vocabulary, lingered waiting for proper care. But toward
the 1750s it became the focus of attention and devotion of the non-noble'
intellectuals, for whom its successful development was a matter of personal
honor.103
The contributions of Trediakovskii and Lomonosov to the development
of literary Russian are well known. Trediakovskii was the one who pro
posed to make Russian rather than Church-Slavonic the language of Rus
sian literature. He advocated phonetic orthography and (taking as his ex
ample Russian folk poetry) tonic verse. He was also the first to argue the
superiority of Russian to other European languages. This argument, which
went counter to some of his earlier assertions, was articulated in the Three
Discourses Regarding the Three Most Ancient Russian Antiquities: (a) On
the Primacy of the Slavonic Language over the Teutonic, (b) on the Seniority
of the Russians, and (c) on the Vikings, Russians of the Slavic Name, Nation
[birth], and Language. The reason for the superiority of Russian was its
derivation from Church-Slavonic. Unlike German or French, which were
languages of the marketplace and politics, Church-Slavonic was a language
of the spirit. Why should we willingly suffer the bareness and narrowness
of French, asked Trediakovskii, when we have the varied richness and
expanse of Slaviano-Russian? Lomonosov, in On the Usefulness of
Church Books for the Russian Language, advanced a similar argument. He
was aware of the newness of the expressive powers of Russian and its recent
poverty: In ancient times, when the Slavic people did not know the use of
a written expression of its thoughts which were very limited for the reason
of ignorance of many things and activities known to learned nations, then
its language, too, could not abound in such a multitude of locutions and
expressions of the reason, as we read today. At the same time, owing to the
possession of its own Church language, the Slavic people, apparently, was
always linguistically superior to European nations that used a foreign lan
guage in religious service. German was very poor, simple and powerless ali
the time while Latin was the language of church service. But as the German
nation began to read sacred books and perform religious service in its own
language, its richness increased and there appeared artful writers. By con
trast, in Catholic regions, where only Latin, and at that barbaric Latin, is
used in service, we do not observe similar success in the purity of the Ger
man language.504The ultimate expression of Lomonosovs linguistic na
tionalism {and probably eighteenth-century Russian linguistic nationalism
in general) is found in the Russian Grammar of 1755:
Charles the Roman Emperor, was wont to say that one ought to speak Span
ish to ones God, French to ones friends, German to ones enemies, and Italian
with the feminine sex. Had he been versed in the Russian tongue, he would
certainly have added that it is appropriate for converse with ail of these. For he
The Scythian Rome: Russia 245
would have found in it the majesty of Spanish, the vivacity of French, the firm
ness of German, the delicacy of Italian, and the richness and concise imagery of
Greek and Latin .., The most subtle philosophical speculations and concepts,
the various phenomena and essences which express the visible structure of the
world of nature and the world of human intercourse, all these find in Russian
appropriate and expressive terms. And if something should be found incapable
of expression, the fault is not that of the language, but of our own capacity.105
The lesser members of the intelligentsia spared no effort to make the Rus
sian language correspond to this exalted image. A Ukrainian, D. S. Samo-
ilovich, emphasized the necessity of creating a Russian medical vocabulary;
terms which are not even known in Russian; at the same time, rather
inconsistently with the recognition of the paucity of the language which this
implied, he stressed the beauty and richness of Russian and quoted Lomo
nosov. Another Ukrainian and former seminarist of the Kiev Academy, Gri-
gorii Poletika, compiled a comparative dictionary in six languages, juxta
posing Russian with the tongues considered most famous and necessary for
the sciences. In general, ethnic non-Russians from the Kiev Academy ap
pear notable among the creators of the modern Russian language. When in
1762 the Senate requested people artful in the purity of the Russian style
and with a perfect knowledge of the Russian language, both persons who
fulfilled these stringent and at the time unusual requirements, Nikolai Mo-
tonis and Grigorii Kozitskii, were at one time pupils in this ancient institu
tion. But, of course, native Russians were equally devoted to the cause.
K. I. Shchepin, the first Russian professor of medicine, resolutely lectured in
Russian, though, as he confessed to deliver ten lectures in Latin is easier
than one in Russian.
The greatness of the nation hinged on the greatness of its language. The
awareness of the pioneering nature of their efforts and the newness of the
language which non-noble intellectuals tried to develop thus went hand in
hand with an immense pride in it and an unshakable belief in its colossal
potential. In 1773, Vasilii Svetov, the author of the Study in the New Rus
sian Orthography; called the language he and his associates were forging
the new-Russian [novorossiiski\ language and dated it back only to the
fifties or sixties of the century. But at the same time another member of the
group, Nikolai Popovskii, confidently asserted: There is not a thought
which could not be expressed in Russian. 106In the middle of the eighteenth
century this was wishful thinking. But thanks to the efforts of these anxious
dreamers, unwilling to put up with their inferiority, in just a few decades a
magnificent language did in fact emerge. Equal to any, it was to be surpassed
by none in beauty and power of expression. A newcomer to the world of
literary creation, it was to be the language of some of the greatest writers of
all ages, and when Russian patriots of later generations worshipped the
great Russian 'Word, it was no more a dream, but reality they worshipped.
246 N A T I O N A L I S M
Another preoccupation of the non-noble intellectuals was Russian history.
A half-educated Russian, wrote one of the first scholars to give this disci
pline systematic attention, a German historian, August Ludwig Schloezer,
takes to any reading with an unusual ardor; he particularly loves national
history. ifn Although some Russian noblemen (notably Tatischev) were in
terested in history earlier in the eighteenth century, the study and writing
of history as a long-range enterprise . . . did not really begin in Russia until
it was undertaken by German scholars who devoted themselves to it en
tirely. 108The first Russian historical journal, edited by G. R Mueller, whose
early appearance {in 1732) is a sign of the centrality of history for the incipi
ent national sentiment, was characteristically entitled Sammlung Russischer
Geschichte. The efforts of the German historians, however, did not satisfy
their Russian audience, and won them bitter reproaches and accusations
rather than gratitude. History was expected to bolster national pride, while
the pedantic scholars persisted in actually looking for facts. This difference
of opinion regarding the definition of the discipline furnished the specific
reason for Lomonosovs attacks on his German colleagues and eventually
led him to devote part of his energies to the creation of Russian history as it
should be. National history was such a science through which one could
best serve ones fatherland. It was the most important science for a citi
zen. If literature can move the hearts of men, said Lomonosov, should
not true history have the power to stir us to praiseworthy ends, especially
that history which relates the feats of our ancestors? Native Russian his
torians concentrated on those episodes in the national past which were in
spiring and heroic. When there were no feats to report, this was not good
history; and it was outright offensive if related by a Westerner.109
Patriotic historians were particularly upset by the so-called Norman
theory of the origins of the Russian state, which had been corroborated by
subsequent historical research. The theory pointed to Vikings, Scandinavi
ans, as the founders of the Russian polity, underscoring both the recency of
Russias political existence (that is, the vexing newness of the Russian na
tion) and the central role of foreigners, 'Westerners, in its formation. Russian
historians would rather see theirs as an original, ancient people, a conclu
sion to which they were led by the passionate desire to discover in the past
the reasons for self-esteem which the present did not provide, and which
they based on an ingenious but hard-to-substantiate linguistic analysis. It is
therefore little wonder that they found the discoveries of German historians
unsatisfactory. Mueller, reprimanded and reduced in rank for spreading
such unflattering information, but wholly committed to his adopted father
land, took his findings back. Schloezer, injured in his professional identity,
uncommitted, and annoyed, did not, and showed no compassion for the
sensitivities of his one-time compatriots. He represented the Russians before
the Vikings as savage, coarse, and dispersed and wrote: May patriots
The Scythian Rome: Russia
247
not be incensed, but their history does not go back to the Tower of Babel; it
is not as old as that of Greece and Rome; it is younger even than that of
Germany and Sweden. Before [the calling of the Varangians] all was dark
ness . . . they were a people -without government; living like the beasts and
birds of their forests, undistinguished in any way.110How could people
whose status, whose very human worth, depended entirely on the image of
their nation accept this humiliating portrayal? How could they, facing the
evidence, however limited their respect for facts, deal with it at all? Eventu
ally they found a remedy to relieve their mental agony. But, before its effects
could be felt, for decades to come, anguish was the dole of Russian nation
alists.
The I ncorporation of the Achievements of Non-Noble Intellectuals in
the Incipient Nationalism of the Nobility
In the last third of the eighteenth centurybecause of the pro-noble policies
of Catherine in education and service, and the fact that service as such was
no longer an adequate basis for the noble identitythe nobility ousted and
supplanted the non-noble intelligentsia in letters. For a long time to come
culture and noble birth were to become entwined, and the Russian intelli
gentsia is believed to have originated in the nobility.511The appropriation of
culture as an attribute of the nobility coincided with the eclipse of the estate
identity by nationality, which immensely increased the significance of both
culture in general and Russian culture in particular. In place of a trait sepa
rating blue blood from red, culture became the very bone of contention be
tween Russia and its model (which it had chosen and now could not tear
away from), all-important for the way I n which Russians, noble and non
noble, could see themselves. The educated patriotic noblemen of the late
eighteenth century devoted themselves to the task of elevating the cultural
level of Russian society and developing Russian culture. In this they drew on
the preparatory work of the non-noble intellectuals, taking pride in their
achievements and thus appropriating both the fruit of their labors and the
laborers themselves. The cultural elite of Russia, which was, since the time
one may speak of it as a reality, predominantly noble, in principle did not
distinguish between people of merit by family origins, and was open to tal
ent. Radishchevs Journey from Petersburg to Moscow concluded with A
Word on Lomonosov. In it the representative of noble patriotism acknowl
edged the kinship and the debt of his generation of patriots to the son of a
Northern peasant for his Herculean efforts in developingin fact creat
ingthe Russian language.112
Thus there occurred a merging and incorporation of the central ideas of
non-noble intellectuals with and in the noble nationalism. If Sumarokov,
however hesitantly, identified patriotism with nobility, and the humble grad
248 N A T I O N A L I S M
uates of the Academic and Moscow universities claimed this lofty virtue as
an attribute of the lovers of learning, the noble intellectuals of the late -
eighteenth century made all threenobility, patriotism, and learningsyn
onyms. Culture existed to serve the fatherland; it had no other purpose.
Novikov, commenting in his journal The Painter on the anonymous author
of the comedy Oh! Times {actually Catherine), wrote: Continue, sir, for
the glory of Russia, for the honor of your own name and for the immense
pleasure of your learned countrymen . . . to glorify your name with your
compositions: your [Russian] pen is worthy of equality with that of Moliere
. . . You first are worthy to demonstrate that liberty given to the minds of
the Russians is used for the good of the fatherland. In its turn, this patriotic
interpretation of the role of culture justified the claims of the men of letters
to the position of leadership in the nation, or their inclusion in (if not the
exclusive right to be considered) the aristocracy. Fonvisin lectured on the
subject in his journal entitled The Friend of Honest People, or Starodum: A
Periodical Dedicated to Verity (1788). I think that liberty to write such as
is in our days enjoyed by the Russians, he wrote, makes a person with
talent, so to speak, the guardian of the general good. In a state where writers
possess the liberty which was given us, it is their duty to raise their loud
voice against the abuses and superstitions harmful to the fatherland, so that
a man with talent can in his room, with a pen in hand, be a useful advisor to
the sovereign and sometimes even the savior of his compatriots and the fa
therland.
The belief that cultural creativity fulfilled a function of extraordinary im
portance for the nation early expressed itself in the celebration (including
self-celebration) of the intellectual elite. One of the first actions of the newly
formed Moscow University was the publication of the complete works of
Lomonosovthe Russian equivalent of all that was glorious in Western Set
ters. Derzhavin in 1796 prophesied his own immortality in one of the first
Russian adaptations of Horaces Exegi monumentum. In it the poet linked
his fame to the glory of the nation, confident that the former would live as
long as the latter and thus implicitly defining culture (literature and his role
in it) as the basis of national greatness:
I shall not wholly die, but a large part of me
WiH live upon my death, and will escape decay,
My glory will increase, without fading,
So long as Universe will honor Slavic tribes.13
The idea of the Monument was soon to be eternalized in the splendor of
Pushkins verse, and this confidence in the centrality of letters and particu
larly of creative writing for the nation was to remain a pervasive theme in
Russian thought.
Like their non-noble predecessors, the cultural'elite of the late eighteenth
The Scyrhian Rome: Russia
249
century concentrated on language and history. Endorsed and supported by
Catherine, their efforts led to the emergence of a culture whose resources
and possibilities were truly awe-inspiring and whose very emergence in such
a short time, and in place of a veritable desert,-was nothing short of mirac
ulous. Almost every writer of any stature wrote treatises on the Russian lan
guage. Significantly, many of them were not written in Russian, for they
were intended for the persuasion of foreign audiences. Kheraskov, who, as
the rector of Moscow University, made Russian the official language of in
struction, wrote Discours sur la poesie russe Fonvisin prepared a lecture
on the subject for the Academie Fran$aise. In 1783 a Russian equivalent of
this illustrious French institution was formed. The first contributions of the
Russian Academy to the common effort were the authoritative Russian ex
planatory dictionary in six volumes (published between 1789 and 1794) and
a grammar (published in 1802). As with the non-nobie intelligentsia, such
acts of the actual creation of language, which implied some awareness of its
incompleteness, were accompanied by expressions of unbounded pride in its
qualities. Catherine herself echoed Lomonosovs introduction to the Russian
Grammar (and, incidentally, Samuel Daniels prophecy of the glory of Eng
lish): Our Russian language, uniting as it does the strength, the richness,
and the energy of German with the sweetness of Italian, would one day be
come the standard language of the world. The most prominent writer of
the end of her reign {and of the eighteenth century in general), Karamzin,
writing on the English literature which he greatly admired, concluded his
comment, surprisingly, with a panegyric to Russian, urging, So let us honor
and glorify Our language, which in its natural richness, almost without any
alien admixture, flows like a proud, majestic riverroars, thundersand
suddenly, if need be, softens, murmurs like a tender brook and sweetly pours
into ones soul, forming all the rhythms which may be contained in the fall
ing and rising of a human voice.114
In 1803 Karamzin became the official historiographer and set out to work
on the monumental History of the Russian State. In its preface he wrote:
History in some sense is the sacred book of nations, the most important,
necessary one; the mirror of their being and activity; the record of revela
tions and rules; the behest of ancestors to their descendants; the supplement
to and explanation of the present, and an example of the future . . . If any
history, even unskillfully written, is pleasant. . . all the more so the national
[history]. A true cosmopolitan is a metaphysical creature or such an excep
tional phenomenon that there is no need to talk about him, to commend
him or to condemn. We are all citizens [herenationalists]the personal
ity of everyone is tightly linked to the fatherland; we love it, for we love
ourselves . . . The world history by its great memories adorns the world for
the mind; while Russian history adorns the fatherland where we live and
feel. llf The reign of Catherine witnessed extraordinary activity in historical
250 N A T I O N A L I S M
research. Russian antiquities and records were studied, collected, and pub
lished. Yet it is revealing that Karamzins History, the crowning event of this'
activity, and based on its achievement, provided an inspiration for the his
torical novel (Zagoskin, Lazhechnikov, Kukolnik), rather than giving rise
to a historiographical tradition and inspiring more interest in the study of
historical facts. The past as it was, was not found sufficient for the nourish
ment of national pride and failed to satisfy the burgeoning national senti
ment. It had to be rewritten as it should have been. Some Russian intellec
tuals tried that, and when rewriting history did not work, the Russians made
history.
Transvaluation of Values: The Crystallization of
the Matrix of Russian Nationalism
It was in the last third of the eighteenth century, when the abolition of com
pulsory service left noble identity hanging in the air, unjustified, undefined,
even more insecure than it had always been, and when the noble elite turned
to learning and national identity and claimed as its own the achievements of
the non-noble intellectuals and their nationalism, that the matrix of the Rus
sian national consciousness finally crystallized. The most important factor
in this crystallization was ressentimentthe existential envy of the West
and the values which were to constitute the Russian national consciousness
and later be embodied in the Russian national character were a result of the
transvaluation bom out of this ressentiment.
Intriguingiy, initially ressentiment took the form of hostility toward those
numerous Russians who were not as yet affected by it and persisted in their
unashamed admiration of the West. The recognition of Russias inferiority
led the sensitive Russians among, the educated elite (and those were the
people who both experienced the crisis of noble identity most painfully and
were the first to turn to national identity) to the realization that having the
West as a model must inevitably result in self-contempt. Karamzin, endowed
with an unusual talent for expressing what others perceived but dimly, after
entirely reversing his opinion in regard to the role of Peter the Great, wrote
in the Memoir of Ancient and Modern Russia (1810): While eradicating
ancient customs, presenting them as ridiculous, stupid, and introducing for
eign ones, the tsar humiliated Russians in their own heart. Can self
contempt predispose a person and a citizen to great deeds? n7The Russians
who naively admired the West were (or at least seemed to be) walking ex
amples of such self-contempt and undermined the yet~uncertain national
pride which,- as a component of identity, was to substitute for the shattered
individual self-esteem of the more thin-skinned members of the elite. Rus-
The Scythian Rome: Russia 251
sian Frenchmen, the petimetry, IIS became the chief objects of satire
which derided them with varying degrees of cruelty, moral fervor, and wit.
In satirical plays, poems, and sketches the imitation (and even admiration)
of the West was represented as embedded in such qualities of character as to
make anyone inclined to such imitation ashamed of himself and willing to
nip if in the bud. The eighteenth-century Russian intellectuals taught them
selves the social psychology of marketing and successfully marketed the re
jection of the West.
The behavior of the complacent majority who actually enjoyed the prox
imity of the West, instead of being tortured by it, must have been a powerful
irritant, for it provided constant inspiration for the best talents and served
as the focus of some of the most entertaining works of the time. The hilar
ious Misfortune from the Carriage by Kniazhnin depicts its Francophile
heroes, the gentry couple Firiulins, as complete idiots, who carry empty-
headedness to the level of high art; their idiocy, which is fortunately moni
tored by the fool of their small court, is-shown to have potentially disastrous
effects. In a scene from the second act, Firiulin and Firiulina exchange im
pressions from their native country to which they have just returned from a
sojourn abroad:
Firiulin: Barbaric people! Wild country! Whar ignorance! What vulgar names!
How they insuk the delicacy of my ears! . ..
Firiulina: I am amazed, my soul! Our village is so close to the capital, and
nobody here talks French; and in France even a hundred miles from the cap
ital everyone does. [The fool sarcastically congratulates them on being so
different from their own people.]
Firiulin [responds]: Ah, even we, we, ah! are nothing in comparison to the
French.
The fool: You should have indeed traveled abroad to bring back only contempt,
not solely toward your countrymen, but even toward your own selves.'!S
While lashing against their unconscientious compatriots, the committed
nationalists launched an attack on the foreigners in Russia. Lists of protag
onists in satirical plays usually included a German or French tutor, stupid
and puffed up, with an appropriate name such as Vralman.n0This other
object of derision also provided endless employment for the satirical jour
nals. Young Novikov placed the following communication in Truten
(The Bumble Bee):m
From Kronstadt: These days several ships from Bordeaux have arrived in this
harbor: on board, besides most fashionable commodities, are twenty-four
Frenchmen reporting that all of them are Barons, Chevaliers, Marquises, and
Counts, and that, being unhappy in their fatherland, for all sorts of reasons
touching upon their honor, they were reduced to such extremity that, seeking
gold, instead of America, they were forced to come to Russia. In all these stories
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N A T I O N A L I S M
they lied very little: for, according to reliable information, they are all natural
Frenchmen, skilled in all kinds of crafts and professions of the third sort. Many
of them lived in a great quarrel with the Paris Police, and for that reason it, out
of hatred toward them, gave them a salutation which they did not like. This
salutation consisted in the order to leave Paris immediately, unless they pre
ferred to dine, sup, and sleep in the Bastille. Although this salutation was very
sincere, these French gentlemen did not like it and for this reason they came
hither, and intend to become tutors and Hoffmeisters of young people of noble
birth. Soon they will leave here for Petersburg. Gentle compatriots, hurry to
hire these aliens for the education of your children! Immediately entrust the
future mainstay of the fatherland to these vagabonds and think that you have
fulfilled your parental duty by having Hired as tutors Frenchmenwithout ask
ing about their position or behavior.
Hostility toward the Russian admirers of the West, and 'Westerners in
Russia, signified the rejection of this ideal geographical entity as a model.
But it was veiled and not entirely consistent. Finally, the veil was dropped,
and the rejection of the West was expressed candidly as the rejection of the
West. Still, there were different levels of complexity. Onesimplemodal
ity of this attitude was that of undisguised and unreasoning hatred. The
reaction was aJcin to that of a wounded beast, blinded by pain and moved
by the desire to hurt back-, nothing was good, everything was bad. Fonvisins
Letters from Abroad, especially his opinion of France, provide us with an
illustration of what this was like.
The mood in which Fonvisin approaches Pads leaves little doubt as to the
nature of the impressions he would derive from his visit. Paris, he says
upon entering the city, this alleged center of human knowledge and taste. I
have not yet had the opportunity to find my bearing here; but I can assure
. . . that I try to spend every hour usefully, noticing all that can give me the
most accurate idea about the national character. He makes an effort to
judge with impartiality and notice both good and bad in the object of his
examination. Fortunately, what he sees soon makes it impossible to follow
this good intention. One has to renounce all common sense and truth to
say that there is not much of what is very good and deserving of imitation
here. All this, however, does not blind me to the extent that I fail to see as
much, or even more, of absolutely evil and such, from which God save us.
For a moment, his conclusion appears to be cultural relativism. In France,
he says, one learns very soon that all the stories of the local perfection are
lies, that people are everywhere people, that a really intelligent and worthy
person is everywhere a rarity and that in our fatherland, however bad it can
be sometimes, one can be as happy as anywhere else. But he does not stop
there. France is not as bad as Russia, it is infinitely worse. Having prepared
the ground by proposing a definition of the nation, which makes his analysis
a foregone conclusion, Fonvisin writes:
The Scythian Rome: Russia
253
My stay in this state greatly diminished its value in my opinion . . . Good
people, whatever their nation, compose between themselves one nation. Hav
ing excluded them from the French, 1observed the qualities [of the latter] in
general . . . A Frenchman does not have any reason and would consider it a
misfortune of his life to have one. . . a Frenchman would never forgive himself
if he ever missed an opportunity to cheat.. . His God is money . . . DAlem
berts, Diderots, in their own way, are as much charlatans as those I mew every
day on the streets; all of them are cheating people for money, and the difference
between a charlatan and a philosophe is only such that the latter to his greed
adds an unparalleled vanity . .. French nobility, for the most part, lives in ex
treme poverty and its boorishness has no parallels anywhere . . . With the ex
ception of the rich and the grandees, every French nobleman, with all his stupid
pride, would consider it a great happiness to become a tutor to a son of our
gentleman . . . [Impartial foreigners) say that in their army there is no military
spirit. Every soldier philosophizes, therefore, does not obey. . . A cattie-yard in
the holdings of our honest gentry is much deaner than [streets] in front of the
very palaces of the French kings . . . If I found anything flourishing in France,
those are, to be sure, their factories and manufactories. There is no nation in
the world which would have such an inventive mind as the French, when it
comes to arts and crafts pertaining to taste . . . This gift of nature has tended
greatly to the injury of their mores.122
So much for the poor French. Interestingly, Fonvisin was so annoyed by
France, that, in passing, he would even pay a compliment to England, if this
served to underscore the worthlessness of the chief object of his attention.
Equality, he said, is a blessing when it, as in England, is based on the
spirit of government; but in France equality is evil, because it comes from
the corruption of mores.123
These passages are an expression of existential envypure and simple.
This is ressentiment, to be sure, an unmistakable, typical case of ressenti
ment, but it is not as yet its creation. There is a certain pleasure in just saying
things such as these aloud, but they can hardly add much comfort to ones
existence. Hatred as such gave vent to the ressentiment of the first Russian
nationalists, but it did not solve their problem. The final stage of this devel
opmentthe construction of an identity with which one could live, the
flower of ressentimentwas-not undisguised hatred. It was a transvaluation
of Western values, the creation of a new, this time in every sense imaginary
model, and with it a new hope for Russia, a new image of Russia, a soothing,
comforting image, able to serve as a basis for individual self-esteem. And
this was the matrix of the Russian national identity.
At this point it might be helpful to recapitulate the stages in this complex
evolution. The Russian elite was attracted to national Identity because this
identity could provide it with the basis for status and self-esteem that nobie
identity failed to provide. The ability of the national identity to do this de
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N A T I O N A L I S M
pended on the successful development of national pride. But the growth of
national pride, which initially built up so quickly because of the triumphant,
miraculous rise of Russia to glory in the beginning of the century, was in
later years impaired by the proximitythe very existenceof the West.
Russians could not separate themselves from the West and return to the
times when its existence was a matter of indifference to them. It was the
West, the encounter with the West, that ushered Russia into the new era in
which it became aware of itself as a nation; it was Russias originally suc
cessful incorporation into' the West which gave its patriots the first reasons
for national pride, and it was before the West that they experienced it. The
West was an integral, indelible part of the Russian national consciousness.
There simply wouid be no sense in being a nation if the West did not exist.
Russians looked at themselves through glasses fashioned in the Westthey
thought through the eyes of the Westand its approbation was a sine qua
non for their national self-esteem. The West was superior; they thought it
looked down on them. How could Russians overcome this obstacle and
build up national pride in spite of the Western superiority?
There were basically three ways to do so. The first was to become like the
West, to imitate it. The choice of this way was predicated on the optimistic
belief that Russia could do this with relative ease,' and most of the eigh-
teenth-century creators of national consciousness subscribed to this position
at one time or another. Equality proving impossible, it could be seen as un
necessary. The second response was to define the West as an inappropriate
model for Russia, although it had merits of its own, because Russia was
incomparable to it, unique, and went its own, unrelated-to-the-West, way.
This was cultural relativism, a transient and inadequate position, because it
defied the purpose which called it into being. To admit that Russia and the
West were incomparable, that they were to be judged by different standards,
amounted to relinquishing the hope of gaining the respect of the Westand
there was no sense in being of value if it was not recognized by the significant
other. In other words, national self-esteem depended on comparability to
the West.
The response that proved the most viable was the rejection of the West
because it was evil, or ressentiment. Like cultural relativism, ressentiment
was based on a deeply pessimistic evaluation of Russia, on the recognition
of its absolute impotence in the competition with the West, but unlike cul
tural relativism, it was a remarkably creative sentiment, capable of unend
ing ramification, constantly generating and fermenting new sentiments and
ideas, a seedbed of ideologies. Because Russians had few indigenous re
sources to provide them with building blocks, the rejection of the West as
such, the pure ressentiment expressed in hatred, could not furnish the basis
for national pride and contribute to the construction of a viable national
identity. The Russians had left their pre-Western existence and would not go
The Scythian Rome: Russia
255
back to it. When in 1836 Chaadaev reminded them of this, his contempo
raries were shocked and he was declared insane;124yet the creators of Rus
sian national consciousness in the eighteenth centuryNovikov, Fonvisin,
Karamzinfaced, realized, and agonized over- exactly this issue. And thus,
unable to tear themselves away from the West, to eradicate, to efface its
image from their consciousness, and having nothing to oppose to it, they
defined it as the anti-model and built an ideal image of Russia in direct op
position to it. Russia was still measured by the same standards as the West
(for it defined Western values as universal), but it was much better than the
West, For every Western vice it had a virtue, and for what appeared as a
virtue in the West, it had a virtue in reality, and if it was impossible to see
these virtues in the apparent world of political institutions and cultural and
economic achievements, this was because the apparent worid was the world
of appearances and shadows, while the virtues shined in the world of the
really realthe realm of the spirit.
From the days of Kantemir, it was the political reality of Russia which Rus
sian patriots found most embarrassing: the lack of liberty, equality, respect
for the individual. It was this difference in the fundamental relation to Man,
not economic or cultural under-achievement, which militated most conspic
uously against the moral canon of the West, which Russia, eager to be incor
porated in this luminary family of nations, nonchalantly embraced. It was
also political reality which appeared most immune to change. This was the
eighteenth century. The West for Russia was France of the Enlightenment.
On the mental horizon vaguely loomed England, which France at this very
time was determined to emulate and surpass, in the process giving its values
the explicit and articulate expression they never had in the place of their
birth. Other European countries, especially the neighboring Germany, were
but imperfect reflections of France. America, the Land of Liberty, in the con
sciousness of eighteenth-century Russians, bordered on the imaginary, an
ideal construction rather than real presence, an embodiment of a principle.
But the principle was the same all along. The thinking individualthe com
mon man endowed with reason, and thus partaking in the nature of the
Deity was the measure of moral good. History had not yet revealed the fail
ure of France and Germany to excel in the English values; the Russians
could not have known that they were not alone in their shame. On the face
of it, their reality did seem so much more repulsive. It was rationality, the
reason of the thinking individual, which necessitated liberty and equality,
Russia did not have liberty and equality, and so it revolted against rational
ity, rejecting both the thinking individual and the faculty that defined his
nature. From the point of view of the eighteenth-century European elite, the
Russian reality was not reasonable, and the first Russian nationalists found
reason unpalatable. Reason as a faculty of the human mind referred to artic-
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N A T I O N A L I S M
illation, precision, delimitation, and reservethey opposed to it life so full
of feeling that one could choke on it, the inexpressible, the unlimited, the
hyperbolic. Reason had to do with calculation, reflection, predictability
they opposed to it spontaneity, the unexpectable, the unmeasurable. By their
very nature these qualities were vague, undefined. It was much clearer what
they were not, than what they were. They defied standards and were perfect
ingredients for the enigmatic Slavic soul.
The qualities of the Russian sou] were arrived at through the mental ex
ercise of posing antitheses to the existing Western virtues with regard to
which Russia was particularly deficient; and therefore in the beginning they
were as little present in Russia as anywhere else. But its possession was so
sweet, and its inventors or discoverers wanted so much to believe in it, that
this initially intangible entity materialized and, embodied in the national
character, became the most formidable and immutable component of the
culture that was emerging around it. Oh, how much did the enigmatic Slavic
soul store within itself! Nobody could see it, and yet it was irrefutable. No
body could deny the Russian nation superiority which expressed itself in the
world beyond the apparent.125
The stages of this complex evolution {from the first realization of Russias
inferiority, through optimistic acceptance of the challenge and different va
rieties of withdrawal from itcultural relativism and pure ressentiment
to the transvaluation of values) cannot be clearly separated and organized
chronologically. They coexist and overlap in various waysand continue to
coexist and overlap beyond the eighteenth century, although in different
measuresand are frequently found on the same pages as a reflection of the
authors struggle with the predicament faced by the Russian elite. These au
thors, the creators of the Russian national consciousness, oscillate between
the several positions, as if testing the powers of every possible remedy, but
they all eventually converge on the final stage of the transvaluation, as the
only viable solution to their problem. The rejection of reason runs through
all these searching writings, as it does, later, through assertions of the Rus
sian national character.
At the end of the eighteenth century, this rejection is specific. The value'of
reason is retained, but reason either is defined in a French way, as the
true philosophy, or becomes closely akin to the Hegelian Geist, the Spirit of
the Age or the Nation. What is rejected is the faculty of the human mind,
the ability that creates the individual. In the nineteenth century, it is the in
dividual that becomes the central object of attack, but the eighteenth-
century pioneers concentrate on the pernicious attribute itself and oppose it
to the soul in comparison with which it is worthless- Fonvisin, in a detached
but loving description of himself, confesses with pride: Nature endowed
me with a keen intelligence, but did not give me any common sense [zdra-
vogo rassudka]?' Ah! exclaims Karamzin with evident self-satisfaction, I
The Scythian Rome: Russia 257
sometimes shed tears, and arn not ashamed of them! Elsewhere he advises
aspiring authors: They say that an Author needs talent and knowledge:
acute, perceptive mind, vivid imagination, etc. [i proch.]. I grant this, but
this is not enough. He must have also a kind, tender heart. . . I am sure that
a bad man cannot be a good Author. Speaking through Starodum, Fonvisin
articulates this position in The Minor. My father repeated over and over
again he makes the worthy old man say, have a heart, have a souland
you will be a man always . . . Without it [the soul] the most enlightened sage
is a pitiful nothing [zhalkaia tuarJ Reason, on the other hand, is just a
matter of fashion and can easily become outmoded. What is there to be
proud of in having reason, my friend? Reason, if it is only reason, is a veri
table trifle. 126
Perhaps the most articulate early image of the exuberant Russian soul,
and the most explicitly contemptuous of the dull and cold reason of the
West, belongs to the pen of a minor poet, N. A. Lvov. The gigantic spirit
of our ancestors, he writes, appears in other lands to be an unnatural
exaggeration. And how could it help being so? In foreign lands all goes ac
cording to plan, words are weighed, steps are measured. There one sits hour
upon hour; then begins to think. Having thought, one rests. Having rested,
one smokes a pipe. Then, thoughtfully, goes to ones work. There are no
songs, no pranks. Among us, Orthodox, however, work is like fire under
our hands. Our speech is thunder, so that the sparks fly and the dust rises in
columns. 127The majestic prose of the nineteenth-century writers would
make the language of their predecessors sound like clumsy babble, but even
such giants as Gogol would but embellish Lvovs succinct characteristic,
adding nothing to the conception and in fact unable to conceive of the mat
ter in any other way. The nineteenth-century Russians would internalize the
fantasy of the eighteenth-century inventors.
The rejection of reason implied a reinterpretation of its corollaries in po
litical culture: liberty and equality. While Russian nationalists agreed that
the concepts denoted great moral virtues, they refused to see in Western in
stitutions their true embodiment. Western liberty and equality were not real
liberty and equality. These were something else. It was not entirely clear
what they were, but the pivot of the reinterpretation is easily established. It
was individual reason that was the source of all bondage: it stifled and con
strained the inner forces of spirit. And every expression of this limiting ra
tionality in economic or political institutions only exacerbated its deleteri
ous effects. Real freedom receded into the soul; it became inner freedom,
and political equality lost all meaning. Fonvisin was among the first to point
to the crucial difference between the real and the apparent. In his letters to
N. I. Panin (1778) he wrote: Observing the condition of the French nation,
I learned to discern liberty by law and real liberty. Our people does not have
the first, but enjoys the latter in many ways. In contrast, the French, having
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N A T I O N A L I S M
the right of liberty, live in veritable slavery. But it was Derzhavin who, un
selfconsciously, gave Russian liberty and equality a concise but articulate
poetic definition. Blessed is the people, he said in The Grandee, which,
like the Russian people, sees happinessin unity/ equalityin equity/ and
libertyin the ability to control ones passions! (V edinodusbiiblazhen-
stvo! Vo pmvosudiiravenstvo!Svoboduvo uzde strastei!}.m
One final step had to be taken before the transvaluation of the Western
canon could crystallize as the Russian national consciousness. The back
wardness of Russia meant the immaturity and underachievement of its civi
lization by Western standards. The Russian patriots connected the abomi
nation of reason to too much civilizationa curse they were sparedand
interpreted the latter as separation from vital, primeval forces, of which they
had to spare. (While, in the course of the eighteenth century, it was many
times emphasized that backwardness was not necessarily an obstacle on the
road to greatness, this intellectual somersault, making virtue_out of neces
sity, turned backwardness into a guarantee of greatness.) jAt this juncture
the Russian nationalist elite discovered, or perhaps invented, the people,
which determined the criteria of membership in the nation and led to its
definition as an ethnic collectivity. For they connected the spiritual virtues of
the Russian soul: spontaneity and feeling, to these vital forces: blood and
soil. The people, which the elite eventually made the centra! object of col
lective worship, was a mental construct, the conclusion of a syllogism. The
soulthe sign of Russiannessderived from blood and soil. The people in
the sense of plebs, the toilers, animals uncontaminated by civilization, had
nothing but blood and soil. Therefore their soultheir nationalitywas
the purest. A corollary of this conclusion was that those who were not of
that blood and soil could not possibly have the Russian soulthe visible
evidence being considered inadequateand thus could not be Russian. The
Ukrainians, Poles, and Germans, who contributed so much to the formation
of the idea of the Russian nation, were by that time either dead or thor
oughly russified; Pushkin was able to disregard his Ethiopian, and Lermon
tov his Scottish, ancestors; and this racist verdict did not create a problem
for those whom Russia wished to call her own.
It was ressentiment, not social concerns, that fueled Russian national con
sciousness, and it was ressentiment, not sympathy for the peasantry, that
made the peasant a symbol of the Russian nation. The attitude toward real
(that is, existing in the world of the apparent) people was hardly sympa
thetic and for a long time remained inconsistent with this tendency to see
the peasantry as the standard bearer of nationality. Serfdom was not seen as
contradictory to this idea, and not until the nineteenth century did the views
appear which with any justification could be called democratic or egalitar
ian. The suffering and humiliation of the peasantry seemed to promote the
development of the Slavic soul, and soon came to be themselves considered
The Scythian Rome: Russia
259
its distinctive qualities, taking their place alongside spontaneity and hyper
trophied feeling.
The image of the peasantry changed considerably with the evolution of
the national consciousness. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, The
Honest Mirror of Youth instructed its tender readers: The serfs are by their
nature uncivil, obstinate, shameless, and proud: for this reason they should
be restrained, subdued, and humiliated. The young gentlemen were advised
to converse among themselves in foreign tongues to distinguish themseives
from peasants and other ignorant blockheads, and also because peasants
were naturally untrustworthy, garrulous, and indiscreet, and it was wise to
keep them as little informed regarding the affairs of their masters as pos
sible. In the late 1760s Novikov fought this attitude, lashing out against
landlords who treated their serfs inhumanely and did not respect them.
Oh, foolhardy! he addressed an imaginary culprit. Did you forget that
you were created a human being, is it possible that you abhor your own self
in the image of the peasants, your slaves? Dont you know that between
your slaves and human beings there is more resemblance than between you
and a human being?129The humanity of the simple people was glorified in
contemporary plays and journals. In their simplicity, they were more human
than their masters, who either persisted in barbaric cruelty and ignorance
unredeemed by suffering (like Prostakova of The Minor) or aped the cold-
hearted evil West (like the Firiulins of Misfortune from a Carriage,) and thus
they were more noble, they were truly noble, and more Russian than the
nobility. They had no manners, they did not speak French, they were spon
taneous and knew no limits in love and suffering. Truly, when they loved or
suffered dust was rising in columns. Peasant women can love too, wrote
Karamzin in Poor Liza, a pivotal work which announced the age of the Rus
sian novel, but one was made to understand that only peasant women knew
how to love. Interestingly, the image of the people was most exalted and
idealized in the works of writers like Karamzin, noblemen who wrote for
the noble elite. A raznochinets, M. D. Chulkov, who intended his collection
of freely interpreted folk storiesior the barely literate merchants with first
hand knowledge of the people, had a somewhat different view. Envy and
hatred, he wrote in one of the stories, are the same among peasants and
city dwellers, but as the peasants are more sincere than the city folk, these
vices are more conspicuous among the former.130Such realism was out of
place in the heat of the efforts to create the basis for the national identity.
The people was kind, long-suffering, endlessly patient, pure of heart,
never reasoning, and had a huge glorious soul which put the rest of the
world to shame. But it was best to keep it that way.
Already at the beginning of the nineteenth century serfdom was consid
ered by many intolerable, but it is surprising how slowly this sensitivity de
veloped. In the Memoir of Ancient and Modern Russia, Karamzin, con
260 N A T I O N A L I S M
cerned about Alexanders dissatisfaction with serfdom (the young tsar took
after his grandmother), wrote: In the community of the state the natural
right must give way to the civic right. .. [Freed peasants] will not have the
land, which (indisputably) is the property of the nobility . . . [The tsar]
wants to make peasants happy with freedom, but what if freedom interferes
with the good of the state? And is it certain that the peasants will be happy,
freed of their landlords, but sacrificed to their own vices, middlemen, and
dishonest judges? Fonvisin, who also had his share in the celebration of the
people, nevertheless considered any notion of equality (that would in
clude it) as absurd. He reported from France, as a most curious incident, the
following: [The governor of Montpellier, Comte PerigordJ has a box in
the theater. Usually there is a soldier on guard at its door, to show respect to
the person [of the Comte]. Once when the box was full of the best people
in the city, the guard, bored to stand at his place, left the door, took a chair,
and, having placed it near the seats of all the noble persons, sat down to
watch the comedy, holding the gun in his hands. A Chevalier of St. Louis,
the major of his regiment, was sitting beside him. I was astonished at the
impertinence of the soldier and the silence of his commander, and took the
liberty to inquire of the latter: Why did the soldier join him like that? Cest
quil est curieux de voir la contedie, answered he with such an expression as
if he did not regard this as in any measure peculiar.131For the astonished
Fonvisin this, evidently, was more than peculiar, and he was not an excep
tion among his countrymen. In eighteenth-century Russia, the hierarchical
view of society' did not as yet interfere with the view of the people as the
true nation.
With the discovery of the people the period of gestation of the Russian
national consciousness ended. When the eighteenth century drew to a close,
the matrix in which all the future Russians would base their identity was
complete and the sense of nationality born. It was a troubled child, but the
agony of birth was over, and the baby could not be pushed back. For the
time to come, it would determine the course of Russian history.
The Two-Headed Eagle
The ingredients of the Russian national consciousness, and the definition of
the Russian nation, were already present by 1800. Between that date .and
1917 the components of this living, self-proliferating whole were in many
ways articulated, refined, reconceptualized, and acted outbut never essen
tially modified. I do not see one single exception to this generalization
among the multitude of extraordinary, complex people who participated in
this process.132The cognitive construct born out of the anguish and humili
ation of the eighteenth-century elite became the identity of its nineteenth-
The Scythian Rome: Russia
261
century descendants; it defined them; they could no more escape it than
jump out of their skin; and when it was not reflected in their writings, it was
reflected in their lives.
The Russian national idea consisted in the following: The nation was (1)
defined as a collective individual, (2) formed by ethnic, primordial factors
such-as blood and soil, and {3}characterized by the enigmatic soul, or spirit.
The spirit of the nation resided in the people, but, rather paradoxically,
was revealed through the medium of the educated elite, who, apparently,
had the ability to divine it. The rejection of the common thinking individual,
which expressed itself in the glorification of his opposite, the community,
also led to the emphasis on special, uncommon individuals, the prophets
and divines of the national spirit, and as a result the adoration of the
people frequently found its counterpart in elitism and contempt for the
dumb masses. The special individuals, who knew what the people
wanted, naturally had the right to dictate to the masses, who did not know.
Russian nationalism was ethnic, collectivistic, and authoritarian.
Constructed in this manner, Russian national identity provided the
ground for individual self-esteem; on the face of it, the comparison with the
West was moved to a new plane where Russia, by definition, was in no way
inferior. Unfortunately, the West remained the significant other for Russia
and was still an absolutely necessary condition for the successful formation
and sustenance of national pride; the paramount motivation within the
framework of thus-defined national identity was still winning its approba
tion. Again and again, eager to prove its worth, Russia was forced to con
front the West on its own ground, only to return, humiliated, to the world
of inner glory, where it licked its wounds and thought of revenge. The very
same drama was constantly reenacted; it is possible that it is being reenacted
right now.
The Decembrist uprising of 1825 was the last dramatic and unadulterated
expression of optimism and confidence that Russia could and would catch
up with the West. Generated by the victory over Napoleon, in which Russia
played such a prominent role, and an aspect of the general upsurge of na
tionalism and triumphant national pride in its train, this optimism ex
pressed itself in the sense of urgency to close the gapwhich at that moment
appeared small and such that it could be easily closedbetween Russia and
Europe. This optimism was further inspired by the liberalism of the reigning
monarch, Alexander I, who not only represented an object of national pride
himself,*33but seemed to encourage the boldest political aspirations of his
subjects. Emperor Alexander promised us much, wrote one of the De
cembrists, Peter Kahovsky; in his testimony, he, it could be said, enor
mously stirred the minds of the people toward the sacred rights of humanity.
Later he changed his principles and intentions. The situation immediately
leading to the uprising was a clear case of explosive frustration with reality
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N A T I O N A L I S M
resulting from inflated expectations, and the inability to tolerate what
seemed to be the few remaining obstacles on the way to their fulfillment, an
ominous psychological predicament described so well by Tocqueville in An-
den regime. The Decembrist uprising was indeed not unlike a mini-French
Revolution. There was a fundamental similarity in motivation. The Russian
rebels wanted to propei their country into equality with Europe in the same
way the optimistic French wanted to wrestle the palm of world leadership
from the hands of the English. In both cases the goal seemed easily achiev
able. Napoleon invaded Russia and then only, for the first time, did the
Russian people become aware of their power, wrote Alexander Bestuzhev
to Nicholas I; only then awakened in all our hearts a feeling of indepen'
dence, at first political and finally national. That is rhe beginning of free
thinking in Russia. The government itself spoke such words as Liberty,
Emancipation! . . . the military men began to talk: Did we free Europe in
order to be ourselves placed in chains? Did we grant constitution to France
that we dare not talk about it, and did we buy at the price of blood priority
among nations in order that we might be humiliated at home? . .. we, in
spired by such a situation in Russia and seeing the elements ready for
change, decided to bring about a coup detat. There was also the similarity
of models. The American Revolution, which from afar seemed to be the
result of a successful divination of the Spirit of the Age, of which the Russian
elite thought itself as capable as the French, and was a challenge to menac
ing Europe, went into the heads of the future rebels. Kahovsky wrote: We
are witnesses of great events. The discovery of the New World and the
United States, by virtue of its form of government, have forced Europe into
rivalry with [America], The United States will shine as an example even to
distant generations. The name o Washington, the friend and benefactor of
the people, will pass from generation to generation; the memory of his de
votion to the welfare of the Fatherland will stir the hearts of citizens. But
Russia was no America.
The story told to Your Excellency, protested Kahovsky in his letter to
General Levashev, that, in the uprising of December 14 the rebels were
shouting Long live the Constitution! and that people were asking What is
Constitution, the wife of His Highness the Grand Duke [Constantin]? is not
true. It is an amusing invention. We know too well the meaning of a consti
tution and we had a word that would equally stir the hearts of all classes
l i b e r t y ! 134Yet, somehow the story refused to die, and even if it was just a
cruel joke, we have learned since then that Russian jokes are not the least-
accurate reflections of Russian reality. Russia was not ready for Liberty
European-style; it fell dismally short of its ideal, and the confidence which
inspired the Decembrists to wish equality with the West was buried together
with their hopes.
The principal contribution of the nineteenth century to the Russian na
The Scythian Rome: Russia
163
tionalist tradition was embedded in deep pessimism regarding Russias abil
ity to emulate and become equal to the West, This contribution was inherent
in the matrix and represented its ramification or differentiation into what
ostensibly were two opposing currents of thought, but were actually two
sides of one current. Expanding the terms used to designate a pivotal in
stance of this differentiation, we may call these traditions Westernism and
Slavophilism. These were to remain the chief alternating approaches to the
confrontation with the West, or responses to its persisting superiority, until
our day.
Facts do not speak; people do. And thus, Lenin notwithstanding, not the
Decembrists and their failure awakened Herzen and with him all the others,
but, according to Herzens own testimony, The First Philosophical Letter
of Chaadaev, which rang like a shot in the dark night. Chaadaev, wrote
R. T, McNally, stands utterly alone in the history of Russian thought, a
fascinating exception to almost any generalization that can be made about
it. ^ This is true, although Chaadaev most certainly was a product of his
native soil. Its influence was clearly evident in his major preoccupation, the
place of Russia vis-a-vis the West; in his concept of the nation, peoples are
moral beings just as individuals are;136in his emphasis on the spiritual; and
in his very intensity. Page after page of his long Philosophical Letter51is a
testimony to his profound concern for the moral image of his nation; he
recognizes its inadequacy and is humiliated and pained by it. The letter is an
indictment of Russian reality; it is an indictment of a passionate patriot, not
unlike the indictments which can be found in the writings of other Russian
patriots before and after him, and remarkably similar to Marxs indictment
of the German reality in the Introduction to the Contribution to Hegels
Philosophy of Right. Chaadaevs judgment is harsh, but his uniqueness lies
not in that he lacerated the abscess, but in that he failed to provide an anes
thetic. He did not believe in the possibility of a fast cure.
The picture of Russia Chaadaev paints is depressing:
One of rhe most deplorable things in our unique civilization is that we are still
just beginning to discover truths which are trite elsewhere. . . Placed, as it were,
outside of the limes, we have not been affected by the universal education of
mankind . . . Our history experienced nothing remotely similar to this age of
exuberant activity, this exalted play of the moral powers of the people . . . We
have absolutely no universal ideals . . . Even in our glances I find that there is
something strangely vague, cold, uncertain, resembling somewhat the features
of people placed at the lowest rung of the social ladder . , , Alone in the world,
we have given nothing to the world, taken nothing from the world, bestowed
not even a single idea upon the fund of human ideas, contributed nothing to the
progress of the human spirit, and we have distorted all progressivity which has
come to us . . . One time, a great man wanted to civilize us, and in order to give
us a foretaste of enlightenment, he threw us the cloak of civilization: we took
264
N A T I O N A L I S M
the cloak but dicf not so much as touch civilization . . . today .. . we do not
amount to a thing in the intellectual order. I cannot stop being dumbfounded
by this void and this surprising solitude of our social existence.
To this gloomy reality Chaadaev opposes Europe, its ideas of duty, justice,
law, and order. He dismisses the possibility of other ideals. Do you be
lieve, he asks, that Abyssinian Christianity or Japanese civilization will
produce the world order which I discussed before and which is the ultimate
destiny of mankind? Do you believe that these absurd aberrations of divine
and human truths will cause heaven to descend upon earth? His Eurocen-
trism is uncompromising.. [The] sphere in which the Europeans live [is] the
only one in which humanity can achieve its final destiny, he insists; despite
all that is incomplete, vicious, evil, in European society as it stands today
. . . it is nonetheless true that Gods reign has been realized there in some
way, because it contains the principle of indefinite progress and possesses
germinally and elementarily all that is needed for Gods reign to become
established definitely upon earth one day.
If it was to become morally acceptable, Russia had no choice but to follow
in the steps of the Westto try, not to surpass, but to be like it. And there
was no certainty that the goal would be achieved. Even though Chaadaev
shared the missionary vision which characterized all European national
isms, he remained pessimistic and uncertain. We are one of those nations,
he mused, which does not seem to form an integral part of humanity, but
which exists only to provide some great lesson for the world. The lesson
which we are destined to provide jvill assuredly not be lost, but who knows
when we shall find ourselves amid humanity and how much misery we shall
experience before the fulfillment of our destiny?137
It is for thisfor this!that Chaadaev was officially pronounced a mad
man. Only mental derangement could be the reason for writing such non
sense. 138So thought the chief of the Secret Police, and hardly anyone (in
cluding Herzen, who denied this) disagreed with him. For one could not live
with the knowledge of such difficulty and insecurity. And it is in response to
itand to prove it wrongthat the two facets of the archetypal tradition
of Russian nationalism that were to shape the ways in which Russians until
our day relate to the world and themselves arose.
The Westernizer Herzen wrote upon the deaths of the Slavophils Khomi
akov and Aksakov: Yes, we were their opponents, but very strange oppo
nents: we had one love, but notan identical one. Both they and we conceived
from early years one powerful, unaccountable, physiological, passionate
feeling, which they took to be a recollection, and wea prophesy, the feel
ing of boundless, all-encompassing love for the Russian people, Russian life,
the Russian turn of mind. Like Janus, or like a two-headed eagle, we were
The Scythian Rome: Russia
265
looking in different directions while a single heart was beating in us.'139One
can comment on this formulation, but there is nothing to add to it. Slavo
philism and Westernism were indeed the two sides of the same set of aspira
tions and sentiments, one facing an image of the past, and the other that of
the future. The terms Westernism and Slavophilism were coined to
characterize an intellectual feud; this feud, however, occurred between
friends, people moved by the same concerns, who forever remained sympa
thetic toward the seemingly opposing views of their opponents. Westernism
and Slavophilism were very much alike; they differed in emphasis and in
mood more than in anything else.1
Both Westernism and Slavophilism were steeped in ressentiment. Both
arose out of the realization of Russias inferiority and a revulsion against its
humiliating reality. In Slavophilism, this revulsion was transformed into ex
cessive self-admiration. In Westernism, the very same sentiment led to the
generalized revulsion against the existing world and to the desire to destroy
it. Yet the difference was that of emphasis. Both were Westernisms, for as
philosophies of ressentiment both defined the West as the anti-model. And
both were Slavophilisms, for the model for them was Russia, which they
idealized each in its own fashion, and whose triumph over the West both
predicted. Westernism saw the fulfillment of the ideal (Russia as anti-West)
in the future, following the destruction of the old world and beyond the
present splendor of the West, but it still accepted the direction in which the
West developed as the only way. Slavophils, on the other hand, placed their
ideal outside Western development and, in fact, outside history. They did not
have to go beyond the West to prove to it Russias superiority. It was proven,
whether revealed or concealed, by its very nature. There was nothing to do
about this. Slavophilism contained a streak of escapism, and thus it could
seem conservative. The Slavophils were not conservative; many of them
were critical of the reality which concealed Russias brilliantholyself
behind Western appearances, but they did not think that Russia had to de
velop to fulfill its mission. Westernism, on the other hand, was activist. Even
though the final triumph was guaranteed, Westernists were never averse to
helping it on the way. In its activism and orientation toward the future,
Westernism retained some of the optimism of the eighteenth century.
One observes a certain circularity in the intellectual and political move
ments of the nineteenth and eariy twentieth centuries, an attempt at political
reform, failure, and withdrawal. And, though Westernism and Slavophilism
cannot be clearly distinguished, they usually were found at the opposing
points in the cycles of thought and unrest. Schematically, the cycle would
start with the optimistic thrust to catch up with and surpass the West while
following its directionWesternism; with the failure of the attempted re
form or the frustration of the aspiration, the cycle would reach its nadir;
266 N A T I O N A L I S M
then the penduium would swing to a Siavophilic escape, revive national self
esteem by rhe loving contemplation of Russias spiritual virtues, and lead to
the upsurge of confidence, optimism, and Westernist activism again.
The solution that Slavophils proposed to the harrowing problem of the
difficulty and uncertainty of catching up with the West, so poignantly for
mulated by Chaadaev, was simple. On the one hand, not only the equality,
but the superiority of Russia was already clearly achieved (it was inherent in
the nation), and on the other, the West was rotten to the core and did not
deserve imitation. The days of the West were gone. It is painful to see,
wrote Ivan Kireevskii, what a subtle, but inevitable and justly sent madness
now drives the Western man. He feels his darkness, and, like a moth, he flies
into the fire, which he takes to be the sun. He cries like a frog and barks like
a dog, when he hears the Word of God. And this gibbering idiot they want
to upbraid in accordance with Hegel!
The superiority of Russia derived from the fact that it was not a Western
nation; indeed it embodied the principle opposed to that on which Western
civilization was based. ThisRussianprinciple represented the true aspi
ration of man (or should we say: his species-being?) and made possible true
freedom; it was the principle of the individuals dissolution in community,
and thus the one that expressed itself in trueperfectnations. For the
nation was, of course, a moral individual endowed with a unique spirit. The
principle was manifested with particular clarity in rhe RussianOrtho
doxChurch, Eastern Christianity, and in the peasant commune. Eastern
Christianity, now preserved for the world by Russia, was the original, and
therefore the true, Christianity. The Russian Church, in contrast to the
Western Churches, which emphasized the individual, was characterized by
sobornosf, which Khomiakov, the Slavophil theologian, defined as the
expression of the idea of unity in multiplicity. The Church is one, he
wrote; her unity follows of necessity from the unity of God; for the Church
is not a multitude of persons in their separate individuality, but a unity of
the grace of God, living in the multitude of rational creatures, submitting
themselves willingly to grace. It is hard not to be reminded of Marx, the
religious context notwithstanding, when one reads the following lines: A
man, however, does not find in the Church something foreign to himself. He
finds himself in it, himself not in the impotence of spiritual solitude, but in
the might of his spiritual, sincere union with his brothers, with his savior.
He finds himself in it in his perfection, or rather he finds in it that which is
perfect in himself, the Divine inspiration which constantly evaporates in the
crude impurity of every separate individual existence. The same redeeming
qualities were found in the peasant commune. A commune, wrote Aksa
kov, is a union of the people who have renounced their egoism, their indi
viduality, and who express their common accord; this is an act of love . . . in
the commune the individual is not lost, but renounces his exclusiveness in
The Scythian Rome: Russia
267
favor of the general accordand there arises the noble phenomenon of a
harmonious, joint existence of rational beings (consciousness): there arises
a brotherhood, a communea triumph of human spirit Freedom was
freedom to live this principle; of course it was inner, of course it had nothing
to do with the outward world of politics. This enabled Slavophils to accept,
in fact uphold, the autocracy. Having understood after the conversion to
Christianity that freedom is only of the spirit, Russia continually stood up
for her soul. . . she knew that perfection was impossible on earth, she did
not seek earthly perfection, and therefore she chose the best (that is, the least
evil) form of government and held to it constantly without considering it
perfect The comparison between Russian and Western political structure
underscored the idyllic character of the former: In the foundation of the
Western state: violence, slavery, and hostility. In the foundation of the Rus
sian state: free will, liberty, and peace. 141And since the Russian people
expressed the essence of humanity itself, it was not a people like any other,
like Fichte of Germany, Aksakov spoke of Russia as a universal nation.
The Russian people is not a people; it is humanity; it is a people only be
cause it is surrounded by peoples with exclusively national essences, and its
humanity is therefore represented as nationality."142What an easy way out
this was! There was no need to catch up with the West; it was this pitiful
opponent who had some catching up to do; Russia was the opposite of the
West and so much better for that. Russia contained the salvation of the
world within herself; she preseved and held high the torch of humanity, and
the West was to watch her in amazement.
The Westernizers rejected the West without transferring their loyalties
outside it and without defining Russia as a non-Westem nation, or an em
bodiment of principles opposed to those of the West. They rejected the West
in its current, present state, which was the state of betrayal of its own lofty
principles, a decadent, rotting, aging stateand to it they opposed the
young, exuberant Russia destined to bring these principles to fruition. The
West was the only repository of history, it was the world. Following the
paths of development which have been trodden by all [emphasis added] so
cieties in historical times, with the exception of the patriarchal states of the
East, it has proved impossible o escape a proletariat, wrote T. N. Granov
sky, utterly oblivious of the fact that all societies with the exception of the
patriarchal states of the East meant at the most three countries in Europe:
England, France, and Germany. This embodiment of world history was now
leaving its task to Russia, the younger brother in the European family,
Opening before it a great and splendid field of activity. But though Russia
harbored great liberating forces, they were imprisoned within a distasteful
reality. "The Russia of the future existed exclusively among a few boys,
wrote Herzen, yet in them lay the heritage of December 14, the heritage of
the learning of all humanity as well as of purely national Russia. These
268 N A T I O N A L I S M
boys, thought Herzen, included Slavophils as much as Westernizers. The
leading characteristic of them all was a profound feeling of aversion for of
ficial Russia, for their environment, and at the same rime the urge to escape
out of it. But in the form of escape the boys differed, for in some of them,
the Westernizers, in addition to this urge there was a vehement desire to
change the contemporary state of affairs. 143Throbbing with indignation,
the Westernizers lashed at the present imperfections of their nation. With a
stupefying intensity, explained by consumption as well as the fiery Russian
soul, the furious Vissarion, Belinsky, sermonized in his Letter to Gogol,
the traitor to the cause of progressive Russia:
Yes, I loved you with all the passion with which a man, bound by ties of blood
to his native country, can iove its hope, its honor, its glory, one of the great
leaders on its path to consciousness, development, and progress . . . [But] you
failed to realize that Russia sees its salvation not in mysticism, nor asceticism,
nor pietism, but in the success of civilization, enlightenment, and humanity.
What she needs is .. . awakening in the people of a sense of their human dignity
lost for so many centuries amid the dirt and refuse; she needs rights and laws
conforming not with the preaching of the church, but with common sense and
justice, and their strictest possible observance. [How could one rest content
with] a country where there ace not only no guarantees for individuality, honor,
and propriety, but even no police order? .. . Proponent of the knout, apostle of
ignorance, champion of obscurantism and Stygian darkness, panegyrist of Ta
tar moralswhat are you about! . . . According to you the Russian people is
the most religious in the world! This is a lie!. . . Take a closer look and you will
see that it is by nature a profoundly atheistic people. . . mystic exaltation is not
in its nature; it has too much common sense, and too lucid, and positive, a
mind, and therein perhaps lies the vastness of its historical destinies in the fu-
ture.w
Enlightenment and humanity, human dignity, law and common sense, guar
antees for individuality, the lucid and positive mind of the people averse to
mystical exaltation! One would think that the next minute Belinsky would
start to speak English. But no. In his memoirs Herzen recalled an incident
with Belinsky arguing his point. In a friends house, in a conversation before
supper, Chaadaevs Letter came up and a certain pedantic Russian Ger
man in blue spectacles expressed himself quite negatively in its regard. This
irritated Herzen, and an unpleasant argument ensued in which Belinsky, en
raged, intervened. In civilized countries, replied the gentleman in blue
spectacles with inimitable self-complacency, there are prisons in which they
confine the insane creatures who insult what the whole people respects
and a good thing too. Belinsky , . . terrible, great at that moment. . . look
ing straight at his opponent . . . answered in a hollow voice: And in still
more civilized countries there is guillotine for those who think that a good
thing. 545So much for common sense, laws, and individuality.
The Scythian Rome: Russia 269
Belinsky said different things at different rimes,146but Herzen and Baku
nin rejected law with consistent vehemence. And there is little doubt that
common sense for them was a profanity, the very sign of the bourgeois
mediocrity of the present West, which so much insulted Herzen, and of the
decadence of Europe in which, as he said, there is no youth and there are
no young men. The individualism of the Westernizers had nothing in com
mon with Westernthat is to say, Anglo-Americanindividualism: the
commitment to the rights and liberty of the common man. Not for a mo
ment did they doubt that a nation is collective in its nature and that real
freedom is inner freedom. But the spirit of the nation and the principle of
freedom needed great, special individuals to reveal them, and it was the in
dividualism of these special uncommon individuals, men like themselves,
and their freedom unlimited by law and common sense, that Westernizers
craved. They wished the glory of Russia, but they despised the masses. 147
And since the masses were expendable, the solution Westernizers proposed
to the problem posed by Chaadaev, of the difficulty and uncertainty of
catching up with the West, was that of a cataclysmic event, a purifying con
flagration that would in one sweep destroy the West and the imperfections
of Russian reality, and from which Russia, with its spirit finally liberated,
would reemerge to enjoy itscrowningshare of historical greatness. The
idea of a Revolutionnot a Decembrist coup detatwas the Westernizers
contribution to the Russian national consciousness. Undoubtedly, they were
led to it by their activist, maniacal temperament. Unlike the Slavophils, they
were unable to sit with their arms folded and tolerate the spectacle of West
ern superiority; and under the crafty influence of ressentiment, Revolution
was the form taken by their wishful thinking. Six years before the appear
ance of the Communist Manifesto, in the Deutsche J ahrbucher in which
Marx was to prophesy the inevitable leadership of Germany, Bakunin,
under the nom de plume of Jules Elysard, announced the specter that was
haunting Europe: All peoples and all men are full of presentiments . . -
Even in Russia, in that limitless and snow-covered empire, of which we
know so little and which has before it perhaps a great future, even in Russia
the dark storm clouds are gathering! The air is sultry, it is heavy with
storms! And therefore we call to our brothers: Repent! Repent! The King
dom of God is coming nigh. And he advised: Let us put our trust in the
eternal spirit which destroys and annihilates only because it is the unsearch
able and eternally creative source of all life. The passion for destruction is
also a creative passion! Herzen was not at alt certain what the results of the
Revolution he welcomed would be. Most of the time he was only moder
ately optimistic. "The Chinese shoes of German make in which Russia has
hobbled for a hundred and fifty years, though they have caused many pain
ful corns, have evidently not crippled her bones, since whenever she has had
a chance of stretching her limbs, the result has been the exuberance of fresh
270 N A T I O N A L I S M
young energies. That does not guarantee the future, but it does make it ex
tremely possible. Yet he could not live with uncertainty and would rather
have the end of the world than prolong it. In 1858, looking at Russia from
the other shore, he wrote from London: Where are we going? Very pos
sibly toward a terrible jacquerie, toward a mass rising of the peasants. We
do not want this at all and state this, but, on the other hand, slavery and the
condition of excruciating uncertainty in which the country is at present are
even worse than a jacquerie,ws Of course, on the one scale were just thou
sands of human lives, while on the other lay the weighty matter of suffering
national pride.
Finding expression under the most diverse guises and names, the two tra
ditions have formed the substance of Russian national sentiment ever since.
There was no clear demarcation in the minds of people between Slavophil
ism and Westernism. Before the split Ivan Kireevskii was a devoted admirer
of the West and edited a journal entitled The European. Herzen ended as a
Slavophil. Chemyshevskii was a Westernizer; Narodnichestvo, a reincarna
tion of Slavophilism, sprang out of his ideas. The first Russian Marxists
the arch-Westernizerswere disillusioned Narodniks. The two currents,
united by the spirit of Holy Russia and the rejection of the West, were one.
They continued to exist side by side, upheld interchangeably in an unending
oscillation between hope and withdrawal. And in the best Romantic tradi
tion of striving toward unity in multiplicity, one could be a Westemizer in
the morning, a Slavophil in the afternoon, and criticize after dinner.
Westernism asserted itself in the conflagration of 1917. The fundamental
motivation of the Revolution, the imperative of Marxism, was the destruc
tion of the world order that had betrayed its own first principles. However
unclear it might have been about the new world that would emerge from the
debris, the ideology guaranteed success in what mattered mostthe de
struction of the perfidious West; and if the price of that was self-destruction,
this was not too high a price. In the desperate bid to escape the anguish of
their inferiority {they believed, in an attempt to save the world), Russian
Westernizers were willing to begin with the destruction of the Russia that
was. So urgent was their desire for national self-esteem that for some time
they let their Russian identity be eclipsed by the sense of cosmic brother
hood Russia represented as a universal nation. To the old world, the world
of national oppression, national squabbles, and national isolation, the
workers counterpose a new world of united working people of all nations,
declared Lenin. I have no doubt that he sincerely believed that the mask of
proletariat, designed by Marx to cover the face of Germany when it sacks
wKat was the West for him, and now worn by the Bolsheviks, was not a
mask but their true face. But in his very advocacy of the sudden Russian
internationalism, Lenin clarified the national sentiment behind it. In the es
say On the National Pride of the Great Russians, directed against persist
The Scythian Rome: Russia
271
ing nationalists within and outside the revolutionary ranks, the leader
wrote:
Ir is unbecoming to us, representatives of the dominant nation of the East of
Europe and a good deal of Asia, to forget about the enormous significance of
the>national question , . . Are we, the Great Russian socially conscious proletar
ians, devoid of national pride? Of course not! We love our language and our
motherland; more than with anything else we are preoccupied with raising its
working masses . . . to the self-conscious life of democrats and socialists. More
than by anything else we are pained to see and feel what violence, oppression,
and degradation our beautiful motherland had to suffer under the hands of the
tsarist hangmen, nobility, and capitalists. We are proud that these oppressions
have met with a rebuff from among us, the Great Russians, that we brought
forward Radishchev, the Decembrists, the revolutionariesraznockintsy of the
70s, that the Great Russian working class created in 1905 a mighty revolution
ary party of the masses, that the Great Russian muzhik is becoming a democrat
and starts to oppose the priests and the landlords .. . We are full of the sense of
national pride, for the Great Russian nation too developed a revolutionary
class, it foo proved that it could show humanity great examples of struggle for
liberty .. . A people that oppresses other peopies cannot be free, so said the
greatest representatives of systematic democracy of the nineteenth century,
Marx and Engels . . . And we, the Great Russian workers, filled with the sense
of national pride, want by all means the free, independent, autonomous, dem
ocratic, republican, proud Great Russia, building its relations with its neigh
bors on the human principle of equality.. . Exactly because we want it, we say:
it is impossible in the twentieth century, in Europe (even if only Eastern Eu
rope), to defend ones fatherland by other means than through the struggle
with the monarchy, landlords, and capitalists of our own fatherland, that is, the
worst enemies of our motherland.
. . . if history will judge to the advantage of the Great Russian capitalism, all
the greater will be the socialist role of the Great Russian proletariat, as the main
mover of the communist revolution . . . The interest.. . of she national pride of
the Great Russians coincides with the socialist interest of the Great Russian
(and all other) proletarians.130
Few explicitly nationalist arguments are more telling than these pathetically
emphasized we too.
One of several great poets of the epoch, Alexander Blok, understood the
motives behind the Revolution in the same way and, in the poem Twelve,
gave it a mystical, deeply religious interpretation, evoking at once the fun
damentally Westernist aspiration of Russia as the Third Rome and its Sla
vophil imagery. The twelve are a Bolshevik patrol, but their very number
makes one think of the apostles of Christ. They are the representatives of
the new world. The old world is likened to a hungry, homeless mongrel,
who, together with the incarnation of the unjust pastthe capitalist or bur-
zhuigloomily watches the twelve marching by, and then trots after them.
I l l N A T I O N A L I S M
The dramatic ending of the poem carries the message to a soteriological
pitch:
. . . So they march with sovereign tread
The hungry mongrel trots behind,
At their headwith a blood-stained banner
. . . At their head isJesus Christ.551
To gain self-respect Russia took upon itself the burden of the worlds salva
tion. We take pride in the fact,5 wrote Lenin, that it fell to our happy lot
to start the building of the Soviet state and thereby usher in a new era of
history. The builders of the Third Rome set the most formidable empire on
earth on fire, and burning in it, stretched out their hands to what they called
the West, and begged for approbation. Their desire shook the world. But
the West, again, failed them.. It was powerless to change their reality and .
relieve the sense of inadequacy which tortured them. And while the revolu
tionaries escaped into the busy work of destruction, the poet gave vent to
despair. At the top of his voice he shouted: To Hell With You! He defied
and threatened the West, and cursed it. He believed that should Europe open
its eyes and recognize the achievement of Russia, the reality would trans
form. (And in the midst of threats and curses, he hoped against hope that
Europe would indeed change its mind and gratify the desire of his nation.)
In no other work of literature has the threat to and the defiance of the West
by a Russian been expressed with such striking, distressing beauty as in
Bloks Scythians.152
As an epigraph Blok chose two lines from a poem by Vladimir Soloviev,
Pan-Mongolism: Pan-Mongolism, though this is a wild name/ It does
caress my ears. The poem itself developed the theme.
There are millions of you, but multitudes of us.
Come try and overcome us!
Yes, we are Scythians! Yes, Asians we are
With squint and lusty eyes!
For youthe centuries, for usone hour.
Like slaves, obeying and abhorred,
We held the shield between the warring breeds
Of Europe and the raging Mongol horde!. . . \
For centuries your eyes were toward the East.
Our pearls you hoarded in your chests, ]
And mockingly you bode the day
When you could aim your canons at our breasts.
The time has come. Disaster beats its wings.
With every day the insults grow.
The hour will strike, and without ruth ]
Your proud Paesrums1 be laid low!
Oh, pause, old world! while life still beats in you
The Scythian Rome: Russia
273
.. . Halt here, Jike wise Oedipus, in front
The Sphinx and its ancient mystery!
The Sphinx is Russia, exulting, grieving,
Oozing black blood,
It gazes, gazes, gazes into you
With hatred and with love!
Yes, you have long since ceased to love
As our blood loves! You have forgotten
That there is love on earth
That burns like fire and kills!
We love all things: cold numbers burning chill,
The gift of sacred revelation.
We know all things: the Gallic reason
And the gloomy genius of the Germans . . .
We love the flesh, irs color and its taste,
Its deathly, heavy, fleshy odor . . .
Are we to blame if the embrace
of our heavy tender paws will break your bones?
We are accustomed, seizing playing colts,
To break their mighty croups
And we are used to tame
Slave women unwilling to submit. . .
Come unto us! From horrors of the war
Come to our peaceful arms!
Sheathe the old sword, before it is too late,
Oh, comrades, lets be brothers!
If not, theres nothing we can lose.
We also know old perfidies! . . .
To welcome pretty Europe we shall spread
And scatter in the thickets of oar forests!
And then well turn to you
Our ugly Asiatic face!. . .
For the last time, old world, we bid you come,
Come to the feast of labor and of peace,
For the last time to a happy feast
The barbarian lyre is calling you to come!
Ovid in Tristia described the Scythians as a terrifying, barbaric tribe: They
are scarce worthy of the name [of men]; they have more of cruel savagery
than wolves. They fear not laws; right gives way to force, and justice lies
conquered beneath the aggressive sword.154The Scythians were the nega
tion of civilization, of all Rome stood for, the embodiment of the forces of
darkness. The Russian intelligentsia of 1917 still knew its Ovid. Only in
utter exasperation could Russians claim the name of this savage tribe. But
even this act of defiance, against all rales of geography, implied that the light
came from the West.
274 N A T I O N A L I S M
Moved by the restless spirit born out of the agony of its elite, Russia
would never give in to despair completely. It would never give up hope to
become the superior 'Western state, to fulfill the promise of France, to be the
truly new New World; and in its bid for national greatness it continued to
build its ownScythianRome. Mandelstam called it a Hyperborean
plague. Fortunately, it is not a sociologists task to pronounce judgment on
history. (
C H A P T E R
4
The Final Solution of
Infinite Longing:
Germany
The concept of nation requires that all its members should form as it were only one
individual.
Friedrich Schlegel
There is perhaps no country that deserves to be free and independent as Germany,
because none is so disposed to devote its freedom so singJe-mindedly to the welfare
of all. The German genius is among all nations the one which is least destructive,
which always nourishes itself, and when freedom is secured Germany will certainly
attain an outstanding place in every form of culture and thought.
Wilhelmvon Humboldt
The German alone can . . . be a patriot; he alone can for the sake of his nation
encompass the whole of mankind; contrasted with him from now on the patriotism
of every other nation must be egoistic, narrow and hostile to the rest of mankind.
Fichte
I hate all Frenchmen without distinction in the name of God and of my people, I
teach this hatred to my son, I teach it to the sons of my people . . . I shall work ali
my life that the contempt and hatred for this people strike the deepest roots in
German hearts.
F. M. Arndt
National hatred is anyhow a peculiar thing. You will always find it strongest and
most violent in the lowest stages of civilization.
Goethe
Fortunately, we Germans are not Scythians.
Karl Marx
& Aj Cl
I he development of German nationalism differed markedly from that
1 of England, France, and Russia. German national consciousness
j L emerged significantly later; it was born in the Wars of Liberation
from Napoleonic domination in the early nineteenth- century. In both France
and Russia the sense of nationality was firmly embedded, and the idea of the
nation dominated political discourse by 1800; in England national identity
dated from the sixteenth century. The development of German national con
sciousness, however, was singularly rapid. One cannot speak of it before
1806; by 1815 it had come of age: it was a formidable presence and pos
sessed all the characteristics by which the world would know it. This devel
opment, from birth to maturity, in other nations took a century. The archi
tects of German national identity did not, as in other cases, come from the
aristocracy and the ruling elite, but from a peculiar class of educated com
moners, professional intellectuals. Their status was higher than that of the
middle class in general (which, on the whole, in Germany had no status to
speak of), but much lower than that of the higher classes, and thus they
found themselves marginalized, suspended between different social strata in
a society which did not, in fact, recognize anything between the middle
classes and the nobility. When it finally emerged in the early nineteenth cen
tury, German national consciousness represented the culmination of a long
and tortuous process of intellectual fermentation, continuously spurred on
by the oppressive sense of status-inconsistency among those who eventually
became the prime movers of German nationalism, and redirected at inter
vals by changing environmental constraints. Fundamentally a response to
the social situation of the educated middle class in the last quarter of the
eighteenth century, it was also the result of the confluence of several inde
pendent traditions, both imported (such as the philosophy of Enlighten
ment) and indigenous. The two most important of the indigenous traditions
were Pietismitself a product of the Reformation and the structural condi
tions of its spread in Germanyand early Romanticism, which was, among
other things, an heir to both Pietism and Enlightenment. The complex ge
nealogy of German nationalism and the overlapping stages in its formation
are represented schematically in Figure 4.
278 N A T I O N A L I S M
Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous
f actors f actors f actors
figure 4 Genealogy and stages in the emergence of German
national consciousness
I . The Setting
The Conception and Miscarriage of Nationalism
in the Sixteenth Century
The success of Protestantism in establishing itself as a legitimate Christian
religion outside the Roman Catholic Church was a reflection of the disinte
gration of the centuries-old authority structure of European Christendom,
known as respublica Christiana. It was this disintegration which provided
the opportunity for national identities and nations to emerge. Nationalism
and the Reformation, though springing from different sources, thus were
made possible by the same development. They emerged within a short pe
riod of each other and, as the example of England clearly shows, developed
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 279
together, Protestantism {however young itself, being a species of a familiar
genus) sheltering nationalism during its first vulnerable century.
The German development, initially, was similar to that of England. In ad
dition to the experience of the disintegration of the universal Church, Ger
many shared with England its exposure to the Italian Renaissance and was
the home of an important Humanist movement. The concepts which went
into the making of the idea of the nation, and the people able to articulate
them, therefore, were present in Germany, too. By the beginning of the six
teenth century, several important social groups in Germany also had reason
for dissatisfaction with the existing definitions of their social positions. They
were experiencing a crisis which could make them receptive to the national
identity. The success of the Reformation in Germany was to a considerable
degree due to the fact that it touched upon and provided solutions to some
of these pressing secular problems. That the sense of German nationality
failed to take root in the sixteenth century is partly attributable to the noto
rious weakness of the central authority within Germany, but is largely ex
plained by the fact that the crises of the groups that could promote nation
alism had been resolved through unrelated developments already by the
latter half of the century, thus eliminating the reason for the basic redefini
tion of the social and political collectivity and allowing the nascent national
sentiment no time to develop.
The confusion and disenchantment of the Babylonian captivity (1305
1378) and the following Great Schism delivered the authority of the Papacy
a blow from which it did not recover. It was permanently weakened, and the
stronger among the secular potentates, long weary of the Holy Sees inter
vention in their affairs, hastened to use this opportunity to weaken it further.
The concsliar movement which challenged the monarchical authority of the
Pope and opposed to it the ecclesiastical republic was one reflection of the
spirit of the age. The establishment of the vote by nations 1the groups
of representatives of secular and ecclesiastical princessymbolized the dis
integration of European Christendom and distinguished between its inter
ests and those of individual territorial entities. After the Councils of Con
stance and Basel, the previously Holy Roman Empire was referred to as the
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. Although, owing to conflicts
between the nations at the Council of Constance, the Papacy was able to
return to its old position, the rulers of England, France, and Spain in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were able to gain from it considerable
concessions and secure a high degree of independence from papal interven
tion in their affairs. Germany was far less successful
Germany at that time meant the territories loosely united under the name
of the Holy Roman Empire. Since the middle of the thirteenth century and
the demise of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, the imperial authority was unable
to assert itself against the combined strength of the territorial rulers; and the
280
N A T I O N A L I S M
latter grew increasingly aware of their own power. In their opposition to the
central authority of the Emperor, by jealous preservation of the elective
character of the imperial office, the princes inadvertently fostered the imper
sonal, modern concept of the polity (in this case empire) as a collectivity,
rather than as the possession of the Emperor, which only later developed
elsewhere, and claimed to be its representatives. The rift between Keiser and
Reich widened even apart from the efforts of the princes. The dynastic suc
cesses of the Habsburgs led in 1519 to the election of Charles of Spain as the
Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The capitula
tion of election which he had to sign sounded a nativist note: none but the
native German nobility were to be employed in German imperial offices and
only German and Latin were to be considered official languages.
While fearful of effective central power, the princes were equally unwill
ing to suffer the interference of Rome. The Golden Bull of 1356, called a
magna charta of German particularism, excluded the Pope from the elec
tion of the Emperor. The Pope negotiated with the most powerful of the
territorial rulers, and Austria, Saxony, Brandenburg, and Jullich-Cleves ob
tained certain privileges through separate concordats. Yet, on the whole,
papal intervention in the affairs of the Empire, including the territories of
the privileged princes, remained much greater than in the territories of other
European rulers, and this conspicuous discrimination added to the sense of
heaviness of the actual burden. Since the Council of Constance in 1417,
increasingly bitter complaints of the estates of the Empire against Roman
injustice were recorded in the Gravamina Nationis Germanicae (The Griev
ances of the German Nation).
It is no wonder that German princes showed so little zeal in aiding the
Roman Church to fight Lutheran heresy when it still could be fought. The
spread of Lutheranism was eventually to put an end to Roman tutelage in
all German territories, including those that remained Catholic, for with it
the Papacy was no more the vicar of Christ on Earth. The princes welcomed
this liberation, and it was a necessary condition for the emergence of na
tional identity, but they were unwilling to form a unified polity which could
serve as a framework for such an identity.
Another groupthe general nobility, or the knightswas more sympa
thetic to the idea of a strong and united Germany. In the latter half of the
fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries, this general German
nobility was in crisis. Several developments combined to bring it about. The
military revolution of the fifteenth century had deprived the knights of their
importance as the class of warriors. The significant loss of population and
the depression of grain prices following the Black Death in the second half
of the fourteenth century adversely affected those living off the landthe
peasantry and the nobility. Conversely, the cities were enjoying increasing
prosperity, the prices of industrial products rose, and, as a result, in Ger
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 281
man history the age before and during the Reformation was more of a
burghers age than any other age before the nineteenth century.2The
knights, as well as the peasants, resented the prosperity of the burghers and
blamed their own misfortunes on the monopolies and other new eco
nomic practices dubbed Fuggerei {from Fuggers, the most powerful eco
nomic'dynasty of the time), rather than on the Black Death. These practices
were seen by the nobles as perverse in the religious sense (as usury), and
as leading to the ruin of the German nation.
Another deveiopment which had an adverse effect on the general nobility
was the consolidation of power in the hands of the territorial princes. To
ward the end of the fifteenth century many of the territories had permanent
administrations in which officials, especially lawyers trained in Roman law,
replaced the untrained nobility. The knights resented the lawyers as much as
the merchants. They were also hostile to the centralizing policies of the
princes. Their opposition had an effect similar to that of the opposition of
the princes to the Emperor: the knights further promoted the modern con
cept of the polity as a collective enterprise oriented toward the common
good, rather than as the patrimony of the ruler. Furthermore, the sympa
thies of the knights lay with the Emperor, for his strength would curtail the
advances of .the princes seen by the nobility as encroaching on its traditional
privileges, unjust, and allied with burghers to ruin the nobility.
The knights, as men concerned with the common welfare of the German
nation,3shared with the princes the tetters hostility to Rome. In combina
tion with their imperialist aspirations, this insistence on the distinctive
ness of German interests vis-a-vis those of the Church formed a variety of
aristocratic nationalism, which was tinted by anti-capitalist resentment and
opposition to the formal law, and in many ways resembled the modern Ger
man nationalism destined to emerge more than two centuries later. The
ablest advocate of this precocious aristocratic nationalism was Ulrich von
Hutten, who, at the outbreak of the Reformation, was the most influential
writer in Germany besides Luther.
A Franconian knight himself, Hutten perfectly exemplifies the tight con
nection between the sense of insecurity and status-inconsistency of the no
bility and nationalism at its inception, and the reinterpretation of the griev
ances of a class as those of the nation. Such reinterpretation, which identifies
the plight of a specific group with that of the nationa much larger entity
and thus renders legitimate the attempts to redress the situation, makes pos
sible a solution to the problem in which the actual internal opponents of the
nobility become its allies. Hutten starts by fighting princes}cities, and law
yers, but ends up calling on everyone to unite in the fight against Rome.
Winning national freedom, rather than winning back the ancient privileges
of the nobility, becomes the goal and the panacea to all private misfortunes.
The foremost among those who represented the conflict with Roman Ca
282 N A T I O N A L I S M
tholicism and Reformation as a struggle for national liberation, Hutten,
parenthetically, associated national conflict with precociously racist conno
tations. He saw it as the continuation of the struggle between the Latins and
the Teutons, which began with the attempts of the Caesarsluckily frus
trated by Arminius the Cheruscanto subjugate the virtuous Germanic
tribes to their unholy rule.
Given the direct influence of the Councils of Constance and Basel on the
perception of the imperial interests as distinct from those of the Church,
which in the period under discussion was symbolized in the concept of the
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, it is likely that the 'nation
itself, when the concept was used by the nobility, had the conciliar meaning
of the elite and thus excluded most of the population. The nobility had no
reason to identify with and equate the nation with the people. Their
aim was to secure the consideration of the princes and to bar them and the
cities from further encroaching on their privileges. Thus the knights, includ
ing, probably, von Hutten, stopped short of developing modern nationalism.
For the most part, however, German nationalism in this period found
spokesmen not among the knights, whom even Hutten regarded, acidly, as
centaurs, butwith the notable exception of Hutten himselfamong
Humanist scholars and poets who came from the lower strata of society and-
belonged to the people. These German Humanists were among the earli
est groups of professional intellectuals in Europe, who owed their consider
able influence and standing in society not to inherited social position but
entirely to their education and academic achievement.
The early existence of a significant number of such men was made pos
sible in Germany, first of all, by its numerous universities, founded from the
middle of the fourteenth century on to create indigenous clergy, loyai to the
German rulers. Initially, theological faculties dominated the universities,
and, since the nobility found the positions of lower clergy unattractive, it
was chiefly the common people who were trained there. As a result, the
prestige of academic training was not very high. During the second half of
the fifteenth century, however, owing to the growing importance of Roman
jurisprudence and the influence of the Italian Renaissance, the secular fac
ulties of law and liberal arts markedly rose in status. The prestige of the
academically trained lawyers grew enormously, paving the way, for some of
them, to ennoblement, and this served to enhance the inherent worth of aca
demic training. At the same time, the spread of Humanism from Italy, which
saw in classical education an indispensable means for the development of a
cultivated spirit, prompted liberal arts faculties, which previously had
served the function of preparatory training for theologians, to assert their
independence. The Humanists were supported by Emperor Maximilian,
who crowned several of them {including Celtis, Bebel, and Ulrich von Hut
ten}poets laureate and appointed the first Court historian; this imperial rec
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
283
ognition undoubtedly contributed to the favorable view of learning. But,
similarly to what happened in England, France, and Russia, the chief reason
for the increase in the self-esteem of the educated was education itself. Many
important German Humanists came from simple peasantry,4yet they tended
to regard themselves as a natural elite. In the controversy following the pub-
lication of Johannes Reuchlins Eyeglasses, one could discern early examples
of the juxtaposition of the spiritual aristocracy and the plebs, which cut
across the existing social gradations, and which was to appear so often in
later centuries (La Bruyere in France, Sumarokov in Russia). Humanists
learned of the ideal of classical patriotism from the horses mouth; they were
likely to be patriotic in relation to the Holy Roman Empire of the German
Nation, and likely to adopt the inclusive, modern definition of the object of
their patriotism and equate the nation with the people.
As elsewhere, identification with the polity turned the early patriots into
zealous defenders of the honor of their nationwhich in the conditions of
conflict with Rome meant the defense of its honor against Rome. This de-
fense took the form of the reinterpretation of the comparison between con
temporary Italy and ancient Greece and Rome on the one hand, and Ger
many on the other; it was cultural, secular, and Rome, too, was defined not
in religious, but in national (geographical, political, cultural) terms.5
Clearly, many academics and clerics of peasant origin outside the narrow
Humanist circle, who had both the education and the reasons to advocate
patriotism and define the German nation as its people, did not do so. The
most important of them, Luther, had no feeling for modern nationalism
with its democratic overtones. Luthers message was given a nationalistic
interpretation by men such as Hutten, and the Reformer himself was not
averse to national pride and predisposed at times to violently xenophobic
fulminations. Yet he did not take the step that connected the separation from
Rome to the definition of the polity as a people. The "German nation, for
Luther, had none but the conciliar meaning of the princes and nobility of
the Empire, and in this sense he used it in An den christlicben Adel deutscher
Nation.6In his translation of the Bible, however, notwithstanding the fre
quent appearance of natio in the Vulgate* Nation appears but once, as the
rendition of the Greek ethnos, in the Apochryphal Stucke von Esther.7
But national consciousness everywhere was initially limited to a tiny
group of people- These carried it into wider sectors responsive to their mes
sage, and with the support of the latter, national identity would take root
and develop. In Germany such responsiveness existed within the influential
groups of princes and knights, and yet national sentiment failed to take root.
It was not the tremendous importance of religious sentiment at the time
which prevented the growth of German nationality, for, as we saw in Eng
land, the rise of Protestantism was the single most important factor in ensur
ing the successful development of national identity. Still, this failure to de
284
N A T I O N A L I S M
velop did result in part from the course of German religious history. The
religious struggle of the first half of the sixteenth century strengthened the
centrifugal forces within the Empire and played into the hands of the terri
torial princes, transforming their territories into tiny empires of which they
were the sovereign rulers. The nation-generating potential of Protestantism
was spent and lost in the institution of Landeskirchen. There was no possi
bility of posing Germany united in its dissenting belief against the erring
world, of saying that God put the Germans in one common wealth and
church as in one ship together, and of defining Protestantism (or even Lu
theranism) as a German national trait, and Germanity as Protestantism or
Lutheranism. Instead of contributing to the creation of a stronger united
Germany, the Reformation and the ensuing wars completed the process of
its disintegration.
Simultaneously the reasons for the possible responsiveness to the idea of
the nation among princes and knights were eliminated. The attentions of
Charles V, whose immense power and anticipated encroachment on the
privileges of the German princes made the latter apprehensive, were engaged
elsewhere. The German part of his possessions was left to itself, and even
tually the imperial authority deteriorated further. The Empire became less
of a concern for the princes, who wanted to weaken it, at the same time
when it became less of a concern for the knights, who earlier had preferred
to see it stronger, too. The position of the nobility in the territorial states
strengthened in the latter half of the century, and Stiindestaat, the duaiistic
state in which the princes and the estates shared authority, came into exis
tence. The population increased and the prices of agricultural products, ris
ing already since 1500, became very high and grew faster than prices for the
products of urban industries. The economic hardships of the nobility were
thus also resolved, and the decline of the cities in the period between 1550
and 1620 served to alleviate further the noble discontent.
Thus the conditions in which a change of identity might take place were
no longer present, and the nascent nationalism of the Reformation period
led to nought. This period left the future nationalists the cult of Arminius
and the Teutonoburg Forest, and the language of Luthers Bible, but two
centuries were to pass before this inheritance would be put to use.
The Early Evolution of the Concept of the State
The severe restriction of the ability of the Church to interfere actively in the
affairs of sovereign territories, which in England led to the transfer of sov
ereignty to those who claimed to represent the nation, in Protestant Ger
many, where viable national consciousness was absent, resulted in the emer
gence of absolutist governments; sovereignty was transferred to the princes.
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 285
The princes tended to regard the territories over which they ruled as patri
monies, and were coinbatted in this by the estates, which saw them as a
public trust to be administered for the common welfare. 9Gradually, how
ever, the princes adopted a new concept of state that was in greater accord
with the wishes of rhe estates. This concept of state, exceptional in many
respects and peculiar to Germany (for no concepts corresponding to it ex
isted and no corresponding realities emerged, either in England and the
United States of America or in France and Russia), was to have a profound
influence on the character of German nationalism. The state was in effect
defined as the princes office, or calling. In it he was obliged to serve God as
diligently as any shoemaker or peasant in theirs. He had to do so without
consideration for his personal needs or wishes, and had no right to recoil
from his responsibilities. Thus the state existed above the prince, and how
ever closely it was initially associated with his person, it was impersonal.
This notion had a special poignancy when the prince was a Calvinist, and,
indeed, it is at the Calvinist Court of Prussia that one finds an exemplary
model of this-worldly asceticism in government, embodied successively in
the Great Elector, Friedrich 'Wilhelm I, and Frederick the Great.10
Frederick William I wrote to Prince Leopold of Anhalt that he himself was
the prime minister and the field Marshall of the King of Prussia. Whether
he saw the king of Prussia as some abstract notion, the symbol of the state
(as some historians tended to interpret this remark), or simply wished to say
that he had no need for anyone to perform these functions for him since he
performed them himself (which was indeed the reason for the letter), it is
clear that he saw his kingship as a service to something far beyond his pri
vate interests. His son, who defined the king as the first servant of the
state, articulated the same idea. The eighteenth-century Hohenzollems, no
doubt, only carried to perfection the developments which had begun much
earlier. The first significant examples of the interventionist and regulatory
Polizeistaat are to be found in the second half of the sixteenth century, in
such Protestant states as Saxony and Hessen, and the system [of absolut
ism] reached an early and full expression, albeit on a small scale, in German
states after the Thirty Years 'War.11The responsibilities of the prince were
to ensure the spiritual and material welfare of his subjects, which were be
lieved to be dependent on the states power. The economic policies of camer
alism and mercantilism, as well as the dirigiste efforts oriented toward in
creasing efficiency in every sphere of life, were the result of this definition.
The concept of state as the princes office (in the sense of Beruf) had little
in common with the idea of the nation; to die notion of individualistic civic
nationalism, which presupposed citizenship in the sense of participation in
collective decision-making, it was in fact opposed, for it implied the non
intervention of the subjects in the affairs of the state and their definition as
an exclusive prerogative of the prince, whose calling the state, after all, was.
286 N A T I O N A L I S M
Yet the inherent absolutism of the original German idea of the state was
compatible with and even congenial to particularistic national identity, as
an identity whose source lay in the identification with a community. Unlike
the French state, which, once dissociated from the person of the king,
became synonymous with the nation, the German state remained a
separate concept. But unlike the equally absolutist and interventionist Rus
sian state (called, significantly, the governmentgosudarstvo), which
was never dissociated from the person of the autocratand later the very
specific agency of the partyand never as such became an object of loyalty,
the German concept implied such a dissociation and fostered the develop
ment of loyalty to an impersonal, secular political entity, the weil-being or
power of which, presumably, meant the common well-being.12
While the territorial state thus unwittingly paved the way for nationality,
the iingering national consciousness, left-over from the days of the Refor
mation, in the seventeenth century favored the territorial state as the focus
of national, that is, German, patriotism. This German national conscious-
ness, unsupported by any significant segment of the population, lived on
among the academics for whom nationality, being Germansespecially if
the German nation could be proven to deserve the respect of othersprom
ised more prestige than either their humble origins or their positions, earned
by education and scholarly labors, could secure. These patriotic academics
considered themselves Germans rather than Prussians, Hessians, or Han-
noverians; they insisted that Germany will live forever, 13and needed to
reconcile this claim with the reality of the disintegrating Roman Empire and
the growing independence of territorial states. This reconciliation was ac
complished in a kind of legal history, for example, in Hermann Conrings
De Germanomm Imperio Romano of 1643 and De Finibus Imperii
Romano-Germanici of 1654, and in Pufendorfs De Statu Imperii German-
ici, written in the 1660s, which presented the Empire as a national institu
tion vested not so much in the emperor as in the princes.14This view was
also shared by another small group of seventeenth-century nationalists: the
minor ruling princes, such as Count George Frederick von Waldeck. The
privileges and the special position (above the territorial nobility and for
mally equal to that of the princes of significant territories) of this latter
group were meaningful only within the framework of the Empire, and en
tirely depended on its preservation and viability. At the same time, the minor
princes were as little willing to increase the power of the Emperor as their
greater neighbors. The solution was the view of the Empire as distinct from
, the Emperor, the Empire without central authority but vested in its sover
eign parts as an expression of a common (ethno-cultural or legal) essence
and an entity larger than any of its parts.15
Apart from the lonely academics and rulers of tiny principalities, how
ever, no groups in Germany fefc the attraction of national identity as yet; by
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 287
modern standards of nationality, to quote Leonard Krieger,1* early modem
Germany shows . . . national semiconsciousness rather than conscious
ness. The age of German nationalism did not dawn until much later. The
important legacy of seventeenth-century thought for its development was
the impersonal idea of the state and the fact that a nation split into several
states' was not considered a contradiction in terms.
The Insouciance of German Nobility prior to
the Nineteenth Century
Thus, ideas which went into the making of national identity had existed in
Germany for a long time, but they failed to stir the people. The nobility, in
particular, remained indifferent to their appeal, though in all other cases in
this book, with the exception of the United States, where it did not exist, this
stratum played a leading role in cultivating and molding the national con
sciousness. The passivity of the German nobility in this respect is especially
striking, since after national consciousness developed in Germany, it was far
more respectful toward the nobility than was the case in England, France,
or Russia, and incorporated elements of the noble social code as those of
Germanness itself. The German nobility kept its aloofness as iate as the be
ginning of the reform period in the early nineteenth century and did so for
the simple reason that it was comfortable, satisfied with its privileged lot,
did not experience anything like the crises which ailed its counterparts in
France or Russia, and was not made by the circumstances dynamic and open
like its counterpart in England. In terms of its social position, for two and a
half centuries between the end of the Thirty Years War and the beginning of
the Napoleonic Campaign, it enjoyed a period of uninterrupted and by com
parison unusual stability. This stability, significantly, was not affected by the
eclipse of the Standestaat and the advent of absolutism. Politically, the es
tates were weakened and in effect deprived of a role in government. Yet,
otherwise the nobility remained unchallenged, with the gulf between it and
the rest of society as wide as ever.
It appears to be a matter of consensus that enlightened despotism, or ab
solutism, as the philosophes envisioned it, and many social scientists still
do, could never exist fin Germany], even if the rulers were enlightened,
because they were simply not absolute. The despots and the estates co
operated in forging the modern state, and in carrying out their reforms the
rulers used existing frameworks and relied on the nobility.*7
In Prussia the onslaught of absolutism was fairly vigorous. During the
century between the end of the Thirty Years War and the accession of Fred
erick the Great, the Hohenzollerns successfully augmented their authority,
severely restricting the participation of the nobility as a corporate group in
288 N A T I O N A L I S M
the affairs of state. By the middle of the eighteenth century, government be
came the exclusive prerogative of the king. The process of which this was
the result was inaugurated by Frederick "William, the Great Elector, in the
middle of the seventeenth century. The conflict between the Landsherr and
his first estate was resolved differently in different provinces, but ended
everywhere with the victory of the former. Everywhere the nobility was
compelled to acquiesce to the creation of the standing army and permanent
civil service. In most provinces the jurisdiction of Landtage was severely
restricted. On the whole, the nobility retained a measure of self-government
only on the local level of the circles or counties, Kreise, which were defined
as seigniorial corporations and in which local assemblies, Kreistage, contin
ued to function.
The next great Hohenzollem ruler, the father of Prussian bureaucracy,
King Frederick William I, building on the achievements of his grandfather,
stripped the nobility, which he considered the most dangerous class in soci
ety and of which his opinion was most unflattering (dumb oxen, but as
malicious as the devil),18of several additional liberties, encroaching even
on their economic privileges. Determined to establish his authority against
the stubborn nobles as a rock of bronze, the king attempted to reform the
system of taxation to redistribute its burden among the different strata more
equitably. Only partially successful in some of these reforms, he formally
abolished the long-since-useless military services of the nobility and turned
the feudal estates, held on condition of availability for such service, into
alodial possessions held in personal ownership. In return for this official rec
ognition of a de facto situation, the king introduced a certain tax, converting
Lehnpferdea knights duty of military service on horsebackinto money,
Lehnpferdegeld.
The expanding responsibilities and regulatory capacities of the central ad
ministration under Frederick William 1the formation of the War and Do
mains chambers and the General Directoryfurther limited the influence of
the provincial diets. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, the office of
the representative of the local estates merged with that of the government
war commissary, responsible for the recruiting and quartering of troops.
This new office in 1702 was given the title of Landrat, county councillor.
The Landrate were government officers, but they were selected from and by
the local nobility. In certain provinces Frederick William interfered with this
privilege and appointed Landrate without taking into consideration the
preferences of the nobles who were to be represented by them. In addition,
the king forbade his nobles to enter foreign service, discouraged them from
attending foreign universities, and denied them the right to travel abroad
except by special permission. At the same time, he did not neglect their
training: to better prepare them for service in the Prussian officer corps, he
established a cadet house in Berlin, and, perhaps inspired by the successes
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
289
of Peter the Great, used gendarmes to remind some forgetful officers-to-be
in the countryside of what was expected of them.
Yet, by comparison with either eighteenth-century Russia or the France of
Louis XIV, the treatment of the nobility even in Prussia was lenient at the
very least. Neither the Great Elector nor Frederick William I encroached on
any of the social privileges of the nobility and in fact defended it from such
encroachment on the part of the middle classes. Throughout the entire pe
riod of their reigns and into the nineteenth century remarkably few com
moners were ennobled in all of Germany. Since the sixteenth century the
avenues to ennoblement had narrowed. The new administrative and mili
tary elites, which on the face of it threatened to replace the traditional aris
tocracy, recruited their members predominantly from it. Fewer commoners
were able to rise to a high administrative office in the seventeenth century
than in the sixteenth; their situation, as we shall see, did not improve in the
eighteenth century. Exclusive schools for the children of the nobility, Ritter-
akademien, providing gentlemens education and preparing young gentle
men for positions in the government and the army, were founded in many
Court towns. Everywhere in Germany the officer corps were the preserve of
the nobility. In Prussia, the Grear Elector insisted on his right to appoint
commoners to positions of high command, but very few were in fact so ap
pointed. Only some 10 percent of his officer corps came from the burgher
class; the rest were noblemen: 10 percent foreigners from other German
territories and Huguenots, and 80 percent native Prussian nobility. The non
noble officers were concentrated in the artillery and engineering troops,
which enjoyed lesser prestige than other military units. Frederick William I
believed that only noblemen could make good officers. His identification
with the army, therefore, was at the same time identification with the nobil
ity, and boosted its prestige.20
The position of the nobility vis-a-vis the peasants was strengthened; their
seigniorial rights were confirmed and augmented. Since 1653 every peasant
was assumed to be a serf, unless proven otherwise, which reinforced serf
dom where it had existed and favored its spread in the territories earlier less
affected by it. The introduction of the canton system of army recruitment
further reinforced existing relationships in the countryside. Now nobles ex
ercised double authority over the peasants: both as landlords and as officers.
To emphasize this double bondage, soldier-peasanrs, even at home, had to
wear at least one piece of their army uniform; this situation also found its
reflection in the concept of soldier-peasant desertion 21The Junkers were
miniature kings on their estates.
The economic superiority of the nobility was hardly challenged by the
absolutist policies of their rulers. While in Prussia they were expected to pay
the Lehnpferdegeld, they could export the products of their estates and im
port basic provisions almost without taxes. At the local level, Kreistage reg
290 N A T I O N A L I S M
ularly met, and no policy affecting the nobitity was introduced without
consultation with these county assemblies. Towns did not have similar rep
resentative bodies; it is in this sense that the Prussian monarchy, in the
phrase of Hugo Preuss,22stood on one long and one short leg: while the
government reached to every level and regulated every sphere of the burgh
ers existence, it stopped at the level of the county when it came to the nobil
ity. Certainly, the peasantry was in an even less enviable position than the
burghers. No other stratum enjoyed anything like the privileges of the nobil
ity, which was defined, as earlier, exclusively by birth. Its standing in society
was unchallenged, and its exclusion, as a group, from the affairs of the state,
not combined with any threat to the personal status of its members, did not
have the effect a similar exclusiontogether with other factorsproduced
in France or Russia.
In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the position of the nobility was
strengthened further and its superiority over the rest of society emphatically
stressed. Frederick the Great identified with the aristocracy much more
closely than did his father. This was reflected both in his opinion of its qual
ities, which differed drastically from those of Frederick William I, and in his
policies. Instead of dumb oxen, Frederick saw in the Prussian nobility
the fairest jewels of the crown, the defenders of their country of a stock
so good that it deserves to be preserved at all costs. Nobility, according to
this enlightened monarch, was a species of men apart from the rest of hu
manity; only it possessed the sense of honor and responsibility necessary for
command and only it could produce officers and high civil servants. In the
political testament of 1752, Frederick declared the preservation of the nobil
ity to be one of the chief goals of the monarchy. The exclusive right of noble
men to own manorial estates was confirmed by severe legal restrictions on
their sale to commoners. Those burghers who were allowed to purchase
noble land did not receive any of the seigniorial rights vested in it: they could
not be represented in local assemblies and were denied the rights of personal
jurisdiction and even hunting. Frederick discontinued his fathers policy of
requisitioning from the nobility lands formally belonging to the Crown or
buying noble estates for the Crown. After the Seven Years War he deferred
the payments of all the debts due from noble land-owners for five years and
established Landsckaften, special credit institutions, to help noble owners in
distress to keep their estates. The only limitation imposed by Frederick on
the order of which he considered himself a member had to do with the eco
nomic and military necessity of keeping the peasants from depopulation and
extinction: the nobies were prohibited from engrossing their estates at the
expense of peasant holdings.23
Under Frederick, the rural assemblies regained their privilege of selecting
candidates for the office of the Landrat, and the responsibilities of the office
were expanded. The provincial courts (Regiemngen) came under the control
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 291
of the local nobility. The officer corps and high civil service, the preserve of
the aristocracy since rhe days of the Great Elector, grew increasingly exclu
sive. The aristocratic character of the officer corps was especially empha
sized. The prestige of military rank increased immensely, generals taking
precedence over ministers of state in Court ceremonials; and while previ
ously it was often economic incentives which attracted nobility to military
service, now the chief attraction became social honor. The officer corps,
which became a second name for the aristocracy, turned into a caste. Burgh
ers had no place in the army, according to the soldier-king; Frederick would
rather give commissions to foreign noblemen. If considerations of military
exigency made recruitment of non-noble officers necessary, as they did dur
ing the Seven Years War, they were still confined to regiments not consid
ered integral parts of the army, and not aristocratic by nature, such as artil
lery and engineering. As a result, years after Frederick had died {in 1800)
there were fewer burgher officers in the Prussian army than in the days of
the Great Elector (9 percent), and in 1806 only 29 out of 1,106 senior offi
cers were non-noble.24
The higher echelons of the civil service experienced similar aristocratiza-
tion, though in this case the results were less dramatic. The representation
of the nobility in the civil service grew proportionately to rank in the hier
archy; the nobility constituted at least one-third in the highest grades of the
administration: in the War and Domains chambers and in the General Di
rectory the higher posts were almost always occupied by nobles. The noble
bureaucrats, it is true, had to be adequately educated and selected from a
number of candidates according to established meritocratic criteria, but if
qualified and admitted to service, they were assured of preferential treat
ment, quick promotion, and tenure. To achieve the latter they usually did
not have to serve more than four to five years, which must have seemed a
great boon in comparison with fifteen to twenty years for their middle-class
colleagues.25The office, unlike the case in Russia, did not ennoble; on the
contrary, it was the nobility which elevated the office by its incumbency.
High officialdom, like the military, became an aristocratic vocation. And,
while he put every obstacle in the way of commoners who would become
officers or state servants, Frederick Justified his preferential treatment of the
aristocracy of birth by the services it rendered {and it alone was allowed to
render) the state in the arniy and bureaucracy. I have always distinguished
[the nobility] and treated it with consideration, he wrote in 1768,u be
cause it provided officers for the army and suitable persons for all great of
fices of state. I have helped it to retain the ownership of its estates, and I
have done my best to prevent commoners from buying up the properties of
nobles. My reason for doing so has been that once commoners become land
lords, they have a prescriptive right to office. Most of them have a vulgar
outlook and make bad officers; they are not fit for any employment. This
292 N A T I O N A L I S M
circular argumentation made the situation self-perpetuating; the old elite,
strengthened in its traditional status and privileges, was at the same time
becoming a new elite. It is small wonder, then, that at the time when both
French and Russian nobilities, in an effort to protea their threatened, inse
cure positions, were changing their identity and their character, and trans
forming membership criteria in their societies, the Prussian aristocracy
could watch them calmly, without for a moment considering their struggle
its own. The potent ideas of nationality, which in this struggle were the main
weapon, might have intrigued the Junkers, but they were irrelevant for
them. The Prussian nobility was content. There is no question, wrote
Henri Brunschwig, of any crisis in the Prussian nobility such as that which
occurs in France at about the same date. Of all the orders of society the
nobility seems to be the most stable and the most faithful to its traditions.
This conclusion applies equally well to other states in Germany. While
these states (with the exception of Austria, which was becoming less and less
German) had neither armies nor bureaucracies as impressive as the Prussian,
the position of the nobility in them was, on the whole, similar. Nowhere in
Germany was the nobilitys superiority challenged by any other group. The
nobility retained its wide privileges; it stood apart from the rest of society
and was looked up to by everyone. The traditional social hierarchy in Ger
many manifested remarkable stability by comparison with its neighbors.
The ancient divisions between different strata remained sharp and clear. Is
there any other country in which the notion of quarterings of nobility has
such a fundamental political and moral influence on ideas and culture as in
Germany? asked Knigge. In what other country do the courtiers as a body
form a completely separate class, within which only persons of particular
birth and rank can make their career, as is the case in the entourage of most
of our princes? In fact, in Prussia merit mattered more than elsewhere:
nobility had its privileges, but it was not allowed to forget its duties. In other
states, duties did not necessarily accompany privileges. The gentlemans
class was in fact the only class in the state that was free in the sense that
nothing was demanded from it.n The acceptance of the high status of the
nobility was universal, and Goethe, as well as Frederick the Great, found
justifications for it.
For all these reasons, in the period of fermentation of the national senti
ment in such great states as France and Russia, when nationalism as a pat
tern of discourse became ubiquitous and could be encountered everywhere,
the German nobility remained completely unresponsive to it and passive. In
the second half of the eighteenth century it was no longer in conflict with the
absolutism of the princes, but reveled in it. (Like so many other forces in
history, which we tend to treat as uniform, absolutism evolved, expressed
itself, and affected different societies in entirely different ways.) The nobility
was no longer a dangerous class. But another group had already emerged,
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
293
humble and inoffensive on the face of it, which had since proved to be the
most dangerous class of all. This group did not belong to the lower classes;
the latter were not as yet believed to be threatening; neither was it the docile
bourgeoisie, which seems never to have acquired this distinction. This new
class was the unattached intellectuals. It was they who were destined to
assume the leadership in urging and molding the German national con
sciousness.
Bildungsburgertum: The Dangerous Class
Among the European cases surveyed in this book, Germany is the only one
which tends support to the view that nationalism is a middle-class phenom
enon. Its leaders on the way to national identity came from the bourgeoisie
rather than the aristocracy. This exception, however, serves to prove the
rule, for the middle-class intellectuals, the visionaries and architects of Ger
man nationality, had as little in common with the bourgeoisie in general as
they had with either the nobility, which looked down on them, or the peas
antry, to which a significant number of them could trace their origins.
From very early on, in Germany, the secular middle-class intellectuals
were a group apart, with its own ethos, and opportunities, aspirations, and
frustrations peculiar to it. This group was a creation of the German univer
sities, and to some degree owed its character to their nature and prolifera
tion. German universities were unlike the universities in the rest of Europe
in several respects. They were not a result of the spontaneous growth and
incorporation of communities of scholars, but were imperial and princely
foundations conceived as a means of training indigenous clergy and Court
servants and as an assertion of the spiritual independence of the Empire
from the Roman Church, In the sixteenth century numerous new founda
tions reflected the claim to sovereignty of the territorial states. The German
universities thus were instrumenta dominationis of particularist govern
ments, rather than stadium generate serving all (at any rate within Christen
dom) who were thirsty for knowledge.
Two faculties were the stronghold of the university: theology and law. The
other higher facultymedical-remained numerically unimportant until
the nineteenth century. The faculty of arts, or, as it was later called, philos
ophy, was originally a preparatory faculty for the more specialized studies
in the other three, and provided a general education for those who had had
too little of it in other frameworks. The theological faculty recruited its stu
dents predominantly, in Protestant Germany exclusively, from the poorer
middle and lower classes. Such students also were the majority of those who
studied philosophy. The faculty of law, in distinction, appealed to the better-
off bourgeoisie and even the nobility.
294
N A T I O N A L I S M
The sharpening of class distinctions which had accompanied the increas
ing assertiveness of territorial rulers vis-a-vis the nobility led to the tempo
rary abandonment of the universities by rhe nobility in the later seventeenth
century, and as a result the prestige of the universities significantly de
creased. At that time the universities had reached a low point in societys
esteem for them, so that even famous scholars considered associating with
them beneath their dignity. Leibniz, notoriously, thought the Court to be
more congenial to the life of the spirit and the development of science and,
while urging the formation of an academy to supplement it, relegated uni
versities to the position of lower-level educational establishments. For those
to whom the Courts were closed, the way out of this pit was to abandon the
scholastic traditions with which the universities had been hitherto asso*
dated, and side with the modems. This road was chosen by people like
Christian Thomasius, a sometime professor at Leipzig, who became one of
the founders of the University of Halle. He insisted on the inclusion of
gentlemanly education (fencing, riding, modern languages, and sciences)
in the curriculum and was the first professor to lecture in German instead of
Latin. He also edited the first German monthly magazine. The university
reform of the early eighteenth century and the adoption by the reformed
universities of the Aufkldrung can be in part attributed to this desire of some
in the professoriate to escape the stigma of low esteem which came with
university affiliation.
Since the early eighteenth century the prestige of academic training was
on the increase. The reasons for that, for the most part, lay outside the uni
versities. Learning was becoming popular among the European aristocra
cies, and at least in England and Francethe main models for the Ger-
manysnobility came to imply cultural polish if not superiority. The merits
of education and the educated were celebrated by the philosophy of Enlight
enment. The University of Halle, which became a home to the Aufkiarung,
was attracting students of noble birth. At the same time increasing numbers
of the nobility were seeing their vocation in the civil service of the territorial
states and were flocking to the universities for this reason.
While some university education in Germany was considered necessary
for entrance into the civil service, aspiring noble bureaucrats did not neces
sarily choose German universities. Many went to study abroad, or at least
supplemented their training in a German university (usually Halle) by a stay
in a foreign one. There, in the centers of new thinking, they were exposed to
new sentiments and ideasamong them that of national pride. One of such
future members of the German elitethe Hannoverian nobleman von
Munchhausenwas bothered by this deference to things foreign, and the
University of Gottingen (founded in 1737) was largely a result of his displea
sure. According to the conception of its founder, Gottingen was to appeal to
the nobility, including foreign nobiiity, whose presence among the students
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
295
would in turn make the university visible and further increase its attractive
ness. Munchhausen took care to find professors of great renown and, not
unexpectedly, concentrated his attention on the law faculty, which was cer
tain to be the choice of the great majority of die native nobility. The kind
of law taught at Gottingen reflected the resentmenr of many German nobles
against the high-handed innovations of increasingly absolute rulers and was
designed to reinforce their position and rights under the laws of the mori
bund empire, common law; and private law . . , more attention was paid to
feudal law, German common law, German and European constitutional law,
legal history, and trial law . .. than to the traditional Roman fare of the
seventeenth century. 25In this way, already in the middle of the eighteenth
century, Gottingen unwittingly promoted natmst and historicist tendencies
in jurisprudence, which were later to become important elements in German
nationalist thought.
Yet another element contributed by Gottingen was to achieve centrality in
the future German national consciousness. Munchhausen emphasized the
importance of general learning, especially history, as the proper way to cul
tivate the mind of leisurely nobility (as against those preparing for service).
This boosted the status of the philosophical faculty, inaugurating a transfor
mation in the nature of German universities. In itself this was no major in
novation, for the status of general learning was rising everywhere in Europe,
and its importance for the nobility was increasingly recognized. What was
an innovation was the shift of emphasis from the practical uses of education
to its inherent value and significance for the development of the inner spirit,
the Bildung of the personality, which came with this new respect. This recess
into the depths of the inner world went against the this-worldly activism of
the Aufkldrung, yet both reflected the desire to dignify university education
in Germany and were in a way related.
Already in 1740 Christian Wolff, brought back in triumph to Prussia by
the phiiosopher-king, preferred a position in the university to the academy
and the Courta choice which contrasted with that of Leibniz several dec
ades earlier. At the close of the eighteenth century, wrote Friedrich Paul
sen, the German people regarded its universities as institutions from which,
particularly, it expected to receive its impulses toward progress in all the
departments of life, the same institutions which only a century before had
called forth the derisive laughter of polite society.30In 1810, for the found
ers of the University of Berlin, university education as suchespecially hu
manistic, not necessarily practical, educationwas noble. In this way, in
Germany too, a concept of an alternative nobility emerged, a nobility based
on culture rather than birth.
Significantly, all through the eighteenth century the vast majority of the
educated came from the middle classes; the nobility supplied only a small
minority of students. At Gottingen, the university most popular with the
296 N A T I O N A L I S M
nobility, only 10 percent of the students in 1737, 8 percent in 1767, and 15
percent in 1797 were noble. The majority of them concentrated in law (55
percent, 45 percent, and 62 percent respectively, but as many as 79 percent
in 1777).31The rest, that is, close to 100 percent in faculties other than law
and universities other than Gottingen, were commoners. Overall enroll
ments in the universities in the eighteenth century were falling. Perhaps this
reflected a perception of the decreasing marginal utility of academic training
in finding appropriate employment in later years. In distinction from their
aristocratic classmates, middle-class students, unless exceptionally wealthy,
always attended the university with a view of finding such employment. The
figures are: 9,000 students {in all universities) in 1700; 7,000 a year in the
late 1760s; 6,000 a year between 1795 and 1800.32If we take 7,000 to be
the average student population a year throughout the century {though it
probably was larger), and four years as the period a student stayed in a
university {though many spent only a year or two there), by the end of the
century we get a population of 175,000 university-educated people, a great
majority of whom were of middle-class origin. If we make an allowance for
attrition by death, it does not seem unreasonable to estimate this population
at any given point in the second half of the eighteenth century at 100,000.33
This figure, small in comparison with the 20,000,000 of German population
in 1800, is quite significant in comparison with the nobility, estimated as, at
maximum, 2 percent of the whole.34These 100,000 university-trained com
moners, and their families, are the educated class, Bildungsburgertum.
In the social hierarchy of German societies, Bildungsburgertum stood
above the middle class as a whole. The last Kleiderordnung (sumptuary
law), in Frankfort-on-Main in 1731, divided the population of the city into
five classes. Doctors of law and, notably, medicine were grouped together
with the patricians and nobility in the first and most prestigious one.31Ad
mittedly, in the middle of the century, the status of jurists, who to begin with
came from better and wealthier families, was more elevated than that of
theologians and philosophers. But, under the influence of the Aufkliirung
and the reinterpretation of learning which emphasized the significance of
inner culture, the distribution of esteem among different degree holders be
came more equal. If anything, the philosophers enjoyed a larger share of it
(the degree in philosophy grew more prestigious than the rest). In the read
ing clubs, which proliferated since the 1780s, the educated rubbed shoulders
with the nobility, and the academic degree as such, as Mme de Stael noted
later, earned one the entree36into society. Education was the avenue of
upward mobility.
For the first generation of non-noble university graduates or attendees,
the inclusion in Bildungsburgertum signified a move into a higher-status
group and implied a significant increase in prestige. In the second half of the
century, however, the educated class was already largely reproducing itself,
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
297
and many students were coming from the families of Bildungsburger. The
marginal utility of university education for them was decreasing. At the
same time, the growing respect for learning as such, and especially for hu
manistic, not occupationally oriented, education, increased the self-esteem
of the educated, who were now expecting greater deference toward them
selves on the part of the society at large. But the society did nor defer to
them to the extent they might have found satisfactory. More often than not
it denied them entrance into the higher ranks and not for a moment let them
forget their common origins. The name of the new class itself implied the
inescapable bond to the commonality: while the intellectuals in France and
Russia alike proudly referred to themselves as the aristocracy of the spirit,
the alternative aristocracy, in Germany they were called the educated bour
geoisie, the alternative middle class. The Bildungsburger identified with the
aristocracy, which would not merge with them, and despised the bourgeoi
sie, to which they were inseparably tied. Elevated above the common lot,
they remained a lower class nevertheless, and were vexed and made un
happy by their position in society. They, too, became the victims of status-
inconsistency.
This frustration of the intellectuals was exacerbated by the condition of
trained unemployability, which toward the end of the eighteenth century
was becoming the lot of increasing numbers of them. The aura of moral
loftiness which surrounded knowledge for its own sake had its uses for the
middle-class intellectuals, but could not render such knowledge any more
affordable for them. Their education remained fundamentally career ori
ented. Liberal professions were not yet seen as an appropriate employment
in Germany, and middle-class students envisioned as the goal of their studies
chiefly careers in the legal and administrative branches of the civil service,
the Church, and university teaching. The opportunities open to Bildungs
burger in civil serviceon the level which they would consider commensur
ate with their qualificationsappeared dwindling toward the close of the
century, owing to the increased competition from the nobility. This compe
tition was particularly strong in administration, where positions were fewer
and more than a full third of the best positions were claimed by noble can
didates.37The percentage of noble bureaucrats increased from 37.8 percent
between 1770 and 1786 to 45.23 percent between 1786 and 1806, creating,
according to Brunschwig, an impression of a small-scale feudal reaction.
The legal branch, in distinction, was nearly monopolized by middle-class
university graduates. There too, however, noble candidates successfully con
tended for the better positions, their percentage, which was slightly above
10 percent at the lower level, rising to a third in the higher grades. Berlin-
ische Monattschrift in 1788 assessed: The number of young men applying
for posts in the civil service is so great that all the administrative services are
overwhelmed. If you compare their number with the number of posts which,
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N A T I O N A L I S M
even if there were to be an epidemic of deaths, are likely to fall vacant, you
can see that there is now no hope whatever of placing all, or even most, of
them in any way that bears the slightest relation to the many sacrifices which
their training has required of them.38Success in passing through this bottle
neck was not at ai] assured, and further hardship awaited after that passage:
a middle-class official had to prepare for a long moratorium and could not
expect to support himself until the age of twenty-seven.
The way to a clerical position was, if anything, even more arduous, even
though the nobility found a clerical career entirely unattractive, and middle-
class theologians, thus, had to compete only among themselves. Theological
faculties continued to attract the mass of the poorer middle-class students,
for they offered scholarships, and examinations by the consistory, in distinc
tion from examinations in the civil service, were free. The Church, however,
could accommodate only a minority of the aspirants: the annual average
number of clerical appointments in Prussia, in the period between 1786 and
1805, was only 27.8, rendering a total of 584. But in 1786 alone, the theo
logical faculty at Halle had 800 students (out of 1,156 at the university as a
whole). Throughout Germany theological candidates, in anticipation of a
brighter future, were becoming tutors to children of the nobility; just in
Dresden they constituted as much as 20 percent of the citys population. A
reporter reflected in 1785: "They hasten from house to house all day and
barely earn enough from their lessons to eke out a miserable existence. All
of them are withered, pallid, and sickly and reach the age of forty before the
consistory takes pity on them and endows them with a living.39
Finally, university teaching could support only a tiny minority of excep
tionally talentedand luckyindividuals. In 1758, in all German univer
sities, with the exception of those in Austria, there were 244 full professors.
The number rose to 6S8 in 1796, and, probably, more waited in the ranks
as Extraordinariett.,l>The universities could not absorb the surplus of intel
lectuals they were producing, and those who were left in the cold had to
look elsewhere for means to succor their bodies and apply their energies.
The unemployed academics were forming an army of unattached,
free-floating intellectuals (these terms, originally derived from German,
fit them perfectly in more than one way). Many of them turned to free-lance
writing, partly because they had no choice and partly seduced by the yet
untapped resources which appeared to be hidden in the use of the printing
presses and the appeai to the growing reading public, by examples of fa
mous English and French writers, and by some suggestive ideas, of which
we shall talk later. There were 3,000 writers recognized as such in Germany
in 1771, and 10,650 by 1800.41If they saw in this profession a way to escape
privation, they were wrong. The courts and the nobility, with a few excep
tions, patronized French letters. And living off the yet undeveloped market
was anything but easy. The horde of famished poets is growing daily, ob
ITie Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
299
served Wieland, in Der teutsche Merkur in 1776; the outcome . . . is still
starvation. They grow sour and write satires against princes who have not
aspired to imitate Augustus and act as wealthy patrons to diem or poets who
have a regular meal waiting for them on the table at home.
Wieland, who was born in 1733, was among the first German intellec
tuals'to attempt the life of a professional man of letters. One of the most
successful writers of his time, he was only partly successful and supported
himself rather with his earnings as a town clerk in Biberach, a professor at
Erfurt, and finally a tutor to "Weimar princes. He was lucky, of course, to be
offered these posts, which, however, he owed to his fame, and many of his
younger compatriots embarked on the uncertain road of literary conquest
in hope that it would lead them to a lucrative and above all secure official
position. Wielands contemporary, and another famous writer, Lessing, be
came a Court librarian in Wolfenbuttel. Two years before he accepted the
post, in 1768, he wrote to his brother, who also aspired to become a writer:
Take my brotherly advice and give up your plan to live by the pen . . . See
that you become a secretary or get on the faculty somewhere. This is the
only way to avoid starving sooner or later.
Such reflections of the first generation of German writers rang true for the
generations which came of age twenty and thirty years later. In 1791 Schiller
concluded on the basis of his experience that it was still impossible in the
German world of letters to satisfy the strict demands of art and simulta
neously procure the minimum of support for ones industry.42Writers of
the end of the century assessed the situation similarly, although a change
of tone is noticeable. In 1799, Wilhelm Schlegel compared the situation of
writers in his country and in France: Duclos notes that there are few note
worthy books which are not produced by professional writers. This Estate
has long been treated with respect in France. Here a writer used to count for
less than nothing if he was a writer and nothing else. Even today this preju
dice still crops up here and there . .. The writers trade is, depending on how
it is plied, a stigma, self-indulgence, pure donkey work, a craftsmans job,
an art or a virtue. 43
The earnings even of a famous writer were meager. And though the pay
ments rose steadily, they never amounted to an adequate income, and were
riot comparable to the earnings of equally famous authors in England or
France. Sir Walter Scott is said to have earned more from literature in three
years than Goethe, without a doubt the most successful writer of the century
in all the Germanys, in all his remarkably long life.44In the security of his
Weimar office, Goethe indeed remembered: German poets . . . did not en
joy the smallest advantages among their fellow-citizens. They had neither
support, standing, nor respectability, except in so far as their other position
was favorable to them; and therefore it was a matter of mere chance
whether talent was born to honor or to disgrace. A poor son of earth, with
300
N A T I O N A L I S M
a consciousness of mind and faculties, was forced to crawl along painfully
through life, and, from the pressure of momentary necessities, to squander'
the gifts which perchance he had received from the muses . . . a poet . ..
appeared in the world in the most melancholy state of subserviency, as a
jester and parasite; so that both on the theater and on the stage of life he
represented a character which any one and every one could abuse at plea
sure.
To some extent this situation was the result of the lack of copyright pro
tection. The widely practiced piracy, that is, unauthorized reprinting of
weli-selling works in cheap editions, made publishers reluctant to undertake
publication of works which were not certain to sell and bring profits quickly.
It also made them less willing to share these profits with the authors. Curi
ously, this tendency agreed with the authors. The production of poetical
works, reminisced Goethe in Dichttmg und Wabrheit, in some contradic
tion of his assessment of the writers condition above, was looked upon as
something sacred, and in this case the acceptance or increase of any remu
neration would have been regarded almost as simony . . . The authors, who
in addition to their talent were generally respected and revered by the public
as highly moral men, had a mental rank, and felt themselves rewarded by
the success of their labors: the publishers were well satisfied with the second
place, and enjoyed a considerable profit. . . thus every thing stood in the
most beautiful equilibrium.5'45
The view of literature as an activity of people who could afford not to be
paid represented it as a noble occupation, which a person of standing
could choose to practice without derogating himseif. Thus the very unlike
lihood of substantial earnings served to make literature more attractive for
university graduates who liked to chink mundane preoccupation with pay
ments beneath their dignity. Some respectable authors in the mid-eighteenth
century, such as Christian Fiirchtegott Gellert, indeed did not want to accept
money for their work. But they were hard pressed; however much they
wished to believe otherwise, they had to make a living, and literature was
the only means many of them had to do so.
As the reading market started to expand in the 1770s, an increasing num
ber of men of letters were willing to redefine intellectual labor in a way
which would make its remuneration expected, legitimate, and adequate.
Klopstocks idea of the Deutsche Gelehrtenrepublik in 1772 was one expres
sion of this changing attitude and the growing unwillingness of German au
thors to accept the destiny of honorable impecunity. The senior poet pro
posed to dispense with the services of the publishers-dealers and make
subscription, the profits from which would go directly to the author, the
way to finance and distribute publications. The appearance of me first and
only part of the Gelehrtenrepublik was followed by a protracted debate over
the nature of the book, which centered on the issue of the legitimacy of
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
301
considering a work of literature the property of its author, for the produc
tion of which he could demand material reward. Many of the prominent
authors of the time, among them Kant and Fichte, took part in the contro
versy and argued that such demands were indeed legitimate. Yet, though
demanding to be paid for their services like other producers, the German
writers as ever stressed that theirs was a special, lofty, noble calling. The
idea of genius allowed them to reconcile these two apparently incon
gruous positions. It defined a work of original writing as one emanating
from the inner resources of the author, and thus entirely his creation, which
no craft, no learning alone, could make possible, and which used but did not
depend on external observations. In this way, the work of original writing
dearly appeared as its authors property, and since it was property, one
could expect payment in exchange for it.'16
The plight of the intellectuals was not only, or even mainly, economic.
Even when desperately poor, they were oppressed more by the humiliation
caused by poverty than by poverty itself. Their plight was the price they paid
for upward mobility. It was, indeed, exorbitant. One has to keep in mind
that Germany was essentially a static society in this period, which meant
that it was composed of a given number of social strata, petrified in their
traditional definitions, which stood in given, long-established relations to
each other, immutably separated. In these conditions the nature and experi
ence of upward mobility differed fundamentally from its nature and experi
ence, for example, in sixteenth-century England, where the entire social
structure was in flux and whole strata moved up and down the social hier
archy, changing their contours at the same time as they were changing their
positions vis-a-vis each other, like the yet unformed continents in the time of
primeval earthquakes. In eighteenth-century Germany upward mobility was
the movement of exceptional individuals from lower toward higher strata.
The possibility of reaching the coveted destination existed, but was in no
way assured. Indeed, to reach it was the lot of only a few of those who
ventured to travel this road. And in the nowhere land of in-between, the
travelers found loneliness, degradation, and despair. It is no wonder at all
that the experience left so many of them gloomy, misanthropic, and bitter.
More than from anything else they suffered from acute status-mconsis-
tency, the painful discrepancy between their self-esteem, which they had ac
quired with and because of their education, and which was reinforced by the
current philosophies they were only too well acquainted with, and the lack
of respect for them in the society which obstinately graded its members ac
cording to official rank. They could not reconcile themselves with the crite
ria, but accepted the gradation; they shared the contempt for the strata from
which they came and resented the nobility, as well as officialdom and the
upper bourgeoisie, to which they could not gain admission. The Bildungs-
biirger could not become a part of the society of which they aspired to be a
302 N A T I O N A L I S M
part. They did not dispute the superiority of the nobility (though their views
of the reasons for it might sound rather academic: many, no doubt, believed
with Goethe that only noblemen could attain to the general cultivation of
personality, which was the goal of civilization itself). And they did not wish
to be a part of the society with which they were in fact associated. No one
lacking wealth and leisure can enter good society, wrote Christian Garve.
But in the society of peasants, mechanics, journeymen, apprentices, shop
keepers, or students he will find that manners are coarse or loose and that
their speech is incomprehensible.47They were suspended between two so
cial worlds, out of place everywhere and always in agony; it is this social
isolation, the pain of it, its roots and the ways to escape it, not poverty,
which is the constant preoccupation of eighteenth-century German litera
ture. What ailed them constantly and made their life a torment was the
feeling of humanity oppressed by its burgher condition.5548
Anton Reiser: A Story of Upward Mobility
The ordeals of Bildungsburger did not start with graduation; rather they
commenced with the very first steps they made in its direction, lured by the
rewards it might bring and the unhappy consciousness of mind and facul
ties. What misery it was to be a clever poor boyand therefore upwardly
mobilein the Germany of that time we can learn from the many written
testimonials left to us by those who were such. The Gelehrten naturally in
clined to self-analysis, and frequently, being unemployed, had nothing better
to do than to put the results of it, and their experiences, into writing. These
testimonials are unquestionably reliable, for, whether they form the very
focus of an autobiography, a novel, a play for the stage or are un-self-
consdously referred to in a diary or personal letters, the experiences of up
ward mobility recounted in them converge in the same pattern. Whatever
part of Germany their authors came from, and whatever sector of the lower
classes they left to move up, they shared the same structural situation, and
therefore the very same misery.
Perhaps the most powerful of these testimonials is Anton Reiser. This
psychological romance is in fact an autobiography, a description of the
first twenty years in the life of its author, Carl Philipp Moritz. Historians of
eighteenth-century German life have recognized in it a rich and valuable
source, and in its own day the book was greatly esteemed by the authors
contemporaries, its admirers including no lesser men than Goethe and
Schiller. The description of the outward circumstances of Anton's life and of
his inner development under the pressure of these circumstances indeed pre
sents before us a portrait of the formative years of several generations of
intellectuals in Germany. The dry and dispassionate, as if tired, manner in
which the story is told helps to underscore the depth of suffering that it
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 303
describes. No embellishments of style are needed to drive home the point
contained in the bare facts. This unadorned, almost pornographic frankness
makes the book painful reading: one is allowed to look into such depths of
unacceptable misery that it makes one recoil. And yet this suffering is only
of the spirit.
Anton is the neglected child of poor and unhappily married parents. His
father, a petty official in Hannover, is a Pietist of sorts, a follower of the
doctrines of Madame Guyon.49In his eighth year, the father teaches Anton
to read; the boy learns remarkably quickly, which brings him for the first
time some attention from his parents, still more from his relations. And,
reading being his only pleasure, he is early driven from the natural world
of children into the unnatural world of imagination, where his spirit was put
out of tune for a thousand joys of life which others can enjoy with a full
heart. The teachings of Madame Guyon constitute some of his readings,
and he learns to find solace in her hymns of the blessed escape from self
and the sweet annihilation before the source of existence. He has no other
joys besides that melancholy tearful joy and to experience it more fre
quently imagines reasons for sadness even when no such reasons exist. He
decides to emulate the behavior of saints of whom he reads and soon makes
such progress on this path of piety that he is able to talk to God, who, as
Anton has no other companions, becomes the only confidant and compan
ion of this eight-year-old boy.
Reading makes Anton ambitious. After reading some romantic story, at
the age of ten, he, for a long time, thinks of nothing less than the idea of
playing a great part in the world. He believes that learning provides the
means to achieve this desire and has a boundless respect for any one who
had studied and wore a black coat, [regarding] such people as almost super
human beings. The vocation of a preacher attracts him in particular: for
some years he could imagine nothing more noble or more attractive than
this profession. He is sent to a writing-master and later, in his twelfth year,
to a private Latin class in the town Grammar School. He becomes the first
of the class, but then, after two months, has to leave school. He tries to
follow the studies- of his schoolfellows, but is unable to keep up with them,
and his unhappiness makes him a bad boy.
He is apprenticed to a master-hatter in Brunswick, who abuses him, and
lives a life of real physical hardship. Yet this is a bearable life, and the hard
ship is interrupted at regular intervals by mealtimes, sleep, Sundays, and
holidays. Others find joy in this, but Antons romantic ideas put him out of
tune with this rhythm. He dreams of a Latin School and watches with sad
ness boys going in and out of it. It is these unfulfilled desires that torment
him, while the hard life of an apprentice provides a refuge. His spirit is lifted
when he is given a black apron, worn by other apprentices. He now looked
on himself as a person who was beginning to have a position of his own.
304 N A T I O N A L I S M
The apron brought him into line with others like him, whereas before he
was lonely and isolated. 50
Since his master regards'him as a tool, to be thrown out when worn out,
he has to work in conditions which are harmful to his health. In winter his
hands bleed, but even in this he finds a source of satisfaction, for his bleeding
hands make him feel that he carries the burden with the rest. Hard work and
discomfort eventually make Ancon seriously sick, but they oppress him
much less than what he perceives as humiliating tasks, such as having to
carry a load on his back along a public street, while his master is walking in
front of him.
At the age of fourteen Anton is discharged by the hatter and returns to
Hannover. To be confirmed he must attend a school with some religious
instruction for a while, and again wins general admiration by his excellent
performance. He reveals to his teachers his desire to study further, and, on
their recommendation, no less than the Prince of Mecklenburg-Strelitz de
cides to sponsor his education. The boys fortunes suddenly become a matter
of general interest and for the first time in his life he is treated with respect.
This boosts his self-esteem and inflates his thoughts of future greatness: he
already sees himself a preacher. This is where his real sorrows begin.
Education appears immensely attractive. "Wadedomains of knowledge lie
before Reiser; his name is for the first time made to end in us, Reiserus,
the Latin ending associated with the idea of dignity; and in addition, the
name High School, current among common folk, the expression High-
School boys which he often heard, [make] his prospects of going there more
and more significant. People vie among themselves for the privilege of help
ing him, another proof of the high esteem in which education was held. But
Anton is poor. His tuition is waived, and the Prince provides a Reichstaler
for his maintenance, but his well-wishers decide to save this money for him,
and, instead, several families, all of his own classshoemakers, bandsmen,
cooksvolunteer to provide for him one meal a week free of charge. He
lodges, also free of charge, with another family, in the parlor. Some others
give hii? table-money instead of meals, a few pence with which he has to
make do for his breakfast and supper, and for dress an old, red soldiers coat
is altered for him. As a result, instead of the pleasure he expected from his
studies, his existence is embittered by the crushing humiliations of his po
sition, His ridiculous coat makes him conspicuously the worst dressed, a
circumstance which contributed not a little from the first to depress his spir
its. All those who have offered him free meals feet they have the right to
offer, in addition, advice, which he is expected to follow. They lecture him
on the dearness of bread, and when the first excitement of righteousness and
charity subsides, regret their hastiness and begrudge him every morsel. He
is made to feel a burden and this depresses him; he is afraid to eat, to speak,
even to cough. Telling of Antons predicament here, Moritz, as a rare excep
The Final Solution of Inf inite Longing: Germany 305
tion to his systematic abstention from judgment, says: The position of the
meanest artisans apprentice is more honorable than that of a young man
who is dependent for his studies on charity. . . if he is not capable of becom
ing servile, he will fare as Reiser did; he will get sullen and misanthropic as
Reiser did, for he now began to find his chief pleasure in solitude. He shuns
his schoolfellows because he is embarrassed, and at first imagines himself
and then really is despised by them. This embarrassment makes him hare
himself; it is unbearable. Again, Moritz comments:
To be reduced to the extremity of shame is perhaps one of the most distressing
feelings possible. More than once in his lifeReiser experienced this feeling:
more than once there -weremoments when he felt reduced to nothing in his own
eyes ... He always felt the deepest sympathy with any one in this position. He
would have done more to save a person fromshame than to save himfrom real
misfortune, for shame seemed to himthe greatest misfortune that can happen
to any one ... Shame is as violent an emotion as any, and it is surprising that
its consequences are not sometimes fatal. The fear of appearing ridiculous was
at times so appalling to Reiser that he would have sacrificed everything, even
his life, to avoid it. No one perhaps ever felt more strongly than he the force of
I nfelix paupertas, quia ridiculos miseros facit, for to himto beridiculous
seemed the greatest misfortune in the world.
Anton gradually loses all of his free meals but one, at the shoemakers,
and is given notice to move from his lodging. He moves to the house of the
Rector of his school, where he is given a place to stay but nothing more.
Although he now earns some money as a chorister this is not enough. He
starves. The alluring pictures of his future status help him to persist for a
while in his diligence and resolve, and after only one year at High School he
is promoted to the senior class. But before long he succumbs under the de
grading pressures of hss position. Cut off from where he came, he does not
belong where he is: he felt how it was always a matter of course that he
came last in everything and yet he must regard it as a great honor. He is
derided by his schoolfellows, who show him nothing but contempt, which,
apart from the general irrational antipathy, arose chiefly from his position
which was humiliating or thought to be so, from his shy manner and his
short coat. And so he shuts his eyes to the reality which is so repugnant to
him. He withdraws into himself, and conceives a passion for the Stage,
which offers him an escape from reality. What he wanted was to have a
powerful part, in which he could speak with strong emotion and transport
himself into a series of moving scenes, which he loved, but could not have in
the real world, where every incident was so poor and miserable. He also
escapes into reading. Reading becomes a drug, able to reduce the senses to
a pleasant stupor; he read himself deep into debt. . . [for] reading took
.. . the place of food and drink and clothing. The boy feeis forced to
306 N A T I O N A L I S M
dream himself into another world where he was better off, entertains
thoughts of suicide, loses all belief in himself and all intecest in his own
fortunes, being now solely preoccupied with the fortunes of the heroes of
dramas and books he reads. As his reading is, for the most part, rather sad,
he reads choking with tears, and revels in the joy of grief, which is the
only joy he has the opportunity to experience and which he enjoys all the
more for that. Found incorrigible, he is expelled from the Rectors house.
In a novel he comes across the story of a nobleman turned peasant out of
love for a peasant girl and finds the idea of becoming a peasant most attrac
tive. His motives are reveaiing. In the calling which Reiser had taken up he
was now of no account at all, and it seemed impossible for him to work his
way up again. But he had received far more education than is needed for a
peasant, as a peasant he would be raised above his class while as a young
man who devoted himself to study and should have prospects he found him
self far below his class. The idea of becoming a peasant then became his
ruling idea and drove out everything else.52But this new hope for a better
future, however improbable, is soon driven away by hunger, which para
lyzes Antons mental abilities. He shares his lodgings with two other young
men in similar circumstances, spending most of his time in bed. It is most
significant that throughout the book we meet one character after another in
situations very similar to that of Reiser; this is his story, but it is not at all
unique.
After a spell of such existence, Anton, who is now sixteen, is promised
forgiveness on the condition that he repents and abandons his bad ways:
namely the reading of romances and the theater. He moves to live with the
family of a tailor, sharing a room with many other people; his tastes change:
he reads mostly philosophy and scientific books and learns French in a
few weeks; his humiliations continue; he is still generally despised and suf
fers from want. He disgusts himself. His self-consciousness, with the sense
of being worthless and rejected, was as burdensome to him as his body with
its feeling of wet and cold . . . That he must be unalterably himself and could
be no other, that he was shut up in the narrow prison of selfthis gradually
reduced him to despair.
And then he discovers in succession Shakespeare and The Sorrows of
Young Werther, which appear that year. These books provide him with the
means to reinterpret and find dignity in his unbearable position. After he
had read Shakespeare in his spirit he was no longer an ordinary common
place person, before long his spirit rose above all the outward circumstances
that had crushed him and all the ridicule and scorn he had suffered .. . when
he felt himself tormented, oppressed, and confined he no longer thought of
himself as alone: he began to regard this as the universal lot of mankind.
This gave a higher note to his complaints .. . the reading of Werther, like
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
307
that of Shakespeare, raised him above his circumstances . . . he was no
longer the insignificant abject being, that he appeared in other mens eyes,*53
The humiliations which are his lot in Hannover, the unbearable sense of
being unnoticed in the multitude, make him fete the dry in general, and
human society, and he becomes a lover of Nature and solitude. (It was his
troubles in a society which refused to change, not, it should be emphasized,
industrialization or atomization brought by modernity, that caused these
anti-urban sentiments.) He seeks Nature and solitude even after he no
longer needs to escape from reality. For his fortunes suddenly take a turn for
the better. Two poems of his own creation which he recited in class propel
him to a position of general respect, so that those who thought he would
come to nothing began to think that perhaps he would come to something
after ail. The Prince, who is interested in Anton again, contributes toward
a new coat for him, and the new coat, which he regarded as putting him on
an equality with his schoolfellows, from whom he had been so long distin
guished by his shabby dress, inspired him with courage and confidence, and
what was most remarkable, it seemed to win him more respect from others,
Significantly, Reiser nevertheless retained his melancholy humor, and
found peculiar satisfaction in it. Being now a local celebrity, Anton is en
trusted with composing and delivering a public address on die occasion of
the Queens birthday, the highest honor a High School student could
achieve. According to custom, it is his right and duty to invite all the nobility
and the high officials of the town in person, by all of whom he is received
with the most encouraging demonstrations of politeness. This unexpect
edly acquired status brings him employmentprivate lessonsand there
fore for the first time real income. His very poverty now becomes for him a
matter of pride; when, in spite of his humble dwelling, one of his rich and
important fellow-students visited him, he felt a secret pleasure, that without
attractive quarters or other external advantages he was sought out for his
own sake.
But now his tragedy is reenacted in an up-scale version. Acting and crea
tive writing take the place of preaching as the vocation of his dreams, and as
did preachers in his childhood, so now actors and writers seem to him
beings of a higher species. His poetic success, as earlier his learning abilities,
make him aspire to become one of these beings. He wavers between poetry
and the Stage, leaning toward the latter, because, he believes, theater would
allow him quickly to win fame and applause [which] had always been his
dearest wish. In his aspiration he is not alone: the Stage was the rage of the
whole generation. This brilliant career, explains Moritz, among other
things, did not require three years preliminary study at the University.S4
But Anton, still a High School student, does not even know how he can
make it to the University, and instead of winning immediate applause enact
308 N A T I O N A L I S M
ing noble sentiments on the Stage, has to tutor less capable but more fortu
nate schoolfellows. This brings him income and new humiliations:
A young nobleman, whom he was teaching, and with whom he was often to
have some conversation in his room after the lesson, took leave of him without
waiting for Reiser himself to take leave... his action struck Reiser as so strange
and shocking that it completely upset him, so that when he left the house he
stood still for a while and let his arms fall... He felt himself for some moments
a nonentity, all his resources were paralyzed. The thought of being de trop even
for a minute weighed on him like a mountain; he would have liked to rid him
self at that moment of an existence which was so burdensome to an outsider
... At bottom it was the feeling of humanity oppressed by its burgher condition
which laid hold of him and made life hateful... What crime had he committed
before birth, that he had not become a person, about whom a number of other
men were bound to be attentive and concerned? Why was he assigned the pan
of the worker and another of the paymaster? If his circumstances had made him
happy and content, he would have seen purpose and order everywhere; now all
seemed contradiction, disorder, and confusion.55
The expenses of his now higher status exceed the income earned at the
price of such humiliations. Finally, the petty debts and the abasements be
come too much for him and he leaves Hannover for Weimar (on foot, with
one ducat of money, and a volume of Homer in his pocket), to join a stage
company there.
Misfortune follows Anton in his travels. He pursues the company of his
dreams unsuccessfully, feeding on raw turnips, for his money soon runs out,
but feeling free and happy exactly because of this. He resolves to become a
man-servant to Goethe, on any conditions. Starved and exhausted beyond
all power to continue, he finds temporary refuge at the University of Erfurt,
again thanks to his poetry and Latin, but the free board and lodging he is
forced to accept there are unbearably humiliating to him and are worse than
starvation. He decides to leave and is, finally, employed as an actor by an
other traveling company. Its Director, however, runs' away with the money
before Anton has a chance to perform. These misfortunes are multiplied by
the effects of his earlier sufferings. He lives in a dual world: the inner one, of
his imagination, and the world of external reality, frequently losing all touch
with the latter. His imagination is morbid, but he seeks solace in morbidity,
because his nature had been attuned to this train of feeling by all the count
less wounds and humiliations which he suffered from his youth up. He is
driven into imaginary sufferings by his unwillingness to reconcile himself
with his hated real self, with his place in reality, by his self-contempt caused
by the constant pressure of circumstances, for which chance was more re
sponsible than men, ss and when the pressure of circumstances abates, he is
no longer able to distinguish between what is real and what is not, or rather
the world of his fevered brain becomes real to him.
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 309
We leave Anton Reiser, at the age of nineteen, with dreams of a stage
career shattered, alone and penniless, and with no hope and prospects of a
brighter future. Carl Philip Moritz eventually knew better days. He studied
theology at the University of Wittenberg, obtained a post at the Gymnasium
zum grauen Kloster in Berlin, published more than fifty works on language,
psychology, and aesthetics, became a friend, rather than a servant, of
Goethe, and died in 1793 (at the age of thirty-seven) as a Professor der
Theorie der scbdnen Kiinste und Alterthumskunde in Berlin. But for many
others like him happier days never arrived, and they, like Dr. Sauer, whom
Anton Reiser met in Erfurt, remained unnoticed and unknown until their
death, their spirit crushed by the incongruity of the dreams bred by their
superior mental abilities and the petrified society which encouraged these
dreams.
The exorbitant emotional toll levied by upward mobility into and within
Bildungsburgertum, and the social consequences of the perpetual sense of
humiliation and exclusion of which the experience of it consisted, should
not be underestimated. It crippled many a soul and left a lasting scar on the
collective psyche, which it still disfigured more than a century later. It re
mained an open sore and was left, indeed made, to fester for generations,
for free-floating, suspended, and unhappy intellectuals made a profession
of tinkering with it. Neither their impecunity nor their status-inconsistency
was unique to the professional writers;57rather, they were the lot of Bil
dungsburgertum as a whole. But the writers were, willy-nilly, left at leisure
to ruminate on their misery and, by the nature of their vocation, became the
spokesmen for the grievances of the class. Forced by necessity, they brought
into being and controlled the German press. This control was never chal
lenged: the nobility, with very few exceptions, did not consider writingof
whatever sorta proper occupation. All who read German, therefore, in
evitably became readers of the middle-class unattached academics and
were exclusively exposed to their view of the society of which they believed
themselves to be members, which meant their view of its scope and nature,
as well as their specific perception of its imperfections and injustices and the
solutions they proposed to ameliorate these. The German reading public in
the second half of the eighteenth century was very small: a contemporary
estimated it at two hundred thousand people;58but it grew steadily. This
reading public consisted of attached, namely employed, Bildungsbur-
gerofficials, jurists, clergy, schoolteachers, and other professionalsof
the educated nobility,-also frequently lawyers and high-placed bureaucrats,
and possibly a section of the non-academic middle class, who lived under
different governments in more than three hundred German states. For this
reading public the ten thousand free-lance frustrated intellectuals became
the source of a common language. Through their publications they molded
310 N A T I O N A L I S M
its way of thinking and seeing reality, and the reading publicthe bureau
cratic elite, the teachers, and the clergycarried this naturally biased per
spective further into the population that did not read. The way anguished,
poor university graduates, unsuccessful in their own view, saw the world
was becoming the Weltanschauung of most thinking Germans. It was, we
may say, becoming the German mentality. This was one of the first manifes
tations of a new power later to be called media. The ten thousand people
whom unkind destiny placed in its control were unknowingly acquiring a
tremendous influence on their linguistic community. And so, inadvertently,
trying to find an escape out of their particular predicament, the unat
tached intellectuals were laying the foundations of the German national
consciousness.
II. The Birth of the Spirit: The Preparation of the Mold for the
German National Consciousness
Aufklarung
In the last quarter of the eighteenth century the German Bildungsbiirger
found their position increasingly hateful and unsupportable. Many a man
among them was familiar with Anton Reisers disgust with his own self,
diminished and degraded by his situation. Unable to escape their position,
the intellectuals eventually arrived at a solution which was almost as good:
they altered the image of their selves. National identity was the ultimate
result of this transformation.
The idea of the nation belonged to the baggage of the Enlightenment. All
German states prided themselves on being enlightened, and some of
themPrussia, Austria, Saxe-Weimarindeed set the tone in their dedica
tion to the promotion of human progress and were considered epitomes of
the age. Prussia was the exemplary enlightened state, a fact, widely rec
ognized, that caused great satisfaction to Prussian subjects as well as to Ger
mans in general. For German intellectuals, the Enlightenment opened a new
era. It inaugurated the age of German letters with which intellectuals proper,
secular intellectuals who saw in letters a professional calling, came into
being. The vocation of the secular intellectual was its creation.
The age of Enlightenment in Germany triumphed in 1740the year of
accession of Frederick II, the Great, to the Prussian throne; the age of en
lightenment, believed Kant, was the same as the century of Frederick.15
In addition to the great philosopher, Fredericks generation included such
men as Lessing, Mendelssohn, and Nicolai. It is during this period that the
first professional writers, living off the market, were able to make their ap
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
311
pearance, as well as the first widely (by the standards of the time) circulating
literary and general intellectual journals, and numerous reading clubs and
philosophical societies.
Like everywhere else. Enlightenment in Germany referred to the advance
of rationalism: it achieved an alternation in the range of human values,
placirig reason at the summit. 60In Was ist Aufklarung? Kant defined
Enlightenment as mans release from his self-incurred tutelage and as free
dom, resolution, and courage to use ones own reason. But what did the
German Enlightenment, Aufklarung, mean specifically? If we refer back to
Kants authoritative answer, we see that it consisted chiefly in the increasing
ability of people to use their own reason in religious matters, in other
words, to doubt and criticize the established religious dogma. Lessing wrote
angrily to Nicolai in 1769: Dont talk to me of your liberty of thought and
the press. It reduces itself to the liberty to let off as many squibs against
religion as one likes. Let somebody raise his voice for the rights of subjects
or against exploitation and despotism, and you will soon see which is the
most slavish land in Europe.(1Kant disagreed. Our rulers, he empha
sized, have no interest in playing the guardians with respect to the arts and
sciences, and the philosopher-king, so Kant believed, even saw that there
is no danger to his lawgiving in allowing his subjects to make public use of
their reason and to publish their thoughts on a better formulation of his
legislation and even their open-minded criticism of the laws already made.
Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, but obey! was the
kings admirable principle. But the focus of the criticism of the champions
of reason nevertheless remained to them unreasonable established religion.
The achievements of the Aufklarung in the sphere of religious toleration
were impressive. Prussia was a haven to free-thinkers of all sorts and even in
France was regarded as an example to be followed. At least in the minds of
the educated, Aufklarung succeeded in thoroughly discrediting established
religion, expelling it from their consciousnesses and hearts, and taking its
place. This was a thoroughgoing change in mentality.
To be educated in the second half of the eighteenth century meant to be
steeped in the values of Aufklarung. Aspiring intellectuals hardly had any
choice in the matter, but they immersed themselves in its clear waters will
ingly, for the message of the Aufklarung was very attractive to them. It
promised them dignity and advancement in life. Was ist Aufklarung? ends
with an optimistic assertion that as the propensity for free thinking devel
ops, it inescapably affects all the spheres of life, and men, who are now
more than machines, are treated in accordance with their dignity. The
belief in reason elevated those who were thought to possess it. Moreover, in
Germany, it implied more than just dignity. German rationalism was very
different from die English respect for common sense, which was the very
basis of individualism: the belief in reason as the defining characteristic of
312 N A T I O N A L I S M
the human species and therefore the belief in the reason of every human
being. Rather, German rationalism was akin to French rationalism. It was
the belief in human reason as the reason of those elect and superior humans
who were able to arrive at the right philosophy, the cultivated reason, the
reason of the educated, reason as a distinguishing characteristic among
rather than ofhumans, and therefore an admission ticket to superior
status.
As we have seen, Aufklarung did not fulfill its promise to the intellectuals.
While the rulers commitment to some of its principles, especially in Prussia,
was sincere, and it was thus encouraged to penetrate certain areas of life,
such as religion, and affected a most thoroughgoing transformation in the
modes of thinking in general, Aufklarung did not attempt, and had it at
tempted would not be allowed, to affect the spheres of politics and of social
relations. In these crucial areas of social existence, the philosophy was su
peradded to an unchanging society, immovable in its semi-feudal makeup. It
added some gloss to it and highlighted its stubborn persistence in archaic
ways blatantly inconsistent with the new outlook. The Aufklarung opened
new vistas for the educated; it promised respect for the men of reason, and
hinted that the future belonged to the university graduates. There were
many more opportunities than before; education and intellectual merit were
in demand and achievement could be highly rewarded. But exacdy this was
the problem. In accordance with the Tocqueville effect, that iron law, a
partial fulfillment was more disturbing than no promise at all. The stakes
became higher, and the pain of failure intensified as a result. The demand
for the educated increased, as did their prestige, but so did the competition,
for the supply was greater than the demand. The possibilitiesand glam
ourof success grew simultaneously with the possibilitiesand trauma
of failure. And those who failed, or those who were afraid to fail, turned
away from the Aufklarung in dismay. It was the logical incongruity between
the modern, officially sponsored philosophy and the inflexibly traditional
social structure that was the chief source of the intellectuals predicament.
But the promise was that of the Aufklarung, and Aufklarung, not the tenac
ity of the social organism predating it, was seen as the immediate cause of
their disappointment. The society they lived and struggled in~that was the
site, the witness, and the cause of their humiliationand the one they
turned against was the enlightened society.
All the same, they remained the products of the Aufklarung. It furnished
the language for their thoughts; their hopes and aspirations were formed by
it. They were essentially enlightened themselves, and they could not es
cape measuring by its standards their performance, their success or lack of
it, and the very means and devices they used to fight against it. Aufklarung
was the basis on which the future German consciousness was built and one
of the important ingredients of this consciousness.
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 313
Under the aegis of the Aufklarung the feeble voice of national patriotism,
which was never silenced completely among the intellectuals, grew some-
what stronger. For the most part, the patriotism of the Aufklarer meant love
for the noble ideals of liberty and equality, imported from England and
France, and was critical of Germany {that is, the territories loosely inte
gratedinto the Holy Roman Empire), which, in this crucial respect, com
pared badly with the two model nations. Imperial conditions were not con
ducive to patriotism. German patriots, who love the Empire as their
Fatherland, where are they? asked Wieland wistfully. Common patriotism
was needed so that Germans could at length say, We are a nation, and
several able men endeavored to exhort their slumbering countrymen to
awaken to this lofty sentiment. Since the Empire was beyond reform, some
patriots focused on Prussia, whose monarch was an object of general admi
ration in Europe, and therefore gave confidence arid a sense of nationality
to all Germans. 62Frederick was glorified in poetry and prose. Even Goethe
admitted to being a partisan of the brilliant Prussian in his youth.63
The moribund state of the Empire also provoked the first expressions of
ressentiment against the West. The evident superiority of the model nations,
England and France in particular, left a sour taste in the mouths of those
who, despite themselves, sang their praise in Germany. Christian Schubart
thundered in his Deutsche Chronik against excessive admiration of foreign
ers: He who does not fling a curse across the frontier from the ruins of
Heidelberg is no true German. And yet what is there that my countryman
does not fetch from beyond the Rhine? Fashion, cuisine, wine, and even the
language. England he found too commercial. Still, he admired English lib
erty and thought that what [the Germans] might learn from the Frenchman
with advantage is patriotism.64
A different kind of patriotism was preached and practiced by Klopstock.
The senior poet turned his sight away from the age of Enlightenment, which
illumined the decrepid and shameful condition of eighteenth-century Ger
many too brightly, and focused it instead on the glorious times when vir
tuous and youthful ancient Germans fought bloody battles against decrepid
and shameless Rome, and were victorious. He was an inspiration to poets of
lesser fame.
The predominant mood of the Aufklarung, however, was cosmopolitan
ism. In the age of reason, it coexisted peacefully with national patriotism.
There was as yet no contradiction. The model nations, England, France, and
certainly America, saw themselves as advanced, chosen, privileged parts of
humanity, not as a different species. To be a good Englishman, Frenchman,
or American, faithful to the ideals of ones nation, was tantamount to being
a good citizen of the world. Having declared their membership in the en
lightened world of England, France, and America, and having little to be
proud of as Germans, the Aufklarer wished to be good citizens of the world.
314 N A T I O N A L I S M
For the spokesman of the Aufkldrung, Nicolai, German nationalism was a
political monstrosity. Weishaupt, the founder of the secret society of Illu
minati, believed that nationalism was comparable to despotism and, like it,
prevented the spread of reason and happiness of humanity. Schiller was
proud of his cosmopolitanism: I write as a citizen of the world . . . I lost
my Fatherland to exchange it for the great world.
Throughout the eighteenth century these varied sentiments intermixed in
equally varied ways. Sometimes a person was in succession a cosmopolitan,
a champion of the Prussian cause, a follower of Kiopstock, a German pa
triot resentful of France, and then a cosmopolitan againsuch was the case
of Goethe. In other cases, cultural nationalism combined with political cos
mopolitanism. Heinrich Heine called Lessing our literary Arminius, who
freed our theatre from the foreign yoke, and indeed the struggle against
French letters was among Lessings chief preoccupations. Yet he could con
fess with great satisfaction: I have literally no conception of the love of the
Fatherland {I am sorry to confess my shame), and it appears to me a heroic
failing from which I am glad to be free.6S
On the whole, cosmopolitanism (which often concealed the lack of any
political sentiment) was a far more widespread attitude. The idea of the na
tion, long available, had no significant appeal in Germany until very iate, at
least by comparison with all the other cases in this book. It was an alien
idea, which on the face of it seemed inapplicable to the Germany of the
eighteenth century. Its psychological implications and potential were not
recognized until the French revolutionary army drove the point home, and
not until this idea underwent a profound transformation that made German
national consciousness unlike any other. Ultimately, Bildungsbiirger found
national identity attractive because it implied an unassailable dignity for
and automatically elevated members of the national collectivity, however
lowly, putting them on a par with the most exalted nobility. It accomplished
what the Enlightenment had failed to accomplish: it made them equal in
human worth to any of their social superiors. And it did so in a manner
which could not be offensive to the spirit of the Enlightenment, for it was a
part of the Enlightenment itself, and the most advanced societies of Europe
subscribed to it. Yet, as the national identity was adopted, it was adapted to
the cultural soil to which it was transplanted. The meaning (and connota
tions}of nationality was reinterpreted in a way which rendered it familiar,
comprehensible, arid consistent with other dominant traditions of discourse,
and the terms of these traditions were utilized in this reinterpretation.
Pietism
The traditions which had this profound impact on the character of German
national consciousness were Pietism and Romanticism. Pietism was the Ger
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
315
man counterpart of English Puritanism, a religious movement with a wide
appeal and numerous converts within every class of society.66Like Puritan
ism, Pietism, an outgrowth of the Protestant Reformation, was opposed to
the established orthodoxy and represented the adaptation of the dogma to
the aspirations, situations, and constraints of the population that adopted
it. It differed from Puritanism to the extent that these situations, constraints,
and aspirations differed, and its effects, therefore, were essentially unlike
those produced by Puritanism in England.
The source of fundamental difference between Puritanism and Pietism is
that Puritanism was the religious ideology of upwardly mobile, ambitious,
and confident groups in a dynamic society that experienced mobility on a
mass scale, while Pietism was the religious ideology of a static society whose
members were unacquainted with worldly success, but intimate with hard
ship and disaster, which fostered a fatalistic outlook. [The] virtues favored
by Pietism were more those on the one hand of the faithful official, clerk,
labourer, or domestic worker, wrote Max Weber, and on the other of the
predominantly patriarchal employer with the pious condescension.67 In
other words, German Pietism was the form in which faithful officials, clerks,
laborers, and so forth, appropriated Lutheran and, to some extent, Calvinist
Protestantism, the manner in which they dealt with the dogma. In a way it
fulfilled the same function which was later fulfilled by nationalism.
At the same time, Pietism was a variant of religious mysticism, which be
came a widespread phenomenon in Germany after the Thirty Years War
and was a response to the misery caused by it.68Under its proper name the
movement emerged in 1675 with the publication by Philipp Jakob Spener of
Pia Desideria oder Wahren emngelischen Kirchethe founding text of Pie
tism. Spener was a Lutheran, the son of a Hofmeister in Rappoltsweiler, and
a university graduate. During travels undertaken to complete his education
at the University of Strassbourg he became acquainted with and was deeply
influenced by the spiritual leaders of Swiss mysticism. Later, in his capacity
as preacher in many different cities, he was able to bequeath these influences
to those who-came in contact with him and, aided by his saintly personality
and the general responsiveness to mystical tendencies, founded the Pietist
movement within the established Church. Several other Lutheran leaders of
the movement in the first half of the eighteenth centurysuch as the aca
demic theologians August Hermann Francke and Gottfried Arnoldwere
personal acquaintances of Spener and were influenced by him direcdy. His
impact on Count Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorfthe founder of the
Moravian Brethren community at Herrnhut, at whose baptism in 1700 Spe
ner was a sponsor, was less direct but equally profound. These followers of
Spener gave the spirit of Pietism body as well as prestige associated with the
authority of the university and the status of the nobility, and carried it fur
ther in institutions such as the Halle Paedagogium (formed by Francke) and
schools and communities of Herrnbuter, and in their writings. Their official
316 N A T I O N A L I S M
positions ensured chat what they had to say would be heard. The appoint
ment of Gottfried Arnold as the first historiographer of Prussia was just one
reflection of the high standing attained by the movement by the beginning
of the eighteenth century in certain provinces. The main centers of Pietism
were in Prussia and Wiirttemburgj but the itinerant academics helped to
spread it throughout Germany.65An extraordinary number of children were
educated in Pietist institutions, and by the second half of the eighteenth cen
tury the movement had penetrated deeply and become influential in the Re
formed Church as well.
The main source of Pietism, however, was Lutheranism, which adapted
better to the needs of the various strata in Germany than did Calvinism.
Pietism, like mysticism in general, was a by-product of the attempt to use
the official religion as a practical philosophy: the means of rendering the
existing order of things, in which suffering was the central element, both
meaningful and livable. In the static world of faithful officials, laborers, and
domestic workers, the emphasis on the doctrine of predestination would be
psychologically untenable. In sharp contrast to their brethren in seven
teenth-century England, their experience would be able to show them only
that they were, indeed, eternally damned. And since, in their case, the as
cetic struggle for certainty about the future world was bound to end in
failure, they were led to strive for the enjoyment of salvation in this
world.70Rather than attempt to change their condition, which they were
powerless to do, they interpreted it as a sign of grace. Their misery itself, the
humility and abnegation, which most of them could not escape if they
tried, became a proof of certitudo salutis, and was freely chosen. Necessity
was transformed into virtue.
The immediate knowledge of salvation, manifest in misery, not only led
to passive acquiescence with fate, but was also actively sought afterin an
unadventurous manner, to be sure, which involved no risk and guaranteed
the success of the undertaking. Election could be proven by active piety
the praxis pietatisand by the emotional experience of unity with Christ
Lutheran unio mystica. In the course of time the two ways of ascertaining
ones salvation became confused, and piety came to mean chiefly the per
sonal emotional experience of divine bliss.
Jesus was a real presence in the life of the Pietists, and the experience of
personal contact with him was one of an unusual vividness and intensity.
Count von Zinzendorf sometimes wrote a little note to his beloved Savior,
told Him in it how his heart felt toward Him, and threw it out of the win
dow, in the hope that He would find it.71Anton Reiser, friendless and ne
glected, had talked to Jesus on a footing of confidence since his eighth
year. Moreover, in the misery of his loneliness, he found a playmate in Gods
Child and amused him, giving him rides on an abandoned wheelbarrow.
He imagined a boy somewhat smaller than himself, and as he conversed so
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 317
familiarly already with God himself, why should he not do so even more
with this son of his? He trusted that he would not refuse to play with him
and therefore would not object if he wished to wheel him about on the
wheelbarrow. He prized it as a great piece of'good fortune, to be able to
wheel about so great a person and to give him pleasure in this way, and as
this person was a creature of his own imagination he could do with him as
he chose, and so made him find pleasure in riding for a longer or shorter
rime and even sometimes said, in all reverence, if he was tired of wheeling:
I should be glad to give you a longer ride, but I cannot do it now. 72
One can speculate how much of this intense intimacy could be attributed
to the loneliness into which people like Anton Reiser were confined by their
poverty and shyness, and by the inability or reluctance to form other
earthlyrelationships. The experience of Gottfried Arnold could not have
been much different from that of Moritz hero: he too grew up in poverty
humiliating for an educated youth and a son of a teacher in the Latin school,
was forced to earn a living by giving private lessons at the age of thirteen,
and yet went to a university. There, among students whose better fortunes
underscored his misery and made it a source of constant humiliation, he did
not make any friends and found no taste in the student life. Even later, when
his exertions bore fruit and he was appointed a professor of history at the
University of Giessen, an office he considered truly divine, he could not fit
in, but preferred to resign and went on to write his mystical works.73It is
revealing that when these lonely souls did find a .friend on this earth, their
devotion was as fervent, and friendship as intense and all-consuming, as the
love they, when still friendless, had felt for Jesus.
Emotionalism was the central characteristic of Pietism; it was Herzenre-
ligion, and its counterpart was scorn for doctrine and theological learning.
The knowledge of doctrine did not contain the certainty of salvation. On the
contrary, it was often those who knew the least, or had the least Kopfwissen-
schaft, who were the best Christians, able truly to identify with the blood
and merit of the Lamb of God. The knowledge of doctrine also prevented
the implementation of the principle of priesthood of all believers. The em
phasis on it was an additional reason for the appeal of Pietism to the numer
ous groups within the middle classes, for whom it provided a way to a loftier
status and a basis for self-esteem, which they could not hope to find other
wise. Thus they agreed with Zinzendorf that religion was not a question of
formulas and ceremonies, nor of taking on certain customs .. . [but that of]
the heart, in which all children of God are alike. 74
The insistence on equality was soon transformed into preference for the
humble and untutored as better able to serve and understand God. Hidden
wisdom, taught Gottfried Arnold, is more surely found among the igno
rant and the simple, content to seek their salvation in fear, than among
learned theologians.75Simultaneously, the rejection of the established stan
318 N A T I O N A L I S M
dards of religious virtuosity led to the formation of new standards of elec
tion and to a new religious aristocracy.
The deemphasis of dogma produced a pluralistic, individualized view of
religion: it was the attitude of faith, rather than its content, that mattered,
and so long as one believed in Christ, it was of little consequence what else
and what exactly one believed. The 1740 declaration of the Hermhuter
Synod of Marienborn stated: Unlike the Lutherans, we . . . construct no
confession of faith which may not later be altered. We desire to retain free
dom, that the Savior may from time to time enlighten our teaching. 76This
attitude necessarily and very soon led to the abandonment of traditional
religious belief altogether and to a mystical pantheistic notion, which, as the
Hermhuter Schleiermacher was later aware, was indistinguishable from
atheism. Two thoughts ran through his Discourses on Religion: that all
religious persons are priests, and that all are one, and he was certain the
treatise would seem to the censor little less than atheistic. The true na
ture of religion, he asserted in this work, is neither [the idea of the objec
tivity of God] nor any other, but immediate consciousness of the Deity as
He is found in ourselves and in the world. For that reason, religion was
endlessly determinable. 77What distinguished a genuinely religious person
was the intensity of this consciousness. Am I wrong, asked the widow of
Schleiermachers friend, whom he consoled and later married, in calling
those feelings religious which are awakened in me by the music in church?
For I must confess that I feel quite differently when the service is not accom
panied by music. I cannot describe to you how my soul is born aloft, as it
were, by the tones; what a feeling of freedom is developed in me, what con
sciousness of the holy and the infinite seems to pervade me . .. But tell me,
my Ernst, is it in accordance with pure Christian feeling, that anything ex
ternal should produce such a powerful religious effect on methat I require
an external agency to enable me to lose myself in God? Dearest, be not
over anxious, answered Schleiermacher, and do not try to separate what
God himself has intimately united. Religion and art belong together as soul
and body . . . the heightened feeling with which [music] inspires the pious,
is, no doubt, really religious. 7t
The characteristic of the new aristocracy of grace, when the abandonment
of dogma led to the replacement of the old one, was thus emotional suscep
tibility, the ability to experience intense emotions. Passion took the place of
scriptural learning as the highest religiousand moralvirtue. Pietist no
tions spread quickly and widely, and this change of standards could be felt
on many levels. Emotionalism, as Weber, following Albrecht Ritschl, notes,
was the reason for the appeal of Pietism to the nobility. It was a religious
dilettantism for the leisure classes. For the same reason it attracted the Bil-
dungshiirger, in whom education and status-inconsistency had developed
heightened sensitivity anyway, and for whom the cultivation of emotion
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 319
provided an easier and surer way ro enhance their sense of dignity than any
other.79
A logical consequence of the view of religion as personal unity with God
was a broad tolerance of the forms of Christian worship. Theoretically at
least, all forms were legitimate, so long as faith was sincere, idiosyncrasy
being in fact a sign of naturalness, sincerity of faith. The counterpart of this
position on a collective level was a new respect for the forms of worship
characteristic of ethnic communities (of Christians), and a novel, mystical
idea of native language, the vernacular which, in Protestantism, replaced
Latin as the medium of worship. This idea was reinforced by the greater
regard for and increased preoccupation with the education of the lower
classes and the instrumental emphasis on German. Like individual human
beings, ethnic communities were unique, peculiar expressions of Gods love
and wisdom, it thus was a matter of Christian piety to preserve ones
uniqueness. The mother tongue, in particular, acquired the dignity of the
means through which God manifested Himself to a people, the peculiar, in
dividualized link between the Deity and a specific community. It was thus
sanctified and acquired value beyond instrumental utility. This mystical idea
of language as a peculiar bond with God first appeared in the thought of
Jakob Boehme.80
The wide appeal of Pietism, its continuous applicability and relevance to
the situations of many groups, and its diffuse therapeutic powers help to
explain the sure hold religion enjoyed in Germany as late as the end of the
eighteenth century. The nature of the movement, moreover, protected it
from the direct assault of the Aufklarung, the brunt of which was borne by
the doctrine. Rationalism chose the teaching of the established Church as its
enemy and dismissed Pietism as hardly worth its learned attention. Pietism
thus was able to provide an outlet for, and preserve, religious feeling in an
anti-reiigious climate and to coexist with rationalism. Because of the nature
of the movement, too, religious toleration, which was inevirably undermin
ing the credibility of coexisting yet mutually exclusive (by their very nature)
doctrines, did not lead to religious indifference. Pietism abandoned doctrine,
and was thus able to preserve faith.
And yet some of the elements of the religious creed, certain religious sym
bols, parts of the doctrine (or narrative), most congenial to be sure to the
generally anti-doctrinal, mystical, and emotional nature of Pietism, were
perpetuated and even reinforced in it manifold. Pietism did contain certain
tenets of faith which combined into something like a doctrine of its own.
Some of these tenets derived directly from the Pietist opposition to dogma
and external symbols of faith. The rejection of doctrine and the insistence
on reine Innerlichkeit necessarily led to an increase in the importance of the
group, the community of like-minded, kindred spirits: an individual left en
tirely to his own spiritual resources and deprived of the sources of moral
320 N A T I O N A L I S M
authority in the mind inevitably turns to the group for guidance. Indeed
Pietism, which regarded the external organization of the official Church 'as
unimportant, opposed to it a community of the faithful, the invisible Church
of the elect. This Church was a reflection of each members personal rela
tionship with the Savior, yet it was impossible to achieve true unity with
God outside the community. Since the way to God lay through humility
and abnegation, the community of the faithful consisted of individuals who
renounced their particular interests and their very selves. It represented a
diminutive Kingdom of God on earth and thus was the ideal community. It
is not surprising, therefore, that Pietists had no sympathy for social struc
tures in which individuals retained their selves and which allowed the exis
tence of and even safeguarded particular interests, or that they regarded the
principle of social contract, which evidently promoted impiety, as an aber
ration.
Furthermore, the Pietists strove to make the invisible Church visible. On
the one hand, the desire to separate the elect from the world could [and
did], with a strong emotional intensity, iead to a sort of monastic commu
nity life of half-communistic character in conventicles removed from the
world.81On the other, the same desire to establish Gods Kingdom on earth
expressed itself in missionary activity and proselytism. These paradoxi
callyif one considers Pietist withdrawal from the worldled to a revision
of the nature of the State (the very embodiment of the mundane), which later
acquired great significance. The aim of every Christian, including the great
of this world, was the establishment of Gods Kingdom. Everyone had to
contribute to this in ones proper office; kings and princes were expected to
dedicate to this goal the states over which they ruled. They were, in fact,
expected to provide individual leadership in this pleasing-to-God process
possibly by analogy o the individual leadership of Jesus. The virtuous
among these temporal rulers were seen by the Pietists as angels of God
and princes of the souls, and the State from a simple utilitarian institu
tion, as it was conceived by the rationalism of the seventeenth and eigh
teenth centuries, was transformed into an ideal entity, the instrument with
which God raised and formed men in conformity with his supreme de-
signs.82I t was of no minor importance that it was the Prussian state and
rulers that were so interpreted above all. The State was sanctified; it was
increasingly viewed as the embodiment of the true Church, and this view, in
combination with the Pietist idea of the community in which the personal
individuality of each member dissolved in a true unity, was acquiring the
unmistakable characteristics of totalitarianism.
Another crucial tenet of Pietist faith destined to have a long-lasting effect
and to survive the decline of the faith itself was the cult of the Passion on the
Cross. The physical agony of the Savior brought Him closer to the believers,
made Him more human, and facilitated sympathy (in the Smithian sense)
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 321
more than any other moment in the Biblical narrative. It is natural that in a
religion which demanded personal contact, identification, and sympathy in
exactly that sense, the Passion became the focal element. And so did the
biood and the wounds which caused it, which'soon became separated and
stoodas religious valueson their own.83In turn, blood, wounds, and
physical suffering added value to everything they were associated with: war,
the profession of a soldier, death. Whether experienced or inflicted on oth
ers, they were sanctified, became the sublime signs of spiritual purity and
strength and of moral righteousness, and paved the road to glory.
Gerhardt Kaiser traces the transplantation of the gory imagery of the Pas
sion on the Cross from religious to secular contexts in the work of Klop
stock. Klopstock is especially important for our purposes, for he was both
the great religiousPietistpoet of the century and the first famous author
of secular patriotic poetry. The epithets applied to Christs blood and suffer
ing in the Messiah systematically reappear in the patriotic epic Hermanns
Schlacht and in the Odes. Very frequently blood is associated with beauty.
The day of crucifixion is characterized as a precious, splendid, bloody
day; the day of the battle in the Arminius epicas the day of the combat
to the death, beautiful and bloody. Christian martyrs are covered with
sublime wounds; Germanic youthswith beautiful wounds. The father
of Arminius thinks that blood will be a beautiful attire for the greying hair
of an old man, and disciples in the Messiah want to soak their greying
hair in the blood of martyrs. Christ dies the most beautiful death; He is
beautiful with wounds (Schon mit Wunden), Beautiful Blood (Schon
Blut) covers those dying for the Fatherland in patriotic Odes. What is most
significant, blood of those one kills is as beautiful as ones own heroically
shed blood. When Arminius returns from the battle covered with sweat,
with Roman blood and with dust of combat, Klopstock exclaims: Never
before was Arminius so beautiful! Blood also works as an aphrodisiac: the
sight of Roman blood on Arminius arouses Thusneldas desire. I want to
see him dirty! she cries. His hair smeared with the blood of the Ro
mans!84
Others followed in Klopstocks steps. In the works of von Stolberg, Her
der, Lavater, Arndt, and many more illustrious personalities of German let
ters, gory death, death in blood, becomes a most desirable, glorious event,
justified on both aesthetic and ethical grounds. Such sanctification of car
nage, its elevation to the position of a supreme social value, which was a
result of the emotionalism of Pietism, had never happened in any other so
ciety, and it may well be the element which did indeed make much of the
more recent German history exceptional, unlike any other and unimagina
ble elsewhere, and was responsible for what so many wish to see as an in
comprehensible aberration.
When one realizes how many of the late eighteenth-century intellec
322 N A T I O N A L I S M
tualsthe inventors of the German national consciousnesswere ar one
point or another in their lives Pietists, as children of Pietist parents, students
in Pietist educational establishments, it is easy to appreciate Pietisms role in
the formation of German nationalism. Like English Protestantism in the six
teenth century, Pietism provided the language as well as the legitimation for
the new identity, and as a result, while shaping it, was carried on in it. It is
not that Pietism planted the seeds out of which nationalism developed:85
nationalism was not a descendant of Pietism. But it provided the soil in
which the seedsbrought from outsidecould grow. Andhere the bio
logical analogy has to endthe soil, in a rather Lamarckian manner,
changed the nature of the plant to live on in the fruit it bore.
Pietism exercised its influence on the character of German nationalism
directly and in an indirect fashionthrough Romanticism, another tradi
tion of tremendous consequence for subsequent ages, which it helped to
bring into being. A direct heir of Pietism, and at the same time a product of
other influences opposed to it, Romanticism appropriated but secularized
central Pietist notions, and in so doing was able to perpetuate them in an
age which was becoming increasingly indifferent to religion.
Romanticism
Romanticism is customarily associated with the domain of literature. While
it is unquestionable that it was a literary phenomenon among other things,
to define it as such necessarily minimizes its significance and hinders our
understanding of it. Rather than originating in literature, as a solution to a
problem in literary development, Romanticism was confined to literature in
Germany by accident, because its creators had no other choice but to be men
of letters, and in other countriesbecause the existential basis on which it
grew in Germany was absent, and as a result, Romantic principles were ap
plicable to and adopted only in art. The originalGermanRomanticism
was a movement of thought, a mode of thinking which found expression
in almost every sphere of the social, political, economic, and cultural exis
tence of the land of its birth and deeply affected its future development. Ob
serving it from France, Henri Brunschwig saw it as one of the most pro
found movements ever to affect Germany; Ernst Troeltsch believed that
German thought, whether in politics or in history or in ethics, is based on
the ideas of the Romantic Counter-Revolution; and Friedrich Meinecke
somewhat arrogantly proposed that it was possibly the greatest conceptual
revolution that the West has yet experienced.
The Weltanschauung of Romanticism is older than its name. Its first sig
nificant manifestation was in the Storm and Stress of the 1770s, the Genie
period. The unfortunate failure of the geniuses of the Sturm und Drang
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 323
and related contemporary groups, such as the Gbttinger Hainbund, to call
themselves Romantics; the fact that the acclaimed leaders of the Sturm
und Drang abandoned its principles and returned to the fold of the Aufkla-
rung under the guise of German Classicism, as a result of which twenty
years of Classicism separated Sturm und Drang from the early Romanti
cism of the very end of the eighteenth century in Jena and Berlin;87and fi
nally the presence in the Sturm und Drang of Goethe (a genuine genius
one might say, if the word did not have such a peculiar significance in the
present context and was not so profoundly abused in it), an extraordinary
individual, defying classificationall these necessarily obscure the funda
mental similarity, almost identity, of the Sturm und Drang period and Ro
manticism. Nevertheless, they belong together. Their kinship does not imply
that Romanticism proper was a development of the potentialities of the
Sturm und Drang, and thus could not be possible without it. Though
early Romantics were all deeply influenced by the work of the original
geniuses of the 1770s, Romanticism could {and most probably would)
emerge even If Sturm und Drang never existed. The two movements belong
together because both were responding to the same structural situation and,
in their response to it, used the same cultural resources: Pietism and Enlight
enment. Differences between them certainly existed, but they were not
greater than the differences between individual Sturmer und Drdnger, be
tween Sturmer und Drdnger and other original geniuses of the 1770s, or
between individual Romantics, In what follows I apply the term Roman
tic to all representatives of the Romantic Weltanschauung, whether before
or after the adoption of the name.
Biographically speaking, all of the eighteenth-century Romantics, began
as rationalists; they were enlightened in every sense of the term, and their
aspirations were formed by Aufklarung. Almost all of them, too, had to
grapple with failure on their chosen path. Johann Georg Hamann, the great
inspiration of the Sturmer und Dranger, was brought up in a Pietist family.
His upbringing left his sensibilities over-cultivated by devotional reading
and practice and himself with a heavy stutter which made him shy and
uncomfortable in social intercourse. He went to the University of Konigs-
berg to study first theology and then law, but quickly lost interest in both,
devoted his time to the enthusiastic study of the French and English Enlight
enment, and did not take a degree. Like so many other aspiring intellectuals,
he earned his bread for a while as a private tutor, but then worked in the
commercial firm of a friend who trusted him to go on a business mission to
London, There, upset by the breakup of a homosexual affair, Hamann
wasted the money entrusted to him and in despair turned to the Bible.
Whether because what he read gave him courage, or because remaining in
London any longer became impossible, he returned to Konigsberg, but de
cided against resuming his job in the firm, although forgiven by his friend,
324 N A T I O N A L I S M
and instead wrote his first anti-rationalist (and we may addfirst Roman
tic) work, Socratic Memorabilia.88
The chief theoretician of the Sturm und Drang, Herder, the son of poor
Pietist parents, also attended the faculty of theology at the University of
Konigsberg. There he was influenced by Kant and studied the thought of the
French and English Enlightenment with an enthusiasm at least equal to Ha-
manns. In 1769 he visited France and met some of the Encyclopedists, Di
derot and Condillac leaving a particularly deep impression on him. His first
works championed the cause of Aufklarung, and, as he later told Hamann,
he only narrowly escaped being a wit. Like many others he aspired to an
academic career. He applied repeatedly for a chair of theology, but was as
repeatedly denied it, among other reasons, because his theology was, as Ni
colai sarcastically remarked,very secular. At the age of thirty, when he
became one of the leaders .of the Sturm und Drang, Herder was already a
frustrated and bitter man. Goethe, who had the opportunity to experience
on himself the after-effects of his friends unhappy past, wrote later: Herder
constantly embittered his finest days, both for himself and others, for he
knew not how to moderate, by strength of mind in later years, that ill humor
which had necessarily seized him in his youth.69He turned against the faith
of his former days with the uncompromising passion of apostasy, and the
earliest of his Sturm und Drang works were also the most violent in their
rejection of the spirit he had professed just several years before.
Another one-time student of Konigsberg University was Lenz, in whose
person and broken life, if not necessarily works, the tortured and turbulent
spirit of the Sturm und Drang found its most perfect embodiment. Lenz also
had been brought up in a deeply Pietist environment and was studying the
ology. Like Herder under the influence of Kant, he found philosophy more
attractive and interrupted his studies. To support himself he accompanied
the brothers von Kleist to Strassbourg; his experience was similar to that of
many other bourgeois tutors to young noblemen: he was and felt degraded
and humiliated. He left his service in 1774 and joined Goethes circle'never
being able to resume his studies or find a proper employment.
The story of Klinger, who christened the movement, was, with but minor
differences, that of Anton Reiser. For that reason, Guelfo, the hero of Klin
gers Twins, became Antons favorite part: he found in Guelfo his own self
derision, self-hatred, seif-contempt, and passion for self-destruction, but
combined with force, Reiser delighted in the scene where Guelfo, after the
murder of bis brother, smashes the mirror in which he sees himself.50
To this pattern of frustrated hopes followed by apostasy, common to the
Stiirmer und Dranger, Goethe may appear a somewhat disconcerting excep
tion. Goethes exceptional abilities and personality, however, make him less
of an exception than he would have to be considered were be an ordinary
Bildungsbiirger. Unlike other Stiirmer und Dranger, Goethe came from an
The Final Solution ol Infinite Longing: Germany
325
upper-bourgeois, patrician family, studied law rather than theology, read the
Bible as a text in history and linguistics rather than as the word of God, and
was only in the later years of his youthby way of entertainmentexposed
to Pietism. Moreover, in 1775, when he was snatched by the Duke of Wei
mar from the claws of the legal career to which he was predestined and
which he heartily disliked, a turn of events that nipped his Sturm und Drang
revolt in the bud, he was only twenty-six years old. Objectively, he had few
reasons to fear and no time to experience failure. His youthful antagonism
to the principles of Aufklarung is accounted for not by the misery of reality,
but rather by the grandeur of his expectations. From very early on he rec
ognizedand was fortunate to be encouraged inhis extraordinary abili
ties, and thus aspired to more than would satisfy his less richly endowed
comrades. As a result, on the one hand, the discrepancy between expecta
tions and reality in his case was as great as it might have been, for other
reasons, in theirs. The disparity between the narrow and slow-moving
bourgeois sphere and the breadth and energy of my nature, he wrote later,
would have driven me mad. n He might have been apprehensive of a dis
appointment. On the other hand, setting his mind on greatness (not merely
making a living) in letters put him in direct competition with the already
great, all of whom at the time were champions of the Aufklarung. However
subconsciously made, the choice of a different path might have been a
product-differentiation strategy, a way to increase his chances of achieving
greatness and reducing the risk of failure. Thus Goethes situation, too,
could have led to his youthful Romanticism, even if he had not arrived at
Strassbourg, where Sturm und Drang originated, immediately after his short
excursion into Pietism and had not been well versed in Pietist literature;
andwhile in Strassbourgeven if he had not been most profoundly influ
enced by Herder and had not written his Sturm und Drang works under the
direct impact of the latters views and personality.
The apprenticeship of the early Romantics of the end of the century
was similar to that of the Sturmer und Dranger. Indeed, Henri Brunschwig
sees the frustration of their hopes of obtaining a position within the institu
tions and in the spirit of the Aufklarung as the direct cause of their turning
away from it. Their failure casts doubt on the validity of the promises of
the Aufklarung and in rejecting it, they reject the society which has
proved incapable of absorbing them. Those acclaimed leaders of the
early Romanticism who lived beyond the age of thirtythe brothers
Schlegei, Schleiermacher, and Tieckspent long years between one occa
sional employment and another, waiting for the position of their dreams.
When Wilhelm Schlegei was finally appointed a professor (at the University
of Bonn, in 1818), a position for which he had prepared all his life, he was
fifty-one years old. Schleiermacher was only thirty-six, when, already a well-
known author, and after years of obscurity and frustration as a private tu
326 N A T I O N A L I S M
tor, chaplain to the Charite Hospital in Berlin, and a pastor of Stolpe, he
became a university preacher and professor of theology at Halle. But to him
this seemed long overdue, and the position appeared so precious that the
threat of Halle being closed by the French was one of the sources of that
passionate national patriotism which made him famous in his later years.
Friedrich Schtegel and Tieck ended their days in relative comfort, but to the
end remained dependent on the personal patronage of the great of this
world. Still, the early Romantics were closer to Goethe than to the other
Sturmer und Dranger, for the discrepancy between expectations and reality
in their case was more the result of their inflated desires than of the incle
mency of objective circumstances. There is a type of ambition which would
rather be the first among the last than the second among the first, wrote
Friedrich Schlegel. That is the ancient kind. There is another ambition
which would rather . . . be the second among the first than the first among
the second. That is the modem kind. The Romantic was the modem ambi
tion; even those who, like Wackenroder or von Kleist, could easily get a
regular, respectable position in the civil or the military service would not
settle for that. A whole generation younger than the Sturmer und Dranger,
they not only carried on and perfected but were also formed by the mental
ity which is the subject of these pages. They wanted giory and fame, and
aspired to positions of conspicuous leadership. That is why professorships
and central preaching posts were considered so valuable. Seeing themselves
as higher beings, they craved a tribune which would allow others to appre
ciate this.92
As a movement of thought, Romanticism was a response to the fears and
frustrations of the Bildungsburger, generated by the Aufklarung. The central
value of the Aufklarung was reason, and it was rationalism that the Roman
tics revolted against. In reaction against the alleged source of their sorrows,
the creators of Romanticism {or, as Henri Brunschwig rightly calls it, of the
mentalile romantique) used available cultural resources to construct an
alternative view. They were drawn to and drew upon Pietism, to the perva
sive spirit of which ali of them had been exposed and in which many of them
had been steeped since their early childhood. Pietism had its own reasons to
denigrate the powers of the intellect, which created a natural affinity be
tween it and the Romantics, and possessed an additional merit consisting in
that, unlike other alternatives to Aufklarung, it had escaped the discredita-
tion by the latter. Romanticism, which was called a kind of artistic and
intellectual Pietism, 93thus transplanted Pietistic principles into the secular
sphere and there articulated, amplified, and systematized them. Emptied of
all specifically Christian content, these principles formed the infrastructure
of a Weltanschauung which was infinitely more widely applicable, and in
this form they exerted their most potent influence.
It is misleading to say that Romanticism was an outgrowth and exten
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 327
sion of pietistic principles or, more accurately . . . that pietism was only an
early form of Romantic mentality, applied to the field of religion, as does
Arlie Hoover,54for this presupposes an identity of source for the two tradi
tions and implies that Romanticism was a result of the inner evolution of
Pietism. This is as wrong as to attribute the nature of Romanticism exclu
sively' to the fact that it was a reaction to Enlightenment or to Classicism,
though this, among other things, it certainly was, and to represent it as the
iTiirror-image of what it reacted against. It was the specific combination of
the two traditions (rationalism, against which the Romantics were reacting,
and Pietism, which they used in their reaction) brought together by their
existential or structural situation and needsby their fears, frustrations,
and aspirationswhich produced Romanticism, and it was this existential
or structural situation and these needs which provided the generative prin
ciple in this case, not either of the two traditions. Equally misleading, how
ever, is the assertion of the otherwise remarkably suggestive and valuable
study of Henri Brunschwig, that the Romantic mentalityin all its com
plexityis a derivation from the structural position of the Romantics,
which does not take into consideration the nature of the traditions which
helped to shape their reaction. With different cultural resources the same struc
tural situation would have produced a radically different result, but in the ab
sence of this structural situation, the same cultural resources might not have
produced anything and their potentialities might have been left unrealized.
The turn to Pietism as an alternative to rationalism in somerarecases
was explicit and unreserved; it was in fact a return. A child of an earlier age,
Hamann rejected reason because of its inadequacy as a medium of Divine
revelation and, like other Pietists, opposed to it emotion, which made the
immediate experience of Divine presence, of grace, possible and provided
certainty of salvation. Kopfwissenschaft, abstract reasoning, was bad be
cause it alienated man from Christ and prevented one from perceiving Him
clearly; feeling was good, for it revealed His presence; so the natural use of
the senses was to be purified from the unnatural use of abstractions. And
yet even Hamann secularized these orthodox Pietistic principles. Unlike the
normal pietist, he stressed the totality of human naturethe faculties of
the body as well as the soulas a proper medium of Divinity. Nature
works upon us through senses and passions . . . Every impression of nature
upon man is not only a memorial, but also a pledge of the basic truth: Who
is the Lord. 95Any intense sensationphysical or spiritualwas to be in
terpreted as revelation and meant consciousness of the Deity- It was not its
nature, but depth, spontaneity, and naturalness, which made it holy. Sexual
ity had a privileged place among the means God used to reveal Himself to
man for Hamann, and one can speculate to what extent, in accordance with
the principle that consciousness' is determined by ones way of life, such
sanctified sensuality reflected Hamanns own notorious libido. Normal
328 N A T I O N A L I S M
Piefists were made quite uncomfortable by this. Yet the fact remains that
Hamann felt bound to the fundaments of the Christian belief and saw Chris
tianity as the basis of and ultimate justification for his preferences and ac
tions. The younger generation dispensed with the justification and exulted
in sensualism, making it a supreme independent value, in fact a religion in
its own right.
Brought up in the atmosphere of Aufklarung at its most vigorous, the
members of the Sturm und Drang generation found the traditional Christian
beliefeven if reduced, as in Pietism, almost entirely to the belief in the
person of Christintellectually offensive and could not accept it. Goethe, a
one-time crazy scorner of religion, considered himself a decided non-
Christian. I f only, he wrote in response to a discourse by Herder that was
still too orthodox for his taste, the whole doctrine of Christ were not such
a mucky affair [Scbeissding}that drives me crazy, Nor had he any patience
with Pietists "in their old state of inanition and stupidity without the least
sign of ever emerging out of it. Herder, who was after all a Lutheran cler
gyman, when it came to his views on religion differed from Goethe but little.
His preaching at Weimar led some to think he was an atheist, a free
thinker, a Sodnian, an enthusiast. He admitted that such suspicions were
not entirely without grounds. His sermons, as he wrote to his future wife,
had nothing but the name in common with other sermons: My sermons
are as little clerical as my person, they are human sentiments of a full heart.
With a chair of theology in mind, he did write a passionate tract defending
Genesis against the assault of modern science (The Oldest Document of the
Human Race, 1774), but at the same time thought that the most sublime
name for God was World-Spirit and openly preferred Spinozism. I do
not recognize an extra-mundane God, he could say. What is a God, if he
is not in you as an organ among his thousand million organs? . . . According
to [Spinoza] he is the being of beings, Jehovah. 1must confess, this philoso
phy makes me very happy. Alternatively, bemoaning the demise of the
primitive Germanic society, for which he blamed the adoption of Christian
ity, he could reproach his forebears: Was not Arminius good enough to be
a God for you?96
The early Romantics were similarly unrestrained in their interpretation
of Christianity. Its only prejudice and presumption that maintains there is
only a single mediator [namely, Christ] between God and man, states Ath
enaeum Fragment #234. For the perfect Christianwhom in this respect
Spinoza probably resembles mosteverything would really have o be a
mediator. I f God could be man, argues Novalis, he can also be stone,
plant, animal, element, and perhaps, in this way, there is a continuous re
demption in Nature. What blindness to talk of atheism! exclaims Fried
rich Schlegei. Are there any theists? Did any human mind ever encompass
the idea of divinity? And in regard to the accusation that Fichte was an
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 329
atheist, he comments that since the essence of religion is an interest in the
world beyond the senses, Fichtes whole teaching is, in fact, religion in the
form of philosophy.97
While persevering in their enlightened anti-dogmatism, Romantics val
ued highly the emotional side of religious faith, and saw the experience of it
as beneficial and even necessary components of a full life. As if attempting
to appease both the Aufklarer and the Pietists in themselves, they redefined
religion as the experience of faith, and in doing so elevated experience to the
rank of religion. Goethe reflected in Dicbtung und Wahrheit: In Faith . . .
every thing depends on the fact of believing: what is believed is perfectly
indifferent. Faith is a profound sense of security in regard to both the present
and the future; and this assurance springs from confidence in an immense,
all-powerful, and inscrutable Being. The firmness of this confidence is the
one grand point; but what we think of this Being depends on our other fac
ulties, or even on circumstances, and is wholly indifferent. Faith is a holy
vessel into which every one stands ready to pour his feelings, his understand
ing, his imagination, as perfectly as he can. 98
Among the early Romantics this extension of the Pietist idea was most
systematically elaborated by the theologian Schleiermacher in the famous
Reden, the Discourses on Religion. The other members of the circle received
this work with appropriate enthusiasm, and in their utterances on the sub
ject more or less repeated Schleiermachers maxims. The Holy Ghost is
more than the Bible, insisted Novalis. This should be our teacher of reli
gion, nor the dead, earthly, equivocal letter. The mind, says the author of
the Reden iiber die Religion, can understand only the universe, approvingly
quoted Friedrich Schlegel. Let imagination take over and you will have a
God. Quite right: for the imagination is mans faculty for perceiving divin
ity. He summarized this proposition differently in another Idea: The
spirit of the moral man is everywhere suffused with religion; it is his element.
And this bright chaos of divine thoughts and feelings we call enthusiasm.
The chief merit of Christianity, accordingly, lay in that it was able to give
rise to this view of religion: In our age or any other, nothing more to the
credit of Christianity can be said than that the author of the Reden iiber die
Religion is a Christian.39
In this underemphasis of doctrinal content and stress on emotion the Ro
mantics were still very close to Pietism. The step from this definition of faith
as feeling to the definition of feeling as faith was small, hardly perceptible.
And yet, in taking it, the Romantics decisively separated themselves from
traditional religion of any kind. Feel your heart with this feeling, great as it
is, thus Faust urges Gretchen, enticing her to submit to his passion,
And when you find full bliss in it,
Give i t whatever name you please,
330 N A T I O N A L I S M
Call it rapture! heart! love! God!
I have no name for it.
Feeling is all;
Name is noise and smoke
Obscuring the glow of Heaven.
Here it is no longer God that reveals Himself in feeling, it is feeling which is
God. And while Pietism was an outgrowth of an old religion, this is the birth
of a new one. The Romantics created a secular religion, and unknowingly
opened a new era, forand this is a fact which is not fully appreciatedit
proved to be the seedbed of the secular religions of the nineteenth and twen
tieth centuries, which changed our lives.
All the basic propositions of Romanticism can be interpreted (and could
be used) as defense mechanisms against the fearor pain of experienceof
failure in a society based on the rational principles of Aufklarung. The con
stitutive ideas of the ground layer of this way of thought, such as cultural
relativism, totality, individuality, and the exaltation of emotion, provided
psychological insurance and amortization of sorts. Denying the superiority
of reason and posing equally legitimate alternatives to it, or denying reason
legitimacy altogether, Romantics reduced the pain of the actual or possible
failure to demonstrate such superiority and protected their self-respect from
the actual or potential injury.
The ideas of cultural relativism, totality, and individuality were but differ
ent expressions of the notion that reason was not the only or the fundamen
tal virtue, but just one of several fundamental virtues inherent in human
nature, and that therefore there existed alternatives to it. This notion repre
sented, logically and chronologically, the first stage of the Romantic deval
uation of reason. These ideas were articulated already in the Sturm und
Drang works of HerderThe Oldest Document of the Human Race, An-
other Philosophy of History, To Preachers, On Knowledge and Perception
in the Human Soul, and the essays in Von Deutscher Art und Kunst, consid
ered to be the Sturm und Drang manifesto. Herders starting point in these
works is cultural relativism. History, he says, is not a unilinear progression
toward one ideal equally attractive for everyone: Human nature is not the
receptacle of an absolute, independent, unchanging happiness. . . it attracts
everywhere as much happiness as it can . . . the idea! of happiness changes
as circumstances and regions changefor what else is it but the sum of the
fulfillment of wishes, of the purposes, and the gentle surmounting of wants,
which all are transformed according to land, time, and place? So at bottom
all comparison is out of place .. . Every nation has its centre of happiness
within itself.101Thus it is impossible to consider reason the universal prin
ciple or standard of achievement, and to judge one culture by the standards
adopted from another. Comparison is irrelevant; what matters is how
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
331
whole the culture is, how true to its own nature, how harmonious with
itsto use a later conceptWesenwille, its individuality.
The totality of a culture is its individuality. The degree to which the
culture expresses this individuality and fulfills itself is the only criterion by
which it may be judged, as it is also its mission and purpose. Whatever its
nature, the more fully it is acted out, the better is the culture. Wholesome
ness becomes synonymous with moral soundness; onesidedness {and mar-
ginality), with unsoundness, corruption. The same principle applies to art,
language, any part of culture, andmost importantto the individual
himself, Everyones actions should arise utterly from the self, according to
its innermost character, Herder wrote to Caroline, his bride; to be true to
oneself: this is the whole of morality.102
Such was the meaning of morality for the early Romantics as well. A
man should be unencumbered and move himself in accordance with his na
ture, without asking who is looking at him and how, wrote Schleiermacher
in Athenaeum Fragment #336. In the Monologen he confessed: To be
come ever more intensively that which I am is my only will. Every action is
a special development of this one will. Come then what may! Friedrich
Schiegel combined the moral imperative of self-realization with the Roman
tic Spinozism: Every good human being is always progressively becoming
God. To become God, to be human, to cultivate-oneself are all expressions
that mean the same thing.103
This admiration for the inner, natural capabilities is close to the Pietist
(and Hamanns) veneration of oneself as a creation, a vessel, a peculiar me
dium of God. For Herder, too, each culture had a religious meaning; it was
an irreplaceable brick in the Providential construction. But on the whole
Romantics dispensed with God: they dissolved the Deity in nature and made
individuality and totality primary values. Very much like the Pietist God,
Nature, thought Goethe, seems to have made individuality her supreme
purpose . . . She appears to everyone in a peculiar form. Nature, wrote
Schiegel in Lutinde, wills that every individual should be perfect in himself,
unique and new, a true Image of supreme, indivisible individuality. (He
added immediately after, possibly as a touch of Romantic irony, Plunging
deeper into this individuality, my reflection pursued such an individualistic
turn that it soon ended and forgot itself.)10'
Simultaneously, a criterion other than the degree of fulfillment of inner
capabilities was applied to all cultures, as well as to parts of culture and
individuals. This criterion was logically unwarranted {in fact inconsistent
with respect to individuality as such), but answered understandable psycho
logical needs and had recognizable historical originsin Pietism. Cultures
differed in the ways in which they provided possibilities of expression for
the various faculties of man: his undivided soul, the harmonious coexis
332 N A T I O N A L I S M
tence of feelings and senses alongside reason. In this context, totality, in
some disregard of individuality, acquired the meaning of such an undi
vided soul, the whole manwhich was to become one of the central
ideals {or at any fate slogans) of Romanticism and to reappear in rather
unexpected contexts throughout the nineteenth century. And, like Goethes
Nature, which made individuality her supreme purpose but cared nothing
for individuals, 305Romantics, in redefining totality and individuality,
seemed to dispense with the actually existingand naturally imperfect
human beings. Friedrich Schlegel declared: Individuality is precisely what
is original and eternal in man; personality does not matter much. Individ
uals mean less to me than of old, confessed Holderlin in 1793 to his
brother. My love is the human racenot, of course, the corrupt, servile,
idle race that we too often meet . . . I love the race of the centuries to
come.104
A bias, any bias apparently, whether a preference for reason or for emo
tion, was unnatural, for it injured totality. It was as fatal to the spirit as
having or not having a system. The only solution in the latter case, insisted
Friedrich Schlegel, was to combine the two. 107But to combine perfect ra
tionality with equally perfect emotionalism was tricky. And indeed the im
partiality of the Romantics was short-lived. Starting from the proposition
that reason was but one natural endowment of humanity, a part of nature
and a component of totality, they swiftly proceeded to viewing it as unnatu
ral and an impediment to totality, the means of dissecting, compartmental
izing, the whole man. It was, we might say, the weapon of alienation.
Societies and cultures which were based on or highly valued reason institu
tionalized and promoted such crippling dissection. Cultural relativism was
replaced by the new absolute standards of judgment.
The absolute devaluation of reason and exaltation of its opposite, the ir
rational, unthinking feeling, was the most characteristic and direct expres
sion of Romantic rejection of the society which failed them. This was the
establishment of a new orthodoxy; advocacy of the cause of totality and the
whole man resultedvia defining these ideals in a certain wayin ex
cluding a substantial chunk, in fact in a decapitation, of human nature.
The whole man was mutilated, his rational side was cut off as unholy, and
whole now meant the unreasoning, feeling man. Reason was deadly;
life came to be identified with lack of intellectual development. Lack of so
phistication led to a superior culture. The wilder, i.e., the more living, more
fully active a people is, wrote Herder in the Ossian essay in Von Deutscher
Art und Kunst, the wilder, i.e., more living, more sensuous, freer, fuller of
lyrical action must be its' poetry. Primitive, simple people were incompara
bly more creative than the so-called civilized society. Learning, wrote Justus
Moser, in addition to disrupting German society, has weakened and per
verted all human pleasures. Hamann thought that reason was unnatural.
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333
You are right, dear Hamann, agreed Herder; all learning is of the devil,
like the lusts of the flesh.108(One wonders why Herder compared reason to
the lusts of the flesh, since neither he nor Hamann thought that these latter
were of the devil.) Emotion, however, came straight from Heaven. It was the
expression of God, of Nature, of Life. I t gave value to life, justified it, and
was 'its purpose. It was all this because it was unthinking and natural; it
reflected the innocence of the pains of reflection and of the burning, insa
tiable ambitions to which reflection gave rise; it expressed ones natural
being and was the medium of totality and individuality. This was the source
of the Romantic admiration for the Volk, children, and young, simple
women, such as the Gretchen of Faust and the Lotte of Werther. They were,
as Werther said of children, so unspoiled [by civilization], so whole (so
unverdorben, so ganz). This was also the source of the Romantic image of
women in general, the creatures of nature in the midst of human society,
[who] alone possessed that childlike consciousness with which one has to
accept the favors and gifts of the gods, and who had less need for poetry
of poets because their very essence is poetry. Unreflective emotion was an
expression of Wesentville, of being at peace with oneself and ones situation.
In the simplicity and contentment of Gretchen or Lotte, their creations, later
of women in general, or of peasants, whom in their naivete they believed to
be content, the Romantics constructed an image that was the opposite of
their own marginality and alienation, which they thought were the products
of reason. Unthinking emotion, thus, was both the expression of and the
means to happiness. Faust, a prisoner of reason, tried to escape from it and
fell in love with the unthinking simplicity of Gretchen:
What plenty in this poverty!
And in this prison cell what bliss!109
They all longed for the black apron which had brought momentary con
tentment to Anton Reiser, unaware that the satisfaction it could afford them
would also be at best fleeting, '
So it was as the means to true happiness, as against the shallow gratifica
tion offered by Aufklarung (and denied them), that they glorified emotion.
But, paradoxically, they considered every emotion worthy of glorification. It
was the intensity, rather than nature, of emotion that was important. As in
faith, the reasons for the deep, irreplaceable feeling of being [des Daseins],
for feeling, mattered little. I am delighted; I am happy! recorded enrap
tured Goethe. I feel it, and yet the whole content of my joy is a surging
longing for something I do not have, for something I do not know. 110Ac
cordingly, since pain would arouse intense emotion most readily, Romantics
celebrated pain. This attitude, again, though it did not derive from it, was
closely reminiscent of Pietism, with the difference that the exaltation of pain
here had no redemptory or penitential overtones.
334 N A T I O N A L I S M
Romantics welcomed pain. My greatest sufferings are caused by my own
heart, confessed Lenz, and yet, in spite of ail, the most unbearable state'is
when I am free of suffering. Goethe dreaded Dumpfbeit, the dullness of
soul, more than anything, and made it one of the sorrows of Werther, who
would lament: I suffer much, for I have lost the only joy of my life: the
sacred, reviving force, with which I created worlds around meit is no
more. This joythe fullness of feelingwas anguish; feelings tortured
"Werther. Yet he refused to be consoled and insisted on his right to suffer, to
enjoy his suffering to the full, though not for a moment deceiving himself as
to the nature of his experience: Is it not the fate of man to suffer his fill, to
drink his cup? . . . why should I pretend it tastes sweet? A protagonist in
Lucinde commiseratedsomewhat condescendinglywith the meek in
spirit: Oh, these poor people who are afraid of suffering, and dont know
what awareness is! 111They wanted to have their cake and eat it, too. Ex*
cessive, intense emotion was a substitute for self-fulfillment in the world, for
the lack of objective rewards and satisfaction. It made their life, indeed, full,
and gave it at least the sense of meaning, and so they reveled in this torment.
There was a peculiarly perverse rationality in this celebration of irrational-
ism: they sought to maximize pleasure by maximizing pain.
The exaltation of feeling was a defense-mechanism in dealing with the
fear or experience of failure in a world which prized rationality. But while it
provided a means of coping with failure, it also increased its probability. It
created a snowball effect. The sensibilities of these young men were over
cultivated; they were lured to abandon themselves, to succumb to shattering
emotions. This reinforced the effects of competition for scarce resources
among the university educated. Tom by their passions, they became really
unfit for rational, worldly activity and were further marginalized by their
inner life. Like Anton Reiser, they could escape this vicious circle in which
they were all caught only by dreaming themselves into another reality
the creation of their fantasy. The certainty of failure grew together with the
invention of ingenious ways to avoid its realization and the construction of
alternative rewards and means of self-fulfillment.
These devices utilized and built on the hypertrophied sensibility of the
Romanticstheir distinguishing characteristic and the only skill they devel
oped to perfection. The idea of genius, the Genie which gave its name to
the Sturm und Drang period and was inherited and carried on by the Ro
mantics of the end of the century, was the most important of them. Genius
denoted original, and thus ultimate, creativity, which turned its possessor
into a God on a smaller scale and put him above ordinary mortals; it legiti
mated extreme sensibility, making feeling both the source and the sign of
creative powers. The appeal of this idea was enormous; it gave several gen
erations of unemployed and frightened intellectuals a reason to rejoice in
their fate and be proud of themselves. In 1786 Moser noted: Germany is
Th'e Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
335
suffering from an epidemia . . . This is the mania for genius. Goethe, in
Dicbtung und Wahrkeit, reflected upon this revolution in values, which in
the calm and serenity of his Weimar Classicism he considered an aberration,
but to which in the earlier days he contributed perhaps more than any other
individual:
A new world seemed suddenly to come into being. The physician, the general,
the statesman, and soon enough anyone who had any pretension to eminence
in theory or practice was required to be a genius ... The term genius became
the key to everything, and as it was so frequently employed, people came to
believe that what it ought to denote was tolerably common. Since everyone was
entitled to demand that his neighbor should be a genius, he came to think that
he was one too. It was a far cry from the time when it was believed as a matter
of course that genius is the power with which man is endowed by the laws
and regulations as a consequence of what he does. Quite to the contrary: it was
displayed only by transgressing the existing laws and overturning regulations,
for it openly claimed that there were no limits to its powers. So it was very easy
to be a genius ... If someone trotted around the globe with no great notion
why he was doing it ot where he was going, it was called a voyage of genius. To
embark on a thing which had neither sense nor utility was a stroke of genius.
Enthusiastic young men, some of them truly gifted, lost themselves in the infi
nite.2
The idea of genius espoused by the early Romantics corresponded
rather closely to Goethes mocking description. Genius was indeed thought
to be something fairly common, something one had to be. Though genius
is not something that can be produced arbitrarily, declared Friedrich Schie
gel, it is freely willed . . . You should demand genius from everyone, but
not expect it. A Kantian would call this the categorical imperative of ge
nius. This was not too difficult a state to achieve: in many cases Romantics
dispensed even with the effort to will it freely. According to Novalis, genius
was the original state of man: Instinct is genius in Paradise, he said, be
fore the period of self-abstraction. Genius was the goodthe natural
aspect of man; thus everyone was, at least to some extent, a genius. To have
genius is the natural state of humanity, reads Idea #19. Nature en
dowed even humanity with health, and since love is for women what genius
is for men, we must conceive of the golden age as a time when love and
genius were universal. But very few people remained true to Nature in the
present, not golden, unnatural age. In it this lofty title could be claimed only
by the virtuous, the select few. Every complete [emphasis added] human
being has some sort of genius. True virtue is genius. m Genius was, then,
the expression of totality, of Nature, and thus the polar opposite of reason.
Athenaeum Fragment #366 stated this polarity: Reason [Verstand] is
mechanical. . . genius is organic spirit. 114
People of genius have always been permitted to be ignorant and trans
336
N A T I O N A L I S M
gressors of the law, said Hamann. To be ignorant and transgress the law
became the mark of genius. To be recognized, the inner workings of emotion
had ro be made manifest, and thus the adulation of genius reinforced the
tendency toward overt expression of feeling; impulsivity, irregular behavior
were highly praised. Originality was just another facet of this: it was ex
pressed in doing what was not done, and what had not been done before.
Genius was not to be learned. Johann Kaspar Lavaters outpourings on the
subject, which read as a torrent of exclamations, no doubt should be consid
ered expressions of original genius themselves. Where there is activity,
wrote this distinguished Pietist, energy, deed, thought, feeling, which may
not be learned or taught by men, there is genius!. . . Genius is not learned,
not acquired, not to be learned, not to be acquired, it is our unique property,
inimitable, divine, it is inspired. Genius flashes, genius creates; it does not
arrange, it creates! Genius, a human god, untutored and bending to no
rule, was the opposite of artificiality and of alienation. He was as whole
as a man could be, and therefore at one with nature, a species-being so to
speak. And I cry Nature! Nature! nothing so completely Nature as Shake
speares characters, cried, on his own testimony, Goethe.115The excitement
and dynamism of the Romantic prose was as accurate a reflection of what
the writers meant to say as the actual words in which they put this intended
meaning.
Genius sought fulfillment in basically two areas: art and personal life. The
way in which it was translated Into art was of paramount significance for
the nature of modern art in general; the way in which it found expression in
life was of significance not only for modern art.
In art genius became the medium and prophet of God, orif God was
dissolved in natureof nature, of feeling, of the primeval source of all life.
(Many so-called artists, said Schlegel, are really products of natures
art.) Let us now hear the sum of my latest aesthetic, taught Hamann,
which is also the oldest: Fear God and give Him the honor. Since God in
nature worked through senses and passions, art had to be a faithful reflec
tion of senses and passions in their intensity and irregularity. Rules were
ruled out. He who wants to abolish caprice and fancy from the fine arts is
like an assassin, plotting against their honor and their life. Both art and
artists were seen as divine in the literal sense of the word. The artist was a
human God (or God in Human formLavater), a dramatic God
(Herder), and it is in this sense that poetry was the mother-congue of the
Human race-the language spoken by God (Hamann). Art acquired fun
damental religious significance: it became the form in which the rightly
understood Deity could be properly worshipped, and the embodiment of the
new cult of feeling. The authority of the artist was supreme, and his freedom
unlimited. Gods in human form! screamed excitable Lavater. Creators!
Destroyers! Revealers of the mysteries of God and men! Interpreters of na
ture! Speakers of unspeakable things! Prophets! Priests! . . . Who is a poet?
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 337
A spirit who feels that he can create, and who does create, and whose crea
tion does not only please himself as his work, but of whose creation all
tongues must witness: Truth! Truth! Nature! Nature! We see what we never
saw and hear what we never heard, and yet, what we see and hear is flesh of
our flesh and bone of our bone! 116In a manner more reserved, but with
equal presumptuousness, Herder exhorted the poet: For you as a dramatic
poet no clock strikes on tower and temple, but you have to create space and
time; and if you can produce a world and it cannot exist but in time and
space, lo, your measure of rime and space lies within you; thither you must
bewitch all your spectators, you must impose it on them, or you areany
thing but a dramatic poet. . . I t matters not how or where the dramatic poet
carries you away; if he can carry you away, there is his world. 117
The views on art and artists of the early Romanticsconcisely ex
pressed in Friedrich Schlegels Fragmentsdiffered from those of the pas
sionate Stiirmer und Dranger only in their authoritative tone and aphoristic
obscurity. The rejection of all limits to the liberty of the artist is reflected in
the attitude toward poetry. People criticize Goethes poems for being met
rically careless, Schiegel noted ironically in Critical Fragment #6. But
are the laws of the German hexameter really supposed to be as consistent
and universally valid as the character of Goethes poetry? In another Frag
ment he proceeded to define poetry. Poetry is republican speech, he said,
a speech which is its own law and end unto itseif, and in which all the parts
are free citizens and have the right to vote. The famous Athenaeum Frag
ment #116 (Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry) con
tains the classical expression of this attitude: [Romantic poetry] can be
exhausted by no theory and only a divinatory criticism would dare try to
characterize its ideal. I t alone is infinite, just as it alone is free; and it recog
nizes as its first commandment that the will of the poet can tolerate no law
above itself. Artists were elevated high above simple mortals. What men
are among the other creatures of the earth, artists are among men. This was
so, again, because artists represented God on earth. To mediate [between
God and man, for instance, like Jesus Christ] and to be mediated are the
whole higher life of man and every artist is a mediator for all other men.
Making art, however, did not necessarily make one an artist, and many of
those who were actually engaged in making it were not included, for they
were not creators in a higher sense. Only a genius (as defined by the Ro
mantics) apparently could be an artist. Schiegel insisted: Not art and works
of art make the artist, but feeling and inspiration and impulse. At the same
time, similarly to the genius, anyone who wanted to acquire the exalted of
fice of mediator between God and men could do. so, for, Schiegel claimed,
everyone is an artist whose central purpose in life is to educate his intel
lect. 118
These Romantic principles were put to practice without delay and were
immediately evident in the style of its inventors. The tendency to write Frag
338 N A T I O N A L I S M
ments rather than completed and articulated works (for completion and ar
ticulation had a tint of reflection and artificiality); the violent, torrential
rhythm of prose and the incessant use of exclamation signs in the Sturm und
Drang writings; and the metrical structures of early Romantic (particu
larly Tiecks) poetry519all elements that were adopted unconsciouslyno
less than the principled rejection of classical form, reflected the fundamental
position of the Romantics, and derived ultimately from the mundane frus
trations to which it was a response. The belief in the creative potentialities
of the genius and deference to his freedom, which sprang from the same
source, had long-ranging implications for the place of standards in art, for
the hierarchy of different arts, and for the prestige of the artist and art in
society.
Perhaps the greatest positive achievement of Romanticism, indeed an in
valuable gift which German Romantic intellectuals (in their effort to will
into being a world in which they would hold a place commensurate with
their worth and denied them in reality) bestowed upon humanity, was the
elevation of music to the position of the most Romantic and soon the
German art. The reverence for music and the emergence of the composer
as the quintessential genius followed naturally from the exaltation of emo
tion. Already in Luther one finds the perception of music as the most emo
tional art, as a divinely inspired form of speech, befitting angels (angels do
not speak, they sing). Romantics secularized and amplified this view. Music
was the immediate objectification of emotion and therefore partook of its
divinity. I t was this attitude which established Germanyalready, and to no
small extent due to the impact of Pietism and mysticism in general, a land of
great composersas the musical center of the world. Romantic music is a
result of the internalized principles which constituted the Romantic mental
ity. Excerpts from Beethovens letters and diary could easily find a place
among the entries in the Athenaeum; one finds in them the idea of art as
religion and the emanation of Nature, of the artist as a higher, special being,
of the genius as a repository of unlearned, original creativity; his ideas are
unmistakably those of a Romantic:
I despise the world which does not intuitively feel that music is a higher
revelation than all wisdom and philosophy.
No metronome at all! He who has sound feeling needs none, and he who has
not will get no help from the metronome . . .
Artists are ardent, they do nor weep.
Lart unit tout le monde,how much more the true artist!
Only the artist, or the free scholar, carries his happiness within him.
There have been thousands of princes and will be thousands more; there is only
one Beethoven!120
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 339
These words are naively arrogant, although no more so than SchlegePs
Fragments, and their pathos strikes the reader as pathetic; they never rise
to the awe-inspiring grandeur of Beethovens music. Yet this music would
have been impossible had his ideas been different.
One should keep in mind that the view of art as religion was promulgated
by intellectuals who since the end of the eighteenth century controlled the
media. In the course of time, with their help, art was established as an activ
ity of very high status, and it was because of this, and through art as rhe
revealer of Truth, that many Romantic ideas penetrated and influenced our
attitudes in areas of life far removed from intellectual and artistic pursuits.
Similar influence was exercised also in a more direct fashion, by the per
sonal examples of the Romantics and especially by the examples of the very
popular heroes of their works. The genius need not be an artist; his godlike
qualities were equally evident in everything he did and expressed themselves
in the very way he lived. The two types of Romantic heroes, for both of
whom Goethe provided prototypes in rhe figures of Gotz von Berlichingen
and Wertherone the titanic man of action, the Kraftgertie, the other the
hypersensitive soul whose existence consisted in intense feelingexempli
fied the ways of living which were commensurate with the majestic, elemen
tal nature of genius. So different on the surface, these two types shared one
central, revealing characteristic. Though one was action personified, while
the othera plaything of exhausting emotionswas essentially passive,
both were expressive rather than'goal-oriented personalities, and sought ful
fillment apart from the concerns of this world. Both, thus, were not of it,
and in this otherworldliness reflected the plight of their creators. In the case
of the heroes of Werthers type this is obvious. Emotion incarnate, Werther
was consumed, wasted by his passions and imaginary sufferings which
turned real. In him Goethe demonstrated the destructiveness of excessive
sensibility. But the ceaseless activity of the Kraftgertie was no less wasteful
and destructive. In the Sturm und Drang, such active'heroes most often were
warriors. War as such would provide them with intense experiences and
thus was well suited to engage their characteristic powers and provide an
outlet for their inner energies. With rare exceptions, such heroes did not
fight for a cause; they had no cause; they fought to fight, for the violence of
war made them feel alive. A protagonist in Klingers play Sturm und Drang
declared: War is the only happiness I know. The author himself shared in
this sentiment entirely. He wrote to a friend with evident contentment:
Where war is, there am I ; fondly referred to military service as that slav
ery that flatters our ambition; and in the end exchanged the laurels of an
artist for a military position to live happily ever after. War was idealized;
both for an individual and, significantly, for a state it was the proper way of
being and self-assertion.125
The fact that war frequently led to and caused death did not deter the
340 N A T I O N A L I S M
Romantics: death was regarded as a thrilling, consummate living experi
ence. Life is [Natures] fairest invention, rhapsodized Goethe, and death
is the masterstroke by which she has much life. Lenz emphasized its sensual
qualities: death was erotic, similar to the consummation of love. Werthers
suicide was in a way a substitute for sexual fulfillment; and it was beauti
fulno wonder that so many readers were tempted to experience such an
end themselves. The generation of early Romantics was raised believing
that death can also be a sweet and beautiful thing, m in fact that it cannot
be but sweet and beautiful. Novalis glorified death in exquisite prose and in
the poetry of his Hymns to the Nightthe chief symbol of death itself
and, too, longed for it as if it were a beloved woman. This moribund poet
considered life a malady, a disease of the spirit, in a way an abnormality,
for rest (death) was the peculiar property of the spirit.123Therefore, the
closer to death, the better. The idea of a perfect health is interesting only in
a scientific point of view. Sickness is necessary to individualization. This
friendliness to (in Novalis case, preference for) death was related, of course,
to the Romantics pantheistic view of the world. Death was not the end of
existence; it opened a newand betterstage in it. Novalis proclaimed in
Athenaeum Fragments: Death is a triumph over the self that, like all self
mastering, procures a new and easier existence.124
The view of death as a triumph over the self presupposed that it could be
legitimately self-inflicted. Suicide, indeed, held a prominent place in the
thought of the Romantics. Once Goethe started it going, thoughts and vi
sions of suicide had been such familiar companions to the German youth
that, for the members of Schlegels generation, they had already lost all the
charm of novelty. The charm of novelty, however, was not suicide's only
charm. Suicide was the way glorious, truly human people, the select, died.
In violently terminating their lives they achieved freedom and fulfilled
their destiny. That mad little book, Lucinde, is interspersed with expres
sions of admiration for suicides. In the Athenaeum Schlegei taught: It is
never wrong to die of ones own free will125
Suicide or not, death became an experience worth livingand dying
for. It promised the most exquisite sensual pleasure. Like you Ive already
learned to fuse the idea of death fearlessly with that of the highest bliss in
the daring and shamelessness of Jove, says Lucinde to Julius.126This orgias
tic, erotic notion of death was at least one of the reasons behind the Roman
tics peculiar return to Christianity in its Catholic form, in which, Hke
Goethe, but with different conclusions, they recognized a religion of death.
Precisely because Christianity is a religion of death, philosophized Schle
gei, it could be treated with the greatest realism, and could have its or
gies. n7 Thus beautified and tempting, death was invested with a religious
significance all its own. Isnt every death, wondered Novalis, a redemp-
tory death? More or less, it goes without saying. And couldnt a number of
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
341
extremely interesting inferences be drawn from this?128Such inferences
surely could be drawn, and the time they were drew near.
In their veneration of death, especially violent, not natural, death (as in
suicide), the Romantics were directly influenced by Klopstock and the Pietist
tradition in general, in which death was also idealized, and continued the
trend which had originated long ago. In their case all connections to the
Passion on the Cross were at least temporarily severed (though they were
presently re-established in their newly found Catholicism); the idealization
of violence and death derived from a cult of human passions. Owing to the
Romantic extension and secularization of this Pietist ideal, death, became
one of the central values of German secular culture in its very cradle. It was
morally good, more than that, glorious, to die, to kill oneself. And since it is
generally acceptable to do a good thing to another, it was acceptable to kill.
The right to cause death was prudently limited to those who understood that
this was a good thing. Only someone who risks himself can risk others. So
too only someone who annihilates himself has a right to annihilate another,
advised the preacher Schleiermacher. But it was in the nature of Romanti
cism to despise prudence, and Romantics would not suffer limits in their
desire to realize a lofty ideal. What a beautiful melancholy idea this was, an
idea, too, which no American mind can possibly reckon with. Assessing it
in passing in 1913, an American critic, a rationalist, poor soul, reflected: It
is quite certain that this way madness lies. 119And yet, how few people in
his and later times realized its terrible significance.
For the authors of Romantic fiction, death served a valuable function: it
provided a way out of the impasse in which their heroes inexorably found
themselves. These heroes incessantly and intensely sought self-fulfillment,
happiness, but could never find it. (Their creators knew that it was not to be
achieved; that is why one of the names they gave to happiness was the
infinite) Death .put an end to their suSering. The great problem faced by
the Romantic generations, which their lives reflected as faithfully as did the
literary creations of the most talented among them, was that emotion, pri
vate life, however full of passion, and expressive activity such as fighting for
no causewhich were after all substitutes for the attentions of the real
world that were denied themif they did not lead to death, led nowhere. So
many of the celebrated Romantic idealsfriendship, love, marriage, as
much as art and inner lifewere substitutions for conspicuously successful
public activity. In fact they represented an uninterrupted chain of substitu
tions: friendship substituting for love, love for infinity, and everything-
friendship, love, marriage, sensuality, love of solitude, and so forthfor
social acceptance.130These substitutions were designed to assuage the un
bearable sense of being unnoticed, to protect one from the pain of forced
inactivity, the failure to fit, to participate in the life of the society, and to
achieve conspicuous, recognized success in it, but they were not viable alter
342 N A T I O N A L I S M
natives. Merely expressive activity, lacking direction, provided no marks
with which achievement couid be measured; the skills o Romantic intellec
tuals remained inapplicable and were made even more inapplicable by their
hypertrophied sensibilities; the cultivation of feeling failed to satisfy the ba
sic urge, the yearning for social status, it was intended to satisfy. It was only
second best and at times seemed no good at ail.
Moreover, in their attempt to elevate the source of their discomfort and
present it as noble and befitting only the most lofty characters (which would
allow them to see in their very misery a sign of election), they made the
satisfaction of this very mundane desire virtually impossible. Though it is
not difficult to gauge what it was that they felt deprived of from their private
letters and diaries, they rarely went as far as Garve, who, in the introduction
to his workspubliclyadmitted to a passionate love of the worldly
which always governed and often troubled his spirits, and at all times
weighed more than the desire for literary fame 131When Romantics trans
formed their experiences into art, or subjected them to philosophical analy
sis, they preferred to represent their privation as an in-principle insatiable
yearning for something so ethereal and ideal that no earthly language could
express it, and disguised its real nature under a series of either poetic or
highly abstract euphemisms and allegories. They longed for a society that
would accept them and give them their due, and they called it The Blue
Flower.132As in so many other respects, the situation of a generation (in
fact generations) of young, educated people was similar to that of Anton
Reiser, who was plunged into deep depression because of the humiliating
lack of clean linen. (He found it impossible to confess his want, which
weighed on him most and was the chief cause of his gloom. He always at
tributed it to something else, for which he pretended to reproach himself,
because the want of linen seemed too petty and unpoetical a subject.)133
The function of this sublimation was similar to that performed for Anton
and numberless othersby Shakespeare and Werther; it gave a higher note
to their complaints. But at the same time it confined them to the vacuum
of universal enthusiasm. For how did one go about searching for The Blue
Flower?
Having no country to defend nor freedom to fight for, they had noth
ing left save the pursuit of happiness. m And since private happiness was
not what they wanted, this was not an easy task. One of the euphemisms for
the fulfillment denied them was action. They believed that their lives
lacked it in spite of ail their frantic activity. Action is the soul of the world,
wistfully commented Lenz. God willed that man should be active. His
existence was confined to imaginary sorrows, great sorrows conjured in the
mind, and he was undone by them. Before he went mad, though, he gave a
mosr explicit, poignant expression to the Romantic frustration. Perhaps he
went mad because he could so clearly perceive that the flimsy devices they
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 343
put so much energy into elaborating lacked the power to satiate their de
sires. In the review of Goethes Gotz Lenz wrote of emotions without ac
tion:
But can this be called being alive? can if be called feeling your existence, the
spark of God? Ah, the attraction of life must be something better: for to be a
plaything of others is a dismal, oppressive thought, an eternal slavery, an artifi
cial, rational, but for that very reason all the more wretched brutishness. What
do we learn from this? . . - This we learn: that action, action is the sou! of the
world, not enjoyment, not .sentimentality, not ratiocination, and only so do we
become images of God, who incessantly acts and incessandy rejoices over his
works. This we ieam: that [without action] all our enjoyment, all our feelings,
all our knowledge are merely passive, merely a postponed death. This we leam:
that this our active energy may not rest, may not cease to operate, to stir, to
rage, before it has created freedom about us, room for activity, good God, room
for activity, and even if it be a chaos that you have created, waste and void, but
freedom would dwell therein, and then, like thee, we could brood over it till
something emergedBliss! Bliss! a godlike feeling, that!
Had he known that in not more than thirty years his dream would come
true, that there would be room for activity, and chaos, and waste, and
voidenough for many generations of the likes of him to brood overhad
he known all this, he would have persevered perhaps. But he could not
know. He felt that his hands and feet were bound, and, like Schiegel and so
many others a generation later, he turned to literature, for there was nothing
better to'do.135But this was not enough: literature only brought the discrep
ancy between the desires of the Romantics and the life they actually lived
into focus; they dissected and articulated the feelings and the suffering of
their heroes and were becoming still more acutely sensitive themselves. Hie
higher they praised feeling, the worse they felt. They demanded satisfaction.
In a poem called originally My First Hymn, and then Eduard AllwilPs
Only Hymn, Lenz addressed to the Deity a passionate, desperate plea to
soothe his yearning:
How the flame of life doth burn!
God, it kindled at thy will.
And thy love grants me in turn
All the joy it may instill...
Once I tasted, it is true
Moments full of sheerest bliss.
But in moments, God, so few,
Thy reward should lie in this? . ..
No, I cryO Savior! Father!
My hearts yearning must be stayed,
Must be sated: if not, rather
Smash the image thou hast made!13*
344 N A T I O N A L I S M
For the leaders of the Sturm und Drang it all ended well. The yearning of
those who did not commit suicide (as did Merck) and did not become insane
(as happened to Lenz) was sated. Both Goethe and Herder found their
equivalent of the infinite at Weimar; Klinger had a successful military career
in Russia. The geniuses went into service and left their rebellion behind as a
memory of childhood, amusing, but unimportant. They were, to put it con
cisely, co-opted. Among those who helped o bring about the exquisite
bloom of German Classicism, Duke Carl August of Saxe-Weimar should be
thanked, perhaps, more than any other single individual.
For the change of fortune was followed by a change of heart, complete in
the case of Goethe, wavering but unmistakable in that of Herder. Klinger
left literature. How closely the two changes were connected, how closely
they followed one upon the heels of the other, may be gauged by the com
parison of Gotz and Werther with iphigenie and Wilhelm Meister, in whom
duty and self-limitation replaced both unbridled rage of titanic energies
which confused freedom with anarchy, and endless yearning. Goethe be
came reconciled with society; he accepted modernity and reason and whole
heartedly embraced the rationalistic French culture. Herder, as Goethe
noted in Dichtung und Wabrheit, would never forgive the world his early
humiliations and fears, and his hostility to modern civilization continued
undiminished. Yet he too was no longer a champion of everything that was
opposed to it.137
The prophets of original genius abandoned their God. But this did not
happen to those numbers of humbler faithful whom they persuaded to be
lieve in him. These did not relapse into Classicism, but carried the new faith
further and further, until it penetrated deep into the mind of the people, and
the Romantic way of thinking and feeling became the German way of think
ing and feeling.
Romantic Social Philosophy
Society and politics were not at the center of the Romantics attention. Like
Pietists, they saw these as mundane; to be preoccupied with the mundane
was beneath them. Dont waste your faith and love on the political world,
advised Friedrich Schlegei, but in the divine world of science and art, offer
up your inmost being in a fiery stream of eternal creation.138Yet they laid
the groundwork of a most portentous social philosophy.
Like everything else in the Romantic Weltanschauung, this social philoso
phy reflected the Bildungsburgefs intense dislike of the society in which they
were living and in which they feit neglected, and represented an embodiment
of the principles of totality and individuality. Its basic tenets were first artic
ulated by Herder. The individuality of each society, he argued in Another
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
345
Philosophy of History and elsewhere, arose out of its material conditions.
By placing a society in a specific environment, God provided a particular
principle around which the society was organized. The material conditions
were not chosen; they were given, and the moral perfection of a society, like
that of an individual, consisted in abandoning itself to its nature determined
by these given circumstances. The perfection of a thing is its reality, be
lieved Herder after Spinoza; Goethe, too, thought that the concept of exis
tence and perfection is one and the same.1Z9The Romantics concurred in
this adulation of necessity. But, curiously, this principle did not apply to
modern, that is, enlightened societyat the time represented by France,
England, and Prussia. The fact that this society put a premium on reason
was not interpreted as a reflection of its material conditions; the reality of
the modern, rational society was not viewed as a sign of its peculiar perfec
tion. Instead, modern society was considered an exception among human
societies, an aberration. In contrast to past societies, which did not value
reason, but were organic, little affected by the division of labor, and in
which community was cohesive and man whole, the unholy effect of rea
son was to divide the community and to split man, making him a part, a
sickly shadow of himself. Reason weakened emotions, desire, instinct, ac
tivity; it separated the heart from the head, the rulers from the people, and
mental from physical labor. Community was replaced by fear and greed,
and chimerical freedoms, such as in England, concealed real slavery. Mod
ern, rational society was a catastrophe: three parts of the world laid waste
and controlled, and we ourselves depopulated, deprived of our manhood,
sunk in luxury, exploitation, and death. 140
I t was specifically the plight of the man of letters which aroused Herders
sympathy. He knew from experience that the life of an intellectual in his day
was burdened by slavish expectations, timidly slinking diplomacy, and
confusing premeditation. In early societies, Herder wrote in the Essay on
Knowledge and Perception in the Human Soul, men could be everything,
poets, philosophers, surveyors, legislators, musicians, warriors, but the di
vision of labor created half-thinkers and half-feelers; moralists who are not
doers, epic poets who are not heroes, orators who are not administrators,
artistic legislators who are not artists.i41In modem society man became
alienated, and the man of letters was the quintessential alienated man.
The Romantics indictment of the enlightened society was a generaliza
tion of their personal experience in it. The unfulfilled promise of the Aufkla
rung to themthe unsuccessful intellectualswhich was responsible for
their unattached state and turned them into pariahs, led them to think
that reason separated man from community. A society that venerated reason
forced men into painful isolation, and was unnatural and unhappy. To this
unnatural society they opposed their image of an ideal natural community,
346 N A T I O N A L I S M
which would put an end to isolation and exclusion, leave no one and noth
ing out, but gather all within its iron embrace. In short, they envisioned a
totalitarian society.
As they were committed to fight rationalism on all fronts, they could not
but scorn the methods of rational discourse. Clear definitions, the very no
tion of a concept, were anathema to them, and they welcomed confusion.
Indeed, a double confusion supported the notion that totalitarianism was a
natural state of man. In the first place, they failed to distinguish between a
concrete society and social reality in general, and, second, they identified
society, social reality, and the state. An attempt to grasp the unfathomable,
lofty social reality with the help of analytical distinctions was nothing but
sacrilege; an idea that moves freely through all times and recognizes every
where the nature of mankind, of right and of the state,142was needed
instead. The specific idea in this context, which one finds throughout the
writings of the Romantics, was in the early nineteenth century given an au
thoritative formulation by the political philosopher of Romanticism par ex
cellence, Adam Miilier, and consisted in the following:
The state (possibly owing to the influence of the Protestant, and especially
Calvinist, concept of the office, decisively separated from the personality of
the ruler and seen as an impersonal entity) was equated with social reality.
The word state was used synonymously with society, social life,
civil life, civil existence, and the like; it was the total of the civil life
itself. Man was a social being; to live within society was natural for man;
human existence was impossible, had never been possible outside of society.
From the very beginning, nature has seen to it that there are always two
humans and not just a single one. Naturally, there had never been an age in
which the state did not exist. The state, in fact, was human nature itself.
The state is entirely autonomous; independent of human caprice and in
vention, it arises directly and immediately from where man himself comes
fromfrom Naturefrom God, the ancients said .. . Man cannot be
thought of outside the state . . . man lacks everything, if he no longer expe
riences the bonds of society or the state . . . the state is the embodiment of
all the needs of the heart, the spirit and the body . . . [man] is not conceiv
able other than in the state . . . there is nothing human outside the state.143
If the state meant social reality, this impassioned prose was but a
tedious repetition of an innocuous sociological truism. Under the magical
action of the Romantic logic, however, it was swiftly transformed into a
justification for a moral and political imperative and acquired ominous con
notations. To be true to ones nature, or individuality and totality, was the
very purpose of human existence. Thus to be true to mans social nature
became a matter of ethical conduct; a man who did not feel one with society
was not an individual and was not whole And since the state, or so
ciety, meant at the same time a particular state, or societythe father
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landnothing but complete fusion with the existence of a particular state
answered the requirements of true humanity. Man's individuality was im
possible without fusion with the state; his personality drowned in the indi
viduality of the state. For states, too, were individuals. They were living,
willing organisms. In fact, they were more individuals than people, The
state is not a mere factory, a farm, an insurance, institution or mercantile
society, it is the intimate association of all physical and spiritual needs, of
the whole physical and spiritual wealth, of the total internal and external
life of a nation into a great, energetic, infinitely active and living whole,
insisted Muller. The state is a person like the individual. What man is to
himself the state is to men, said Novalis; to his poetical imagination it ap
peared as the beautiful great individual whose spirit approached that of
a single exemplary man who has expressed forever one law only: be as good
and as poetical as possible. ^
The state did not exist for the good of men. It was a most unfortunate
mistake to think of it in instrumental termsa mistake which reflected
mans alienation in a rational society, his loss of his true and whole self. The
state is too great, too alive to surrender itself exclusively and solely for one
of those purposes [like freedom, security, right, and happiness], in conform
ity with the desires of the theoreticians, thought Muller; it serves them all,
it serves all purposes that can be imagined, because it serves itself. And
what good was the good of men anyway? France exemplified the ridiculous
pettiness of instrumental considerations. The best of the French monarchs
wished to make his subjects so rich that every peasant would have every
Sunday chicken and rice on the table. But would not a government be pref
erable, asked Novalis, under which a peasant would rather have a slice of
moldy bread than a roast in another country, and yet thank God for the
good luck of having been born in his land?145
The purpose of the state was, of course, to preserve its individuality. If one
understood the organic, living nature of the state, one could not conceivably
desire to change any particular state. If one regards the state as a great
individual encompassing all the small individuals, believed Muller, then
one understands that human society cannot be conceived except as an au
gust and complete personalityand one will never wish to subject the in
ward and outward peculiarities of the state, the form of its constitution to
arbitrary speculation. Moved by its exalted purpose, the state, clearly,
could not tolerate independence, indifference, or insufficient enthusiasm on
the part of the smaller individuals who composed it. Tolerationthat
watchword of the Aufkldrungwas generally scorned by the Romantics.
To Novalis it was one of the monstrous phenomena of the modern age,
while Schleiermacher enigmatically declared: Tolerance has no object
other than destructiveness. On these grounds Muller defended the medieval
state, justly intolerant of anything which was exempted from its author
348 N A T I O N A L I S M
ity, and wondered, How is i t . . . possible . . . to tolerate . . . a domestic
virtue which is entirely opposed to civil virtue . . . an inclination of the heart
which is completely antagonistic to external obligations, a science whose
work is contrary to all nationality, a religion of indolence, of cowardice and
of isolated interest, which completely destroy the energetic spirit of political
life? This is worse than the state within the state. There was to be no dis
tinction between the private and public spheres, no corner where an individ
ual could rest from the intensity of his civic life. The Romantics rested for
too long. For too long they were reduced to a miserable, inconspicuous ex
istence in a corner. They knew for a fact that life within the state alone
could be called truly life.I4<:
The dreamy Romantic literati were not the only worshippers at the altar
of the increasing majesty of the state. It is important to remember that.
Their nebulous effusions on the subject had an exact (in the sense of both
very similar and rigorously argued) parallel within the bastions of scholarly
learning. Venerable professors of philosophy (and not only Fichte and
Schelling, personally involved with the Romantic coterie) who never openly
renounced reason, but only redefined it out of existence, backed the coliec
tivistic totalitarian view of the state with their formidable authority and for
tified it with the iron, though somewhat idiosyncratic, logic that was the just
foundation of their fame. While Kants position on this matter was ambiva
lent, no ambivalence characterized Hegels theory. For him the state was an
organism, an ethical totality, and the only vehicle through which the true
individuality of any particular human being, that is, ones humanity, could
be expressed. It was "the achievement of ali, the absolutely accomplished
fact, wherein individuals find their essential nature expressed and where
their particular existence is simply and solely a consciousness of their own
universality.147Like the Romantics proper, the Romantic Hegel advocated
total integration of the interests of the individual with those of the collectiv
ity: in a society or an age which allowed the existence of particular interests
of any sort, the individual was split, he was alienated from his true (social)
nature and thus from his own self.
Like people, states vied with each other and were moved by a powerful
striving for the possession of importance and splendour. This was natural.
Natural, too, was the chief means they chose to satisfy this desirewar.
Wars were great institutions for the refinement of the idea and reflected
the inner destiny of the human race. !4SIn war the individuality of the state
was revealed most forcefully, it showed itself as a totality, as one great beau
tiful Kraftgenie, while peace fostered discord and undermined its unity.
Corresponding notions of freedom, equality, and ideal political behavior
were articulated simultaneously with this view of social reality. The Roman
tics had no understanding and no taste for the liberty of rhe individual
namely personal independence and freedom from coercion and arbitrary
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
349
government. Freedom defined that way seemed alien to them, and they ridi
culed it. The subjects of several countries [that is, England and France],
noted Wilhelm Schlegei scornfully, boast of having a great many freedoms,
which would become wholly superfluous through the possession of free
dom.149The real freedom .(jene uralte, lebendige Freibeit)150which merci
lesslyunderscored the pettiness and insignificance of all other notions of
freedom was the freedom to fulfill the purpose of nature, to become
whole, that is, true to and fully conscious of ones individuality. Plainly
put, it was the recognized necessity. The achievement of such full conscious
ness of individuality, for men, was possible only through fusion with the
state, and thus freedom resulted from and was only possible because of
the unconditional subjection of the individual to collective authority and the
virtual dissolution of the individual personality within the state. The state
was nothing but the articulation of the concept of freedom, that form of
reality in which the individual [by definition] has and enjoys freedom; but
on the condition of his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is
common to the Whole. Consequendy, what the state demanded from its
members as a duty was eo ipso our right as individuals.
While freedom was made to mean the total lack of independence, its cor
ollary in Anglo-American and French political thought, equality, was re
jected altogether. This rejection, however, was a result of the very same rea
soning and also followed from the Romantic concern for individuality.
Individuality, as was noted above, had two essentially incompatible mean
ings. They were used interchangeably, as the need arose, and owing to the
confusion which was taken to be the sign of creativity and cultivated, added
spice and pathos to the very same texts, without anyone being upset by the
glaring contradiction between them. The original meaning was that of ones
peculiar nature. It was certainly a carry-over from Pietism, which considered
each human being a peculiar vessel of God. Ones individuality in this sense,
an irreplaceable brick, however tiny, in the Providential scheme, or alterna
tively a token of Gods inscrutable wisdom, was sacred and to be jealously
preserved. This peculiar nature apparently revealed itself in, among other
things, ones calling, or position in life, which, too, thus partook of divinity.
God willed the social world as it was; to desire to change it was impious.
This was both a specific.expression of and a reason for the Pietist acquies
cence with the status quo. Hierarchy was sanctified. Most of the Romantics
forgot about the theological justification for the celebration of heterogene
ity, but since they had their own reasons to praise it (for it obfuscated the
singular virtue of reason), they also considered individuality defined as pe
culiarity to be sacred. Nor did they need theological grounds for treating
hierarchy as sacred, too. They believed that in a society where everyone kept
his place, and was not lured away from it by empty promises, people were
happier. Happiness was an expression of Wesenwille. of wholeness; people
350 N A T I O N A L I S M
were happy in their place because they achieved individuality. Thus it was
not only foolish but wicked ro desire equalityit went against nature. '
The other meaning of individuality was that of ones human nature. It
contradicted the first, for it emphasized what one (allegedly) had in common
with the rest of humanity, and not at all what made one unique. Neverthe
less, in regard to equality, individuality as the expression of universality led
to the same conclusion. The postulate that what was most sacred in every
human being (his individuality) was his humanity, what he shared with the
human species as a whole, contradicted not only the alternative postulate
that what was most sacred in every human being (his individuality) was his
peculiarity, but, on the face of it, also the demand that men forever remain
unequal. The derivation of this latter conclusion from the first postulate
demanded some philosophical doing. For a great mind such as Hegels, how
ever, this did not present any difficulties. He assumed that the self-
consciousness (the consciousness of ones true individuality) that the indi
vidual acquired through the dissolution of his personality in the state, as it
penetrated from the higher individual (the collectivity) down, stopped on
the level of a specific particularity, or, in other words, ones class or sta
tion. A human individual, therefore, could not acquire the consciousness of
his individuality but as a member of a particular class. The preservation of
distinctions between classes and stations became an indispensable means for
the fulfillment of the highest good and the purpose of nature, as well as for
human self-fulfiilment, and thus a good in itself.
The intellectuals dissatisfaction with their personal situation, their frus
tration with the principles of the Aufklarung, which was the direct, though
not the main, cause of their predicament; their extrapolation from their ex-
perience to the experience of man in general in a society based on reason;
and the ensuing humanitarian concern thus led to some rather disconcerting
conclusions. To be free, it appeared, man had to renounce all independence;
to be happy, he had to reconcile himself to the place assigned to him in the
larger scheme of things and was never to will to change it. Not less discon
certing was the proviso that these conclusions applied only to other men;
they did not apply to Romantic intellectuals themselves. For the Romantic
rejection of the Aufklarung was incomplete. The intellectuals resented its
failure to fulfill its promise, but clung to the promise itself: by hook or by
crook the world had to belong to those with superior mental powers. Their
claim to status in society rested on their intellect, and they were not willing
to give this claim up. They magnified and deified the faculties that set them
apart, and though they redefined the intellect and no longer meant by it the
capacity for calm, analytical reflection valued by the Aufklarung, they
nevertheless perpetuated the characteristic of the German- (as against
Anglo-American-) enlightenment inclination to see in the intellect the
ground for the inequality, rather than equality, of men.
The Final Solution of Inf inite Longing: Germany 351
Through the opening created by this insistence on the excepdonal and
superior nature of some individuals, the Romantic concepts of genius and
art entered politics, where they acquired portentous significance. Artists
were seers and oracles; they could divine historythat is, Providenceand
thus could provide an alternative route to individuality for lesser men. Art
ists make mankind an individual, wrote Friedrich Schiegel, by connecting
the past with the future in the present. They recognized necessity as, and
better than, did other human beings, but their perspective on it was infinitely
grander, and cherefore their necessity was infinitely less limiting. In the eigh
teenth century the Romantics were apolitical and contemplative. They saw
no place for themselves in politics, and reacted accordingly. Friedrich Schie
gel, who seemed to be able to find virtue in any necessity, wisely advised:
The artist should have as little desire to rule as to serve. He can only create,
do nothing but create, and so help the state only by making rulers and ser
vants, and by exalting politicians and economists into artists. Quite inno
cently the Romantics proceeded to do just this. They defined political leaders
as artists (A true prince is the artist of artists, ruled Novalis) who spoke
directly to God and owed respect to no human law. What great men ac
complish in enthusiasm, in which their whole being and the higher humanity
in them raises and glorifies and reflects itself, asserted a character in a piece
by the immensely popular jean Paul Richrer, that is right for them and their
fellows, but for them alone. Yes, the author agreed with him, there must
be something loftier than mere law. 1S2
This definition resulted in a new and sinister ideal of political leadership.
The thorough collectivism and anti-individualism of the Romantics ruled
out parliamentarian alternatives of government, and they, like the Aufklarer
and the eighteenth-century German intellectuals in general, although for dif
ferent reasons, tended to favor authoritarianism. The Romantic authoritar
ianism, the rule of a political genius, was, however, essentially different
from other varieties and, if implemented (as it eventually was), would be
infinitely closer to absolute power than any exponent of enlightened abso
lutism could ever hope to be. For this was authoritarianism unrestrained by
either tradition or reason and expediencycharismatic revolutionary lead
ership par excellence, unaccountable by nature and demanding uncondi
tional devotion.
The social ideal of the Romantics reflected the intellectuals dissatisfaction
with their personal situation. It represented an inverted, upside-down image
of social reality as they knew it. It was a remote ideal, similar to the infinite,
and equally unattainable. This image against which Romantics measured
reality remained constant. But sometimes it seemed to them that they per
ceived its features in the past, sometimes they saw it in the future, or in some
distant lands. Examples to which they pointed lacked precision, and they
were not particular about the terms they employed. The revolutionary de
352 N A T I O N A L I S M
sire to realize the Kingdom of God on earth, wrote Friedrich Schlegei refer
ring to this ideal, is the elastic point of progressive civilization and the be
ginning of modem history. Whatever has no relation to the Kingdom of God
is of strictly secondary importance in it. Since the location of the ideal in
time varied, the means believed to be necessary for its attainment and the
institutional forms of the values it embodied differed, too. Later, left and
right, radicals and conservatives, would- adjust to this matrix equally well.
Most of the early Romantics, on the whole, preferred the past. But even
the fascination with the Middle Ages, so characteristic of the period that it
is frequently identified with the Romantic mode of thought, was not essen
tial to their social philosophy. When regarded as an embodiment of the
Kingdom of God, the medieval society assumed the characteristics of this
ideal image, rather than molding this image in terms of its own historical
characteristics. And even the early Romantics did not always find this
retrospective vision satisfactory. The only thing Friedrich Schlegei found to
criticize in his Critical Fragments about the model of Germany, which a
few great patriotic authors have constructed, was its incorrect place
ment. It does not lie behind, he said, but before us. 153
"Wherever it lay, the ideal society in which all the wrongs suffered by Bil-
dungsbtirger because of the unfulfilled promises of Enlightenment would be
corrected was the never-never land of the perfect Community. One can
understand and even sympathize with their yearning for it: they wanted to
escape a condition which caused them pain. But why have the intellectuals
of the West been so taken up by this fantasy? How could we take this crea
tion of bitter and fevered imagination for a scientific description of a pos
sibleand more than that, desirablereality? Why have we for almost two
centuries admiringly followed those pied-pipers in their search for the Ro
mantic dreamland (that terrible land of totally absorbing society, in which
the individual was sacrificed to the higher individuality and found freedom
and happiness in submission, and which was ruled by the unaccountable
and unrestrainable semi-divine men of genius whose power was abso
lute) ? We must leave this question for another occasion, but it is worth pon
dering.
I I I . The Materialization of the Spirit
The Impact of the French Revolution
The social philosophy of the Romantics, like the Romantic mentality in gen
eral, developed as a response to the depressing situation of the Bildungsbiir-
ger. The intellectuals did not perceive any realistic way out of their predica
ment. Extraordinary abilities were developed in them which cried for public
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
3S3
expression and recognition. They were trained to become men of impor
tance in their society, but were doomed to obscurity and scorn. Their imag
ination, the cause of many of their sufferings, was also their only protection.
They dreamed their humiliation away, and convinced themselves that the
neglect and alienation which they could not escape were the signs of election
and true nobility, and were freely chosen. Love, friendship;; marriage, titanic
emotions, suffering, art, the yearning for the infinite, even glorious .inactiv
ity were so many ways they conjured to ennoble and justify their lack of
success, of which they were ashamed, in achieving the social position of
honor they had prepared themselves forthat is, die inactivity they in the
depth of their soul felt as ignominious. The totalitarian Kingdom of God
was another such device. The enlightened society was evil to the extent that
it would be simply unnatural not to be alienated in it. The Kingdom of God,
on the other hand, was so remote an ideal that it did not seem to be within
human powers to bring it aboutand one would be foolish to try toand
so it was quite enough, and a service to humanity, just to philosophize about
it. The conception utilized the same building blocks of totality and individ
uality on which was predicated the rest of the Romantic worldview, and thus
had its own momentum, and could develop regardless of externa! events. It
was, also, initially unrelated to the development of the national conscious
ness. But, with the rest of Romanticism, and Pietism before and alongside it,
this social philosophy prepared the mold, the very skin, bones, and muscle,
for the migrant spirit of the national idea, and added essential finishing
touches to the character nationalism was to acquire in Germany at the mo
ment of its arrival.
Although this portentous development was mainly fueled from within,
the last layers in the fundament of the German national consciousness took
shape in the forty years (roughly from 1775 to 1815) under the shadow
or the brilliant light, as the case may beof the French Revolution. This
world-shaking event had such a confusing effect on the Romantic generation
that for a rime the latter found itself, almost unconsciously, back in the camp
of the Aufklarung. When the mistake was discoveredin the very last years
of the eighteenth century and very first ones of the nineteenthboth the
Aufklarer and the Romantics abandoned the camp, and enlightened Ger
many was no more.
The story of the German educated reaction to the French Revolution is
well known: unreserved rapture, with which it was met, gave way to equally
unreserved repugnance and indignation; the final judgment on it was harsh.
The initial excitement was due to several factors. The ideas of the Revolu
tion, or at least its slogans, were familiar to the educated Germans who were
taught by the Aufklarung to recognize in them desirable social goals.
G. J- D. von Scharnhorst, the famous Hannoverian and then Prussian gen
eral in the wars against France, reminisced in his French Revolutionary War:
354 N A T I O N A L I S M
When the French Revolution began .. , those who loved readingthat is,
most of the educated classeshad already grasped the idea of a better con
stitution, which had long been seductively preached in novels and poems;
and the ideas of liberty, equality, and independence had been thrown into
circulation by the American "War, It seemed as if the promise of the Auf-
kldrung had in fact come true. It is glorious 0 see what philosophy has
ripened in the brain and realized in the State! exclaimed Forster. For the
discontented middle-class intellectuals, this realization of ideals promised to
be of great practical significance. The Revolution preachedand evidently
practicedthe gospel of equality; for a moment it appeared that in Ger
many, too, undeserved privilege would be toppled and merit, inteliectuaS
merit in particular, would rise in its place. The hatred of nobility was
recognized as one of the most common reasons for sympathy toward the
French, when the war began, and the lower classes and, significantly, the
scholars were generally considered the most likely sympathizers. In 1793
Fichte, in Contributions to the Rectification of Public Opinion on the
French Revolution, expressed the opinion of the intellectuals. Addressing
the nobility, he wrote: You fear for us the subjection by a foreign power,
and to secure us against this misfortune, you prefer to subject us yourselves?
Do not be so confident that we regard the situation in the same way as you
do. It is easy to believe that you prefer to subject us yourselves than to leave
it to somebody else; but what we cannot understand is why we should prefer
it so much. H. Ch. Boie frankly suggested insubordination: For whom are
they calling upon you to fight, my good German people? . . . For the vile
breed of princes and nobles and for the priestly vermin! Hoiderlin coun
seled his sister to pray for the French and wrote to his mother to take the
war lightly: 'Wherever it had penetrated in Germany, the good citizen has
lost little or nothing and gained a great deal.155
The identification with France was made easier by the sense that it was no
longer French. Since the German intellectuals saw in the Revolution the ful
fillment of the Aufklarung, they found no difficulty in believing that the rev
olutionaries were moved by the plight of suffering Humanity, and that their
concern for the French nation was of secondary importance. Cosmopolitan
ism, which, though widespread, had previously been more of an expression
of diffuse indifference than of ardent feeling, turned into a passion, while the
slowly brewing resentment against the French, which accompanied the yet
unformed but already wounded national pride, retreated into the back
ground. The letters of Joachim Campe, written from Paris in 1789, dearly
reflected the new sentiment, as well as the sentiments it replaced. Is it really
true, the famous educator wrote in the first letter,
. . . that 1am in Paris? . . . I could have embraced the first people, who met us.
They seemed no longer French . . . All national differences and prejudices
The Final Solution of Inf inite Longing: Germany
355
melted away. They had regained their long-lost rights, and we felt that we were
men -. - Even before we reached Paris, 1often asked myself, Are these really the
people we used to call and think of as French? Were the shrill chattering dan
dies, the arrogant and brainless swaggerers who used to cross the Rhine and
turn up their noses at everything they saw in Germanywere they only the
dregs and scum of a nation of which on our journey we have nor seen a single
example? Or has their whole character so changed with their revolution that
the noble elements which were undernearh have now come to the surface, and
vulgarity sunk out of sight?. . . the cleansing of [the French] national character
in the purgatorial fires of liberty is a fact which has struck German and other
observers who were here before the Revolution.116
No wonder that the patriotic intoxication of the Parisians on the night of
August 4, noted by certain observers from Germany, perplexed and even
disconcerted them. Still, in 1789, it failed to tint their opinion of the grand
event. It was natural that, since all national differences and prejudices had
melted away, the fact that Frenchmen had regained their long-iost rights
made German intellectuals feel that they, too, were men, and they eagerly
expected direct and personal benefits from the French upheaval.
But they were impatient. My heart is heavy, complained Novalis to
Friedrich Schlegei, that the fetters do not already fall to pieces like the walls
of Jericho. The welcome transformation tarried on the way, and the hope
was abandoned. The consciousness that one was misled, that one hoped in
vain, led to a drastic change of sentiment. The opinion of many a German
intellectual about the French Revolution transformed overnight, yet this did
not happen at the same time in every case. This lack of synchronization
makes it difficult to attribute the disgust which replaced unqualified admi
ration to the shock to sensitivity caused by the revolutionary excesses, to
which, in retrospect, many did attribute their about-face, an argument later
backed by historians. Nursed as they were at the springs of Pietism, Klop
stock, and Sturm und Drang, the Germans saw nothing wrong in violence.
During the days of their short-lived revolutionary enthusiasm, they in fact
had been rather annoyed when anyone pointed to the excesses and saw in
them the reflection of the evil nature of the Revolution. Blessed be its influ
ence on nations and rulers, wrote Johannes Muller of the Revolution in
1789. I am aware of the excesses; but they are not too great a price to pay
for a free constitution. Can there be any question that a clearing storm, even
when it works some havoc, is better than the plague? Johanna Schopen
hauer remembered later the ardent love of liberty which burned in every
young breast. Murders and excesses committed she wrote, were re
garded as inevitable incidents in a time of excitement.157
In some cases, at least, the decision, or rather the impulse, to change sides
was directly related to the degree to which persistent hope in a better future
interfered with the possibilities of a comfortable present, and the extent to
356 N A T I O N A L I S M
which such possibilities were indeed open. The opportunities, after all, de
pended oit those who could regard sympathy with the revolutionary cause
as a personal affront. Thus Johannes Miiller, employed as the secretary of
the Elector of Mainz since 1788, seeing no sign that liberty would triumph
in Germany by the spring of 1792, no longer felt inclined to sympathize with
its cause. People have told [the Elector] that I am a democrat and mixed up
with the enemies of princes, he wrote at the time anxiously. I am not. . .
these cabals are a great worry to me. Indeed he turned into a sworn enemy
of the Revolution, by which, as he saw it now, all mankind was outraged
in their deepest feelings, and did not lose an opportunity to stress that he,
personally, was for evolution, never for revolution. Since the Elector en
nobled him, made him his Councillor, and called him to his table, noted
once an admirer of Mullers, Reichardt, he is as zealous for the Emigres
and as hostile to the Constitution as he was previously enthusiastic for lib
erty and the rights of man. m
Young men, who couid disregard the concerns of adult life, or men for
whom no opportunities were open anyway, persisted much longer. Friedrich
Schlegel, that eminently excitable young man, wrote to his brother in May
1796: I am tired of criticism and shall work at revolutions with incredible
enthusiasm. I shall also write something popular on republicanism . . . I do
not wish to conceal from you that I have republicanism even more at heart
than divine criticism or still more divine poetry. Even he, however, was
aware of the danger such audacity might have presented for his advance
menthad the new world he wished for failed to materializeand he did
not neglect to take the necessary precautions. In preparing the essay on The
Conception of Republicanism, which was published in 1796 in Reichardts
Deutschland, he chose to abide by the following rule (revealing both his
anxiety and the spirit of Romantic science): Because of the rigor of the
scientific approach, he decided, I shall refrain from any allusion to facts
He also comforted himself with the consideration that the obscurity of ab
stract metaphysics will protect me. When one writes solely for philosophers,
one can be incredibly daring without anyone in the police perceiving it, or
even realizing how daring it is. After his hopes for a professorship were
ruined, Henri Brunschwig tells us, Schlegel gained courage, and since there
seemed nothing else for him to lose in this world, he put his faith in the
prophets of the new one. In 1799, Dorothea, his wife, still hoped for salva
tion from the West: The whole world is talking of Buonaparte. Can. one
not put ones trust in the fortunes of a truly great man? That same year
Caroline, Wilhelm Schlegels, later Schellings, wife, wrote to her daughter:
And now Bonaparte is here! Rejoice with me, or I shall have to think that
you axe not good for anything save romping and havent a serious thought
in your head. The admiration for Napoleon among the Romantics was
general.
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
357
Schiegels circle, however, was among the very last champions of the rev
olutionary cause in Germany. And the mood was changing rapidly at the
time even among Schiegels familiars. The political works of Novalis dis
tinctly sounded a new note. In Die Christenheit oder Europa (Christianity
or Europe) he condemned the Revolution, the values it stood for, the nation
that made it, and the age in which it occurred. Though a Fragment, this
essay represented an early self-contained statement of the Weltanschauung
of mature Romanticism, and the arguments which first appeared in it were
later to reappear again and again in German thought.
Novalis saw the Revolution as the final stage in the process of alienation
and spiritual destruction started by the Reformation, a child of Reason,
which undermined the pristine, wholesome world of Catholic Christianity.
He wrote:
With the Reformation Christendom was lost, and from that time onward ir no
longer existed . .. Modern Politics originated first during this period .. , reli
gious hatred extended very naturally and consequently to all objects of enthu
siasm, and denounced imagination and feeling, morality and the love of art, the
future and the past as heretical, and gave man the highest place in the order of
natural beings . . . One enthusiasm was generously left to the miserable human
race and as a touchstone of the highest education was made indispensable to
everyone thus concerned . . . France was so fortunate as to become the source
and seat of this new faith, which was pieced together from mere knowledge .. .
Light became their favorite subject on account of its mathematical obedience
. .. and thus they named after it their great enterprise, enlightenment. . , They
took pleasure in enlightening the common people and in training them to this
cultured enthusiasm. Thus arose a new European guild of philanthropists and
men of enlightenment. It is a pity that nature remained so wonderful and in
comprehensible, so poetical and infinite, defying all attempts to modernize it. If
anywhere there arose an ancient superstition about a higher world or some
thing similar, alarm was immediately sounded on all sides and, if possible, the
dangerous spark was suppressed by philosophy and wit; nevertheless, tolerance
was the watchword of the educated, and especially in France it was synony
mous with philosophy. This history of modern skepticism is the key to ait the
monstrous phenomena of the modem age, and only in this century and espe
cially in its later half has it begun to grow to an immense size and variety . . .
Shall the revolution remain the French Revolution, as the Reformation was the
Lutheran reformation? ShaH Protestantism once mote be established contrary
to nature as a revolutionary government? Is the letter without spirit merely to
replace another letter without spirit?*0
Novalis answer to these burning questions is: No! Salvation will come
and it will arrive from Germany, which goes its slow but sure way in ad
vance of other European countries. In this, too, he established a compelling
pattern to be picked up by most unlikely followers in the years to come.
Friedrich Schiegel, in 1799, found the historical conception of Die Chris-
358 N A T I O N A L I S M
tenheit oder Europa too arbitrary, its religiosity excessive; refused to pub
lish the essay in the Athenaeum; and ridiculed it. In his case, as in several
others of equal importance, it took a visit to Franceat that time (in 1802)
aglow with new national pride and aspirationsto effect a final conversion
and to wean him irrevocably from the cosmopolitan and libertarian preoc
cupations of the Aufklarung. But by the beginning of the new century the
transformation was complete. The revolutionary cause in Germany had
only enemies. With the victorious advance of the French army, new, unex
pected opportunities opened to the intellectuals, and with them the era of
nationalism.
The Birth of German Nationalism
It was the defeat of Prussia in the course of the French revolutionary wars
that finally ushered German nationalism into the world. The emergence of
the national sentiment was nothing short of miraculous. Notwithstanding
the feeble and uncertain expressions of enlightened patriotism among the
eighteenth-century Gelehrte, the conception in this case seemed to be im
maculate and no visible pregnancy preceded the appearance of the infant.
Yet, it emergedendowed with healthy lungs and fistsand at its very
birth acquired all the long-formed habits of its native land, to become the
unexpected culmination of a century-long development of the German
spirit.
For the unattached intellectuals, nationalism indeed was God-sent. It pro
vided a practical, this-worldly solution to their problem, and put an end to
their alienation. To Pietism and Romanticism it added directedness and ac
tivisminstead of persistence and acquiescence in the status quo, with its
dubious emotional pleasures, it offered a goal for which to fight and a real
istic possibility of changing the status quo and distinguishing oneself in the
world, rather than through reine Innerlichkeitand all this while remain
ing faithful to the Pietist-Romantic worldview and standards.
The conversion, the transformation of the Romantic mentality into na
tionalism, was sudden and unforeseen, for the glorious opportunities it of
fered were created ali of a sudden, by an extraneous, unforeseeable event
the intervention and victorious advance of the French army. The idea of the
nation was known in Germany throughout the eighteenth century; it was
almost commonplace. But until the fall of Prussia and the dismemberment
of the Empire, it did not ring a bell. It held nothing in store for the intellec
tuals marginalized by the unhappy inconsistency between the principles of
the Aufklarung and the arrangements of the traditional society. Unlike the
French and Russian aristocracies, the downtrodden German Bildungsburger
had no power to enforce the new definition of nobility and social honor
which the idea of the nation implied. To demand it, to insist on the redistri
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
359
bution of prestige in open disregard of the class which controlled its distri
bution at present, would be inviting frustration and ridicule and was worse
than a cry in the wilderness (and thus all sorts of escapism which the intel
lectuals practiced), for in this case one was certain to be heard. The news of
the French Revolution, which inspired them with hope, moved them to do
just that, but their optimism was short-lived and heavily tinted with cosmo
politanism. The tragedy of the Bildungsburger was that their predicament
was theirs alone. Without nobility and/ or bureaucracy at their side, they had
no chance whatsoever to change it, and for this the community of interest
was lacking. The Napoleonic invasion created such a community of interest.
Whatever the effect of the invasion on the German population as a whole,
the attack of the revolutionary army was explicitly directed against and in
tended to injure the representatives and beneficiaries of the old order, the
aristocracy and the bureaucracy. The intellectuals made the cause of the old
order, which they christened the German cause, their own. This identifi
cation allowed them to share in the common humiliation, the humiliation
whose brunt was born by the most powerful and respectable members of
society, the very groups whose acceptance the intellectuals so fervently de
sired, and into which this common experience finally afforded them the en
try. This grand humiliation in which the Bildungsburger had the privilege of
sharing was far less humiliating than the unbearable sense of being unno
ticed and the abject state of poverty and obscurity which contrasted so
painfully with their self-esteem and was their singular dole. It was in fact
elevating and filled them with noble sentiments. And for this reason they felt
it all the more; they willingly let it eclipse the memory of all their private
humiliations and concentrated solely on this collective misfortune. From
this time on the pride and the self-esteem they strove to defend was national
pride and self-esteem. They changed their identity and became, passionately
and irrevocably, Germans.
Owing to the circumstances of its birth, the German national cause was
from the start defined as the anti-French cause. This suited the influential
groups who were directly affected by the invasion, and they lent a sympa
thetic ear to the nationalistic admonitions of the intellectuals. For the first
time, the intellectuals were explicitly invited to participate in the experience
and efforts of the highest ranks of society and were seen by them as valuable
allies. Since the Aufklarung was irreparably stigmatized by its association
with the French Revolution, the positive definition of the German nadonal
consciousness was left entirely in the hands of the Romantics. For several
decades they vied successfully with the drier and less enchanting Aufklarung
for the attentions of the German public. They were the voice of their people;
they spoke to every German who could read through their novels, poems,
and periodicals, and by this means furnished the terms in which their read
ers thought. Through their writings the Romantic Weltanschauung was al
ready becoming the German Weltanschauung; their influence had been sig
360 N A T I O N A L I S M
nificant even before the war, though they were unaware of the degree of its
significance. But this influence doubled and trebled now that their teaching
had the weighty approbation of the upper classes and the governments of
states behind it, and was elevated into the official gospel of the new public
religion. The happy union of the intellectuals and the establishment lasted
but briefly. The attachment was momentary, and with the end of the "Wars of
Liberation was over, leaving the most ardent of the Bildungsbiirger unat
tached again. But in the ten years or so of the great collective effervescence
in which they were allowed to play the central role, these intellectuals forged
the national identity of the German-speaking people. German nationalism
is Romantic nationalism. German national social philosophy is Romantic
social philosophy, and the German national character is the Romantic char
acter, for the ideal, the true German, expressing the individuality of his
nation, is either the creature of nature, faithfully obedient to his Wesentville,
or the Geniethe man of titanic emotions and contempt for the peace and
calm of the little mens livesthe creature of natures art.
While Romanticism left a permanent imprint on the character of German
nationalism, nationalism in turn reacted back on Romanticism. It broke the
narrow circle of personal life and purely expressive agitation, which had
constrained the expressions of the revolutionary inclinations of the Roman
tic spirit to futile rage about itself, and opened for it a room for activity, the
one that Lenz had so fervently hoped for before he went mad. In this room,
the spirit was let loose. It became imperativeand seemed possibleto es
tablish the ideal state, instead of simply lamenting the perfidy of the existing
reality. It became imperative to fight the holy glorious war, and receive and
inflict real wounds, and meet and cause death, instead of simply imagining
it and singing its praise. The gloomy philosophy of quiescence which Ro
manticism had inherited from Pietism was transformed into an unshakable
belief that the infinitethe Kingdom of Godwas within easy reach, and
spurred the believers on to a frenzied activity to help in its realization. The
Romantic spirit of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was revolutionary
in a way very different from that of the eighteenth: it was determined to be
fulfilled in this world. The first expression of this reinvigorated Romantic
mentality, and of the nascent German national consciousness, was the war
against the French. This explains why German nationalism, which arrived
on the stage so late, and almost unannounced, instantly became the most
activist, violent, and xenophobic species of the phenomenon.
First Expressions and Crystallization of German
National Consciousness
This German nationalism, full-fledged and endowed with all the character
istics which made it unique, was quickly embedded in the soil which ten
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
361
years before would have seemed a most unlikely place for its emergence.
Friedrich Schiegel, who turned nationalist after his visit to France, and Ernst
Moritz Arndt, who in 1802 wrote Germanien und Europa, were among the
very first converts. But innumerable others followed in quick succession.
Collections of folk songs and tales, expressive of the preoccupation with
questions of national identity, began to appear in the first decades of the
nineteenth century. Ludwig Tieck published his Minnelieder am dem
Schwabischen Zeitalter in 1803, and pointed in the introduction to the
quick change which has occurred in so short a time, so that one is not only
interested in the monuments of the [national] past but appreciates them.16!
The first collection of folk songs edited by Arnim and Brentano appeared in
1805, and the folk-song fever reached its peak in the next decade, when
the brothers Grimm published their famous collections of tales. The patri
otic zeal of poets and folklorists was supplemented by that of the scholars in
established disciplines. The interest in German history revived. Anxious to
foster this interest, Karl vom Stein sponsored the work on the Monumenta
Germaniae Historica, a monumental collection of sources, which took more
than a hundred years to complete, and which at the time of its completion,
in 1925, numbered 120 volumes.
It was clearly the preoccupation with the honor of the German nation
which inspired the champions of liberal reform in PrussiaStein, Harden-
berg, Humboldt, and their counterparts in the military, such as Schamhorst,
Gneisenau, and Clausewitz. These leaders explicitly stated their motives.
Stein wrote that the reforms were intended to create a civic spirit among
Germans, to bring about the revival of patriotism and of the desire for
national honor and independence; they aimed at imposing the obligation
upon the people of so loving king and fatherland that they will gladly sacri
fice property and life for them, Clausewitz proclaimed fatherland and na
tional honor two earthly deities he felt himself obliged to serve. The interests
of Prussia were of secondary importance. I have but one fatherland, wrote
Stein, and that is Germany . . . to it and not to any part of it, I am whole
heartedly devoted .. . my desire is that Germany shall grow large and
strong, so that it may recover its independence and nationality.
Das Deutsche Volkstum of Turnvater Jahn, published in 1810 and,
along with Fichtes Addresses to the German Nation of 1808, that bible of
nationalism, recognized by the grateful compatriots as one of the spiri
tual sponsors of the new Germanness and one of the most precious prod
ucts of the German spirit, 164gave national sentiment an articulate ideolog
ical expression. In the electrifying sermons of Schleiermacher, who preached
it from the pulpit of the Holy Trinity Church in Berlin, this sentiment was
represented as a new religion, the true heir of the Reformation, and soon
eclipsed the message of the Gospels, adulterated as it was already by the
century-old labors of Pietists before him. In 1814, a Junker, F. A. L. von der
362 N A T I O N A L I S M
Marwitz, unsympathetic to popular nationalism and opposed to reform,
which was one of its manifestations, admitted, in a letter to Hardenberg,
that the idea of a common German fatherland has taken .. . deep root.
Whoever seizes upon this sentiment will rule Germany.lss
The sudden conversion to nationalism was in many individual cases trig
gered by the collapse of Prussia in 1806. At least in some of the most impor
tant of these cases, an obvious connection existed between Prussian interests
and the personal interests of the neophytes, which were directly affected by
the defeat. One of the most influential propagandists of German national
ism, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, was before his conversion a principled cosmo
politan and sympathized with the French. As late as 1799, when, accused of
atheism, he lost his professorship at Jena, he hoped for French victory in
Germany, for nothing was more certain to him than the fact that unless the
French achieve the most tremendous superiority . . . in Germany . . . no Ger
man who is known for ever having expressed a free thought will in a few
years find a secure place. Moved by this consideration, he asked to be em
ployed by the French Republic, but then did find a secure place in Prussia.
There, until 1805 faithful to his cosmopolitan credo, he remained indifferent
to the fate of Germany and untouched by the nationalism to which some of
his friends had already converted. The war of 1806 between France and
Prussia, however, changed everything. There was no doubt in Fichtes mind
that in this conflict France represented the forces of darkness and Prussia
those of light, and he longed to be a soldier in its battle. In the absence of a
sword, he wished to talk swords and thunderbolts. 166The Addresses to
the German Nation, which were the product of this state of mind, indeed
added a formidable weapon to the arsenal of the nation which he now pro
claimed his own and through his attachment helped to create.
Similarly,- the change in Schleiermacher was effected to a large degree by
the fact that the French closed the University of Halle, where he was a pro
fessor. He described the circumstances that grieved him in this period of
national humiliation in letters to Henrietta Herz,16? enumerating his con
cerns in the following revealing order: The sudden destruction of the
school which I was in the act of founding here . . . the probable dissolution
of the entire university . . . and added to this the precarious state of our
fatherland . . . Dearest, you can hardly conceive how this affects me.. . The
thought that it may be my fate for a long time to live only for and by author
ship, is very depressing This much only is certain, Schleiermacher re
flected on the vicissitudes of military fortune, that as long as the war lasts,
there is little likelihood that the university will resume its activity .. . Na
poleon must have a special hatred for Halle. This terrible disaster, he con
cluded, meant that the rod of Gods wrath fell on Germany, obviously for its
past inability to fulfill the high mission for which it was destined. This pater
The Final Solution of Inf inite Longing: Germany
363
nal punishment was a sure sign of Germanys election. Its very degradation
at present made it crystal dear that the triumph of Germany was willed by
God, and that everyone had to toil without rest and do his part in helping to
bring this triumph about. Patriotism was piety.-
German nationalism brought together the Pieto-Romantic mentality,
forged and hardened in the lasting predicament of successive generations of
Bildungsbiirger, which penetrated deeply into the souls of the Germans who
could read, to become the way they thought and felt, and the idea o the
nation, which, though long available, until then had had no appeal in Ger
many. When this idea was finally appropriated, it was inevitably interpreted
in the light of Pieto-Romantic mentality and imbued with an entirely new
meaning. At the same time, the Romantic ideals were nationalized and
represented as the reality peculiar to the German people, language, and
land. The German nation, which was now seen as the object of supreme
loyalty, and which did not at the time exist as a united polity (or economy),
assumed the characteristics of the true Church and the Romantic ideal com
munity. Now it was the embodiment of true individuality, the moral totality,
the eternal in this world. Only in the nation could an individual become a
whole man, and therefore individuals did not live but for it. The concept of
nation requires that all its members should form as it were only one individ
ual, declared Friedrich Schlegel.1'"* In the Eighth Address, Fichte defined a
nation less aphoristically. It is, he wrote,
a totality which lives and represents a definite and particular law of the devel
opment of rhe Divine ... its distinctive characteristics ... are the Eternal to
which (the noble-minded individual] entrusts the eternity of himself and his
continual influence, the eternal order of things in which he places his portion of
eternity; he must will its continuance, for it alone is to him the means by which
the short span of his life here below is extended into continuous life ... his
conception [of] his own life as an eternal life is the bond which unites first his
own nation, and then, through his nation, the whole human race, in a most
intimate fashion with himself, and brings all their needs within his widened
sympathy until the end of time. This is his love for his people, respecting, trust
ing, and rejoicing in it, and feeling honoured by descent from it. The Divine has
appeared in it, and that which is original {the source of all things] has deemed
this people worthy to be made its vesture and its means of directly influencing
the world; for this reason there will be further manifestations of die Divine in
it. Hence the noble-minded man wjil be active and effective, and will sacrifice
himself for his people. Life, merely as life, the continuance of changing exis
tence, has in any case never had any value for him; he has wished for it only as
the source of what is permanent [the Eternal]. But this permanence [eternity] is
promised to him only by the continuous and independent existence of his na
tion. In order to save his nation he must be ready even to die that it may live,
and that he may live in it the only life for which he has ever wished.1
364 N A T I O N A L I S M
This view of the nation did not differ from the Romantic concept of the
state. Indeed, the words nation and "state were frequently used inter
changeably. Some difference in meaning did emerge, though, with the na
tionalization of Romantic concepts. Nation, which was also synony
mous with Volk, as distinct from the state, represented the inner unity and
spirit of the people (designated by a variety of new concepts: Volksgeist,
Nationalgeist, Volkstum, and others); it was the immediate embodiment of
this spirit and unity, again reminiscent of the invisible Church of the Pietists,
while the state represented its outward structure. The German Volk was pre
ferred to Nation, which was of foreign derivation, but the two words re
ferred to the very same concept.170
Since Germany was, apparently, one nation among many, a legitimate in
ference would be that it was also one individuality and one invisible Church
among many. But this was not the inference made by the German patriots.
In pre-nationalist Pietist and Romantic thinking, too, the original postula
tion of multiple equal individualities or expressions of Divinity inevitably
gave way to the selection of only one of them as the true one, and the rejec
tion of others as either incomplete or false. Thus, reason, initially conceived
of as a part of nature and one way through which God manifested Himself
to man, was rejected as unnatural, while irrational emotion became the sole
venue of Divine revelation; and modern enlightened society was denied
individuality, its specific character being represented as the embodiment
of alienation from natural will. Though no logical necessity commanded
such conclusions (which were unequivocally non sequitur in each instance),
the minds that conceived them were obviously unable to accept pluralism
with equanimity and were driven to them by psychological necessity. When
these logicians of Pietist and Romantic formation turned nationalists, there
fore, they were immediately driven to abandon the inherently vexing posi
tion of cultural relativism, which presented Germany as one nation among
many, for the much more satisfactory view that only Germany was a nation,
or, which meant the same thing, that it was the only true, ideal, perfect na
tion in the world,
Germany was the perfect nation because it expressed humanity most fully,
the most human nation of all. This was consistent with the ground rule that
true individuality is the expression of the universal. For this reason, Ger
many was destined to play a great role in the world. The fate of Europe, or,
alternately, of the entire world, depended on her. Every German personality
of renown in the period of nationalist awakening expressed this belief in
one form or another. Wilhelm von Humboldt reflected: There is. perhaps
no country that deserves to be free and independent as Germany, because
none is so disposed to devote its freedom so single-mindedly to the welfare
of all. The German genius is among all nations the one which is least de
structive, which always nourishes itself, and when freedom is secured Ger
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 365
many will certainly attain an outstanding place in every form of culture and
thought. . . Other nations do not love their country in the same way as . . .
we love Germany. Our devotion is maintained by some invisible force, and
is far less the product of need or habit. It is 'not so much affection for a
particular land as a longing for German feeling and German spirit. For
Arndt, the German was a universal man, to whom God has given the whole
earth as a home, and Germany, consequently, the greatest world-nation of
the present earth. This view was most forcefully stated by Fichte in his
Eighth Address, where he asserted that only the Germanthe original
man, who has not become dead in an arbitrary organizationreally has
truly a people and is entitled to count on one, and . . . he alone is capable of
real and rational love for his nation. 171
The reasoning behind this astounding claim testified to the remarkable
single-mindedness beneath the apparent heterogeneity of Pieto-Romantic
thought and reflected its unifying master-idea. True individuality was the
expression of the universal; it strove toward the realization of the purpose
of the universal. In Der Patriotismus und sein Gegenteil, composed in
1806, Fichte explained that the wilt of the universal, "the dominant will,
was that the purpose of the existence of humanity be really achieved by
humanity. He called this will cosmopolitanism. Patriotism represented
the individualization of the universal will; it was the will that the purpose
be first fulfilled in that nation of which we ourselves are members, and that
the result shall spread from it to the whole of mankind. However, to will
something necessitated first the knowledge of what to will. Therefore, patri
otism, and consequently cosmopolitanism, could characterize only certain
elite nations to whom such knowledge was revealed. In his as yet pre-
nationalistic days, in the lectures on Die Grundzuge des gegenwartigen
Zeitalters of 18045, Fichte maintained that at different ages different na
tions assumed the leadership of mankind on its way to the fulfillment of its
purpose, and that the loyalty (or patriotism) of any reasonable person,
whatever his nation of origin, was due to such leader-nations. Which is the
fatherland of the truly educated Christian European? he asked, and re
sponded: In general it is Europe, in particular it is in each age that Euro
pean state which had assumed the cultural leadership. 172To use a more
modern idiom, not al! classes of humanity represented humanity equally;
rather, it was represented in each age by one, ascending, class that was on
its road to dominance fully justified by its universal role. The nation in
which the knowledge of the purpose of humanity, or the true philosophy,
was created was in a favorable position to perceive and follow this purpose.
In Fichtes age such true philosophy was created by him, in Germany. Thus,
in Der Patriotismus und sein Gegenteil, he concluded that the German
alone, by possessing this knowledge and understanding the age through it,
can perceive .. . the next objective of humanity.
366 N A T I O N A L I S M
It was but a short step to a further, and this time non sequitur, conclusion
that Germany was a universal nation par excellence, that is, that,'at all
times, only it truly represented humanity and perceived its purpose: The
German alone can therefore be a patriot; he alone can for the sake of his
nation encompass the whole of mankind; contrasted with him from now on
the patriotism of every other nation must be egoistic, narrow and hostile to
the rest of mankind,51!7J A pan-human nation, Germany bore on its shouL
ders the destiny of humanity. If there is truth in what has been expounded
in these addresses, Fichte concluded his impassioned appeal to feliow-
Germans, then are you of all modern peoples the one in whom the seed of
human perfection most unmistakably lies, and to whom the lead in its devel
opment is committed. If you perish in this your essential nature, then there
perishes together with you every hope of the whole human race for salvation
from the depths of its miseries . . . if you go under, all humanity goes under
with you, without hope of any future restoration. 174
Very frequently, the humanity which called for Germanys salutary inter
vention, however, was defined rather narrowly. The world for Germany was
Europe, Western Europe, to be precise. It was European civilization that
Germany represented to its thinkers, rather than the spirit of humanity, and
they were concerned solely with the preservation of what they took to be
this civilization. The great confederation of European nations, prophesied
Adam Muller, wi l l , . . wear German colors; for everything great, thorough
and lasting in all European institutions is German. And Fichte warned:
Should the German not assume world government through philosophy, the
Turks, the Negroes, the North American tribes, will finally take it over and
put an end to the present civilization. There was no shadow of a doubt in
the German educated mind that 'Western Europe, the perfidious world of
enlightenment, was far superior to the Turks, the Negroes, and the tribes
of North America. Fortunately, Germany was the ultimate expression of
the true spirit which Europe had betrayed, and while the latter decayed, it
stood ready to uphold and reveal to the world Gods will:
Europas Geist erlosch: In Deutschland fliesst
Der Quell der neuen Zeit.17J
German superiority was evident, first and foremost, in its thinkers, the
German mind. This understandably self-congratulatory attitude on the
part of its representatives predated their wholesale and irrevocable conver
sion to nationalism, and was voiced frequently in the late eighteenth century
by people otherwise professing cosmopolitanism. Friedrich Schlegel, for ex
ample, already in 1791 had discovered that the German people has a very
great character . . . There is not much found anywhere to equal this race of
men, and they have several qualities of which we can find no trace in any
known people. He saw this in all the achievements of the Germans, espe-
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
367
dally in the field of scholarship, and foresaw (quite rightly, as it happened)
that things will happen among our people as never before among men.
Time and again he returned to this point. Germanity was a specifically intel
lectual virtuea superior degree of artistic sensibility and scientific spirit.
Not Hermann and Odin are the national gods of the Germans, but art and
sdence . . . this spirit, this power of virtue, is precisely what differentiates
the German from everyone else. tn
In the nineteenth century, however, when the nation of whose superiority
the excellence of the German mind was a sign was exalted by the triumphant
nationalism as the incarnation of the- Absolute and the Eternal, the praises
of the German letters both increased in number and became louder, and its
evident greatness was assigned a far greater significance. The development
of the scholarly mind in Germany is the most important event in modern
intellectual history, announced Adam Miiller. It is certain that... just as
German tribes have founded the political order of Europe, the German mind
will sooner or later dominate it. The specific virtue of the German mind,
and a reflection of its universality, was its ability to transcend itself and re
spect and appreciate the imperfect individualities of other peoples. Miiller
asserted that, apparently in spite of its natural humility, the German mind
is forced to ascribe to itself as an advantage over all other nations its obedi
ent and pious understanding of everything alien, even if this prostration and
understanding may sometimes degenerate into the idolatry of foreign habits
and persons. We find our own happiness, he concluded, not in the
suppression but in the highest flowering of the civilization of our neigh
bours, and thus Germany, the fortunate heartland, will not need to deny its
respect for others when it will dominate the world by its spirit. Fichte com
mented on the German generosity of spirit in a similar vein, claiming that
this trait [was] so deeply marked in their ... past and present, that very
often, in order to be just both to contemporary foreign countries and to
antiquity, they have been unjust to themselves.177Father Jahn thought that
this generosity went too far. To him the alleged readiness to appredate for
eigners and to depreciate their own worth was the greatest vice of the Ger
mans, rather than thdr virtue.
Driven sophists as were these Erwecker zur Deutschland could not, how
ever, stop at asserting the superiority of their nation, but had to discover the
deep and convindng-to-them reasons why this should be so. Their explana
tion derived from notions already present in Pietism. In distinction from all
other nations (at least the Western European ones that counted), the Ger
man nation preserved its individuality unadulterated. For believing Pietists,
this of course meant that Germany was the only God-fearing, pious people,
for in its loyalty to its own ways it deferred to and acknowledged Gods will.
For those nationalists of pietist formation who no longer believed in God,
(national) individuality nevertheless retained its ultimate value. The individ
368
N A T I O N A L I S M
ualityin this case the innermost unique characterof a nation was faith
fully reflected in its language, and the German tongue differed from the rest
in that it was not contaminated by borrowings from other languages, but
remained pure. In Fichtes words, it was the Urspracbe, die original lan
guage. It was directly related to Nature, and therefore, being whole (not
alienated) in its humanity, was the only one capable of serving as a basis for
a true Culture.178This admiration of individuality as a principled, adaman
tine impermeability to outward influences contradicted the belief in the uni
versality of the German mind in which its spokesmen (such as Fichte) took
understandable pride. But contradictions in a system of thought, for the Ro
mantic mentality, were a merit rather than a fault.
During the period of German Liberation, German language became an
object of worship. It was a favorite theme of patriotic poetry. Arndts Des
Deutschen Vaterland, one of the most popular examples of such poetry,
defined Germany as the realm of the German language (and, incidentally,
also as the Sand where every Frenchman was called an enemy and every Ger
man a friend).173Turnvater Jahn, whose zeal for the perfectly German
body did not lead him to neglect its spirit, but whose obsession with the
necessity of combatting foreignisms in the German language might lead one
to suspect whether its much advertized purity was not somewhat exagger
ated, proclaimed in Das deutsche Volkstum: A people is first made into a
nation by its mother-tongue. Attention to the national vernacular has made
victors and rulers . . . All foreign words are to be avoided. Only German
family names should be permitted. The spirit of the people, he added, is
reflected in its popular literature, one of the best examples of which he con
sidered the collection of the Grimm brothers.180In the same work Jahn ad
vised that the state should develop the teaching of the mother tongue and
suggested that the knowledge of German be used as a qualification for citi
zenship.
Language was a reflection of the unique spirit of the people, of its Volk
stum. With all due respect to higher realities, the champions of German na
tionality, enlightened pietists [and Romantics] as they were, refused to see
this ethereal entity as the beginning of all things, and made it itself a reflec
tion of material reality. The spirit of the nation, and therefore its language,
reflected the body; ultimately nationality was based on blood. Again, the
excellence of the German nation lay in the fact that its blood was pure, there
were no foreign admixtures, the German was the Urvolk. Arndt put it rather
bluntly: The Germans are not bastardized by alien peoples, they have not
become mongrels; they have remained more than many other peoples in
their original purity and have been able to develop slowly and quietly from
this purity of their kind and nature according to the lasting laws of time; the
fortunate Germans are an original people. This was written in 1815, long
before the word race acquired its specific meaning and assumed its hon
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
369
orable place in the German vocabulary, and long before racism, bolstered
by the authority of science, became an articulate and presumably objective
view. Nevertheless, German national consciousness was unmistakably and
distinctly racist from the moment it existed, and the national identity of the
Germans was essentially an identity of race, and only superficially that of
language or anything else. The language, deeply revered as it was, was but
an epiphenomenon, a reflection of race, the indisputable testimony of com
mon descent. In the mind of the architects of the German national con
sciousness, one could not exist without the other, and both represented the
fundamental bonds of German nationality:
Uns kniipft der Sprache heilig Band
tins kniipft ein Gott, ein Vaterland,
Ein treues deutches Blut.m
Since the spirit and the language reflected the race, they could retain their
originalitytheir Ur-characteronly if the blood was kept pure. The
founders of German nationality were utterly opposed to the blending of dif
ferent nationalities. The purer the people, the better, ruled Jahn. For the
benefit of the whole world as well as for the benefit of each individual na
tionality there must not be any universal union, stated Arndt. It is much
more appropriate to nature, decreed Schlegel, that the human race be
strictly separated into nations than that several nations should be fused as
has happened in recent times. Each state is an independent individual ex
isting for itself, it is unconditionally its own master, has its peculiar charac
ter and governs itself by its peculiar laws, habits and customs. 182National
individuality, especially the individuality of the original and universal na
tion, was nothing to toy with.
German nationalism, like any other, symbolically elevated the masses and
profoundly changed the nature of status hierarchy in German society. In its
veneration of the people, specifically the peasantry,3the virtuous Volk, glo
riously indifferent to the march of unnatural civilization and faithfully up
holding its pristine purity, German nationalism, in fact, far surpassed its
Western counterparts and, among the societies in this sample, was compa
rable only to nationalism in Russia. As in Russia, the internal political con
sequences of this outright adulation were insignificant. The people that was
worshipped did not consist of living individuals, but represented a cognitive
construct. Like early Romantics, who professed their passion for republi
canism, their successors frequently declared themselves champions of de
mocracy. In both cases this meant nothing but the total submersion of the
individual within the collectivity (in the latter instancethe nation), renun
ciation of every particular interest, and unconditional service of the collec
tive self by each in his proper place. The rights of citizens, said Father Jahn
in Das deutsche Volkstum, are dependent upon the activity of such citizens.
370 N A T I O N A L I S M
That citizen loses his rights who deserts his flag, besmirches his Fatherland
in foreign countries, or loses his reason.184What were the rights of citizens
who did not defame themselves by a similar lack of patriotism or by coward
ice, and remained sane, he did not deign to explain. This complete submis
sion to the higher individuality could satisfy the craving for equality of a
certain kind (and, naturally, one was to desire no other). However humble
in his own state, each servant of the nation was equal to any other in its eyes,
as the servants of God were all equal before God.
As to liberty, which was the watchword of the day and constantly on
everybodys lips, the period of Liberation added to its definition a new
meaning. This meaning was entirely consistent with the demand for disso
lution of the person within the collectivity (and the abdication of the per
sonal for the collective will) and reflected the belief in the salubrity and ne
cessity of cultural and racial isolation. In addition to voluntary submission
to recognized necessity, liberty came to mean freedom from foreign domi
nation. Arndt defined it aptly: freedom he said, was a condition in which
no foreign executioner can order you around and no foreign slave-driver
exploits you 185(native executioners and slave-drivers were apparently all
right).
In this framework, foreign intervention was, by definition, the most hei
nous of crimes. It encroached upon the liberty of the people and threatened
its individuality (which in the case of Germany was both universal and true,
and therefore thrice sacred). No wonder that the French invaders were at
tacked with such vehemence and fought (at least by the minority of true
believers) with such ardor. At the same time, there was more to the calls for
war than the immediate need to expel the impudent foreigner. War was a
good thing in itself. It was an ennobling, purifying rite which alone could
assure true consciousness of nationality and the wholeness of human exis
tence, which was impossible without the latter. Max von Schenkendorf gave
this lofty thought a poetical expression:
Derm nur Essen kann uns retwn
Nur eriosen kann uns Blut.
Already after the war, on his return from vanquished Paris, Jahn dreamed:
Germany needs a war of her own. She needs a private war with France in
order to achieve her nationality. Germany . . . needs a war against Frank-
dom to unfold herself in the fullness of her nationhood [Volkstumli-
chkeit
There was hardly an exception to this spirit among the German patriots
of the Liberation period. Clausewitz argued that war was the most efficient
means of politics and needed no further justification. But most of his con
temporaries regarded it as an end in itself. Its virtues were expressive rather
than instrumental. Peace was beneath German dignity; it was uniformly
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
371
scorned. God spoke his word on the subject through Arndt: Tell this lazy
people: I am not the God of their perpetual peace; I am the God, the avenger,
the terrifying, the destroyer who lusts for struggle and war. Otherwise all
history which is my history would be a lie; for its beginning is war and its
end will be war. Their peace is called death and rotting, my war is life and
movement. To shed blood is always a horror, but not the blood which flows
for liberty, for freedom and virtue. War and struggle, the live movement of
live forces, that is my lust, thus my name is called, that is myself, I, God the
Lord.187It is not surprising to find Arndt among worshippers of war, but
to discover among them Wilhelm von Humboldt is somehow disheartening.
Yet he, too, joined in singing its praises. I recognize in the effect of war
upon national character, he is reported to have said, one of the most sal
utary elements in the molding of the human race. The possibility of war is
required to give the national character that stimulus from which these
[noble?] sentiments spring and thus only are nations enabled to do justice to
the highest duties of civilization in the fullest development of their moral
forces. sss
Only several years earlier, in 1802, Friedrich Schiegel lamented the degen
eracy of his nation with but a glimmer of hope that it would stand up to its
former fame: The poetry of former times has disappeared and with it vir
tue, its sister. Instead of the furor tedesco which had been mentioned so
frequently by the Italian poets, patience has now become our first national
virtue and beside it humility, in contrast to the formerly reigning mentality,
on account of which a Spaniard who traveled with Emperor Charles V
through Germany called the Germans los fteros Alemanos. But as far as we
are concerned, we wish to retain firmly the image or rather the truth of the
great times and not become confused by rhe present misery. Perhaps the
slumbering lion will wake up once more and perhaps even if we should not
live to see it, future world history will be full of the deeds of the Ger
mans. ,ss His hope was not in vain. The demonic spirit of the Romantics,
long bottled within the tiny space of their personal existence and finally re
leased, sought to avenge itself in destruction. Their passionate exhortations
fell on attentive ears and set mens hearts on fire; their tireless efforts revived
the furor tedesco, which swept around the world. The slumbering lion woke
up time and again, history was full of the deeds of the Germans, and the lust
of Arndts terrifying God was, ai least temporarily, quenched.
The Finishing Touch: Ressentiment
The West as the Incarnation of Evil
The belief that Germany, too, was a nation took root in the land only after
it had been trodden by the victorious armies of the conqueror from the West;
372 N A T I O N A L I S M
France was ultimately responsible for the emergence of German national
ism. Its contribution to the development of the national spirit in the days of
its fragile infancy, though incomparable in importance to the contribution
of the Pieto-Romantic mold, was nevertheless inestimable. France gave Ger
mans the Enemy, against whom ail the strata of the disunited German soci
ety could unite, on whom everyone could blame their misfortunes and vent
their frustrations. Hatred of France inspired the uncertain patriotism within
the German breast; it provided this new and as yet flickering passion with a
reason for existence and with a focus. Without the decade of collective effer
vescence and common effort, the vital enthusiasm which was sustained by
the persistence of the French menace, German nationalism would not have
survived its birth. The French victories preserved it through the first tender
years, and, thanks to them, nourished by the incessant patriotic agitation
which was its mothers milk, it could stand, in 1815, on its own.
France continued to stimulate German nationalism even after 1815. The
Francophobia of the Wars of Liberation was aroused only in part by the
aggression and the interference with the German order of things. It went
much deeper. It was rather an expression of existential envy, ressentiment.
Naturally, nothing but total annihilationindeed demanded by Schle
gelcould satisfy this sentiment; neither the temporary termination of the
conflict nor even the German victory would put an end to it.
In the German mind, that is, in the mind of its scholars and writers,
Germany was never anything but a part of the Western world, to which it
historically belonged. Much of German culture in the eighteenth century
drew its inspiration from and developed in response to and in imitation of
the advanced Western nations: France and England. Aufklarung was
thoroughly Germanized, but Enlightenment was not a German invention.
The nobility, insofar as it busied itself with culture at all, patronized French
culture, Frederick the Great being only the most famous example of the utter
contempt in which native genius was held. But even Bildungsburger, deter
mined to win for themselves, to the last person, the public justly appertain
ing to the universe of the German tongue, who since Lessing and Sturm und
Drang had fought French culture in Germanyeven they were encouraged
to do so by the example of French and English men of letters and the im
ported spirit of Enlightenment, and, however reluctantly, saw in the coun
tries west of Germany the model to be followed. The cosmopolitanism of
the end of the century, so characteristic of German intellectuals, as well as
the fight against foreignisms at the beginning of the new century (the very
furiousness of which meant that there were foreignisms to fight indeed), be
trayed the fact of the widespread acceptance of the Westthat is, of France,
first of all, and of Englandas the model.
As everywhere, the satisfaction to be derived from national identity
(adopted to satisfy the thirst for dignity which the traditionally defined so
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
373
ciety had failed to quench) depended on the ability to sustain and enjoy the
elevating sense of national pride. National pride, in turn, depended on how
well Germany measured against its significant other, and on the recognition
of its merit by the latter. Thus with the conversion to nationalism, the psy
chological importance of the West for Germany increased. The arena of con
test was political culture; for those who had any doubts on the matter, this
had been clearly demonstrated just years ago by France in its explicit bid to
outdo England. Political culturewith its three immovable pillars: reason,
individual liberty, and political equalitydefined the nature of the West and
distinguished it from other societies. No special astuteness was needed to
realize that, judged by these standards, Germany was inferior to its "Western
neighbors. German intellectuals only too clearly saw the truth in Mirabeaus
indictment of German reality: Your brains are petrified with slavery.190
Thus the moment Germans turned to national identity and acquired na
tional pride, this pride was wounded, and not by Napoleonic conquest
alone, but rather by the miserable and laughable state of their society, ren
dered conspicuous by the proximity of the West. Their hatred toward the
West was fed by the very fact that the West existed. The enemy could be
driven out of the land and aggression stopped, but the springs of ressenti
ment, replenished as they were from within, would never dry out.
Even the heat of the Wars of Liberation was powerless to obscure French
superiority. The borrowed idea of the nation was conceptualized with the
help of specifically French importations: as in France, the emphasis was on
unity and regeneration. Though grinding their teeth, the Prussian reform
ers saw France as the model to be imitated. It is from France they learned
that only a united nation could be strong, and only citizens could create a
united nation. To be citizens people had to participate actively in their soci
ety; they could not remain slaves. The leaders of the Prussian state adminis
tration and the military understood and willed this as much as anythat is
why, in the face of virulent and persistent opposition, accused of Jacobinism
and lack of patriotism, they staunchly advocated the emancipation of serfs
(Stein), the abolition of restrictions on economic activity (Hardenberg), the
reorganization of the army along the lines of the levee en masse (the gener
als), in short, a revolutionfrom aboveas thoroughgoing and radical as
was the French Revolution. What was it, asked Steins biographer, Leh
mann, that attracted these thoroughly German minds . . . to the revolu
tionary legislation of France, which they only approved with large reserva
tions? The answer is that they desired to attain for their country the position
of power which these laws had secured for France.191Liberal reforms were
deemed necessary for the achievement of national unity, regeneration, and
strength.
This determined imitation, however, was very different from a genuine
effort to become like the West, based on the acknowledgment of the West as
374 N A T I O N A L I S M
the model. Of the three logically possible ways to deal with the sense of
inferiority (see Chapters 2 and 3), this first one was ruled out from the be
ginningby the native cultural tradition, the amalgam of Pieto-Romantic
sentiments and concepts, which became the German character long before it
was thought to be national. The second alternative, that of cultural relativ
ism, which had been tried and abandoned by Herder, was never picked up
by his successors. The Romantic mentality irresistibly impelled toward the
remaining possibility: the definition of the West as the anti-model, the incar
nation of evil, of all the values of Aufklarung that Romanticism rejected for
its own reasons.
The choice of this third possibility as the archetypal response to the sense
of inferiority was, as everywhere, prompted by ressentiment. In Germany
ressentiment did not result in a transvaluation of values. The values which
were to form the core of German national consciousness were already pres
ent and firmly- embedded in the collective mind. The function of ressenti
ment in Germany was different. It fueled and directed, rather than defined,
nationalism defined by indigenous cultural tradition. It allowed goal-
oriented expression to the aimless Romantic spirit. Blended with the Ro
mantic Weltanschauung, ressentiment focused its passionate but diffuse bit
terness and hatred of the world. It eternalized both Germanys peril and its
Enemy and not only explained the laughable present state of German society
by the perfidy of the West and the fact that its malice and envy prevented
Germany from attaining the greatness to which it was destined, but pictured
the West as ever concerned about the possibility of such greatness in the
future and ever ready to attack Germany again. A holy eternal war against
this alien civilization and everything it stood for was the only way to cope
with this situation.
The image of the West which resulted from its definition as the anti-model
was not a reflection of empirical reality; it represented a projection of the
ideal image of the evil world of the Aufklarung, an abstraction and general
ization of the Romantics personal experience, on the West. This projection
was analogous to the nationalization of the image of ideal community,
believed now to be represented by Germany. As a description of concrete
societies, the image of the West wab almost as far from reality as the Roman
tic image of perfect community was far from the real Germany. Whether
this latter image was believed to exist in the past or in the future, the actually
existing German society had to be changed to achieve the ideal. But in both
cases Germany was much closer to it than the West, either because it was
less estranged from the ideal past or because it was better prepared to make
the leap into the ideal future. The values which the West, however imper
fectly, embodied were unequivocally condemned.
The centrality of French letters in the German cultural life of the eigh
teenth century, the direct competition of the German intellectuals with the
The Final Solution of Inf inite Longing: Germany 375
products of the French pbtlosophes for the German public, and the Napo
leonic invasion made France a natural choice for the personification of the
imaginary 'West.The rejection of Enlightenment, when first national
ized, focused on this one country. By the second decade of the nineteenth
century, Germany could boast of an established tradition of Gallophobia
and possessed an impressive arsenal of cliches with which to express its sen
timent.
In his essay on Strassbourg Minster, included in the collection Von
Deutscher Art und Kunstthe manifesto of the Sturm und DrangGoethe
attacked Frenchmen of all nations: French culture was the embodiment
of the artificial, unnatural, dead rational thought. Unlike all other cultures,
it was not characteristic, not truly reflective of the being of the people
which had created it (or perhaps this people was not worthy of being re
flected?); it imitated classical antiquity and prescribed rational rules. But the
rule for Romantics was no rules, and no imitation, and so the French culture
was rejected. Athenaeum, that journal which in a unique way represents
the pure Romantic ideal at its actual fountain head,192contains a whole
gamut of the early Romantics opinions on France: they range from judg
ments of the French superficiality to amazement at the French stupidity to
the inevitable and grave conclusion of the worthlessness of the French cul
ture as a whole. France is a chemical (as opposed to organic) nation; this
explains its dominance in the chemical age. French tragedy is merely the
formula of a form; what can be more contrary to good taste than writing
and performing plays that are completely outside nature? The French lan
guage is a language bound by conventions, French poetry is worth noth
ing, the philosophy is pitiful. Even the famous Fragment #216, whose
first line is so frequendy quoted, aims in fact only at belittling the historical
significance of the French Revolution. After the opening phrasethe
French Revolution, Fichtes philosophy, and Goethes Meister are the great
est tendencies of the ageit reads: Whoever is offended by this juxtapo
sition, whoever cannot take any revolution seriously that is not noisy and
materialistic [like the French], hasnt yet achieved a lofty, broad perspective
on the history of mankind ... many a little book, almost unnoticed by the
noisy rabble at the time, plays a greater role than anything they did.193
The admiration for English literature, which was in great vogue among
the Bildungsburger in Germany throughout the second half of the eigh
teenth century, and later for some Spanish authors, owed a great deal to the
general resentment of the still-unchallenged centrality of the French culture.
Yet, in the judgment of the Romantics, England on the whole fared little
better than France. In the Athenaeum Fragments it is attacked almost as
frequendy as France and with equal acerbity. English freedoms are worth
less and will be made wholly superfluous through the possession of free
dom. Virtue, in England, can be bought and sold for money. The notion
1
376 N A T I O N A L I S M
that the English national character is sublime is . . . a by no means con
temptible contribution to the science of sublime ridiculousness. The Eng-
lish are characterized by pedantic bigotry; they misunderstand Shake-
speare. Even their Satan is not sufficiently Satanic in comparison with the
German Satan, to that extent one might say that Satan is a German inven
tion. Besides the Germans, the French, and the English, the only other na
tion mentioned in the Athenaeum Fragments is the Dutch; characteristi
cally, it is mentioned in a comparison, Dont criticize the limited artistic
taste of the Dutch, advises Fragment #179. In the first place, they know
exactly what they want. Secondly, they have created their own genres for
themselves. Can either of these statements be made about the dilettantism
of the English? 194England was a natural object of Romantic criticism, for
it, like France, stood for rationality and represented the forces of enlight
enment.
During and after the Liberation period invectives against everything
French increased in number and ferocity. The odious French nation was
the natural and hereditary enemy of the Germans, an impure, shameless,
undisciplined race. In no history, thought Stein, does one find such im
morality, such moral uncleanliness, as in that of France. I hate the French
as cordially as a Christian may hate anyone, he confessed when already an
old man. I wish they would all go to the devil.i9SWith a passion of which
the statesman was incapable, Arndt, avowed the same sentiment: I hate all
Frenchmen, without distinction in the name of God and of my people, I teach
this hatred to my son, I teach it to the sons of my people__I shall work all
my life that the contempt and hatred for this people strike the deepest roots
in German hearts and that the German men understand who they are and
whom they confront. To him, as to Romantics before him, the Frenchmen
were a talking, the Germans a thinking people. He failed to understand
and refused to reconcile himself with the evident willingness of a still signif
icant number of his compatriots to see in France the apex and fountain of
civilization. Can those men educate, he asked fervently, who themselves
are no men, who give you artificiality for nature, elegance for beauty, illu
sion for virtue, fashion for morality, and chatter for thought? Who under
stand and esteem nothing foreign? . . . Incapable of eternal ideas of deep
enthusiasm, blissful ecstasy, human longing, for which they even lack
words; making fun of the holiest and highest of mankind for the sake of
wittiness. French language (which as any language mirrored the soul of
the people, molded and embodied its ideas, and therefore had a peculiar
character corresponding to the quality of the people) indeed would hardly
have words for anything worthy of expression. It was, wrote a German
army volunteer from Paris in 1815, not an orderly organic language at
all, but resembled animal noises. The German tongue, which had words
for everything, pinpointed the French bestiality with such apt epithets as ein
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 377
Affenvolk and, the animal world being unable to adequately express and
sufficiently castigate its wickedness, offered some religious metaphors as
well. To the learned Professor Heinrich Leo, whose creative mind it was that
discerned the resemblance between the French people and the apes, the cap
ital of that beastly nation was not a jungle, but rather das alte Haus des
SatanS.196
In their rage against France, German patriots of the Liberation period
were willing to go to any lengths, even as far as to consider England a para
gon of virtue. Both Stein and Arndt, for example, admired England. His
hatred of France, recalled Arndt, dated back to his childhood. Already then
the story of that evil people had filled him with distaste, even with repul
sion and he felt toward them just like an Englishman. W7To begin with,
the English had the indisputable advantage of being of the same racial stock
as the Germans; their Germanic blood was not contaminated by subhuman
admixtures, as was that of the irresponsible Franks. In addition, England,
like Germany, had fought Napoleon and was most instrumental in bringing
about his downfall.
Yet with this downfall went the protection of the German economy from
British competition. England could have been impeccably Germanic, but its
economic might transcended the limits of good taste; it was too affluent for
comfort. Now it, too, showed its true and ugly face. An admirer of British
character, Friedrich List, the apostle of German economic nationalism,
clearly saw the treacherous ends that England pursued. English national
economy, he explained to his countrymen, has for its object to manufac
ture for the whole world, to monopolize all manufacturing power, [and] to
keep the world . . . in a state of infancy and vassalage by political manage
ment as well as by the superiority of her capital, her skill, and her navy.
England was evidently opposed to Germanys economic greatness and
would resist German unification.J9S
And what else could one expect of perfidious Albion? (Here the French
had a point.) It was, after all, the country of Adam Smith, the prophet of
capitalism, and capitalism was the most general manifestation of that anti
social spirit, of that arrogant egotism, of that immoral enthusiasm for false
reason and false enlightenment,199in short, the spirit of the West. It be
lieved in reason, it upheld individualismwicked, infamous notionsit
was as irredeemably Western as France, and perhaps even more so. Herder
recognized this in the eighteenth century, and Marx believed this in the nine
teenth. In the middle of the nineteenth century the German opinion of the
English nation was summarized by Treitschke.-Wrote the famous historian:
The hypocritical Englishman, with the Bible in one hand and a pipe in the
other, possesses no redeeming qualities. The nation was an ancient robber-
knight, in full armor, lance in hand, on every one of the worlds trade routes.
The English possess a commercial spirit, a love of money which has killed
378 N A T I O N A L I S M
3
every sentiment of honor and every distinction of right and wrong. English
cowardice and sensuality are hidden behind unctuous, theological' talk
which is to us free-thinking German heretics among all the sins of English
nature the most repugnant. In England all notions of honor and class preju
dices vanish before the power of money, whereas the German nobility has
remained poor but chivalrous. That last indispensable bulwark against the
brutalization of societythe duelhas gone out of fashion in England and
soon disappeared .. . This was a triumph of vulgarity.200
As the West was increasingly identified with capitalism, England eclipsed
France and emerged as the leader of the bourgeois world. Later still, the
United States of America, the land without a heart,201assumed its place
by the side, and soon at the head, of the other two representatives of evil.
The German miid justifiably regarded these three societies as faithful
heirs of Enlightenment, and pinned on them the biased and exaggerated im
age of Aufklarung, generalized from everything it hated in it. This living
anti-model, prosperous, proud in its freedom, and looked upon by the rest
of the world as the center, kept alive the deepest grief of the Bildungsbiir-
gerthe unbearable sense of being unnoticedwith the difference that
now they saw it as the unjust fate of their nation brought upon it by the
malicious West, and spurred German nationalism to ever greater heights of
xenophobic hysteria and ferocity. Yet the principal embodiment of Western
degeneracy and the chief perpetrator of its treacheries was none of the actu
ally existing Western societies. And not the actually existing West, forbid
ding in its might (though not so forbidding as to rale out the hope and even
tually attempts of a just retribution), bore the brunt of Germanys rightful
ire. Instead, it was an Asiatic folk, the children of the bearers of an ancient
religious creed, whose residence in Europe was but a sign of well-deserved
Divine punishmentthe eternal enemy of the Christian peoples, the scourge
of humanity, the Jews.
Anti-Semitism
How, through which mental gymnastics, Germany was led to this remark
able conclusion will forever remain obscure to the Western mind incapable
of higher understanding. The Romantic psycho-logic, which ruled that a
thing exists if it should exist (that is, if the German mind, the representa
tive of the Ego, the Individuality, and the Absolute, wills that it exist), un
doubtedly helped. As a result of a double intellectual somersault through
which the adjustment to the painful comparison between Germany and the
advanced nations was in part accomplished, the Jew became the symbol
of the West.
This portentous association was born together with German national
consciousness during the years of Napoleonic invasion. In opposition to the
THe Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 379
liberal reforms of the Jacobin Hardenberg, high-minded patriots of noble
birth and Romantic persuasion, von Kleist, von Arnim, and von der Mar-
witz, formed a Christlicbe-germanische Tiscbgesellschaft, from which they
excluded the three enemies of virtue: Jews, Frenchmen, and philistines. V)1
In the wake of the Wars of Liberation, the fire that burned . . . In patriotic
hearts was fueled with hatred of the French and the jews; the French who
had invented Cosmopolitanism and invaded their sacred soil; the Jews who
incarnated Cosmopolitanism and who, as born bloodsuckers and money
lenders, had profiteered by the French invasion. But the French were safely
back home.203Philistines also got away lightly. In their rejection of the
enlightened Western society, German intellectuals were led to compare
Germany to the ideal community which personified the anti-West and anti-
Enlightenment, and which for them was the real and true, not merely
apparent, Germany. When they turned inward and searched for it in the
Germany that existed, they were likely to find appalling those qualities in
German life which represented points of similarity with, or reminded them
of, Western values (and in which they could not but see a reflection of their
hated selves that they wished to forget): the bourgeoisie, trade and industry,
cities, science. Yet their attitude toward al! these had to remain ambivalent:
all these factors were absolutely necessary if Germany was not to forsake
the hope of one day triumphing over the Western nations.204Jews repre
sented all of these hated un-German values and they were not necessary.
The escalation of anti-Jewish sentiment after the Wars of Liberation was,
Treitschke explained, an expression of a healthy German patriotism. The
powerful excitement of the War of Liberation, he wrote, brought to light
all the secrets of the German character; amid the general ferment all the old
and profound hostility to everything Judaic once more made itself mani
fest. 205But the hostility, which was indeed profound and harkened back to
some very old traditions, was in effect rather new. So much militated against
the Jews in the recent past and the present that their crimes of bygone days
were all but forgotten. Their liberation was defended by the appeal to rea
son, and as reason became increasingly discredited toward the end of the
century, to many Romantic minds it became increasingly indefensible. The
jews were further stigmatized by the determined French intervention on
their behalf, and by the policy of emancipation conceived by the Prussian
reformers who followed die French example. Jews, German patriots as they
were in their infinite naivete, did benefit from the Aufklarung which made
German intellectuals suffer and from the French occupation which was a
slap in the face of the German nation. It was clear that they were in a pact
with the Devil.
To the honor of the German nation, it must be said that it did not invent
the hatred and persecution of the Jews. These were Christian sentiment and
pastime, as universal as Catholic Christianity itself. The Reformation in
380 N A T I O N A L I S M
Germany did not lead, as it did in Holland, England, and later the New
World, to the tendency to recognize in Judaism the seedbed of the Christian
tradition and in the Jews the first chosen people, steadfast in its covenant
with God, which it held in common with Christian nations. This divergence,
Heiko Oberman tells us, is related to the fact that in Germany the Refor
mation was not associated with the experience of diaspora.206German re
formers, as well as reformed and unreformed German Humanists, even
those who recoiled from Luthers sanguine fulminations against the Jews,
retained in regard to them all the pre-Reformation notions and continued to
dream of a Jew-free prosperity. The German nationalists of the early nine
teenth century inherited these notions; they did not create them. The tradi
tional definition of the jew as an evil and impure outsider, as wicked as he
was defenseless, made him an exceptionally convenient peg on which to
hang the blame for the innumerable frustrations which could not otherwise
be soothed.
Still, it was not until Christ and the tribal god Teut clasped hands207
that there appeared a sentiment one could call anti-Semitism, and with its
invention German nationalists who worshiped tribal gods should deservedly
be credited. A mutant species of an old sentiment, anti-Semitism gave the
traditional persecution a new significance and, much more important, a new
lease on life, propelling and perpetuating it in an age that tended to forget
religious differences. In 1879 its distinctive, racial rather than religious,-
character was recognized and asserted in a new German word, Antisemitis-
mus, another creation of the German spirit which since then got interna
tional recognition. But the sentiment emerged long before the concept.208
When the age of Enlightenment dawned on Germany, German Jews
formed the lowest rung of society, excluded from intercourse with the Ger
man culture, locked in filthy ghettos, andon account of their filthy condi
tions, cultural exclusion, and lowly status, as well as religionuniversally
despised. In Prussia, at the end of the century, their lives were still regulated
by General-Priviiegium und Reglement vor die Judenschaft, which ex
pressed Fredericks views regarding Jewish nature and was, in the words of
Mirabeau, a law worthy of a cannibal.109Individual Aufklarer, Lessing
and Prussian bureaucrats, such as Christian Wilhelm Dohm, fought this (un
acceptable to them) situation in the face of unbending opposition. Although
they achieved nothing like the emancipation they demanded, with their help
individual Jews, men of extraordinary talents, were able to escape the unre
lieved misery of the judengasse. Like Moses Mendelssohn, the German
Socrates, they became privileged jewswhich meant that they were al
lowed to walk the streets walked by other human beings.210
These extraordinary individuals advanced where they were allowed: in
finance, trade, and the professions. Most of them abandoned the faith of
their fathers, and all enthusiastically embraced the burgeoning German cul
The Final Solution of Inf inite Longing: Germany
381
ture, To mix in good society without ceremonyone had to be introduced
to Jewish salons. In these salons Jewish women provided the leadership, and
their men the money. Their contribution to German literature of the period
was inestimable. They filled the social void in the lives of the unattached
intellectuals, made misanthropic by shyness; they introduced them to the
society of women, and taught them sociability. Most important, the Jewish
hostesses noticed these intellectuals when they were noticed by no one else.
They pampered their egos and cultivated their talents. They were also trend
setters. Goethe-worship in German literature originated in the heart and
home of Rahel Varnhagen. Goethe, no friend of the Jews himself, attested:
She was the first to understand and recognize me.311Schleiermachers Dis
courses would have hardly been written at all were it not for the devotion
and encouragement of Henrietta Here.
Every person who was or aspired to be of note in letters sought to be
among the visitors to the Jewish salons. Members of the free-thinking nobil
ity, Alexander and 'Wilhelm von Humboldt and Achim von Amim {as well
as others with intellects less, but titles often more, brilliant) met there with
the brothers Schlegei, with Fichte and Schleiermacher, Brentano, Chamisso,
Fouqu6, and Jean Paul. Tender friendships developed between hostesses and
their guests. Ah, how Schleiermacher loved Henrietta Herz! She was too
beautiful, and her colossal, queenlike figure too much an opposite of his
fragile frame, which he thought neither colossal nor beautiful, for him ever
to conceive of anything but a platonic relationship. But she admired his spir
itual powers, and his platonic love was an ardent passion. To his sister
Schleiermacher explained rather wistfully: If it had so happened that I had
married Henrietta Herz, I think we should have made a model couple, the
only fear being that we might have been too united212Friedrich Schlegei
married Dorothea Mendelssohn; he was so proud of his achievement, of
finally being able to find a woman who would love him and marrying her,
that he commemorated the event in Lucinda, a novel that even shameless
Romantics considered too indiscreet.215
On the whole, though, the German intellectuals were rather embarrassed
by the fact that some of their best friends were Jewish. They objected to the
taunts of the less enlightened, who sneered at their circle of acquaintances.
But in defending it, they tried to justify to themselves the fact, which per
plexed them no less than the others, that they found it acceptable. Friedrich
von Gentz, a friend of Rahel Varnhagen, admitted that the society of the
salons always borders on mauvatse soci i t ethe Jews were not good com
pany. He thought, though, that among them the women are ... one hun
dred percent better than the men, and so continued to take pleasure in their
hospitality. The Jews, in whose houses the German intellectuals were so rap
turously received, never gained the wholehearted acceptance of their guests.
Even eminent friends of the Jews regarded their advancement with rancor.
382 N A T I O N A L I S M
I hear . . . that Varnhagen has now married the little Levy woman, re
corded Wilhelm von Humboldt upon learning of the marriage of Rahel
Levin to the Prussian of non-Jewish and even noble blood, Varnhagen von
Ense. So now at last she can become an Excellency and Ambassadors wife.
There is nothing the Jews cannot achieve.114It piqued the German intellec
tuals when the Jews became too much like them, as if there were indeed no
difference. When the opportunity arrivedand, in the dawning age of Ger
man nationalism, the German intellectuals gained entry into higher circles
they hastened to dissociate themselves from this embarrassing connection.
And it was from these jews, Jews who had relinquished Judaism and shared
with them in the same culture, Jews who spoke the same language as they
did (literally and metaphorically), jews who fervently strove to participate
in their sorrows and joys, Jews who loved the French when they did, and
hated the French when they did, that the German intellectuals wished to
dissociate themselves most emphatically.
The situation of the Jews who attempted to assimilate215was analogous
to the situation of the Bildungsbiirger, but in distinction from it, it was much
more vulnerable, and as the German Bildungsbiirger resolved their predica
ment, the predicament of the Jews worsened. For a while, before the advent
of nationalism, Jews and German intellectuals shared in common misfor
tune. Both were outsiders, lured into and then forcibly alienated from the
society to which they wished to belong; both were upwardly mobile and
owed their advancement to individual merit, in a social system which
frowned upon merit and was hostile to mobility. Like the Bildungsbiirger,
the jews suffered from acute marginality, but their marginality was more
profound and escape from it seemed less and less likely with time. "I have a
strange fancy, wrote Rahel Varnhagen to a friend; it is as if some supra -
mundane being, just as I was thrust into the world, plunged these words
with a dagger into my heart: Yes, have sensibility, see the world as few see
it, be great and noble, nor can I take from you the faculty of eternally think
ing. But I add one thing more: be a Jewess! And now my life is a slow
bleeding to death. This misery made her hate what she was, as it did Anton
Reiser. 1wish nothing more ardently now than to change myself, out
wardly and inwardly, she confessed passionately. I . . . am sick of myself,
but I can do nothing about it. 216
While the Bildungsbiirger, turning nationalists, were changing their so-
hateful-to-them identity, they created for the jews an identity far more hate
ful than before and nailed them to it as to a cross. Romantic nationalism
brought racism in its wake, and made the cleft between Germans and Jews
unbridgeable. In accordance with the materialistic twist of the Pieto-
Romantic thought espoused by the unfaithful and yet indelibly enlight
ened disciples of the Aufkldrung, the jews, like the Germans, were defined
as a race. Already Herder had insisted that the Jewish question was not a
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
383
question of religious controversy, that religion was only an epiphenome-
non, a reflection of Jewish history and individuality,of the fact that they
were in Europe an Asiatic folk foreign to our continent. The Romantics
were likely to concur in this view, and at the turn of the century it became
an explicitly accepted notion. In 1803, in a pioneer publication in this re-
specti a patriotic lawyer, Grattenauer, denounced elegant Jews more than
others (for whom he had no sympathy either); they might talk about
Goethe, Schiller, and Schlegel, but still remained an Asiatic, alien folk,
and all intercourse with them was highly reprehensible. The new racial
element made acceptance theoretically impossible. I t did not, could not,
matter whether the Jews accepted everything German, subscribed entirely to
the ideals of the German culture, and rejected wholeheartedly their own. It
did not matter whether Jews were baptized or not. Or rather, it mattered
only for Jews. Years later, in 1862, Moses Hess, a one-time friend of Karl
Marx, felt compelled to stress: The Germans hate the religion of the Jews
less than their race. Neither radical reform . . . nor baptism, neither edu
cation nor emancipation completely unlocks for the German Jew the portals
of social life. They, therefore, seek to deny their origin. ni
This was clear as day for several generations, but, to the last, not to the
Jews. Some Jews persisted in the belief that it was religion and nothing else
that divided them from the society to which they wanted to belong. Some
tried to reform their religion to bring it closer to Christianity. A great num
ber converted to it, Heinrich Heine saw in baptism the admission ticket to
European civilization; the views of his critics proved beyond doubt that he
was wrong. There were no admission tickets. Since race was the issue, noth
ing but physical, biological conversion would make it possible for the Jews
to become Germans, and since this was impossible, there was no solution.
Fichte {who saw the Jews as a powerful inimical State [within European
countries] which wars continually against all others and often succeeds in
bitterly oppressing their peoples) in 1793 put it this way: The only way I
can see to give the Jews civil rights is to cut off their heads in a single night
and equip them with new ones devoid of every Jewish idea.118
The definition of the Jews as an alien race irrevocably changed the nature
of anti-Jewish sentiment. The fact that this alien race was identified with the
West, and therefore was the incarnation of all the evil in the world and of
everything to which Germany was opposed, added ferocity to this new and
already vigorous sentiment. This double modification of a moribund Chris
tian tradition was predestined from the 1860s and 1870s to blossom and
still later bear a horrifying fruit.219Since German national identity was from
the outset defined as a racial identity, and as it was fueled by ressentiment
against the West, anti-Semitism was an integral part of this identity, and a
central element in it. The pervading presence and escalation of anti-
Semitism in Germany in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries has
384 N A T I O N A L I S M
been a subject of many detailed studies, and there is no need to dwell on its
apparent but unnoticed madness, as it became increasingly widespread. Suf
fice it to stress again, as has been many times done, that a direct (though not
absolutely clear and unchallenged1) line connected Hitler to the idealistic
Romantic patriots of the Wars of Liberation.220In combination with the ex
altation of violence and death, an equally fundamental element of German
nationalism, racial anti-Semitism paved the way to the Holocaust. The pos
sibility of the Final Solution was inherent in German national conscious
ness. While not inevitable, it was no accident and no aberration of German
history; it was not a natural response to a historically immediate structural
situation, and, given an identical situation, could not have happened else
where. A madman like Hitler was needed to hold a match, and certain im
mediate structural conditions were necessary to stimulate him and his audi
ence, but the combination of racism, identification of a particular race as the
incarnation of evil, and glorification of violence and brutality was highly
combustible, and only Germany could produce Hitler and give this form to
the response to structural conditions.221Germany was ready for the Holo
caust from the moment German national identity existed. It is imperative to
realize this. The simple Germans who obeyed orders obeyed them not
simply because these were orders, but because these orders were within the
range of orders they expected to be given (that is, accorded with their Wes-
enwiile) and they were not outraged by them. One of the greatest sociolo
gists of all times, Max Weber was a German, and he wrote that no lasting
domination can rest on brute force alone, but is, instead, by necessity based
on a realistic expectation that its orders will be obeyed, and thus on volun
tary obedience, on willingness to obey on the part of those subject to i t This
voluntary obediencewithout which no social system can endureis given
in terms of the systems {of authority) claims to legitimacy, and because the
subjects consider these claims persuasive. No system of authority, no society,
exists for any length of time if it is not legitimate and cannot claim voluntary
obedience from the mass of its subjects. The Nazis understood this as well
as any. Perhaps they understood this better than mostfor only to the in
ability or refusal to understand that a government as dependent on. the co
operation of the mass of its population for the execution of its policies as
was that of National Socialist Germany could hardly exist for a week with
out such cooperation, and therefore support, of this population can one at
tribute that dear to-the-West, persistent myth of Nazism as an unexplain
able deviation from the course of otherwise virtuous German history, of
which the majority of the German people were ignorant and innocent.
The anti-Semitic stereotype of the Jew reflected the symbolic substitution
of the Jews for the West and bore striking resemblance to the image of the
West in German thought. Elegant Jews of the cities spoke perfect Ger
man; the way they spoke it nevertheless betrayed their vile nature and ge
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 385
neric incapacity for feeling. It was as offensive to the musical ear of Richard
Wagner as French and, like the latter, reminded him of animal noises. In
Judaism in Music, directed against the annoyingly famous composers of
Jewish descent Felix Mendelssohn and Giacomo Meyerbeer, the patriotic
composer wrote: The Jew speaks the language of the nation in whose midst
he dwells from generation to generation, but he always speaks it as an alien.
Our whole European art and civilization have remained to the Jew a foreign
tongue. In this speech, this art, the Jew can only after-speak and after
patchnot truly make a poem of his words, an artwork of his doings [in
this the Jews again were remarkably similar to the French], In the peculiari
ties of Semitic pronunciation the first thing that strikes our ear as quite out
landish and unpleasant, in the Jews production of the voice-sounds, is a
creaking, squeaking, buzzing snuffle. This mode of speaking acquires at
once the character of an intolerably jumbled blabber. The cold indifference
of his peculiar blubber never by chance rises to the ardor of a higher heart
felt passion.222
Above all, the Jews, like the "Western world as a whole, were revoltingly
materialistic. They worshipped and represented the power of money. In the
anti-Jewish polemic this was an old and tested line. It went back to the fa
thers of the Church. The Jews, believed St. John Chrysostom, live for
their bellies, they crave for the goods of this world This in the nineteenth
century became a favorite theory of many respectable intellectuals. A philos
opher, Professor Fries of Heidelberg, for example, in 1816 published a trea
tise, On the Menace of the Jews to the Welfare and Character of the Ger
man, which was an instant success and in which the author claimed, among
other things, that Jews are a social pest which owes its rapid spread to
money and is accompanied by misery, tyranny, and taxes. Wagner reiter
ated in 1850: The Jew in truth is already more than emancipated: he rules,
and will rule, as long as Money remains the power before which all our
doings and our dealings lose their force.223But St. John Chrysostoms po
sition was updated in accordance with the latest discoveries of science and
philosophy. On the one hand, the Jews were now identified with the soulless
and inhuman form of society, the generalized money principlecapitalism;
on the other, Jewish reverence for money was attributed to their inner na
ture, race, rather than religion.
This view penetrated deep into the consciousness of Germany. Even Jews,
among those who so fervently wished to be accepted as Germans, the great
majority of whom were hard-working professionals or impecunious intel
lectuals, in complete disregard of all evidence of which they had immediate
knowledge, shared in it. In fact, one of the exemplary expressions of this
stereotype is to be found in the work of an author who was both Jewish and
notoriously impecunious, Karl Marx.
The symbolic substitution of the Jews for the West is transparently clear
386
N A T I O N A L I S M
in the Essay on the Jewish Question. Marxs opinion of the Jewish reli
gioncontempt for theory, for art, for history, and for man as an end-in
himselfwhich he considered to be the real, conscious standpoint and
the virtue of the man of money, is exactly the way Romantic nationalists
pictured what for them represented the West. Seeking the secret of Juda
ism in the real Jew, materialistic Romantic as he was, Marx discerned in
it a universal antisocial element of the present time. What is the profane
basis of Judaism? he asked, and answered: Practical need, self-interest.
What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god?
Money. He could not repeat this more often: Money is the jealous god of
Israel, beside which no other god may exist. . . The bill of exchange is the
real god of the Jew. Thus, the emancipation of the Jews was actually the
emancipation of the world from Jews, and in fact, claimed Marx, the Jew
has already emancipated himself in a Jewish manner, for thanks to their
financial power, Jews decided the destiny of Europe.224
Anti-Semitism was an inherently frustrating and self-perpetuating senti
ment. The identification of the jews with and their symbolic substitution for
the West made them the chief object of German ressentiment. The existential
envy could be acted out on them, for, unlike the West, they were powerless
to react. Paradoxically, the ressentiment did not diminish as a result, but
instead grew, for it could not be acted out on its real object, for which the
jews were only a substitute. Whatever was the fate of the Jews, the West
persisted in its infuriating superiority. Anti-Semitism, which relieved the
psychological discomfort necessarily associated with ressentiment, also ag
gravated it. In so doing, it kept the consuming fire of this deadly sentiment
burning, and nourished furor tedesco. A constant stimulant for German na
tionalism, it stimulated the worst in it.
The Twin Blossoms of the Blue Flower
By the 1840s nationalism had developed into an important emotional
bond which absorbed the continuing loyalty of increasing numbers of indi
vidual Germans. 22f It was speedily becoming the framework of the deepest
individual and collective identity, and as such informed contradictory polit
ical approaches. The matrix of German nationalism, which these ap
proaches reflected and in various ways developed, was a product of anti-
Western ressentiment injected into the complex system of Pieto-Romantic
thought which had constituted the German consciousness before the latter
became national, and included the following principles among its basic ten
ets: {1) the view of the modernWestern, capitalistworld as meaningless,
worthless, and evil; (2) the view of modern man as fragmented, alienated
from society and from his true nature; (3) the definition of social nature as
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
387
the true nature of man and the beiief that the real, objective man is possible
only through a fusion of individuality in a collectivity, through the renun
ciation of all claims to particular autonomy, and through being essentially a
member of a larger whole imbued with spirit; only the individual who be
came one with a community was considered to be his true self and thus both
rational and free; {4) the yearning for the transformation of society that
would make the reai tnan possible, usually to be accomplished through a
violent war or revolution; (5) the emphasis on the primacy of intellectuals
in bringing about this transformation.
The insistent prophecy of Romantic intellectuals, however absurd and ri
diculous in its arrogance, that the world would subject itself to the rule of
the German mind, came true. In the century and a half that followed the
birth of German nationalism, nothing had affected so many people so deeply
as did two German traditions, one of the left and one of the right: Marxism
and the Volkish tradition which culminated in National Socialism. One nat
urally recoils from admitting the kinship between the two, as indeed one
would recoil from admitting the kinship of National Socialism to anything.
Its crimes against humanity seem to stand apart from human history, as
something that was not human at all, a sort of hellish apparition that could
not have happened. The acronym Nazism conveniently obscures the fact
that it denotes a variety of socialism. And the supposition that an interna
tionalist doctrine, such as Marxism, conceived by a Jew and carried on by
scores and scores of other Jews, which called on proletarians of all countries
to unite, may have something in common with that most horrible variety of
militant and xenophobic nationalism, for which anti-Semitism was the driv
ing passion, seems utterly preposterous. Yet the two are close kin; they are,
one can say, brothersthey come from the same parentage and are products
of the very same upbringing. They are both elaborations of the matrix of
German nationalism, a system of beliefs and aspirations, which was pro
foundly socialist, and while socialism, however obscured, is nevertheless a
central element in National Socialism, so is nationalism (and very specifi
cally German nationalism) a central element in Marxism.
It would be redundant to demonstrate the nationalist character of Na
tional Socialism. Its direct succession from the nationalism of the Liberation
period has been many times traced, and there is no need to trace it again
here. It added little to the already existing body of thought, but sharpened,
articulated, brought into focus, and strengthened several central tendencies
in it. It tended to represent modern Western reality in essentially economic,
rather than political and cultural, terms (aspects of politics and culture being
seen as reflections of the unnatural economic structure), and chose capital
ism as the specific target of its attack on Western society. It represented the
conflict between values (those of the West it opposed and the ones it opposed
to them) which were embodied in the two antagonistic economies, Western
388
N A T I O N A L I S M
capitalism and German socialism, as a reflection of a still deeper racial an
tagonism. I t made the Jews its paramount enemy, anti-Semitism its principal
motive, and liberation of the world from the Jews its ultimate goal. And,
finally, it evoked the authority of science and brought science to bear upon
and support the view of social reality it presented, as well as the moral mes
sage it derived from this presentation. Racism and specifically anti-Semitism
were defined as disinterested, objective positionsimposed on one by stub
born, material realityand anyone subscribing to these positions was ab
solved of all personal responsibility. Otherwise National Socialism pre
served the Romantic matrix intact.
In Marxism, too, capitalism became the essential aspect of the evil mod
ern reality. Its conclusions, too, were presented as scientific. It, too, as I shall
attempt to show presently, retained the perspective and remained faithful to
the aspirations of Romantic nationalism. And though it was neither racist
nor explicitly anti-Semitic, racist anti-Semitism was almost certainly the
central source of inspiration for it.
Shortly after the Essay on the Jewish Question, in which Marx, among
other things, attempted to dissociate himself from Jews and Judaism, he
wrote an Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegels Phi
losophy of Right. This essay is one of the finest examples of the archetypal
Romantic nationalist argument, almost identical in its structure to Novalis
Christenheit oder Europa. The essay starts with what was indeed the start
ing point of Romantic nationalism: comparison of Germany with the West
and the realization that it is unfavorable. Early in the beginning of the essay
Marx declares that it deals with Germany. He proceeds to describe the Ger
man situation: I f one were to begin with the status quo itself in Germany,
even in the most appropriate way, i. e. negatively, the result would still be an
anachronism. Even the negation of our political present is already a dusty
past in the historical lumber room of modem nations. If I negate the German
situation of 1843 I have, according to French chronology, hardly reached
the year 1789, and still less the vital center of the present day126This short
passage reveals a number of points. There is an awareness that the vital
center of the day lies outside Germany, somewhere among the "modem
nations. Germany, accordingly, is not a modem nation. This realization
and the comparison between Germany and the modern nations at the center
are clearly humiliating.
Marx goes on to describe the unacceptable situation of Germany, rejects
in passing the position of those who look for salvation in Teutonic forests,
and declares war upon the state of affairs in Germany, because this state of
affairs is beneath the level of history. In order to give the nation courage to
revolt against and change this state of affairs, he wants to make it terrified
of itself and deny it an instant of illusion and resignation,
Germany, says Marx, will not change only for itself. Even for the mod
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany 389
ern nations, he says, this struggle against the limited character of the
German status quo does not lack interest. Actually, Germany wouid be per
forming a world mission, for the German status quo is the open consum
mation of the ancien regime, and the ancien regime is the hidden defect of
the modern state Germany would be in effect curing the defect of other,
modem nations, at the vitai center of the present day. He names these na
tions; they are France and England.
Up to this point Marx lamented German inferiority in comparison with
the advanced nations. Now he changes the direction of the argument and
declares that this is not so much an inferiority as an advantage. Germany is,
after all, not so badespecially if compared with some less fortunate na
tionsand, in fact, its present backwardness and difference from the mod
em nations contains the guarantee of its future greatness. This turn of
thought also was an element of the archetypal Romantic nationalist argu
ment, and was present already in Pietism, which, compelled to seek salva
tion in misery, glorified misery as a necessary path to salvation. Marxs ar
gument in this Pietist vein also reflected, alien to Pietism, but characteristic
of Romantic nationalism, pride in the intellect and the tendency to see in
German letters the essence of the nation. Marx wrote:
If the whole of German development were at the level of German political de
velopment, a German could have no greater part in contemporary problems
than can a Russian .. .
Fortunately, we Germans are not Scythians.
just as the nations of the ancient world lived their prehistory in the imagina
tion, in mythology, so we Germans have lived our post-history in thought, in
philosophy. We are the philosophical contemporaries of the present day with
out being its historical contemporaries. German philosophy is the ideal prolon
gation of German history .. . The German philosophy of right and of the state
is the only German history which is a! pari with the official modern times. The
'German nation is obliged, therefore, to connect its dream history with its pre
sent conditions, and to subject to criticism not only these existing conditions
but also their abstract continuation.
The German speculative philosophy of right, says Marx, was raised to the
level of science. Its criticism, also science, would be both an extremely sig
nificant development in philosophy and a critical analysis of the modem
(not German) state and of the reality connected with it. Why should one
criticize this modem reality? Because it is fundamentally evil, much more so
than the present German reality. The modern state, says Marx, which for
Germany remains in the beyond, leaves out of account the real man, or
only satisfies the whole man in an illusory way.
Germany compares unfavorably with France and England, but the ques
tion for it, says Marx, is not whether it can catch up with these modern
nations. These nations are corrupt, they disregard the real man, and their
390
N A T I O N A L I S M
social flesh is degenerate. The question for Germany is: Can it overcome
these nations? He asks rhetorically; Can Germany attain a practical activ
ity a la hauteur des principes; that is to say, a revolution which will raise it
not only to the official level of the modern nations, but to the human level
which will be the immediate future of these nations?
Marxs answer 0 this question is: Yes, it can. Germany had already
proved itself capable of such revolutions in the past, and in the past, too, it
did so with the help, and under the leadership, of ideas. As it did in the
Reformation, so will it lead the world again on its road to the revolutionary
transformation of society now. It has what other nations lackphilosophy
developed into science.
For a revolution to take place, however, there must exist a mass to carry
through the prescriptions of the philosophy. A class must be formed, says
Marx, which will fight not for partial interests and benefits, as did revolu
tionary classes in advanced nations, but for the complete emancipation of
man. This class is proletariat. It is only beginning to form itself in Germany,
but since partially revolutionary classes cannot exist in Germany anyway, it
will surely be formed in the nearest future. And once the lightning of
thought [German philosophy] has penetrated deeply into this virgin soil of
the people [German proletariat], the Germans will emancipate themselves
and become men . . . In Germany no type of enslavement can be abolished
unless all enslavement is destroyed. The emancipation of Germany will be
an emancipation of man. The essay concludes with an enigmatic statement:
"The day of German resurrection will be proclaimed by the crowing of the
Gallic cock. This statement recalls the t^rgent question in Novalis Chris
tianity or Europe: Shall the revolution remain the French Revolution?
Marx, like Novalis, answers it in the negative. The French Revolution is
merely a precursor, a herald of salvation brought to humanity-by Germany.
This outburst of patriotism does not necessarily show that Karl Marx was
a passionate German nationalist.227However, at the time of Marxs early
adulthood nationalism had already acquired the character of a deeply
embedded cognitive blueprint and in fact became a convenient cultural
frame 228for the expression of ideas in the most diverse areas. The fact was
that Marx inherited the nationalistic attitude in toto andfar from being
unaware of it, as his later writings were to suggestshared in it fully. He
accepted it unreffectively, without a shade of the skeptical suspension of
commitment229No element of this perspective was for him as much as
questionable; this was the very prism through which he to the end of his life
saw and related to the world.230Nationalism, molded by the Romantic vi
sion and widely shared, formed the foundation of Marxs thought, and if it
was never mentioned as such but went unnoticed, perhaps it was that very
fundamental, natural character of this vision, self-evident for Marx, that
explained this lack of recognition.
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
391
Marxs early writings bear remarkable resemblance to the general spirit
of the German letters of the first half of the nineteenth century, informed by
Romanticism and ressentiment against the West. One finds in them the rei-
teration of all the essential elements of this spirit: the curious blend of chau
vinism and cosmopolitanism in the vision of the German mission; the em
phasis on the essentially social nature of man and coliectivistic definitions of
freedom and individuality; the emphasis on the whole man and the inability
of the anti-social decadent West to allow his self-realization; the pride in
German letters and the belief in the special salvational power of German
philosophy. The differences which exist between Marx in his early writings
and those of the Romantics proper amount to no more than differences in
terminology. For example, the ideal society is called the Kingdom of God
on Earth by Schiegel and communism or socialism by Marx, but both
refer to the state of what Marx in Economic and philosophical Manuscripts
of 1844 calls transcendence of human self-alienation. Even this choice of
vocabulary still may, and probably should, be interpreted as an expression
of Marxs youthful patriotism. Friedrich Engels, in an article written in Eng
lish for an Owenite newspaper in 1843, before he and Marx had become
collaborators and friends, made it clear that communism had a special sig
nificance for the Germans. This was due to its centrality in German philos
ophy. The Germans, unlike the English and the French, explained Engels,
arrived at the idea of communism by a philosophical path; it constituted the
fulfillment of Hegels philosophical principles. Hegels philosophy was the
crowning achievement of German philosophical thought, and philosophical
thought was the pride of the German nation. To believe in and propagandize
the idea of communism was the patriotic duty of a German. Engels wrote:
The Germans are a philosophical nation, and will nor, cannot abandon
communism, as soon as it is founded upon sound philosophical principles;
chiefly as it is derived as an unavoidable conclusion from their own philos
ophy. And this is the part we have to perform now. Our party has to prove
that either all the philosophical efforts of the German nation, from Kant to
Hegel, have been uselessworse than useless; or, that they must end in
communism; that the Germans must either reject their great philosophers,
whose names they hold as the glory of their nation, or that they must adopt
communism. nl Communism thus took the place of the Kingdom of God
without in the least changing the reasons for which this new form of society
had to be advocated. It represented the nationalized infinite, was an up
dated name for the Absolute, that is all. Philosophy and national glory were
connected, and to be a Hegelian philosopher in the 1840s implied being a
German patriot in the same way as at the beginning of the century to be a
Romantic poet implied being a German patriot.
After the 1844 Manuscripts, while the structure of the argument remained
exactly the same, the idiosyncrasies evident in Marxs early writings (such
392 N A T I O N A L I S M
as the idea of the proletariat, the alleged predominance of economic factors
and motives over all others) developed into major propositions of the Marx-
ist theory and gave it a look which on the face of it had iirtle in common
with Romanticism and the explicitly nationalistic (or Volkish) varieties of
German political thought- The reason for this development away from an
explicitly nationalistic problematic was, one is led to think, the racist and
emphatically anti-Semitic character of mainstream German nationalism.
Marx tried to take care of the problem this created for a German patriot of
Jewish descent in the Essay on the Jewish Question. For a while he seemed
to be satisfied with the result; in his very next essay hewith a sense of
liberationcould say: We Germans. But Marxs passionate rhetoric ap
peared convincing to hardly anyone but himself: it was not enough to re
nounce ones Jewishness to be accepted as a German. Even the skin of an
elephant would not be sufficiently thick to leave Marx unaware that the
intellectual feat he had performed in On the Jewish Question could not
be entirely effective, and that he never would become a real German in the
eyes of those he considered to be real Germans.
Anti-Semitism made it impossible for Marx to remain faithful to the letter
of Romantic nationalism. But through an ingenious turn of thoughr he suc
ceeded in remaining faithful to its spirit, and retained the rest of its funda
mental beliefs and aspirations without having to subscribe to the position
whichat least in the eyes of the otherswould define him as an alien,
inferior being, excluded from participation in the victorious march of the
superior race destined for glory. He ensured his own participation and es
caped racism. This was achieved by the substitution of class for nation.
As is well known, Marx arrived at the idea of the proletariat not through
empirical study, but by way of philosophical speculation. In the Introduc
tion to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right
Marx postulated the need for a mass to carry out the teachings of German
philosophy. The mass had to correspond to the character of this philosophy:
in other words it had to be the material expression of the situation and des
tiny of Germany, in the same manner in which philosophy was its spiritual
expression. This mass therefore had to embody the very antithesis of mod
em society, and to contain within itself the seeds of its overthrow. It was
destined to become everything, and therefore had to be as close to noth
ing as possible. A concept of a new class closely corresponding to these
requirements was available in contemporary French socialist literature,
which had been very fashionable in Germany since the 1830s. Already Ger
man philosophers tended to identify the proletariat with mankind in the
same way in which since the beginning of the century they had identified
Germany with mankind. The goal of German historythe overthrow of
modern Western society-was in their opinion the goal of humanity. It was
but a small step to the identification of the proletariat with Germany,
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
393
The concept of the proletariat and the phenomenon it corresponded to
was analyzed in the Hegelian framework by Lorenz von Stein in his Der
Socialismus und Communi&mus des heutigen Frankreichs, published in
1842. Von Stein viewed the proletariat as an entirely new class, emerging in
the wake of the French Revolution. It was propertyless and tended to gen
eralize its condition by creating a community of goods. Thus it was the
very antithesis of the modern Western society founded on principles of
property and personality. Moreover, the proletariat was not simply the
mass of the poor; it was a special class of defiant propertyless people who
resented their society and wished to transform it into a different one through
a revolution. Marx was deeply influenced by von Steins book, and adopted
the concept of the proletariat developed in it.232
It is in this function, as the massthe carrier of the German philosophical
ideathat the proletariat appeared for the first time in Marxs Introduc
tion to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right.
Later the idea of Germanys mission and leadership on the way to world
revolution disappeared from his theoretical writings {though it reappeared
now and then in letters and occasional newspaper articles), and the proletar
iat emerged as the sole savior and leader. The true philosophyearlier a
manifestation of the national spirit, the ideal projection of the real tenden
cies of national historywas incorporated in the idea of the proletariat; it
was the true class consciousness, part and parcel of the proletariats eco
nomic situation. At the same time, Capitalor capitalismreplaced the
West, the modern nations, England and France {which nevertheless were
believed to represent it), as the anti-hero. While the proletariat was the me
tamorphosed Germany, Capital was the metamorphosed West. Both re
tained all the qualities of the forces of good and evil, respectively, of the
Romantic nationalist scheme.
In Marxism classes took on all the characteristics of the Romantic na
tions. It is classes for Marx that are the actors of history; classes, not men,
are the real individualities. Men are subsumed under them; they are nothing
but their members in the biological, rather than sociological, sense of the
word. The characters, abilities, behavior, and views of men are but reflec
tions of the dispositions of classes, as they are of nations in the thought of
German patriots of the period. Like nations (notably in Fichte}, classes in
Marxist theory are divided into partial and pan-human. The view of the
proletariat as the universal class, in distinction from all other classes, reflects
the idea of Germany as the pan-human nation in distinction from all other
nations.
Thus most of the elements of the Romantic nationalist Weltanschauung
were retained. Though it was Capital now, and not particular societies,
which was evil personified, its characteristics were unmistakably the char
acteristics ascribed to the advanced, Western nations, and one therefore was
394 N A T I O N A L I S M
justified in resenting these nations, for they were the historical embodiment
or expression of Capital (in much the same way, one must note, in which
jews were its racial embodiment and expression within another tradition).
The West was still seen as the doomed embodiment of evil; the role of the
savior of mankind was to be played by the anti-West. As a result of the
metamorphosis of nation into class, this vision, inherent in German nation
alism, gained a source of universal appeal. While originally each nation
vexed by the superiority of the West had to express its ressentiment in its
own terms, with the role of the anti-model and savior performed for Ger
mans by Germany, for Russians by Russia, and so on, and while therefore
the battles fought by each nation and the enemies against which it fought
were different in every case, the new Marxist version was acceptable to all
nationalities struggling with the realization of their inferiority; in this sense
it was' indeed international.
In addition, Marxism had the form of an economic theory. Like the rac
ism of the late nineteenth century, it ostensibly represented a scientific, ob
jective, and therefore non-ethical position. To subscribe to it was no longer
a question of moral choice, or of choice in general.*33Those who were will
ing to subscribe to it were absolved from moral responsibility. Their sym
pathies and antipathies were now justified by science. They were doing what
they wanted to do, but now they knew that they had to do this. In a way,
they simply fulfilled orders. Here they stood and they could do no other.
They were freeof doubts and pangs of consciencefor this was a state of
recognized necessity.
Of course, in the conditions of nineteenth-century Germany, there was a
choice to be made; it was a choice between two conflicting scientific doc
trines. Since, whatever differences there were between them, their way of
doing science and the notions as to what constituted it were pretty similar
in accordance with the Romantic redefinition of scientific pursuit, both had
little regard for facts and concentrated on the exploration of reality beyond
the apparentthis was a particularly difficult choice to make. It is hardly a
wonder that in the end it was the circumstances of ones material existence
(it should be granted, more often racial than economic) that determined
ones consciousness, and not the scientific qualifications of either of the two
theories.
In Germany, as elsewhere, Jews tended disproportionally in the direction
of Marxism. It prophesied the disappearance of nations and promised to
deliver them from a humiliating and oppressive identity. In Russia, Trotsky,
when asked whether he would define himself as a Russian or a Jew, is re
ported to have replied, revealingly: Neither. I am a Socialist.234jews were
likely to be firm and sincere internationalists and to see the transformation
of the world, rather than of any particular nation, as the ultimate and truly
significant goal of their activity. The idea of socialism in one country, by
The Final Solution of Infinite Longing: Germany
395
default National Socialism, appealed to them less; they were overrepre
sented among the supporters of permanent revolution.
In many central issues an admirable agreement existed between German
Marxists and representatives of Volkish ideology who were also socialists
(and therefore direct ancestors of National Socialism). The number of so
cialist nationalists was not insignificant, for German nationalism in general
was inherently socialist, and it included some of the leaders of the German
anti-Semitic movement.23* Wilhelm Marr, the founder of the Antisemiten-
Liga and the inventor of the term anti-Semitism, declared that anti-
Semitism is a Socialist movement, only in nobler and purer form than Social
Democracy. (One must admit that in the light of Marxs pronouncements
in the essay On the Jewish Question, such an assertion did sound rather
plausible.) Marxists doubted the intellectual quality of their alleged kin, but
recognized the kinship. Anti-Semitism, they admitted, was indeed socialism,
but that of the dumb (der Sozialismus des dummen KerlsjP6German
socialists agreed that insofar as anti-Semitism was anti-capitalist, which it
emphatically was, it represented a step forward in historico-political
development and compared well with liberalism, which was not anti
capitalist.237
Whether Marxists, the preachers of communist internationalism, or anti-
Semites, the prophets of National Socialism, they came from the same stock,
burned with the same desire, and fought the same enemy. Their mind was
still that of Pietists and Romantics; they were driven by ressentiment and
hatred of the West. Both were faithfully pursuing the national dreamthe
Blue Flowerlooking for it, one on the right side of the road, the other
on the left. When they found it, it appears, both discovered that its color
was red.
C H A P T E R
5
In Pursuit of
the Ideal Nation:
The Unfolding of
Nationality in
America
It is of great importance to begin well.
John Adams
The commonwealth of mankind, as a whole, was not co be constructed in one gen
eration. But the different peoples are to be considered as its component parts, pre
pared, like so many springs and wheels, one day to be put together... In this great
work our country holds the noblest rank ... Our land is ... the recipient of the
men of all countries . .. Our country stands, therefore, more than any other, as the
realization of the unity of the race.
George Bancroft
A
s it spread on the European continent, nationalism changed its
character. The direction of its transformation was away from the
original, English, individualistic principles of nationalitythe very
same principles, it is worth stressing, which the world has named, in a man
ner which conveniently obscures their national origins, the ideas of modern
democracy. Having followed their permutations at some length, we may
find it useful to return to these principles and examine the conditions under
which they were not only preserved in their original significance, but also
developed and carried into new areas of social experience.
We have left English nationalism in the late seventeenth century. In that
unhappy age, when an universal deluge of tyranny [had] overpowered the
face of the whole earth, liberty, together with equality and reason, consti
tuted the core of English nationality. One of the foremost Whig philosophers
of the time, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, articulated the social and political
implications of the English idea of the nation. Of all human Affections, he
wrote, the noblest and most becoming human nature, is that of love to
ones country. This . . . will easily be allowed by all men, who have really a
Country, and are of the number of those who may be called a People, as
enjoying the happiness of a real constitution and polity, by which they are
free and independent. He explained in a note to rhe term People: A
multitude held together by force, though under one and the same head, is
not properly united: nor does such a body make a people. I t is the social
league, confederacy, and mutual concent, founded in some common good or
interest, which joins the members of a community, and makes a People one.
Absolute Power annuls the publick; and where there is no publick, or con
stitution, there is in reality no mother-Coimtry, or Nation. The term na
tion referred to a civil state, a union of men as rational Creatures, not
a primordial unit; the latter view Shaftesbury thought a misconception.
He accounted for it with marvelous insight. I must confess, he wrote, I
have been apt sometimes to be very angry with our language, for having
denied us the use of the word Patria, and afforded us no other name to ex
press our native community than that of country . .. abstracted from man
kind or society. Reigning words are many times of such force as to influence
400 N A T I O N A L I S M
us considerably in our apprehension of things. Whether it be from any such
cause as this, I know not; but certain it is, that in the idea of a civil state or
nation, we Englishmen are apt to mix somewhat more than ordinary gross
and earthy. No people who owed so much to a constitution, and so little to
a soil or climate, were ever known so indifferent towards one, and so pas
sionately fond of the other. To derive national loyalty from the place of
birth and residence was absurd. Had it happened to one of us British men
to have been born at sea, could we not therefore properly be called British
men? . . . It may therefore be esteemed no better than a mere subterfuge of
narrow minds to assign this natural passion for society and a country, to
such a relation as that of a mere fungus or common excrescence, to its
parent-mould, or nursing dunghill.
John Locke, in the second Treatise on Civil Government, also defined po
litical community or commonwealth as a "civil state or compact be
tween rational beings, and not a mystic unity arising from common origins:
Nothing can make any man [a member of a commonwealth] but his actu
ally entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise and com
pact He did not use the word nation, but the society of which he spoke,
unquestionably, was one. Locke presented liberty and equality of men in
societythat Is, association of men in a nationas required by the law of
nature: The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges
every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but
consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm an
other in his life, health, liberty or possessions Mans liberty and equality
to other men followed from his having reason, which is able to instruct
him in that law he is to govern himself by. 1Given that men were rational
beings, inequality and lack of liberty, or a society which was anything other
than a nation, were, therefore, both unnatural and unreasonable.
These ideals were rarely disputed. But the gap between ideals and reality
was wide and, in the eighteenth century, seemed to grow wider. The reason
lay in part in what John Murrin calls the English revolution settlement
the pattern assumed by a revolutionary regime after the turmoil itself is
over, which for a long time to come determines the manner of the political
and social evolution. In England, this settlement, achieved between 1688
and 1721, following the Restoration, established Court, rather than Coun-
try (which stood for the original ideals of English nationalism) as the domi
nant force in British politics.2As a result, progress toward a closer alignment
between the lofty principles, to which most professed loyalty, and reality
was significantly slowed. The more general reason was the identification of
the abstract idea of the nation with the actually existing institutions, the
concrete and necessarily imperfect reality, and the gradual transfer of loy
alty to the latter. This identification, the idea that England as it was, was the
elect nation, had its origin in the ardent hope of the Elizabethans. Since that
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
401
early time, therefore, English patriotismdevotion to the English nation
could refer both to the idealistic commitment to the values of liberty, equal
ity, and reason (which is what Shaftesbury meant in speaking of the nation)
and to the emotional attachment to the land, government, and ways of Eng
land. One was the original English nationalism, the other an updated partic-
ularis'm, clothed in nationalist rhetoric. One was inherently revolutionary,
inevitably critical of the status quo so long as the embodiment of the ideals
in it was imperfect; the otherconservative in the literal sense of the word:
it cherished the actual. Shaftesbury was, of course, over-critical of his coun
trymen, perhaps because he lacked comparative perspective. When it came
to the definition of the nation, Englishmen, on the whole, tended to be less
rather than more than ordinary gross and earthy, as the works of their
eminent thinkers attested. Nevertheless, there was truth in his assessment.
In Restoration England, tired of the revolutionary striving to attain the
ideal, people found comfort in the thought that their destiny was not of their
making, but was instead inherent in the soil and climate, and were eager
to be satisfied with the status quo. The author of the Origines Britannicae
(1685), Edward Stillingfleet, argued sensibly that it was fortunate that men
were contented with the places of their habitations; for , . . now, since the
true Paradise is lost, it seems to be most convenient for the world, that every
nation should believe they have it at home. 3
This sense of satisfaction with the existing state of society was expressed
in the vague idea of and the admiration for the British constitution. In the
eighteenth century, constitution as a rule referred not to the fundamental
principles of a polity, but to that assemblage of laws, customs, and institu
tions which form the general system according to which the several powers
of the state are distributed and their respective rights are secured to the dif
ferent members of the community4; it was a term for the existing order of
social and political relations. Of course, relatively speaking, and by compar
ison with other societies of the age, the state of the English society was
rather satisfactory, and the desire to make it even more so did not revive on
a significant scale until the nineteenth century, with the appearance on the
political scene of new groups, heretofore denied the pleasure of experiencing
such satisfaction personally.
But before it could regain momentum at the place of its birth, the promise
of original English nationalism was carried much further toward its realiza
tion, and at a much swifter pace, than could have been possible in any part
of Europe, with its age-old habits of doing things and thinking, by English
men on the other side of the Atlantic. The story of this development, a direct
continuation of the process begun in England in the sixteenth century, is the
story of the emergence of the American nation.
The conditions under which civic nationalism developed were unique,
and although in matters of national identity exceptionalism is unexcep
402 N A T I O N A L I S M
tional, this makes the uniqueness itself of American nationalism peculiar.
The nationality of American identity and consciousness does not demand an
explanation. The English settlers came with a national identity; it was a
given. They necessarily conceived of the community to which they belonged
as a nation; the idea of the nation was an American inheritance. National
identity in America thus preceded the formation not only of the specific
American identity (the American sense of uniqueness), but of the institu
tional framework of the American nation, and even of the national territory,
all of whichsince we no longer follow Shaftesburyare conventionally
thought of as foundations of nationality. Because of this singular develop
ment, the symbolic nature of nationality and its essential autonomy from
material or objective ethnic and structural factors are demonstrated here
with particular clarity.
It has been the fate of the American nation, it is said, not to have ideolo
gies but to be one.5In a way this is true of every nation, for a nation is first
and foremost an embodiment of an ideology. There are no dormant na
tions which awaken to the sense of their nationality existing due to some
objective unity; rather, invention and imposition of national identity lead
people to believe that they are indeed united and as a result to become
united; it is national identity which often weaves disparate populations into
one. Yet this applies more rigorously to America. For, in America, at the
outset, ideology, the firm conviction that the American society (every objec
tive attribute of whichterritory, resources, institutions, and character
was as yet uncertain) was a nation, was the only thing that was certain. An
explanandum in every other case, nationalism, in the American society, is an
independent variable.
The idea of the nation emerged in an old, traditional society, very different
from the ideal image the concept implied. Subsequently, in every case but
British settlement in America, it was imported into social environments
whose reality stood in flagrant contradiction to it. In the uneven battle be
tween the nascent principle and long-established ways of life, it was the
principle that had to adjust. But in America, to begin with, there was almost
no social reality, other than the one the settlers brought with them in their
own minds. (One couid say that there were no structural constraints apart
from the constraints of the symbolic structure.) To be sure, a society was
soon formed. Economic opportunities, or their scarcity, bred interests and
structural relations which had little to do with the ideal of national collectiv
ity. But this ideal was nevertheless a given. While in older societies the novel
idea was acting upon the obdurate reality, in America the new reality acted
upon the stubborn inherited idea. The transformative effect of the national
idea on reality has been great everywhere, but the idea which eventually had
this effect was, in older societies, itself transformed by the counterpressure
of institutions and traditions that were the legacy of their pre-national past.
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
403
The specificity of the American case lay in that the idea of the nation, na
tionality as such, although undoubtedly also modified by the independently
emerging reality, was a much more potent factor in the formation of the
national society, Contrary to the accepted opinion, then, in a certain, analyt
ical, sense, the American nation is an ideal nation: the national element in it
is challenged by the fewest counterinfluences; it is a purer example of a na
tional community than any other.
Because of the strictly derivative character of the national identity in
America, the conceptual problem presented by American nationalism is dif
ferent from the one we confronted in the four previous cases, and the em
phasis in the following pages will be different from the one in the rest of the
book. Rather than seeking to explain how nationalism in America emerged
(which is unproblematic), we address the question of how a unique society
and its very geo-political framework were molded by the given of national
identity, by the fact that the seed population, so to speak, to begin with
consisted of citizens of a nation who brought the conviction of their nation
ality with them to a new continent. This process of formation, which began
aboard the motley fleet carrying Englishmen to the New 'World, was not
completed until after the Civil War between the Union and the Confederacy.
Only then was the fundamental question settled of what was to be the con
crete geo-political referent of the American national loyalty. The outcome of
this conflict, another revolution settlement, reconfirmed the commitment
of the new society to the original principles derived from the old one, and
determined that it would henceforth develop toward ever closer alignment
wirh them.
America as a New England
Examples of the developed, articulated nationalism of the Americans of the
colonial period, and of the fact that theirs was English and then British na
tionalism, are not hard to find. Their loyalty found expression in many
forms. Not the least eloquent were the names they gave to their settlements.
Of these New England was just the most explicit. Boston and Cam
bridge, which did not bother to stress their derivative character, or Vir
ginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, which honored and commemorated
English rulers rather than localities, reflected a similar sense of sameness
identity with Englandnostalgia and desire to recreate the dear image and
essence itself of the mother country on the foreign shores. This pattern of
naming is not self-evident: it presents a striking contrast to the practice of
Latin American colonies.* Where Spaniards encountered an alien country,
Englishmen tended to discern similarities which made their removal"
across the ocean not much different from a regular change of residence. In
404 N A T I O N A L I S M
the preamble to the first New England sermon to be printed, Robert Cush
man, one of the organizers of the Mayflower group, explained: n ew -
en g l a n d , so called, not only (to avoid novelties) because Captain Smith
hath so entitled it in his Description, but because of the resemblance that is
in it, of England, the native soil of Englishmen; it being much what the same
for heat and cold in Summer and Winter, it being champaign ground, but no
high mountains, somewhat like the soil in Kent and Essex; full of dales, and
meadow ground, full of rivers and sweet springs, as England is. But princi
pally, so far as we can yet find, it is an island, and near about the quantity of
England, being cut out from the main land in America, as England is from
the main of Europe. Two generations later Cotton Mather, in Magnalia
Christi Americana, wrote similarly: The Name of n ew -en g l a n d . . . has
been ever since [1614] allowed unto my Country, as unto the most Resem
bling Daughter, to the chief Lady of the European World.7
The motives for removal to America were diverse. The founders of Vir
ginia, in the spirit of Elizabethan adventurers, sought earthly opportunities,
like the latter eager to honor England by the successes of their ventures.
These Cushman characterized as mere worldlings . . . having their own
lusts carrying them . . . out of discontentment in regard of their estates in
England; and aiming at great matters here, affecting it to be gentlemen,
landed men, or hoping for office, place, dignity, or fleshly liberty. Still, he
did not deny legitimacy to materialistic motives altogether: they occupy a
central place in an apologia he published in England early in 1621, under
the title Reasons and Considerations Touching the Lawfulness of Remov
ing out of England into the Parts of America. Cushman undertook in it to
answer the question how a man that is here bom and bred, and hath lived
some years, may remove himself into another country. He started from the
premise that, though the home of a Christian is nowhere but in the heavens
. . . now, as natural, civil and religious [pertaining to the religious controver
sies of the time] bands tie men, so they must be bound, and that, therefore,
legitimate reasons for leaving England should take these secular bands
into account. The removal should be as beneficial to England and people
remaining at home as to those who would endeavor it, he argued, even leav
ing aside the religious motives of the latter (the bitter contention that hath
been about religion). For now many an able-bodied person was forced to
sit here [in England] with their talent in a napkin, since notwithstanding
the many blessings England enjoyed thanks to Gods favor (sweet delights,
and variety of comforts), there was such pressing and oppressing in town
and country, about farms, trades, traffick, &c.; so as a man can hardly any
where set up a trade, but he shall pull down two of his neighbours. Let us
not thus oppress, straiten, and afflict one another, he called; but seeing
there is a spacious land, the way to which is through the sea, we will end this
difference in a day. This solution was all the more natural because the spa-
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
405
cions land he was referring to was proper to the king of England, as a
result of the ancient discoveries, contracts and agreements which our Eng
lishmen have long since made in those parts, and was thus a part of the
national patrimony.Presented in this manner, the practise of removal
was an act of true English patriotism.
The religious reason, for Cushman, was, of course, much more impor
tant. He was a Puritan, and on the whole, the Puritans identified with the
ideal England which at the time they saw violated on the island where it had
taken its earthly residence. Some stayed to fight for it at home; some left and
carried it with them to the wilderness where it could not be assailed. Mather
later described the reasons that drove Englishmen to America: The Sum of
the Matter is, That from the very Beginning of the r ef o r ma t i o n in the
English Nation, there hath always been a Generation of Godly Men, desir
ous to pursue the Reformation of Religion . . . And there hath been another
Generation of Men, who have still employed the Power which they have
generally still in their Hands . . . to stop the Progress of the Desired Refor
mation . . . Then twas that. . . Multitudes of Pious, peaceable Protestants,
were driven, by their Severities, to leave their Native Country, and seek a
Refuge for their Lives and Liberties, with Freedom, for the Worship of God,
in a Wilderness, in the Ends of the Earth.
If the removal of the Virginians began as a business trip, the Puritans went
into voluntary exile. In both instances, the prohibitive vastness of the ocean
and the opportunities of the open continent transformed what could have
been a temporary situation into a permanent one and redefined i t Had the
Puritans gone no farther than Holland, they would probably have returned
after the conditions at home became more to their liking. It is certain that
the removal was not conceived as a renunciation of national allegiance; it
was not expatriation or emigration. Indeed, with Cromwells victory, many
chose to return even from America, and one of the reasons why more re
solved to stay was that America, for them, was a part of England. Recount
ing the story of the Plymouth plantation, Mather tells the following: The
founders had not been very long at Leyden before they found themselves
encountered with many Inconveniencies . .. they were very loth to lose their
Interest in the English Nation; but were desirous rather to enlarge their
Kings Dominions. These Reasons were deeply considered .. . and ., , they
took up a Resolution . . . to r emo v e into AMERICA. There, in the utmost
parts of the Earth, they insisted that we have changed only our Climate,
not our mindes. They remained faithful both to the principles of the Eng
lish government, best agreeable to our English temper1and to English re
ligion. In 1648, The Cambridge Platform asserted: Wee, who are by na
ture, English men, doe desire to hold forth the same doctrine of religion . . .
which wee see and know to be held by the churches of England. 9
The men of Mathers generation, himself foremost among them, clearly
406 N A T I O N A L I S M
also saw themselves as Englishmen. They spoke of both Englands, pro- j
fessed that separation between them and the mother country was only spa- i
rial, and thought of England with heartfelt affection. Among the numerous
merits of Magnalia, wrote John Higginson in the Attestation to this
Church-History of New England, was that it stressed the ties which united
Englishmen in America and Europe and allowed that the Little Daughter
of New-England in America, may bow down her self to her mother England
in Europe. . . assuring her, that tho by some of her Angry Brethren, she was
forced to make a Local Secession, yet not a Separation. Mather himself
referred to England as the Best Island of the Universe, talked with pride
about the discoveries of the English Nation in the New "World, insisting
on the chronological precedence of some of them over Columbus, and de
clared that all the concern of this our History, is to tell how English People
first came into America; the Magnalia Americana were the wonderful
works done since by Almighty God for the English in these Regions. 10In
the New as in the Old England, Puritans fused the English with the Protes
tant cause: they viewed their removal5 in terms of pilgrimage, an errand
into the wilderness. In America they saw the dream of England come true
at the very same time as it was being frustrated on their native island, but
they never lost sight of the fact that this was England's dream.
Whether or not religious liberty was the main motive for migration to
America, it was early represented as such in the colonial lore and became a
central element in the emerging sense of uniqueness and localAmerican
identity. This identity was formed in the process of systematic, though pre
sumably not entirely intentional, selection of certain characteristics of the
colonial way of life and careful weeding out of others, the result of which
was a uniform and eminently positive image. The determination of the gov
ernment of Massachusetts in suppressing criticism {by such unsavory means
as cutting malcontents ears, whipping, and otherwise convincing people to
modify their opinions) contributed to the establishment of the idea of the
Godly Commonwealth of New England, which was later extendedat least
for the outsidersto include all of the British settlements in America, al
though New England remained the model of godliness. In Magnalia, Cotton
Mather quoted George Weymouth as saying in regard to the early coloniza
tion that one main End of all these Undertakings, was to plant the Gospel
in these dark Regions of America. Mather agreed that this was the main
end for them, indeed, but proceeded to tell Mankind about that one of
the English plantations for which this was not only a main End, but the
sole End upon which it was erected. This was, to be sure, that English
Settlement, which may, upon a Thousand accounts, pretend unto more of
True English than al! the rest, and which alone therefore has been called
Neuf-England." All the settlements considered themselves true English;12
however, eventually, as the discourse secularized and religious liberty be
came.liberty as such, they accepted New Englands lead in the interpretation
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 407
of the English identity which in America was carried to perfection. It was
through the Puritan mediation that love of liberty became the distinguishing
characteristic of America. Thus, from very early on, American identity was
New Englands identity in more than one sense.'
The formation of the sense of American uniqueness in no manner inter
fered with the loyalty of Americans to the English nation and their English
national identity: the peopie of which they were members was still the Eng
lish people, regardless of the place of residence. The place of residence,
neverthelessand naturallygenerated emotions of local pride, not unlike
the pride of an Englishman in Kent or Yorkshire. This pride in locality was
all the more pronounced in the face of the actual hardship and disappoint
ment the early settlers necessarily encountered; they had to think positive
this was a way to boost the fragile morale. Criticism aroused such violent
reaction in the early colonies because, in the conditions they faced, objectiv
ity was depressing and potentially destructive. Of course, death then did not
bespeak the finality it does now, and for people who had already moved to
one New World, a move to yet another one might not be such a frightening
prospect, but the confidence of the surviving members of the Plymouth plan
tation, who had buried half of its population in the course of the first yeaf,
and still wholeheartedly subscribed to the somewhat hyperbolic 13com
mendations of New Englands abundance and felicity, nevertheless appears
striking. The allegedly wholesome and plentiful natural resources of the new
continent were a subject of constant celebration. As it happened, the expec
tations of prosperity based on the natural excellency of the place were
soon fulfilled. In 1654 Edward Johnson (writing about the year 1642) told
the reader of his Wonder-Working Providence of the remote, rocky, barren,
bushy, wild-woody wilderness . . . [that] through the mercy of Christ becom
a second England for fertilness .. . [and] hath not only equalized England in
food, but goes beyond it in some places. To him, this made America the
wonder of the world. This prosperity was taken as a sign of Gods favor
and linked with the godliness of the people in the consciousness of American
uniqueness. Common expressions such as New-English Jerusalem,
American Jerusalem, Gods American Israel, American Canaan con
noted both the superior virtue of the people of the colonies and their supe
rior well-being, a sure sign of their election. I f the English were Gods own
people, the American English were the elect of the elect.
When in the eighteenth century this sense of uniqueness received a more
secular expression, the emphasis on the singular American prosperity was
retained. The fact that it was general, so impressive in comparison with the
wretched conditions of the masses in Europe, inspired most comments.
After a tour in Ireland and Scotland, Benjamin Franklin wrote from Lon
don: In those countries, a small part of the society are landlords . . . ex
tremely opulent, living in the highest affluence and magnificence. The bulk
of the people are tenants, extremely poor, living in most sordid wretched
/ - x
/ - - \
408
N A T I O N A L I S M
ness, in dirty hovels of mud and straw, and clothed only in rags. I thought
often of the happiness of New England, where every man is a freeholder,'has
a vote in public affairs, lives in a tidy, warm house, has plenty of food and
fuel, with whole clothes from head to foot. Another contented American,
Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, opened his discussion of the Situation, Feel
ings, and Pleasures of an American Farmer with a philosophical remark to
the effect that it is strange that misery, when viewed in others, should be
come to us &sort of real good, and though he was far from rejoicing to
hear that there are in the world men so thoroughly wretched (Hard is their
fate to be thus condemned to a slavery worse than that of our Negroes},
joyfully proceeded to enumerate the material, among other, blessings of the
American whose lot compared so well with that of destitute humanity else
where.
Bodily comforts generally enjoyed by Americans were related to equally
if not more felicitous experiences of the soul, of which paramount was
equality in liberty and dignity, which characterized the American society. As
in England, godliness in the colonies gradually acquired a secular meaning,
which by the eighteenth century became dominant and, even more than in
England, expressed itself in devotion to the triadliberty, equality, and rea
son. In Information to Those Who Would Remove to America, Franklin
wrote that in America individuals were respected for their merits and birth
had no value. The people have a saying, that God Almighty is himself a
mechanic . . . and he is respected and admired more for the variety, ingenu
ity, and the utility of his handiworks, than for the antiquity of his family . . .
According to these opinions of the Americans, one of them would think
himself more obliged to a genealogist, who could prove for him that his
ancestors and relations for ten generations had been ploughmen, smiths,
carpenters . . . and consequently that they were useful members of society,
than if he could only prove that they were gentlemen . . . living idly on the
labor of others This situation was a realization of an English ideal, yet
Britain, at that time without doubt one of the most egalitarian societies in
Europe, could not equal America in equality. British visitors were quick to
notice the difference. Lord Adam Gordon in 1765 observed that inhabitants
of Massachusetts resemble much the people of Old England, from whence
most of them are sprung. But, he added, the levelling principle here
everywhere operates strongly, and takes the lead. Everybody has property,
and everybody knows it. Crevecoeur, who, it is worth noting, was as firmly
convinced of the Engiishness of America as any American of British descent,
mused about what could be going on in the mind of a visiting Englishman.
He thought:
He must greatly rejoice that he lived to see this fair country discovered and
settled; he must necessarily feel a share of national pride [saying to himself,]
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
409
This is the work of my countrymen .. . They brought along with them their
national genius, to which they principally owe what liberty they enjoy and
what substance they possess. Here he sees the industry of his native country
displayed in a new manner . . . He is arrived on a new continent; a modern
society offers itself to his contemplation, different from what he had hitherto
seen. It is not composed, as in Europe, of great lords who possess everything
and of a herd of people who have nothing. Here are no aristocratical families,
no courts, no kings, no bishops, no ecclesiastical dominion, no invisible power
giving to a few a very visible one, no great manufactures employing thousands,
no great refinements of luxury. The rich and the poor are not so far removed
from each other as they are in Europe . .. The meanest of our !og-houses is a
dry and comfortable habitation. Lawyer or merchant are the fairest titles our
towns afford; that of a farmer is the only appellation of the rural inhabitants of
our country. Ir must take some time ere he can reconcile himself to our diction
ary, which is but short in words of dignity and names of honor . . . We have no
princes for whom we toil, starve, and bleed; we are the most perfect society
now existing in the world.14
I f earlier America had been identified with the Providential design, now,
as the course of empire took its way Westward, it became in addition the
end and fulfillment of history. American society was exemplary in its devo
tion to the English ideals: it turned them into reality. Liberty and equality,
for Americans, became self-evident. 1need not spend any time to prove the
equality of men, or the inalienable rights of humanity, wrote Samuel Dick
inson somewhat later; you, my countrymen know the reality. They are a
sacred deposit in the bosom of every American. {To point out that such was
the reality for the white male population only would in our skeptical age be
redundant, but it is worth emphasizing that for white male populations else
where such reality could not be but a dream.)
The sense o exemplary devotion to and implementation of English values
was shared by the colonists everywhere and became a central element in the
local American identity. Not only were they, indubitably, English, but they
were better English than the English. Beyond this Americans of different
colonies shared little, and the differences of locale, climate, and economic
and social arrangements other than the basic equality of conditions among
the white men led to the differentiation of the unique American identity into
different local identities of specific colonies. As Englishmen, the colonists all
belonged to one nation; as Americans, they inhabited different provinces.
Their local pride as New Englanders, Pennsylvanians, or Virginians was
fierce and their sentiments toward the other colonies only on rare occasions
resembled brotherly love. New Yorkers styled New Englanders Goths and
Vandals, contemptible to the extreme on the revealing account of their
Levelling Spirit, and this sentiment was shared by other colonies. New
Englanders regarded Virginians as uncivilized Natives, and so on.1?
410 N A T I O N A L I S M
In this the colonies were not different from rivaling provinces anywhere.
The development of strong feelings of local patriotism was natural; in fact
one would have to come up with an ingenious explanation had such senti
ments failed to develop. But, generally, local patriotism was not exclusive; it
was a sentiment of a different nature and in no way contradicted the British
nationalism of colonial Americans. In fact it could be used as an argument
for and an explanation of the persistence of British nationalism. British na
tionalism was both necessary and invincible, claimed Franklin in 1760, for,
if the colonies could not agree to unite for their defense against the French
and Indians, who were perpetually harrassing their settlements, burning
their villages, and murdering their people; can it reasonably be supposed
there is any danger of their uniting against their own nation, which protects
and encourages them, with which they have so many connexions and ties of
blood, interest and affection, and which it is well known they ali love much
more than they love one another? 18Whichever colony Americans called
my country, their national allegiance was English, becoming, according to
some colonial historians, still more, or more articulately, English by the sec
ond half of the eighteenth century.19
In Candid Examination, which he addressed to his dear countrymen,
Joseph Galloway adopted Burlatnaquis view of a narion as a society ani
mated by one soul, which directs all its motions, and makes all its members
act after a constant and uniform manner, with a view to one and the same
end, namely the public utility. It was in no way geography that defined such
a nation. The British nation, to which the great majority of Galloways com
patriots before independence were absolutely loyal, in his view consisted of
the two countries: England and America. He, too, called America niy
country, but this in no way contradicted his nationality. Daniel Dulany
urged: Let it be demonstrated that the subjects of the British Empire in
Europe and America are the same, revealingly juxtaposing not the British
and the Americans, but the Europeans and die Americans of Britain. Are
we not one nation and one people? asked Francis Hopkinson in 1766. We
in America are in all respects Englishmen, notwithstanding that the Atlantic
rolls her waves between us and the throne to which we all owe our alle
giance.20The distinction between Britain, or the British Empire {the terms
nation and empire were used interchangeably), as a nation in which
one was a member, and America, or a particular colony in America, where
one happened to live, as my country, was commonplace and reflected not
a divided loyalty, but concentric circles of loyalty. No contradiction was per
ceived or existed between the two attachments as there is no contradiction
in being a member of a family, a resident in a city, and a citizen in a state.
John Adams disputed the applicability of the word empire to Britain,
whose constitution he considered to be that of a quintessential republic. At
the same time he did not question that Americans and the inhabitants of
I n Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 411
Great Britain were one nation. The quarrel between the British administra
tion and the Colonies, on which he commented, was for him the great
national subject. Franklins affection to Pennsylvania prevented him
from accepting for his daughter an offer of marriage into a good family in
England, for he did not wish to be separated from her by a great distance
and ,fcould not think of removing there; yet he was most enthusiastic
about England (to the extent, in fact, that he found criticism leveled on it by
Englishmen in England too harsh). During the Seven Years1War he rejoiced
over British victories, explaining: And this is not merely as I am a colonist,
but as I am a Briton; considered the British Empire the greatest political
structure that human wisdom ever yet erected; and insisted on the true
British spirit which animated Americans.15 Americans exulted in the
name of Britons. England for them was still the finest country in the
world, the Eden of the world. They emphasized the natural, historical,
and emotional ties connecting Americans to Britain and frequently used the
highly charged metaphor of mother country and children colonies, forever
beholden to her, to denote them. John Randolph, the Virginian, wrote in
1774: The Americans are descended from the Loins of Britons, and there
fore may, with Propriety, be called the Children, and England the Mother of
them. The Americans are properly Britons, insisted Charles Inglis. They
have the manners, habits, and ideas of Britons; and have been accustomed
to a similar form of government. These ties were priceless and irreplacea
ble. If America separated from the mother country, speculated John Dickin
son anxiously, where shall we find another Britain, to supply our loss? Torn
from the body to which we are united by religion, liberty, laws, affections,
relation, language and commerce, we must bleed at every vein. 22
American colonists considered themselves a part of the British nation.
They were fully conscious of the nature of their loyalty and were deeply
committed to it. In 1764 James Otis wrote in the Rights of the British Col
onies; We all think ourselves happy under Great Britain. We love, esteem,
and reverence our mother country.. . And could the choice of independency
be offered the colonies, or subjection to Great Britain upon any terms above
absolute slavery, I am convinced they would accept the latter, 23Yet, within
the next decade the definition of what constituted absolute slavery grew sus
piciously inclusive, and the choice the colonists were put before grew far
more difficult, urgent, and painful.
The Separation
In January 1776, Thomas Paine opened Common Sense with the declaration
of his awareness that the sentiments expressed in it were not yet sufficiently
fashionable to procure them genera! favor. 24The documents of the period
412
N A T I O N A L I S M
bore out his impression. The soon-to-be architects of independence pro
fessed loyalty to Britain and stressed the British nationality of America as
vehemently and insistently as did future loyalists. Two- months after the
Battle of Bunker Hill, Jefferson looked with fondness toward the reconcil
iation with Great Britain; a few months before the Declaration of Indepen
dence, the Continental Congress protested that it did not wish to dissolve
that union which has so long and so happily subsisted between American
colonies and the mother country. To see in the conflict an attempt of a
colonized nation, conscious of its unity and uniqueness, to assert its sover
eignty vis-a-vis a foreign power that had usurped it could not be more mis
taken. Not that other colonized nations who in less distant times have in
deed attempted to assert cheir sovereignty vis-a-vis foreign powers were,
prior to independence, invariably characterized by widespread awareness of
their unity and uniqueness, yet, in the case of such nations, at least, the
struggle for independence was preceded by a sometimes protracted period
of nationalist agitation by intellectual and other elites. No such agitation
took place in America. But, if Americans were loyal and proud Englishmen,
why did they seek independence from England? The answer to this question
is that they did so because their national identity was English.
To say this implies no paradox. A drive for secession was inherent in the
nature of the English nationalism which, furthermore, rendered it legiti
mate. English national identity, from its earliest days, provided for two types
of national loyalty: one was concrete and materialistic, for its referent was
a concrete reality, materialized in a territory, ways of life, and specific polit
ical institutions; and the other, the original one, was idealistic or abstract
this loyalty was to the national values. The idealistic loyalty to national val
ues, which could be and usually was as ardent a patriotism as the more
earthly love of country, was by its very nature a stimulus for disaffection and
revolt, for the more intense the commitment to the ideals, the more sensitive,
the more intolerant, one became to the imperfections in their realization. It
was this idealistic patriotism that in the seventeenth century had driven
some Englishmen to removal and others to rebellion; it was this patriot
ism that has bred discontent in England ever since. The central English
valueLiberty, embedded in reason, and in regard to which all rational
Englishmen were equalwas, at least since Milton, defined as self-
government. 25Another word for it was independence. The logical con
summation of the inherent tendencies of English nationalism, its fulfillment,
absurd as it sounds, was the absolute sovereignty, self-government, or inde
pendence of every individual; in other words, complete atomization and po
litical anarchy. English nationalism, the cohesive force which held English
men together, was potentially self-destructive and propelled toward the
disintegration of the national collectivity. And so long as one was consist
ently devoted to the English national ideals (such consistency was necessar
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
413
ily rare, because psychologically burdensome), one could not in good con
science object to this tendency. Thus, the colonists very Englishness, which
they took such pains to stress, served as a cause and a justification for the
resistance of the colonies to the British government, which eventually trans
formed what had begun as but a local secession into a decided separa
tion.26
As elsewhere, those modes of thought and sentiment fared best which
were favored by the structural constraints of a given situation and could
attach themselves to the interests they bred. For this reason, Englishmen in
England tended toward the concrete or materialistic variety of patriotism,
while in America the majority was attracted to the idealistic and abstract
variety.27 The idealistic nature of English patriotism in America was re
flected in the modified notion of the constitution, which, though a minor
ity view in England, had become predominant in the colonies by the time of
the Revolution. Rather than regarding the consitution as the character of
a polity expressed in its institutions and ways of life, Americans tended to
define it as a formal statement of the fundamental principles of the polity.
British constitution referred to a government of laws, and not of men,
claimed John Adams in the Novanglus essays. The Genuine Principles of the
Ancient Saxon or English Constitution in 1776 defined constitution as a set
of fundamental rules by which even the supreme power of the state shall be
governed. These rules, and not the variant, inconsistent forms of govern
ment which we have received at different periods of time, 28were the proper
object of loyalty. This tendency to view constitution, which convention
ally referred to the actual community itself, and therefore also to view the
community, in terms of basic principles was observable throughout the co
lonial period: the Mayflower and later Compacts and Agreements
adopted by colonial governments were constitutions in exactly this sense.25
But until the Revolution this novel view peacefully coexisted with the more
traditional one.
Curiously, idealism in this context expressed itself in the appeal to self-
interest, for the ideal and self-interest coincided in the idea of liberty. If some
argued for unity with Britain on the basis of deep natural and emotional
attachment, many more, and the same authors more often, defended this
unity on instrumental grounds, as offering the surest safeguard of everyones
self-government. He, who considers these provinces as states distinct from
the British empire, argued John Dickinson in the second of the Letters from
a Parmer, has very slender notions of justice, or of their interests. We are
but parts of a whole. We are a part of the British dominions ., *and it is
our interest and duty to continue so, granted John Adams. Otherwise in
disagreement with Novanglus, Massachusettensis concurred with him on
this point: It is our highest interest to continue a part of the British em
pire.30In general, the argument ran: we are kept together by leaving each
414
N A T I O N A L I S M
other alone, or, conversely, if addressed to the British administration; the
more we leave each other alone, the stronger is our union.
Similar arguments were made in England. Edmund Burke, in his grand
speech on conciliation with America, contended that loyalty to the British
government could be secured only by eliminating the latter. He also accepted
the American view on the nature of the bonds that held the British nation
together and, in this speech at least, shared their notion of consi.tuti.on:
Let the colonies always keep the idea of their civil rights associated with your
governmentthey wjll cling and grapple to you, and no force under heaven
will be of power to tear them from their allegiance. But let it be once under
stood that your government may be one thing and their privileges another, that
these two things may exist without any mutual relationthe cement is gone,
the cohesion is loosened, and everything hastens to decay and dissolution. As
long as you have the wisdom to keep the sovereign authority of this country as
the sanctuary of liberty, rhe sacred temple consecrated to our common faith,
wherever rhe chosen rae'e and sons of England worship freedom, they will turn
their faces towards you. . , the more ardently they love liberty, the more perfect
will be their obedience. Slavery they can find anywhere. It is a weed that grows
on every soil . . . But until you become lost to all feeling of your true interest
. . . freedom they can have from none but you. This is the commodity of price,
of which you have the monopoly . . . Deny them this participation of freedom,
and you break that sole bond which originally made, and must sail preserve,
the unity of the empire . . . It is the spirit of the English constitution which . . .
unites. . . the empire.31
I f it could be proven that the unity was detrimental to liberty, both the in
strumental {and idealistic) and the natural attachment arguments easily lent
themselves to inversion and became arguments for independence. This was
later eloquently demonstrated by Thomas Paine.
The central issue in the controversy was the abuse, from the American
point of view, of the liberties (all of which were aspects of self-government)
to which colonists were entitled by birthright as Englishmen, which implied
the violation of the British constitution. The latter altruistic concern of the
colonists was articulated. J ohn Hancock defined patriotism as opposition to
unjust administration and, speaking of the possibility of a continental con
gress, saw its advantage and aim in that it wouid enable the colonists to
frustrate any attempts to overthrow our constitution; restore peace and har
mony to America, and secure honor and wealth to Great Britain, even
against the inclination of her ministers, whose duty it is to study her wel
fare. Similarly, Franklin, insisting that the Americans were to the last truly
devoted to Britain (they were the true loyalists . . . affectionate to the
people of England, zealous and forward to assist in her wars . . . beyond
their proportion), qualified his assertion, adding: But they were equally
fond of what they esteemed their rights, and if they resisted when those were .
attacked, it was a resistance in favor of a British constitution, which every
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
415
Englishman might share in enjoying who should come to live among them;
it was resisting arbitrary impositions that were contrary to common right
and to their fundamental constitutions, and to constant ancient usage. It
was indeed a resistance in favor of the liberties'of England. It was a patri
otic duty indeed to resist a government which betrayed the nation. Jonathan
Mayhew, who argued so in 1750, merely echoed the English tradition of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Such resistance was national in the
strictest sense of the word, insisted another clergyman, and no different
from lawful self-defense against a foreign invader: [Americans] have as just
a right, before GOD and man, to oppose king, ministry, Lords, and Com
mons of England when they violate their rights as Americans as they have to
oppose any foreign enemy; and this is no more, according to the law of
nature, to be deemed rebellion than it would be to oppose the King of
France, supposing him now present invading the land. Conversely, John
Dickinsons Letters from a Farmer compared the American colonies with
other nations oppressed by native tyrants, such as England under James II.
As Englands resistance to James was a Glorious Revolution (in the sense of
putting things right), so would be the American resistance to usurping Brit
ish authorities.32
The entitlement of Americans to English liberties was incessantly stressed.
This emphasis is, indeed, the most characteristic feature of the official dec
larations, petitions, and resolutions of the period immediately preceding in
dependence. The members of the Stamp Act Congress, with Minds deeply
impressed by a Sense of the present and impending Misfortunes of the Brit
ish Colonies on this Continent, esteemed it their duty to make the follow
ing declarations:
I. That his Majestys Subjects in these Colonies, owe the same Allegiance to the
Crown of Great-Britain, that is owing from bis Subjects born within the Realm,
and all due Subordination to that August Body the Parliament of Great-Brilain.
II. That his Majestys Liege Subjects in these Colonies, are entitled to all the
inherent Rights and Liberties of his Natural born Subjects, within the Kingdom
of Great-Britain,
III. That it is inseparably essential to the Freedom of a People, and the un
doubted Right of Englishmen, that no Taxes be imposed on them, but with
their own Consent, given personally, or by their Representatives ...
VI. That all Supplies to the Crown, being free Gifts of the People, it is unreason
able and inconsistent with the Principles and Spirit of the British Constitution,
for the People of Great-Britain [namely the Kingdom] to grant to his Majesty
the Property of the Colonists.
VII. That Trial by Jury, is the inherent and invaluable Right of every British
Subject in these Colonies.
After the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766, Reverend William Smith, Provost
of the College of Philadelphia, congratulated Americans on asserting our
416 N A T I O N A L I S M
pedigree and showing that we are worthy of having descended from the il
lustrious stock of Britain.33
In 1774 the deputies to the First Continental Congress denied that the
colonies owed any subordination to the august body of the Parliament, but
persisted in claiming for themselves the rights and liberties of Englishmen.
Thus, in the first place, as Englishmen, their ancestors in like cases have
usually done, for asserting and vindicating their rights and liberties, they
declared:
2. That our ancestors, who first settled these colonies, were at the time of their
emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, liberties, and
immunities of free and naturaS-born subjects, within the realm of England.
3. That by such emigration they by no means forfeited, surrendered, or lost any
of those rights, but that they were, and their descendants now are, entitled to
the exercise and enjoyment of all such of them, as their local and other circum
stances enable them to exercise and enjoy.
4. That the foundation of English liberty, and of all free government, is a right
in the people to participate in their legislative council: and as the English colo
nists are not represented . . . in the British parliament, they are entitled to a free
and exclusive power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures ...
5. Thar the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England .. .
6. That they are entitled to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed
at the time of their colonization.
Daniel Leonard, staunchly loyalist and arguing for submission to England
even at the cost of some discrimination, summarized the argument of his
opponents: The principal argument against the authority of parliament, is
this, the Americans are entitled to all the privileges of an Englishman, it is
the privilege of an Englishman to be exempt from all laws, that he does not
consent to in person, or by representative; The Americans are not repre
sented in parliament, and therefore are.. . not subject to its authority,34To
a very significant extent the conflict that was brewing was an internal
struggle over the correct interpretation of the British constitution, in which
both parties believed themselves faithful to the supreme values of the nation
and had the good of the nation as their goal.
After 1763 the colonists were systematically treated by the British authori
ties as if their membership in the nation was of an inferior sort. Special reg
ulations fettered colonial commerce and manufactures and interfered with
their internal affairs. What made Americans particularly sensitive to this
high-handed treatment, and added insult to the injury, was their sense that
they were better English than the English. They had been long resentful of
the condescending (as it appeared to them) attitude of their European
fellow-nationals. Now, they felt not only materially threatened and in
fringed upon in their interests, but emotionally wounded by the actions of
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 417
the metropolitan authorities who denied them the autonomy enjoyed by
Englishmen elsewhere. Instead of allowing them fuller control of their own
affairsbecause of their superior capability to assume it and because they
were different from the mother country and better acquainted with the pe
culiarities of their situation than the officials in Londonor at least the con
trol they had got used to before 1763, the English government tied their
hands and treated them like children. They demanded recognition of their
equality and grew firmer in the sense of their superiority. Is there not some
thing exceedingly fallacious in the commonplace images of mother country
and children colonies? asked vexedly John Adams. Are we not brethren
and fellow subjects with those in Britain, only under a somewhat different
method of legislation and a totally different method of taxation?35
Not everyone in Britain was oblivious to the virtues of the Americans. The
Bishop of St. Asaph, in an eloquent commentary on the Bill for Altering the
Charters of the Colonies of Massachusetts Bay in 1774, characterized
America as "the only great nursery of freemen now left upon the face of the
earth, the focus of the fairest hopes . . . the last asylum of mankind. Eng
land, he thought, ought to cherish [the colonies] as the immortal monu
ments of our public justice and wisdom; as the heirs of our better days, of
our old arts and manners, and of our expiring national virtues. Others
pointed to the contribution of the colonies (actual or potential) to the
strength and wealth of the empire. Adam Smith envisioned the possibility of
Parliament removing to America on account of the growing share of this
contribution to the general defense and support of the whole.36In Amer
ica this idea was surprisingly common. Daniel Leonard used the prospect of
the future centrality of America for the British nation as an argument for the
continuing union with it in the present: After many more centuries shall
have rolled away . . . the colonies may be so far increased as to have the
balance of wealth, numbers and power, in their favor, the good of the em
pire make it necessary to fix the seat of government here; and some future
George, equally the friend of mankind, with him that now sways the British
sceptre, may cross the Atlantic, and rule Great-Britain, by an American par
liament. John Adams saw such an arrangement as nothing less than reason
able and demanded that steps be taken to implement it then and there: A
union of the colonies might be projected, and an American legislature; for,
if America has 3,000,000 people, and the whole dominions 12,000,000, she
ought to send a quarter part of all the members to the house of commons;
and instead of holding parliaments always at Westminster, the haughty
members for Great Britain must humble themselves, one session in four, to
cross the Atlantic, and hold the parliament in America.37Even the most
sympathetic British view of America hardly matched this sense of self-
importance.
The growing realization of Americas strength and resources further stim
418
N A T I O N A L I S M
ulated the brewing disaffection.38 Franklin had warned already in 1767:
America, an immense territory, favored by nature with all the advantages
of climate, soils, great navigable rivers, lakes, etc., must become a great
country, populous and mighty; and will, in less time than is generally con
ceived, be able to shake off any shackles that may be imposed upon her, and
perhaps piace them on the imposers. In the meantime every act of oppres
sion will sour their tempers . . . and hasten rheir final revolt; for the seeds of
liberty are universally found there, and nothing can eradicate them. As in
so many other cases, at least one reason for revolt was the perceived oppor
tunity for attaining great power and prosperity, and increased expectations
the speedy realization of which appeared curbed. This realization of
strength threw a new light on the interests of Americans and made the con
nection with Britain seem superfluous. The extraordinary swiftness and ease
with which the deep affection for Britain was transformed into indifference,
hostility, and contempt are explained to no small degree by this beckoning
of opportunity. As late as May 1775 Washington was reluctant to consider
independence. Nine months later he wrote: If nothing else could satisfy a
tyrant and his diabolical ministry, we are determined to shake off all connex
ions with a state so unjust and-unnatural. Granted that the impositions of
the London authorities were taxing, their presumption annoying, and the
Intolerable Acts truly intolerable, the dramatic leap to diabolical ministry
and unjust and unnatural state still seems to be something of an overreac
tion. Only the confidence in the brilliant future of the offspring, and the
opinionwhich demanded justification on moral groundsthat continu
ing association with the mother country was not in its interest, could make
the latter appear so unattractive. When I consider the extreme corruption
prevalent among orders of men in this old, rotten state [England], wrote
Franklin, and the glorious public virtue so predominant in our rising coun
try, I cannot but apprehend more mischief than benefit from a closer
union.35He might have substituted the cause for the effect and vice versa,
however. It was at least as likely that he tended to see England as rotten and
corrupt, as well as to discern glorious public virtue in his own country so
clearly, because he could not apprehend more mischief than benefits from
the union.
On the whole, Englishmen understood this earlier than Americans. More
over, they thought it reasonable that a part of the nation objectively capable
of prospering on its own should seek political independence from the rest.
Such thinking reflected the voluntary, rational character of the English idea
of the nation. In 1767, Sir George Saville wrote to the Marquis of Rock
ingham: In my opinion . . . it is the nature of things that sometime or other
Colonies so situated must assume to themselves the rights of nature and
resist those of Law, which is Rebellion. By rights of nature I mean advan
tages of situation or their natural p ow er sCaptain William Evelyn, sta
tioned with the British Army in Boston, also reflected on the matter and,
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 419
rejecting the possibility that the Rebellion was plotted by a few ambitious
enterprising spirits, argued rather that the true causes of it are to be found
in the nature of mankind . . . it proceeds from a nation, feeling itself wealthy,
populous, and strong; and being impatient of restraint . . . struggling to
throw off that dependency which is so irksome to them. 40I have never
met a man either in England or America, noted Paine in the fourth chapter
of Common Sense, who hath not confessed his opinion that a separation
between the countries would take place, one time or other. This singular
experience, no doubt, reflected the fact that, having arrived in these parts
only in November 1774, Paine had not had the opportunity to meet many
Americans. His observation on the state of opinion in England, however,
was well founded. The British, not the settlers, writes John Murrin, imag-
ined the possibility of an independent America . . . British writers almost
took it for granted that one day the American colonies would demand and
get their independence. 41
One also should not forget that the disorganized and ili-conceived actions
of the British administration in the years after 1763 affected specific interests
of certain influential groups. The reaction to the Stamp Act, in particular,
was so violent because, by taxing paper, this act infringed on the rights and
revenues of the most articulate segments of the population, such as printers
and lawyers. The economic situation was volatile and exposed the authori
ties to attack: the post-war depression which afiecred broad sectors of the
population in all the colonies made people willing to think in terms of con
spiracies. The ilis of the economy were attributed to the ill-will of the mother
country, anyhow plotting to destroy the civil and religious liberties of the
people. John Adams, indefatigable and unscrupulous in the service of the
glorious cause, saw no wrong in speculations along these lines and com
mended printers on their readiness and freedom in publishing them.42The
straitened circumstances of the large planters in the South, indebted to Brit
ish factors, bred similar suspicions, and in addition made Southern gentle
men painfully sensitive to encroachments on their political authority, which,
by way of compensation, they valued all the more the less prosperous they
became. Neither would they, under the threat of impoverishment, accept
with equanimity the restrictions imposed by London on speculation in
trans-Allegheny lands.43
And yet, with so much against the British connection, independence was
not a foregone conclusion. The unity of the nation had inherent value and
Americans refused to believe that they wished to dissolve it. The illusion that
the conflict was caused by Britain, that the provocation was such as not to
leave the colonists any choice, persisted to the last. As late as 1775 Philip
Freneau, soon to become an Anglophobe, pleaded:
O Britain come, and, if you can, relent
This rage, that better might on Spain be spent,
420 N A T I O N A L I S M
as if a calmer temper on rhe part of Britain would blind Americans to the
opportunities which tempted them to independence. The Prohibitory Act of
December 1775, which declared Americans rebels, was met almost with a
sense of relief. We cannot be Rebels excluded from the Kings protection,
reasoned Richard Henry Lee, and Magistrates acting under his authority
at the same time. Now they did not have a choice indeed. Independence,
that ill-shapen, diminutive brat, 44was forced on them.
But when it came, they were well prepared to accept it. The arsenal of
arguments that would rationalize it was ready, and the justification of the
separation existed before rhe fact. The popularity of Common Sense re
flected the readiness of the public to be convinced as much as the ingenuity
of Paines propositions. The weeping voice of nature* cried: t i s t i m e t o
p a r t , and its plea was backed by Providence itself. Even the distance at
which the Almighty hath placed England and America proved that the
authority of the one over the other, was never the design of heaven.
Independence thus was a result of several factors. By far the most impor
tant was the fact that Americans had a national identity from the very start,
and that this was the English national identity. It was the nature of the Eng
lish nation which made the separation conceivable, possible, and legitimate.
The English idea of the nation implied the symbolic elevation of the com
mon people to the position of an elite, which in theory made every individ
ual the sole legitimate representative of his own interests and an equal par
ticipant in the political life of the collectivity. It was grounded in the values
of reason, equality, and individual liberty. The nation of an individual was
the community within whose bounds he could realize his liberty and the
right of participation, the community whose interests were fully ones own
interests since one could influence them, and in which one had true member
ship. The inability to fulfill ones rights of citizenship within a particular
geo-political sphere justified exit. An additional stimulus was provided by
the fact that Americans excelled in the English values, that they believed to
be and in many respects were more English than rhe English. The slightest
degree of unfairness would offend people who believed they had the right to
expect a greater than normal degree of respect. The lack of even such a mod
icum of recognition bred frustration and hurt feelings. Given that the at
tempts to change the attitude of the mother country did not succeed, sepa
ration was the way to deal with the problem. Nations, in general, are not
apt to think until they feel argued John Dickinson perceptively in Letters
from a Farmer.45This may be interpreted as an assertion of the priority of
interest over ideology. But in bringing about independence, the two were so
closely interwoven that it is not always possible to distinguish one from the
other. Interests activated ideas, turning them into weapons in a battle, but
ideas informed interests. The main interest of the colonists was their lib
ertythe control over their destinies {and purses)which they felt was
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 421
being treacherously snatched from them, but this was also the main tenet of
their ideology.
Of course, the preservation of the spirit of English nationality was made
possible in America by the specific social conditions prevailing there, and
social conditions made it possible for the Americans to give vent to their
sense of frustration. The unique equality of conditions made active partici
pation of the people in the governance of local affairs both realizable and
necessary. Americans could afford their pride because of the growing
strength of the colonies and the awareness of their economic, political, and
military possibilities, which, by increasing their expectations, motivated
them to grasp for opportunities that appeared to be more accessible to them
alone than to the British Empire.
The last, but probably not the least, factor that ensured commitment to
the cause of independence was the success of the insurrection and its relative
facility. Commenting on the colonial lack of preparedness and the dismal
state of military discipline, Daniel Boorstin concluded that the most persua
sive answer to the question How could we account for the outcome of the
conflict? is not that the Americans won but that the British lostor per
haps that they simply gave up This is plausible. The British, being British,
were never completely convinced that their position vis-a-vis the colonies
was morally defensible, and as to the British interest in keeping them, which
might make it seem so, they were less and less certain that they had such an
interest. The Wealth of Nations appeared in 1776, the year Americans de
clared their independence, and by 1783 the powers that be in Britain had
ample opportunity to acquaint themselves with its argument regarding the
costs of empire. Adam Smith wrote: The rulers of Great Britain have, for
more than a century past, amused the people with the imagination that they
possessed a great empire on the west side of the Atlantic. This empire, how
ever, has hitherto existed in imagination only. It has hitherto been, not an
empire, but the project of an empire; not a gold mine, but the project of a
gold mine; a project which has cost, which continues to cost, and which, if
pursued in the same way as it has been hitherto, is likely to cost, immense
expence, without being likely to bring any profit. . . If the project cannot be
completed, it ought to be given up . . . it is surely time that Great Britain
should free herself from , . . those provinces.44The British, like Thomas
Paine, might have arrived at the conclusion: Tis time to part. And so Amer
ica, almost by surprise, found itself on its own.
One peculiar feature of this short struggle for national self-determination,
which had so many peculiar features, was the relative weakness and quick
abatement of hostility to Britain. While the conflict lasted, this hostility per
formed the valuable function of justifying the resistance and supporting the
wavering desire for independence. When it was over and this function dis
appeared, the sentiment, while not entirely dead, was no longer alive.47Un~
422 N A T I O N A L I S M
like the case in so many other nations, American national identity was not
sustained by the hatred of the other; it knew no ressentiment. The free, and
no longer British) Americans needed not and could not afford to brood over
real or imagined offenses in the past; they had problems to attend to which
were far more pressing.
A Union Begun by Necessity
The American Prohibitory Act of December 22,1775, was, in Max Savelles
apt, thoughgiven its natureoddly sexless, metaphor, something like a
childbirth, actually forcing the offspring out of the body of the parent.4S
The Declaration of Independence, the metaphor may be continued, cut the
umbilical cord. Yet what was born was not the infant American nation, but
the embryo; or rather, the nation was born so premature that for the next
ninety years it existed only as a potentiality. The unformed American soul
hung precariously to the undeveloped body, and the eventually firm union
of the two was not a matter of certainty, but the result of a string of happy
accidents.
In Common Sense, when the disaffected Englishman Thomas Paine set out
to prove that Americans were not, and should have no desire to be, English,
to begin, he disillusioned them a propos the so much boasted British con
stitution. On examination, it turned out to be the base remains of two
ancient tyrannies [the monarchical and the aristocratic], compounded with
some new republican materials. He then proceeded to dispell the myth
of the English descent of Americans, heretofore a matter of much pride, and
claimed that Europe, and not England, is the parent country of America.
This new world hath been the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and
idigious liberty from every part of Europe . . . Not one third of the inhabi
tants, even of this province [conveniently, he resided in Pennsylvania], are of
English descent. Wherefore, I reprobate the phrase of parent or mother
country applied to England only, as being false, selfish, narrow, and ungen
erous. Even were Americans descended from Britain, he continued, what
would this amount to? His answer was: Nothing. Britain, being now an
open enemy, extinguishes every other name and title. American identity
was of a far more universal (though appropriately qualified) sort: We claim
brotherhood with every European Christian, and triumph in the generosity
of the sentiment. This expansive definition of the national community,
which, in the understanding of the time, made Americans coterminous with
humanity, led Paine, on the one hand, to claim that a government of our
own is our natural right, namely that self-government was Mankinds
birthright, not an English liberty. On the other hand, it allowed him to iden
tify the American cause with the cause of Mankind. Such ideas were not
In Pursuit of the Weal Nation: America
423.
new: the identification of America with the best hope of humanity, and spe
cifically with liberty, had a long tradition and was inherent in the early reli
gious notions of Gods American Israel and the superior Englishness of
Americans.49What was new was the explicitrress and unambivalent nature
of their universalism, and this universalism was destined to become one of
the hallmarks of the American national identity.
The separation from Britain implied universalization of English values.
The ideal of liberty, which in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, through long association, came to be seen as an English national
characteristic, was dissociated from England. The inalienable rights
evoked by the Declaration of Independence were no longer those guaranteed
by the British constitution, but by the Laws of Nature and of Natures
God, and the people of the United Colonies claimed them not by virtue of
being Englishmen, but by virtue of being human. The significance of Amer
ican independence, wrote Jefferson in what was probably his last letter, lay
in that it opened the eyes of all to the rights of man.30
Americans pledged themselves, far more explicitly and unambivalently
than did the English before them, to universal liberty. The implication of this
universalism was a pervasive individualism. Universal self-government
meant the self-government that is, the independenceof each individual
(Christian European) man/ 1and this national commitment to the liberty of
every individual man presented a formidable obstacle for the creation of a
single American nation. It was not at all obvious why there should be only
one American nation. In principle, to carry the ideal of self-government to
its logical conclusion, every individual constituted a nation in his own right;
in practical terms, at the moment of independence one could easily think of
thirteen American nations. Thus the very nationality of the American iden
tity, the uncompromising commitment of Americans to the purified prin
ciples of civic nationalism, for a long time to come was bound to, hinder the
formation of a consensus regarding the geo-political referent of American
national loyalty, leaving open the question of what was, or whether there
was, the American nation.
That nation-building on the (exclusive) basis of ideals of civic nationalism
was a Herculean task was realized early in the process. However much some
Americans wished to see the colonies united, they knew that as a matter of
fact they were not one entity. We may never know whether Patrick Henry
indeed claimed in 1774 that the distinctions between the colonies were no
more and that he was not a Virginian but an American, or whether his elec
trifying and precociously triumphant unionist tirade was only the fruit of
his biographers fantasy; if he did, he certainly* was talking of things that
have not yet gone through the formality of taking place.52The very fre
quency with which some enthusiasts in the years following independence
insisted that America, the thirteen colonies together, was a nation leads one
424
N A T I O N A L I S M
to suspect that there was an element of wishful thinking in it. John Murrin
is undoubtedly right in proposing that to repudiate Britain meant jeopar
dizing what the settlers had in common while stressing what made them
different from one another.53While there existed an American identitya
sense that ail Americans, be they from Virginia, Massachusetts, or else
where, shared certain characteristics (such as an exemplary love of lib
erty)it was not accompanied by a sense that Americans constituted a
unity. Only in later periods would some writers trace its emergence back to
the early colonial period.54The habitual use of the collective designation
American during the colonial period did not reflect the existence of an
American collectivity. It was a purely geographical qualifier. Such use was
to be expected. The term was employed to distinguish British citizens, Eng
lishmen not in England. They were first called English (or British) Ameri
cans, and then Americans for short. In this context it is significant that
such a collective designation was more commonly employed at first by the
British. Carl Bridenbaugh cites an English admirals derisive reference to the
Continental forces during the hostilities in 1741 as Americans as one of
the first examples of such a collective designation. (The American response,
revealingly, was to refer to the British troops, with equally derisive intent, as
Europeans.) Similarly, Merle Curti stresses that Burke used the expression
America rather than colonies in his speech on reconciliation. Both Bri
denbaugh and Curti seem to regard Franklins characterization of himself in
a letter from London as an American instead of a Pennsylvanian as a
sign of a growing sense of American unity.55But it is not coincidental that
Franklin was writing from England and, as he took care to make clear, it
was in English eyes that he seemed too much of an American. For England
the colonies were America insofar as they were not European, not be
cause of a presupposition of unity. I t is probable that the English hardly
knew the number or the names of all the colonies and cared even less. To sec
the term American as the reflection of an actually existing unity would be
analogous to considering as such collective terms like Africa, the Third
World, Eastern Europe, or the West.
One reason why many proud Americans failed to rejoice at the idea of
independence was the widespread understanding that separation from Eng
land was likely to result in the total disintegration of the intercolonial unity.
(Incidentally, those who were the least concerned were foreigners, such as
Thomas Paine or Alexander Hamilton.) The penman of the Revolution,
John Dickinson, refused to sign the Declaration of Independence. On July 1,
1776, he explained the reasons for his caution, among them his fear that it
may weaken that Union (of the Colonies) . . . In bitterness of Soul [the
people] may complain against our Rashness . . . A p arti ti on of these Col
onies will take place if Great Britain cant conquer Us. To escape from the
protection we have in British rule by declaring independence would be like
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
425
Destroying a House before We have got another, in Winter, with a small
Family . .. Nor only Treaties with foreign powers but among Ourselves
should precede this Declaration. We should know on what Grounds We are
to stand with Regard to one another . . . Some of Us totally despair of any
reasonable Terms of Confederation. He added almost prophetically: I
should be glad to know whether in 20 or 30 years this Commonwealth of
Colonies may not be too unwieldy, and Hudsons River be a proper Bound
ary for a separate Commonwealth to the Northward. 1have a strong Im
pression on my Mind that this will take Place. Yet John Dickinson was an
American patriot who fervently desired the union of rhe colonies. It was he
who composed the proud Liberty Song, calling:
Come, join hand in hand, brave Americans all,
And rouse your bold hearts at fair libertys call.
There, he insisted:
No tyrannous acts shall suppress your just claim,
Or stain with dishonor Americas name.
In freedom were born and in freedom well live!
Bur this bright future was dependent on the existence of the union, which
was not to be presumed as a given. The poem contained a well-known warn
ing: By uniting we stand, by dividing we fan.56
The Union of the States was proposed and defended on instrumental
grounds, fundamentally for the same reasons that earlier were advanced in
defense of the continuing association with Britain: it was argued that it
served to promote and safeguard the self-government of its parts. Yet the
end itself, to which the Union was supposed to be the meansself-govern
ment of the partswas contradictory to its existence, for the Union neces
sarily presupposed a central government, and self-government implied
decentralization. This was the issue of the controversy around the Consti
tution.
What was to be the nation of the Americans? Was a single nation (the
union of the states) or several nations best suited to their national (and em
phatically so) identity, most agreeable, as their seventeenth-century progen
itors would have said, to their American temper? The architects of Indepen
dence were torn by these questions. There was no presumption of the
existence of some metaphysical unity that made the formation of the politi
cal union natural and necessary. Americans held some things to be self-
evident, but the Union was not among them. Its utility was clearly realized.
Thomas Paine argued it with his usual rhetorical ability in the Crisis in
1783: On this [the Union of the states] our great national character de
pends . . . It is through this only that we are, or can be, nationally known in
the world; it is the flag of the United States which renders our ships and
426 N A T I O N A L I S M
commerce safe on the seas, or in a foreign port . . . In short, we have no
other national sovereignty than as United States. I t would be fatal for us/ if
we had, for it would be too expensive to be maintained, and impossible to
be supported . . . Our citizenship in the United States is our national char
acter . . . Our great title is Americansour inferior one varies with the
place Without the Union, thought Jefferson, America, this heavenly
country, would become an arena of gladiators. Later he wrote regarding
the motives for its formation: It could not but occur to every one, that these
separate independencies, like the petty States of Greece, would be eternally
at war with each other, and would become at length the mere partisans and
satellites of the leading powers of Europe. All then must have looked for
ward to some further bond of union, which would ensure eternal peace, and
a political system of our own, independent of that of Europe. For such
instrumental reasons, these United States were to be considered as one
nation in ali treaties concluded with foreign powers. In foreign relations,
in other words, they were to conduct themselves as i f they were one nation,
although everyone at home knew that they were not. For, while Americans
agreed that presenting a single national facade to the world had certain ad
vantages, they were far from being persuaded that a single nation at home
would promote the great cause of liberty. In fact, some argued, as did Sam
uel Bryan of Pennsylvania, that if the United States are to be melted down
into one empire . . . anything short of despotism could not bind so great a
country under one government; and . . . whatever plan you might, at the
first setting out, establish, it would issue in despotism, For this reason he
urged to oppose the Constitution.57
Americans did not conceive of a nation, or a people, or a state, in terms
of a unitary entity, a collective individual. None of these concepts were rei
fied; they remained, as' in England, but more conspicuously so, collective
designations for associations of individuals. I t is indeed a singular feature of
the political language of revolutionary America that the word people in it
is used, as a rule, in the plural. {For instance, in the Declaration of Indepen
dence: Whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
ends [life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness], it is the Right of the People
to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its founda
tions on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them
shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.) The location of
sovereignty within the people in the plural divided sovereignty. A na
tion, as in the original English conception, was a community of sovereign
members. Its own sovereignty was composite, not unitary; it was derived
from theirs. Thus any nation, in principle, was a federal structure, in the
sense that it was based upon the good faith (from the Latin foedustreaty,
derived from fidesfaith) of its members in one another, or a social con
tract. The moral primacy of the individuals, the parties to the contract, and
the artificial character of societies {social compacts) were made explicit and
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 427
insisted upon. Membership did not imply the dissolution of the individual
in the community; while he exchanged some of his natural rights for civil
protection, he in no way abrogated his sovereignty. In fact, he had no right
to do so: There are certain natural rights, stated Virginia legislators, of
which men, when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their
posterity.JS
Because of the inherently contractual nature of the national collectivity,
the size of an ideal society became an important matter for consideration. It
could be reasonably argued that smaller societies, such as states, were better
fit to be nations than a large society, such as the Union of the states. Yet,
interestingly, because of the centrality of the issue of whether the states to
gether did, could, or should consitute one nation, the concept became asso
ciated with the Union, acquiring a novel significance which has since
influenced American thinking about nationality. Rather than refer to the in
ner structure of the collectivity, nation was increasingly taken to connote
generality, commonality, and centralization of sovereignty. (By contrast,
state, seen in opposition to the Union, in the American context did not
have such implications until much later.) How this transformation occurred
could be observed in the resolutions proposed by Edmund Randolph on
May 30, 1787, during the debates in the Federal Convention, and Gouver-
neur Morris interpretation of them. That day, Madison reports:
The propositions of Mr. Ra n d o l ph which had been referred to the committee
being taken up, he moved, on the suggestion of Mr. G. mo r r i s, that the first of
his propositions,to wit: Resolved, that the Articles of Confederation ought
to be so corrected and enlarged, as to accomplish the objects proposed by their
institution; namely, common defence, security of liberty, and general -wel
fare,should mutually be postponed, in order to consider the three follow
ing: 1. That a union of the states merely federal, will not accomplish the ob-
jects proposed by the Articles of Confederationnamely, common defence,
security of liberty, and general welfare. 2. That no treaty or treaties among the
whole or part of the states, as individual sovereignties, would be sufficient. 3.
That a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme
legislative, executive, and judiciary . .. Some verbal criticisms were raised
against the first proposition .. . which underwent a discussion, less, however,
on its general merits than on the force and extent of the particular terms na
tional and supreme. Mr. c h a r l es pi n c k n ey wished to know of Mr. Randolph,
whether he meant to abolish the state governments altogether.. . Mr, g o u v er -
n eu r mo sr i s explained the distinction between a federal and a national su
preme government; the former being a mere compact resting on the good faith
of the parties, the latter having a complete and compulsive operation. He con
tended, that in all communities there must be one supreme power, and one
only.s?
Curiously, the adjective federal, though opposed by Morris to national,
by the same logic, through its association with the Union, soon became syn
428 . N A T I O N A L I S M
onymous with the latter term. In this framework, a nationalist or feder
alist position, which was originally that of the champions of self-
government, acquired the meaning of an advocacy of centralization.
Federalists and J effersonians
Every difference of opinion, argued Jefferson wisely in his First Inaugural
Address, is not a difference of principle. We have called by different names
brethren of the same principle. We are all republicanswe are all federal
ists, all equally attached to union and representative government. 60The
nationalist Federalists held liberty as dear to their hearts as did their
states-rights opponents. The difference in their views regarding the appro
priate focus of American national loyalty reflected the opposing conceptions
they held of human nature and, as a result, of strategies necessary for the
preservation of liberty, not a difference in objectives or values. Federalists
were realists who tended toward pessimism. They were aware of the duality
of human nature, the coexistence in it of capabilities for both good and evil,
of the rational and the irrational. For them, as for the anti-Federalists, lib
erty was the right of rational creatures; its basis and justification was rea
son. But they thought that reason, that one side of the dual human nature,
unless supported by the committed-to-liberty government, was not to be
counted upon to sustain itself in the masses of men, and that, therefore,
liberty unsupported by government was in danger of being subverted. Lib
erty was not licentiousness; it was both a right and an obligation not to
encroach on the rights of others; it implied self-restraint. But to trust men
left to their own devices to restrain themselves was to disbelieve history
and universal experience . . . to disbelieve Revelation and the Word of God,
which informs us that the heart is deceitful above all things and desperately
wicked. John Adams rejected such naivete. He had a high opinion of the
American people, as distinguished from men in general, and thought that,
owing to the happy circumstances of their existence, they were reasonable,
not subject to . . . those contagions of madness and folly which are seen in
countries where large numbers live . . . in dayly fear of perishing for want.
Yet he cautioned: Remember, democracy [that is, a true, decentralized self-
government by the people] never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts and
murders itself.61Publius (either Hamilton or Madison) warned in the Fed
eralist #63: There are particular moments in public affairs when the
people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or
misled by the artful representations of interested men, may call for measures
which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and to
condemn . . . liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as
by the abuses of power ., . and . . . the former, rather than the latter, are
apparently most to be apprehended by the United States. The people, even
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
429
in America, where, the Federalist recognized, they were exceptionally judi
cious, had to be guarded against the tyranny of their own passions. It is
the reason alone, of the public, insisted Publius in the Federalist #49, that
ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be
controlled and regulated by the government. Thus it was not the opposition
to the' republican form of government, but the awareness of the dangerous
propensities against which it ought to be guarded, a that prompted the Fed
eralists advocacy of restrictions on the popular democracy and the central
ization of sovereignty in the national supreme government, as against leav
ing it, divided and endangered, in the hands of the local communitiesthe
states.
By contrast, Jefferson believed in the essential, perennial rationality of
men, which made a strong government unnecessary. He thought that man
was a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights, and with an innate
sense of justice; and that he could be restrained from wrong and protected
in right, by moderate powers, confined to persons of his own choice, and
held to their duties by dependence on his own will . . . The cherishment of
the people then was our principle, the fear and distrust of them, that of the
other [Federalist] party. He thought that self-government was self
preserving and self-generating, that the best means to safeguard it was to let
it be. Where every man is a sharer in the direction of his ward-republic,
he wrote, "or of some of the higher ones, and feels that he is a participant in
the government of affairs, not merely at an election . . . but every day; when
there shall not be a man in the State who will not be a member of some one
of its councils . . . he will let his heart be torn out of his body sooner than
his power be wrested from him by a Caesar or a Bonaparte.Because
states allowed fuller participation in the government, Jefferson favored
states rights.44In a society characterized by a unique equality of conditions
and ruled by an indomitable leveling spirit (and this much more so in the
Federalist East than in the Jeffersonian South), with opportunities which
were indeed open and resources almost unbounded for those who wouid but
see them, the masses would not accept tutelage, even such that was designed
for their benefit. Watching Federalists in power allow their solicitude for
unprotected liberty run amok and degenerate into paranoia persuaded them
that it could not be for their benefit. The Jeffersonian position was more
in harmony with dominant attitudes and concerns, and this position
triumphed.
Ironically, it was this victory, which identified states rights with liberty
and thus with the American national purpose, that later allowed the slave-
holding states of the South to claim and sincerely believe that they, and not
the free states of the North, were the true champions of the American ideals.
The irony went further. One cannot help suspecting that Jeffersons unwav
ering defense of a truly participatory democracy (to which New England
430 N A T I O N A L I S M
with its notorious and resented-elsewhere leveling spirit came so close)
was related to the fact that he had never experienced it. The good people of
Virginia, by comparison with their unruly brethren farther North, were in
deed a reasonable and docile lot. They knew that their betters knew better
and trusted in them.*55Jefferson showed perfect equanimity in the face of
rebellion, whether in France or in Massachusetts, believing it to be a med
icine necessary for the sound health of governments and holding that a
litde rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary in the politi
cal world as storms in the physical. You never felt the terrorism of Shays
Rebellion in Massachusetts, John Adams reproached him later. I have no
doubt you were fast asleep in philosophical tranquility.66
Furthermore, Jeffersons belief in the incorruptibility of reason led him to
approve of excesses and inhumanity perpetrated in its name and to ration
alize irrationality (both in the sense of justifying it and presenting it as ra
tional). He excused it as the agonizing spasms of infuriated man, seeking
through blood and slaughter his long-lost liberty. Speaking of the terror
during the French Revolution he staunchly supported, he regretted the tragic
death in it of his acquaintances and men he admired (In the struggle which
was necessary, many guilty persons fell without the form of trial, and with
them some innocent), but, he said, he regretted them as I should have
done had they fallen in batde. I t was necessary to use the arm of the people,
a machine .. . blind to a certain degree . . . My own affections have been
deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to this cause, but rather than it
should have failed I would have seen half of the earth desolated; were there
but an Adam and an Eve left-in every country, and left free, it would be
better than as it now is. 67How fortunate for America that its freedom did
not have to be purchased at the price of depopulation. Such convictions on
the part of a leader could be dangerous otherwise.
The final irony is, of course, that Jefferson, the tireless champion of the
ideal participatory democracy, was a slave-owner. He was deeply troubled
by the problem of men owning other men, though chiefly on the account of
its effects on the owners.63After all, it was not difficult, in the framework of
his view of human nature, to find a perfectly rational basis for slavery. The
claim to liberty was based on reason. For Jefferson, reason was infallible and
unassailable, perfect. This implied that there could be no degrees of reason:
one either had it in its perfection, or did not have it. The Negroes, so Jeffer
son staunchly believed, were intellectually inferior to white men. This im
perfection of their reason, which negated it altogether, excluded them from
the race of men who were born equal and endowed by nature with an in
alienable right to liberty. It was his firm conviction that mans reason was
invincible, the very degree of his great respect for the rational man, which
led Jefferson to acquiesce in this ultimate indignity inflicted by some men on
others. The Federalists, on the other hand, did not have such respect for
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 431
anyone; they thought all men, if unprotected by government, fallible, and it
was much harder for them to justify a situation in which some fallible men
had the right to own others.
The Constitution, as ratified, represented a compromise between the Fed
eralist or nationalist position and the states-rights attitude, which later be
came' identified with Jefferson. The word nation was never once men
tioned in the text;69 the Constitution was of these United States. The
composite, contractual nature of the polity and the dispersion of sovereignty
were reaffirmed. But at the same time the Constitution bound the states'to
gether in the shared loyalty to itself and thus by default created a unified
inclusive politya nation in the American sense. Reverence for the Consti
tution, as earlier love of liberty, became the core of the American national
identity. But, similarly to the love of liberty, the Constitution could not settle
the question of what was to be the geo-political embodiment of this identity
or the material, as against the symbolic, referent of national loyalty.
The Tug-of -War: The Persisting Threat of Secession and the
Development of National Unity
In 1780 Washington confessed in a letter to a delegate to the Continental
Congress that he saw one head gradually changing into thirteen. The
adoption of the Constitution changed the situation but slightly. The Consti
tution did give significant powers to the central {federal or national) govern
ment, but it still was possible to interpret it, as did Jefferson in 1825, as a
compact of many independent powers, every single one of which claims an
equal right to understand it, and to require its observance. 70The separatist
impulse was inherent in the very conception of the Union, as it was earlier
in the conception of the English nation, and its legitimacy was much more
explicit. The Union was in perpetual peril of dissolving, the materialization
of which twice became imminent and was averted only owing to the fortui
tous resolution of a military conflict, which was favorable to the preserva
tion of the United States. In both cases thoughts of secession were provoked
by a perceived threat to the economic or political interests of a particular
region, which led its leaders to calculate the value of the Union and con
clude that it did not pay off. This was, evidently, an easily comprehensible,
natural response, and it highlighted the fact that the association of the states
was regarded in instrumental terras. But in both cases the opposition to the
Union was presented as a stand in defense of Americannationalideals,
and there is no reason to doubt that this claim on the part of the advocates
of disintegration was sincere.
It was the Federalist New England that threatened to secede first. The
reason was the fear that the political influence of the Northern states in the
432 N A T I O N A L I S M
Union would be curtailed and their commercial interests hurt as a result of
the Louisiana Purchase and the expansion of the agrarian West, which'led
to the War of 18X2. Admit this western world into the Union, argued
Senator William Plumer of New Hampshire, referring to Louisiana, and
you destroy, at once, the weight and importance of the eastern states, and
compel them to establish a separate and independent empire. When the
war was declared on Britain by a narrow majority of votes in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate, a Northern Confederacy was pro
posed and a union with Britain against the United States, and Gouverneur
Morris confessed that he lost all loyalty to the nation. Explaining their
disaffection, citizens of Massachusetts assembled at a meeting in Springfield
insisted on the elevated and general nature of their concern: We consider
the late act of the president unjust, unnecessary, and ruinous to the best
interests of this country, as a war of aggression and conquest. . . we hold in
utter abhorrence an alliance with France, the destroyer of all republics. 71
Altruism, which in the United States often informed self-interest, was at
least as frequently motivated by it.
The secessionist!! of the South, which requires discussion at a later point,
was similarly inspired by the perceived threat of Northern dominance. From
the economic point of view, the practices of the rapidly industrializing
North, on whose industrial production the South was dependent, indeed
could be seen as internal colonialism. The political weight of the South
was also diminishing. In 1850, with the recently acquired Mexican lands in
mind, the Charleston Mercury noted that the South, for the first time, per
ceives the insecurity and ignominy of her situation in the Union, and ad
vised to don the casque and buckle the armor. Two years later, the people
of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, declared and or
dained, very much in the spirit of 1776, that South Carolina, in the exercise
of her sovereign will, wished to secede from the Federal Union, that this
was her right, without let, hindrance, or molestation from any power
whatsoever, and that for the sufficiency of the causes which may impel her
to such separation, she [was] responsible alone, under God, to the tribunal
of public opinion among the nations of the earth. 7Z
Fortunately, the War of 1812 ended with a victory of the United States,
and in the brief but healing era of good feeling that followed, both the
noble indignation of the Northern states, whose fears were now allayed, and
their intentions to secede vanished for lack of relevance. Likewise, fifty years
later, after a much more brutal struggle, the Northern states, now fighting
for the Union, prevailed, and Southern secessionism was subdued in its turn.
Until 1865, however, it was unclear what the relationship between the many
and the one in E Pluribus Unum should be, and entirely possible that the
United States would disintegrate into several American nations.
The situation, however, was gradually changing, and as early as 1787
there existed important conditions that promoted the formation of the sense
In Pursuit of the Idea! Nation: America 433
of unity which would not only increase the instrumental value of the Union,
but render it a good and an end in itseif. Throughout the period the seces
sion impulse, as in England earlier, was held in check by the possibility of
spatial separation. In 1780, owing to the self-interested obstinacy of Mary
land, the unappropriated lands, to which individual states were entitled by
their charters as colonies or otherwise, were ceded to the United States for
their common benefit.73This created a national or public domain, to
be administered by the central government, and thus transformed the latter
into the largest iand-owner and the distributor of the most valuable re
source. The opportunities available in the framework of the Union were
multiplied, and the inability to realize them in a settled place did not gener
ate disaffection, but simply encouraged one to move. It was a remarkable
situation in which exit and voice were not the only ways to express dissatis
faction (in fact they were highly unlikely ways to do so), for loyalty did not
imply staying where one happened to be born.74The marginal utility of
secession for the people of the thirteen original states and the sheer number
of possible motives for it were greatly reduced. At the same time the provi
dent Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787, a true stroke of political ge
nius, tamed the secession impulse of the Western settlers, which might have
developed in the course of time, before it was born. It laid out the rules for
the automatic ascent of a territory through the stages of increasing self-
government to the status of a state and its admission to the Union on the
footing of complete equality with its original members. The constitutional
provision for a decennial census of the population guaranteed each new
state political influence commensurate with the number of residents in it.75
The West, as is widely recognized, became a unifying factor of outstand
ing importance. This was not only because the major reasons for opposition
to the Union had been eliminated from the start, but because it promoted
the development of nationalthat is, general Americanloyalty to a
greater extent than was possible in the older states. To begin with, there
were no competing loyalties capable of obstructing this development; local
patriotism needed time to evolve. The emergent communities did not have a
sense of their own particularity and did not tend to distinguish between their
interests and the interests of the United States as a whole. Besides, it was the
government of the United States which had obliged them with their land and
on which they relied for the introduction of large-scale improvements, such
as the construction of roads, that could not at that time be undertaken pri-
vately.7fi There was no Ohio or Illinois identity comparable to the identities
of Massachusetts (or even Boston) or Virginia. And so the four-year-old
Chicago, a town not yet incorporated, with a population of four thousand
people, had a newspaper with a grand, capacious title: The American. (This
was Chicagos second newspaper; the first one, founded a year earlier
[1835J, had an equally inclusive name: The Democrat.)
The West also, to a greater extent than the original states, promoted the
434 N A T I O N A L I S M
sense of American uniqueness. If New England (taken in the comprehensive
initial meaning of all the British settlements on the Atlantic coast) thought
of itself as a better England, it still preserved the awareness of and cherished
its Englishness; it stressed the fundamental sameness and the continuity be
tween the mother country and its colonial progeny. But the West was no new
England; it was essentially different. I t was the West which led to the identi
fication of America with a pioneering spirit, with the unpolished, but hon
est, independent, and self-confident individual who might have regarded the
rules of spelling as contrary to nature (as did Davy Crockett), but knew
the difference between right and wrong and was steadfast in his solid com
mon sense.
The West reinforced the image of America as the land of opportunity and
identified it with the promise of individual prosperity and advancement to a
greater extent than was possible in the East. The opportunities of the Atlan
tic coast were many, but in the vast expanses of the West they appeared
unlimited. Everything was open to us, summarized William Larimer, the
indomitable founder of failed cities, whose perseverance was eventually re
warded by the birth of Denver, Colorado.77The natural abundance of eco
nomic opportunities was complemented by the creation of a similar plenty
in the political sphere. The unique American institutionthe political
partywith its focus on organization rather than issues, and its consequent
geographical egalitarianism, furnished an office for every man: so long as
one wished to be politically involved, one could be politically involved.
Another factor which contributed to the formation of the sense of Ameri
can unity was immigration. Even less than Western settlers did immigrants
share in the divisive loyalties of the original states. Like Englishmen of ear
lier times, who had conceived of America as a unity long before such a
thought entered the minds of the colonists themselves, immigrants were un
likely to be aware of internal distinctions among the United States. They
came to America, became Americans on arrival, and their loyalty was
to the nation as a whole, which they tended to regard in much more cohesive
terms than did the experienced native population. This attitude was sup
ported by law: since 1740 a foreigner was granted rights of citizenship in all
the colonies after seven years of residence in any one of them. The Naturali
zation Act. of 1802, after some vacillation between two and fourteen years,
fixed the residence requirement at five years, but the citizenship remained
national. Although it was not spelled out until later, it was understood that
the immigrant is not a citizen of any State or Territory upon his arrival, but
comes here to become a citizen of a great Republic, free to change his resi
dence at will. n
Foreigners, unencumbered by unwieldy knowledge of regional specifici
ties, were the first not only to conceive of American unity, but to perceive its
uniqueness as well. It was Crevecoeur who gave an authoritative answer to
in Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 435
the question: What is an American? It was Tocqueville who left us the
anatomy of American society which is still used as a guide by its students.
The perceptions by the sympathetic outsiders of what America was about
helped to put its distinctiveness into a sharper focus lor the Americans (there
was a natural tendency to disregard the unsympathetic perceptions). In this
manner the immigrants impressions, too, aided in defining American iden
tity.
The reasons for the immigrants loyalty to America and the process in
which it was formed allow one to make an important observation regarding
the nature of national loyalty in general: the immigrants commitment did
not derive from the love of country; it derived from the uplifting, dignifying
effects of liberty and equality, the exhilarating lure of opportunity, and the
enjoyment or even the expectation of a greater prosperity. The love of coun
try, allegedly a primary sentiment, was based on the national commitment,
rather than generating it. In his perceptive analysis of the transformation of
the European immigrant into an American, Crevecoeur underscored the es
sentially conceptual nature of national identity. European immigrants, he
wrote, had no country before they came and could know no national feel
ing; they embraced American identity eagerly, because only as Americans
were they elevated to the status of men. Prosperity, that is, having bread on
ones table (or to be precise, plenty of beefsteaks and onions, which ac
cording to the acid observations of Mrs. Trollope were the regular diet
among the American poor), had its attractions for the hungry. Yet, even pov
erty in America appeared sweeter than elsewhere. I think I would rather be
poor here in America than in Blackenheim, mused a German immigrant in
Wisconsin. There one is obliged to do obeisance to the great, while here
that is not necessary. An immigrant from Norway, in a letter to a friend,
echoed Crevecoeurs analysis. 1have learned to love the country to which 1
emigrated more sincerely than my old fatherland, he wrote. I feel free and
independent among a free people, who are not chained down by any class
or caste systems; and I am very proud of belonging to a mighty nation,
whose institutions must in time come to dominate the entire civilized world,
because they are founded on principles that sound intelligence must recog
nize as the only ones that are right and correct. n The immigrants shared
and reinforced the sentiments felt by more experienced Americans. Both, the
former and the latter, recognized equality in dignity as the essence of the
United States. She, that lifts up the manhood of the poor, James Russell
Lowell characterized his country. It was this gift of dignity that the immi
grants awkward explanations reflected and because of which they were be
coming ardent American patriots.
Of course, this was not so in every case, and with the immigration of the
1840s the general mood was altered significantly. The reason was the emer
gence of nationalisms in the countries from which the immigrants came.
436 N A T I O N A L I S M
Crevecoeurs assertion, that two-thirds of the Europeans did not have a
country, in the eighteenth century was not a rhetorical device, but a state
ment of fact. In the middle of the nineteenth century this was no longer true.
Some immigrants, specifically those from Germany, were coming with a
competing national identity. Nationalism everywhere elevated the status of
the indigenous people, and the respect immigrants got in America as individ
uals, for some of them, did not measure up to the outright adulation they
had been growing used to as members of a group. For such immigrants with
national identity, assimilation became much more difficult than it was for
their countrymen without it. They had to give up comforting notions of this
or that national character, on which were based their sense of self-esteem
and pride. One dreaded to part with such notions; as a result, their loyalties
for a long time continued divided. Still, at least until rhe late nineteenth cen
tury, European nationalisms affected chiefly the elites, and for the majority
of simple men and women, America remained the only country where they
could lead a dignified existence.
Immigrants and pioneers soon developed an attachment to the American
land, both the specific plot on it where they happened to settle and the coun
try as a whole. They eagerly appreciated its abundance and beauty, even in
conditions where such appreciation required a certain imaginative effort.
Somewhat like the original members of the Plymouth plantation, who sang
praises to the salubrity of New Englands air while burying their dead, the
settlers admired Western sunsets, and believed, wherever they were and
whatever difficulties were facing them in the present, that never on earth
did nature present a fairer field for the use of man, never one more beautiful
for his eye to survey, or his heart to admire and love.5 80The possibilities
inherent in the wilderness, which it was for them to realize, gave rise to the
sense of proprietary pride: they loved the country because they had a stake
in it. The pull of Americas promise, inherent in the national commitment to
equality, has always been stronger than the push of reality that failedtem
porarilyto stand up to it. This explains why so few of the immigrants
returned and so few of the native Americans (that is, Americans born in the
United States) became expatriates. It was much easier to brave the difficul
ties with which one' could meet anywhere, than to forgo the opportunity
which was hardly conceivable anywhere else.
One indisputable virtue of the American land, on which the certitude of
future prosperity to an extent rested, was its vastness. The sheer size of
America early became one of its most endearing features and was celebrated
in rapidly developing folklore as well as professional art. The bigness of the
Western folk-heroes, says Boorstin, combined with the contempt for any
thing little, was quite without parallel in any other tradition. The infant
Davy Crockett was rocked by water power in a twelve-foot cradle made
from the shell of a six-hundred-pound snapping turtle, varnished with
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
437
rattlesnake oil, and covered with wildcat skins. According to the almanacs,
he could walk like an ox, run like a fox, swim like an eel, yell like an Indian,
fight like a devil, spout like an earthquake, make love iike a mad bull/ His
knife Big Butcher was the longest in all Kentucky, his dog Teaser could
throw a buffalo. Works of professional art inspired by Americas size were,
if possible, even more astonishing. A New Yorker, John Banvard, actuated
by a patriotic and honorable ambition, that he should produce the largest
painting in the world, set out to paint a picture of the beautiful scenery of
the Mississippi, which should be as superior to all others, in point of size, as
that prodigious river is superior to the streamlets of Europe. The result of
his efforts was the Largest Picture ever executed by Man, three miles of
ten-foot-high canvas, which the painter displayed piecemeal, helped by an
ingenious device of revolving cylinders placed some twenty feet apart from
each other. Banvard enjoyed great success and soon was imitated by other
similarly inspired artists and patriots, who, being highly committed to real
istic representation, produced still larger paintings. Bigness became Ameri
can. For a long time to come in Chicago, that essentially American city on
the boundless prairie and the mighty lake, Big was the word. Biggest
was preferred, and the biggest in the world was the braggart phrase on
every tongue. Chicago had the biggest conflagration in the world. It slaugh
tered more hogs than any city in the world. I t was the greatest railroad
center, the greatest this, and the greatest that. It shouted itself hoarse in re
clame.11
Like the West, immigration helped to put certain uniquely American qual
ities into sharper relief. It reinforced and gave a new meaning to the claim
that America had a universal mission, and that the American nation itself
was a universal nation, the nation of mankind. Its uniqueness was a result
of a unique fusion of peoples, all of whom, so it was felt and so it was in
scribed in the national consiousness, came hither in search of freedom, for
America was the asylum for the oppressed. Haste you to America, wrote
a Jewish song-writer in Germany in 1848,
H aste to greet the land of freedom,
Free from prejudice, hate, and envy,
Free from hangmen and tyrants!
.. . think and make haste !31
The scale and persistence of immigration reassured Americans of the supe
riority of their society; their governments and their own attitude of open
ness reinforced their sense of moral perfection. A speaker in the Congress,
arguing for the reduction of the proposed two-year-residence requirement
during the discussions of the 1790 naturalization bill, asserted confidently
and, clearly, with pride: It is nothing to us, whether Jews or Roman Cath
olics settle among us; whether subjects of Kings, or citizens of free States
438
N A T I O N A L I S M
wish to reside in the United States, for here in America, individuals of all
nations were melted into a new race of men.83
This shining universalistic image was early tarnished by jealousy, suspi
cion, and wounding professions of religious and ethnic pride. There was
opposition to other than English immigration as soon as it began. At differ
ent times it was opposed by Franklin, Jefferson, very strongly by the Feder
alists. DeWitt Clintons boast that Americans had descended from a supe
rior stock and his conjecture that the extraordinary characters which the
United States have produced might be ascribed to the mixed blood of
those nations where civilization, knowledge, refinement have created their
empire; and where human nature has attained its greatest perfection, may
be interpreted both as an expression of somewhat biased and uninformed,
or even tactless, universalism and as a statement of ethnic superiority, spite
ful toward a good part of humanity. The later celebration of the Anglo-
Saxon or, more generally, Teutonic roots of the American people could
probably bear only the latter interpretation. Immigrants were seen as in
ferior and dangerous to the American community on religious or linguistic
grounds, as well as on those of social and political unpreparedness. Zealous
Protestants were concerned about the purity of manners and doubted the
loyalty of Roman Catholics. The aristocratic sensibility of Henry James was
offended by the proprietary irreverence of "the vast contingent of aliens
whom we make welcome toward his English language, which they made
their own and handled like their own. But while in other countries ethnic
chauvinism of this kind easily crowded out alternative attitudes and became
a central element in the respective national identities, in America it always
remained a marginal alternative to the national identity which was pro
foundly universalistic.
Nativism flared up when and where resources appeared scarce and there
was a fear of competition for them. For this reason, organized labor was
often hostile to immigration. The change in the structure of economic op
portunities as a result of the inevitable exhaustion of the geographical
frontier84was bound to make resources appear scarce. If before there was
an opportunity and a reasonable hope to make good for everyone who was
willing and able to work hard, now opportunities were in fact open only for
those who had special access to them, either because of a singular acumen,
the gift of resourcefulness which made Frederic Tudor the Ice King, or be
cause of the initial possession of such auxiliary resources as contacts, edu
cation, and wealth. In other words, after the West was won, opportunities
were no longer equal. The realization of this disappointing fact on the part
of those who were not specially endowed in any way, which was the major
reason for their fear and jealousy of immigrants, did not, however, promote
disunity. Rather, by way of the reinterpretation of the fundamental Amen-
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
439
can national values, it helped to foster a more unitary notion of the nation
and thus contributed to the development of a sense of national cohesion.
In a society which sets great store by equaiity, economic inequality ac
quires a significance which goes beyond the effects of differences in material
well-being. It is necessarily seen as unjust by the have-nots and is per-
ceived-as an affront to their dignity, because it belies the proposition that all
men are created equal and have equal rights to life and happiness. Equality
in liberty (that is, self-government) becomes less important in such situa
tions. In fact, rather than being regarded as an absolute good, it is likely to
be seen as a tool for the perpetuation and concealment of existing inequali
ties. Liberty is infinitely divisible; other goods are not. An increase in the
liberty of another does not imply a proportional decrease in ones own; in
crease in anothers share of a finite quantity of something, whether power or
wealth, does. "When these resources become scarce, the demand for equality
of opportunity, dignity, and respect commensurate with ones abilities gives
way to the demand for equality of result. It is clear that equality of oppor
tunity, which does not provide for the equality of result, would appeal more
strongly to those who have the qualifications necessary to realize the oppor
tunities open to them. It is also clear that in the early American society,
actually characterized by equality of conditions, equality of opportunity
would be generally acceptable without special provisions for the equality of
result simply because it would appear that the latter was implied, inherent
in the former. But when actual equality of conditions no longer obtains, the
provisions for equality of opportunity only (the legal equality of rights)
must appear unsatisfactory. The transformation in the nature of desired
equality began to be evident in America in the 1830s. It initiated the trans
formation in the perception of the functions of government: government as
essentially a protective agency (guarding against encroachments on the
peoples rights by others) no longer appeared sufficient; there was a feeling
that it should act as a distributive agency. This, in turn, affected the attitudes
toward centralization, making it acceptable and even necessary.
One could observe this transformation in the labor disputes of the period
and in the thought of labor leaders and spokesmen. They redefined national
loyalty as commitment to equality seen as equal access of all classes of indig
enous Americans to American prosperity, and claimed their share in the
name of American ideals. As happened so often, in America as well as else
where, a particularistic interest was identified with the general, national
one, and as a result, the general perception of the national interest was al
tered. Thus, Seth Luther, in an 1832 Address to the Workingmen of New
England, refused to see national interest in anything that did not promote
the welfare of the workers, and interpreted appeals to the nation that did
not take this welfare into consideration as thinly camouflaged attempts on
440 N A T I O N A L I S M
the part of some Imperial and Kingly sympathizers to subvert the American
national purpose. An attorney for the New York workers in a labor-
conspiracy case in 1836 accused the employers of attempting to keep any
one class down . .. and thus exclude them from . .. the general prosperity.
This was un-American, and he had no doubt that an end would be put to
such treachery: In our country the protection against such a partial opera
tion of the laws, is to be found in our courts of justice, and though the rem
edy may be delayed for a while, the good sense and true patriotism which
pervades our whole community, render it ultimately certain. But in practi
cal terms protection was expected from the central government. It was to
the Congress that Seth Luther appealed to restrict immigration in order to
protect the operative from foreign competition in the shape of importation
of foreign mechanics and laborers, [which tends] to cut down the wages of
our own citizens.85
With the rise of the mass political parties and the elimination of property
requirements for voting in the Northern and Western states in the second
and third decades of the nineteenth century, the working-mens perceptions
as to what constituted the proper functions of government were bound to
gain in influence. The demands of the rapidly organizing labor in the North
for governmental patronage coincided with similar demands of the fledgling
Western communities. Such demands were favorable to the concentration of
authority (that is, sovereignty) in the hands of the federal government, thus
contributing to a more unitary concept of the national community. Ironi
cally, it was the Jacksonian commitment to decentralized, participatory de
mocracy which made these demands heard and prepared the conditions for
their eventual satisfaction.
While the settlement of the West, the massive immigration, and the changes
in the economic profile of the settled population in the North worked clan
destinely to form the sense of national unity, it was also forged consciously
and explicitly by the intellectuals dedicated to the creation of a national
ethos. Whether they were politicians and ideologues or belonged to the
newer group of literati, American intellectuals from early on were dispro
portionately committed to the Union, which was for them a value in itself,
and inclined to think in terms of a unitary American nation. Their frame of
reference was larger; they thought in terms of the civilized world. Consid
erations of rank and honor figured more prominently among other matters
that might have preoccupied them; their personal sense of status depended
on the status of the community of which they were members; and the status
of the United Statesof Americapromised in all conditions to be infi
nitely greater than that of any state in it. Many articulate Americans, there
fore, with Daniel Webster, would redefine the hierarchy of American values,
rejecting those words of delusion and folly, Liberty first and Union after
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 441
wards.1Theirs was the motto Liberty and Union, now and forever, one
and inseparable! and they were dedicated to making it a sentiment dear
to every true American heart.Sf;
Rather than seeing their personal interests as the national interest, such
people were likely to internalize what they sincerely believed to be the inter
est of' the nation (what would ensure its independence and augment its
power and prestige) and make it their own. (Of course, since their inner
well-being depended on the well-being of the nation, however defined, its
well-being was clearly in their interest.) This solicitude for the nation
formed the basis of the ideologies and programs of economic, political (ter
ritorial and pertaining to foreign relations), and cultural American nation
alism.
A nation could not be powerful or well regarded if it was not independent.
Independence, thereforeeconomic, political, and culturalwas the para
mount concern of the nationalists. The aim of the economic program of
Alexander Hamilton (including the protection of indigenous industries and
the creation of the national bank) was to free the national government from
dependence on the states and to ensure the economic self-sufficiency of
America vis-a-vis foreign powers. Jefferson, who vehemently opposed Ham
iltons economic centralism, recognized that he was moved by unselfish mo
tives. Hamilton, he wrote in Anas, was, indeed, a singular character.
Of acute understanding, disinterested, honest, and honorable in all private
transactions. Yet with all his good qualities he still held fundamentally, un
forgivably mistaken views: he sacrificed the individual to the collective and
was willing to compromise the ideals for which the American nation stood
in order to assure its survival and strength. In his recollections of Hamiltons
proposals regarding public credit and the bank, Jefferson recorded the fol
lowing anecdote, which, he believed, spoke volumes. He had invited John
Adams and Hamilton to dine with him, and at the dinner table Mr. Adams
observed, Purge [the British] constitution of its corruption, and give to its
popular branch equality of representation, and it would be the most perfect
constitution ever devised by the wit of man. Hamilton paused and said,
Purge it of its corruption, and give to its popular branch equality of repre
sentation, and it would become an impracticable government: as it stands at
present, with ail its supposed defects, it is the most perfect government
which ever existed. Hamilton thought compromise of national principles
a fair price for the welfare of the nation. This welfare was above the welfare
of individuals who composed it (Hamilton was undaunted by the prospect
of women and children of a very tender age constituting the bulk of the
industrial workforce he was advocating), and a little infringement on the
rights or comforts of individuals did not necessarily hurt it. Jefferson
thought it was Hamiltons Anglophilia which led him to such peculiar views.
Ironically, it was the steadfast Jeffersonians who, after the successful con-
442
N A T I O N A L I S M
elusion of the War of 1812, implemented the central tenets of the Hamilton
ian program; Mathew Carey, who carried it on later, and who so impressed
Friedrich List that he made Hamiltonian economic nationalism a pillar of
German nationalism, was both a Republican and an Anglophobe, and so
were many of his like-minded compatriots. Jefferson himself was not be
yond compromising central values of the nation for the sake of its collective
independence, though it is possible that he was not aware that he was doing
so. The thrust of his territorial policy and of his isolationism in foreign re
lations was exactly that: to ensure the independence of the United States
from outside pressures. The acquisition of Louisiana made possible endur
ing isolation, and isolationism betrayed the universalistic commitment of
the American nation to the freedom of mankind. The claim that America,
that oasis of liberty in the enslaved world, needed to withdraw from it in
order to preserve itself and develop, so that it could serve it better as an
example, was a clever excuse, but it did not square with the assertion that
freedom was worth the reduction of human population to but an Adam
and an Eve left in every country. Apparently, the peace and prosperity of
the United States of America were worth more. For Jefferson, too, whether
he recognized it or not, the preservation of the nation became an end in
itself.
Though some people wished to see the United States more independent,
economically and politically, than they were, after the Revolution it was
agreed that they were already essentially independent. In regard to cultural
independence this was not at all clear. Until very late American intellectuals
were tormented by a lingering suspicion that, culturally speaking, America
was under-age, that it lacked a national character, that there was no Such
thing as American culture. This was a difficult thought to bear because, in
the light of the new, German, theories of nationality, which became popular
in the nineteenth century, the lack of a national culture raised the question
as to the reality of the nation itself. But even before the wisdom of German
Romantics caused American literati to realize the full significance of their
cultural inadequacy, Noah Webster urged Americans to unshackle [their]
minds and act like independent beings. You have been children long
enough, he insisted, subject to the control and subservient to the interests
of a haughty parent [England]. You now have an interest of your own to
augment and defendyou have an empire to raise and support by your ex
ertionsand a national character to establish and extend by your wisdom
and judgement. The authority of foreign manners, he warned, keeps us
in subjection.83The plight of the intellectuals preoccupied with this prob
lem was exacerbated by the general indifference of the population to it.
When the American people felt an urge to commune with muses, which was
rare to begin with, they were hardly bothered by the foreign inspiration of
the latter. They contentedly read English books, and this not only demon
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
443
strated the low priority of cultural independence among their aspirations,
but significantly complicated the situation of the native literary talent.
The question ""Who reads an American book? wickedly posed by an ob
viously self-satisfied Englishman, Sydney Smith, was a cause of anguish in
the emerging literary community in America. Some thirty years later James
Russdll Lowell wrote: The Stamp Act and the Boston Port Bill scarcely
produced a greater excitement in America than [that] appalling question.
Smiths judgment was devastating. The Americans are a brave, industrious,
and acute people; but they have hitherto given no indication of genius.89In
1823 William Ellery Channing gloomily reflected: Literature is plainly
among the most powerful methods of exalting the character of a nation . . .
Do we possess indeed what we may call a national literature? Have we pro
duced eminent writers in the various departments of intellectual effort? We
regret that the reply to these questions is so obvious. He added dejectedly:
It were better to have no literature than form ourselves unresistingly on a
foreign one. The American nation, conceded in 1838 James Fenimore
Cooper, some time adamant in his optimism as to the cultural potentialities
of his country, is very far behind most polished nations on various essen
tials. Still in 1850, Herman Melville raged against American indifference to
cultural independence: You must believe in Shakespeares unapproachabil-
ity, or quit the country. But what sort of a beliel is this for an American, a
man who is bound to carry republican progressiveness into Literature, as
well as into Life? Believe me, my friends, that Shakespeares are this day
being born on the banks of the Ohio. And the day will come, when you shall
say: who reads a book by an Englishman that is a modern? His diagnosis
of the present situation was as depressing as any other: While we are rap
idly preparing for that political supremacy among the nations, which pro
phetically awaits us at the close of the present century, in a literary point
of view we are deplorably unprepared for it, and we seem studious to re
main so. ,0
This insistence on the necessity, and anxiety over the continued lack, of
cultural independence, much more than parallel demands in the economic
and political spheres, presupposed a unitary interpretation of the national
community. It implied the definition of the nation as a unity characterized
by a uniform and unique manner of thinking and feeling, a collective person
ality. But, in America, such unitary notions have always had to compete
with the contrary view, seeing the nation in composite terms, as an associa
tion of individuals, and before the Civil War they were characteristic only of
a minority of thinkers even among the intellectuals preoccupied with such
matters as literature.
In Kavanagk, a story which appeared at about the same time as Melvilles
review quoted above, Longfellow made a protagonist answer the claim that
if literature is not national, it is nothing by a counter-claim: nationality
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N A T I O N A L I S M
is a good thing to a certain extent, but universality is better. It is only
geographically that we can call ourselves a new nation, concluded Lowell,
who reviewed the story. He felt no mortification, for, he thought, in culture
nationality was only a less narrow form of provincialism. The cultural
independence of America was, like America itself, composite; it was a reflec
tion of the individual independence of Americans in culture. This was the
message of Emersons American Scholar. In the conclusion of the famous
address Emerson unequivocally rejected the unitary concept of the national
culture: Is it not the chief disgrace in the world, not to be an unit;not to
be reckoned one character;not to yield that peculiar fruit which each man
was created to bear, but to be reckoned in the gross, in the hundred, or the
thousand, of the party, die section, to which we belong; and our opinion
predicted geographically, as the north, or the south? Not so, brothers and
friends,please God, ours shall not be so. We will walk on our own feet;
we will work with our own hands; we will speak our own minds. The
American nation was not a nation of Americans. A nation of men, pre
dicted Emerson, will for the first time exist, because each believes himself
inspired by the Divine Soul which also inspires all men. 91The indepen
dence of the American Scholar rendered the whole issue of the cultural in
dependence of America as a nation irrelevant. But, paradoxically, the very
emphasis on the individual and the rejection of the unitary concept of the
nation highlighted the uniqueness of American national consciousness and
fostered the sense of national unity.
It is important to keep in mind that, until the Civil War settled the issue,
the forces that could (and eventually did) bring the United States to the brink
of disintegration were at ieast as strong as those which fostered unity. There
fore, while a few exceptional individuals were preoccupied with the essen-
tialist issue of American national culture, many more were concerned with
the cultivation of loyalty among the heterogeneous sectors of the American
people. There was a conscious effort to forge a national consciousness that
would admit of no doubt that the United States were indeed a nation, and a
nation which more than any other deserved passionate commitment. Patri
otism was taught through history, literary anthologies, national heroes and
symbols, and even arithmetic. Tocqueville noted in Democracy in Amer
ica: [Americans] are separated from all other nations by a feeling of pride.
For the last fifty years no pains have been spared to convince the inhabitants
of the United States that they are the only religious, enlightened, and free
people . . . hence they conceive a high opinion of .their superiority and are
not very remote from believing themselves to be a distinct species of man
kind. M
Such efforts continued weil beyond the time he made this observation.
The self-appointed apologists used numerous arguments to convince Amer
icans (themselves often included) that they belonged together and were dif
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 445
ferent from the rest of the world. One such argument was geographical. It
was by the design of Providence, of Nature, or of both, it ran, that the
United States were bound into an indissoluble union- A speaker in Charles
ton, in a Fourth of July Oration in 1820, demanded: Do not our moun
tains, which run from North to South, bind us in indissoluble union, like the
sacre'd chain in nature which links all her jarring elements in peace? Do not
our rivers rise in one state and run into another, receiving the tributary
streams of both, and fertilizing with their waters . . . the meadows of. all
through which they hold their majestic course, without distinction or regard
to local prejudices? What Madison called the manifest indications of na
ture were perceived as such in every geographical region of the country.
When the South decided that, after ail, they were not that manifest, Lincoln
persisted in the belief. Physically speaking, we cannot separate, he
claimed. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor
build an impassable wall between them. He argued: A nation may be said
to consist of its territory, its people, and its laws. The territory is the only
part that is of certain durability. One generation passeth away, and another
generation cometh, but the earth abideth forever. For this reason, the dis
solution of the Union, which, territorially, was one flesh, was inconceivable.
Political limits were determined, once and for ali, by geography. Paradoxi
cally, the very same argument was used to effect territorial changes, for ge
ography, similarly to Nature and.Provideoce, lent itself to a variety of inter
pretations. Those who saw Americas manifest destiny in continental
expansion (an expansion which was, of course, also justified by the fact that
it increased the realm of freedom) regarded geography as their closest ally.94
In this case, it must be recognized, contrary to the accepted view of the rela
tions between territoriality and nationality, national loyalty bred territory.
But those who opposed expansion relied on geographical arguments as well.
Patriots of a less mystical bent pointed to the intricate and expanding
communication networks and the developing economic unity of the United
States. However, not the material infrastructure, but the social relations and
the values of American society were considered the most obvious reason for
patriotism. Popular textbooks, such as McGuffeys Eclectic Readers, ad
monished schoolchildren that America has furnished to Europe proof of
the fact, that popular institutions, founded on equality and the principle of
representation, are capable of maintaining governments . . . that it is practi
cable to elevate the mass of mankind, that portion which, in Europe, is
called the laboring or lower class; to raise them to self-respect, to make them
competent to act a part in the great right and great duty of the self-
government. She holds out an example . . . to those nine-tenths of the hu
man race, who are born without hereditary fortune or hereditary rank. An
other author of childrens literature, Samuel Griswold Goodrich, famous
under the pen name of Peter Parley, wrote in a book on American history.-
446
N A T I O N A L I S M
There are doubtless other nations which surpass ours in certain refine
ments; but if we regard the general happiness of the great mass of the
people, our country is without rival.9SSuch themes were harped upon end
lessly, and the fact that they were harped upon in childrens books ensured
that the image of the American nation would be firmly tied with the notion
of democracy in the consciousness of its citizens. When the young readers of
Goodrich and McGuffey grew up, they were prepared to see their country
with the eyes of Bancroft and Emerson, in whose magnificent tirades Amer
ican national identity found its quintessential expression.
For George Bancroft, America was no longer the promise of mans self-
fulfillment; it was the fulfillment of the promise. Unmindful of the internal
contradictions of a democratic society, he did not perceive the discrepancies
between American ideals and reality. In the reality of his country he saw the
realization of the ideal, the end of the worlds journey. His vision was
formed already in 1821, when at the age of twenty-one he left for Europe,
his bosom burning with love for Freedoms western home. In his fare
well poem to Rome two years later, he confessed his yearning for Free
doms air and for western climes, where the brave, the generous, and the free
dwelt, and exclaimed with relief and confidence: O! there is Rome; no
other Rome for me. This was a line in a poem, but no poetic exaggeration.
Throughout his long intellectual and political career Bancroft emphasized
the universal meaning of America, which, like Emerson, but in the very pres
ent, he defined as a nation of men. I t did not belong to a particular race or
to an ethnic group that could be defined by religion or language; it was pan
human. In an oration delivered in 1854 he asserted the fundamental unity
of humanity, which for ages-had existed as a potentiality only but was finally
being realized in the United States:
The commonwealth of mankind, as a whole, was not to be constructed in one
generation. But the different peoples are to be considered as its component
parts, prepared, like so many springs and wheels, one day to be put together
.. . In this great work our country holds the noblest rank . . . Our land is not
more the recipient of the men of all countries than their ideas. Annihilate the
part of any one leading nation of the world, and our destiny would have been
changed. Italy and Spain, in the persons of Columbus and Isabella, joined to
gether for the great discovery that opened America to emigration and com
merce; France contributed to its independence; the search for the origin of the
language we speak carried us to India; our religion is from Palestine; of the
hymns sung in our churches, some were first heard in Italy, some in the deserts
of Arabia, some on the banks of the Euphrates; our arts come from Greece; our
jurisprudence from Rome; our maritime code from Russia; England taught tts
the system of Representative Government; the noble Republic of the United
Provinces bequeathed to us, in the world of thought, the great idea of the tol
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
447
eration of all opinions; in the world of action, the prolific principle of federal
union. Our country stands, therefore, more than any other, as the realization of
the unity of the race.
Arabia, India, Palestine, and Russia, in addition to the usual leading na
tions of the worldrhe desire to prove his point carried Bancroft far be-
yoncf the brotherhood of Christian Europeans, which delimited the scope
of American universalism in the popular imagination of his time. The image
of America he helped to create expanded and gained in grandeur and signif
icance in proportion to this liberal definition of mankind which it repre
sented.
Universality was inseparably connected to liberty and equality. As a con
sequence of the tendency of the race towards unity and universality,
thought Bancroft, the organization of society must more and more con
form to the principle of f r ee d o m. And as in America the historical ten
dency was brought to fruition, the organization of American society did so
conform. In a still later address, On the Life and Character of Abraham
Lincoln, Bancroft reiterated: Thousands of years had passed away before
this child of the ages could be born. From whatever there was of good in the
systems of former centuries [America] drew her nourishment; the wrecks of
the past were her warnings . . . The fame of this only daughter of freedom
went out into all the lands of rhe earth; from her the human race drew
hope.
The men whose nation America was and who found fulfillment in it were
common men; freedom, which was self-government or government by the
majority, was based on the recognition of the fundamental equality between
them that reflected the universal diffusion of Reason, that gracious gift to
each member of the human family, existing within every breast. Because
of this universal endowment, Bancroft-held,
the common judgment in taste, politics, and religion is the highest authority on
earth . .. the nearest criterion of truth .. . In like manner the best government
rests on the people . .. the sum of the moral intelligence of the community
should rule the stare . . . [In America] free institutions .. . have acknowledged
the common mind to be the true material for a commonwealth. . . The absence
of the prejudices of the Old World leaves us here the opportunity of consulting
independent truth; and man is left to apply the instinct of freedom to every
social relation and public interest. We have approached so near to nature that
we can hear her gentlest whispers; we have made humanity our lawgiver and
our oracle; and therefore, the nation receives, vivifies and applies principles,
which in Europe the wisest accept with distrust. Freedom of mind and of con
science, freedom of the seas, freedom of industry, equality of franchises, each
great truth is firmly grasped, comprehended and enforced; for the multitude is
neither rash nor fickle.56
448
N A T I O N A L I S M
Bancrofts contribution to the forging of the American national identity
was gratefully acknowledged. Though his fame rests chiefly on the teri-
volume History of the United States, which he wrote in the course of forty
years, for his contemporaries he was more than a scholar. During his long
life he was several times entrusted with high office and served his country as
secretary of the navy, minister to England, and then to Prussia and Germany.
When he died in 1891, he was mourned as a national hero.
Emerson, in distinction, could not count on the gratitude of the common
man, because for him the common man was not an ideal. Or rather, he
camouflaged his respect for the common man by exhorting every man to
uncover the uncommon in himself; he extolled the individual and distrusted
the multitude as such. Unlike Bancroft, he was a realist, intensely aware of
the contradictions between principles and reality and painfully conscious of
the failings of his society. His vision was critical, and for this reason he ap
pealed to people who felt uneasy with Bancrofts complacent attitude. And
yet Emerson had no doubt about the superiority of America over all other
existing societies. With all its faults, it still eame closer to the fulfillment of
mans nature, because ir was a universal nation and based on freedom and
respect for the individual, and he was sure that with effort and perseverence
it would correct the faults and realize the glorious ideals to which it was
committed. This ideal state was in the future, but Emerson was certain that
it was the future of his nation. In Young American, he asserted: We can
not look on the freedom of this country, in connexion with its youth, with
out a presentiment that here shall laws and institutions exist on some scale
of proportion to the majesty of nature . . . it cannot be doubted that the
legislation of this country should become more catholic and cosmopolitan
than that of any other. It seems so easy for America to inspire and express
the most expansive and humane spirit; new-born, free, healthful, strong, the
land of laborer, of the democrat, of the philanthropist, of the believer, of the
saint, she should speak for the human race. I t is the country of the Future.
Emerson deplored the preoccupation with material goods which led men
away from spiritual concerns and obscured for them the higher meaning of
life and the true significance of American society. At the same time, he
stressed the fundamentally beneficent effects of capitalism on society, which
formed the basis not of equal prosperity, but of the dignity of man as such
a far greater good, in Emersons eyes, and the distinguishing characteristic
of the American nation. He wrote: The philosopher and lover of man have
much harm to say of trade; but the historian will see that trade was the
principle of Liberty; that trade planted America and destroyed Feudalism;
that it makes peace and keeps peace, and it will abolish slavery. We complain
of its oppression of the poor, and of its building up a new aristocracy on the
ruins of the aristocracy it destroyed. But the aristocracy of trade has no per
manence, is not entailed, was the result of toil and talent, the result of merit
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 449
of some kind, and is continually falling, like the waves of the sea, before new
claims of the same sort. Trade is an instrument in the hands of that friendly
Power which works for us in our own despite. Therefore, he concluded,
after all the deduction is made for our frivolities and insanities, there still
remains an organic simplicity and liberty, which, when it loses its balance,
redresses itself presently, which offers opportunity to the human mind not
known in any other , region. In Europe, and even in England, Emerson ar
gued, the aristocracy, incorporated by law and education, degrades life for
the unprivileged classes. Americans could be only too thankful for our
want of feudal institutions. It was this that made America the leading na
tion of its age, standing for the interests of general justice and humanity.
Which should be that nation but these States? Emerson asked rhetorically.
To him, the answer was clear: he was confident that if only the men are
employed in conspiring with the designs of the Spirit who led us hither, and
leading us still, we shall quickly enough advance . .. into a new and more
excellent social state than history has recorded. For it was plain for all
men of common sense and common conscience, that here, here in America,
is the home of man. 97
Inconsistencies and Tensions
The identification of the American nation with a democratic society whose
members were free and equal, which was based on respect for the individual
and in which humanity composed of individuals found its fulfillment, was
universal. Whether or not one believed with Bancroft that America was such
a society in reality, everyone agreed that this was what it should be. Much
more than in England, the loyalty constantly cultivated was not to a partic
ular stretch of land, sets of people, or political framework, but to the prin
ciples and institutions which embodied them. Give the American his insti
tutions, and he cares little where you place him, wrote Charles Mackay in
1837.ss American nationalism was idealistic nationalism. As a result, the
stronger it was, the more seriously did one take the ideals to which the na
tion was committedthe stronger was the potential for alienation from its
reality. Often the very. strength of American national Loyalty tended to
weaken the American nation.
The Stumbling Block
I t must be realized that individualistic-libertarian nationalism sets itself an
impossible task. A nation, ideally, is a society composed of individuals equal
in their human worth. But in fact such perfect equality cannot be achieved.
The reality of an individualistic nation and its ideals are necessarily incon
450
N A T I O N A L I S M
sistent, and this inconsistency breeds discontent and frustration. In The
American Democrat {a book which its author wanted to call Anti-Carit
to emphasize the dishonesty of treating the idea! image as if it were reality),
a keen, though jaundiced, observer, James Fenimore Cooper, distinguished
between the ideal equality and that imperfect approximation to it that, he
thought, could exist in fact. Of Leatherstocking fame, Cooper is rarely re
membered for his contribution to political analysis. Yet The American Dem
ocrat is one of the few works of that genre and period which are considered
to be of lasting value.35The views expressed in it very likely represent the
position of the patrician class in the North of the time, of which Cooper was
a prominent member, and it is thus worth considering at length.
Equality, Cooper wrote, in a social sense, may be divided into that of
condition, and that of rights. Equality of condition is incompatible with civ
ilization, and is found only to exist in those communities that are slightly
removed from the savage state. In practice, it can only mean common mis
ery. Equality of rights is a peculiar feature of democracies. In societies of
other types, he explained, there exist privileged classes, possessed of exclu
sive rights . . . that are denied to those who are of inferior birth. All these
distinctions are done away with in principle, in countries where there exists
a professed equality of rights, though, he warned, there is probably no
community that does not make some distinctions between the political priv
ileges of men. Rights in regard to which men were equal could be political
or civil. Political rights referred to suffrage, eligibility to office, and a con
dition of things that admits of no distinction between men, unless on prin
ciples that are common to all. Civil rights he defined as equality before the
law, or an absence of privileges. Equality of rights, Cooper insisted, was
never absolute, and to prove this he brought up several apparently obvious
examples. Women, he wrote, nowhere possess the same [civil] rights as
men . .. Minors are deprived of many of their civil rights, or, it would be
better to say, do not attain them, until they reach a period of life that has
been arbitrarily fixed. Neither is equality of political rights ever absolute. In
those countries where the suffrage is said to be universal, exceptions exist,
that arise from the necessity of things, or from that controlling policy which
can never be safely lost sight of in the management of human affairs. The
interests of women being thought to be so identified with those of their male
relatives as to become, in a greater degree, inseparable, females are, almost
generally, excluded from the possession of political rights. There can be no
doubt that society is greatly the gainer, by thus excluding one half its mem
bers .. . Men are also exduded from political rights previously to having
attained the age prescribed by law . . . Thus birth-right is almost universally
made the source of advantage.
The equality in America, he continued, is no more absolute than that of
any other country. There may be less inequality in this nation than in most
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
451
others, but inequality exists, and, in some respects, with stronger features
than is usual to meet with in the rest of Christendom. The rights of prop
erty being an indispensable condition of civilization . . . equality of condi
tion is rendered impossible . . . Women and minors are excluded from the
suffrage, and from maintaining suits at law . . . here as elsewhere. None but
natives of the country can fill many of the higher offices, and paupers, felons
and all those who have not fixed residences, are also excluded from the suf
frage. In a few of the states property is made the test of political rights, and,
in nearly half of them, a large portion of the inhabitants, who are of a differ
ent race from the original European occupants of the soil, are entirely ex
cluded from all political, and from many of the civil rights, that are enjoyed
by those who are deemed citizens.
Cooper did not bewail this situation (although he disagreed with some of
its particulars), because he believed a certain degree of social inequality to
be natural, and saw literal interpretation of the principle of human equality
as both mistaken and dangerous:
The celebrated proposition contained in the declaration of independence is not
to be understood literally- All men are not created equal, in a physical, or
even in a moral sense, unless we limit the signification to one of political rights.
This much is true, since human institutions are a human invention, with which
nature has had no connection . . . As regards all human institutions men are
born equal, no sophistry being able to prove that nature intended one should
inherit power and wealth, another slavery and want. Still artificial inequalities
are the inevitable consequences of artificial ordinances, and in founding a new
governing principle for the social compact, the American legislators instituted
new modes of difference.
The very existence of a government at all, infers inequality. The citizen who
is preferred to office becomes the superior of those who are not, so long as he is
the repository of power, and the chiid inherits the wealth of the parent as a
controlling law of society. All that the great American proposition, therefore,
can mean, is to set up new and juster notions of natural rights than those which
existed previously, by asserting, in substance, that God has not instituted polit
ical inequalities, as was pretended by the advocates of the Jus Divinum, and
that men possessed a full and natural authority to form such social institutions
as best suited their necessities.
There are numerous instances in which the social inequality of America may
do violence to our notions of abstract justice, but the compromise of interests
under which all civilized society must exist, renders this unavoidable. Great
principles seldom escape working injustice in particular things.
Cooper believed himself to be as good a democrat as there is in Amer
ica, but his democracy was not of the impracticable school. He wrote of
himself in the preface: [The author] prefers a democracy to any other sys
tem, on account of its comparative advantages, and not on account of its
452
N A T I O N A L I S M
perfection. He knows it has evils; great and increasing eviis, and evils pecu
liar to itself; but he believes that monarchy and aristocracy have more. It
will be very apparent to all who read this book, that he is not a believer in
the scheme of raising men very far above their natural propensities. His
view of American ideals thus was instrumental. He wished to warn his coun
trymen against notions that are impracticable, and which if persevered in,
cannot fail to produce disorganization, if not revolution, against the idle
hope of substituting a fancied perfection for the ills of life.100He was a
conservative, in the sense in which loyalists were conservative, or English
men who loved England rather than the values for which it stood. But Amer
ican nationalism was idealistic to the core, and many of Coopers compa
triots (at least as far as they personally were concerned) would settle for
nothing but perfection.
By the third decade of the nineteenth century, artificial invidious distinc
tions between men, which constituted the very fabric of European societies,
in America had been reduced to a minimum. There were no legal estates,
and neither wealth nor education was recognized as a legitimate claim for
superior status. The fundamental status categories that remained were re
lated to natural differences, such as those of sex, race, and age, and to a
lesser extent to religion. That equality in American society had advanced
beyond anything imaginable elsewhere at the time cannot be disputed. But
the American society was also committed to equality to an extent that was
unimaginable elsewhere. Thus, while the reality in America in this regard
was incomparably better than in any other society, the gap between it and
its brilliant ideal was nonetheless wider.101Because equality was interpreted
literally, American inequality appeared to have stronger features than
usual. The problem with America, said Cooper in another work, was
chiefly that it is lamentably in.arrears to its own avowed principles.102
Twenty years later another earnest American addressed the issue of Amer
ican inequality. Speaking on the Dred Scott decision, Abraham Lincoln said-.
I think the authors [of the Declaration of Independence] intended to include all
men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did
not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or
social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what respects they
did consider all men created equalequal with certain inalienable rights,
among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . . . They meant to
set up a standard maxim for free society which should be familiar to all and
revered by all; constantly looked at, constantly labored for, and even though
never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly
spreading and deepening its influence and augmenting the happiness and vaSue
of life to all people of all colors everywhere ... Its authors meant it to be-~as,
thank God, it is now proving itselfa stumbling block to all those who in
afterrimes might seek to turn a free people back into the hateful paths of des
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
453
potism. They knew the proneness of prosperity to breed tyrants, and they
meant when such should reappear in this fair land and commence their voca
tion, they should find left for them at least one hard nut to crack.103
While for Cooper, American principles were unrealistic even in their limited
significance, and the inevitable inequality was the hard nut to crack, the
stumbling block on the way to their realization, Lincoln, who accepted
Coopers limited definition of equality in the Declaration of Independence,
believed that in regard to their rights men could and would be equal, exactly
because inequality contradicted the American principles. This very incon
sistency, he was convinced, would ensure the ultimate triumph of ideals over
reality. However, while it certainly was the means for the solution, incon
sistency also represented a greater part of the problem.
Inequality inherent in social reality was blatantly inconsistent with Amer
ican national commitment. In a society which believed that wall men are
created equal, the denial of equality meant that one was not human, was
less of a human than others. I f one chose not to or could not blind oneself to
it, the experience must have been one of a crushing, unbearable humiliation,
an indignity quite beyond that experienced by the iower classes in European
societies which divided humanity into unequal groups to begin with, justi
fied such division by its function in the Divine order of things, and consoled
those at the bottom by their participation in the great chain of being.
That the degree of material deprivation and physical hardship associated
with the denial of equality in America was relatively small is largely irrele
vant in this context. The cliometric data of Fogel and Engerman in fact sup
port the claims of Southern defenders of slavery that the material conditions
of slaves lives were better than those of free industrial workers in the North;
their diet was nutritionally adequate, their health good, and as a result the
slave population in the United States {and earlier in the colonies) rapidly
increased.104The anti-cant American Democrat Cooper was undoubtedly
right, writing of slavery, which he considered an evil, that it was an insti
tution as old as human annals and no more sinful, by the Chri sti an code,
than it is sinful . . . to enjoy ease and plenty, while our fellow creatures are
suffering and in want, and of American slavery, in particular, that the Af
rican is, in nearly all respects, better off in servitude in this country, than
when living in a state of barbarism at home . . . American slavery is mild, in
its general features, and physical suffering cannot properly be enumerated
among its evils . . . It is an evil, certainly, but in a comparative sense, not as
great an evil as it is usually imagined. There is scarcely a nation in Europe
that does not possess institutions that inflict as gross personal privations and
wrongs, as the slavery of America. 105
Indeed, what was peculiar or particularly cruel about the peculiar institu
tion of some American states, was the fact that it existed in America. Amer
454 N A T I O N A L I S M
ican slaves might have been better off than slaves elsewhere, but they were
slaves in America, which made their slavery appear more oppressive, for
they were slaves of people dedicated to freedom. Men, at least some of them,
live not by bread alone, and however much America emphasized prosperity,
it always placed greater emphasis on liberty and dignity. The deprivation
from which slaves suffered was not primarily material, but psychological,
and the suffering was most acute among those who might have been better
off materially than othersthe uncommonly intelligent, sensitive, and edu
cated. The master to whom Nat Turner (the leader of the sanguinary slave
revolt in 1831) belonged as a child remarked of him early in his life that he
had too much sense . . . and .. . would never be of any service to anyone
as a slave. He learned to read and write; he was discovered to be great
by his fellow servants; and Mx. Travis, the kind master who was his
first victim and whose property he had been since 1S30, placed greatest
confidence in him. I t is not surprising that, arriving to mans estate and
being still a slave, Nat Turner began seeing white spirits and black spirirs
engaged in battle and believed that he was chosen by God to slay [his
white] enemies and liberate black people.106It is surprising that slave re
volts, similar to this, did not happen more often.
Perhaps this could be explained by the fact that, as Cooper put it, refer
ring to the personal restraints of the system, men do not feel very keenly,
if at all, privations of the amount of which they know nothing. 107It was
often the free blacks who felt the weight of degradation more. I t was the
insupportable, the intolerable contradiction between slavery and the na
tional commitment to equality of men in liberty, not the cruelty of slavery in
America, which tormented Nat Turner, driving him to his indiscriminate
work of death, and it was this contradiction which inflamed William
Lloyd Garrison, moving him to increasingly radical abolitionist positions.
Still an advocate of gradual emancipation, which he was to renounce sev
eral months later, Garrison argued passionately on July 4, 1829: Every
Fourth of July, our Declaration of Independence is produced, with a sublime
indignation, to set forth the tyranny of the mother country and to challenge
the admiration of the world. But what a pitiful detail of grievances does this
document present in comparison with the wrongs which our slaves endure!
.. . Before God, I must say that such a glaring contradiction as exists be
tween our creed and practice the annals of ,000 years cannot parallel. In
view of it, I am ashamed of my country. I am sick of our unmeaning decla
mation in praise of liberty and equality; of our hypocritical cant about the
inalienable rights of man. I could not, for my right hand, stand up before a
European assembly and exult that I am an American citizen, and denounce
the usurpations of a kingly government as wicked and unjust. . . the recol
lection of my countrys barbarity and despotism would blister my lips and
cover my cheeks with burning blushes of shame. Similarly, Lincoln hated
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
455
the monstrous injustice of slavery, because it deprives our republican ex
ample of its influence in the world; enables rhe enemies of free institutions
with plausibility to taunt us as hypocrites; causes the real friends of freedom
to doubt our sincerity; and especially because it forces so many good men
among ourselves into an open war with the very fundamental principles of
civil liberty.108
For propaganda purposes, Abolitionists stressed the mistreatment of the
slaves by bad masters and their physical suffering, which easily aroused pity
and sympathy. This, on the whole, weakened their position, for slavery apol
ogists could not only refute their claims, but point to the greater material
misery of the lower classes elsewhere (including the free states) and thus
accuse the Abolitionists in being inconsistent and, therefore, dishonest.105*
Slavery was the ultimate betrayal of the national idealsthe blackest
spot, strictly a national sin. It was also the most conspicuous contradic
tion: it bore the name of the negation of freedom. The situation of women
contradicted American commitment less openly, but was equally inconsist
ent with it. In fact, if one accepts Orlando Pattersons interpretation of slav
ery (according to which the essentia! characteristic of the slave status is the
lack of personal autonomy and honorable will, which makes a slave,
however thriving physically, socially dead, rather than the legal definition
of a slave as a form of property), the position of women in nineteenth-
century Americaas well as elsewhereappears in significant respects
analogous to slavery. Women did not fail to perceive this analogy. Man,
claimed the authors of the Seneca Falls Declaration on Womens Rights in
1848, established an absolute tyranny over the woman, making her civ
illy dead. 110
It may be claimed that American women on the whole had it better than
most of their European sisters, which is undoubtedly true. The indepen
dence of the American girl was notorious. Tocqueville duly acknowledged
that nowhere are young women surrendered so early or so completely to
their own guidance. To a far greater extent than in Europe, they were mis
tresses of their own actions. One could expectand accepton the part
of an American girl liberties inconceivable and unforgivable on the part of a
European. Mr. Winterbourne (whom Henry James perhaps saw as a reflec
tion of himself), hesitant whether or not to be shocked by Daisy Millers
eccentricities, wrote them off to her nationality. But more experienced
Americans were shocked, and her independence was punished by death, for
there was no other resolution, the choice facing the American woman being:
live unfree or die.
According to Tocqueville and numerous others, the freedom of American
women ended (was irrecoverably lost) with marriage. He thought they
loved it. I never observed, he wrote, that the women of America consider
conjugal authority as a fortunate usurpation of their rights, or that they
456
N A T I O N A L I S M
thought themselves degraded by submitting to it. It appeared to me, on the
contrary, that they attach a sort of pride to the voluntary surrender of their
own will and make it their boast to bend themselves to the yoke, not to
shake it off. He believed the reason for such voluntary submission lay in
the education of the American woman. Americans, he said, were of the
opinion that a womans mind was just as fitted as a that of man to discover
the plain truth, and her heart as firm to embrace it and sought to arm her
reason. Thus, while they have allowed the social inferiority of woman to
continue, they have done all they could to raise her morally and intellec
tually to the level of man. What Tocqueville did not recognize in Democ
racy in America (and what he so persuasively demonstrated in his later book
on France) was the Tocqueville effect produced by exactly this inconsist
ency. Cultivated, accomplished women, daughters, sisters, and wives of ac
tive men who insisted on the equality and liberty of intelligent beings, yet
whose authority over them was unquestionable, women whose sensibilities
and abilities were developed, overdeveloped given the prospects open to
them, could not help feeling degraded. The Seneca Fails Declaration stressed
this: [Man] closes against her all the avenues to wealth and distincfion
which he considers most honorable to himself. As a teacher of theology,
medicine, or law, she is not known . . . He has endeavored, in every way that
he could, to destroy her confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-
respect, and to make her willing to lead a dependent and abject life. 111
The profession of a woman, said Catharine Beecher, was to serve the men
around her. The function that awaited a woman, rhe end of her develop
ment, was self-effacement. Not being a man, a woman had no right to hap
piness. No matter that, when Tocqueville wrote, there were few such
women; there were more and more of them as years went by; they multi
plied as the slaves multiplied in the prosperous United States, which could
afford to cultivate those whom they would not care to recognize. The exis
tence of a stereotype for what was such womens alternative to marriage,
Boston marriages, on which they expended their otherwise pent-up capac
ities which had gone sour for Sack of expression, suggests that in the latter
part of the century they were not uncommon, and that they were particu
larly common in places like Boston, wirhin sight of Bunker Hill and in the
birthplace of liberty, where the inconsistency of their situation was most
glaring.512
What is remarkable about all this is how long and how patiently the
American public as a whole endured the gross inconsistencies in its midst.
Different sectors of it might have been acutely aware of their own plight (if
plight it was) and yet completely insensitive to the similar indignity inflicted
on others. Contemporaries and observers of the same situation perceived in
it different contradictions. Nothing, in fact, appeared self-evident, least of
all that all men were created equal, or, rather, that all those clamoring for
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 457
equality were equally men. More often than not the adjective self-evident
denoted the persuasiveness of positions which fit or served the interests of
those who advanced them. While many Northern patriots during the Revo
lutionary conflict clearly understood the inconsistency of Negro slavery with
the ideals for which they were fighting and spoke against it, John Dickinson
believed the colonists had it much worse than the slaves of the South, for, he
said, there was no idea of slavery more complete, more miserable, more
disgraceful, than that of a people where justice is administered, government
exercized, and a standing army maintained at the expence of the people, and
yet without the least dependence upon them. The stance of the Southern
champions of liberty and equality was, of course, even more problematic.
Later, Thoreau, the author of Civil Disobedience, seeking to escape from the
philistine preoccupations of mid-nineteenth-century American society into
the haven of self- and nature-watching, wrote in Walden: I sometimes won
der that we can be so frivolous, I may almost say, as to attend to the gross
but somewhat foreign form of servitude called Negro Slavery, [while] there
are so many keen and subtle masters that enslave both north and south. It is
hard to have a southern overseer; it is worse to have a northern one; but
worst of all when you are the slave-driver of yourself. 153For him, Negro
slavery was an insignificant evil, compared with the socially and self-
imposed subjection of the spirit in the pursuit of material things. Love of
property, not treating men as such, truly contradicted the principle of lib
erty.
To white laborers protesting the employment of skilled ebony workers
as masons and carpenters in the South, it seemed self-evident that white
labor should always be preferred to black. A working-man wrote in the
Southern Banner of January 13, 1838: The white man is the only real,
legal, moral, and civil proprietor of this country and state. . . By white man
alone was this continent discovered; by the prowess of white men alone
(though not always properly or humanely exercized [what an amazing qual
ification in this context]) were the fierce and active Indians driven occiden-
tally. And if swarms and hordes of infuriated red men pour down now . . .
white men alone .. . would bare their breasts to the keen and whizzing
shafts of the savage crusadersdefending Negroes too in the bargain.
The right, then, gentlemen, you will no doubt candidly admit, appealed
the author to the honorable public, of the white man to employment in
preference to Negroes, who must defer to us since they live well enough on
plantations, cannot be considered impeachable by contractors. And he
added: I am surprised the poor do not elect faithful members to the legis
lature, who will make it penal to prefer Negro mechanic labor to white
mens.
Some two months later forty thousand black citizens of Pennsylvania pro
tested against their disenfranchisement by the decision of the states supreme
458 N A T I O N A L I S M
court. In their Appeal to the People5 they asked that no man shall be
excluded on account of his color, and explained: When you have taken
from an individual his right to vote, you have made the government, in re
gard to him, a mere despotism; and you have taken a step toward making it
despotism to all. To your women and children, their inability to vote at the
polls may be no evil, because they are united by consanguinity and affection
with those who can do it. They were oblivious of the fact that the ties of
affection, if not consanguinity, connecting masters and slaves were claimed
by supporters of slavery in the South, thereby justifying the exclusion of
blacks from citizenship; to the free blacks of Pennsylvania it appeared self-
evident that only sex and age constituted legitimate bases of exclusion.
Henry James, the sensitive post-emancipation Bostonian, however incon
stant, through whose eyes we see the drama of The Bostonians, found the
concerns of the feminists amusing, but had no sympathy for them. Olive
Chancellor, the young womanand yet a signal old maid, a spinster as
Shelley was a lyric poet, or the month of August is sultrywho represents
these concerns, is an unattractive character. James describes her views with
ironic exaggeration; his irony makes it embarrassing to agree with them.
The authors sympathies lie with Basil Ransom, the irresistible Mississip-
pian, whose idea of womens rightsthe rights for gentlemens condescen
sion and protectionhe evidently shared. (As it happened, the first femi
nists were alsoand firstAbolitionists, which can be explained perhaps
by the fact that the injustice of sexual inequality was even less self-evident
than others and did not become a legitimate object of attack until later.)114
Of course, such egocentrism and selective indifference were not universal.
Many disinterested men and women found the contradiction of American
inequality intolerable and advocated the rights of minorities to which they
themselves did not belong. There were male champions of sexual equality,
while the Abolitionist sentiment in the free Northern states was notoriously
strong and grew stronger. Thousands of Americans must have feit oppressed
by the purely mental burden of inconsistency, demanding anxiously and im
patiently, as the preacher Levi Hart demanded as early as 1775: When, O
when shall the happy day come, that Americans shall be consistently en-
gagedin the cause of liberty? 11S
Still, the fact that the great majority of those personally unaffected by a
particular discrimination were blind to the plight of those who suffered
under it, and did not perceive the denial of equality and freedom to others
as inconsistent with the ideals of the nation, made the correction of any one
inconsistency possible only if it connected to a powerful interest. In general
one may describe the relationship between ideals and interests in the Amer
ican caseand elsewhereas follows. {The specificity of the American case
consists in that we start from a pool of values, but otherwise the pattern is
fundamentally the same everywhere.) Of the available ideals and their pos
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
459
sible interpretations, only those are selected and upheld at any given period
which correspond to significant interests operating at the time (namely the
interests of groups that possess the necessary means for their realization,
such as critical mass, influence, and so forth), while others are at least tem
porarily discarded or put aside. They may be picked up at a later point
when interests emerge that can be served by them. The selected ideals and
interpretations are usually capable of further diverging ramifications; and
again, some of these are selected and some are discarded in accordance with
existing interests. Interests are frequently informed by the ideals and reflect
them, but often they are formed by the existential, or structural, constraints
of the actors. In the latter case, they are strengthened if they correspond to
the ideals in the pool, and are rendered problematic if they contradict them,
but may persist nonetheless. Arrangements inconsistent with ideals in the
pool, therefore, may exist so long as there are either interests which support
them or no interest that requires and has the requisite means for their elimi
nation. However, when interests of the latter type do emerge and the incon
sistencies in social arrangements are conceptualized as such, they quickly
become indefensible and are likely to disappear more or less gradually. The
ideals, therefore, to an extent prescribe the general direction for the devel
opment of the society, the general course it is to follow. Yet it is not at all
inevitable that it will follow this course. At any point in time interests cre
ated by structural constraints unconnected to the ideals may emerge which
could be incongruent with or even antithetical to the latter, and yet powerful
enough not to give way under the pressure of inconsistency and opposing
interests. Such interests may lead to the creation of a different pool of ideals
which are consistent with them and, in the case of their success, arrest the
previous development of society and divert it from its initial course.
In addition to these general reasons why systemic contradictions may
continue unattended for long periods of time, there existed in America a
particular reason which accounted for the persistence of arrangements in
consistent with American ideals. The gross inconsistencies of American
societythe denial of equality of rights to particular groups of Ameri
cansmight not be perceived as such so long as liberty and equality were
considered the prerogatives of rational beings, and reason was seen as the
essence of humanity. In this framework, if it were possible to prove, for ex
ample, that blacks were significantly less rational than whites, and women
similarly inferior to men, the denial of equality to these groups would, in
fact, be consistent with the proclaimed ideals of the nation. Indeed, the in
telligence of the blacks was the focus of the early debate around the issue of
slavery, in which Jefferson committed himself so strongly to the view of
black intellectual inferiority. (Less explicidy, but unambivalently, he sup
ported the claim that women were no equals of men in the masculine sound
Understanding) But it was a matter unsusceptible to proof, or rather, the
460 N A T I O N A L I S M
ability to prove it one way or the other depended on ones desire and not on
evidence which lent itself to various interpretations. Besides, the emphasis
on group characteristics itself was inconsistent with the American respect
for the individual. Thus reason was eventually discarded as a means of es
tablishing group eligibility for partaking in the dignity of equality in liberty
and abandoned by the defenders of both broad and narrow definitions of
humanity endowed with inalienable rights. Already in 1789, the Maryland
Abolition Society asserted that the human race, however varied in color or
intellects, are all justly entitled to liberty. Rights were dissociated from rea
son and became unconditional. Thus the only conceivable justification for
inequality in the framework of American ideals was eliminated.116
The Myth of Anti-Intellectualism
The American attitude toward reason was an element in yet another built-in
tension in American society which stood in the way of the formation of
national loyalty and made it waver. If the flaws in the realization of the ideal
of equality bred frustration, so did the approximation to that ideal. The
attitude toward equality is necessarily ambivalent: one wants to be equal to
ones superiors, but does not desire equality with those seen as ones in
feriors. The principle of equality of human worth works against one of the
most important and ubiquitous social intereststhat of status-seeking. The
American ideals conflicted with and impeded status-achievement and status-
display. AH pretensions to inherent superiority among the white male citi
zens of the nation were rendered illegitimate, un-American, From a certain
point of view, this was a systemic deficiency, and it particularly affected cre
ative intellectuals, such as writers of fiction and other artistspeople whose
self-esteem and, in many cases, creative energy and raison detre depended
on the inner consciousness and general recognition of their very inequality,
superiority to others, on the belief that there was within them some inherent
quality which could be neither learned nor acquired otherwise, and which
distinguished them from the rest of the human race,117While the imperfect
realization of the ideal of equality bred disaffection among groups who were
treated as inferior, the very desire to realize it formed the structural basis for
the alienation of the intellectuals, because they were treated as equal to the
rest. In both cases, discontent expressed itself chiefly in attempts to reform
American society, and frequently intellectuals were found at the head of re
form movements aiming at the achievement of a more perfect equality. At
least in some such instances, it may be assumed that this was the result of
the displacement of the frustration peculiar to intellectuals and of the ration
alization of their vexation in terms that rendered it legitimate within the
framework of American values. As often, however, this vexation was not
displaced. It was experienced as the frustration of intellectuals, not of Amer
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
461
icans, and this experience gave rise to the myth of the anti-intellectualism of
American society, which connoted crass materialism and contempt for
learning.
It is important to analyze this persistent misconception in the present con
text, for it is responsible for one distinctive feature of American patriotism:
the fact that it is not, primarily, the province of intellectuals; patriotic effu
sions by prominent cultural figures in it are relativelyand by comparison
with other nations, conspicuouslyrare. Conversely, this phenomenon also
explains, at least to the same extent as the structural inconsistencies of
American society, the latters unparalleled penchant for self-criticism. All
societies tend to be self-congratulating. The self-congratulatory tendencies
in America, therefore, do not make it in any way unique. But only in Eng
land, and for the same reasons, there exists a similar tendency to perceive
and focus on the shortcomings not simply of the government, but of the
nation as such. This social criticism is naturally articulated by the articulate
segment of societythe intellectualsand the built-in discontent within
this articulate segment, indeed in accordance with the famous Marxist dic
tum, inevitably serves as a major source of inspiration for it.
The claim of anti-intellectualism was cultivated because of the systemic
alienation of American intellectuals, but it also reflected an actual peculiar
ity of the American attitude toward culture, which was noticed even by the
unprejudiced foreigners, Tocqueville opened his interview with Livingston
with a statement; It seems to me that American society suffers from taking
too little account of intellectual questions.118This statement was in direct
contradiction to many of his observations in Democracy in America, but
only because it was imprecisely formulated. America was indeed character
ized by a pervasive disrespect toward its creative intellectuals. It did not
defer to them. In comparison with European societies, such as Prance (or
Germany, or Russia), where intellectuals formed an alternative, if not the
only, aristocracy, this was indeed striking. This noticeable lack of awe in
regard to intellectuals was interpreted as lack of intellectual interests and
contempt for culture. But, at least until the latter half of rhe nineteenth cen
tury, nothing could be further from the truth. American society was singu
larly receptive to culture; rather than repelling it, it absorbed it like a
sponge, and therein, not in its cultural indifference, lay the reason for the
intellectuals distress.119
The general literacy of the population was another facet of the character
istic equality of conditions during the colonial period. In 1701 Governor
Joseph Dudley was of the opinion that in New England there are no chil
dren to be found 10 years old who do not read well, nor men of twenty who
do not write tolerably. In 1722 Rev. Jacob Duche wrote of Philadelphia:
Such is the prevailing taste for books of every kind, that almost every man
is a reader; and by pronouncing sentence, right or wrong, upon the various
462 N A T I O N A L I S M
publications that come in his way, puts himself upon a level, in point of
knowledge, with their several authors. Visitors were surprised by the high
level of popular discourse in the country and the purity of English spoken in
all walks of life. Common people were well instructed in the knowledge of
their Rights and Liberties; toward the end of the eighteenth century, Ed
mund Burke noted that in no country perhaps in the world is the law so
general a study . . . all who read, and most do read, endeavor to obtain some
smattering in that science.120It is no trivial detail that New England had a
college when Massachusetts Bay colony was but six years old. The newness
of America, sectarian enthusiasm, and the absence of legal fetters allowed
colleges to proliferate. Because of the territorial dispersion, they competed
for students and thus were not selective. In the eighteenth century, the cost
of higher education, while not cheap, was comparatively low: ten to twenty
pounds per year as compared with fifty pounds earned by a skilled carpen
ter. The colleges depended on the support of the community and were gov
erned by it; their goal was the spread of learning rather than cultivation of
pure knowledge. This was not conducive to the development of special
ized education, but fostered an exceptionally high level of general literacy.
Because general literacy was so widespread, intellectual monopoly was re
sented; priests, lawyers, and physicians were regarded as the three great
scourges of mankind, Learned Gentlemen unworthy to be maintained by
the community. And yet, twenty-five of the fifty-six signers of the Declara
tion of Independence, thirty-one of the fifty-five members of the Constitu
tional Convention, ten of the twenty-nine first Senators and seventeen of the
sixty-five Representatives in the first Congress were lawyers, while the
Constitutional Convention could be called the first American brain trust
because sc many of its members were college educated, and because it in
cluded first-rate (by the existing standards) scholars and scientists, two uni
versity presidents, and three college professors.121There was no contradic
tion here: educated men in colonial America did not constitute a separate
estate.
Colleges continued to grow in numbers in the nineteenth century. In 1851
an enthusiast referred to the United States as a land of colleges. In 1815
Hezekiah Niles bragged in a letter to William Cobbett: There are'no such
men in the world as our independent farmers, who constitute the large ma
jority of our people. Many of them have libraries, like your English lords,
and what is more, they even understand the books they have.122No matter
that he might have exaggerated, the fact that he considered the superior in
tellectual propensities of the mass of his countrymen a subject worthy of
advertising is important in itself. Besides, Niles had some hard evidence to
support his view: by 1819 his Weekly Register had more than ten thousand
subscribers. Around the same time the most popular publication in Russia
had three hundred.123Although America is perhaps in our days the civi
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation; America
463
lized country in which literature is least attended to, wrote Tocqueville cir
cumspectly, still a large number of persons there take an interest in the
productions of the mind and make them, if not the study of their lives, at
least the charm of their leisure hours . . . There is hardly a pioneers hut that
does not contain a few odd volumes of Shakespeare. I remember that I read
the feudal drama of Henry V for the first time in a log cabin. 524Those who
know when Russia learned to read or when French peasants turned into
Frenchmen will not doubt for a moment that odd volumes of Shakespeare
(or Zhukovsky, or Racine) in a peasant hut in Central Russia or Provence in
the 1830s (or 1850S; or 1870s) would be an utter impossibility, and that
whatever might constitute the charm of leisure hours in those parts, it would
not be, by any stretch of imagination, the productions of the mind.
The high-placed spokesmen for colonial and later national authorities in
America consistently stressed the importance of education for the people.125
Educational achievement was a condition of a happy and respectable exis
tence. A popular rhyme urged children to take their alphabet seriously, for
he who learns his letters fair / Shall have a coach to take the air. This was
an openly instrumental approach. Americans did not treat learning as an
end in itself: both the needs and the opportunities of the country militated
against such an attitude. We want hands, my lord, more than heads, wrote
William Livingston to the Bishop of Llandaff; the most intimate acquaint
ance with the classics will not remove our oaks; nor rhe taste for the Georg
ies cultivate our lands. So great is the call for talents of all sorts in the
active use o professional and other business in America, that few of our
ablest men have leisure to devote exclusively to literature or fine arts, Jus
tice Story thought in 1819. This obvious reason will explain why we have
so few professional authors, and those not among our ablest men.126
In Europe, the view that learning was an end in itself was related to the
traditional contempt for manual labor as the dole of inherently inferior
classesthe mass of iaboratores. Intellectual preoccupations, although
originally less respectable than military ones, implied that one did not need
to work to support oneself, but belonged to a superior leisure class. There
was no American leisure class and, in general, in the beginning Americans
had very little leisure, which allowed neither full-time gentlemanly dedica
tion to intellectual pursuits that had no practical application on a scale of
any significance nor the formation of a mass market that could support such
dedication, turning it into a sort of business. Yet it would be wrong to as
sume that culture was valued less because it was considered practically in
dispensable. Some forms of culturefiction, speculative theology or poli
ticswere valued less. Lack of leisure implied both scarcity of time one
could spend on reading for pleasure and less boredom and therefore need
for entertainment. But indifference to fiction and speculation made inquisi
tive Americans only more earnest in the pursuit of learning and understand
464 N A T I O N A L I S M
ing that could be defined as useful. A writer in the Atlantic Monthly claimed
in 1858 that nowhere but in America was speculative interest so colored
with rhe hues of practical interest without limiting its own flight; nowhere
[were] labors executive powers so receptive of pure intellectual sugges
tion. 127
The American temper was not anti-intellectual; it was an intellectual tem
per of a certain kind. While intellectuals might have been slighted, intellect
was highly esteemed. This attitude was uncongenial to imaginative and
speculative writing, but it fostered empirical study. Nothing at the rime
could be a better rule for the development of science than Jared Eliots irrev
erent maxim: An Ounce of Experience is better than a Pound of Science.
3t was the profound respect for the intellect, the veneration of human rea
son, which lay at the basis of disrespect for professional intellectuals. Amer
icans thirsted for learning, but they wished and thought they could learn by
themselves. Theirs was the priesthood of all believers; they did not need
authorities to interpret for them the mysteries of the universe. Reading
many Books is but a taking off the Mind too much from Meditation, Wil
liam Penn advised his children. Reading your selves and Nature, in the
Dealings and Conduct of men, is the truest human wisdom. The Spirit of a
Man knows the Things of Man, and more true Knowledge comes by Medi
tation and just Reflection than by Reading; for much Reading is an Oppres
sion of the Mind. 128
This philosophy (and this rejection of mediated knowledge was indeed
love of wisdom) was never better expressed than in an address delivered
in 1837 before an audience of aspiring intellectuals at Harvard University.
The orator challenged the intellectual to be Man Thinking, not mere
thinker, the parrot of other mens thinking. He spoke of the education of
the scholar by nature and by action, and had this to say of education by
books:
Each age .. . must write its own books . .. The books of an older period will
not fit this .. . The sluggish and perverted mind of the multitude, slow to open
to the incursions of Reason, having once so opened, having once received [a]
book, stands upon it, and makes an outcry, if ir is disparaged. Colleges are built
on it. Books are written on it by thinkers, not by Man Thinking; by men of
talent, that is, who start wrong, who set out from accepted dogmas, not from
their own sight of principles. Meek young men grow up in libraries, believing it
their duty to accept the views, which Cicero, which Locke, which Bacon, have
given, forgetful that Cicero, Locke, and Bacon were only young men in librar
ies, when they wrote these books. Hence, instead of Man Thinking, we have
the bookworm. Hence, the book-learned class, who value books as such; not
as related to nature and the human constitution, but as making a sort of Third
Estate with the world and the soul. .. Books are the best of things, well used;
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
465
abused, among the worst . . . They are for nothing but to inspire. I had better
never see a book, than to be warped by its attraction clean out of my own orbit
. ,, The one thing in the world, of value, is the active soul. This every man is
entitled to; this every man contains within him, .although in almost all men,
obstructed, and as yet unborn . . . it is .. . not the privilege of here and there a
favorite, but the sound estate of every man.l!!
This diatribe against canonized culture, this rejection of the authority of
professional intellectuals, pronounced by one of the most sensitiveand
professionalintellectuals of the age, was at the same time an apotheosis of
human intellect. This was Emersons The American Scholar, called our
intellectual declaration of independence. 130Its message was the motto of
Enlightenment, Sapere aude.
What were mere thinkers to do among people accustomed to seeing them
selves as Men Thinking? What could self-appointed high priests of intellect
aspire to in the priesthood of all believers? When professional intellectuals
began to form as a group in the 1830s (those 1830s when odd volumes of
Shakespeare could be found in pioneers huts), it was immediately perceived
that the society, the masses as well as the elites, were unresponsive to the
intellectuals demands for status and authority. Not that there were no op
portunities for intellectual activity (including the most esoteric intellectual
activity) in America, or that it was economically insupportable; there were,
probably, more such opportunities than elsewhere. But the society did not
particularly reward it; it did not bestow on intellectuals its high approbation
and gratitude, as it did on successful men of action; it did not admit of the
aristocracy of reason. It was neither indifferent to culture nor suspicious of
the life of the mind, but it refused to admit that those who lived such a life
had a claim on its unconditional respect, just because they chose to do so.
This lack of credit, the unwillingness to grant that the mere fact of being
an intellectual implied authority, put American intellectuals in an unenvia
ble position, both relative to their European counterparts and in absolute
terms. In Europeat least on the Continentbeing an intellectual did con
stitute a legitimate claim to deference. In the nineteenth century in France,
Germany, and Russia intellectuals were the acclaimed leaders of society;
they were objects of national cults, worshipped alongsideand more
thanmilitary leaders and kings. The worshippers were mostly intellec
tuals or quasi-intellectuals themselves (by no means could they be consid
ered representatives of the popular mood), but this did not detract much
from the sense of the exalted status that they enjoyed as a result of this adu
lation. Yet this relative deprivation was the lesser of the problems troubling
American intellectuals. In intellectual labor, status anxiety is an occupa
tional hazard, and they were exposed to it, objectively, to an unusually high
degree. Creative intellectual activity to a greater extent than most others
466
N A T I O N A L I S M
constitutes a reward in itself, and intellectual occupations are often chosen
because one feels irresistibly drawn to engage in them. At the same time,
creative intellectuals are singularly susceptible to agonizing attacks of inse
curity and self-doubt, and only social approbation can reassure them of the
reality of their talent and the worthiness of their pursuits. It is rarely that the
joy of thinking, writing, or working in the non-verbal arts sustains itself for
long in the face of persistent lack of recognition. Because of the extraordi
nary respect for the intellectual abilities of the human individual as such,
there was less sensitivity in America to extraordinary intellectual abilities,
and its creative intellectuals were doomed to higher levels of insecurity.
As so often happens, three options were available to them: loyalty, voice,
and exit. They could either accept their society as it was and adjust to what
ever approbation and respect they got; try to change their society and make
it love them more; or change their frame of reference altogether. The choice
of the first option was implicit in the constantly growing number of Ameri
can scholars and artists. The second was behind much of the rhetoric of
American cultural nationalism. The third led to expatriation or internal ex
ile. Those who chose the two latter options were a minority, but they were
highly noticeable, both because they articulated the arguments behind their
choice, while the first groupa majoritydid not, and because, in the in
ternational context, they were unique.
in the already quoted essay of 1823, William Ellery Charming asserted:
The true sovereigns of a country are those who determine its mind, its
mode of thinking, its tastes, its principles; and we cannot consent to lodge
this sovereignty in the hands of strangers. A country, like an individual, has
dignity and power only in proportion as it is self-formed. m The insistence
that it was essential for the nation to assert its cultural independence rested
on, among other things, the assumption (a presumption ridiculous in its ab
surdity in the American context) that intellectuals were its natural leaders.
Perhaps nobody professed this intellectual megalomania with more convic
tion and passion than the great poet and American patriot Walt Whitman.
National spirit, or Soul, manifested itself in native intellectuals (Whitman,
a poet, narrowed the definition of the intellectual to a Poet, or literatus,
but used literature as an inclusive term, sometimes subsuming under it
science). Therefore, by cultivating its intellectuals, America cultivated itself.
At the time of the first appearance of Leaves of Grass (1855) Whitman
seemed to be optimistic. He trusted the nation was of one mind with him
and did not seek to persuade, but only to reinforce in it the truths which
appeared to him self-evident. He asserted the superiority of the poet and
praised universal equality in the same breath, and his nation was to him a
spectacle of perfection. The Americans of all nations at any time upon the
earth have probably the fullest poetical nature, he wrote. The United
States themselves are essentially the greatest poem . . . Of all nations the
In Pursuit of the ideal Nation: America
467
United States with veins full of poetical stuff most needs poets and will
doubtless have the greatest and use them the greatest. Their Presidents shall
not be their common referee so much as their poets shall. Of all mankind
the great poet is the equable man. As- it was- not entirely clear what this
meant, he explained: He is the equalizer of his age and land .. . His brain
is theultimate brain. He is no arguer . . . he is judgment. . . As he sees the
farthest, he has the most faith . . . he is the seer . . . he is individual. . . he is
complete in himself . . . the others are as good as he, only he sees it and they
do not
The American poets found no problem with equality. The messages of
great poets to each man and woman are, Come to us on equal terms, Only
then can you understand us, We are no better than you . . . Did you suppose
there could be only one Supreme? We affirm there can be unnumbered Su-
premes . . . The American bards shall be marked for generosity and affection
and for encouraging competitors. They shali be kosmos . .. hungry for
equals night and day. The American poets were also champions of Liberty.
Liberty takes the adherence of heroes wherever men and women exist.. .
but never takes any adherence or welcome from the rest more than from
poets . . . to them it is confided and they must sustain it.
The poets were a superior breed, a new order of men, the interpreters
of men and women and of ail events and things. They were to arise in
America, and America was ready to receive them. America prepares with
composure and goodwill for the visitors that have sent word . .. Only to
ward as good as itself and toward the like of itself will it advance half-way
. . . The soul of the largest and wealthiest and proudest nation may well go
haif-way to meet that of its poets . . . There is no fear of mistake. If the one
is true, the other is true. The proof of a poet is that his country absorbs him
as affectionately as he has absorbed it 131
He soon learned, however, that America was insensitive to its great poets.
In a letter to Emerson a year later, Whitman reproached his country for
using ready-made English literature and failing to assert its cultural inde
pendence. America, grandest of lands in the theory of its politics, in popu
lar reading [nota bene], in hospitality, breadth, animal beauty, cities, ships,
machines, money, credit, collapses quick as lightning at the repeated, ad
monishing, stem words,. Where are any mental expressions from you, be
yond what you have copied and stolen? Where are the born throngs of
poets, literats, orators, you promised? . . . You are young, have the perfec-
test of dialects, a free press, a free government, the world forwarding its best
to be with you . . . do strict justice to yourself. Strangle the singers who will
not sing you loud and strong. . . Call for new great masters to comprehend
new arts, new perfections, new wants. Submit to the most robust bard till he
remedy your barrenness.133
But America did not go half-way to meet her poets; she did not recognize
468
N A T I O N A L I S M
in them her masters; she hardly noticed them. Whitman lost his confidence
in the intellectual promise of America. Or rather, he doubted that Ameri'ca
held a promise for intellectuals, for he acknowledged the plentiful intellec-
mal smartness of the people. His commitment to equality became quali
fied. He realized that what he loved in America (and he dearly loved Amer
ica) was its potential and not its actuality. There was no intuitive
understanding. He felt he had to argue his case, to persuade. He did so in
Democratic Vistas, a long prose essay, written at the end of the 1860s. In
it the poet maintained that the greatness of America depended on the exis
tence of great poets, that without them it was lost, worse than lostworth
less. I would alarm and caution even the political and business reader,
Whitman wrote,
against the prevailing delusion that the establishment of free political institu
tions, and plentiful intellectual smartness, with general good order, physical
plenty, industry, &c. . . . do, of themselves, determine and yield to our experi
ment of democracy the fruitage of success. With such advantages at present
fully, or amost fully possessd ... society, in these States, is cankerd, crude,
superstitious, and rotten . . . never was there, perhaps, more hollowness at
heart than ar present, and here in the United States . . . The depravity of the
business classes of our country is not less than has been supposed, but infinitely
greater . . . In business . . . the one sole object is .. . pecuniary gain1... I say
that our New World democracy, however great a success in uplifting the masses
out of their sloughs, in materialistic development, products, and in a certain
highly-deceptive superficial popular intellectuality, is, so far, an almost com
plete failure in its social aspects, and in really grand religious, moral, literary,
and esthetic results.
His faith in America was shaken, but his belief in the superhuman powers
of the poet remained firm. Nothing equaled literature in importance. Our
fundamental want to-day in the United States . . . is of a class . . . of native
authors, literatuses, far different, far higher in grade than any yet known,
sacerdotal, modern, fit to cope with our occasions, lands, permeating the
whole mass of American mentality, taste, belief, breathing into it a new
breath of life, giving it decision, affecting politics far more than the popular
superficial suffrage . .. accomplishing [that] without which this nation will
no more stand, permanently, soundly, than a house will stand without a
substratum . . . never was anything more wanted than, to-day . . . the great
literatus of the modern. At all times, perhaps, the central point in any nation
. . . is its national literature, especially its archetypal poems. Above all pre
vious lands, a great original literature is surely to become the justification
and reliance . . . of American democracy. He went further: Should some
two or three really original American poets, (perhaps artists or lecturers,)
arise . . . together they would give more compaction and more moral iden
tity . . . to these States, than all its Constitutions^legislative and judicial ties,
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 469
and all its hitherto political, warlike, or materialistic experiences. His con
clusion derived from this logically: I demand races of orbic bards, with
unconditional uncompromising sway. Come forth, sweet democratic des
pots of the west! 13J
This was, of course, poetic license, but the recurrent terms Whitman used
to refer to intellectualsdespots, masters, Supremesare revealing.
Intellectuals (and poets least of all) were nobodys masters in America; they
were people with strange hobbies, addicted to exclamation points to which
the public at large was averse. This was a wishful vocabulary. It was hard to
be an American intellectual and an admirer of America at the same time. For
this reason so many American intellectuals were not admirers of America.
Only few of them were as outspoken as the other great literary talent of
the mid-nineteenth century, Edgar Allan Poe, who went straight to the root
of the intellectual alienation and rejected the fundamental value of Ameri
can society. The founders of the Republic, he wrote scornfully, started
with a queerest idea conceivable, viz., that all men are born free and equal
this in the very teeth of the laws of gradation as visibly impressed upon all
things both in the moral and the physical universe. All that this achieved
was to replace acceptable tyrannies of natural superiors by the most odious
and insupportable despotism that ever was heard on the face of the
Earththat of the mob.136There is a tendency to explain rhe discontent of
American intellectuals by the persistent failures of American society to stand
up to its ideals, by the fact that the latter, like all ideals, so easily degenerate
into cant, and that a correction of one inconsistency only makes the others
more glaring. While this is true in numerous cases, there is no doubt that
many intellectuals among those particularly mortified by the unexceptional
position of cultural occupations in American society were bothered not by
the inconsistencies between ideals and reality, but by the ideals themselves.
What jarred their sensitivities was the unceremonious handling of culture by
Americans, as if, indeed, it was everyones domain! Henry James resented
immigrants because they so soon claimed English as their tongue: All the
while we sleep the vast contingent of aliens whom we make welcome, and
whose main contention . . . is that, from the moment of their arrival, they
have just as much property in our speech as we have, and just as good a
right to do what they choose with itthe grand right of Americans being to
do just what he chooses over here with anything and everything: all the
while we sleep the innumerable aliens are sitting up (they dont sleep!) to
work their wiil on their new inheritance and prove to us that they are with
out any finer feeling or more conservative instinct of consideration for i t. . .
than they may have on the subject of so many yards of freely figured oilcloth
.. . that they are preparing to lay down, for convenience, on kitchen floor or
kitchen staircase. u? This still bothered him in 1905, when after twenty
years of absence and forty years of living in Europe (most of them in Eng
470 N A T I O N A L I S M
land of which in 1915 he became a naturalized citizen) he came to the
United States as a visitor.
Emigration is a measure of the degree of dissatisfaction with ones coun
try; emigration from America, the land of immigrants, was exceptionally
rare. Even those whose experiences in this land of their birth were far from
idyllic, even blacks, whether former slaves or freeborn, who could remem
ber little but indignity and degradation at the hands of white fellow-
Americans, did not wish to emigrate, but preferred to wait or to fight for
their rights in America, for bad as it was, the result of their inner calculus
must have been, it was worth staying. Yet intellectual expatriation (specifi
cally, that of writers and artists, though not of scientists) was more charac
teristic of America than of many countries which supplied America with
immigrants. If a French or, more commonly, a German or a Russian writer
was frequently an exile, a fugitive from persecution at home, an American
intellectual left his home of his own accord, for he found it distasteful, A
French, a German, or a Russian writer might not object to being translated,
but wherever he lived, his primary audience remained that of his native
country; and though he knew that the great majority of his people would
never read his works, because they were illiterate or entirely devoid of inter
est in intellectual matters, he wrote, undaunted by such a state of affairs, for
his country. Conversely, an American intellectual, dismayed at the condition
of true intellect in his all-too-literate native land, would not uncommonly
be concerned more about the general interests of the Republic of Letters
than his country, as was Poe, and, with Poe, insist upon regarding the
world at large as the sole proper audience for the author.138Only to a cer
tain extent could this cosmopolitan bent be explained by the fact that Amer
ican writers wrote in English; American artists expatriated much more often
than did German or Russian ones (France, being a center of artistic expatria
tion, had almost no experience of it itself); the expatriation of American
scientists, on the other hand, was, in the nineteenth century, at least as infre
quent as that of scientists of any other nation.
The point of the above is not that the American public has been consist
ently characterized by a superior sensitivity to culture. 'What I am saying is
that the dissatisfaction of intellectuals in America with their society cannot
be explained by American indifference to culture (and has to be accounted
for by the specificity of the structural position of the intellectuals), simply
because in countries characterized by a comparable if not greater indiffer
ence to culture, intellectuals, placed in a different structural situation, do not
as a rule complain of anti-intellectualism.
In our century, the development of the complex network of modern uni
versities, that great archipelago of ivory tower islands, has afforded disaf
fected intellectuals the comforts of internal exile. Although this development
lies beyond the scope of the book, it might be worthwhile to draw attention
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 471
to its effects on the intellectual profile of the American nation considered as
a whole. Aided by the institutional growth, the charge of antx-mtellectualism
tended to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The universities completed a se
ries of successive bifuractions in American culture, which separated the cul
ture acceptable to the intellectuals from that of other groups.
The first split in the series, as is often noted,139was a result of the Great
Awakening and then the persistence of a strong evangelical sentiment in the
mainstream American religion. Like Pietism in Germany, Quietism in
France, and popular expressions of Russian Orthodoxy, American evange
lism was mystical, emotional, and anti-intellectual in the literal sense of
being irrational and anti-rational. Back country was its center; it was pre
dominantly a rural phenomenon, and the urban society, especially that of
Boston, opposed to it rational, practical, and unemotional TJnitarianism,
which became the intellectual orthodoxy and so irritated Henry Adams.
Transcendentalism was an intellectual reaction to this cold orthodoxy, from
which it differed primarily by the emotional fervor and intensity of its belief
in reason and the individual as a rational being. In Germany and Russia the
haloed Romantic movement intellectualized, exulted, and sanctified the ir
rationality of their respective Volker, thereby making anri-intellectualism an
indelible part of the national high culture and inscribing it in the national
identity itself. In distinction, the educated classes in the United States never
gave their support to grass-roots mysticism and remained firm in their de
votion to reason.
Another split was a result of the shared aspiration of the upper classes to
dissociate themselves from the lower, all the more intense in a democratic
society because the separation was not automatic. In their pursuit of status,
the upper classes used and presented culture as a status-symboi, thereby pre
siding over its division into high-brow and low-brow, and creating what
Richard Hofstadter calls a mugwump culture.140The appropriation of
certain forms of art and literature by the members of the upper classes will
ing to go to considerable lengths to prove that they were not equal to the
rest of society made the rest of society unwilling to associate with the forms
of culture thus appropriated. The masses were anti-mugwump, which made
them anti-intellectual. But mugwumps were not necessarily intellectuals,
and for status-sensitive intellectuals the high-culture club they created was
not exclusive enough. Toward the end of the century such sensitive intellec
tuals and high culture parted company. From the. point of view of the for
mer, the latter was almost as contemptible as the mass (lack of) culture.
They dubbed it cultural Establishment and transferred their loyalties to
the cultural forms that were anti-establishment.
This process, as we know from Simmel, could go on forever. But the uni
versities provided an organizational framework which sheltered the intellec
tuals from the madding crowds and put a stop to their fraternizing advances.
472 N A T I O N A L I S M
Universities created a protective environment in which intellectuals driven
by cultural interests could earn their living while pursuing them, and statuS-
sensitive intellectuals could legitimately seek and display status, which was
tightly connected to intellectual achievement. Universities thus formed an
alternative society, an aristocracy of merit within a democracy, which did
not recognize equality in humanat least intellectualworth, and re
warded natural superiority with status. The formation of this alternative
society resulted in the creation of a cultural vacuum in the society at large.
While professional intellectuals satisfied their curiosity or aesthetic sensibil
ities, while they sought answers to the urgent questions that perplexed them,
or busied themselves with trivial pursuits (of fame and place in the republic
of letters), this vacuum was filled by what came to be known as mass cul
ture. Its enterprising creators sought to entertain rather than educate and
in most cases, though not all, cared little for the life of the mind. They pro
vided the American public with a digestible, but probably not very nutri
tious, cultural diet, and made the society used to it. The taste that they cre
ated confirmed the traditional intellectual verdict of the anti-intellectualism
of American society, which, in this century, may have more truth to it than
in the previous one. However, if the society is indeed anti-intellectual, this
might at least in part be the fault and responsibility of American intellec
tuals. Universities deprived society of the beneficial leadership of its best
minds. They isolated intellectuals from society and society from intellec
tuals. At the same time, it is possible that they greatly contributed to the
stability of the American society. In other countries discussed in this book,
frustrated intellectuals proved to be a dangerous group. In America, univer
sities mitigated the frustration of intellectuals, perhaps saving the nation
from its potentially destructive effects.
The Trial and Completion of American Nationality
Thus status-sensitive intellectuals decried American anti-intellectualism,
their spirit oppressed by the irresistible egalitarianism imposed by American
ideals, and other groups nursed grievances generated by the imperfect real
ization of these ideals and suffered from the oppression of inequality, which
in America was insufferable. In the meantime, the stability of the American
nation was threatened by the inherent and, in the framework of American
nationalism, legitimate secessionist impulse which was confounded with the
view, never seriously challenged, that the right of self-government was
vested in the individual states. In the Fourth of July oration in 1858, Rufus
Choate, anxious to preserve the Union, pointed to the potential for disrup
tion inherent in the original conception of the American nation. I t is, he
said, the great peculiarity of our system . . . that the affections which we
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 473
give to country we give to a divided object, the states in which we live and
the Union by which we are enfolded. We serve two masters. Our hearts earn
two loves. We live in two countries at once and are commanded to be capa
cious of both . . . Have you ever considered that it was a federative system
we had to adopt, and that in such a system a conflict of head and members
is in 'some form and to some extent a result of course?141Because of the
persistence and legitimacy of the dual loyalty, the possibility of secession as
a response to dissatisfaction with the nation was always present. Yet only a
most serious grievance could justify it. Since the end of the 1840s the South
ern states became increasingly persuaded that their grievance was serious
enough. Their attempted secession led to the Civil War. In this conflict, the
interest of the Northern or Union states was to preserve the Union. This
powerful interest (powerful because it was buttressed by the government,
the army, and the popular sentiment) connected to the issue of slavery,
whose inconsistency with the national ideals was articulated. The Northern
cause became identified with the cause of emancipation, and with its
triumph the most jarring inconsistency of the American life was eliminated.
Matters of interest and of principle, and different principles, intertwined
and fused in the Civil War and the interpretations of events which led to it
at least as much as in any similar social cataclysm. The issue for the North
ern states, clearly, was one of the territorial and political extent of the Amer
ican nation, rather than its ideals. That Union must be preserved was a
shibboleth of [the Northern] faith. Lincoln considered the conflict a war
to preserve the Union. Answering Horace Greeley, who was sorely disap
pointed and deeply pained by the Presidents policy with regard to the
slaves of the Rebels, he wrote: I would save the Union. I would save it the
shortest way under the Constitution . . . My paramount object in this
struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I
could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it, and if I could
save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do i t . .. What I do about slavery
and the colored race I do because I believe it helps to save this Union; and
what I forbear I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the
Union. 142
For many years before 1860 the existence of the nation was a value in
itself. It was a value everywhere, but where, as in the North, it did not ap
pear to interfere with the ability of the relevant population to enjoy life, it
was a value which eclipsed all other values. In 1850, when the threats of
Southern secession became common, the old Daniel Webster anxiously
asked: Why, what would be the result? Where is the line to be drawn?
What states are to secede? What is to remain American? What am I to be?
An American no longer? It was his, and the others, very identity that was
at stake. Everything was secondary to that. Rather than think of secession,
Webster pleaded, let us enjoy the fresh air of liberty and union. After alt,
474 N A T I O N A L I S M
America offered so little cause for dissatisfaction. No monarchical throne
presses these states together; no iron chain of despotic power encircles them;
they live and stand upon a government popular in its form, representative in
its character, founded upon principles of equality, and calculated, we hope,
to last forever. In all its history, it has been beneficent; it has trodden down
no mans liberty; it has crushed no state. Its daily respiration is liberty and
patriotism; its yet youthful veins are full of enterprise, courage, and honor
able love of glory and renown. In the name of this felicity, Webster called
upon the free states to honor the fugitive slave law (their constitutional
duties in regard to the return of the persons bound to service, he put it
gently, who have escaped into the free states), and still perceived no con
tradiction between what he preached and what he advised to practice and
condoned. Love makes men blind. No friend of slavery himself, he was
never forgiven by its enemies for advocating the appeasement of slavehold
ers. But the great majority of Northerners would tolerate slavery if this was
the price of keeping the nation intact. Even a principled opposition to slav
ery, as in Lincolns case, did not necessarily imply endorsement of immediate
{or for that matter gradual) emancipation. And most Northerners did not
regard slavery in the South as problematic, simply because it was not their
central concern.149
But if the North would take the Union with slavery, the South would not
take it without. If the position of the North was: Union at any price, under
the Constitution, of course (which, however, provided few guidelines in
regard to slavery), that o the South was: either slavery or disunion. The
grievances of the South were many. Having lost their leadership in national
politics, the Southern states felt increasingly deprived of influence, at the
same time as they were treacherously excluded from their share in the com
mon prosperity by the industrial and rapacious North. These sentiments
became particularly widespread and grew more acute after the Mexican
War, when the acquisition of new territories and the impending admission
of California as a free state revived the question of the extension of slavery,
heretofore believed to have been settled by the Missouri Compromise of
1820. In the debate over compromise resolutions proposed by Henry Clay,
the grand old man of the South Senator John Calhoun stated the reasons
for Southern disaffection. The great and primary cause of it, he said, was to
be found in the fact that the equilibrium between the two sections in the
government [the North and the South], as it stood when the Constitution
was ratified and the government put into action, has been destroyed . . . as
it now stands, one section has the exclusive power of controlling the govern
ment, which leaves the other without any adequate means of protecting it
self against its encroachment and oppression. This state of affairs was
achieved with the help of inequitable legislation on the part of the North,
starting with the Northwest Ordinance and ending with the Missouri Com
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 475
promise. By these several acts, the South was excluded from 1,238,025
square miles . . . I have not included the territory recently acquired by the
treaty with Mexico. The North is making the most strenuous efforts to ap
propriate the whole to herself by excluding the South from every foot of it
. . . To sum up the whole, the United States, since they declared their inde
pendence, have acquired 2,373,046 square miles of territory, from which the
North will have excluded the South if she should succeed in monopolizing
the newly acquired territories, from about three-fourths of the whole, leav
ing to the South but about one-fourth.
It should be noted that no individual was excluded by any of the ordi
nances from settling in the West, and that there was no attempt on the part
of any of the Northern states to transplant there as a community. What Cal
houn meant by the exclusion of the South was that, in distinction from in
dividuals from the North who could move to the West with all their prop
erty and enjoy it there, there was a category of property peculiar to the
South which could not be enjoyed in some of the new territoriesthe slaves.
In Calhouns opinion, the limitations on the extension of slavery represented
an aggression of rhe North against the rights of the South, as a result of
which what was once a constitutional federal republic [was] converted, in
reality, into one as absolute as that of the Autocrat of Russia, and as despotic
in its tendency as any absolute government that ever existed.
The South thus tied all its grievances to the Northern dislike for its pe
culiar institution. Its interests were identified with slavery, at the same time
as they came to be seen as rights, and an attack on slavery thereby became
an attack on its rights. In this process the Northern opposition to slavery
was generalized in two ways: it was conceived of as hostility toward the
South as suchtoward all its interests and toward its way of lifeand as
an attitude characteristic of the North as a whole. Calhoun was convinced
that every portion of the North entertains views and feelings more or less
hostile to what he delicately referred to as the relation between the two
races in the Southern section. Those most opposed and hostile regard it as
a sin, he wrote, and consider themselves under the most sacred obligation
to use every effort to destroy it. Indeed to the extent that they conceive they
have power, they regard themselves as implicated in the sin and responsible
for suppressing it by the use of all and every means. Those less opposed and
hostile regard it as a crimean offense against humanity, as they call it
and, although not so fanatical, feel themselves bound to use all efforts to
effect the same object; while those who are least opposed and hostile regard
it as a blot and a stain on the character of what they call the nation, and feel
themselves accordingly bound to give it no countenance or support.144Al
though this would make perfect sense, it was patently untrue that all, or the
majority, or even the leadership of the North subscribed to such views. But
Southerners did not conduct surveys; they believed that it was natural and
476 N A T I O N A L I S M
inevitable that Northerners would think so (for in the depths of their souls
they knew that owning property in persons was incompatible with being
Americans, and that it was therefore fundamentally wrong, immoral, and
shameful), and what they thought to be a matter of fact was in fact a projec
tion of their fears and shame.
It was possible to believe that all men are created equal, and yet be
oblivious of slavery elsewhere or even concede that because of the practical
difficulties involved in its abolition, it should be temporarily tolerated. But
one couid not champion slavery and uphold the ideal of equality in liberty
at the same time. This was not simply inconsistent, this was schizophrenic.
Having identified their vita! interests with slavery, Southerners were driven
to champion it. They, said Lincoln, exchanged die old faith, in which slavery
was tolerated only by necessity, for the new one, that for some men to
enslave others is a sacred right of self-government.145Unable to reconcile
this faith with the values that constituted the core of American nationality,
they set out to reinterpret and adjust them to their situation. Although the
words they used remained the same, their meanings were transformed. They
were creating a new pool of values. The ideals which they saw the South
representing, and which formed their identity, were no longer American.
When they seceded, they were on the way to being a different nation.
It would be wrong to see the secession as in any way a result of Southern
nationalism (namely the development of a specifically Southern identity, loy
alty, and consciousness). Southern nationalism and secession were both re
sponses to the unbearable inconsistency between American national ideals
and slavery. In the framework of individualistic nationalism, secession was
possible without the preceding development of a separate identity, as was so
clearly demonstrated by the American Revolution itself. But the fact that
North and South appeared as separate and antagonistic nations might have
made the transition even less traumatic than it would have been otherwise.
The nascent Southern ideology bears unmistakable resemblance to the Ro
mantic ethnic nationalisms such as the German and Russian ones.146Since
this baby was, literally, murdered in its infancy, its features never got the
chance to develop, but there is no doubt that they would have been strongly
racist, collectivistic, and authoritarian, that it would have been traditional
ist, anti-capitalist, less calculating, and, therefore, less rational, and would
have valued honor above wealth. In fact, the resemblance went so far that
the infant, barely beginning to prattle, had already manifested a taste for
abstract theory and metaphysics in politics. Astute Northerners, actually,
called Southern political thinkers metaphysical politicians.547To present
slavery as a social ideal one indeed needed a very sophisticated argument.
Presenting slavery as a social ideal did not at all imply that Southern ide
ologists turned enemies of liberty. On the contrary, with the exception of
slavery, nothing was so dear to their heart: liberty and slavery, one may say,
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
477
were their twin passions. In the Civil War they fought for liberty, trusting
that victory would be theirs, for while our enemies rely on their numbers,
we rely upon the valor of free men. They gloried in their freedom from
public opinion; it was beneath the honor of "a gentleman to bow to it.S4S
Their chief concern in secession was to preserve their sacred right of self-
government. While they were not the first to claim that slavery was requisite
for the preservation of liberty, they claimed, in addition, that progress itself
necessitated it. To secure true progress {which required chaining down
mediocrity, as well as unfettering genius), George Fitzhugh, the spirited self-
appointed sociologist, demanded: Liberty for the fewSlavery, in every
form, for the mass!149
Fitzhugh was a particularly able and articulate apologist of slavery. In his
defense of it, he placed his faith in sociology rather than in history, political
theory, or what not, and his variety of sociology was Marxist. Although
it is highly unlikely that Fitzhugh was influenced by Marx, since his major
works had appeared in 1854 and 1857, while Capital was published only in
1867, he was remarkably close to the master in reasoning and in tone,
andwhat is most surprisingin terminology. If Fitzhugh did not neces
sarily share Marxs sympathies, he did, unquestionably, sympathize with the
latters antipathies. His main argument in defense of slavery was that, what
ever one could say of it, the free, capitalist society, based on division of labor
and competition, was infinitely worse. Its boasted liberty was mockery; it
was inconceivable how slavery could degrade men lower than they were de
graded by freedom. Given the depths of misery into which the free society
had reduced its lower classes, Fitzhugh approved of their socialist leanings.
He differed from Marx in that he believed that the promise of socialism was
realized in slavery. In Sociology for the South, or the Failure of the Free
Society, he wrote:
The poor themselves are all practical Socialists and in some degree pio-slavery
men. They unite in strikes and trade unions and thus exchange a part of their
liberties in order to secure high and uniform wages . .. Slavery to an association
is not always better than slavery to a single master. The professed object is to
avoid ruinous underbidding and competition with one another, but this com
petition can never cease while liberty lasts. Those who wish to be free must take
liberty with this inseparable burden ... A well-conducted farm in the South is
a model of associated labor that Fourier might envy . ., Slavery protects the
infants, the aged, and the sick ... They are part of the family, and self-interest
and affection combine to shelter, shield, and foster them... Socialism proposes
to do away with free competition; to afford protection and support at all times
to the laboring class; to bring about, at least, a qualified community of property
and to associate labor. All these purposes slavery fully and perfectly attains.156
Thus slave society was the best f orm of society yet devised f or the masses.
Fitzhugh articulated his arguments in his other book, with the catchy title
478 N A T I O N A L I S M
Cannibals All! or, Slaves Without Masters. The indictment of the free capi
talist society in it rested on the theory of surplus value, which our prescient
sociologist elaborated in a language whose similarity to that of Marx in the
yet unwritten Capital cannot fail to amaze the reader. North and South,
claimed Fitzhugh, were engaged in the white slave trade, which was far more
cruel than black slavery, because It exacted more from the slaves, and yet left
them unprotected. In an eloquent passage Fitzhugh disclosed to his North
ern reader the full significance of his actions: What you have considered
and practiced as a virtue is little better than cannibalism . . . Capital com
mands labor as master does the slave. Neither pays for labor; but the master
permits the slave to retain a larger allowance from the proceeds of his own
labor, and hence free labor is cheaper than slave labor. You, with the com
mand over labor which your capital gives you, are a slave owner; a master
without the obligations of a master. They who work for you, who create
your income, are slaves without the rights of slaves. Slaves without a master!
. . . under the delusive name of liberty, you work [the laborer] from morn
to dewy eve, from infancy to old age; then turn him out to starve. You treat
your horses and hounds better. Capital is a cruel master. The free slave
trade, the commonest yet the crudest of trades.
Clearly, Fitzhugh saw little value in liberty for the masses. He treated it as
simply irrelevant to the comparison that he was drawing. As to equality, he
rejected it altogether. Men are not bom entitled to equal rights! he in
sisted; the famous passage in the Declaration of Independence had no truth
or meaning out of its specific context. Slavery was based on natural inequal
ity and was thus itself natural. It is, we believe, conceded on all hands,
argued Fitzhugh (holding the following truths to be self-evident),
that men are not bom physically, morally, or intellectually equal; some are
males, some females, some frombirth, large, strong, and healthy, others weak,
small, and sickly; some are naturaliy amiable, others prone to all kinds of
wickedness; some brave, others timid. Their natural inequalities beget inequal
ities of rights. The weak in mind or body require guidance, support, and protec
tion; they must obey and work for chosewho protect and guidethem; they have
a natural right to guardians, committees, teachers, or masters. Nature has made
themslaves; all that law and government can do is modify, and mitigate their
slavery. In the absence of legally instituted slavery, their condition would be
worse under the natural slavery of the weak to the strong, the foolish to the
wise and cunning. The wise and virtuous, the brave, the strong in mind and
body, are by nature bom to command and protect, and law but follows nature
in making themrulers, legislators, judges, captains, husbands, guardians, com
mittees, and masters.11
This argument was not obviously absurd, but its usefulness for the cause
Fitzhugh was defending depended on the assumption that the inherent in
equality of men derived from the inherent inequality of uniform groups to
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 479
which they belonged, that it was, in other words, the inequality of collectiv
ities, not of individuals. In the framework of American nationalism, the core
element of which was individualism, it was untenable. Lincoln demon
strated how easily it could be turned around if"the emphasis was transferred
back to the individual. In his notebooks appear the following syllogisms:
Yoii say A is white, and B is black. It is color, then; the lighter having the
right to enslave the darker? Take care. By this rule, you are to be slave to the
first man you meet with a fairer skin than your own. You do not mean color
exactly? You mean the whites are intellectually the superiors of blacks, and
therefore have the right to enslave them? Take care again. By this rule, you
are to be slave to the first man you meet with an intellect superior to your
own. 152
But in the emergent Southern consciousness the group and rights of the
group as such were consistently substituted for the individual and the rights
of the individual. This was the fundamental alteration wrought in the Amer
ican ideology, which underpinned other alterations. Racism was only a va
riety of collectivism, and authoritarianism was made possible only by it.
Unity was no longer a plurality; the many in one were no longer associated
but fused. Indeed, among the very few changes introduced by the Confeder
acy in the Constitution of the United States was the removal of the motto E
Piuribus Unum, in the place of which was put Deo Vindice. The South and
the North, which were but names of geographical sectors, the borders be
tween which were established by convention and could be recharted, in rhe
Southern consciousness became reified concepts, collective bodies possessed
of antagonistic souls and pitted against each other as might be two warring
persons. At least to the same degree to which specific states remained the
focus of American loyalties after independence, the state, rather than the
Confederacy, remained the focus of Southern loyalties. Had the Confeder
acy survived, the secession might have brought into the world several South
ern nations, rather than one. But if the South was even less of a union than
the United States, each Confederate state was a unitary state. It was this
fundamental transformation in the definition of the relationship between the
individual and the collectivity which allowed the reinterpretation of the
principle of self-government, that is, liberty in its original American sense,
which made it compatible with slavery. Self-government was the watch
word of the South. Within the Union, Southerners clamored for the recog
nition of their inalienable right to it; because they feit that it was trampled
upon, they seceded; and in secession they remained faithful to it, firmly be
lieving that they were the true bearers of the supreme American ideal In
fact, they betrayed it and upheld its negation. They call themselves Demo
crats, wrote Frederick Law Olmsted of the Southerners in 1854, Call
them what you will , . . they are not the legitimate offspring of democracy,
thanks to God, but of slavery under a democracy. 153Self-government could
480 N A T I O N A L I S M
not be made into a communal right. It was rhe inalienable right of individu
als, and only in this sense was it meaningful; the right of communities to'
self-government was but the composite liberty of its members. A coliectivis
tic interpretation of this value was a distortion of its originalof its Ameri
canmeaning. To demand the extension of slavery as a recognition of the
Souths right of self-government, thought Lincoln, was preposterous.
When the white man governs himself, he said, that is self-government;
but when he governs himself and also governs another man, that is more
than self-governmentthat is despotism. 154
The attempt of the South to found a new nation, which would be one very
different from the American nation, was thwarted. At the price of thousands
of lives, the Union (the association of thousands of individuals) was pre
served. In 1865, the soul of the American nation, which had been before but
a resident tenant in its vast territorial body, became its owner: the national
identity finally achieved a geo-political embodiment. A nation of self-made
men, America was a self-made nation. As a material reality, a country on a
map, it, more than any other, was a creation of people who believed them
selves Americans, and a product of their national identity and loyalty.
For many Americans, the Civil War marked the line between the dream of
nationality and its realization, which was comparable to the significance of
the Revolution and the Constitution for other generations. For many, it only
then became, in the words of James Russell Lowell, something more than
a promise and an expectation. Their loyalty was justified and many times
reinforced. Before the War our patriotism was a firework, a salute, a sere
nade for holidays and summer evenings, wrote Emerson. Now . . . it is
real. I f among us in the earlier day there was no occasion for the word
Nation, there is now. A Nation is born, asserted Charles Sumner in an 1867
address entitled Are we a Nation? 155
The establishment of the geo-political referent of national loyalty com
pleted the long process which brought into being the American nation as it
exists today. Between then and now; to be sure, it has changed tremendously,
for American ideals, or rather the inescapable inconsistency between them
and reality and the tensions they bred, implied permanent revolution, but it
has changed within the structure which emerged at the end of the Civil War
and along the lines provided in it. At that crucial moment the rules of the
game in American politics were redrawn and political action redirected.
Since then the American revolution has been going on in a new framework.
The Civil War was fought because the Union was believed to be indivis
ible. Its preservation in the bloodiest struggle in the Western world before
the era of world wars confirmed this belief, as it increased the value of and
strengthened the commitment to national unity, A speaker addressing Yale
alumni in 1865 stressed: In this blood of our slain our unity is cemented
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America 481
and sanctified . . . We had nor bled enough [before] to merge our colonial
distinctions, and let out the state-rights doctrine, and make us a proper na
tion Lowell exulted: What costly scuff whereof to make a nation! The
Southern secession discredited the idea of states rights; dual allegiance, to
the state and to the nation, became inadmissible; the states were denied the
right to compete for loyalty with the nation. State rights, in all their dena
tionalizing pretensions, declared Sumner, must be trampled out forever.
The government, he thought, should be national, not federal.156As a result,
ironically, the triumph of American national ideals, the individualist prin
ciples associated with the Union, paved the way for the development of a
unitary notion of the American nation which was not entirely consistent
with them.
Hegelian ideas and ideas of political Romanticism which had been the
standard fare of German thought for three-quarters of a century were dis
covered and enjoyed brief popularity. There appeared a tendency to reify the
nation and see it as a living organism or a collectiveand higherindivid
uality. It was indivisible and sovereign in its own right, it existed above and
beyond men, and its members owed it natural allegiance. This organic
theory of the nation, novel in America, was opposed to the traditional con
stitutional view, according to which a nation was a social compact, a volun
tary association of free individuals, which derived its sovereignty from
theirs. American Hegelians who thus apostrophized the nation, however,
were patriots devoted to the ideals of their nation, and the organic theory
was given a peculiar twist in their hands. Unruly, individualistic Americans
would not dissolve in the higher individuality. In the best Romantic tradi
tion, the nation represented an Idea, but the Idea of the American na
tion was individual freedom. A prominent representative of this trend of
thought, the German immigrant Francis Lieber, for example, asserted: We
belong to that race, whose obvious task it is . . . to rear and spread civil
liberty over vast regions . , , We belong to that tribe which alone has the
word Self-Government. Furthermore, in the German tradition nationality
was interpreted in ethnic and ultimately racial terms. The unique national
Idea reflected the ethnic and racial uniqueness of the nation. To a certain
extent this interpretation was carried over into the American version of the
organic theory and expressed itself in the emphasis on the Anglo-Saxon
foundations of the American nation. Yet American Hegelians were emphat
ically universalistic. A nation, proclaimed the Hegelian Elisha Mulford, if it
asserts as its ground the rise of a race and not the rise of man, has no
longer a moral foundation, nor a universal end.157
The organic theory of the nation in America was not a coherent system of
thought and it never had wide appeal. At the same time, its central proposi
tion, though stripped of its Hegelian garb and brought down to earth, was
shared by many, eventually becoming yet another self-evident truth. This
482 N A T I O N A L I S M
proposition, that the United States were one nation, and chat this nation was
a unity, with no longer many, but one head, one tremendous body, and one
soul, reflected the new reality. In 1874 Patrick Henry would indeed have
reason to claim that the distinctions between Virginians, Pennsylvanians,
New Yorkers, and New Englanders, are no more, and that all were now,
first and foremost, and unquestionably, Americans. (The regional differ
ences that remained were secondary, and to regard them as fundamental was
no longer legitimate.) Centralization of authority in the federal government
aroused less suspicion and in many cases was welcomed or even demanded.
Yet, although America was now seen as a unitary polity, rather than as a
federation of states, it differed significantly from unitary Continental na
tions in Europe, for it still was an association of individuals, and therefore a
composite body, rather than a higher individuality. Underneath the nation
in the singular, the original nation in the plural remained. In contrast to the
European nations, where the primacy of the nation over the individual im
posed general uniformity, the unchallenged primacy of the individual al
lowedeven guaranteedplurality of tastes, views, attachments, aspira
tions, and self-definitions, within the shared national framework. Pluralism
was built into the system. The united American nation did not become, in
the phrase of Michael Walzer, a jealous nation. 158It tolerated multiple
allegiances. Individual states no longer could serve as a major focus for loy
alty, but circumstances and the climate of opinion soon combined to create
a substitute for them. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the organic theory
of the nation itself contributed to its formation. For the entity which took
the place of a state in the heart of an American citizen, and which from then
on, above any other factor, defined the identity of different groups of Amer
icans and distinguished between them, was ancestral nationality, or, as it
came to be defined, ethnicity.155Dual identity thus remained typical, but
Virginians, Pennsylvanians, and New Yorkers were replaced by hyphenated
Americans. In the beginning of the twentieth century it was reasonable to
assert that the United States was less a Union of states than of nations.160
America has been a nation of immigrants from the beginning, and from
early on these immigrants have been coming from different countries. Yet
the dual national, or ethnic, identity of Americans is of a more recent
origin. It dates only from the end of the last century.161As was already em
phasized above, originally and primarily, Americans, with the exception of
English Americans, were not recruited from nations.162They were recruited
from various populations which, having some identity {in the case of the
lower-class immigrants, as a rule, not well articulated), had not as yet devel
oped a national identity. Only toward the end of the nineteenth century was
the average immigrant likely to be a member of a nation before he arrived in
America. The fact that more often than not the nation of which such inimi-
In Pursuit of the Ideal Nation: America
483
grant was a member was an ethnic, rather than a civic, nation adds poi
gnancy to the compound ethnic American.
This momentous transformation in the populations from which Ameri
cans are recruited inevitably affects the ability of the immigrants to integrate
and the character of the American nationality in which they partake. The
psychological gratification which national identity affords to the humblest
of nationals makes one hold on to it. The integration, therefore, becomes
more difficult, because it requires at least some degree of conscious renunci
ation. Immigrants with national identity became the rule when immigration
acquired its truly mass character. It is probable that of 1,100,000 immi
grants admitted to the United States in 1906, the great majority had a sense
of nationality. The view that nations represented indissoluble unities pos
sessed of a unique spirit, which was the essence of the organic theory and
was shared in some very fundamental way by such people as Woodrow "Wil
son (otherwise it is difficult to explain his championship of the rights of
nations), prepared the receiving society for a high degree of tolerance to
ward the retention of original national identity among new Americans, or
at any rate made it ambivalent in regard to such a possibility.
There were, of course, nativist movements and sentiments which opposed
such retention and resisted the formation of dual loyalties even before the
mass immigration and before the Civil War. Later, both Theodore Roosevelt
and Wilson inveighed against hyphenated Americans. If America was not a
jealous nation, there were always plenty of jealous Americans, Bur, on the
whole, nativist sentiments were not widespread and efforts to enforce uni
formity on the part of the leadership were half-hearted. Exclusive loyalty
was not insisted upon, and the void left by the discreditation of the states as
major foci of group loyalty was filled by nationalities of origin without
much or strenuous opposition. The toleration of ethnic pluralism was a
functional equivalent of the Northwest Ordinance, when nationality of ori
gin replaced a state as the chief competitor of the American nation for the
attachments of its members. Acceptance of this other identity as legitimate
tamed a potentially divisive force, prevented disaffection, and secured loy
alty to the nation. Perpetuation of ethnic allegiance, and in many cases de
liberate cultivation of an allegiance long forgotten, however, created a new
source of tension; Americans again lived in two countries at once and were
commanded to be capacious of both; conflict, therefore, in some form and
to some extent, became a matter of course.!S!
As long as the geo-political framework of the nation remained ambigu
ous, one could choose among political secession, geographical separation,
and internal reform as ways to deal with the discontent generated by the
internal contradictions of individualistic nationalism. In the framework of
unambiguously fixed geo-political boundaries, with group secession ruled
484 N A T I O N A L I S M
our and geographical separation within the system no longer possible, rhis
discontent was channeled toward internal reform, the only other optifcm
being withdrawal into privacy. Society itself became the new frontier. I n
stead of clearing forests, one group after another, and many groups simul
taneously, have been attempting to carve out for themselves or even create
new, heretofore unimagined social spaces. This has been hard labor, but the
society is steadily becoming more inclusive and accommodates more inter
ests than before.
The national commitment of Aonericato liberty and equalityremains
the main source of social cohesion and the main stimulant of unrest in it.
The rigidity of loyalty to these national ideals, as well as its laxity, endangers
the nation; yet this loyalty preserves it. In America, the maxim My country,
right or wrong is wrong: it betrays the ideals. But the alternative prin
cipleMy country, right or wrong! When right, to be kept right; when
wrong, to be put right!is unrealistic and sets one onto a frustrating proj
ect which may lead to disaffection. Compromise is inconsistent with ideal
ism. Yet the ability to compromise has become a distinguishing characteris
tic of this intensely idealistic nation. To be an American means to persevere
in ones loyalty to the ideals, in spite of the inescapable contradictions be
tween them and reality, and to accept reality without reconciling oneself to
it. One has to live in the world and accept it in all its frightening implica
tions, wrote an American idealist. One has to to live consciously and self
consciously, in the involvement and the alienation, in the loyalty and the
questioning, in the love and in the critical appraisal. . . At best we can live
in a paradox. 164
The uniqueness of the American nation consists in that in the course of its
iong existence, a national existence longer than that of any other Society
with the exception of England, it has remained faithful to the original idea
of the nation, and come closest to the realization of the principles of individ
ualistic, civic nationalism. I t stands as an example of its original promise
democracya proof of its resilience and viability despite the contradictions
inherent in it. It is because of this, not because of its newness or heterogene
ity, that America is not a nation like all the others.
But, then, as this book has attempted to show, neither is any of the others.
A F T E R WO R D
U
ltimately, nationalism can be traced to the structural contradictions
of the society of orders. It was a response of individuals personally
affected by these contradictions to the sense of disorder they cre
ated. Many other responses were possible, and at other times tried and
found successful; the choice of nationalism was not inevitable. Neither (cer
tainly not in the form it assumed and at the time it actually occurred) was
the dissolution of the old society. It was contingent on the nationalist re
sponse to its dysfunction. Once adopted, nationalism accelerated the pro
cess of change, channeled it into a certain direction, limited the possibilities
of future development, and became a major factor in it. It thus both ac
knowledged and accomplished the grand social transformation from the old
order to modernity. The old society was replaced with a new one, based on
the principle of nationality.
The inventors of nationalism were members of the new English aristoc
racy. Commoners by birth, they found the traditional image of society, in
which upward mobility was an anomaly, uncongenial and substituted for it
the idea of a homogeneously elite peoplethe nation. Had they concen
trated, instead, on forging genealogies, a perfectly logical thing to do given
the circumstances, history could have taken an entirely different course.
As it was, the idea of the nation took root. The ascendancy of England
ensured its salience, but its appeal in circumstances different from those of
its emergence was due to its nature, rather than descent. Nationality ele
vated every member of the community which it made sovereign. It guaran
teed status. National identity is, fundamentally, a matter of dignity. It gives
people reasons to be proud.
In the society of orders, pride and self-respect, as well as the claim to
status or the respect of others, was a privilege of the few, a tiny elite placed
high above the rest. The lot of the rest was humility and abnegation, which
they tried to rationalize and make tolerable in one way or another and
sometimes even managed to enjoy, but could never escape. Even the proud
elite was not safe from degradation. Its status depended on the preservation
of rigid distinctions between orders and the strict observance of the rules of
precedence; any breach in them threatened it, for status is entirely a matter
488
N A T I O N A L I S M
of social convention, it is socially constructed in its every element, and easily
deconstructs if the convention is broken. Nationalism diminished the signif
icance of invidious distinctions and, at the same time, secured everyone from
ultimate degradation. Within a nation, status {and, with it, sense of pride
and self-respect) can never be totally lost. One still can rise and fail, but
never fall so low that it would break ones heart.
It would be a strong statement, but no overstatement, to say that the
world in which we live was brought into being by vanity. The role of van
ityor desire for statusin social transformation has been largely under
estimated, and greed or will to power are commonly regarded as its main
springs. In all the five cases in this book, however, the emergence of
nationalism was related to preoccupation with status. The English aristoc
racy sought to justify it; the French and the Russian nobilityto protect it;
the German intellectualsto achieve it. Even for the materialistic Ameri
cans, taxation without representation was an insult to their pride, more than
an injury to their economic interests. They foughtand became a nation
over respect due to them, rather than anything else.1
The political, and even economic, realities of the modern world were to a
significant extent shaped by nationalism born out of such preoccupation
with status. In the former case, the influence of nationalism has been more
direct. The basic framework of modern politicsthe world divided into na
tionsis simply a realization of nationalist imagination; it is created by na
tionalism. The internal political structures of different nations reflect the
original definitions of nationality in them, specifically whether it is defined
as individualistic or coliectivistic, and as civic or ethnic. The former defini
tion gives rise to democratic, liberal societies; othersto various forms and
degrees of authoritarianism. Foreign policies, which are of course dependent
on the structure of international opportunities and the availability of means
to carry them out, are motivated by the ideas of national missions or objec
tives, and by considerations of international prestige, which are also to a
large degree defined by the image of the nation and of its standing vis-a-vis
the others. Even the availability of the means to carry policies out is related
to this. The reification of the nation in the framework of coliectivistic na
tionalism increases the susceptibility of a nation to ressentiment. Ressenti
ment not only makes a nation more aggressive, but represents an unusually
powerful stimulant of national sentiment and collective action, which makes
it easier to mobilize coliectivistic nations for aggressive warfare than to mo
bilize individualistic nations, in which national commitment is normally de
pendent on rational calculations.
The five nations on which this book focused have been major actors in
modern politics. Their nationalisms were particularly important in defining
the political structure of modernity, as they were in defining its cultural char
acter. Each one of them left on it a unique, indelible imprint. Had any of the
Afterword
489
five nationalismsEnglish, French, Russian, German, or Americanbeen
different, rhe world would be a different place for all of us.
Economic reality is not constructed in the same sense and to the same
extent as political reality. Imagination may be an important economic re
source, but most economic resources {which determine structures of eco
nomic opportunities) have little to do with imagination. Moreover, similar
economic systems exist in widely differing political and cultural environ
ments. The impact of nationalism in the economic sphere is felt most where
economic issues are interwoven with political and ideological ones. Nation
alism affects economic behavior insofar as it creates a certain ethic (in this
sense it is not different from Protestant or any other religious ethic, and
similarly to the economic effects of dissimilar religious ethics, economic ef
fects of various nationalisms differ); it affects attitudes toward money and
money-making, toward various occupations, thereby determining the
strengths and weaknesses of particular economies. It also affects the eco-
'nomic policies of governments, domestic as well as foreign. The economic
ideological politics characteristic of this century, the central expression of
which was the often victorious struggle against capitalism around the
globe, are largely a product of nationalism, and specifically of the national
ist resentment against politically advanced nations. Capitalism was
first associated with liberal society of the Anglo-American type in France
(that first anti-Western nation); other nations resentful of the West (in which
they before long included France) made this association into a dogma. And
today the belief in it makes us rejoice at the resolve of the Soviet government,
and of Eastern European nations recently liberated from the yoke of the
Soviet government, to replace their defunct socialist economies with func
tioning capitalist ones. We interpret this for-a-change rational behavior
as a sign of their desire to adoptand capability to implementlibera!
ideals and turn democratic. But if there is a necessary connection between
capitalism and democracy, it exists only to the extent that a free society ne
cessitates a capitalist economy. Capitalism (which allows a certain freedom,
which is never absolute, to the play of market forces and is, therefore, al
ways a mixed economy), on the other hand, can very well coexist with soci
eties which are anything but democratic,
Marx to the contrary,, there is no one-to-one correspondence between sys
tems of production and ownership and systems of social and political rela
tions. Economy does not define the nature of society. This is determined by
the image the society has of itself or by its essential identity. A profound
change in the structure of economic opportunities may lead to a modifica
tion of identity (as was the case of the American South), but does not guar
antee it, and the introduction of a mixed economy may not result in a pro
found change of economic opportunities to begin with.
National identities which owe their origins to long-forgotten circum
490 N A T I O N A L I S M
stances and needs which today can hardly be imagined persist because of the
psychological rewards inherent in nationality, Its status-enhancing quality. -
Nationality makes people feel good (and collectivistic and ethnic nationality
on the whole makes them feel better than individualistic and civic national
ity, for the simple reason that individualistic nationalism merely affirms the
dignity inherent in the individual, adding nothing to it, while collectivistic
nationalism allows one to partake in the dignity of a far greater, stronger,
and more perfect being, the brilliance of whose virtues has the power to
blind one to ones own failings). Although groups whose interests every spe
cific nationalism was summoned to serve, and which in turn defined it, no
longer exist, and their interests have lost all relevance, national identities
still serve peoples interests. These interests, which are served by particular
national identities in their respective nations, however, in most cases would
be equally well served by other national identities. No individual and no
group of people are genetically bound to define themselves in one or another
fashion, and as the original interests which gave rise to particular national
identities disappear, a change of national identity is not impossible. Apart
from deep changes in the economy, other structural changesfor instance
ones brought on by the outcome of a war and occupationmay result in the
redefinition of a particular national identity. (West German national iden
tity, for example, may be significantly different from the German identity
that existed in the unified Germany, although careful research is necessary
to establish in what ways exactly they differ. This new identity, in tuni, may
be affected by the reincorporation of Prussia and other Eastern provinces.)
One has to admit, though, that such redefinitions are extremely rare.
So long as the national identity remains unchanged, the fundamental
structure of motivations and, consequently, the fundamental nature of the
national society remain unchanged, and patterns of behavior characteristic
of it in the past should be expected. Of course, motivations are not always
realized. Desire and ability alone do not determine the course of action; it
also needs propitious conditions. Nevertheless, the potential for their real-
ization exists. The power of nationalism to mold collective behavior makes
it all-important to realize that nationalism is not a uniform phenomenon.
There is no greaterand gravermistake than to regard all nations as cre
ated equal. Men are created equal, but nations are not. Some are created as
compacts of sovereign individuals and emphasize the freedom and equality
of men; some are created as beautiful great individuals who may feed on
man, and preach racial superiority and submission to the state. Rights of
nations, which we now consider incontestable, to no small extent owing to
American naivete, have very different significance and implications in such
different cases.
Images of social order, bom out of the efforts of elites in the society of
orders to cscape its contradictions, are perpetuated in the laws, institutions,
Afterword 491
and cultural forms of modern societies. Our world is still the one they cre
ated. The continuity, however blurred, is unbroken. The age of nationalism
has not ended; we have but entered the phase of neo-nationalism. At no
other time has this been demonstrated more clearly than during these very
days when regimes and ideologies crumble around us, and nationalism
everywhere raises its head amid the rubble and confusion, as full of energy
as ever. Forces shaped centuries ago continue to shape the destinies of man
kind at the end of the twentieth century. Our ability to make sense of them
and to deal with the reality around us depends on our understanding of their
origins.
Nationalism is a historical phenomenon. It appeared in one age and it can
disappear in another. But if it does, the world in which we live will be no
more, and another world, as distinct from the one we know as was the soci
ety of orders that it replaced, will replace it. This post-national world will
be truly post-modern, for nationality is the constitutive principle of moder
nity. It will be a new form of social being and it will change rhe way we see
society; to understand it, we shall have to begin anew.
Notes
I ntroduction
1. The concept style of thought was coined by Karl Mannheim in his essay
Conservative Thought, in Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 74-165, and wss based on the no
tion of style developed in art history. Itencapsulated the idea that broad cul
tural currents, or traditions, similarly to artistic styles, cannot be characterized
by any of their composing elements, each of which may be found in many other
traditions, including those directly contradictory to the tradition in question,
but only by the organizing idea, or principle, which brings these elements to
gether in a distinctive configuration that imparts to each element a special sig
nificance it would lack in any other configuration. Obviously nationalism does
not have the unity of a tradition such as Liberalism(though it is questionable
whether Conservatism may be regarded as a unified tradition in the same
sense). The concept style of thought, therefore, may not be strictly applicable
to nationalism, which, rather, represents a class of styles unified by the same
fundamental idea, which, however, can be interpreted in a variety of ways*
2. Guido Zernatto, Nation: The History of a Word, Review of Politics, 6
(1944), pp. 351-366.
3. (Ch.-L. de Secondat) Montesquieu, De I'esprit des lots (Paris: Librairie Garnier
Frtres, 1945), vol. II, p. 218. Zernatto (Nation) quotes this definition on
p. 361.
4. The concept comes to us from biology (see, for example, Samuel Alexander,
Space, Time and Deity [London: Macmillan, 1920], and Michael Polanyi,
Lifes Irreducible Structure, Science, 160 [June 1968], pp. 130812); and life
is the paradigmatic example of emergence. Life cannot be reduced to the sum
total of its inanimate elements, it cannot be explained by any of their proper
ties; it is the relationship between the elements, unpredictable from these prop
erties, which gives rise to it, and which in many ways conditions the behavior
of the elements the moment they become elements of the living matter. The
mystery of life lies in that we do not know its unifying principle: we do not
know why inanimate elements form a relationship which gives rise to life. Be
cause of our systematic inability to solve this mystery, the best strategy in the
study of life has been considered to put this question aside and be content with
the study of the mechanisms and expressions of life. 3n many other areas of
study this is not the best strategy. In the case of emergent social phenomena.
494 Notes to Pages 713
which are structurally parallel to the phenomenon of life, we can answer the
question of what brings elements together, and why, and can discover the uni
fying principle, if we choose ro do so. A text, a simple sentence, is such an
emergent phenomenon, A sentence is composed of certain elements which have
definite grammatical, morphological, and phonetic properties. Yet, nothing in
them can explain the existence of a sentence or why all these elements combine
together to form it. This is explained by the idea of the author of the sentence,
by what he or she wishes to express, by the significance of the sentence for him
or her. Undoubtedly, the author is only able to construct a sentence within the
boundary conditions formed by the grammatical, morphological, and other
properties o the elements in a language he or she uses. But it is the idea which
brings some of the elements together in a sentence and determines the role each
of them is to play in it. It is the idea which creates out of existing elements a
novel reality. Currents of culture, traditions, and ideologies are also emergent
phenomena, though on a higher level of complexity. It was their emergent char
acter that led Mannheim to refer to them as styles of thought.
J . This political nature of nationalism does not necessitate statehood either as a
reality or as an aspiration. It has to do with the definition of the ultimate source
of authority which does not have to belong to the state, as religious believers
among us so well know, although it may be in part delegated to it. As a result,
nations without states of their own are in no way abnormal or incomplete, and
the one-to-one correspondence between the two, while a fact or a desideratum
in many cases, is not at all of essence in nationalism. In much of the scholarship
on nationalism it is seen as such, however. (On the imperfect correspondence
between states and nations, see G. P. Nielsson, States and Nation-Groups: A
Global Taxonomy, in New Nationalisms of the Developed West, ed. E. A.
Tiryakian-and R. Rogowski [Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985], pp. 27-56.)
6. For discussion of ethnicity, see Nathan Glaxer and Daniel P. Moynihart, eds.,
Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1975), especially the editors introduction. A. D. Smiths The Ethnic Ori
gins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) emphasizes the role of ethnic
ity in nationalism.
7. David Lairin suggested in a conversation that in the two hundred years since
this transformation took place, the meaning of the word nation" could be
further modified, and that the new nations of today may be nations in a
sense not considered here. Theoretically, this is a possibility. But in practice, the
nation as a unique people is so broadly defined and allows so many interpre
tations without the change of the concept that if such a change did occur, the
idea of the nation would be defined out of the framework of nationalism alto
gether.
8. A recent book by Jeffrey Brooks provides us with a good example (When Rus
sia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 18611917 [Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985], pp. 5455). According to the data of several
studies of schoolchildren {entering pupils, ages 811) conducted in Russia in
the early twentieth century, a whole one-fifth of the children interviewed in
rural areas could not tell their first names. Only about a half knew their patron
ymics or family names. Over a half of the Moscow children did not know that
Notes to Pages 14-15
495
they were living in Moscow. What was their identity? Clearly, the identity of
the children who did not know what their first names wereand one shudders
imagining the destitute, horrible existence they leddid not include these
names. For themselves, they were nameless. Probably they realized that they
were human, male, poor; this is as far as their identity went. Did these Russian
.children, who did not know that they wercKiissinn, have national identity?
{We can ask this question since in this case the sense of a unique Russian iden
tity developed simultaneously and is inseparable from national identity.) The
answer is: definitely not. And this is so even though they might have shared,
and very likely did share, all those qualities which would characterize any self-
conscious Russian and which, so nationalists believed, made a Russian. They
were born in Russia of Russian parents and had, probably, the distinctive light-
brown (in Russianrusy) or fair hair; they spoke Russian; they crossed them
selves in an Orthodox manner; if they could find it, they drank vodka. All these
qualities, however, in no sense, with the possible exception of the legal, assured
their nationality. In the legal sense, one should note, newborn babies have na
tional identity, although they do not know that and although, clearly, in the
psychological sense they have no identity at all. Such automatic categorization,
so long as it is not realized and acknowledged by the person who is categorized
in this fashion, is irrelevant to this discussion, for, obviously, while it can orient
the behavior of others toward the person, it cannot orient and affect his or her
actions in any way.
9. The existence of a supra-societal system, or shared social space, was a necessary
condition for the spread of nationalism from the very beginning of the process.
Borrowing presupposed the existence of a shared model, and such a model
could exist only for societies which were explicitly relevant for each other. It is
probable that initially such shared social space was created by Christianity and,
perhaps, the Renaissance. Parenthetically, this may explain why, while individ
ual proto-nationsnamely societies held together by solidarities remarkably
similar to national, although not called nationswere known in the ancient
world, notably among the Jews and the Greeks, nationalism never spread be
yond the borders of these individual societies. In distinction, Christianity did
create in Europe the supra-societal social space which made such spread pos
sible. This social space could contract or expand. The rise to dominance of the
West continued the work of the Middle Ages, and ensured the expansion of
this social space. The more it expanded, the more societies were drawn within
the orbit of the influence of the nation canon, until, in our day, it became
shared by virtually the whole world.
10. This means that reference societies (Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People
[Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978]) do not simply impose them
selves, but are chosen as models by those whom they influence.
11.1 use this concept in the sense it was originally defined by Durkheim in The
Division of Labor in Society and in Suicide, and later developed by Robert K,
Merton in Social Structure and Anomie, as denoting structural inconsistency,
and specifically the inconsistency between values and other elements of social
structure.
12. Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 1887, in The Philosophy of
496
Notes to Pages 1618
Nietzsche {New York: The Modern Library, 1927), pp. 617809; Max
Scheler, Ressentiment, 1912 (Glencoe, Hi.: The Free Press, 1961).
13. Alexis de Tocqueville. The Old Regime and the French Revolution, 1856 (Gar
den City, N.J.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955); Francois Furet, Interpreting
the French Revolution {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). In
some cases (for example, Germany) ressentiment was originally nurtured by
the situation within the community that was to be defined as national, but the
unsatisfactory internal situation was interpreted as the result of foreign influ
ence, and a foreign country that had been the object of imitation became the
focus of ressentiment all the same.
14. Ressentiment, which is a specific psychological state associated with the emer
gence of certain types of nationalism (ethnic, and to a lesser extent, collectivis-
tic but civic), should not be equated with the psychological dimension of na
tionalism as such, which is much broader. A student of society cannot be
oblivious to psychological processes. In the social process they perform the role
of necessary conductors, mediating between social structures and cultural for
mations, and between social structures and cultural formations at different
stages in social transformation. The final outcome at any stage is affected by
the nature of the psychological processes involved. Every social phenomenon
is, therefore, also psychological, and nationalism is no exception. But, since
this in no way defines it, in this book the psychological dimension of national
ism is treated as given. Even ressentiment, it should be noted, which plays a
specific role in the formation of certain nationalisms, does not generate nation
alism in and of itself. Only in certain structural conditions may it do so, and
only in confluence with very specific ideas can it do so. In other conditions, and
in conjunction with other ideas, the very same psychological state may trans
late into entirely different phenomena, as well as vainly spend itself and have
no effect at all.
"While there is no justification for interpreting nationalism as the product of
specific psychological states or needs (possibly in distinction from Identity in
general), neither is there any for considering it a psychological state. As do
many other stimuli, nationalism arouses psychological responses, and therefore
has psychological manifestations. These manifestations are not specific to it:
other identities, as well as emotions of a totally different nature, may be simi
larly expressed. The specificity of nationalism (that which makes it what it is, a
phenomenon sui generis) lies not in the specificity of the psychological re
sponses tt arouses, but in the specificity of the stimulus, which is cultural.
15. Mas Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1978), vol. 1, Basic Sociological Terms, specifically pp. 4, 24.
16. The two most important recent works representing the conventional view are
B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London: Verso Editions, 1983), and E. Gellner, Nations and Na
tionalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983). This view is briefly discussed in my
The Emergence of Nationalism in England and France, Research in Political
Sociology, 5 (1991), pp. 333370. It is embedded in a materialist conception
of social reality, in which material, or real, factors, through unspecified
psychological mechanisms which they activate, cause symbolic, cultural, or
Notes to Pages 18-32 497
ideal phenomena. Realfactors may be economic or political structures or
processes, as well as common language or shared history. Contemporary soci
ology tends to accentuate the former, and as a result, in sociology, and in the
discourse influenced by it, the materialist conception assumes the form of one
or another variety {sociological, as distinguished from other kinds) of struc
turalism.The premises of structuralism are rarely spelled out, and often the
name connotes merely the belief in the explanatory primacy of social struc
tures. The only rationale of such belief, nevertheless, is contained in these
premises. This is a good example of an ideal factora theoretical position
turning into an objective force which affects rhe professional behavior and
beliefs of individuals, yet the significance of which they no longer fully under
stand. It appears, indeed, impossible, on the basis of empirical evidence, to
distinguish between realand "ideal factors in society, for peoplesbeliefs
and ideas are real forces in their lives, and structures are always informed with
meanings. The only distinction that would make sense is that between systems
of meanings which are embodied in social relationships and exist as inherent
parts of social structures (for the sake of brevity these may be identified with
structures), and systems of meaning, equally objective, that exist, so to
speak, in a disembodied form, as cultural traditions, beliefs, and ideas (cul
ture, for short).
17. The term is the counterpart of models of reality, which distinguish human
thinking and form rhe building blocks of culture; Clifford Geem, Religion as
a Cultural System,in his Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books,
1973), pp. 87-125.
18. Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, SeVi ed. (Glencoe, 111.: The
Free Press, 1966), authors preface to second edition, p. xlvii, fn. 3.
19. Quoted in Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The National Experience (New
York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. 336.
1. Gods Firstborn: England
1. Thomas More, in E. F. Rogers, ed., St. Thomas More: Selected betters (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), Letter 53 to Cromwell,
March 5, 1534, pp. 212-213; Letter 54 to Margaret Roper, April 17, 1534,
pp. 221-222.
2. The few existing studies of English nationalism locate the emergence of the
English national consciousness in the seventeenth or even eighteenth century:
Hans Kohn, "The Genesis and Character of English Nationalism, Journal of
the History of Ideas, 1(January 1940), pp. 6994; Gerald Newman, The Rise
of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 17401830 (London: Wedenfeld,
1987). Kohns work was most useful as a pointer to primary sources.
3. Promptorium Parvalorum, 1499 (Menston, Eng.: The Scokr Press, 1968).
4. Perez Zagorin, The Cotin and the Country: The Beginning of the English Rev
olution (New York: Atheneam, 1971), pp. 3338.
5. Thomas Elyot, Dictionary, 1538 (Menston, Eng.: The Scolar Press, 1970); this
was the first dictionary reflecting the influence of the new learning.
498
Notes to Pages 3235
6. Thomas Cooper, Thesaurus Linguae Romanae et Britannicae, 1565 (Menston,
Eng.: The Scolar Press, 1969).
7. John Rider, BibUotheca Scholastica, 1589 (Menston, Eng.: The Scolar Press,
1970).
8. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act Ill, Scene II (Brutus); Marlowe, 2 Tamburlaine,
Act V, Scene I: 10-11 (Governour). Such examples can be multiplied endlessly.
Shakespeare uses the word country (often in the same breath with related
terms: nation, people, and others) hundreds of times, usually in its new
meaning, although the word is clearly tnultivalent, and the detailed concor
dances of his work make possible an easy quantitative as weSi as qualitative
assessment of the new prominence and significance of the new concepts.
9. Zagorin, Court and Country, Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy,
15581641 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 6162 and passim.
This also makes it easier to understand why the Country party, or Parliamen
tary opposition, was alternatively called the Patriots.
10. The alteration in the meaning of this concept has been the subject of a heated
controversy in twentieth-century Tudor historiography. In the early 1960s the
view of G. R. Elton (expressed in England under the Tudors [London: Me
thuen, 1955]; The Political Creed of Thomas Cromwell, Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society, 5th series, vol. 6, 1956, pp. 69-92; and elsewhere)
that this change could actually be seen to have taken place in the Act of Ap
peals, 1533, was attacked by some other scholars (particularly G. L. Harriss)
on the pages of Past and Present, 25 (July 1963) and 31 (jiily 1965). As far as I
know, no agreement has been reached on the matter. According to Neville Fig
gis, The Divine Right of Kings, 1896 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965),
England, on occasion, claimed to be an empire even before Henry VIH. See
Chapter 2 on similar uses of the concept in France, The exhaustive work on the
history of the term is R. Koebner, Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1961).
11. Elton, England under the Tudors, p. 161; G. L. Harriss, A Revolution in Tu
dor History? Past and Present, 31 (July 1965), pp. 8794.
12. Act of Appeals, Statutes of the Realm, Printed by command of His Majesty
King George I I I in pursuance of an address of the House of Commons of Great
Britain (London, 18101821, reprinted in 1963 by Dawsons of Pall-Mall,
London), vol. Ill, 24 Henri VIII, cap. XII, p. 427. (Statutes of the Realm here
after cited as SR.)
13. Sermons and Homilies of Bishop of Lincoln, gathered by Abraham Flemming
(London, 1582); Homily against disobedience and willful Rebellion.
14. Thomas Eiyot, The Boke Named the Governour, 1531 (New York: Everymans
Library, 1907); ch. 1, The signification of a Publike Weale, and why it is
called in latin Respublica, p. 1.
15. Significantly, citntas, the closest approximation to what we understand by the
state in Latin, is translated by Eiyot as a citie, and he explains: Properly
it is the multitude of cytesens gathered togyther, to lyue according to lawe and
ryght, The fact that the modern political concept of the state appears in
English so late, as well as that Latin in fact had no equivalent to it, may be well
Notes to Pages 3643
499
worth pondering over by those social scientists who toil today to bring the
stare back.
16. SR, vol. II, XI Henri VII, cap. 3, p. 568; 1Henri VII, cap, I, p. 499. (Below the
spelling is modernized.)
17. SR, vol. in, 26 Hen. VIII, cap. Ill, p. 493; 35 Hen. VIU, cap. I, p. 955; 31 Hen.
VIII, cap. VIII, p. 726.
18. SR, vol. IV, 1Edw. VI, cap. XII, p. 18; 3-4 Edw. VI, cap. Ill, p. 102.
19. SR, vol. IV, 1 Eliz., cap. I, p. 350; 13 Eliz., cap. I, p. 526; 27 Eliz., cap. ],
p. 704; 43 Eliz., cap. XVIII, p. 991; 13 Eliz., cap. I, p. 527.
20. SR, vol. IV, 1Jac., cap. I, pp. 1017-18.
21. The Journals of the House of Commons, vol. I, p. 243.
22. James I, Workes (London: Robert Barkes and John Bill, 1616), pp. 514, 525,
533.
23. The Three Resolutions Passed by the House of Commons in Defiance of the
Kings Dissolution of Parliament, 1629, in j. Rushworth, Historical Collec
tions (London: T. Newcomb for G. Thomason, 1659), vol. I, p. 660; S. R.
Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625
1660, 3rd ed. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1906), p. 206, and ibid., Speci
men of the First Writ of Ship-Money," October 20, 1634, p. 105.
24. Journals of the House of Lords, vol. Vt, p. 430; Gardiner, Constitutional Doc
uments, Heads of Proposals Offered by the Army, p. 321.
25. Nevertheless, the text continued, neither such Lords as have demeaned them
selves with honor, courage and fidelity to the Commonwealth, nor their post
erities who shall continue so, shall be excluded from the public councils of the
nation. From the heights of our historical experience, which, among other
events, includes the French and the Bolshevik revolutions, this specification is
at Least as remarkable as the language in which it is expressed. (Gardiner, Con
stitutional Documents, p, 387.)
26. Ibid., The Act Erecting a High Court of Justice, January 6, 1649, pp. 357
358; The Act Abolishing the Office of King, March 17,1649, pp. 385386;
The Act Establishing Commonwealth, March 19,1649, p. 388.
27. Edward Hall, Chronicle: Henry VI I I , ed. Ch. Whibley (London: T. C. and E.
C. Jack, 1904), vol. I, p. 154. According to Kohn (Genesis, p. 73), one-third
of the London population was foreign in 1550.
28. John Bale, Chronicle of the Examination and Death of Lord Cobham (John
Oldecastett), in Select 'Works of Bishop Bale, ed. for the Parker Society by Rev.
Henry Christmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1849), p. 8. Bales
opinion of Polydores history stuck. John Foxe, undoubtedly aware of it, re
lated in The Acts and Monuments in the year 1570 that he had heard that the
unfortunate historian also burned a heap of our English stories unknown
(John Foxe, The Acts and Monuments, ed. Rev. Stephen Reed Catdey [Lon
don: R. B. Seelby and W. Burnside, 1841], vol. HI, p. 750).
29. Roger Ascham, The Scholemaster, 1570, in William Aldis Wright, ed., English
Works of Roger Ascham, 1904 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1970), p. 293.
30. Ascham, Toxophitus, 1545, in English Works, p. 53; John Bale, Examinations
500 Notes to Pages 4347
of Anne Askew, Preface of her first examination, 1547, in Select Works,
pp. 141-143.
31. Bale, Select Works, pp. 56.
32. Ascham, Toxiphilus, pp. xii, xiii, xiv; Elyot, Govemour, The Proheme,
p. xxxi; Thomas Wyatt, Tagus, in E. M. W. Tillyard, The Poetry of Sir
Thomas Wyatt: A Selection and a Study (London: The Scholartis Press, 192.9),.
p. 119; Thomas Starkey, A Dialogue between Cardinal Pole and Thomas Lup-
set, 1533-1536, K. M. Burton, ed. {London: Chatto and Wjndus, 1948), p, 22.
33. George Gascoigne, The Steel Glas, 1576, ed. E. Arber {Westminster: A Con
stable 8c Co., 1895), p. 78.
34. The evidence that Lawrence Stone brings to the contrarysuch as excessive
preoccupation with status, heightened sensitivity toward possible signs of dis
respect from inferiors, as well as legislative efforts such as the first draft of the
Statute of Uses of 1529, which intended to freeze the structure of aristocratic
land-tenure, or the Act of Precedence of 1539, establishing ranks among court
officialsonly proves this. These were the signs of the crisis of identity within
the nobility and the increasing inadequacy of the traditional definition of aris
tocracy, as a result of which it could not be left alone as unproblematic. Stone,
indeed, is aware of this: This ideological pattern and these measures designed
to freeze the social structure and emphasize the cleavages between one class
and another were introduced or reinforced at a time when in fact families were
moving up and down in the social and economic scale at a faster rate than at
any time before the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed it was just this
mobility which stimulated such intensive propaganda efforts. Stone, Crisis,
p. 36.
35. Bale, Anne Askew, p. 141; Christopher Marlowe, Tamburlaine the Great, pt. I,
I, IS, 34 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), p. 15; Barnabe Googe,
1563, Eglogs, Epitaphs and Sonettes, by Barnabe Googe, a facsimile reproduc
tion (Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars Facsimiles and Reprints, 1968), 3rd Eclogue,
p. 37; George Chapman, Dedication from Ovids Banquet of Sense, 159S, in
H. E. Rollins and H. Baker, eds., The Renaissance in England: Non-Dramatic
Prose and Verse of the Sixteenth Century (Boston: D. C. Heath Sc Co., 1955),
p. 449; George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie, 1589, ed. G. D. Wiii-
cock and A. Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936), pp. 59-
60; Henry Peacham, The Complete Gentleman, 1622, ed. V. B- Heltzel (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 28. Also see Lewis Einsteins very in
formative Tudor Meals (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1921).
36. Zagorin, Court and Country, p. 23.
37. Elyot, Govemour, vol. I, ch. 1, pp. 5,6; ch. 12, pp. 4950; vol. II, ch. 4,p. 30.
38. Ascham, Toxophitus, pp. xiv-xv; Peacham, Complete Gentleman, pp. 5, 4; Sir
Philip Sidney, An Apologie for Poetrie, 1583, in G. Gregory Smith, ed-, Eliza
bethan Critical Essays (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1904), vol. I, p. 205;
Gascoigne, Steel Glas, p. 76.
39. Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution, 15291642 (New
York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 65. This process was actually started by the
Yorkist kings; see W. T, MacCaffrey, England: The Crown and the New Aris
tocracy, 15401600, Past and Present, 30 (April 1965), pp. 52-~64.
Notes to Pages 4751 501
40. Only two of the seven peers created between 1509 and 1529 were civil ser
vants, but the latter constituted the majority of the much larger number created
in subsequent years. MacCaffrey, The Crown, p, 54.
41. This elimination was signaled by the replacement of Cardinal Wolsey by Sir
Thomas More as Lord Chancellor in 1529.
42. i^mong the first of them were Thomas Cromwell, the first two Cecils, Nicholas
Sidney, Francis Knollys, Henry Cary, John Russell, John Herbert, William Pau-
let, Ralph Sadler, William Petre, and Thomas Audley. MacCaffrey, The
Crown, p. 54.
43. This simile is borrowed from Joseph Ben-David and Randall Collins.
44. But while their situation predisposed the new elite to sympathize with the na
tionalist perspective, it did not necessitate it. Neither did the thorough immer
sion in the new learning, as we can judge from the example of Sir Thomas
More, prevent a complete lack of such sympathy.
45. Stone, English Revolution, p. 67, connects this to macro-economic and demo
graphic changes: The doubling of the population in the 120 years before the
civil war is the critical variable of the period, an event the ramifications of
which spread out into every aspect of the society and was causally related to
the major changes in agriculture, trade, industry, urbanization, education, so
cial mobility and overseas settlement. It gave a tremendous stimulus to agricul
tural output, which increased sufficiently fast between 1500 and 1660 to feed
twice the number of mouths. The importance of these factors cannot be
underestimated, but at the same time it is certain that social change cannot be
explained in such a simple behaviorist fashion. It was lucky that the English
economy could respond and adjust quickly to the dramatic accretion in the
population, but such adjustment was not inevitable. Social mobility was not a
reaction to the greater need in agricultural output.
46. Stone, English Revolution, p. 72.
47. Ibid., p. 95; Einstein, Tudor Ideals, p. 318.
48. Gascoigne, Steel Glas, p. 62; Starkey, A Dialogue, p. 94; John Bate, Dialogue
between a Christian and an Atheist {London, 1589}, p. 160.
49. Edward Lord Herbert, The Life and Reign of King Henry VIII (London, 1683),
quoted in Stone, English Revolution, p. 59; ibid.
50. Einstein, Tudor Ideals, p. 202. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century interpreters
of the break from Rome, by the way, would not accept the view later advanced
by Voltaire and voiced by lesser celebrities in their own day, that England opted
for Protestantism because the king had fallen in love. John Foxe in the Book of
Martyrs, a revolutionary conservative as he was, interpreted the separation as
the return to the old ancient church of Christ (a gloss in the margin stated-.
The Church of Rome revolted from the Church of RomeFoxe, vol. I, p. 9).
William Haller, Foxe' s Book of Martyrs and the Elect Nation (London: Jona
than Cape, 1963}, commenting on his argument, summarized it: The re
formed Church had not swerved from Rome; Rome had swerved from itself
(p. 136). In 1665 Thomas Sprat argued in a similar vein: It is false that our
English Reformation began upon a shameful occasion, or from the Extrava
gance of a private Passion. I know he [Sorbiere] has the Famous Story of King
Henrys Divorce to oppose to what I say; but I am not startled by that. .. The
502 Notes to Pages 5154
Reformation to which we stand is of latter Date. The Primitive Reformers
amongst us beheld the Reason of Men tamely subjected to one Mans Com
mand, and the Sovereign Powers of all Christendom still exposed to be checkd
and destroyd by the Resolutions of his private Will: Upon this they arose to
perform Two of the greatest Works in the World at once, to deliver the Minds
of Christians from Tyranny, and the Dignity of the Throne from Spiritual
Bondage. Whatever was the accidental, this was the teal Cause of our first Ref
ormation, and of their Separation from us, not oars from them. Thomas
Sprat, Observations On Mons. de Sorbieres Voyage into England, 1665 (Lon
don, 1709), pp. 101-180; 129.
51. An Act Concernyng Restraynt of Payment of Annates to the See of Rome,
1532, SR, vol. HI, 23 Hen. VIII, cap. 20, p. 386.
52. Harriss, A Revolution, p. 85.
53. Regarding this and other issues in the history of the English Bible, see F. F.
Bruce, History of the Bible in English: From the Earliest Versions (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1978) and Haller, Foxe' s Book of Martyrs.
54. The metaphor is Stones.
55. This, clearly, was unintended too. How little Henry intended to revolutionize
the doctrine may be seen in the Dispensation Act of 1534.
56. In sharp contrast to France, as we shall see later, a strong sense of a unique
English identity failed to develop earlier. The two main reasons for such failure,
especially after the Norman conquest, were the French connections and aspi
rations of the English aristocracy and royalty, on the one hand, and the unex
ceptional character o English Catholicism, on the other. The sixteenth century
eliminated both.
57. The English text is: The Kings have laid waste all the nations; the Latin: fe
' cerunt reges Assyoriorum terras et regiories earum. Isaiah 51.4, which in the
original Hebrew has am and leom in the verse, is rendered in English:
Hearken unto me, my people; And give ear unto me, O My nation (the use
of nation here greatly increases the dramatic effect of the verse); the Vulgate
text of the same verse reads: "Adtendite ad me, populus meus, et tribus mea me
audite. The translation of the same verse in the Great Bible is also interesting:
Have respect unto me, the, o my people both high and lowe and laye thine
care to me. Nothing of the sort appears in Hebrew, and this is clearly an at
tempt to redefine a people in a nationalist vein, which downplays class and
status distinctions and emphasizes the unity of various strata.
58. In Italy since 1471; France1472; Holland1477 (Old Testament).
59. W. K.Jourdan, Philanthropy in England, 14801660: A Study of the Changing
Pattern of English Social Conditions (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959); Law
rence Stone, The Educational Revolution in England, 15401640, Past and
Present, 28 (July 1964), pp. 4180.
60. Thomas Hobbes was of the opinion that the English Bible was not to a small
degree responsible for the Puritan Rebellion, for after the Bible was translated
into English, every man, nay every boy and wench, that could read English
thought they spoke with God Almighty, and understood what he said .., The
reverence and obedience due to the Reformed Church here, and to the bishops
Notes to Pages 5560
503
and pastors therein, was cast off, and every man became a judge of religion,
and an interpreter of the Scriptures to himself, Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth:
The History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England, ed. William Moles-
worth (New York: Burt Franklin, 1962[?]), p. 28.
61. Haller, Foxes Book of Martyrs, p. 43.
62. JFoxe, Book of Martyrs, vol. VII, p. 41; vol. VIII, p. 476.
63. Ibid., vol. VII, p. 53.
64. Quoted in Haller, Foxes Book of Martyrs, p. 201,
65. John Poynet, A Shorte Treatise of politike pouuer, and of the true Obedience
which subjects owe to kmges and other entile Gouemours, with an Exhorta
tion to all true natural Englishe men, 1556, reprinted in W. S. Hudson, J ohn
Ponet: Advocate of Limited Monarchy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1942), p. 61 of the original text,
66. Michele cited in Einstein, Tudor Ideals, p. 24. Later, after another transforma
tion, Cardinal AUen eloquently wrote: It is the turpitude of our nation
through the world, whereas we blush before strangers that sometimes fall into
discourse of such things, that in one mans memory and since this strange mu
tation began, we have had to our prince, a man, who abolished the Popes
authorise by his laws, and yet in other pontes kept the faith of his fathers: we
have had a child who by the like laws abolished together with the Papacie the
whole ancient religion: we have had a woman who restored both againe and
sharply punished Protestants: and lastly her Majestic that now is who by the
like laws hath long since abolished both againe, and now severely punisheth
Catholikes as the other did Protestants; and all these strange differences within
the compasse of about 30 years. "WilliamAlien, An Apologie of the English
seminaries (Mounds in Henault, 1581), f. 34. Religious pluralism breeds indif
ference. See Stones caustic remarks in English Revolution, pp. 83,109,
67. Paul Hughes and Robert Fries, eds., Crown and Parliament in Tudor-Stuart
England: A Documentary Constitutional History, 148S1714 (New York,
G. P- Putnams Sons, 1959), comment on the Act Concerning the Improvement
of Commons and Waste Grounds, 1550, p. 81.
68. Typical of the multitude, is the anonymous writer who describes the queens
triumphal entry with King Philip into London, and Cardinal Poles speech on
the restoration of Catholicism. He relates how with many others he regretted
his past conduct and repents for his religious sins, determining to make amends
\nhenceforth practicing the most holy Catholic faith. Einstein, Tudor Ideals,
p. 205.
69. MacCaffrey, The Crown, p. 56,
70. Anthony Fletcher, Tudor Rebellions (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1983), pp. 69
81-
71. Quoted by William Haller in John Foxe and the Puritan Revolution, The
Seventeenth Century, volume in honor of Robert Foster Jones (Stanford: Stan
ford University Press, 1952), p. 209.
72. Packer also was certain that God was English; in a letter to Lord Burghley, he
wrote in connection to the pitiable situation of religion: Where God Almighty
is so much English as he is, should we not requite his mercy with some eamesty
504 Notes to Pages 6065
to prefer his honour and true religion. Letter of March 12, 1572 or 1573, in
Correspondence of Matthew Parker, D.D., The Parker Society {Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1853), p. 419.
73. This is the title of the first English {1563) edition of the work.
74. An epistle attached to the edition of 1570. Foxe, Book of Martyrs, vol. I,
p. 520.
75. From A Booke of certaine Canons . . . Printed by John Daye, 1571, quoted in
Haller, Foxes Book of Martyrs, p. 221.
76. William Harrison, Description of England, in Holinsheds Chronicles, 1586
(London: J . Johnson et a!., 1807), vol. I, p. 331. Harrison mentioned this as an
example of Englands love of learning: the books were provided "for the exer
cise of such as come into [the court]: whereby the stranger that entereth into
the court of England upon the sudden, shall rather imagine himselfe to come
into some publike schoole of the universities. Ibid.
77. The epithet is Richard Hakluyts (The Principal Navigations, Voyages and Dis
coveries of the English Nation, 1589, dedication); the information about Sir
Francis pastime is from Haller, Foxes Book of Martyrs, p. 221.
78. Hakluyt, Principal Navigations; Hakluyt mentioned Foxe alongside Bale and
Eden.
79. Richard Hooker, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, 1597, in John Keble, ed.,
The Works of Richard Hooker (New York: Burt Franklin, 1888, reprinted
1970), vol. HI, p. 330.
80. Einstein, Tudor Ideals, p. 210.
81. Roger Cotton, in Edward Farr, ed., Select poetryChiefly Devotional of the
Reign of Queen Elizabeth {London: The Parker Society, 1845), vol. II, p. 372.
82. Elizabeths adulation seems nauseating in its jingo ideology and its sycophan
tic flattery of the monarch. Stone, English Revolution, p. 88.
83. According to Haller, Foxes Book of Martyrs, p. 90.
84. John Norden, A Progress of Piety, 1596 {London: The Parker Society, 1847),
pp. 38, 44.
85. John Phillip, in Farr, Select poetry, p. 532.
86. Anthony Nixon, Memorial of Queen Elizabeth, in Farr, Select poetry,
p. 556.
87. Michael Drayton, I oly-Olbion, Song XVII, in J . W. Hebei, ed., Michael Dray
ton: Tercentenary Edition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1933), voL IV, pp. 337-
338.
88. It is possible, however, that she sympathized with the national sentiment, for
she was, after all, a tutee of Roger Ascham. She was certainly exceptionally
well attuned to the spirit of nationalism and played the role assigned her by the
zealots of the newsecularfaith very well. Among the signs of her sensitivity
may be included both the fact that she referred to herself as the nursing
mother of Israel and the replacement of the figure of Christ on the cross at
parish churches by the royal coat of arms.
89. This view was consistently argued by Haller and disputed, for instance, by Paul
Christiansen in Reformers and Babylon: English Apocalyptic Visions from the
Reformation to the Eve of the Civil War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
Notes to Pages 6669
505
1978) and K. R. Firth in The Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain,
1530-1645 (Ne-w York: Oxford University Press, 1979).
90. Richard Crompton, The Mansion of Magnanimity (London: W. Ponsonby,
1599), ch. 12, sig. O; Walter Raleigh, The Last Fight of the Revenge, p. 30,
and Linschotens Account, p. 91, in E. Arber, ed., The Last Fight of the RE
VENGE at Sea (London: Southgate, 1871).
91. J . Rhodes, in Farr, Select poetry, pp. 269270.
92. Haller, Foxes Book of Martyrs, p. 214.
93. These authors were, for ali intents and purposes, raznochintzy, thoughfor
sociological rather than linguistic reasonsno equivalent term was ever coined
in English.
94. William Shakespeare, King Richard II, Act II, Scene I (Gaunt).
95. William Webbe, A Discourse on English Poetrie, 1586, in Smith, Elizabethan
Critical Essays, vol. I, pp. 240242.
96. Gabriel Harvey, Letter to Spenser, The Works of Gabriel Harvey, A. B- Grosart,
ed. {London: Hazel, "Watson, and Viney, 1884), vol. I, p. 77.
97. Hakluytj Principal Navigations; Raleigh, The Last Fight of the Revenge;
William Harrison, The Description of England, in Chronicles of Raphael Hol-
inshed, 1586 (London: J. Johnson et al., 1807), vol. 1, p. 266; Peacham, Com
plete Gentleman, p, 115; regarding emblems, see the introduction by Heltzel in
ibid., p. xi,
98. George Gascoigne, The Making of Verse, 1575, in Smith, Elizabethan Criti
cal Essays, vol. I, p. 50; Michael Drayton, Poly-Olbion, dedication, To my
Friends, the Cambro-Britatns; Francis Meres, Palladis Tamia, wits treasury,
1598, in Smith, Elizabethan Critical Essays vol. n, p. 314; Thomas Nash, A
General Censure, 1589, in ibid., vol. I, p. 318; Philip Sidney, An Apologie, vol.
I, p. 152.
99. Thomas Nash, The Unfortunate Traveler: or, the Life of Jack Wilton, 1594, in
H. E. Rollins and H. Baker, eds., The Renaissance in England (Boston: D. C.
Heath, 1954), p. 794; Richard Carew, Epistle on the Excellency of the English
Tongue, 159596, in Smith, Elizabethan Critical Essays, vol. II, p. 293; Meres,
Palladis Tamia, pp. 313, 317; Nash, A General Censure, p. 318; John Weever,
Epigrams, 1599, Epigram 22, in Rollins and Baker, Renaissance in England,
p. 467. Of course, authors are not the only ones to be adorned with such epi
thets and claimedwith a pronoun our and possessive prideas the repre
sentatives of the nation. In Hakluyt, for instance, orse naturally finds a refer
ence to our famous chieftan Sir Francis Drake. Nevertheless, it remains a fact
that in. the sixteenth centuryin distinction from a later periodthe authors,
the people writing in English, are the focus of attention and collective venera
tion by the cultural elite.
100. Sidney, An Apologie, p. 152; Samuel Daniel, Musophilus: Containing a Gen
eral Defence of All Learning, ed. R_ Himdick (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue
University Press, 1965), p. 86; Richard Stanyhursr, On the translation of Vir
gil, in Smith, Elizabethan Critical Essays, voL I, p. 138; Meres, Palladis
Tamia, p. 319; Michael Drayton, Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, to Geral
dine, from England's Heroical Epistles, 1598, in Rollins and Baker, Renats-
506 Notes to Pages 7073
sance in England, p. 434. (Italian and French were the two languages most
constantly evoked for comparison, while other contemporary tongues with'
which English was compared included German and Dutch.)
101. Carew, Epistle, pp. 285, 290,292-293.
102. Daniel, Musophtlus, p. 86.
103. Meres, Palladis Tamia, p. 316; Ascham, Toxophilus, p. 53; Ben Jonson, Epi
gram to William Camden, 1616, in Rollins and Baker, Renaissance in Eng
land, p. 492; Peacham, Complete Gentleman, 1634 edition, sig. Cc2, quoted in
Heltzels introduction, p. x.
104. These are the numbers given by Hailer, Foxes Book of Martyrs, p. 227. The
destinies of these Englishmen are discussed in Part 5.
105. Regarding this, see Mark H. Curtis, The Alienated Intellectuals of Early
Stuart England, Past and Present, 23 (November 1962), pp. 2543; Christo
pher Hill, Economic Problems of the Church (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).
106. Hooker, Ecclesiastical Polity, pp. 343, 357; Thomas Smith, De Republica An-
glorum {London, 1635), pp. 4849.
107. Joel Hurstfield summarized the situation: Above all, by the end of the reign,
Elizabeth had reached a stage in her relations with the Parliament when the
increasingly urgent constitutional problems were insoluble within the existing
framework of society. Through their control of direct taxation, the parliamen
tary classes made a bid for greater legislative power. Their wealth, relative to
that of the queen, had sharply increased. They had also some pungent views on
the political, religious, economic and diplomatic issues of the day, in which
they felt that their interests were as much involved as were those of the mon
archy. J . Hurstfield, Elizabeth and the Unity of England (New York: Harper
and Row, 1960), pp. 212,214; and Einstein, Tudor Ideals, p. 83.
108. William Camden, Annales Rerum Anglicarum et Hibemicarum, Regnante Eli-
zabetha, quoted in Hailer, Foxes Book of Martyrs, p, 231.
109. Both quoted in Stone, English Revolution, pp. 100,101.
110. Ibid., p. 99.
111. In the seventeenth century, at least, Puritanism appears to be at least as much
a political term as a religious one. It referred to the opposition. According to
Henry Parker (A discourse concerning Puritans, 1641, pp. 10-11), by a new
enlargement of the name, the world is full of nothing else but Puritans. To be
an honest man is now to be a Puritan, concluded the Commons (Commons
Debates, 1629, p. 178). Both quoted in Zagorin, Court and Country, pp. 192,
191.
112. Christopher Hill and E. Dell, The Good Old Cause, 1640-1660, 1943 (New
York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969), p. 307; also from Hobbes: The doctrines
which to this day are controversed about religion do for the most part belong
to the right of dominion (p. 163).
113. Quoted in Stone, English Revolution, p. 81. Another manifestation of the
switch was the patriotism of the English Catholics. Both at times of persecution
at home and in exile they pleaded to be allowed to devote themselves to their
dearest, beloved countrie. Sir Thomas Copley, forced to accept service in
Spain, begged Elizabeth for some employment wherein a good Catholic
Christian may without hazard to his soul serve his temporal prince, and con
Notes to Pages 74-78
507
fessed that though for a time I live abroad I cannot cease to be an Englishman
and love this soil best (Correpondence, ed. R. C. Cristie, London, 1897,
p. 10a Letter to the Queen, 1572; and p. 100a Letter to Dr. Wilson,
1577), Cardinal Allen too, in Apologie of the-English Seminaries, emphasized
the devotion of Catholics to their country and pointed out that only very few
of themcompared with the numbers of Calvinists in Franc*revolted in
England.
114. This was succinctly put by Levellers, who thought that the issue of the Civil
War was the question of to whom belonged the right to exercise the supreme
power over the people, D. M. Wolfe, Leveller Manifestoes of the Puritan Rev-
akition (London: T. Nelson and Sons, 1944), p. 237.
115- Geracd Winstanley, An Humble Request to the Ministers of Both Universities
and to All Lawyers in Every Inns-A-Court, 1656, pp. 713, in Hughes and
Fries, Crown and Parliament, pp. 243244. Winstanleys position was, among
other things, an early instance of the confusion between political and economic
equality, that is, between equality in liberty, or right of self-government, and
equality in prosperity, which would become a dominant demand in later peri
ods in both England and America.
116. Oliver Cromwell, The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell with Elucida
tions by Thomas Carlyle, ed. S. C. Lomas (London: Methuen, 1904), Speech
VIII, April 3, 1657, vol. Ill, pp. 30-31; Speech II, September 4,1654, vol. II,
p. 345; Speech III, September 12, 1654, vol. II, p. 388; Speech II, vol. II,
p. 358; Self-Denying Ordinance, December 9, 1644, vol. I, p. 137; Speech
XVII, January 25, 1658, vol. Ill, pp. 172-173. See also Kohn, Genesis.
117. Christopher Hill, Gods Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English Revo
lution (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970).
118. H. Belloc, Milton (Philadelphia; Lippincott, 1935), p. 22.
119. John Milton, in F. A. Patterson, ed. The Works of John Milton (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1931), Areopagitica, vol. IV, pp. 339340, 341,
305; Tetrachordon, pp. 137,117118; The Tenure of Kings, vol. V, pp. 3940.
On the evolution of Miltons views see Haller, Puritan Revolution, and A
Milton Encyclopedia, ed. W. B. Hunter (London; Associated University
Presses, 197879), especially the article Areopagitica, vol. 1, pp. 70-76.
120. Hill, Gods Englishman, p, 265.
121. The Book of Common Prayer (London, printed by His Majesties printers,
1662).
122. John Dryden, The 'Works of J ohn Dryden, ed, W. Scott, revised by G. Saints*
bury (London: W, Paterson, 1882-1893), vol. XV, pp. 273-377; vol. XII,
pp. 59-60; Annus Mtrabilis, vol. IX, p. 150. It should be remembered that
Daniels Musophilus was a general defense of all learning, and that he, too,
paid special attention to science and spoke of these more curious times
(p. 83). In his rime, though, science had not as yet acquired the specific meaning
it had for Drydens contemporaries. My argument regarding the connection
between science and English nationalism was first presented in Liah Greenfeld,
Science and National Greatness in Seventeenth-Century England, Minerva,
25 (Spring-Summer 1987), pp. 107-122.
123. Sidney, An Apologie, p. 160.
508 Notes to Pages 7983
124. Brian Tuke, preface to the 1532 edition of Chaucers works, in The Works of
Geoffrey Chaucer and Others, a reproduction in facsimile of the first collected
edition 1532 from the copy in the British Museum, with an introduction by W.
W. Skeat (London: De La More and Oxford University Press, 1905), p. xxii
(p. 3 of the original).
125. Sidney, An Apologie, p. 182.
126. R. F. Jones, Ancients and Modems: A Study of the Rise of the Scientific Move
ment in England, 1936 (New York: Dover, 1982), p. x. Also see L. I. Bredvold,
The Intellectual Milieu of John Dryden, 1934 (Ann Arbor: University of Mich
igan Press, 1956).
127. Francis Bacon, vol. XIV, Novum Organum, and vol. II, The New Atlantis, in
The Works of Francis Bacon (London: William Pickering, 1831, 1825).
128. Gabriel Harvey, in Grosart, Works, vol. I, p. 123.
129. This is the thrust of the famous thesis of R. K. Merton, Science, Technology,
and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, 1938 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.:
Humanities Press, 1970).
130. Jones, Ancients and Modems, p. 79, and, in general, The Gilbert Tradition,
pp. 6287.
131. William Gilbert, De Magnete, trans. M. P. Fleury (New York: Dover, 1958).
132. A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, eds., The Correspondence of Henry Old
enburg (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 19661973), vol. Ill, Letter
623, March 21,1666 or 1667, p. 373.
133. H. W. Turnbull (ed. for the Royal Society), Correspondence of I saac Newton
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955-1977), vol. I, Letter 29, Janu
ary 2, 1671 or 1672, p. 73; Letter 41, August, 2,1671 or 1672, pp. 107108.
134. Ibid., Letter 95, September 24,1672, pp. 242243.
135. Ibid., Letter 309, July 5, 1687, pp. 481..482. These contemplations, Hailey
went on, should be pursued because they would be of prodigious use in Nav
igation. This was only one of the numerous instances of promotion of in
ventions and scientific discourse because they were thought to be materially
advantageous to England. These can be interpreted as expressions of the util
itarian attitude to science, considered to be characterisitic of the seventeenth
century, but in fact, it is very difficult to distinguish here between a purely util
itarian attitude and the desire for national eminence, in the framework of
which utility is defined as service to the nation.
136. Letters of the most prominent scientists of this age, Boyle and Newton, are
almost exclusively devoted to purely scientific matters. There is little else in
themvirtually no discussion of the religious, political, or personal signifi
cance of science,
137. Newton, Correspondence, vol. II, Letter 248, January 1680 or 1681, p. 335.
138. Correspondence of Henry Oldenburg, vol. II, Letter 276, June 10,1663, p. 65;
Letter 401, August 21,1665, p. 486.
139. Ibid., Letter 361, December 13,1664, p, 337; Letter 364 (from Sachs) January
12,1665, p. 345.
140. (Bernard le Bovier de) Fontenelle, The Eulogium of Sir Isaac Newton (London:
j. Tonson, 1728), pp. 23-29. This is the original English translation of the
French text.
Notes to Pages 8393 509
141. Jones, Ancients and Moderns, pp. 221-222.
142. Thomas Sprat, History of the Royal Society (London, 1667), j. L Cope and
H. W. Jones, eds. of a facsimile edition (St. Louis: Washington University Stud
ies, 1958), p. 2.
143. Sprat, Observations, p. 102,
144. Ibid., pp. 171172,178. Sprat is a true patriot, and would combat the arrogant
foreigners wherever he perceived the need to do so. His defense of the English
cuisine, insulted by Sorbiere, is as ardent as that of any other national charac
teristic. The cooking too brings forth the excellencies of the English nature: I
cannot but say to the Advantage of Boild Beef and Rost, that the English have
the same Sincerity in their Diet which they have in their Manners; and as they
have less Mixture in their Dishes, so they have less Sophisticate Compositions
in their Hearts, than the People of some other Nations" (ibid., p. 175).
145. Sprat, History, pp. 114,150,78,371-372.
146. Ibid., pp. 426-427; Joseph Glanvill, Plus Ultra; or the Progress and Advance~
ment of Knowledge Since the days of Aristotle (London, 1668), p. 149.
147. Sprat, Observations, p. 179.
148. Bredvold, Intellectual Milieu, pp. 58-59; Jones, Ancients and Modems,
pp. 183-237.
149. The style of preaching changed dramatically during this period. While before
the Restoration it was characterized by affectations, fanciful conceits, meta
phors, similes, plays upon words, antitheses, paradoxes, and die pedantic dis
play of Greek and Latin quotations, after die Restoration its chief character
istics became plainness, directness, clarityin short, the scientific ideal. (R. F.
Jones, The Attack on Pulpit Eloquence in the Restoration: An Episode in the
Development of the Neo-Classical Standard for Prose, in The Seventeenth
Century, p, 112.) The vehement speech of horrid Metaphor-Mongers (J.
Eachard, The Grounds and Occasions of the Contempt of the Clergy and Reli
gion Enquired into [an eloquent title], 10th ed. [London, 1696], p. 55) was
opposed for having too much affinity with madness and distortion (Meric
Casaubori, quoted in Jones, p. 113). For that reason Sprat, in a charming pas
sage, proposed to banish eloquence out of civil Societies, as a thing fatal to
Peace and good Manners (History, p. 111.).
2. The Three I dentities of France
1. Collete Beaune, Natssance de la nation fiance (Paris: Gallimard, 1985),
p- 207; Suzanne Citron, he Mythe national: LHistoire de France en question
(Paris: Editions Oeuvrieres, 1987), p. 123; Jean Lestocquoy, Histoire du patri
otisms en France des origines a nos jours (Paris: Albin Michel, 1968), pp. 22-
23.
2. Quoted in Beaune, Natssance, p. 208.
3. The French text is quoted in ibid., p. 209; the Latin original, in Marie-
Madeleine Martin, The Making of France (London: Eyre and Spoffiswodc,
1951), p. 103. It reads: Christianoram sunt gentes er in varias secras divisae
quorum priroi sunt Frand . . . et isti purl catholici sunt. Note that rhe Latin
text does not use nation.
510 Notes to Pages 93108
4. Claude de Seysel, La Grande Monarchic, in Beaune, Naissance, p. 213.
5. Quoted in ibid., pp. 2X1,215.
6. Quoted in Martin, France, pp. 88,100101.
7. Miroir historial, cited in Beaune, Naissance, p. 214.
8. Citron, in Le Mytbe, writes: Au 15 siecle le lys royal et le lys marial sont
confondus dans une meme louange. Satan (1Anglais) sattaque au lys, Vjerge et
Roi, quf Dieu a fait croitre. Le lys est a la foi la vierge que toiis doivent prier et
le Roi qui, par ses vercus, accedera a la beatitude. La piete de Jeanne d'Arc ne
pouvait les separer (p. 131). See also Beaune, Naissance, p. 246. Regarding
the wavering loyalties of Jeanne dArcs contemporaries, see Martin, France,
pp. 112-114.
9. This possibility is suggested by Beaune, Naissance, p. 229.
10. A. Tuetey, 1431, quoted in ibid., p. 221.
11. Lestocquoy, Histoire dti patriotisme, pp. 6469.
12. Jean de Montreuil, LOeuvre polemique, Armagnac, and others quoted in
Beaune, Naissance, pp. 295, 296; also ibid., pp. 291, 297; Citron, Le Mythe,
p. 126; Code Michaud, Article 27, in F. A. Isambert, Recueil general des an-
ciermes lots fran$aises (Paris: Belin-Leprieur, 1829), vol. XVI, p. 232.
13. J-R Angleberme, 1517, quoted in Beaune, Naissance, p. 290.
14. Montreuii, LOeuvre, quoted in Beaune, Naissance, p. 315,
15. Chansons de geste quoted in Martin, France, p. 83; Masselin, in Citron, Le
Mythe, p. 136.
16. Patriewas used by Jean Chartier in 1437, Lestocquoy, Histoire du patriotisme,
p. 31; for more on the history of the word, see Jacques Godechot, Nation,
patrie, nationalisms et patriotisme en France au XVin siecle, Annates bisto-
riques de la revolution franfaise, 206 (October-December 1971), pp, 481--501.
17. Ronsard quoted in Lestocquoy, Histoire du patriotisme, p. 47; Joachim Du Bel-
lay, Deffence et illustration de la langue frangoyse, edition critique par Henri
Chamsrd (Paris: Albert Fontemoing, 1904), pp. 35,169.
18. Quoted in Lestocquoy, Histoire du patriotisme, p. 48,
19. The work was written for the edification of the young Francois I, published in
1519, and did little but present a theory which, in its main outlines, had long
been accepted. See 'William Farr Church, Constitutional Thought in Six
teenth-Century France: A Study in the Evolution of Ideas, (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1941), for its context, content, and importance. The
quotation is from p. 23.
20. P. Charron, De la sagesse, Book I, ch. 51, De 1estat, souverainetg, souverains
(Paris: Chasseriau, 1820, Collection de Moralistes Francais), p. 376,
21. See Maurizio Vkoli, From Politics to Reason of State, forthcoming, on a paral
lel development in the thought of Niccolo Machiavelli.
22. Quoted in Martin, France, pp. 139-144.
23. Ibid., p. 135. Dialogue is also analyzed by Church, Constitutional Thought,
ch. 6.
24. Du Bellay, Regrets, 1559, canto IX (Paris: Sansot, 1908), p. 33.
25. Quoted in Lestocquoy, Histoire du patriotisme, p. 48.
26. The possibility of the correction of a ruler by a lesser ma-jistrate is addressed
Notes to Pages 108113
511
by Martin Bucer, and the Magdeburg Admonition of 1550 admits the legiti
macy of resistanceby inferior magistratesin the case of persecution of the
true ref igion by a ruler. See discussion of Theodore Beza, The Rights of Magis
trates, in Julian H. Franklin, ed., Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Six
teenth Century (Three Treatises by Hotman, Beza, and Momay) (New York:
Pegasus, 1969), p. 30.
27. Francogallia, pp. 47-96; Vindiciae contra tyrannos, pp. 137-199; in Franklin,
Constitutionalism. The tatter work has also been attributed to Languet,
28. Francogallia, p. 79.
29. Theodore Beza, The Rights of Magistrates, in Franklin, Constitutionalism,
p. 109. John Neville Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 18 96 (New York: Har
per Torchbooks, 1965), stresses the feudalist character of the argument in the
Vindiciae: Its strange exaltation of municipal and provincial authority, seems
to carry us back to the days of provincial sovereignty and semi-sovereign com
munes {p. 116).
30. On the similarities between Huguenot and papist theories, see Figgis, Divine
Right; on the reaction of moderate Catholic, and Huguenot, opinion to the
populism of the League, see Church, Constitutional Thought.
31. Dialogue dentre le maheustre et le manant, p. 544, quoted in Church, Cowstf-
tutional Thought, p. 304.
32. Pierre Pithou, Harangue de Mr. DAubray, in Satyre Menippee de la vertu du
Catholicon dEspagne . . . , revue sur le texte compiet 1594 {Paris: Alphonse
Lamerre, 1877; Geneve: Slatkine Reprints, 1971), p. 187. Nous voulons sor-
tir a quelque prix que ce soit, de ce mortel labyrinthe, wrote the author. Nous
aurons vng Roy qui donnera ordre a tout, 8Cretiendra tous ces tyranneaux en
craantre &Cen devoir: qui chastiera les violents: punira ies refractaires: exter-
minera les voleurs & pillards . .. Sc conservera tout le monde en repos &: tran-
quilite. En fin, nous voulons ung Roy pour avoir ta paix. But, he added, Nous
demandons ung Roy & chef naturel, non artificiel: ung Roy desia fait & non a
faire .. . Le Roy que nous, demandons est desia faict par la nature, ne au vray
parterre des fleurs de liz de France. Ibid., pp. 185,187.
33. Constant, De Vexcellence et dignite des rois, 1598, French text quoted in
Church, Constitutional Thought, p. 308, fn. 16; De Rivault, quoted in ibid.,
and meaning ascribed to the first maxim of LoisePs Institutes, p. 338. Accord
ing to Figgis, certain elements of the theory existed before this period, but now
it was emphatically asserted (Divine Right, p. 120).
34. Figgis, Divine Right, p. 123, and ch. 6 in general.
35. For a discussion of Loyseaus views, see Church, Constitutional Thought,
pp. 315-335.
36. This opposition of political to religious loyalties was echoed in later centuries
in the conflicts between nationaux and sacerdotaux, patriots and clericaux.
37. The statement of Charles H. Mcllwain is referred to in the acknowledgment to
William Farr Church, Richelieu and Reason of State (Princeton; Princeton Uni
versity Press, 1972), as the inspiration for the book. Church lists and exten
sively quotes from the authors who contributed to the formation of the reason
of state" position in France under Richelieu. The discussion of these writings
512 Notes to Pages 114118
here relies on this work and often utilizes Church's translations (1972 by
Princeton University Press; reprinted by permission of Princeton University
Press).
38. J , Ferrier, Lettre au toy, in Paul Hay du Chastelet* ed, Recueil de diverses
pieces pour servira Ihistoire (Paris, 1643), pp. 8485; J . Ferrier, Le Catholique
destat? in ibid., pp. 91,93. Church, Richelieu, pp, 129132.
39. Du Chastelet, "Observation sur la vie la condamnation du Marechal de Maril-
lac/ in Recueil de diverses pieces, pp, 840841. Churchy Richelieu, p. 230*
40. Ferrier, Lettre au roy,topp. 85, 86; Catholique, p. 98; Churchy Richelieu, pp.
130* 134; Balzac quoted in ibid., p, 257.
41. Church, in Richelieu, p. 14, writes about this period: Unfortunately, for those
who would trace the growth of the French state, the word etat is ambiguous.
Nor only is the historic confusion between the kings estate and the state
perpetuated by the single term for both; in this period it was also variously
used to denote a territorial unit that was ruled by a single sovereign* the royal
government with its vast apparatus of offices and powers, and community or
nation at large. The most frequent and important usage was . .. the state as the
governing organ that was animated and controlled by the sovereign power of
the king.
42. j. Ferrier, Response au manifeste du Sieur de Soubize, in Mercure franqois
(Paris: Jean et Estienne Richer* 1626), vol. XI, pp. 242-243,
43. Richelieu, wAdvis donne au roy apres la prise de La-Rochelle, January 13,
1629, in Lettres, instructions diplomatiques et papiers detat du Cardinal de
Richelieu (Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1858), vol. Ill, pp, 182,195. The trans
lation here is from Richelieu, A Program for the King, pp, 2934, in William
Farr Church, ed., The Impact of Absolutism in France under Richelieu>Maza-
rin, and Louis XI V (New York: John Wiley and Sons* 1969), pp. 31, 33* This
and subsequent quotations from the Church book are reprinted by permission
of John Wiley 6c Sons, Inc.
44. Guez de Balzac, Letter to Richelieu, March 5,1631, insOeuvres (Paris: Jacques
Lecoffre, 1854), voL I, p. 199,
45. Reponse du Roy a Monsieur, May 30, 1631, in Mercure fran^ois, voL XVII
(1633), p. 262, Church, Richelieu, p, 209,
46. Discours dun vieil courtisan desinteresse sur la lettre que la reyne mere du roy
a ecrite a sa majeste apres estre sortie du royaume3in du Chastelet, Recueil de
diverses pieces, p. 446; Church, Richelieut p. 217; Sirmond quoted in ibid., p.
219; Mathieu de Morgues, Advertissement de Nicocleon a Cleonville sur son
advertissement aux provinces, 1632, p* 1, p. 91; Church, Richelieu, p. 221.
47. Ordinance of Villers-Cotterets, in Isambert, Recueil General, voL XII, pt. II,
p. 590; also see Ordinance of Blois* Royal. Declaration of 1610, in ibid*, vol.
XIV, p. 424; vol. XVI, pp* 68; Cardin Le Bret quoted in Church, Richelieu, p,
274; Code Michaud, Article 179, January 1629, in Isambert, Recueil general,
vol. XVI, p. 275.
48. Richelieu, Avis du Cardinal, in Richelieu* Lettres, instructions>vol. I ll,
p. 665; Achille de Sancy, Reponse au libelle intitule cTres humble* tres veri
table . . in du Chastelet, Recueil de diverses pieces, p. 563.
Notes to Pages 118-125 513
49. Roland Mousnier, Les XVIe et XVIIe siecles (Paris: Presses Universkaires de
France, 1954), p. 160.
50. Richelieu, Lettres, instructions, vol U, p. 321; Guez de Balzac, Letter to Riche
lieu, December 25, 1625, in Les Premieres Lettres de Guez de Balzac (Paris:
librairie E, Droz, 153334), vol. II, p. 21.
51.f Mathieu de Morgues, Tres humble, tres veritable et tres importante remon
strance au roi, 1631, in Recueil de pieces pour la defence de la reyne mere du
Roi Tres Chretien Louis XI I I , Anvers, 1643, p. 66.
52. The term did not exist then and for some rime to come; when it was first em
ployed as a self-standing noun in 1756, it meant the functions of police
the satisfaction of the everyday needs of the population, Roland Mousnier,
Institutions de la France sous la monarcbie absolue, voL II, Les Organes de
lftat et la societe (Paris: Presses Universitakes de France, 1980), p. 34. On the
organization of the governmental structure in the early seventeenth century, see
ibid., ch. 3, Chancelliers, conseils* ministres de 1598 a 166I W; Roland Mous
nier, Le Conseil du roi de la mort de Henri IV au gouvernement personnel de
Louis XIV, Etudes dhistoire moderne et contemporaine, 1947, pp. 29-67; A.
Lloyd Moote, The Revolt of the Judges: The Parlement of Paris and the Fronde3
1643-1652 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), especially ch. 1,
French Government and Society in 1610.
53. Mousnier* Institutions^ vol, II, pp. 149-52; also on the concept of creature,
see Orest A, Ranum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII (Oxford; The
Clarendon Press, 1963), ch. 2, The Creatures of Cardinal Richelieu, pp. 27-
44.
54. On possible reasons for Richelieu's identification with absolutism* see Orest A.
Ranum, Richelieu and the Great Nobility: Some Aspects of Early Modem
Political Motives, French Historical Studies, 3 {I 963)i ppt 184-204.
55. Ranum, f<The Great Nobility, pp. 201202; Councillors, p. 22.
56. Mousnier, Institutions, vol. II, Book II, ch, 1, Les officiers, pp. 47-66;
Moote, Revolt, p. 6. In addition to Parlements, there were different lesser
courts which adjudicated civil and criminal cases; cours des aides and lesser
organizations to deal with taxes; chambres des comptes for accounting*, and
other corporations, which, in each province, composed a hierarchy. The Parle-
ments, cours des aides, and chambres des comptes were, theoretically, sever*
eign courts, bur they had no right to legislate and were subject to royal review.
57. Moote, Revolt, pp. 4, 32, and ch. 2, The Reign of Louis XIII; Governmental
Revolution and rhe Officiers; Mousnier, Institutions, vol. II, pp. 487, 489-
494.
58. Godefroi Hermant, Memoires sur la vie ecclesiast'tque du XVIIe siecle {Paris:
Plon, 19051910), voL I, pp. 177,178.
59. Church, I mpact of Absolutism, p. 62. For general discussion*'see Ernst H.
Kossmarm, La Fronde (Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden* 1954); and Louis
Madelin, La Fronde (Paris: Pion, 1931),
60. Madelin, La Fronde, p. 338; Kossmann, La Fronde, pp. 259, 260.
61. Church, Impact of Absolutism, p. 45.
62. Claude Joly, True Maxims of Government, in ibid., pp. 49, 4652.
514 Notes to Pages 125132
63. On kings work, and particularly chat of Louis XSV, see Mousnier, Institutions,
vol. II, Book I, Le Roi, especially ch. 4, pp. 2731.
64. C. Dreyss, ed., Memoires de Louis XIV (Paris, Didier et Cie., 1860), vol. II,
pp. 230, 403405. (Passages from pp. 230520 are translated in Church, Im
pact of Absolutism, pp. 6973.)
65. jean Domat, The Ideal Absolute State, in Church, Impact of Absolutism,
p. 78.
66. J.-B. Bossuet, Sermon on the Duties of Kings, in ibid., p. 74. Eglises protes-
tantes quoted in Martin, France, p. 165. Politique tiree de 1Ecriture Sainte, in
J.-B. Bossuet, Oeuvres choisies (Paris: Hachette, 1868), vol. II, pp. 9, 21, 118,
122.
67. Pierre Corneille, Horace, Act U, Scene III, in Theatre de Corneille (Paris, 1765),
vol. II, p. 49; J. Racine, Esther, Act I, Scene III, in Theatre de J. Racine (Paris:
Librairie des Bibliophiles, 1842), vol. Ill, p. 189.
68. Pascal, Pensees (Paris: Editions Garnier, 1964), pp. 151, 152; La Bruyere, Les
Caracteres, Du souverain ou de la republique (Paris: chez Lefevre, 1843),
vol. I, p. 348.
69. Georges Pages, La Monarchie dancien regime en France (de Henri IV a Louis
XIV) (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1946), p. 186, and John Law, quoted in
ibid., p. 186.
70. Charles Godard, Les Pouvoirs des intendants sous Louis XIV, particulierement
dans les pays delections, de 1661 h 1715 (Paris: Librairie Sirey, 1901), p. 440.
71. Pages, La Monarchie, p. 189. Sympathetic to the institution, Godard writes:
Through the power of centralization, Louis XIVs ministers and intendants
assured the realm extraordinary development of national activity, suppression
of brigandage and the worst abuses committed by the nobles and justices, the
benefits of extraordinary justice without cost, severe control that won French
administration its reputation for honesty, regular accounting in the cities and
communities, and a notable decline of wrongs and vexations in matters of di
rect taxation . . . If the intendants had not been created, the French people . . .
would have been abandoned to the capricious despotism of country squires,
new nobles who held state offices, and urban oligarchies . . . In the absence of
liberty, consistent despotism is preferable- [Here the historian agreed with
Louis XlV.j There is always the possibility that administrative tutelage may be
skillful and impartial, whereas it is much less likely that a local potentate will
have both administrative skill and impartiality. Godard, Les Pouvoirs, pp,
443444, as trans. in Church, Impact of Absolutism, p. 163.
72. Les Soupirs de la France esclave, qui aspire apres la liberte, 1690, second mem
oir, in Church, Impact of Absolutism, pp. 102,103,104105.
73. Saint-Simon, Memoirs, rrans. B. St. John (Akron, Ohio: St. Dunstan Society,
1901), vol. II, p. 12. The religious nature of Jansenist teaching, to contempo
raries at least, was not altogether clear. Saint-Simon thought this to be an im
aginary heresy, a fruit of Jesuit conspiracy. He wrote (ibid., pp. 8687): I
need not dwell at any great length upon the origin and progress of the two
religious parties, the Jansenists and the Molinists; enough has been written on
both sides to form a whole library. It is enough for me to say that the Molinists
were so called because they adopted the views expounded by the Pere Molina
Notes to Pages 132..137
515
in a book he wrote against the doctrines of St. Augustin and of the Church of
Rome, upon the subject of spiritual grace. The Pere Molina was a Jesuit, and it
was by the Jesuits his book was brought forward and supported. Finding, how
ever, that the views it expounded met with genera! opposition, not only
throughout France, but in Rome, they had recourse to their usual artifices on
, feeling themselves embarassed, turned themselves into accusers instead of de
fenders, and invented a heresy that had neither author nor follower, which
they attributed to Cornelius Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres. Many and long were
the discussions at Rome upon this ideal heresy, invented by the Jesuits solely
for the purpose of weakening the adversaries of Molina. To oppose his doc
trines was to be a Jansenist, That in substance was what was meant by Jansen
ism.
74. The repudiation of several propositions allegedly found in Jansenius Augus
tinus and declared by the Pope heretical.
75. On the education of Louis XIV, see Maurice Ashley, Louis XIV and the Great
ness of France (London: Hodder and Stoughton for the English University
Press, 1946); and Mousnier, Institutions, vol. II, pp. 2123.
76. Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century:
From Feudalism to Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985), p. 1.
77. Mousnier, Institutions, vol. I, Societe et etat (Paris: Presses Unsversitaires de
France, 1974), p. 101.
78. Franklin L. Ford, Robe and Sword: The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy
after Louis XIV (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 31;
Mousnier, Institutions, vol. 1, believes that many of these were heads of fami
lies, which would make the overall number much larger. Ford does not seem to
think so.
79. The opinion of contemporary historians is also divided. Mousnier {Institu
tions, vol. I, p. 121) tends to agree with Coyer, and claims that in the eighteenth
century the nobility represented 2 percent. Chaussinand-Nogaret (French No
bility, p. 30) goes to the other extreme; his assessment is 25,000 noble families
. or 110,000 to 120,000 individuals in 1789. Ford (Robe and Sword, p. 31}be
lieves dHoziers Armorial, if adjusted, to be the most reliable source; his figure
is, therefore, around 200,000 individuals, or 1 percent of the population in
1715.
80. Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, pp. 2531.
81. Mousnier, Institutions, vol. I, p. 136; Ford, Robe and Sword, pp. 3233.
82. Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobilily, pp. 5253; 58; 63.
83. Saint-Simon, Memoirs, vol. I, p. 255.
84. On duels and the governments efforts to prevent them, see Mousnier, Institu
tions, vol. I, pp. 114120; and Ranum, The Great Nobility.
85. La Roque, quoted in Mousnier, Institutions, vol. 1, p. 103.
86. Ibid., p. 132.
87. Ibid., p. 125; Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, p. 30.
88. Lavisse, quoted in Ashley, Louis XIV, p. 80.
89. La Bruyere, Les Caracteres, De la cour, ch. 8, 63, vol. I, p. 301. He wrote
also: Ceux qui habitent cette contree . .. ont leur dieu en leur roi: les grands
516 Notes to Pages 137142
de la nation sassemblent tous ies jours a une certaine heure, dans un temple
. . . les gens de pays le nomment Versailles {pp. 305-306), Mme de Pompa- -
dour* quoted by Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, p. 45 >also referred to
the Court as another country.
90. Ford, Robe and Sword, pp. 174175; Mousnier, Institutions, vol. I, p. 126.
91. Saint-Simon, Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 66, 73; 3135* The particular mistreatment
of the princes of the blood, as well as the reasons for it, are revealed in Saint-
Simons characterization of the Due dAnjou, the second son of the Dauphin,
unexpectedly chosen by Charles H of Spain to succeed him on the Spanish
throne, <4Younger brother of an excitable, violent, and robust prince* Philip V
had been bred up in submission and dependence that were necessary for the
repose of the Royal family. Until the testament of Charles II, the Due dAnjou
was necessarily regarded as destined to be a subject all his life; and therefore
would not be too much abased by education, and trained to patience and obe-
dience. That supreme law, the reason of state, demanded this preference, for
the safety and happiness of the kingdom, of the elder over the younger brother.
His mind for this reason was purposely narrowed and beaten down (p. 283).
92. Memoires de boms XIVf vol. XI, p. 391.
93. Saint-Simon, Memoirs* voL II, p. 125.
94. Chevigny, La Science des personnel de la cour, 1706, original text quoted in
Ford, .Ro& and Sword, p. 10; La Bruyere, Les Caracteres, p. 303; Saint-Simon,
Memoirs, vol. I , pp. 295, 328.
95. La Bruyere, Les Caracteres, "De la cour 67, vol. I* p. 302, Saint-Simon, who
characterized La Bruyere as *a man illustrious by his genius . . - who died of
apoplexy at Versailles, after having surpassed Theophrastus in his own man
ner, and after painting, in the new characters* the men of our days in a manner
inimitable. He was besides a very honest man, of excellent breeding (Mem
oirs, vol. I, p. 105), certainly thought him trustworthy.
96. Quoted in Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Mobility* p. 7.
97. Saint-Simon, Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 267, 268.
98. Mousnier, Institutions, vol. I, p. 112.
99. This was wthe effort to exclude individuals enjoying some degree of indepen
dent, especially hereditary prestige from the sort of governmental functions
which might have made that prestige dangerous to the crown. This was no
innovation in royal policy, any more than noble opposition to it was a new
development. The Carolingians4missi>the medieval Capetians* baillis and se-
nechauxf the intendants of the sixteenth century and even more under Riche
lieu* all had represented stages in the crown's long effort to retain control over
its officialdom by superimposing new administrative layers over previous
agents who had succeeded in converting into personal property their respective
segments of delegated sovereignty, Ford, Kobe and Sword}p. 7. Also pp. 8,
35.
100. Saint-Simon, Memoirs, vol. I, p. 141, Also see Ranum, Councillorst p. 31.
101. Mousnier Institutions, vol. I, pp. 106107; Ford, Robe and Sword, pp. 1213.
102. Mousnier, Institutions>vol. I, p. 132,
103. It included members of the kings Council, Padements, and other sovereign
courrsall in all, thirty-one corporations. In the first half of the eighteenth
Notes to Pages 142-147
517
century, the overall population of the grands robins was 2,000 to 2,300. per
sons, Ford) Robe and Sword, pp. 5354.
104. Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility.>p. 35; Mousnier, Institutions}vol. 1,
p. 202. Nevertheless* it must be emphasized that financiers were not bour
geois by any criterion that wouid make sense of the term. Legally, they were
, more often than not members of the nobility, or were on the verge of ennoble
ment. They might have been born into the middle class,1* but cut themselves
off from it. They were a marginal and despised sector of the elite, but a sector
of the elite nevertheless.
105. La Bruyere, Les Caracteres, Des grands, ch. 9, 40, voL I, p. 335.
106. According to Mousnier, the merging took place late; Chaussinand-Nogaret
and Ford seem to think that it both occurred earlier and was more complete.
107. Saint-Simon, Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 183-184. Marriages between men of the mil
itary aristocracy and daughters of rich magistrates were not infrequent; they
provided the means for the families of the former, in the phrase of the period,
to manure their lands.74Yet this reflected the tendency toward female hyper-
gamy, rather than social acceptance of the nobility of the robe. Mousnier, Insti
tutions, vol. I, p. 164.
108. Ford, Robe and Sword, pp. 177-178.
109. Quoted in ibidMp. 72. Ford cites early in'the Regency as the date for the first
quote.
110. Saint-Simon, Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 23, 170; a petition of the church nobles of
1748-49, quoted in Ford, Robe and Sword, p. 199.
111. Henri Francois dAguesseau, LAmour de son etar,s>1st mercurial, in Oeuvres
choisies (Paris: Lefevre, 1819), vol. I?pp. 9293.
112. J . H. Shennan, "France, 1490-4715, pp. 472-483, in Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica, 15th ed. vol. I XX, p. 473.
113. Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, pp. 8283, rightly emphasizes this af
finity.
114. G. A. de La Roque, Traite de la noblesse, preface, 1678, in G. Chaussinand-
Nogaret, Une Histoire des elites>17001848, vol. VI, Le Savoir historique, (La
Ha ye: Mouton, 1575), p. 24- Boileau, Satires, Satire V: La Noblesse, in
Oeuvres completes (Paris: Gamier Freres, 1870), vol. I, pp. 101,102; La.Bruy-
ere, Les Caracteres, De quelques usages, ch. 14,18, vol. II, p. 107.
115. Henri de BoulainviHiers, Comte de Saint-Saire, Essais sur la noblesse de France
(Amsterdam, 1732), pp, 9-10, 11-
116. Abbe Gabriel Francois Coyer, La Noblesse commerqante (London and Paris,
1756), pp. 214-215; Philippe-Auguste de Sainte-Foix, Chevalier dArc, La
Noblesse militaire, ou Le patriots franqats {Paris, 1756), pp. 40, 85, 86.
117. Cherin or Guyot quoted in Mousnier, Institutions, vol. I, p. 101-
118. Quoted in Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, p. 20,
119. Ibid., pp. 21, 60. DAntraigues% said Simon Schama, in Citizens: A Chronicle
of the French Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), was the first
and most famous of all arisrocratic pronouncements of self-liquidation
(p. 121).
120. Quoted in Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, p. 6.
121. These regulations could be always overruled by the king, but this caused as
518 Notes to Pages 148150
much annoyance to the grands as would have unlimited access to Court honors
(for it was the expression of absolute power the king wielded over the nobility), '
and in addition must have irritated those of the not qualified to receive these
honors, for whom no exception was made.
122. Ford, Robe and Sword, passim. The assumption of leadership by the robe is the
focus of Fords book.
123- Saint-Simon wrote of the Prince de Conti that he was very well educated
against the custom of those of his rank. Memoirs, vol. II, p. 75.
124. Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, pp. 6585.
125. Alexis de Tocqueviile, The Old Regime and the Revolution, 1856, trans. Stuart
Gilbert {Garden City, N.J.: Doubieday Anchor Books, 1955), pp. 142, 145;
Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, p. 73.
126. Maurice Reinhard, Elite et noblesse dans la seconde moitie du XVIII siecle,
Revue dhistoire modeme et contemporaine, 3 (1956), pp. 537, 2024. Rob
ert Damron, in The Literary Underground of the Old Regime (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), dtes the income of Suard, a typical
case of a successful philosophe, as being between ten thousand and twenty
thousand livres a year, perhaps more. This compares well with the incomes of
large sectors of the old nobility. An editor at the Gazette de France, Suard later
took over its administration. The job provided him with an apartment where
Mme Suatd had a literary salon of her own (pp. 36). Much of the discussion
of the changing position of middle-class intellectuals relies on ch. 1 in Darti-
tons book.
127. Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, p-73. Cultivation is as characteris
tic of the eighteenth-century elite vocabulary as creation is of that of the
seventeenth. This change of terms reflects a basic change of attitude. While
creation implies making something out of nothing (or somebody out of no
body), only something worthy in itself deserves to be cultivated. Cultiva
tion refers to recognition of the innate merit of its object, and of the value of
merit as such. It is a sign of substitution of universalistic criteria of social ad
vancement for particularistic criteria, and of the transformation of an aristoc
racy of birth into a meritocracy.
128. Daroton, Literary Underground, p. 5.
129. Darnton, p. 3, quotes from Reinhard, Elite, p. 21; the quotation is taken
from John Nickolls (1754).
130. There is the people opposed to the great, which is the populace and multitude.
There is the people opposed to the wise, the clever, the virtuous; it indudes the
great as well as the small." La Bruyere, Les Caracteres, Des grands," ch. 9,53,
vol. I, pp. 345346.
131. It is expressed, for example, in DAlemberts Essai sur les gens de lettres et
les grands, Ducloss Considerations sur les moeurs de ce siecle, Voltaires Gens
de lettres, in the Encydopedie, and Gout, in the Dictionnaire philoso-
phique.
132. Turcaret was first written in 1707 and bore a different title, Les Etrermes. Tur-
caret, the fiinander, is its central and most contemptuous character. Le
monde, by exalted members of which the play was sponsored, however, is not
at all represented as noble and deserving of respect, but receives its share of
ridicule.
Notes to Pages 150157
519
133- Schama, Citizens, pp. 7173.
134. According to ARTFL data, its first instance is found in Guillaume Thomas
Francois Raynal, Histoire pbilosopbique et politique des etablissements et du
commerce des europeens dans les deux Indes (La Haye, 1776; written in 1770),
vol- VI, p. 80. (ARTFL is a University of Chicago data-base, a comprehensive
.file of the important French texts published between 1600 and 1930. It does
not include all the texts that were published, but seems to include every text of
note.)
135. VImprovisateur frangais (Paris: chez Goujon Fils, an xii, 1804), vol. 1II-IV,
pp. 45-46.
136. Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, p. 35.
137. j. j. Rousseau, Social Contract, in The Social Contract and Discourses, trans.
G. D. H. Cole (London: Everymans Library, 1952, published by David Camp
bell Publishers), p. 77, and Government of Poland, trans, W. Kendall (Indian
apolis and New York; The Bobbs-Merill Co., 1972), pp. 6870.
138. Noblesse, pp. 166181, in Encyclopedie, vol. XI.
139. J . le Rond dAlembert, Histoire des membres de iAcademie Frangiise morts
depuis 1700 jusquen 1771 (Paris: chez Panckoucke et Moutard, 1779), vol. I-,
preface, pp. xxxiixxxiii (Darntons translation).
140. See Tocquevilles discussion, Old Regime, Book III, ch. 5.
141. Quoted in Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, p. 6.
142. Ford, Robe and Sword; Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility; Patrice Higon-
net, Class, Ideology and the Rights of Nobles during the French Revolution
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Schama, Citizens.
143. Francois Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press/ Editions de la Maison des Sciences de PHotnme, 1981),
p. 183.
144. Bakac, be Prince, p. 81; Schama, Citizens, p. 859.
145. Quoted in Hans Kohn, France between Britain and Germany, Journal of the
History of Ideas, 17:3 (June 1956),p. 283.
146. Voltaire, Reflexions sur Ihistoire, Annales de 1empire, in Oeuvres com
pletes, vol, XXV, p. 170; vol. XIII, p. 513; Guillaume Thomas Raynal, Histoire
philosophique et politique des etablissements et du commerce des Europeens
dans les deux Indes (Geneve, 1775), vol. V, p. 10; Charles Pinot Duclos, Con
siderations sur les moeurs de ce siecle, in Oeuvres diverses (Paris: N. L. M.
Dessesartes, 1802), vol. 1, p. 10.
147. Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 13, fn. to ch. 6.
148. Voltaire, Lettres anglaises (Utrecht: jean-Jacques Pauvert, 1964), Letter 8,
pp. 4950, and Letter 20, Sur les seigneurs qui cultivent les lettres. There
Voltaire continues: II y a a Londres environ huit cents personnes qui ont le
droit de parler en public et de soutenir les interSts de la Nation; environ cinq
ou six mille pretendent au meme honneur a leur tour; tout le reste serige en
juge de ceux-ci, en chacun peut faire imprimer ce quil pense sur les affaires
publiques. Airtsi, toute la Nation est dans la necessity de sinstruire (p. 127).
The letter specifically devoted to the subject is Sur ia consideration quon doit
aux gens de lettres, where Voltaire writes: Tel est le respect que ce people a
pour les talents, quun homme de merits y fait toujours fortune . . . Entrez a
Westminster. Ce ne sont pas les tombeaux des Rois quon y admire; ce sont les
520 Notes to Pages 15S160
monuments que la reconnaissance de la nation a eriges aux plus grands
hommes qui one contribue a sa gloire (pp, 140, 141). Voltaire's impressions
echo Fontenelles Eulogium to Newton.
149. Montesquieu, De Pesprit des lots (Paris: Gamier Freres, 1945), Book XI, ch. 6
(De la constitution cTAngleterre, pp. 163-174). The English edition used is
the first American edition (Worcester: Isaiah Thomas, 1802); quotations are
from vol. I, pp 189, 191?185; ibid., Book XI X, ch. 27, p. 341; English text,
vol. I, p. 366, and Book XIV, O f Laws Relative to the Nature of Climate, ch.
13, Effects Arising from the Climate of England, p. 252; English text, vol. l>
p. 272.
150. Parlement quoted in Citron, Le Mythe, p. 150; Daniel Mornet, Les Origines
intellectuelles de la revolution fran$aise, 1715-1787 (Paris: Armand Colin,
1933), p. 23; and D'Argenson quoted in Jacques Godechot, Nation, patrie,
nationalisme et patriotisme en France au XV01 siecle, pp. 4S1-501, in An-
nales historiques de la revolution franqaise, 206 {OctoberDecember 1971),
p* 489.
151. Robert R. Palmer, The National Idea in France before the Revolution J our
nal of the History of Ideas, 1 (1940), p. 98.
152. J . J . Rousseau, Discours sur cette question: Quelle est la vertu la plus neces-
saire aux heros; et quels sont les heros a qui cette vertu a manque? in Collec
tion Complete des Oeuvres (Deux Ponts: chez Sansot et Gie* 1782-83), voL
XIII-XTV, pp. 10-11, 17-18. For comparison, see Government of Poland.
Grimm quoted in Palmer, National Idea, p. 105; the glory-loving citizen in
Schama, Citizens, p, 127 (the occasion is the death of the aviator Pilatre du
Rozier).
153. Rossel, Histoire du patriotisme franqais, 1769.
154. Condorcet quoted in Lestocquoy, Histoire du patriotisme, p. 84 \ Rousseau,
Government ofPoland3p. 99,
155. The calculations are the resuit of a computer search for sentences with the
words nation, etat>estat, patrie, peuple>France, and combinations of them, by
decade, between 1600 and 1800, There was a parallel* though not simulta
neous, decrease in the use of roi, royaume, and Couronne. The number of times
these words were employed dropped dramatically between 1720 and 1730,
then rose again, possibly reflecting the strength of Louis XVs position, but
started to decline steadily after 1770.
156. The numbers are: 17011710: 45 times in 7 out of 20 texts; 17111720: 106
times, 12/ 25; 1721-1730: 106, 15/ 31; 1731-1740: 156s27/ 94; 1741-1750:
210, 25/ 62; 1751-1760: 990, 43/ 95; 1761-4770: 948, 46/ 118; 1771-1780:
837,41/ 106; 1781-1790: 915, 68/ 97; 1791-4800: 530,27/ 50.
157. 1701-1710: 376 times in 12 texts; 1711-1720: 1,782/ 19; 1721-1730: 418/
16; 1731-1740: 1,584/ 41; 1741-1750: 628/ 40; 1751-1760: 1,643/ 49; 1761-
1770: 2,003/ 68; 1771-1780: 2,026/ 47; 1781-1790: 2,175/ 43; 1791-1800:
1,542/ 35.
158. 1701-1710: 34/ 12; 1711-1720: 279/ 14; 1721-1730: 116/ 30; 1731-1740:
590/ 30; 1741-1750: 212/ 36; 1751-1760: 462/ 48; 1761-4770: 658/ 61;
1771-1780: 719/ 44; 1781-1790: 806/ 40; 1791-1800: 442/ 35.
159. The numbers for etat are: 17011710: 491 instances; 17111720: 899; 1721
Notes to Pages 160168
521
1730: 453; 1731-1740: 2,647; 1741-1750:1,441* 1751-1760: 3*561; 1761-
1770: 3,640; 1771-1780: 2,303; 1781-1790-. 2,371; 1791-1800: 1*306. This
does not take into account the instances with the older spelling (estat)s which
may affect the numbers for earlier decades.-In any case, a textual analysis is
indispensable for establishing when the word is used in any one of its political
, senses.
160. Abhe Antoine Furetiere, Dictionnaire universel, contenant genfr&iement tous
les mots franqais, tant vieux que modernesset les termes de toutes les sciences
et les arts (La Haye: Arnout et Reinier Leers, 1690), voh 1I>pp. 214,215.
161. Dictionnaire universe! franqois et latin vulgairement appdle Dictionnaire de
Trevoux (1732), vol. IV, pp. 3233.
162. Dictionnaire de VAcademie Franqoise (Lyon: Joseph Duplain, 1777), vol. II,
p. 129.
163. Nouveau dictionnaire fran^ois, compose sur le dictionnaire de VAcademie
Franqoise, enrichi de grand nombre de mots adoptis dans notre langue depuis
quelques annees (Paris et Lyon: J . B. Delamolliere, 1793), vol. II* p. 140.
164. Bncyclopedie ou dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers>par
une societe de gens de lettres, vol. XI (1756), p. 36.
165. Furetiere, Dictionnaire universal, vol. II, p. 375; Dictionnaire de Trevoux, vol.
IV, p. 784.
166. Bncyclopedie, vol. XII, pp. 475-476.
167. Dictionnaire de l*Academie (1777), vol. II, p. 236.
168. Furetiere* Dictionnaire universe}, vol. II, p. 347; Dictionnaire de VAcademie
(1777), p. 212; Dictionnaire universe!, historique et critique des moeurs (Paris:
j.P. Costard, 1772)* p. 343.
169. jaucourt, "Patriotisme,p Encyclopedic, vol. XII* p. 181.
170. J . J. Rousseau, Letter to Charles Pictet, March 1* 1764 (No. 3162), in Corre-
spondance complete (Banbury: The Voltaire Foundation, 1973), vol. XI X,
p. 190.
171- Furetiere, Dictionnaire universel vol. I, p. 672; Le Dictionnaire de VAcademie
Eranqoise, dedie au roy (Pads: Jean Baptiste Coignard, 1694), vol. I, pp- 402-
403; P. Berthelm, Abrege du dictionnaire unwersel fraaqois et latin* vulgaire
ment appelie dictionnaire de Trevoux (Paris: Ubraires Associes, 1762), vol. I*
. pt.I I ,p. 141.
172. Jaucourt, Etat, Encyclopedic, vol. VI (1756), pp. 1819.
173. Quoted in Lestocquoy, Histoire du patriotisme, pp. 84, 85.
174. Quoted in Palmer, National Idea, p. 104.
175. John Markoff, Images du roi au debut de la revolution, ed. Michel Vovelle,
LTmage de la revolution franqaiset vol. I (Oxford: Pfergamon Press, 1989),
pp. 237245, 240, 239. The classic study of Beatrice Hyslop, French Nation
alism in 1789 According to the General Cahiers (New York: Columbia Univer
sity Press, 1934), also shows that the cahiers were not at all anti-monarchical.
176. Godechot, Nation, patrie, p. 495,
177. Philiippe Grouvelle, De I3autorite de Montesquieu dans la revolution presente
(Paris, 1789), p. 61.
178. See discussion in Ford, Kobe and Susord; also Maurice Cranston, ftThe Sover
eignty of the Nation, ch. 5, in The French 'Revolution and the Creation of
522 Notes to Pages 169175
Modern Political Culture, vol. II, The Political Cultureof the French Revolu
tion, ed. Colin Lucas (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988).
179. Montesquieu, Esprit, Book XXVIII, ch. 9; English text, vol. II, p. 209; French
text, vol. II, p. 218; Boob XI X, ch. 27; English text, vol. I, p. 367; French text,
vol. 1, p. 342.
180. Boyd C. Shafer, Bourgeois Nationalism in the Pamphlets on the Eve of the
French Revolution, journal of Modern History, 10 (1938), pp. 31-50, 35. In
the pamphlets Shafer discerns a change in vocabulary which shows a striking
change in loyalties and psychology. More and more la patrie was used instead
of le pays, le citoym and le coucitoyen instead of le sujet, and la nation instead
of Vetaf' (p. 32). Representative titles included the Catechisme national, the
Bssai du patriotisme, the Quest-ce que la nation? et quest-ce que la Francei
and so on. Shafer stresses that the nation was never explicitly equated with
property-owners. But he regards both the French Revolution and nationalism
as bourgeois phenomena (a view which agrees neither with recent analyses
of the Revolution nor with the conclusions of the present study) and therefore
does interpret the identification of the nation with the Third Estate as such an
equation.
181. Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 78; Rabaut-Saint-Etienne, Considerations tres
itnportantes sur les interets du Tiers-Etat, 1789, quoted in Shafer, Bourgeois
Nationalism, p. 38.
182. The notion of rhe nation as rhe elite of the population persisted well into the
revolutionary decade, as did the derogatory meaning of the people, though
the idea of who constituted this elite had by then changed. The dispute over the
proper name of what became the Assembles Nationale and the rejection of the
alternative tide, Representants de Peuple Fran<jais, proposed by Mirabeau, is a
case in point. See discussion in Zernatto, Nation, p. 365.
183. Rousseau, Social Contract, pp. 58, 80.
184. Seep. 173.
185. Rousseau, Government of Poland, pp. 9, 89,28, 29, 42. See also pp. 40,51.
186. Ibid., pp. 29,30, 97; 1516; Social Contract, p. 80.
187. See Darntons (Literary Underground) discussion of the literary underground
and "low-life. Schama {Citizens, p. 121) quotes Grouvelle as saying: O
Montesquieu, you were a Magistrate, a gentleman, a rich man; you found it
congenial . . . to demonstrate the advantages of a government in which you
occupied an advantageous place.
188. DAntraigues, quoted in Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, p. 21; Comte
de Segur, quoted by Schama, Citizens, p. 49.
189. Emmanuel Sieyes, Quest-ce que le Tiers Etat? (Paris: Quadrige/ Ptesses Univ-
ersitaires de France, 1982), pp. 30 (fn. 1), 32; Deiaute quoted in Citron, Le
Mythe, p. 146.
190. Sieyes, Tiers Etatp. 67; Jacques Godechot, ed., Les Constitutions de la France,
text of Declaration des droits de Phomme et du Citoyen du 26 aout 1789,
pp. 3334. See Yehoshua Arieli, Individualism and Nationalism in American
Ideology, for a comparison between the language of the Declaration and that
of the American Constitution.
191. Rousseau, Social Contract, pp. 12, 13; 15, 23, 14; 15; 23; 20, 21, 78; 31; 33,
34, 79; 47,49,56,57.
Notes to Pages 176179
523
192. Ibid., p. 16. This magic Erick by which less was made more also applied to
property. The Stated said Rousseau, in relation to its members, is master of
all their possessions by the social contract. His endorsement of this state of
things made Rousseau a socialist. But he believed that the peculiar fact about
this dispossession which he called alienation was that, in taking over the
goods of individuals, the community, so far from despoiling them, only assures
them legitimate possession (pp. 17, 18), and this made him a very naive so
cialist.
193. Ibid., p. 14; Government of Poland, pp. 1920.
194. Cest, en un mot, pour le bien de tous, parce que cest le seul moyen de par-
venir, sans injustice, a ne composer les assemblies que des hommes a qui leur
education et leur consideration personnelle donoent le plus de moyens pour
faire le bien. Consideration personelle here may be interpreted as, on the one
hand, status, and on the other, understanding or virtue. Marquis de
Condorcet, Oeuvres (Paris: Firmin Didot Freres, 1847), vol. VIII, pp. 155-
156.
195. Then, wrote Palmer, the national idea came to Sifeeverywherein a govern
ment that gave help to patriotic tragedies and took over schools [from Jesuits],
in theories of educational reform, in the Parlements and among their cohorts of
adherents, in the minds of those phslosophes who were still relatively young
after 1750, and in the wide bourgeois circles where the philosophic ideas
spread" ("National Idea, pp. 107-108). In the light of more recent studies,
one might disagree with Palmer that the circles where the philosophic ideas
spread were bourgeois, but his dating of the formation of national con
sciousness is correct.
196. Originally regeneration referred to the return to the days when France was
faithful to its fundamental laws and ancient constitution. It had feudal
and possibly certain Renaissanceconnotations. It was not from the start a
metaphor for winning back from England the position of centrality in Europe,
but it is certain that in the course of the century this increasingly became its
predominant meaning.
197. Voltaire to Mme dEpinay, July 6, 1766, in Correspondence complete (Ban
bury: The Voltaire Foundation), vol. XXX, p. 299.
198. Frances Acomb, Anglophobia in France, 17631789: An Essay in the History
of Constitutionalism and Nationalism (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1950), pp. 16, 26, 54. This book contains a very detailed and informative dis
cussion of the varieties and development of the Anglophobe opinion in France.
199. At the same time, liberty in France retained an intensely individualistic, in
fact egocentric, connotation, as unqualified in its rejection of all authority, and
all limitations (including those imposed by the rights of other individuals), as
liberty as an attribute of general will was in its submission to authority. Such
libertarianism, a spirit of revolt for the sake of revolt, inconsiderate of others
and unmindful of its own implications, was characteristic of Lafayette and ex
pressed, for example, in the heros youthful sympathy for man-hunting carni
vores described by Schama (Citizens, pp. 2627). The case of Lafayette makes
it clear that the two liberties, however contradictory in theory, could coexist
in the very same person without ever making him aware of the contradiction
between them.
524
Notes to Pages 179185
200. Mably, De 1etude de ihistoire in Collection complete des oeuvres de VAbbe
de Mably, vol. XII (Paris: Desbriere, {an 10 de la Republique [179495]), -
pp. 230,233; 218.
201. Rousseau, Government of Poland, pp. 4041, 36; 32, 36; Social Contract,
p. 78.
202. Rousseau, Government of Poland, p. 36.
203. Mably, De 1iStude, pp. 238, 240. See also Holbach, Ethnocratie, Ou Le Gou-
vernment sur la morale.
204. Palmer, "National I deap. 100. Schama also talks about the Seven Years War
as a stimulant of patriotic culture {Citizens, pp. xv; 33-34).
205. Les sauvages de 1Europe (Berlin, 1760); quoted in Palmer, National Idea,
p. 100.
206. Pierre Laurent Buyreitc de Beiioy. Le Siege de Calais, preface, p. v.
207. Schama put it strongly: For France, without any question, the Revolution
began in America. Citizens, p. 24.
208. Alphonse Aulard, Histoire politique de la revolution fran^aise (Paris: Armand
Colin, 1901), p. 20; Lettres a. Lord Shelburne, depuis Marquis de Lansdowne
(Paris: E. Plon, Nourritetcie., 1898), p. 110.
209. That is, if any motivation besides general restlessness is to be attributed to
them. Lafayettes motto is reported to be Why not? Schama, Citizens, p. 42.
210. Ibid.: Segur quoted on p. 25, Lafayette on pp. 25,40, Vergennes on p. 49.
211. Journal de Geneve, 1779, quoted in Acomb, Anglophobia, p. 77. (See also
"Observations impartiales sur la guerre actuelle des Anglois avec leur colo
nies, in Journal historique et litteraire, July 15, 1777, pt. II. [vol. CXLVII},
p. 418.) Brissot quoted in Acomb, p. 83. On Brissot as the denizen of rhe
fringes, see Darnton, Literary Underground, pp. 21-22, 35-38, 4170. Af
faires de IAngleterre et de I'Amerique, voi. I, no. 1(1776), quoted in Acomb,
p. SS.
212. This work, although completed in 1772, was first published in 1782.
213. Tocqueville, The Old Regime, p. 146; Acomb, Anglophobia, p. 101.
214. Louis Edme Bilkrdon de Sauvigny, 'Washington: ou, La liberte du nouveau
monde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), Act I, Scene V; Camille
Desmoulins, La France libre, 1793 (Paris: Ebrard, 1S34), p, 67.
215. Napoleon, Decree of October 26, 1806, quoted in Kohn, France between
Britain and Germany, pp. 283300.
216. Rouget de Lisle, Chant de vengeances, 1797, in Poesies nationales de la rev
olution franqaise, ou Recueil complet des chants, hymnes, couplets, odes, chan
sons patriotiques (Paris: Michel Fils Aine & Bailly, 1836), pp. 285287; Ponce-
Denis E. Lebrun, Ode nationale contre lAnglererre, Poesies, pp. 292296.
217. On the internal differentiation of the French bourgeoisie before the Revolution,
see Elinor G. Barber, The Bourgeoisie in Eighteenth-Century France (Prince
ton: Princeton University Press, 1955).
- 218. Le Brun, La votx de citoyen, 1769 (?), quoted in Shafer, Bourgeois National
ism, pp. 34,35.
219. See Hyslop, French Nationalism.
220. For example in Catechisme national, 173.9. p. 10 (quoted in Shafer, Bourgeois
Nationalism," pp. 3536): Une nation est une societe dhommes libres, qui
Notes to Pages 185-195
525
vivent sous un raeme chef, ou plusieurs chefs quils se sont donnes volontaire-
merst, pour ne faire quune seul et meme corps dont Fame sont les loix par
lesquelles ils pretendem etre gouvernes.
221. A, J. Rupe (Raup) de Baptestein de M.oulier$y-Memoire sur un moyen facile et
infaillible de faire renaitre le patriotisme en France, dans toutes les classes des
.citoyens, cotnme dans les deux sexes . . ., 1789, quoted in Shafer, Bourgeois
Nationalism, p. 33, and references in ibid., p. 47.
222. Tocqueville, The Old Regime, p. 209.
223. For connotations of Grande Nation, see Godechot, Nation, patrie, pp. 499-
500.
3. The Scythian Rome: Russia
1. Referred to in N. I. Pavlenko, Idei absolutisms v zakonodatelstve XVIII
veka, in N. M. Druzhinin, ed., Absolutism v Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1964),
p. 398.
2. Polnoie sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii s 1649 goda {hereafter cited as
PSZ), 1830, #1752, vol. IV, pp. 8-10, and others; #1804, vol. IV, pp. 66-72;
#2789, vol. V, pp. 91-95. This evolution of the concept helps to explain why
the Russian State was, less than anywhere else, the State of this or that class,
but the States State. A. Gerschenkron, Europe in the Russian Mirror: Four
Lectures in Economic History {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1970), p. 79. It was identical with autocracy, or rather, with each and every
ruling autocrat. This also explains why, in Russia, the Srare never became iden
tified with the Nation, but could be so easily defined as something alien to and
superimposed on it. An informative and thoroughly documented piece on this
issue is James Cracraft, Empire versus Nation: Russian Political Theory under
Peter I, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 10 {December 19S6), pp. 524-541.
3. PSZ, #1910, vol. IV, pp. 192-193; #1899, vol. IV, p. 189.
4. For example, N. V. Riasanovsky, A Parting of Ways: Government and the Ed
ucated Public in Russia, 18011855 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976),
p. 12; Paul Dukes, Catherine the Great and the Russian Nobility: A Study
Based on the Materials of the Legislative Commission of 1767 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 1. The source of this opinion is a some
what hasty generalization in the otherwise informative review of PSZ by Pav
lenko, Idei absolutisma.
5. PSZ, #2287; #2298; #2301, vol. IV, pp. 543-545, 560-567, 575-577, and
so on.
6. This important wordotechestvooriginated in the fifteenth century and
originally applied to patrimony of the princesthe right coming to them from
their fathers and grandfathers (po otechestvu i po dedsWu). Whenever there
was a need, however, as under the attack from the khan Ahmat in 1480, to
arouse broader masses and inspire them to sacrifice their lives for the defense
of princely patrimony, it was represented as something in which these broader
masses too had a vital interest and for which they therefore were expected to
care deeply. In such cases what was generally regarded as the private property
526
Notes to Pages 195201
of the overlord thus acquired the highly evocative connotation of the patrie.
See L. V. Cherepnin, Uslovia formirovania russkoy narodnosti do konza XV
veka, p. 102, in Voprosy formirovania russkoy narodnosti i nazii (Moscow:
Academy of Sciences, 1958), pp. 70106.
7. PSZ, #2210, #2221, #2224 (vol. IV, pp. 424-425,440-442,444-448), and
others.
8. PSZ, #2315, voi. IV, p. 588; #3890, vol. VI, pp. 486-493; and #3840, voi.
VI, pp. 444445.
9. Brenda Meehan-Waters, Autocracy and Aristocracy: The Russian Service Elite
of 1730 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1982), pp. 60, 69.
See also Cracraft, Empire.
10. P. P. Shafirov, Rassuzhdenie o zakonnykh prichinakh voiny mezdu Shvetsiey i
Rossiey, 1717, reproduced along with the original English translation, with an
introduction by "W. E. Butler, in A Discourse Concerning the Just Causes of the
War Between Sweden and Russia: 17001721 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana
Publications, 1973), pp. 7377. The text of the Discourse, and the conclusion
in particular, is representative of Peters efforts to create a new secular lan
guage, which are also evident in his decrees. Very frequently one meets there
with Russian transliterations on foreign words, supplemented with an expla
nation, or a Russian equivalent in parentheses. Many of Peters or his collabo
rators importations took root; some, like sekul, did not.
11. Butler, Discourse, p. 32.
12. PSZ, #3840,1721, p. 445, my emphasis.
13. Pavlenko, Idei absolutisms, pp. 410-412,
14. PSZ, #5499, 1730, voi. VIII, p. 247; #8262, 1740, vol. XI, pp. 276-277;
#8473, 1741, vol. XI, pp. 537-538; and #11.390,1761, vol. XV, p. 875.
15. According to Prince Shcherbatov, O povrezhdmii nravov v Rossii (St. Peters
burg: V. Vrublensky, 1906), p. 69, the fateful Manifesto owed its creation to
the need of the Emperor for an alibi for his official mistress concerning the
night which he planned to spend with an unofficial one.
16. PSZ, #11.444,1762 vol. XV, pp. 912-915.
17. Catherine li, Zapiski Imperatrizy Ekatermy Vtoroy (Sr. Petersburg, 1907),
p. 585.
18. W. F. Reddaway, ed., Documents of Catherine the Great: The Correspondence
with Voltaire and the Instruction of 1767 in the English Text of 1768 (Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), pp. ix-xxiii; F. de Labriolle, "Le
prosvescente russe et les lumieres en France, 17601798, Revue des etudes
slaves, 45 (1966), pp. 7591.
19. In Catherine IPs Zapiski, I found only one remark that could be interpreted as
openiy contemptuous of Russia; this is the story of a stupid lady-in-waiting, on
p. 114, regarding whom Catherine writes: In any other country, instead of
sending such a person to the Court. .. the whole family would try to hide her
in a far corner.
20. Catherine II, Zapiski, p. 601. The very fact that Catherine did not choose to
follow these examples and limit her activity to luxurious dressing, sitting in an
armchair, and enjoying life, which would be the traditional, quite appropriate,
and easy option, but actually ruled her vast country, in itself, it seems, is a basis
for a measure of admiration.
Notes to Pages 201211 527
21. Catherine II, Zapiski, p. 626; and Nakaz Yeio Imperatorskavo Velichestoa
Yekateriny Vtoroy (St. Petersburg: Akademia Nauk, 1770). (This is a docu
ment on which the Empress studiously worked several hours a day for two
years, and which also became a favorite object of attacks, this time on her lack
of originality and tendency eo quote thoughts of others verbatim without due
acknowledgmenta tendency which she duly acknowledged.) The substitu
tion of the personal I for the usual royal we in this last passage of the docu
ment, which, kept as it was in every edition, could not have been a slip of
tongue, is telling. It was Catherines personal glory that was at stake in the
glory of Russia.
22. Catherine II, Zapiski, p. 647, and PSZ, #11.582,1762, vol. XVI, pp. 3-4. She
abolished the term slave in 1786, and one of the poets, Kapnist, celebrated
this historical occasion in exalted verse. On the Abolition of the Term Slave,"
in Clarence A. Manning, ed., Anthology of Eighteenth-Century Russian Liter
ature (New York: Kings Crown Press, 1951), vol. II, pp. 67-68.
23. PSZ, #11.598,1762, vol. XVI, pp. 12-13.
24. The story about Walachia is told by Zernatto, Nation, pp. 362-363.
25. PSZ, #11.584, 1762, vol. XVI, p. 4, and others, and #16.187, 1785, vol,
XXII,pp. 344358, specifically, pp. 345, 348.
26. Labriolle, Le prosvescenie, p, 75.
27. PSZ, #16.187, Charter of the Rights, Liberties, and Privileges of the Russian
Nobility, p. 344, and #16.188,1785, vol. XXII, p. 358.
28. J. Blum, Russia, pp. 68-97, in D. Spring, ed., European Nobility in the Nine
teenth Century (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 68; M.
Beloff, Russia, pp. 172-181, in A. Goodwin, ed., The European Nobility in
the Eighteenth Century (London: A. & Ch. Black, 1953), p. 173.
29. Dvorsanstvo, Enziclopedicheskiy slovar (St. Petersburg: Brokhaus and
Evfron), vol. X, pp. 203218; Meehan-Waters, Autocracy, p. 138. (In the sev
enteenth century, an average member of the Boyar Council, who belonged to
the upper echelon of servitors, held estates in six provincesMeehan-Waters,
p. 6.) S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (London: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1963), p. 182.
30. Mestnichestvo, Enziclopedicheskiy slovar, vol. XX, p. 332.
31. Meehan-Waters, Autocracy, pp. 9,11.
32. Ibid., pp. 2,36.
33. Algarotti; quoted in Beloff, Russia, p. 177.
34. Meehan-Waters, Autocracy, p. 18.
35. PSZ, #3890, pt. 11, p. 491.
36. This is dubious, however. There is no sign of relief in the evidence we have:
literature and occasional diaries {for example, Dolgorukaia). It is probable,
though, that during these decades, the experience of the crisis itself stabilized
on a certain level and was not aggravated.
37. The succession crisis of 1730 itself was a sign of the sense of insecurity and
discontent among the nobility and an eloquent expression of the suspicions its
two sectorsthe ancient and the new nobilityhad of each other.
38. Seenotel5.
39. Catherine H, Zapiski, p. 533.
40. Beloff, Russia, p. 181.
528
Notes to Pages 211218
41. A. V. Romanovich-Slovatinski, Dvorianstva v Rossii otnachala XVIII veka do
otmeny krepostnogo pram (St. Petersburg: Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1870),
p. 212. See also Dukes, Catherine the Great and the Russian Nobility, p. 6.
42. Catherine II, Zapiskt, p. 626; PSZ, #12.465, vol. XVII, p. 319; #12.723, vol.
XVII, p. 938; #13.306, vol. XVIII, pp. 898-899. Also see M. M. Shtrange,
Demokraticheskaia intelligentsia Rossii XVIII veka (Moscow: Nauka, 1965),
pp. 262263.
43. Dukes, Catherine the Great and the Russian Nobility, p. 84.
44. PSZ, Charter of Nobility, #16.187, 1785; M. Diakov, "Dvoryanstvo, En-
zyclopedicheskii slovar*, vol. X, pp. 206208.
45. Regarding the Commission, see Dukes, Catherine the Great and the Russian
Nobility, pp. 55, 6162; the InstructionBeloff, Russia, p. 187; the crisis
in noble fortunesP. G. Liubomirov, Kniaz Shcherbatov i ego sochinenia,
pp. vi-xi, in M. M. Shcherbatov, Neizdannye Sochinenia (Moscow: Works of
the State Historical Museum, 1935).
46. Dukes, Catherine the Great and the Russian Nobility, pp. 189217; Riazartov-
sky, Parting of Ways, p. 14; Shtrange, Demokraticheskaia intelligentsia,
pp. 254,267; 255.
47. Novikov served on the Committee as a secretary, after which, in 1769, at the
age of twenty-four, he founded his first periodical, The Bumble Bee.
48. The first Russian newspaper appeared in-1703 and was published by Peter.
Several periodicals of the Academy of Sciences, Moscow University, and the
Cadet Corps followed. Sumarokovs Busy Bee was the first journal published
by a private person, and it lasted only one year (1759). The coming of age of
the periodical press did not occur until Catherine. Already in the first half of
her reign twenty different journals circulated, and the number grew steadily.
Catherine herself was an active contributer and sponsored several publications.
49. Catherine II, Zapiskt, p. 627.
50. Ya. B. Kniazhnin, Izbrannye Proizvedenia (Leningrad: Sovetskii Pisatei, 1961),
The Boaster (Hvastun), Act I, Scene IV, p. 318.
51. Quoted in Dukes, Catherine the Great and the Russian Nobility, pp, 158,147.
The discussion of the Legislative Commission here relies on this excellent study
of the noble opinion in it.
52. See ibid., pp. 178-180; 129,142, 174.
53. Ibid., p. 122; Shcherbatov, Zamechanie na boishoi Nakaz Ekateriny,
pp. 1664, in Neizdannye Sochinenia, p. 16; O povrezhdenii nravov, pp. 47,
16; Liubomirov, Kniaz Shcherbatov, p. xxviii.
54. A. P. Sumarokov, Polnoe Sobranie vseh Sochinenii (Moscow: Novikov, 1781),
vol. IV, pp. 6162; G. P. Makogonenko, ed., Paety XVIII veka (Leningrad:
Sovetsky Pisatei, 1958), vol. I, p. 3S. (It is significant that Sumarokov identi
fied patriots with noblemen; his definition of the nation was very similar to
that of Montesquieu: the nation was, for him, the elite of the country, not the
country as a whole; his was fundamentally an estate patriotism.) Sumarokov,
vol. VII, pp. 356,358.
55. One finds this view already in the first Russian manual of manners addressed
to young noblemen, The Honest Mirror of Youth (Younosti chestnoe zertsalo).
Among different useful instructions, such as Dont glut like a pig and dont
blow . .. ro spatter everywhere or Dont clean your teeth with a knife, it
Notes to Pages 219225
529
included the following assertions: "Not a famous family and high birth make a
nobleman, but noble and commendable deeds and A peasant would be more
respected than a nobleman who does not keep his noble word and promise:
thats why it happens even today, that some rather believe a peasant than a
nobleman. Younosti chestnoe zertsalo, pp. 8-9, 11, in A. Alferov and A. Gru
zinsky, eds., Russkaia literatura XVII veka: Hrestomatia (Moscow: Shkola,
1915).
56. Antiokh Kantemir, Na zavist i gordost dvorian zlonravnyh, in Alferov and
Gruzinsky, Russkaia literature pp. 81-82. For characterization of Kantemir,
see Manning, Anthology, vol. I, p. 35.
57. G. Derzhavin, Sochinenia Derzhavina (St. Petersburg: Academy of Sciences,
1868), vol. I, pp. 431-433. For characterization, see Aiferov and Gruzinsky,
Russkaia literatura, p. 410.
58. Enzyclopedicheskn slovar', p. 207.
59. The orthography of fon-Visins name was changed into Fonvisin in the mid
nineteenth century by Professor Tihonravov, but Pushkin thought the change
advisable much earlier, for, in his opinion, it would make the name more Rus
sian and thus emphasize the national character of the writer he considered
the Russian of arch-Russians (iz pererusskih russkiy).
60. Denis Fonvisin, The Minor, Act 111, Scene II; Act IV, Scene II, Pervoe Polnoe
Sobranie Sochinenii D. I. Fon-Visina, 1761-1792 {Moscow: K. Shamov,
1888), pp. 125,138-139.
61. Fonvisin, Questions, Pervoe Polnoe Sobranie, pp. 812814.
62. Ibid., pp. 813814.
63. Piotr Tolstoy, Puteshestvie, 16971699; Andrey Matveev, Visit to Paris,
1705; V. K. Trediakovskii, in Alferov and Gruzinsky, Russkaia literatura,
pp. 24, 37, 89.
64. Younosti Chestnoe Zertsalo, #4, in Alferov and Gruzinskij, Russkaia litera
tura, p. 7; Sumarokov, Polnoe Sobranie, vol. IV, p. 63.
65. See discussion of this criticism in Hans Rogger, National Consciousness in
Eighteenth-Century Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1960).
66. Alferov and Gruzinsky, Russkaia literatura, p. 39.
67. In one of the earliest panegyrical dramas, The Sad Glory by Zhurovskii, writ
ten on the death of the tsar, Eternity extolls Peter for his untiring patriotism.
He was
AU the time in labors, not sparing himself
And moved only by love toward fatherland . . .
Quoted in L- V. Krestova, Otrazhenie formirovama russkoi nazii v russkoi
literature i publizistike pervoi poloviny XVIII veka, pp. 253296, in Voprosy
formirovania, p. 264.
68. 1.1. Nepluyev, Memoirs, in Alferov and Gruzinsky, Russkaia literatura, p. 19.
Nepluyevs memoirs offer an insight into the specific reasons why the Emperor
was so deeply admired and enjoyed such passionate loyalty from people whose
lives he, objectively speaking, disrupted and rendered very difficult. One reason
was the enormous personal investment of these people in his reforms; they
were not unlike the Marines in some respect. We, the disciples of Peter the
530
Notes to Pages 225234
Great, wrote Nepluyev, were led by him through fire and water (p. 16). The
other had to do with the truly remarkable personality of the monarch. When
Nepluyev, sent abroad to study, returned to Russia, he was examined by the
tsar himself and upon successfully passing the examination was rewarded with
an office and rhe privilege to kiss the august hand. The sovereign, turning his
hand palm up, gave it to me to kiss and said: 'You see, brother, I am a tsar, but
1have corns on my hands; and everything for this: to be an example to you and
at least in my old age to see to myself worthy helpers and servants to the father
land (p. 18).
69. Feofan Prokopovich, Slovo na pogrebenie, 1725, in Manning, Anthology,
vol. i, pp. 25-26.
70. Quoted in Krestova, Otrazhenie, p. 254.
71. Shafirov, Rassuzhdenie, the page before Dedication (pagination starts with
the latter); Krestova, Otrazhenie, p. 259.
72. Quoted in Krestova, Otrazhenie, p. 256.
73. Nikolai Karamzin, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii (St. Petersburg: Selivanovsky,
1803), vol. IV, pp. 285,283.
74. It is very dangerous to believe foreigners, he says; they are not our great
good-wishers; for this reason, one should not rely too much on their sciences
too. Krestova, Otrazhenie, p. 259.
75. Sumarokov, Polnoe Sobranie, vol. VIII, pp. 359361. (The title in this edition
is Another Choir to the Upside-down World.)
76. A. N. Radishchev, Puteshestvie Iz Peterburga v Moskvu, in Polnoe Sobranie
Sochinenii (St. Petersburg: Akinfiev, 1907), vol. I, p. 189.
77. II ny a pas de paysan, en Russie, qui ne mange une poule quand il lui plait, et
.. . depuis quelque temps, il y a des provinces ou ils preferent les dindons aux
poules, July 314, 1769, p. 30, in Reddaway, Documents of Catherine the
Great.
78. The full title of the refutation is: Die so genannte Moscowitische Brieffe, oder
die, wider die lobliche Russische Nation von einem aus der andern Welt zuriick
gekommenen Italidner ausgesprengte abendtheuerliche Verlaumdungen und
Tausend Lugen aus dent franzosischen iibersetzt, mit einem zulanglichen Reg
ister versehen und dem Brieffsteller sowohl, als seinen gleichgesinnten Freun-
den mit dienlichen Erinnerungen wieder heimgeschickt von einem Teutschen
(Frankfurt and Leipzig: Verlegts Joh. Leopold Montag Buchhandter in Regen*
spurg, 1738). This discussion relies on Krestova, Otrazhenie, pp. 267275.
79. The Letters were first published in Karamzins Moscow Journal, the most pop
ular periodical of the time, which, by comparison with others, had an extraor
dinary number of subscribers: three hundred. They appeared again in 1797.
Their numerous readers became inconspicuously educated in the traditions of
the European civilization; they as if matured with the maturing of the young
Russian traveler, learning to feel with his noble feelings, to dream with his
beautiful dreams. Buslayev in Alferov and Gruzinsky, Russkaia literatura,
p. 449.
80. Karamzin, Polnoe Sobranie, vol. I ll, pp. 60--61, 179180; vol. IV, pp. 280
288.
81. Fonvisin, Perttoe Polnoe Sobranie, Letter of April 1778 (from Paris, to his sis
ter), p. 963.
Notes to Pages 234241
531
82. That it was the government of foreigners seems to be the argument of the
most comprehensive treatment of Russian eighteenth-century nationalism
Rogger, National Consciousness.
83. Quoted in ibid., p. 30.
84. There were no men of mental labor (liudi umstvennogo truda) outside the
clergy, and if we exclude the several Ukrainians and Poles imported in the sev^
enteenth century to entertain the Moscow Court, in Russia before this time.
85. In the 1720s only one of the five St. Petersburg shipyards employed more than
ten thousand workers.
86. The students in these schools were raznochinzythey bdonged to that residual
category of people excluded from the taxable population (peasants, merchants,
and artisans) who did not belong to the nobility or clergy, the two groups
which composed the service sector. Admission to a school was regarded as en
trance into state service and implied exclusion from the taxable category. Mili
tary draft had the same implication, and thus soldiers sons bom after their
fathers were drafted were raznochinzy too.
87. It was formally founded by Peter, as an Academy of Sciences and Arts, in 1724.
88. The discussion of the emergent system of Russian education is based on
Shtrange, Demokraticheskaia intelligentsia, and articles in the Entsiclopedi-
cheskii slovar of Brokhaus and Evfron and the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. All
the figures are taken from Shtrange.
89. These figures refer only to secular education. For comparison, see the numbers
in Dukes, Catherine the Great and the Russian Nobility, p. 244.
90. This calculation is based on the information in Shtrange, Demokraticheskaia
intelligentsia, which does not at all focus on this remarkable drcumstance. The
number of Ukrainians among the non-noble intellectuals discussed by Shtrange
is extraordinary; it is beyond doubt thar they played a very prominent role in
the activities of the eighteenth-century intelligentsia; at the same time, the jig-
ures have to be systematically checked before a reliable estimate can be arrived
at. Fifty percent is an impressionistic assessment.
91. Quoted from Shumliansky and Znamensky by ibid., pp. 58, 22.
92. The growth of the sense of self-respect under the impact of education is illus
trated by the tragic story of Nicholai Smirnov, a talented serf of the Golitsyns.
His father, an able administrator who enjoyed the favor of his masters, with
the help of hired tutors gave Nicholai an excellent education, which the boy
continued in Moscow University, which he attended privately, owing to an
arrangement with the director, since without being freed by the masters, he
could not be formally enrolled. He proved himself a brilliant student. But with
the improvement of his education his sense of degradation (by his status as a
serf) also grew. The humiliating name of a serf made slavery appear to me as
a heavy chain which oppressed me. He asked to be freed, his appeal was re
fused, and the youth dedded to flee abroad. Caught, he was first condemned to
hard labor, then made a soldier in Tobolsk and heard about no more (ibid.,
p. 207). The number of suicides among members of this group also attests to
their uneasiness. See ibid.
93. Quoted in ibid., pp. 83,99.
94. Trediakovsky, Stihs pohvalnye Rossii, and Pohvala Izherskot zemle i tzar-
stvuyuschemy gradu Sanktpeterburgu, in Manning, Anthology, vol. I, pp. 41
532 Notes to Pages 241242
42- For characterization of the poet, see Alferov and Gruzinsky, Russkaia liter
atura, p. 89* In the EnZyclopedicheskii slovar*, Trediakovskii is characterized'
thus: KA prominent Russian scholar of the eighteenth century and an unsuc
cessful poet, whose name became an adjective for the mediocre poetasters (E.
Lyatskii, vol. XXXI I I , p. 750). Lyatskii adds that Trediakovskii was one of
the most educated people of the contemporary Russian society.
95. Derzhavins characterization, quoted in Rogger, National Consciousness,
p. 259.
96. M. V. Lomonosov, Anniversary Ode of 1747, in Sochinenia Lomonosova
(St. Petersburg: A. Srnirdin, 1847), vol. i, p. 94; Sochinenia (St, Petersburg,
1891), vol. V, p. 143; vol. L, pp. 119,135-
97. Sochinenia, vol. II, p. 252. This exclusion, apparently, applied only to Western
ers; it seems Lomonosov considered Ukrainians to be native enough.
98. Krestova, ^Otrazheniej* p. 282.
99. Quoted in Shtrange* Demokratickeskaia intelligentsia, pp. 107, 98. This egali
tarianism was sometimes expressed in openly anti-noble attitudes, one conspic
uous instance of which was the forged anti-noble decree found in 1764 in the
Senate, where many of the graduates of the Academic and Moscow universities
were employed as secretaries, copyists, and other clerical workers. Ibid.,
p. 117.
100. Ibid., p. 74 (regarding Popovskii), and M. V. Lomonosov, Polnoe Sobranie So
chinenii (Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 1957), vol. X, Sluzhebnye dokumenty
i pisma, 1734-176$ p. 55.
101. W. E. Brown, A History of Eighteenth-Century Russian Literature (Ann Arbor,
Mich,: Ardis, 1980), p. 88.
102. Lomonosov, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. X>p. 497 (Letter to Shuvalov,
November 1, 1753); p, 554 (Letter to Tepiov, January 30, 1761)* Science is
valued as a condition and a component of the national greatness. This is so in
the West, where great men of letters and scientists toil to increase the pridew
of their compatriots (Letter to Shuvalov, May 10,1753); and so it should be in
Russia, which as clearly a [the?] most important member in the European
system requires [cultural] splendor appropriate for and fitting its majesty and
power {Sochinenia, vol. V, p. 143). In letters to his noble patrons (for in
stance, Count Shuvalov), Lomonosov insists on this yet unfulfilled necessity
and, comparing the situation of academics in Russia and the West, emphasizes
the lamentable inadequacy of their support in Russia, In his poetry, however,
perhaps as a rhetorical device, he represents his dreams as an established fact.
The interrelation of science and national greatness is unambiguously expressed
in the Anniversary Ode of 1747. In it, Lomonosov depicts the reigning Em
press, Elizabeth, as a great patroness of science, thereby exhorting her to be
come one. The poet exhorts Elizabeth: Look at the high mountains / Look at
your broad valleys / Where Volga, Dneper, and Ob flow; / The secret riches of
all these / Will be uncovered by science i Which flourishes due to your gener
osity, and says to the Russian scientists: KOh, your days are blessed / Encour
aged, dare now to show / With your assiduity that / the Russian land can bring
to birth its own Platos and Newtons, swift of reason {The translation of the
last part of the sentence is Browns, A History, p. 88.)
Notes to Pages 244250
533
103. Noblemen such as Sumarokov also contributed to the development of the Rus
sian; tongue (see Rogger, National Consciousnessf p. 104), but their individual
efforts are less important than the collective effort of the intelligentsia.
104. Trediakovskii quoted in ibid.j p. 99; Lomonosov, Sochinenia, vol. I, pp. 528-
529.
105. Lomonosov, Rosstiskaia grammdtika (St. Petersburg: Academy of Sciences,
1755), preface, pp. 6-7; the translation is Roggers, National Consciousness,
p. 103. Rogger justly emphasizes the similarity between this panegyric to Rus
sian and Richard Carews Epistle; the similarity is all the more striking, since it
is certain that Lomonosov was unaware of minor English writers of the six
teenth century.
106. Shtrange, Demokraticheskaia intelligentsia, pp. 61* 84370,171,49.
107. Quoted in ibid., p. 214.
108. Rogger, National Consciousness3p. 194.
109. Bashilov, quoted in Shtrange, Demokraticheskaia intelligentsia, p. 158; Lo
monosov in ibid.j p. 157; Rogger, National Consciousness, p. 221. In general,
sec Rogger, pp. 202-220. Not only Germans, however, incurred Lomonosovs
patriotic indignation. When another Russian patriot, a Ukrainian, as was so
often the case, G. A. Poletika, wrote in 1757 a treatise On the Beginning,
Restoration, and Spread of Learning and Schools in Russia and on Their Cur*
rent State, Lomonosov condemned the workj for the researcher failed to find
any schools between the tenth and the seventeenth centuries to speak of (on the
flimsy ground that there were none)* and the treatise was not published.
Shtrange, pp. 80-81.
110. Quoted in Rogger, National Consciousness, p. 220.
111. This opinion is justified, for there is a break in continuity between rhe non-
noble intelligentsia of the mid-eighteenth century and that of the nineteenth,
while the noble intelligentsia of the end of the century is directly connected to
the nineteenth-century stratum for which rhe name was coined. See Marc
Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966).
112. The Word of the Russian tribe, which was renovated in our time by you, will
be carried in the mouth of the people over the boundless horizon of centuries.
Radischev, Puteshestvie>p. 220.
113. Novikov, April 12, 1772, in Alferov and Gruzinsky, Russkaia literaturat
p. 210; Fonvisin* Petvoe Polnoe Sobranie, p. 827; Derzhavin, Pamiatnik in
Sochinenia Derzhavina, vol. I* p. 534.
114. Catherine quoted in Rogger, National Consciousness, p. 113; Karamzin, Pol
noe Sobranie, vol. V, p. 346.
115. Karamzin, Istoria gosudarstva rossiiskovo {St. Petersburg: E. Evdokimov,
1892), vol. I, pp. xvii-xix. This is the same Karamzin who* breathing the
mountain air in the Alps, talked about being a citizen of the world as the true
destiny of man.
116. It is equally revealing that Karamzin became one of the most popular writers in
Gorbachev's Russia.
117. Karamzin, Zapiska o drevney i novoy Rossiif ed. Richard Pipes (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 22. See the analysis of Karamzins
534 Notes to Pages 251261
ideas and their background in Pipes, Karamzin's Memoir of Ancient and Mod
em Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959).
118. From the French petit mattre; see the excellent discussion in Rogger, National
Consciousness, p. 48 et passim.
119. Kniazhnin, Izbrannye Proizvedenia, Neschastie ot karety, Act II, Scene V,
p. 582.
120. Vral means "a liar; man is a German ending; Vrarmanthe name of the
German turor in The Minor.
121. Novikov, Truten1, p. xviii, August 11, 1769, in Alferov and Gruzinsky, Rus
skaia literatura, pp. 206-207.
122. Fonvisin, Pervoe Polnoe Sobranie, pp. 897-898, 903~909. The letters are ad
dressed to Count P. I. Panin,
123. Incidentally, like many of Fonvisins other aphorisms, this phrase is translated
from Duclos.
124. Chaadaev was proclaimed insane by- Nicholas II; his First Philosophical Let
ter, published in 1836, was actually written in 1829.
125. Hans Rogger, in his sensitive description, presented the incipient national con
sciousness in eighteenth-century Russia as evolving in a series of antitheses, one
element in each pair reflecting an aspect of Western society and culture as per
ceived by Russians, and the other, its opposite, upheld as a quality of Russian
national character. These were antitheses, such as mind and heart, form and
substance, age and youth. The list can be continued indefinitely, for the series
is organized around one principle: every pair is bat a variation on the theme of
the rejection of reason.
126. Fonvisin, Chistoserdechnoe priznanie v delach moich i pomyshieniach in
Pervoe Polnoe Sobranie, p. 856; Karamzin, Polnoe Sobranie, vol. Vll, O nau-
kah, pp. 77, 20, 24; Fonvisin, The Minor, Act III, Scene 1; Act IV, Scene I;
pp. 121-122,138.
127. Quoted in Rogger, National Consciousness, p. 270.
128. Fonvisin, Pervoe Polnoe Sobranie, p. 907; Derzhavin, Sochmenia Derzhavina,
vol. I, p. 435.
129. Yunosti chestnoe zerzalo, pp. 513, in Alferov and Gruzinsky, Russkaia lit
eratura, #50, #27; Novikov, Truten, p. xxiv, October 6,1769, in Alferov and
Gruzinsky, p, 207.
130. M. D. Chulkov, A Bitter Dole, from Peresmeshnik Hi Slavianskie Skazki,
pp. 110114, in Manning, Anthology, p. 111.
131. Karamzin, Zapiska, pp. 72-74 (Russian text); Fonvisin, Pervoe Polnoe So
branie, p. 908.
132. Isaiah Berlin, in Herzen and Bakunin on Individual Liberty, pp. 82113, in
Russian Thinkers (London: Penguin Books, 1948), has forcefully argued that
Alexander Herzen was such an exception; I attempt to show why I disagree
with this,
' 133. Pushkin (in an unpublished letter to Chaadaev, quoted in Leonard Schapiro,
Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century Political
Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967], p. 46), was to place him
alongside Peter and Carherine the Great as another example of the Russian
Notes to Pages 262-269 535
geniuswhat other country could boast of such a pleiad of extraordinary, spir
ited people on the throne?
134. Kahovsky to General Levashev, in Thomas Riha, ed., Readings in Russian Civ
ilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 297; Bestuzhev in
ibid., p. 299; Kahovsky in ibid., pp. 297, 298. Leonard Schapiro (Rationalism
and Nationalism) wrote about Decembrists: There can be no doubt. . . that
national pride, far from being an incidental element in their outlook, was a
dominant motive in determining their political attitudes. They were above all
overwhelmed by strong feelings of resentment and humiliation because the mil
itary triumph of I S 12 had not brought any commensurate political progress in
its train (p. 29).
135. R. T. McNally, ed. and trans., The Major Works of Peter Chaadaev (Notre
Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1969), p. xvii.
136. Chaadaev in McNally, Major Works, First Philosophical Letter, p. 32.
137. Ibid., pp. 27, 29-30,35, 37,38,40; 42,34, 44, 32.
138. Benkendorf, quoted by Riazanovsky, Parting of Ways, p. 171.
139. A. I. Herzen, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii i Pisem, ed. M. K. Lemke (Petrograd,
1915-1925), vol. XI, p. 11 (# 1539,1861).
140. Schapiro, Rationalism and Nationalism, sees nineteettth~century political
thought in Russia as split into traditions of rationalism and nationalism, West
ernism being fundamentally rationalist, and Slavophilism representing nation
alism. I do not think that this distinction is applicable to Russian thought in
general; it certainly cannot characterize the differences between and the nature
of Westernism and Slavophilism. Both were species of nationalism, and both
were very far from rationalism, unless we assign the term a very peculiar, idio
syncratic meaning.
141. Kireevskii, Khomiakov, and Aksakov, quoted in Rtasanovsky, Parting of Ways,
pp. 183,179,193,187.
142. Aksakov, in ibid., p. 192. In the nineteenth century the development of partic
ular nationalisms was no longer autarchic, and nationalist ideas which fit in the
matrix were freely borrowed from other countries and added to the inchoate
indigenous traditions. The awareness of Western, particularly German,
thought among the nineteenth-century Russian elite is ubiquitous, and almost
every nationalist idea has a paralleland a classic expressionin Fichte, He
gel, or their contemporaries and followers. Yet, in most instances, such paral
lels were cases of simultaneous invention, for they grew out of very similar
matrices which indeed developed independently. Even in the cases of a whole
sale borrowing, such as the adoption of Marxism, such borrowing was due to
the perfect fit between the nationalist aspirations in Russia and the particular
imported solution.
143. Granovsky, quoted in Schapiro, Rationalism and Nationalism, pp. 80; 79;
Herzen, Polnoe Sobranie, vol. XI I , p. 28 (My Past and Thoughts, pt. IV).
144. V. G. Belinsky, Pismo k Cogolu (Moscow; OGIZ, 1947), pp. 3-9.
145. Herzen, Polnoe Sobranie, vol, XIII, p. 26.
146. in the review of Zhukovskys Anniversary of Borodino, Belinsky eulogized
autocracy: Our freedom is in the tsar; Our unconditional obedience to the
536
Notes to Pages 269-273
tsars authority is not only our benefit and our necessity, but also the highest
poetry of our life, our nationality, if one is to understand by the word nation
ality a merging of private individualities through a general consciousness of
ones State personality and identity. See the discussion in Riasanovsky, Parting
of Ways, pp. 213216.
147. Hereen, Polnoe Sobranie, vol. XIII, p. 37; Granovsky, quoted in Schapiro, Ra
tionalism and Nationalism, p. 76. Berlins argument (Herzen) regarding
Herzens exceptionaiism hinges on rhe interpretation of Herzens views as es
sentially libertarian and individualistic, which was indeed exceptional in Rus
sia as well as in most of Continental Europe. But Herzen was a perfect Russian;
he was such an attractive, fascinating, extraordinary personality because he
was a perfect Russian, because he so fully imbibed the spirit of this beguiling
culture; and for this reason he held no views that were not in this culture.
Liberal individualism emphatically was not in it. Herzen was an elitist who
held massesand individuals who composed massesin utter contempt; he
did not uphold their liberty. The individual whose unlimited liberty he craved
with all the passion of which he was capable, and the craving for which he
expressed in that fiery, ardent language, the very power of which is the power
to blind readers to its meaning, was himself, and people like himself, the special
individual, the prophet and the leader. Herzen was no John Stuart Mill; Mill,
also an elitist, cared for the masses and believed that they could and should be
elevated by education. For Herzen, masses were irredeemable.
148. M. Bakunin, quoted in Riasanovsky, Parting of Ways, p. 218; Herzen, Polnoe
Sobranie, vol. XIII, p. 37; Schapiro, p. 100.
149. It may be necessary to stress that the fact that the composition of the cultural
elite changed in the course of the nineteenth century, and that at least since the
1860s raznochinzy predominated in it, did not fundamentally affect the nature
of its concerns. These were inherited from the noble nationalists of due earlier
period, appropriated, and developed. Far from being determined by material
existence, this inherited consciousness of die Russian intelligentsia shaped life,
defining peoples aspirations and passions and channeling their energies in cer
tain directions.
150. V. I. Lenin, Pohtoie Sobranie Sochinenty, 1914, vol. XXVI, pp. 106110.
151. I borrowed from the translation by C. E. Bechhofer (London: Chatto and Win-
dus, 1920).
152. Scythians is another reminder that beauty has little to do with other virtues.
This magnificent, majestic poem knows parallels only in music, of Borodin and
Rimsky-Korsakov, written in the same mood (for in music one may express
what one wishes without the fear of being taken at ones word). There is no
possibility of doing it justice in translation. And yet it was written for this
audience to hear. (The text is a significandy modified translation by Babette
Deutsch and Avrahm Yarsnolinsky, Russian Poetry: An Anthology [New York:
International Publishers, 1927], pp. 187189.)
153. For the sake of the rhythm Blok speaks of Paestums, but there is no doubt that
it is the City Rome, the embodiment of Western civilization, whose destruction
he foretells.
154. Ovid, Tristia, V, VII, 46. 1am indebted for this reference to Rory Childers,
Notes to Pages 279286 537
whose article Mandelstam and Soviet Power, in L. Greenfeld and M. Martin,
eds., Center: Ideas and Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1988), drew my attention to the pervasiveness of the theme of Rome vs. Scythi
ans in Russian literature of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and
gave me the idea for the title o this chapter.
4. The Final Solution of I nfinite Longing: Germany
1. On the meaning of Nation in German, and specifically on the conciliar mean
ing, see Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Grander, eds., Historisches Wdrterbuch
der Philosophic (Basel and Stuttgart: Schnabe & Co. AG, 1984), vol. VI,
pp. 406-414.
2. Ha jo Holborn, A History of Modem Germany, vol. I, The Reformation {New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 57.
3. Gerald Strauss, trans. and ed., Manifestations of Discontent in Germany on
the Eve of the Reformation, a collection of documents (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1971), p. 192.
4. Bebel, Celtis, Crotus Rubeanus, Eobanus, and Glareanus were peasant sons.
Holborn, Modern Germany, p. 107.
5. There was hardly a humanist writer who did not at one time or another
charge that Germanys past history and present achievements were being
shamefully concealed and flagrantly falsified by malevolent and covetous for
eigners. Strauss, Manifestations, pp. 64-65.
6. Ritter and Gtiinder, Historisches Wdrterbuch, pp. 407408.
7. Wie wir pflegen gegen alle Nation, p. 1947, Stiicke von Esther, D. Martin
Luther, Die ganze Heilige Schrift Deutsch, 1S4S (Munchen: Rogner St Bern-
hard, 1972), vol. IL The English text (from the Standard Edition of the Bible,
after the version of 1611) is [the favor) that we show toward every nation.
The location in the Greek text is Esther S. 121 (p. 968).
8. This disintegration was symbolized in the formula cujus regio ejus religio,
and in the middle of the seventeenth century it was legalized and made a fact of
international politics by the Peace of Westphalia.
9. Holborn, Modem Germany, p. 31.
10. In the sixteenth century the common meaning of Staat {state) was status or
social position. Thus it is plausible that the modern German concept of the
state represented the result of the reinterpretation of the princes social position
in the light of Protestant doctrine. It was a creation of Protestant doctrine,
whether or not Staat as status was its point of departure. See Adelungs Worter-
buch, 1801, pp. 258259; Triibners Deutsches Worterbuch (Berlin: Verlag
Walter de Grunter &CCo., 1956), vol. VII, pp. 508509.
11. Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Moder
nity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Com
parative Approach, American Historical Review, 80:5 (1975), p. 1222.
12. The growing needs of the state thus defined produced the first large group that
developed such loyaltythe corps of the bureaucracy, which, although ideal-
typical, was not typical at all, but also peculiar to Germany. These officials, no
538
Notes to Pages 286296
matter where they came from, identified neither with the interests of the prince
nor with those of their own social groups, but with the state.
13. Hermann Conring, De Origins Juris Germanici, 1643; quoted in Erik Wolf,
Idee und Wircklichkeit des Reiches im deutschen Rechtsdenken des 16. und
17. Jahrhunderts, in Karl Larenz, ed., Reich und Rechi in der deutschen Phi-
losophie (Berlin, 1943), pp. 111113; also quoted by Leonard Krieger in Ger
many, in Orest Rarntm, ed.s National Consciousness, History, and Political
Culture in Early-Modern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975), p. 85.
14. Krieger, Germany, p. 85.
15. William Jannen, jr., Das Liebe Teutschland in the Seventeenth Century
Count George Frederick von Waldeck * European Studies Review, 6 (1976),
pp. 165-195.
16. Krieger, Germany, p. 71.
17. Charles Ingrao, The Problem of Enlightened Absolutism and the German
States, Journal of Modern History, 58, supplement (December 1986),
pp. 161-180; 170. Also see Charles Ingrao, Barbarous Strangers: Hessian
State and Society during the American Revolution, American Historical Re
view, 87: 4 (1982), pp. 954-976, and Raeff, "The Well-Ordered Police State.
18. Quoted in A. Goodwin, Prussia, in A, Goodwin, ed., The European Nobility
in the Eighteenth Century (London: Adams and Charles Black, 1953), p. 88.
19. Ibid., pp. 8587; Holbom, Modem Germany, vol. 0, 16481840, pp. 196
197. Goodwin discusses other examples of the economic encroachment on the
nobility, specifically the conversion of royal estates into a family landed trust,
which prevented the passing of these lands into the hands of the nobility, and
encouraged the rise of middle-class estate-managers.
20. See Robert M. Berdahl, The Stiinde and the Origins of Conservatism in Prus
sia, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 6:3 {Spring 1973), pp. 298-321; W. H. Bru-
ford, Germany in the Eighteenth Century: The Social Background of the Lit
erary Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935); Goodwin,
Prussia, and Holborn, Modem Germany, vol. II.
21. Berdahl, The Stande, p. 301.
22. Quoted in Holbom, Modem Germany, vol. II, p. 203.
23. Goodwin, Prussia, pp. 89-90, 94; Henri Brunschwig, Enlightenment and
Romanticism in Eighteenth-Century Prussia (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1974; original French ed., 1947), p. 54; Berdahl, The Stande, p. 302;
Holbom, Modem Germany, vol. II, p. 264.
24. Brunschwig, Enlightenment, p. 82.
25. Goodwin, Prussia, p. 93.
26. Frederick H, Political Correspondence, quoted in Brunschwig, Enlightenment,
pp. 5152.
27. Brunschwig, Enlightenment, p. 53.
28. Bruford, Germany in the Eighteenth Century, p. 51.
29. Charles E. McClelland, State, Society, and University in Germany, 17001914
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 37,43-45.
30. Friedrich Paulsen, The German Universities and University Study, trans. F.
Thilly and W. Elwang (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1906), p. 48.
31. McClelland, State, Society, p. 46.
Notes to Pages 296302
539
32. Ibid., p. 28. There were twenty-eight universities in Germany that year, not
including the Austrian schools. Three more were added later in the century.
33. It was, most probably, larger than that: we tack some initial data and do not
take into account the population, which must have been already significant, in
1700. A more accurate approximation may be 120,000.
34. McClelland, State, Society, p. 47; Bruford, Germany in the Eighteenth Cen
tury,p. 159.
35. Bruford, Germany in the Eighteenth Century; p. 193.
36. Mme La Baronne de Stael, Oeuvres Completes, vol. X, De UAllemagne (Paris:
Treuttel et Wurtz, 1820), p. 109.
37. Henri Brunschwig sees trained unemployability in the late eighteenth century
as a function, first and foremost, of die dramatic increase in population, the
cause of the economic crisis in many areas and strata. This general increase in
the population may partly account for the influx of the nobility into govern
ment service. Brunschwig (Enlightenment, p. 128) cites the yearly average of
13.2 appointments at the rank of Referendar in Prussia, as compared with 117
appointments of a comparable rank in the legal branch.
38. Quoted in ibid., p. 125.
39. Der teutsche Merkur, 1785, quoted in ibid., p. 135,
40. McClelland, State, Society, p. 80.
41. Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal
Conditions of the Emergence of the Author, Eighteenth-Century Studies,
17:3 (Summer 1984), pp. 425448, quoting from a contemporary catalogue;
p. 433; Brunschwigs numbers are 3,000 in 1773, and 6,000 in 1787.
42. Wieland quoted in Brunschwig, Enlightenment, p. 140; Lessing, Schillerin
Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright, pp. 431,432.
43. Athenaeum: Eine Zeitschrift von August 'WilhelmSchiegel und Friedrich Schle-
gel (Hamburg: Rowohlt), vol. I, p. 103, Athenaeum Fragment #20. Unless
otherwise indicated, the translation is from the English edition, Friedrich Sdile-
gel, Lucinde and the Fragments (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1971). This quotation is from p. 163.
44. Bruford, Germany in the Eighteenth Century, p. 279.
45. Johattn Wolfgang Goethe, The Truth and Fiction Relating to My Life, pt. II,
Book X, in Complete Works (New York: P.P. Collier Sc Son, n.d.), vol. II, p. 9,
and Book XII, pp. 108-109. Regarding authors attitudes toward money, and
the changing status of literary activity, see Levin Ludwig Schiicking, Die So-
ziologie der Uterarischen Geschmaksbildung (Mimchen: RosI, 1923).
46. See Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright.
47. Quoted in Brunschwig, Enlightenment, p. 151.
48. Der durch burgerliche Verhalmisse unterdriickten Menschheit, Karl Philipp
Moritz, Anton Reiser: in psychologischer Roman, Mit den Abbildungen der
Ausgabe von 1785, Insel Taschenbuch 433 (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag,
1979), p. 315. All the quotations, unless otherwise specified, are given in P. E.
Mathesons translation: Carl Philipp Moritz, Anton Reiser: A Psychological
Novel (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1978; reprint of 1926 Oxford Uni
versity Press ed.). Matheson translates this sentence {p. 329) as humanity op
pressed by its social conditions; this does not, however, transmit the meaning
of burgerliche, with its emphasis on middle-class, plebeian reality.
540
Notes to Pages 303317
49. Mme Guyon was a Quierist; the tenets of her doctrine, however, on the whole
closely resembled Pietism.
50. Moritz^Anton Reiser, pp. 9>1011,26,44,73,51,55,
51. Ibid.* pp. 130,119,129,147,149-151.
52. Ibid., pp. 163,170,176,162,178-179,187,199,
53. Ibid., pp. 236, 237-238, 264,
54. Ibid., pp. 247,277,274,278, 289,315, 319.
55. Ibid., pp. 328329. Matheson*s translation is modified here.
56. Ibid., pp. 295,431.
57. See Brunschwig, Enlightenment, pp. 2632; 132135 on the plight of the
teachers, clergy, and so on.
58. Nicolai in ibid., p. 141; Bruford, Germanyin the Eighteenth Century^pp. 279
286, cites numbers of subscribers and buyers of various contemporary publi
cations. They varied between a few hundred {for instance, for Goethe's Works,
1787-1790) and a few thousand (for Schillers Tell or Historische Kalendar fur
Damen, to which famous writers contributed).
59. All quotations are from Immanuel Kant, What Is Enlightenment? in Kants
Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970),
pp. 54-60; 58.
60. Brunschwig, Enlightenment p. 90.
61. G. P. Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution (Hew York: Russell fit Rus
sell, 1966), p. 5.
62. Wieland, Johannes Muller, Niebuhr, quoted in ibid., pp. 2,4,
63. Goethe, Truth and Fiction, vol. I, Book II, pp. 39-40; 60.
64. Quoted in Gooch, Germany, p. 33.
65. Schiller, Lessing, quoted in ibid.?p. 34.
66. Le mouvement religieux le plus puissant en Allemagne depuis la Reforme.
Gerhard Kaiser, Leveil du sentiment national? Role du pietisme dans la naiss-
ance du patriotisme, Archives de sociologie des religions, 22 (JulyDecember
1966), p. 59.
67. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York:
Charles Scribner and Sons, 1958), p. 139*
68. Pierisdc roots may be found in earlier mystical movements like those of Jakob
Boehme, Valentin Weigel and Gichtel, in the earlier church poetry, particularly
in the work of Paul Gerhardt, and the work of more emotional and moralistic
theologians like Johannes Arndt, Theophilus Grossgebauer, Christan Scriver,
and Balthasar Schuppius. Koppei S. Pinson, Pietism as a Factor in the Rise of
German Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), p. 13.
69. By 1700, says Pinson (ibid., p. 16) there were about 32 cities in which the
Pietists had attained to a position of great influence.
70. Weber, Protestant Ethic, p. 130.
71. Quoted from Spangenberg by Pinson, Pietism, p. 22.
72. Moritz, Anton Reiser, p. 18.
73. Pinson, Pietism, pp. 1920.
74. Ibid., p. 24; Arlie j. Hoover, The Gospel of Nationalism: German Patriotic
Preaching from Napoleon to Versailles (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wies
baden GmbH, 1986), p. 8.
75. Quoted in Kaiser, L'eveil, p. 68.
Notes to Pages 318322
541
76. Quoted in Pinson, Pietism, p* 24. See Hoover, Gospel of Nationalism, p. 22,
who relies on Ernst Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study
of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modem World.
77. Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, The Life of Schleiermacher as Unfolded
in His Autobiography and Letters, trans. F. Rowan (London: Smith, Elder 5c
.Co., 1860), vol. I, Letters to Henrietta Herz of March 27, and February 22,
1799, pp. 203,189; and On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultural Despisers (New
York: Ungar, 1955), pp. 82,135.
78. Schfeiermacher, Life, vol. II, Letter of November 8, 1808, from Henrietta von
WilHch to Schleiermacher, and Letter of November 27, ISOS, from Schleier-
macher to Henrietta von Wiliich, pp* 150-151; 157158.
79. Weber, Protestant Ethic>p, 139. Moritz recalled how the landlady of little An
tons house, a shoemakers wife, liked Anton to read to her from Carl von
Mosers Daniel in the Lions Dent because it sounded to her so moral: which
meant to her, so elevated; and of a certain preacher, who always preached in a
very bombastic tone, she said she liked him because his sermons were so
moral. This, Moritz adds in a footnore, is another proof how careful we
ought to be in books and talk with the people to refrain from such expressions
as are not current among the people. In England even the most uneducated man
knows what moral means. Moritz, Anton Reisert p. 32.
80. Kaiser* L'eveii, p* 75* Zinzendorf spoke of national religions as specific
forms chosen by God to teach people, in accordance with their particular
aptitudes and in accordance with the climate of their countries, the truth and
the love of His Son (ibid., fn. 73).
81. Weber, Protestant Ethic, pp. 131-132.
82. Kaiser, Leveil, p, 61.
83. <EOn en arrive, writes Kaiser, de la sorte a un veritable culte du sang et des
blessures analogue au culte de la Passion de Jesus-Christ tel que Iexerce le pie-
tisme et, en particulier, ie herrnhutisme (ibid., p* 70). Some evidence of this
effect of Christian mysticism, elements of which are present in Lutheranism,
can be found in earlier periods and among Lutherans who were not Pietists as
well: the exaggerated naturalism of Matthias Grunewaids Isenheim Crusific-
tion, which knows no equal as a pictorial representation of physical pain, or
the harrowing yet enthralling emotion of Bachs Passion Oratorios, which also
have no parallels outside Germany, can be traced to the same idea. It is signifi
cant that Bach, like Luther, believed that music was the means of personal
union with God and a superior medium of revelation; it differed from spoken
sermon mostly in that it was by nature divinely inspired and made His Truth
directly accessible* Luthers view of the special religious status of music as the
most emotional speech testifies to the emotionalism of the Lutheran doctrine
itself; Pietism inherited it, and made it explicit. Regarding Baches philosophy of
music, see Otto L* Bettmann, Bach as Rhetorician, The American Scholar,
55 (Winter 1985-86), pp. 113-118.
84. See Kaiser, Leveil, pp. 70-73. Also see Hasko Zimmer, Aufdetn Altar des
Vaterlands: Religion und Patriotismus in der deutschen Kriegslyrik des 19-
jahrhunderts (Frankfurt am Main: Thesen Verlag, 1971).
85. Pinson, Pietism, p. 12.
86. Brunschwig, Enlightenment, pp. 247, 245; Ernst Troeltsch, The Ideas of Nat
542 Notes to Pages 323330
ural law and Humanity in World Politics, in Otto Gerke, ed., Natural Law
and the Theory of Society, ISOOI 8OO (Cambridge, 1934), vol. I, p. 203;
Friedrich Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsrason in der neueren Gescbichte
(Miinchen und Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1925), p. 451.
87. The Sturm und Drang group consisted of Goethe, Herder, Klinger, Leizewitz,
Lenz, Merck, Maler Muller, and Wagner. Among people associated with and
sympathetic to it were Hamann, Klopstock, Justus Mdser, Gerstenberg, Lava-
ter, Jung-Stilling, Jacobi, Heinse, and Schiller. Gottinger Hainbund included
Holty, Voss, Burger, and the brothers Stolberg. The early Romantics in
cluded the brothers Wilhelm and Friedrich Schiegel, Schleiermacher, Novalis
(Friedrich von Hardenberg), Tieck, and Wackenroder. Closely associated with
this group were the philosophers Fichte and Schelline and the novelist Jean
Paul (Richter).
88. Roy Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang (Manchester, Eng,: Manchester
University Press, 1967}, p. 7; Frederick C. Beiser, The Bate of Reason: German
Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1987), pp. 1920. My discussion of Sturm und Drang relies heavily on Pascal,
and quotations from works discussed are often given in his translation.
89. Herder and Nicolai quoted in Pascal, Sturm und Drang, pp. 95, 94. Goethe,
Truth and Fiction, vol. II, Book X, pp. 21,13ff,
90. Moritz, Anton Reiser, p. 352.
91. Goethe, Letter of August 11,1781, to his mother, in Goethes Briefe (Hamburg:
Hans Christian Wagner Verlag, 1969), vol. I, p. 369.
92. Brunschwig, Enlightenment, p. 244; Schleiermacher, Life, pp. 6475 espe
cially; Schiegel, Lucinde, "Critical Fragments, #76, p. 152; Schleiermacher,
Life, vol. I, p. 328: Preaching is, in the present day, the only means of exercis
ing persona! influence over men in masses.
93. William J . Bossenbrook, The German Mind, p. 249, quoted in Hoover, Gospel
of Nationalism, p. 11.
94. Ibid.
95. J. G. Hamann, Kreuzzuge des Philologen, Schriften (Berlin: Reimer, 1821
1843), vol. H, p. 281 (quoted in Pascal, Sturm und Drang, p. 91); Pascal, p. 90;
Hamann, in ibid,, p. 283.
96. Goethe, Letters to Herder, May 12, 1775, and to Langer (m French), Novem
ber 30, 1769, in Briefe, pp. 182, 97. Herder quoted from letters in Pascal
(Sturm und Drang), pp. 95, 94,104,102.
97. Schlegei, Lucinde, p, 194, Novalis, Aphorisms, in German Classics: Master
pieces of German Literature Translated into English, (New York: The German
Publication Society, 1913}, vol. IV, p. 187. Schiegel, Ideas, #118, #105,
pp. 252, 251.
98. Goethe, Truth and Fiction, vol. II, Book XIV, p. 190.
99. Novalis, Aphorisms, p. 186. Schiegel, Lucinde, Ideas, #8, #18, p. 242;
. #112, p. 251.
100. Goethe, Faust, in Werke (Hamburg: Christian Wegnert Vergal, 1949), vol. HI,
p. 110. Pascals translation, Sturm und Drang, p. 114.
101. Herder, Auch erne Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit,
1774, Samtliche Werke (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung,
1967), vol. V, p. 509. (Translation in Pascal, Sturm und Drang, p. 222.}
Notes to Pages 331-335
543
102. Herder, Letter to Caroline Flachsland, January 9,1773, in Herders Briefwech~
sel mit Caroline Flachsland (Weimar: Verlag der Goethe-Gesellschaft, 1926-
1928}, vol. II, p. 325.
103. Athenaeum Fragments in Schlegei, Lucinde, p. 212; Monologen quoted in
Oskar Walzel, German Romanticism (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing
, Co., 1932), p. 50; Schlegei, Athenaeum Fragments, #262, p. 200.
104. Goethe, Die Natur, in Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gesprdche
(Zurich: Artemis-Verlag, 1949), vol. XV3, pp. 922, 924. Quoted in Pascal,
Sturm und Drang, p. 208. Schlegei, Lucinde, p. 120. This moral imperative
found an immediate expression in art theory, in the emphasis on the individu
ality of a work of art as its only value. Celebrating the Gothic architecture of
the Strassbourg Minster, so irregular by classical standards, and so much better
for it, Goethe wrote: The only true art is characteristic art. If its influence
arises from deep, harmonious, independent feeling, from feeling peculiar to
itself, oblivious, yes, ignorant of everything foreign, then it is whole and living,
whether it be born from crude savagery or cultural sentiment. Goethe, Von
Deutscher Baukunst, in Gedenkausgabe, vol. XIII, p. 24; translationPascal,
Sturm und Drang, p. 265.
105. She seems to have made individuality her supreme purpose and she cares
nothing for individuals. Goethe, "Die Natur, p. 922.
106. Schlegei, Lucinde, Ideas, #60, p. 247. Holderlin in Gooch, Germany,
p. 240, who quotes from Litzmann, Holderlins Leben in Brief en, p. 169.
107. Schlegei, Lucinde, Athenaeum Fragments, #53, p. 167.
108. Herder, Briefwechsel uber Ossian und die Lieder alter Volker, S'dmtliche
Werke, vol. V, p. 164, emphasis added. Analyzed and quoted by Pascal, Sturm
und Drang, p. 253; and Letter to Hamann, August 125, 1772, in Briefe an
]. G. Hamann im Anhang Herders Briefwechsel mit Nicolai (Hildesheim:
George Olms Verlag, 1975), p. 70.
109. Goethe, Sorrows of Werther, in The Complete Works, vol. Ill, p. 29. (The trans
lation here is not accurate: their whole nature simple and unpolluted.) Schle-
gel, Lucinde, p. 99, and Ideas, #127, p. 253. Goethe, Faust,p. 87.
110. Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, erster und
zweiter Teil, Sdmtliche Werke, vol. XIII, Book VIII, p. 337. Goethe, Fragment
eines Romans, in Gedenkausgabe, vol. IV, p. 266. This is not an entry in a
journal, but a fragment of a future novel. Goethes compelling descriptions of
emotions in fiction, however, represent accurate descriptions of his own emo
tions: he had an exceptional ability for turning his personal experiences into
art (as he indeed noted in Truth and Fiction).
111. Lenz quoted in Pascal, Sturm und Drang, p. 33. Goethe, Sorrows of Werther,
pp. 75, 77. Schlegei, Lucinde, p. 138.
112. Moser quoted in Brunschwig, Enlightenment, p. 214. Goethe, Truth and Fic
tion, vol. II, Book IXX, p. 307. (The translation here, however, is from Brun
schwig, p. 214; it is superior to Oxenfords.)
113. Schlegei, Critical Fragments, #16, p. 144. Novalis, Aphorisms, p. 188.
Schlegei, Ideas," #19, p. 242; Ideas, #36, p. 244.
114. Athenaeum, German text, p. 177. The English translation in Schlegei, Lucinde,
p. 221, of Verstandis understanding; in this context, however, reason is a
more appropriate interpretation. In their ratiocinative early days, the leaders of
544
Notes to Pages 336- 339
the early Romanticism deviated from the Sturm und Drang definition of ge
nius as a force of nature expressed in the intense, non-reflective, irrational, and
thus true feeling by adding-to its characteristics the power of self-limitation.
Later* however, they returned to the Sturm und Drang position. See Walzel,
German RomanticismJ who stresses the transient rationalism of the early
Romantics and sees in it an important difference between Romanticism proper
and Sturm und Drang. One should not forget, though, that Stiirmer und Dran-
ger>too, started as disciples of the Aufklarung.
115. Lavater quoted in Pascal, Sturm und Drang,, pp, 154, 138. Goethe,. Zum
Shakespears Tag, in M. Morris, ed,, Der Junge Goethe (Leipzig; Insel Verlag,
1909), vol. II, p, 140.
116. Schiegel, Lucinde, "Critical Fragments, #1, p. 143. Hamann quoted in Pas
cal, Sturm und Drang, p. 238* Pascal, pp. 138, 241Lavater*, p. 244Her
der; p. 237Hamann. Lavater in Pascal, pp, 138, 241; translations slightly
differ.
117. Herder, Shakespear, Samtlicbe Werke>vol. V, pp. 227, 228, quoted in Pascals
Sturm und Drang, p. 244. This last sentence reflects an unbounded belief in the
powers of human will. An artist could will a world into beingthus the prom
inence of miraculous occurrences in Romantic fiction and of the faith in mir
acles in Romantic philosophy and life, Novalis thought he could, and earnestly
attempted to, will himself to die. Marxs belief that philosophy had the power
ro change the world, that classes would emerge just because they were neces
sary for the fulfillment of the philosophical mission (a class must be formed),
was an expression of the same confidence in wishful thinking. The most re
markable thing about this is that they were right. Worlds were willed into being
which could only have been conjured in a Romantic imagination, and which
forever changed our views of human naturenot, unfortunately, for the better.
Such was the power of genius.
118. Schiegel, Lucinde, "Critical Fragments, #6, p. 143; #65, p. 150; Athen
aeum Fragments, #116 (excerpt), p. 175; Ideas, #43, p. 245; #44* p. 245;
Critical Fragments, #6S, p. 151; #63, p. 150; Ideas, #13, p. 242; #45,
p. 245; #20, p. 243.
119. See ibid,, Athenaeum Fragments, #206 and #259. For an analysis of the
metrics of Romantic poetry, see Walzel, German Romanticism, pp* 127133.
120. Schiegel, Lucinde* p. 98. Walzel, German Romanticism, pp. 121133, focuses
on the early Romantics1attitudes toward music. To Thomas Mann, in 1910,
it still seemed obvious that music was the German art, and that even literature
could not compete with it for place in the national consciousness. See Thomas
Mann, Ein Brief zur Situation des deutschen Schriftstellers um 1910,
Tboma$-Mann-Studien}3 (1974). On Luther's view of music, see Bettmann,
Bach as a Rhetorician.* Beethoven, in Friedrich Kerst and Henry E. Krehbiel,
eds., Beethoven: The Man and Artist, as Revealed in His Own Words (New
York; Dover Publications, 1964; first published in 1905), pp, 13, 14, 39, 41,
51,73.
121. F. M, Klinger, Sturm und Drang}Act I, Scene I, in Dramatiscbe Jugendwerke
(Leipzig: E. Rowohk Verlag, 1913), vol. II, p, 269, Pascal, Sturm und Drang,
pp. 51, 36 (quotations from Klingers letters), 55.
Notes to Pages 340- 342
545
122. Goethe, Die Natur, p* 923: Leben ist ihre schonste Erfindung, und der Tod
ist ihr Kunstgriff, vie! Leben zu haben. Schlegel, Ludnde* p. 118.
123. Novalis, "Aphorisms/ * p. 187. And, as if rhis statement were not enough as
food for thought, he added, characteristically: From the spirit comes gravita
tion.
124. Ibid., and Novalis in Schlegel, Ludnde, Athenaeum Fragments," #292,
' p. 203.
125. Schlegel* LucindePp. 91; p. 60 (the characterization of his oeuvre is Schlegels
own); Athenaeum Fragments, #15, p. 163.
126. Schlegel, Ludnde, p. 131.
127. Ibid., Ideas, #138, p* 254. But, of course, Catholicism had many other mer
its to recommend itself: it was positively stigmatized by rhe hostility of Enlight
enment; it was not Protestantism; it was the religion of the Middle Ages.
128. Novalis in Schlegel, Ludnde, Athenaeum Fragments, #286, p. 203.
129. Schleiermacher in Schlegel, Ludndet Athenaeum Fragments, #328, p. 211.
James T. Hatfield, The Early Romantic School * pp. 4S70, in German Clas
sics, vol. V, p. 66.
130. Uhland defined Romanticism as conscious, systematic substitution: The spirit
of man feeling, indeed, that it will never experience infinity in all its splendour
and wearied by the vague groping of its desire, soon fixes its yearning upon
temporal images in which there seems to be a dawning vision of the celestial
.. *This mystic manifestation of our innermost feelings in an image, this pro
jection of the world spirits, this incarnation of the divine, in a word: the presen
timent of infinity in our perceptions is what is Romantic. Walzel, German
Romanticism, p. 32, Ludnde is a very edifying story in this respect, for in it
erotic exhibitionism alternates with passages of lucid and revealing self-
analysis. Take, for example, this passage from Apprenticeship for Man-
hood: Women he actually did not understand at all .. *But he reacted to
young men who were more or less like him with passionate warm love and a
real rage for friendship. But that alone wasn't enough to satisfy him. He felt as
if he wanted to embrace a world and yet couldn't grasp anything . . . He be
came sensual from spiritual despair, committed imprudent acts out of spite
against fate, and was genuinely immoral in an almost innocent way *.. With
this kind of personality, it was inevitable that he should often feel lonely in an
even friendliest and loveliest society; and actually he felt least lonely when no
one was with him. At such times he would intoxicate himself with images of
his hopes and memories and intentionally let himself be seduced by his own
imagination/ 3He was afraid of his passionate nature, and consequently de
voted himself exclusively to friendships with other young men who, like him,
were capable of being enthusiastic *. - Indeed, the whole group of his friends
glowed with noble love, and many a great talent slumbered undeveloped in
them. They would often utter . . . sublime things . . . particularly about the
divine quality of male friendship, which Julius intended to make the true busi
ness of his life. Schlegel, Ludnde, pp. 78, 88.
131. Quoted in Brunschwig, Enlightenment, p, 151; also see Brunschwigs discus
sion in the chapter Isolation of the Young Intellectuals
132. *LDie blaue Blume of poetry, the quintessence of the idea! aspirations of the
546
Notes to Pages 342345
human spirit, sought after by Heinrich von Ofterdingen of Novalis' unfinished
novel of the same name. It became a symbol of Romantic idealism.
133. Moritz, Anton Reiser, p. 401.
134. Friedrich Schlegei, quoted in Brunschwig, Enlightenment, p. 161,
135. J. M, R. Lenz, Uber Gotz von Berlichingen, in Werke und Schriften (Stutt
gart: Neue Bibliothek der Weltliteratur, 1966), vol. I, pp. 378-379. (Trans
lated in Pascal, Sturm und Drang, p. 148.) Lenz wrote: We are, or at least
would like to be, the first rung on the ladder of freely active, independent crea
tures, and since we see around us, here and there, a world that is the proof of
an infinitely and freely active being, the first impulse we feel in our soul is the
desire to do likewise. But since. . . we have to content ourselves with the things
that are there, we do at least feel an accretion to our existence, happiness, by
recreating its Creation on a small scale (Lenz, Antnerkungen fibers Theater,
in ibid., p. 333).
136. Lenz, Eduard Allwiils Erstes Geistiiches Lied, ibid., pp. 9596. (Transla
tionPascal, Sturm und Drang, pp. 128130.)
137. Herders later works, and even later versions of earlier works such as the collec
tions of folk songs and the Essay on Knowledge and Perception in the Human
Soul, are markedly different from those written during his Sturm und Drang
period. It is nothing short of astounding to see the change in Herders concep
tion of genius, which is completely reversed between the earlier and the later
versions of the Essay on Knowledge and Perception. While in the 1774 ver
sion of the essay, exuberance of feeling is considered the source and the sign of
genius, in a later version people torn by passions are likened to the hounds of
Hell; while not long ago intensity of emotions was the guarantee of their sin
cerity, this same intensity later makes Herder suspect that these emotions are
false. Genius now is characterized by cool reflection; those who succumb to
feeling, by eternal uneasiness, misanthropy, zealotry, envy and thirst for re
venge in their hearts. If this is genius, says Herder, who of all people cer
tainly knew what he was talking about, who would not cross himself against
it? Pascal, Sturm und Drang, p. 163.
138. Schlegei, Lucinde, Ideas, #106,p. 251.
139. Quoted in Pascal, Sturm und Drang, pp. 220,212.
140. Herder, Auch eine Phiiosophie der Geschichtc zur Bildung der Menschheit,
in Samtliche Werke, vol. V, p. 550. Herders condemnation of the division of
laborbefore the publication in England of that great panegyric to it, Adam
Smiths The Wealth of Nationsis of utmost significance for the understand
ing of the economistic opposition to modern society in the nineteenth century.
His intense dislike of this ubiquitousand, one must admit, indeed rational
device makes Karl Marx his direct descendant. Goethe found this hostility
funny and depicted Herder as a satyr who, in an attempt to abolish the division
of labor, would have people iive on raw chestnuts. But this was exactly the
ideal Marx envisioned in the German Ideology, when he eulogized the joys of
hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, reading Plato in the evening,
and criticizing after dinner. There could be no totality if labor was divided; the
division of labor destroyed the whole man.
Notes to Pages 345361 547
141. Herder, Ubers Erkennen und Empfinden in der Mensehlichen Seele, in Sam-
tlicbe Werke, vol. VIII, p. 261.
142. Adam Muller, Elements of Politics, Lecture #2, in H. S. Reiss, ed. The Polit
ical Thought of the German Romantics (Oxford: Basil Biackwell, 1955),
p. 155.
143- Ibid., pp. 144,154,155,146.
144. Ibid., p. 150. Novalis, Fragmente (Dresden: Wolfgang Jess Verlag, 1929),
#1532, #1541, pp. 487-488. Quoted in Hans Kohn, Romanticism and Ger
man Nationalism, Review of Politics, 12 (1950), pp. 443472,448.
145. Miiller, Elements, p. 158. Novalis, Fragmente, #1583, p. 498 (quoted in
Kohn, Romanticism, p. 449).
146. Muller quoted in Kohn, Romanticism, p. 466. Novalis, Christendom or Eu
rope, in The Political Thought of German Romantics, p. 134. Schleiermacher
in Schiegel, Lucinde, Athenaeum Fragments, #349, p. 216. Muller, Ele
ments, p. 148. Von Eichendorff, Politische Schriften, SSmtliche Werke (Re
gensburg: Verlag von J . Habbel, 1913), vol. X, p. 160.
147. Muller, Elements, p. 146. Regarding Kant, see Leonard Krieger, The Ger
man Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 86125. Hegel quoted in ibid., p. 132.
148. Muller, Elements, pp. 160,159,158.
149. Wilhelm Schiegel in Friedrich Schiegel, Lucinde, Athenaeum Fragments,
#60, pp. 168! 69.
150. That ancient, living Freedom; Eichendorff, in Ahming und Gegenwart, ch,
24, SSmtliche Werke, vol. Ill, p. 325.
151. Hegel, in Krieger, The German Idea, pp. 133,132,133.
152. Schiegel, Lucinde, Ideas, #64, p. 247; #54, p. 246. Novalis, fragmente,
#1614, p. 514 (quoted in Kohn, Romanticism, p. 449). Richter quoted in
Gooch, Germany, p. 247.
153. Schlegei, Lucinde, Athenaeum Fragments, #222, p. 192; Critical Frag
ments, #38, p. 147.
154. Quoted in Gooch, Germany, p. 531.
155. J . G. Fichte, Beitrage zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums iiber die
Franzostsche Revolution, 1793, in Sammtliche Werke (Berlin: Verlag von Veit
und Co., 1845), vol. VI, p. 95. Also see Hans Kohn, The Paradox of Fichtes
Nationalism, Journal of the History of Ideas, 10:3 (June 1949), p. 321. Boie
quoted in Brunschwig, Enlightenment, p. 171; Holderlinin Gooch, Ger
many, p. 234.
156. Gooch, Germany, pp. 41-43.
157. Ibid., pp. 234,47,54.
158. Ibid., pp. 4652.
159. Ibid., p. 232; Brunschwig, Enlightenment, pp. 176177,149,177.
160. Novalis, Christianity and Europe, pp. 131136.
161. L. Tteck, Minnelieder aus dem Schwabichen Zeitalter, Vorrede (Hamburg:
Verlag Der Hamburger Presse, 1918), p. 1.
162. See J . G. Gagliardo, From Pariah to Patriot (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1969), p. 147, and Louis L. Snyder, Literature: Nationalistic As
548 Notes to Pages 361366
pects of the Grimm Brothers* Fairy Tales, pp. 4474, in Snyder* German Na
tionalism: The Tragedy of a People: Extremism contra Liberalism in Modem'
German History (Harrisburg, Penn.: The Stackpole Company, 1952), regard
ing the explicitly nationalistic aspirations of the Grimms. Snyders is a valuable
book with a misleading title, German nationalism was, indeed, a tragedy, bar it
was a tragedy of peoples other than German in the first place-
163. Walter M. Simon, "Variations in Nationalism during the Great Reform Period
in Prussia; American Historical Review, 59 (195354), p. 305; Friedrich Mei-
necke, The Age of German Liberation* 17951815 {Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977), p. SO. Stein in Krieger, The Idea of freedom, p. 148.
Meinecke, p, 64, Stein (1812}quoted in Simon, p. 307; also see Simon regard
ing German orientation of other reformers.
164. Louis L. Snyder, Pedagogy: Turnvater Jahn and the Genesis of German na
tionalism* pp. 2143, in Snyder, German Nationalism, p, 32,
165. Quoted in Simon, Variations in Nationalism, p. 312, (n. 29,
166. Kohn, "Fichte * p. 321, in, 5; p. 327,
167. Schleiermacher, Life, voL II* Letter of November 4, 1806, p. 66, and of No
vember 21, p. 69.
168. Kohn, Romanticism, p. 459.
169. Johann Gottlieb Fichte* Addresses to the German Nation, trans. R. F. Jones
and G. H. Turnbull, reprint of the 1922 edition, published by Open Court
Publishers (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press* 1979), pp. 134-136.
170. Adelungs Worterbuch defines Nation in 1801 as die eingeborenen Einwohner
eines Landes, so fern sie einen gemeinschafdichen Ursprung haben, und eine
gemeinschaftiiche Sprache reden, sie mogen ubrigens einen einzigen Staat aus-
machen* oder in mehrere venheilet seyn . . . Ehe dieses Wort aus dem Latein
entlehnet wurde, gebrauchte man Volk fur Nation (p. 439), The dictionary of
the brothers Grimm interprets it as das (eingeborne) Volk eines Landes, einer
groszen Staatsgesamtheit (p, 425), Ritter, in Historisches Worterbuch,
p, 406, writes: Der Begriff ist nur selten eindeurig und ausdrucklich definiert;
seine Bedeutung ist haufig schillemd und iiberschneidet sich mit der anderer
Begriffe, besonders mit Volk. See also Trubners Deutsches Worterbuch, pp.
689-694, 697698; and Campes Dictionary of 1810.
171. Humboldt quoted in Simon* Variations in Nationalism, p. 310; Arndt.in
Hans Kohn, "Arndc and the Character of German Nationalism, American
Historical Review, 54:4 (July 1949)* pp. 787803; 803, Fichte* Addresses,
p, 130,
172. Fichte, Die Grundzuge des Gegenwartigen Zeitalter, Lecture #14* in Sd-
mmtliche Werke, vol. VII, p. 212, See discussion in Kohn, Fichte,
173. Quoted in Kohn, Fichte, p. 326.
174. Fichte, Addresses, pp. 268269. This flattering idea was not born during the
Liberation period. It had been voiced already by Schiller* for example, in an
unfinished poem Deutsche Grosse, Sdmtliche Werke (Miinchen: Carl Hanser
Verlag, 1965), vol. I, pp. 473-478,
175. Muller, quoted in Kohn, Romanticism, p. 471; Fichtein Kohn, "Fichte*
p, 327, Friedrich Schlegel* An die Deutschen, 1800* in Sdmmtliche Werke
(Wien: Jakob Mayer, 1823), vol, IX* p. 16,
Notes to Pages 367371
549
176. Schlegei, Letter to his brother, November 8, 1791, in (X F. Walzel, ed,, Briefe
an seinen Bruder August 'Wilhelm (Berlin: Verlag von Epner und Peters, 1890)t
p. 26; Lucinde, Critical Fragments,* #116, p. 157; Ideas, #120, p, 252;
#135, p. 254.
177. Muller in Kohn, Romanticism, p. 467. Fichte, Addresses, p. 237.
178. Fichte* Addressest specifically Address #4.
179. Das 1st des Deutschen Vaterland\ . . . Wo jeder Franzmann heisset FeindVWo
jeder Deutsche heisset Freund. Ernst Moritz Arndt, Des Deutschen Vater-
iand, pp. 2628, in Deutsche Vaterlmdslieder (Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 193[?J),
Insel-Bucherei 154, p. 28.
180. Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, Das deutsche Volkstum, precis from the original edi
tion (Liibeck: Niemann und Comp.* 1810), trans. and printed in Snyder, Ger
man Nationalism}p. 3738.
181. Kohn, Arndt, pp. 791-792. Friedrich Schlegei in Kohn, Romanticism/ 1
p. 460. Theodor Korner, jagerliedj 1813, in Sdmmtliche Werke (Haag: Ge-
bruder Hartmann, 1829), p. 19. Fichte in the Addresses, however, did not see
race as all-important, and believed there was no harm in admitting that the
German-speaking people (that is, the German nation) was in fact a mixture of
races.
182. Hans Kohn, Father Jahns Nationalism, Review of Politics 11 (October
1949), pp. 419432; 428. Friedrich Schlegei, Pbilosophische Vorlesungen aus
den Jahren 1804 bis 1806 (Bonn: Eduard Weber, 1837), vol. II, pp. 358, 382
{quoted in Kohnj Romanticism, p. 460).
183. See Gagliardo, Pariah, p. 172ff, Peasantry was the Volk m the original mean
ing; it merged with Germanness itself. This led to the idealization of agriculture
through which man, allegedly, more than through any other activity, became a
creator and therefore an active and free being, and reinforced the antipathy
toward trade and industry (of which Germany anyway did not have much to
show) and anti-urban sentiments. Efforts were made not to antagonize the
bourgeoisie and to find a place for it within the German people. Yet this was
done reluctantly; Arndt, for example, believed that burgher and peasant stood
in natural contrast to each other. This, too, contributed to and in part ac
counted for the anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois character of German national
ism.
184. Jahn, Das deutsche Voikstum, p. 37.
185. Arndt, Katechismus fur den deutschen Kriegs-und Wehrmann (Leipzig: Ver
lag von Philipp Reclam?n.d.), p. 57.
186. M. von Schenkendorf, Das Eiserne Kreuz,1Gedicbte (Berlin: Deutsches Ver-
lagshaus Bong 6c Co.}, p. 29. Jahn in Snyder, German Nationalism, p. 28.
Jahn, inscription in the Wartburg guestbook, October 24, 1815, in Werke
(Hof: Verlag von R. Lion, 1887), vol. II, pt. II, p. 1003.
187. Arndt, Staat und Vateriand (Mtinchen: Drei Masken Verlag, 1921), p. 5, in
Kohn, Arndt," p- 800.
188. This is quoted by Snyder in Militarism: The Development of War-Cult Ex
tremism from Karl von Clausewitz to Ewald Banse (pp. 227254 in Snyder,
German Nationalism) from Friedrich von Bernhardi, himself a notorious war
monger, and may not be entirely reliable.
550
Notes to Pages 371380
189. Koim, Romanticism, p. 458.
190. Quoted in Gooch, Germanyp. 515.
191. Gagliardo, Pariah, p. 182; Gooch, Germany, p. 525. See discussion of reform
ers attitudes in Gooch; Krieger, German Idea; Simon, Variations in Nation
alism.
192. Hatfieid, German Classics, p. 51.
193. Schiegel, Lucinde, Athenaeum Fragments, #426, #110, #141, #209, #210,
#355, pp. 234,174,180,190, 217.
194. Ibid., #60, #115, #199, #219, #301, #379, pp. 168, 175, 188, 191, 204,
223.
195. Stein and Carsten Niebuhr, quoted in Gooch, Germany, pp. 60,520,521,523.
196. Arndt, Schriften fur und an Seine Ueben Deutschen (Leipzig: Weidmannrsche
Buchhandlung, 1854), vol. I, pp. 405, 412ff, quoted in Kohn, Arndt,
pp. 796, 795; army volunteerin Kohn, Arndt, p. 793; Professor Leoin
Hans Kohn, France between Britain and Germany, journal of the History of
Ideas, 17:3 (June 1956), pp. 283299; 295n. Significantly, at the very same
time, France was apparendy possessed by ardent Germanophilia (Teutono-
manie); its enemy was England, while Germany was more than a friend, it was
a sister-nation. Contemporary French attitudes toward Germany and Eng
land are the subject of the very informative paper mentioned iast in this note.
197. Quoted in Gooch, Germany, p. 63.
198. List was another patriot of the Liberation period denounced as a Jacobin and a
Republican (but later vindicated by Treutschke as a demagogue only in the
noblest sense), a friend of Lafayette, and a one-time denizen of the United
States of America. See Snyder, Economics: The Role of Friedrich List in the
Establishment of Zollverem, pp. 75100, in Snyder, German Nationalism.
List in ibid., p. 87.
199. Adam Miiller, Ausgewahlte Abhandltmgen, quoted in Kohn, Romanticism,"
p. 466.
200. Treitschke, Excerpts from 'Works, in Louis L. Snyder, ed., Documents of
German History (New Brunswick, N. J .: Rutgers University Press, 1958),
p. 262.
201. These were the titles of two books published in Nazi Germany in 1940 and
1942, respectively: England: Leader of the Bourgeois World and America: The
Land Without a Heart.
202. Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, rev.
ed. (London: Peter Halban, 1988), p. 31.
203. Marvin Lowenthal, The J ews of Germany: A Story of Sixteen Centuries (Phila
delphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1936), p. 230.
204. For an example of such ambivalence and the ways in which elements of West
ern civilization most obviously opposed to the German spirit were reconciled
to it and incorporated in the German culture, see Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary
Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
205. Lowenthal,/ cm's of Germany, p. 230.
206. Once the homeless, fugitive Christians were compelled to share the destiny of
the Jews, expulsion no longer bore the unambiguous marks of God-sent pun
ishment. The destiny of worldwide diaspora, formerly the proof of the obsti
Notes to Pages 380- 384
551
nate Jews guilt, was now the badge of faith of the avowed Christian. In the late
sermons of Calvin, delivered in French . . . we encounter a growing sense of the
hidden community of fate shared by Christians and Jews in their homeless state
of persecution and diaspora.
This view of Gods covenant as one held in common by Christians and Jews,
utterly inconceivable from Augustin to Erasmus and Luther, now spread in two
directionsby way of France and the Netherlands to England and Scotland,
and eventually to North America," Heiko A. Oberman, The Roots of Anti-
Semitism in the Age of Renaissance and Reformation {Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1984; first published in German in 1981),p. 141.
207. L o w en th al ,of Germany, p. 231.
208. The inventor of the word is believed to be Wilhelm Marr, who also founded the
Antisemiten-Liga. Both the word and the organization appeared in 1879. See
the discussion in Puizer, Political Anti-Semitism.
209. Lowenthal. Jews of Germany, p. 219.
210. Mendelssohn was made a privileged Jew by Frederick, who had no pro-
Jewish sympathies otherwise. The philosopher-king was persuaded to do so by
the Marquis dArgens, who wrote on Mendelssohns behalf: A philosopher
who is a bad Catholic begs a philosopher who is a bad Protestant to grant this
privilege to a philosopher who is a bad jew. This revealing story is recounted
by Lowenth si, jews of Germany, p. 203. He also relates the following: In the
year 1776a date with other associations for AmericansMendelssohn, then
at the height of his fame as a European philosopher, had to pay at the gate of
Dresden an entry-tax [as a Jew], a head-tax, which as he remarked, was set at
the same figure as for a Polish cow (p, 210).
211. Schleiermacher, Life, vol. I, p. 178; Letter to sister Charlotte, August4, 1789.
Goethe quoted in Lowenthal, Jews of Germany, p. 226.
212. Schleiermacher, Life, vol. I, pp. 249,187.
213. Indiscretion and shamelessness were phenomena of . . . Romanticism.
Harma Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewish Woman, rev. ed. (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), p. 20.
214. Gentz and Humboldt quoted in ibid., pp. 33, 201. Commenting era Hum
boldts reaction, Arendt says: Here, as elsewhere, Wilhelm von Humboldt was
the best, keenest and most malicious gossip of his age. She notes that he did
put the matter more crudely and more spitefully than was absolutely neces
sary.
215. One should keep in mind that the majority of the Jews, even in great cities such
as Berlin, continued to live in the abject poverty and obscurity of the ghetto.
216. Arendt, Rahel Vambagen, pp. 7,13.
217. Herder in ibid., p. 29. Lowenthal, J ews of Germany, pp. 221222. Puizer, Po
litical Anti-Semitism, p- 6. Moses Hess, Rome and Jerusalem (New York: Phil
osophical Library, 1943[?]), pp. 25-26.
218. Heine quoted in Gordon Craig, The Germans (New York: G. P. Putnams Sons,
1982), p. 132. Fichte in Lowenthal, Jeu>s of Germany, p. 229. See also Fichte,
Beitrage in Sammtliche Werke, vol. VI, pp. 149-15Off.
219. On the development of anti-Semitism in this period, see Puizer, Political Anti-
Semitism.
220. Despite its claims of historical novelty in seeking to combine the waves of
552 Notes to Pages 384393
nationalism and socialism, the Nazi movement in reality was stale and unori
ginal. There was little new in naziism other than the fanatical and ferocious
method of genocide used to implement its ideology. All the ideas in this ideol
ogy date back to the early nineteenth century or even earlier. Snyder, German
Nationalism, pp. 1819. See also George Mosse, The Crisis of German I deol
ogy: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: The Universal Library,
1964), on the absolute centrality of anti-Semitism in German consciousness in
the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Mosses is the most systematic
discussion of the perpetuation of the elements of Pieto-Romantic mentality,
which he picks up around the middle of the nineteenth century and traces to
Nazism, in the time following the period of its crystallization discussed here.
221. Those were still the same structural conditions, perpetuated in the course of
more than a century, which frustrated the eighteenth-century Bildungsburger
and stimulated the emergence of German nationalism in the first place. Note
the predominance of unemployed academics and frustrated intellectuals among
the protagonists of Mosses survey, Crisis: Lagarde, Langbehn, Hitler himself,
and others.
222. Wagner, quoted in Snyder, Music and Art: Richard Wagner and The German
Spirit, in Snyder, German Nationalism, p. 163.
223. St. John Chrysostom quoted in Craig, The Germans, p. 127; Professor Fries in
Lowenthal, Jews of Germany, pp. 231-232; Wagner in Snyder, German Na
tionalism, p. 162.
224. AH quotations are given from the text in R. C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels
Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 2652; italics everywhere are
in the original. On the possible role of the Essay on the Jewish Question iti
the development of Marxist theory, see Liah Greenfeid, Nationalism and
Class Struggle: Two Forces or One? Survey, 29:3 (Autumn 1985), pp. 153
174.
225. Krteger, The German Idea, p. 277.
226. The quotations are from the text in Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 53
65.
227. For some description of the passions that governed Marxs life, see Peter De-
metz, Marx, Engels and the Poets: Origins of Marxist Literary Criticism (Chi
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); and Leopold Schwarzchild, The Red
Prussian: The Life and Legend of Karl Marx (London: Hamish Hamilton,
1948).
228. Krieger, The German Idea, p, 327,
229. Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1961), p. 22.
230. This is not as surprising as it may seem. After ail, Marx was a Romantic poet.
On this point, see Leonard P. Wessell, jr., Karl Marx, Romantic Irony, and the
Proletariat: The.Mythopoetic Origins of Marxism (Baton Rouge and London:
J Louisiana University Press, 1979).
231. Marx-Engels, Collected 'Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), vol. Ill,
p. 406.
232. Sidney Hook, Prom Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of
Karl Marx (New York: The Humanities Press, 1950). Tucker, Philosophy and
Myth, pp. 114-116.
Notes to Pages 394401 553
233. On this point, see Karl Kautsky, Ethics and the Materialist Conception of His
tory (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1907}; Tucker, Philosophy and Myth, regard-
ing Lenin; and Adam B. Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution: An Essay on the
Sources of Influence of Marxism and Communism (New York: Vintage Books,
I960}.
234. For similar reasons Jews were also attracted to Liberalism, which, however,
was very weak in Germany, and ro reformist varieties of Social Democracy.
Trotsky quoted in Pulzer, Political Anti-Semitism, p. 255.
235. Indeed a great many anti-Semites proclaimed themselves Socialists, and this
becomes more comprehensible when we remember that, especially in Germany,
many eminently conservative thinkers, inspired by a tradition of bureaucracy
and mercantilism, were grouped in the school of Kathedrasozialisten (ibid.,
p. 44).
236. Ibid., pp. 45, 262.
237. Here is, for example, how the two were compared by Neue Zeit in 1891
(quoted in ibid., p. 261): Philo-Semitism {alias Liberalism] is no whit better
than anti-Semitism. If the one claims to be fighting capitalism by persecuting
the Jews, then the other claims to protect the Jews by defending capitalism
through thick and thin . . . As opposed to the brutalities committed by anti-
Semitism, more in word than deed, against the Jews, we must not forget the
brutalities committed by philo-Semitism, more in deeds than words, against all,
be they Jews or Turks, Christians or heathen, who oppose capitalism.
5. I n Pursuit of the I deal Nation: America
1. John Trenchard, An Argument Shewing that a Standing Army is inconsistent
with a Free Government. . . 1697, in A Collection of Tracts by the late John
Trenchard, Esq., and Thomas Gordon, Esq. (London: Cogars, 1751), p. 6. An
thony Ashley Cooper, Eari of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners,
Opinions, Times (London-: Basil, 1790), vol. Ill, Miscellany III, pp. 119,
119n., 124125, 120121. John Locke, Two Treatises on Civil Government
(London: Butler et at, 1821), Treatise II, pp. 294,191,239.
2. John M. Murrin, The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Compari
son of the Revolution Settlements in England (16881721) and America
(17761816), pp. 368453, in j. G. A. Pockock, ed., Three British Revolu
tions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). An ar
gument parallel to Murrins is found in Lipsets illuminating comparison be
tween the United States and Canada (Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental
Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada [Washing
ton and Toronto: Canadian-American Committee, 1989]), whose differences,
despite many similarities, Lipset relates to the different significance and legacy
of the outcome of the American Revolution in the two cases.
3. Quoted in Sacvan Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 85.
4. Charles Inglis, quoted in Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the Amer
ican Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1967), p. 175.
552
Notes to Pages 384393
nationalism and socialism, the Nazi movement in reality was stale and unori
ginal. There was little new in naziism other than the fanatical and ferocious
method of genocide used to implement its ideology. AH the ideas in this ideol
ogy date back to the early nineteenth century or even earlier. Snyder, German
Nationalism, pp. 18-19. See also George Mosse, The Crisis of German I deol
ogy: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: The Universal Library,
1964), on the absolute centrality of anti-Semitism in German consciousness in
the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Mosses is the most systematic
discussion of the perpetuation of the elements of Pieto-Romantic mentality, .
which he picks up around the middle of the nineteenth century and traces to
Nazism, in the time following the period of its crystallization discussed here.
221. Those were still the same structural conditions, perpetuated in the course of
more than a century, which frustrated the eighteenth-century Bildungsburger
and stimulated the emergence of German nationalism in the first place. Note
the predominance of unemployed academics and frustrated intellectuals among
the protagonists of Mosses survey, Crisis: Lagarde, Langbehn, Hitler himself,
and others.
222. Wagner, quoted in Snyder, Music and Art: Richard Wagner and The German
Spirit, in Snyder, German Nationalism, p. 163.
223. St. John Chrysostom quoted in Craig, The Germans, p. 127; Professor Fries in
Lowenthal, Jews of Germany, pp. 231232; Wagner in Snyder, German Na
tionalism, p. 162.
224. AH quotations are given from the text in R. C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels
Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 26-52; italics everywhere are
in the original. On the possible role of the Essay on the Jewish Question in
the development of Marxist theory, see Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism and
Class Struggle: Two Forces or One? Survey, 29:3 (Autumn 1985), pp. 153-
174.
225. Krieger, The German Idea, p. 277.
226. The quotations are from the text in Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 53
65.
227. For some description of the passions that governed Marxs life, see Peter De-
metz, Marx, Engels and the Poets: Origins of Marxist Literary Criticism (Chi
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); and Leopold Schwarzchild, The Red
Prussian: The Life and Legend of Karl Marx (London: Hamish Hamilton,
1948).
228. Krieger, The German Idea, p. 327.
229. Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1961), p. 22.
230. This is not as surprising as it may seem. After all, Marx was a Romantic poet.
On this point, see Leonard P. Wessell, Jr., Karl Marx, Romantic Irony, and the
Proletariat: The Mythopoetic Origins of Marxism (Baton Rouge and London:
J Louisiana University Press, 1979).
231. Marx-Engels, Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), vol. Ill,
p. 406.
232. Sidney Hook, Prom Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of
Karl Marx (New York: The Humanities Press, 1950). Tucker, Philosophy and
Myth, pp. 114116.
Notes to Pages 394401
553
233. On this point, see Karl Kautsky, Ethics and the Materialist Conception of His
tory (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1907); Tucker, Philosophy and Myth, regard
ing Lenin; and Adam B- Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution: An Essay on the
Sources of Influence of Marxism and Communism (New York: Vintage Books,
I 960).
234. For similar reasons jews were also attracted to Liberalism, which, however,
was very weak in Germany, and to reformist varieties o Social Democracy.
Trotsky quoted in Pulzer, Political Anti-Semitism, p. 255.
235. Indeed a great many anti-Semites proclaimed themselves Socialists, and this
becomes more comprehensible when we remember that, especially in Germany,
many eminently conservative thinkers, inspired by a tradition of bureaucracy
and mercantilism, were grouped in the school of Kathedrasozialisten (ibid.,
p. 44).
236. Ibid., pp. 45,262.
237. Here is, for example, how the two were compared by Neue Zeit in 1891
(quoted in ibid., p. 261): Philo-Semitism [alias Liberalism] is no whit better
than anti-Semitism. If the one claims to be fighting capitalism by persecuting
the jews, then the other claims to protect the jews by defending capitalism
through thick and thin . . . As opposed to the brutalities committed by anti-
Semitism, more in word than deed, against the jews, we must not forget the
brutalities committed by philo-Semitism, more in deeds than words, against all,
be they Jews or Turks, Christians Or heathen, who oppose capitalism.11
S. I n Pursuit of the I deal Nation: America
1. John Trenchard, An Argument Shewing that a Standing Army is inconsistent
with a Free Government. . . , 1697, in A Collection of Tracts by the late John
Trenchard, Esq., and Thomas Gordon, Esq. (London: Cogan, 1751), p. 6. An
thony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners,
Opinions, Times (London; Basil, 1790), vol. Ill, Miscellany III, pp. 119,
119n., 124125, 120121. John Locke, Two Treatises on Civil Government
(London: Buder et al., 1821), Treatise II, pp. 294,191,239.
2. John M. Murrin, The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Compari
son of the Revolution Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America
(1776i16), pp. 368-453, in j. G. A. Pockock, ed,, Three British Revolu
tions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). An ar
gument parallel to Murrins is found in Lipsets illuminating comparison be
tween the United States and Canada (Seymour Martin Upset, Continental
Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada [Washing
ton and Toronto: Canadian-American Committee, 1989]), whose differences,
despite many similarities, Lipset relates to the different significance and legacy
of the outcome of the American Revolution in the two cases.
3. Quoted in Sacvan Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self (New
Haven and London: Yaie University Press, 1975), p. 85.
4. Charles IngHs, quoted in Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the Amer
ican Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1967), p. 175.
554 Notes to Pages 402408
5. Richard Hofstadter, quoted in Hans Kohn, American Nationalism (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1957), p. 13.
6. Regarding comparison with Latin America, see Bercovitch, Puritan Origins,
pp. 139-143.
7. Robert Cushman, Sermon-. The Sin and Danger of Self-Love, preached at
Plymouth, in New England, 1621, printed in London, 1622, reprinted in
Henry Wyles Cushman, Historical and Biographical Genealogy of the Cush
mans: The Descendants of Robert Cushman, the Puritan, from the Year 1617
to 1S55 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1855), p, 42. {I am indebted to
Thomas Cushman, a descendant of Robert Cushman, for making me aware of
this document and putting it at my disposat.}Cotton Mather, Magnolia Christi
Americana, Books I and II, ed. Kenneth B. Murdock (Cambridge, Mass: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977), reprinted from the 1702
edition, p. 122.
8. Cushman, Genealogy of the Cushmans, pp. 5657; and Reasons and Consid
erations Touching the Lawfulness of Removing out of England into the Parts
of America, pp. 3138 in ibid.; pp. 33,36, 34.
9. Mather, Magnalia, pp. 91, 125. John Norton; example of attitudes toward
English civic principles; and The Cambridge Platform quoted in Daniel Boor-
stin, The Americans: The Colonial Experience (New York: Vintage Books,
1958), pp. 16,22.
10. John Higginson, Attestation . . . pp. 6373, in Mather, Magnalia, p. 70.
Mather, pp. 92, 120, 119. Mathers national identity, like that of his fellow
New Englanders, was unquestionably and isnproblematically English. It is as
Englishmen that they faced the rest of the world. For example, Mather ad
dressed to the Indians An epistle to the Christian Indians, giving them a short
account, of what the english desire them to know and to do, in order to their
happiness. Written by an English minister, at the desire of an English magis
trate," published in Boston, 1700.
11. On criticism and its suppression in early colonial Massachusetts, see David
Cressy, Coming Over: Migration and Communication between England and
New England in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), ch. 1.
12. Mather, Magnalia, pp. 122, 120. In 1724, Rev. Hugh Jones wrote of Virginia
that, by comparison with the other colonies, it may be justly esteemed the
happy Retreat of true Britons." Quoted in Boorstin, Colonial Experience,
p. 123.
33. Thomas Dudley, quoted in Cressy, Coming Over, p. 16. Dudley thought such
commendations pernicious and decided to set the record straight lest other
men should fail short of their expectations when they come hither, as we to our
great prejudice did, by means of letters sent us from hence into England,
wherein honest men, out of desire to draw over others to them, wrote some
what hyperbolically of many things here.
14. Edward Johnson, History of New England, or Wonder-Working Providence of
Sions Saviour, 162816S2, ed. J . Eranklin Jameson (New York: Scribner,
1952), pp. 209-210.
15. Benjamin Franklin, Letter to Joshua Babcock, January 13,1772, in John Bige
Notes to Pages 409412
555
low, ed., The Works of Benjamin Franklin {New York: Putnam, 1904), vol. V,
pp. 287288. J . Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Letters from an American
Farmer, 1782 {New York: Penguin American Library, 1981), pp. 5153.
16. Franklin, Information to Those Who WouId.RemOve co America, 1782, in
Works, voi. IX, pp. 435436. Lord Adam Gordon, Journal, in Howard H.
Peckham, ed., Narratives of Colonial America {Chicago: The Lakeside Press,
1971), p. 292. Crevecoeur, Letters, pp. 6667,
17. These examples, among several others, are cited by Murrin, A Roof without
Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity, pp. 333348, in Richard
Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II, eds., Beyond Confedera
tion; Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity {Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1987), pp. 343-344.
18. Franklin, The Interest of Great Britain Considered, with Regard to her Colo
nies and the Acquisitions of Canada and Guadaloupe, 1760, in Works, vol.
Ill, p. 321.
19. Murrin, Roof, pp. 336337.
20. Joseph Galloway, Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great Britain
and the Colonies with a Plan of Accommodation on Constitutional Principles,
1775 {New York: Research Reprints, 1970), p. 5. Daniel Dulany, Considera
tions on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies, 1765, in
Bernard Bailyn, ed., Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 17S01776 (Cam
bridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), vol. I, pp. 598
658, 649. Hopkinson quoted in Merle Curti, The Roots of American Loyalty
{New York; Atheneum, 1968), p. 12.
21. John Adams, the opening sentence of the first Novanglus essay, January 23,
1775, in Novanglus and Massachusettensis (Boston: Hews and Goss, 1819),
p. 9. Franklin, Letters to his wife, March 5, 1760; to Peter Collinson, May 9,
1753; and to Lord Karnes, January 3, 1760, in Works, vol. Ill, p. 254; voi. II,
p. 416; vol. Ill, p. 248; The Interest of Great Britain, p, 294. Also see Frank
lin, Letter to David Hume, September 27, 1760, in Works, vol. Ill, pp. 337
338.
22. John Randolph, Considerations on the Slate of Virginia, n.p., 1774, quoted in
Max Savelle, Nationalism and Other Loyalties in the American Revolution,
pp. 901923, American Historical Review, 57:4 (July 1962), p. 912, Charles
Inglis, The True Interest of America Impartially Stated, 1776, pp. 62-69, in
Richard Hofstadter, ed,, Great Issues in American History, 17651865, a selec
tion of documents (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 67. John Dickinson,
Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colo
nies (New York: The Outlook Company, 1903), Letter III, pp. 32-33.
23. James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonists Asserted and Proved, in Bai-
lyn, Pamphlets, pp. 418482, 458. If I have one ambitious wish, confessed
Otis, tis to see Great Britain at the head of the world, and to see my king,
under God, the father of mankind (ibid., p. 449).
24. Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in Bruce Kuklick, ed., Political Writings (Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p- 2.
25. This definition was new and striking; it attracted the attention of those who,
like Hobbes, could think of any number of alternative definitions. Hobbes
556 Notes to Pages 413417
blamed the tendency of Milton and others to extol popular government by
the glorious name of liberty on excessive reading of the classics. Yehoshua
Arieli, Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. S3.
26. This is a point stressed by several authors. See ibid., p. 62; Murrtn, Roof,
p. 340; Kohn, American Nationalism, p. 7; and others.
27. It was this idealistic nature of English nationalism in America which allowed
Bernard Baiiyn, in The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, to
characterize the latter as above all else an ideological, constitutional, political
struggle, and not primarily a controversy between social groups undertaken to
force changes in the organization of society or the economy (pp. vi, 18, and
passim). But interests reinforced the ideals, and ideals themselves tended to be
perceived as interests. By contrast, Savelle characterizes the differences of posi
tion between Whigs, who were soon to champion independence, and Tories,
who were to remain loyalists, in America as expediency versus loyalty, or Brit
ish nationalistic idealism. The Tories were idealists; the Whigs were realists
(Savelle, Nationalism and Other Loyalties, p. 914). I think that, analytically
speaking, this was the other way around. It was the Whigs who defended the
ideals of British nationalism irrespective of their current geo-political embodi
ment. The Tories, on the other hand, defended the embodiment, though cogni
zant of its failings in the realization of the ideals. The Whigs benefited from
their position, while the Tories lost, and we can say, post factum, that the
Whigs acted in their objective interest, while the Tories acted against their in
terest, but this should not obstruct our view of the fact that the Whigs, never
theless, defended the ideals, and Toriesthe status quo. The British could have
persevered and won; who knows what the fate of the Whigs and Tories would
have been then.
28. Adams, Novangius, March 6,1775, p. 84. Genuine Principles, William Hicks
quoted in Baiiyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 182,181.
29. Arieli, Individualism, pp. 5255, makes this point. In general, see Arieli and
Baiiyn, Ideological Origins, regarding the nature and evolution of the concept
of constitution in colonial America.
30. John Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer, Letter II, p. 13; Adams, Novangius,
March 6,1775, p. 94; Daniel Leonard, Massacbusettensis, in Adams, January
9,1775, p. 172.
31. Edmund Burke, Speech on conciliation with America, March 22,1775, in Hof-
stadter, Great Issues, pp. 4043.
32. Hancock quoted by Savelle, Nationalism and Other Loyalties, p. 907.
Franklin, Letter to Francis Maseres, June 26, 1785, Works, vol. XI, p. 66. Al
len, American Alarm quoted in Baiiyn, Ideological Origins, p. 305. Dickin
son, Letters from a Farmer, Letter VI, pp. 6266.
33. Stamp Act Congress, October 1765, Declarations. Smith quoted in Hans
Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1944), p. 277.
34. First Continental Congress, Declaration and Resolves, October 14, 1774.
Leonard, Massacbusettensis, January 9,1775, p. 170.
35. John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, 1765, in Charles
Francis Adams, ed., The Works of J ohn Adams (Bostonr Litde and Brown,
Notes to Pages 417421
557
1851), vol. 10, p. 461. (Adams continued: But admitting we are children,
have not children a right to complain when their parents are attempting to
break their limbs, to administer poison, or to sell them to enemies for slaves?
. . . will the mother be pleased when you represent her as deaf to the cries of
her children?) See Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 5152, 202204, and The
Origins of American Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), regarding cir
cumstances which made Americans more capable than Englishmen of self-
government.
36. Jonathan Shipley, A Speech intended to have been spoken on the Bill for Alter
ing the Charters of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay (London: Cadetl, 1782),
pp. 31, 34, 33, 27. (The importance of this exceptionally sympathetic English
view of America is slightly diminished by the possibility that its proponent
and the author of the speechwas Benjamin Franklin.) Adam Smith, The
Wealth of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), vol. II,
p. 140.
37. Leonard, Massachusettensis, January 9, 1775, pp, 172173. Adams, Novan-
gtus, March 6,1775, pp. 9091.
38. Carl Bridenbaugh, The Spirit of 76: The Growth of American Patriotism be
fore Independence, 16071776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), de
votes to this connection a chapter aptly entitled Mounting Self-eonEdence
and Gradual Alienation.
39. Franklin, Letter to Lord Karnes, April 11,1767, Works, voi. IV, p. 286. George
Washington, Letter to Joseph Reed, February 10, 1776, in John Fitzpatrick,
ed., The Writings of George Washington (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1931-1936), vol. IV, p. 321. (On the development of Washing
tons sentiments, see Curti, Roots, pp. 16-17.) Franklin, Letter to Joseph Gal
loway, February 25, 1775, Works, vol. VI, p. 431. See also Kohn, The Idea of
Nationalism, p. 272.
40. Quoted in Bridenbaugh, Spirit of 76, pp. 129, 146. it is worth noting that
Evelyn here uses the word nation in the sense of a community capable of
supporting itself.
41. Paine, Common Sense, p. 30. Murrin, Roof, p. 339.
42. Adams, Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, p. 457.
43. According to Jefferson, planters became a species of property, annexed to cer
tain mercantile houses in London. Thomas Jefferson, Answers by Mr. Jeffer-
soti to Questions of Mons. de Meusnier, 1786, The Writings of Thomas J ef
ferson, ed- A. A. Lipscomb (Washington, 1903), vol. XVII, p. 59. On such eco
nomic grievances, see Boorstin, Colonial Experience, p. 320; Bridenbaugh,
Spirit of 76, passim; and Curti, RooZs, pp, 17ff.
44. R. H. Lee, Letter to Patrick Henry, quoted in Arieli, Individualism, p. 70. The
contemporary characterization of independence is quoted in Baityn, Ideologi
cal Origins, p. 142.
45. Dickinson, Letters from a Parmer, Letter XI, p. 121.
46. Boorstin, Colonial Experience, p. 370. Smith, Wealth, vol. II, p. 486 (the clos
ing sentences of the book).
47. At times, in the early decades, the government of Britain would be compared to
the powers of Hell, for being equally hostile [with the latter] to the happi
558 Notes to Pages 422425
ness of mankind. Nathaniel Boileau, 1814, quoted in John Murrin, Escaping
Perfidious Albion, unpublished, p. 46. But there were at least as many of those
who prayed: Heaven bless America, and Britain,/ May folly past suffice,/
Wherein they have each other smitten,/ Who ought to harmonize. Common
Prayer for the Times, 1776, in Frank Moore, Songs and Ballads of the Ameri
can Revolution, 1855 (reprint, Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1964),
p. 126. The opinion of rhe elitethis must be emphasizedwas split already
in the 1780s, a substantial number professing great respect and admiration for
the oppressor and enemy o several years ago. This would have been inconceiv
able in Russia or Germany, and even in France. When the memories of the
conflict faded, the anti-British sentiment all but disappeared; in other countries
memories of conflicts persisted much longer.
48. Savelle, Nationalism and Other Loyalties, p. 913.
49. Paine, Common Sense, pp. 1,16,30. John Adams held the same messianic view
in 1765, when he asserted, in the often quoted passage from the Dissertation
on the Canon and Feudal Law, that the settlement of America was caused by
a love of universal liberty. Adams, 'Works, vol. Ill, pp. 451, 452n. Similar
expressions were scattered in the writings of other colonial Americans given to
expressing themselves in writing.
50. Jefferson, Letter to Roger C. Weightman, June 24,1826, declining invitation to
the celebration of the Fourth of July in Washington on account of ill health,
'Writings, vol. XVI, p. 182.
51. The narrowness of this original definition of humanity expressed itself not only
in the exclusion of blacks and women, but also in allowing the State of New
Hampshire, for instance, until 1877 to deny voting rights to the Jews,
52. A phrase of a nineteenth-century editor, referring to the unbridled enthusiasm
of the nascent press in the West, quoted in Daniel Boorstin, The Americans:
The National Experience (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. 127.
53. Murrin, Roof, p. 341.
54. In 1853, George Burnap viewed the founding of the first American newspaper,
in Boston in 1704, as the actual birthday of a specifically American nation.
(Curri, Roots, p. 51.) But even the most outspoken contemporary advocate of
this view, Carl Bridenbaugh, finds it necessary to qualify his belief in its exis
tence before independence. He says: The deep sense of a continental commu
nityeconomic, social, and cultural, though not yet politicalattained during
the two decades 17401760~was . . . for the most pare uncomprehended by
the great body of the colonists of those years (Bridenbaugh, Spirit of '76,
p. 73).
55. Bridenbaugh, Spirit of76, pp. 93,107; Curti, .Roofs, p. 22. Franklin, Letter to
a friend, November 28, 1768, Works, vol. V, p. 41. Bercovitch (Puritan Ori
gins, p. 89), however, claims that the term American in its modern meaning
first appears in Mathers Magnalia.
- 56. John Dickinson, Arguments against the Independence of the Colonies, in
jack P. Green, ed., Colonies to Nation, 17631789: A Documentary History
of the American Revolution (New York: Norton, 1975), pp. 295296, and
The Liberty Song (or A Song much in Vogue in North America) in Moore,
Songs, pp. 3739.
Notes to Pages 426-431 559
57. Thomas Paine, The American Crisis, 13, 1783, in M. D. Conway, ed., The
Writings of Thomas Paine (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1984), vol. I,
pp. 374375. Jefferson, Letter to Elbridge Gerry, May 13, 1797, and The
Anas, Writings, vol. IX, p. 385, and vol. 1, pp. 266267. Instructions to the
Ministers Plenipotentiary Appointed to Negotiate Treaties of Commerce with
the European Nations, quoted in Arieli, Individualism, p. 32. Samuel Bryan,
Centinei, Letter I, in Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Anti-Federalist; Writings by
the Opponents of the Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1985), p. 18.
58. Declaration of Independence, emphasis added. (See on this point Arieli, Indi
vidualism.) Regarding the original meaning of federal, see Boorsrin, Na
tional, p. 415. Preamble to the Virginia Bill of Rights, quoted in Arieli, p. 37.
59. James Madison, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in the
Convention Held at Philadelphia in 1787; with a Diary of the Debates of the
Congress of the Confederation, ed. Jonathan Elliot (Washington, D.C.: Elliot,
1845), pp. 132133.
60. Jefferson, Inauguration Address, March 4,1801, Writings, vol. Ill, p. 319.
61. John Adams, quoted in Fred Siegel, Two Centuries of American Conserva
tism, in Encyclopedia of American History, and Adams, Defence of the Con
stitutions of Government of the United States of America, Letter to John Tay
lor, April, 15,1814, Works, vol. IV, pp. 489-490; vol. VI, p. 484.
62. Edward Mead Earle, ed., The Federalist (New York: The Modern Library,
1941), #63, pp. 410,413; #49, pp. 331, 327.
63. Jefferson, Letter to 'William Johnson, June 12, 1823, advising him on the dis
pute and differences between Federalists and Jeffersonians, and Letter to J o
seph C. Cabell, February 2, 1816, Writings, vol. XV, p. 441, and vol. XIV,
p. 422.
64. I am aware that Jeffersons position on all those thorny issues was not entirely
consistent and that at times he, too, was tormented by uncertainty. I do not see,
however, that the thrust of his thinking, which is especially salient in compari
son with that of the Federalists, can be mistaken.
65. See in this regard Francois Jean, Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North
America in the Years 178017811782 (New York, 1827), p. 277.
66. Jefferson, Letter to Madison, January 30, 1787, and Adams, Letter to Jeffer
son, June 30, 1813, both in Jefferson, Writings, vol. VI, p. 65, and vol. XIII,
p. 297.
67. Jefferson, Inauguration Address, p. 319, and Letter to Wra. Short, January
3, 1793, Writings, vol. IX, p. 10. Jefferson opened rhe letter by reproaching
Short for the extreme warmth with which [his letters] censured the proceed
ings of Jacobins in France.
68. Regarding Jeffersons attitude to slavery, see Winthrop D. Jordan, White over
Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 15501812 (Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1969), and John Chester Miller, The Wolf by the Ears: Thomas Jeffer
son and Slavery (New York: The Free Press, 1977).
69. Neither was slavery mentioned; in both instances a clever use of language al
lowed the avoidance of dealing with problematic issues.
70. Washington, Letter to Joseph Jones, May 31, 1780, Writings, vol. XVIH,
560
Notes to Pages 432440
p, 453. Jefferson, Letter to Edward Livingston, March 25, 1825, Writings, vol.
XVI, p. 113.
71. Plumer, Morris, and the Declaration of the Springfield meeting quoted in
Kohn, American Nationalism, p. 95. In a footnote, Kohn cites other examples
of the self-interested solicitude for the nation, and pro-British and anti-French
sentiments during that period. On the same point see Curti, Roofs, p. 45 and
passim.
72. Charleston Mercury\ July 4,1850, quoted in Curti, Roots, p. 157. South Caro
lina Declarationin Kohn, American Nationalism, p. 115.
73. Resolution of Congress on Public Lands, October 10, 1780, pp. 119120, in
H. S. Commager, ed., Documents of American History {Mew York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1963).
74. The options are those of Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cam
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
75. The Constitution, Article 1, Section 2.
76. See Boorstin, National, the chapter on Government as a Service Institution.
77. Ibid,, p. 121.
78. President Grant, in a message to the Congress of May 14, 1S72, The immi
grant is not a citizen of any State or Territory upon his arrival, but comes here
to become a citizen of a great Republic, free to change his residence at wiii, to
enjoy the blessings of a protecting Government, where all are equal before the
law, and to add to the national wealth by his industry. On his arrival he does
not know States or corporations, but confides implicitly in the protecting arm
of the great, free country of which he has heard so much before leaving his
native land . . . I see no subject more national in its character than provision
for the safety and welfare of the thousands who leave foreign lands to become
citizens of this Republic. Quoted in Kohn, American Nationalism, p. 142.
79. Crevecoeur, Letters, pp. 69-70, 8284. Frances Trollope, Domestic Manners
of the Americans, 4th ed. (London, 1832), vol. I, The Annals of America (Chi
cago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1976), vol. V (18211832), p. 544. Immi
grants reflections quoted in Curti, Roots, p. 82, and Kohn, American Nation
alism, p. 141. Translations vary slightly.
80. Pioneers impressions quoted in Curti, Roots, pp. 3641,
81. Boorstin, National, pp. 295, 237-239. Louis H. Sullivan, The Autobiography
of an Idea (New York: Press of the American Institute of Architects, 1924),
pp. 200- 201.
82. Quoted in Lowenthal, The Jews of Germany, p. 250.
83. Curti, Roofs, p. 73; also see F. George Franklin, The Legislative History of
Naturalization in the United States (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1906); ch. 3 discusses the Act of 1790. Crevecoeur, Letters, p. 70.
84. The geographical frontier was not the only frontier, and other frontiers have
not been exhausted so easily. See on this point David Potter, Abundance and
the Turner Thesis, pp. 109134, in Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed,, History and
American Society: Essays by David M. Potter {New York: Oxford University
Press, 1973).
85. Seth Luther, An Address to the Cordwainers of the United States (Philadel-
Notes to Pages 441446
561
phuaj 1836), p. 4; Address to the Workingmen of New England (Boston,
1832), p. 39; quoted in Curti, Roots, pp. 107, 80.
86. Dante! Webster, Speech delivered in the Senate, January 27,1830 (second reply
to Hayne), The Annals of America, vol. V, p. 355.
87. Jefferson, Anas, Writings, vol. I, p. 279. Alexander Hamilton, Report on
,the Subject of Manufactures, December 5, 1791, in Hofstadter, Great Issues,
p. 172.
88. Noah Webster, in American Magazine, 1788 and 1787, quoted in Kohn, Amer
ican Nationalism, p. 47, and Curti, Roots, p. 100.
89. James Russell Lowell, a review of Kavanagh by Longfellow, in North American
Review (Juty 1849); see discussions in Kohn, American Nationalism, pp. 70
71, and in Perry Miller, The Raven and the Whale (Westport, Conn.: Green
wood Press, 1973), pp. 255256. Sydney Smith was a famous critic and divine;
his question appeared in an article in Edinburgh Review in 1820. The discus
sion here relies on Kohn, pp. 51ff.
90. William Ellery Channing, Remarks on National Literature, 1823, Works
(Boston: James Munroe, 1841), vol. I, pp. 248, 252, 261. James Fenimore
Cooper, Home as Found (New York: Stringer Sc Townsend, 1852), preface,
p. v. Melville, Hawthorne and his Mosses, in Harrison Hayford, ed., Mel
ville (New York: The Library of America, 1984), pp. 1161,1164. Let Amer
ica then prize and cherish her writers, Melville implored; yea, let her glorify
them .. . And while she has good kith and kin of her own, to cake to her
bosom, let her not lavish her embraces upon the household of an alien . . . let
America first praise mediocrity even, in her own children, before she praises. . .
the best excellence in the children of any other land (ibid.).
91. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Kavanagh: A Tale, in Kavanagh and Evan
geline (Philadelphia: McKay, 1893), p. 119. Lowell, a review of Kavanagh,"
quoted in Kohn, American Nationalism, pp. 7071, and in Miller, Raven,
p. 256. Ralph Waldo Emerson, The American Scholar, pp. 5171, in Joel
Porte, ed., Essays and Lectures (New York: The Library of America, 1983),
p. 71.
92. Boorstin, National, pp, 327390, and Curti, Roots, pp. 122-143.
93. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Phillips Bradley (New York:
Vintage Books, 1954), vol. L P- 410.
94. Francis D. Quask, quoted in Curti, Roots, p. 43. Lincoln, Complete Works, ed.
John G. Nicolay and John Hay (New York: Francis D. Tandy, 1894), vol. VI,
p. 181, The First Inaugural Address; vol. VIII (the annual message of 1862),
p. 110. John OSullivan, the editor of the United States Magazine and Demo
cratic Review, who coined the phrase manifest destiny, first used it in the
context which emphasized Providence rather than geography: in an editorial
urging the annexation of Texas (July 1845), he saw the latter as a step in the
fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent alotted by Prov
idence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions. The Annals
of America, vol. VII, p, 289.
95. William Holmes McGuffey, Newly Revised Eclectic Fourth Reader, 1853, and
Goodrich quoted in Kohn, American Nationalism, p. 63. See also Goodrich, A
562
Notes to Pages 447455
History of the United States of America, 4th ed. (Bellows Falls, Vt., 1824),
introduction.
96. George Bancroft, Poems: Expectations, June 1821; Rome, July 1823 (Bos
ton, 1823); The Necessity, the Reality, and the Promise of the Progress of the
Human Race, Oration delivered before the New York Historical Society, No
vember 20, 1834 (New York, printed for the Society), pp. 2829,3334; Me
morial Address on the Life and Character of Abraham Lincoln (Washington,
D.C-: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1866), pp. 4, 6; The Office of the
Peopie in Art, Government, and Religion, oration delivered at Williamstown
College, August 1835, in The Annals of America, vol. VI, pp. 128136.
97. Emerson, The Young American, in Essays and Lectures, pp. 217, 226, 221,
228,229; 230,226,228.
9 8. Charles Mackay, Life and Liberty in America, quoted in Curti, Roots, p. 31.
99. George Dekker and Larry Johnston, introduction to James Fenimore Cooper,
The American Democrat (London: Penguin Books, 1989), pp. 8, 45, and pas
sim.
100. Cooper, The American Democrat, pp. 104, 105109, 70, 69. The American
Democrat was written in 1838, about the same time when Tocqueville postu
lated that equality of conditionscombined with prosperitywas the distin
guishing characteristic of the American society.
101. This is Huntingtons argument in American Politics: The Promise of Disbar-
mony (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
102. Cooper, Home as Pound, p. v.
103. Abraham Lincoln, Speech delivered at Springfield, HI., June 26, 1857, Com
plete Works, vol. II, pp; 330331.
104. Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross: The Economics
of American Negro Slavery (Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1974). Those who,
for propagandist purposes, present Southern slavery as in any sense compa
rable to the Holocaust miss the point (they diminish the enormity of the Holo
caust and do no justice to slavery). It was a degrading, not a homicidal, ar
rangement, a way of life, however unacceptable, not of mass murder, and in
order to comprehend its effects on those who experienced it, it must be under
stood as a way of life.
105. Cooper, American Democrat, pp. 220223.
106. Nat Turner, Confession (dictated in prison and recorded by Turners attor
ney, Thomas R. Gray), The Annals of America, vol. V, pp. 472481.
107. Cooper, American Democrat, p. 222. There was undoubtedly more than a
grain of truth, however awkward it is to admit this, in the pro-slavery argu
ment of Thomas Dew that all of us . .. are too prone to judge of the happiness
of others by ourselveswe make self the standard and endeavor to draw down
everyone to its dimensions . . . We might rather die than be the obscure slave
that waits at our backour education and our habits generate an ambition
that makes us aspire at something loftier, and disposes us to look upon the
slave as unsusceptible of happiness in his humble sphere, when he may indeed
be much happier than we are. Thomas R. Drew, The Pro-Slavery Argument
(1832), The Annals of America, vol. V, p. 510.
108. See the Address of the Negro Convention in Philadelphia, June 611, published
Notes to Pages 455460
563
in Liberator, October 22, 1831 {The Annals of America, vol. V, pp. 424-426);
William Lloyd Garrison, Address on The Dangers of the Nation, July 4,
1829, The Annals of America, vol. V, p. 305; Lincoln, Speech on the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, delivered in Peoria, October 16,1854, Complete Works, vol. II,
p. 205.
109.>See, for example, George Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South, or the Failure of
Free Society, 1854, four chapters reprinted in Harvey Wish, ed., Ante-bellum:
Writings of G. Fitzhugh and H. R. Helper on Slavery (New York: Capricorn
Books, 1960); and Cannibals All! or, Slaves Without Masters, 1857 (Cam
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I960). Also see Edmund Ruffin,
Consequences of Abolition Agitation [De Bow's Review, JuneDecember
1857, The Annals of America, vol. VIII, pp. 466-475).
110. Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1982). (Incidentally, Patterson rejects the usefulness of defin-
ing slavery only as the treatment of human beings as property, because such
definition does not really specify any distinct category of persons. Proprietary
claims and powers are made .with respect to many persons who are clearly [in
legal terms] not slaves; specifically, wives and children may be considered as
property of husbands and fathers. This again undescores the resemblance be
tween the status of women and slaves.) The Seneca Falls Declaration on
Womens Rights, in The Annals of America, vol. VII, pp. 438441.
111. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. II, pp. 209,223, 224,211,225. The
Seneca Falls Declaration, p. 439.
112. Henry James jotted in his Notebook that The Bostonians should be a study of
one of those friendships between women which are so common in New Eng
land." The Bostonians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, The Worlds Classics,
1984), p. 438. The quoted phrase is Garrisons, from the salutatory of the first
issue of Liberator, for whose publication Garrison believed Boston to be the
proper place, because the history and traditions of the place threw inequality
into a sharper relief than those of any other place.
113. Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer, Letter IX, p. 98. Henry David Thoreau,
Walden and Civil Disobedience, ed. Michael Meyer (New York: Penguin Clas
sics, 1986), p. 49.
114. J. J . Flournoy, Ebony Workers and White Workers, Southern Banner, Janu
ary 13, 1838; Appeal of Forty Thousand Citizens, Threatened with Disen
franchisement to the People of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1838, The Annals
of America, vol. VI, pp. 415-416; 417. James, The Bostonians, p. 32 and pas
sim.
115. Quoted in Bailyn, Ideological Origins, p. 243.
116. Although one may add, tongue in cheek, that if the ability CO reason is no
longer invoked, there is no reason at all why Americans should deny their mi
nors the rights enjoyed by people of age. For Jeffersons views on slavery and
black intellectual inferiority, see Notes on Virginia; also, Jordan, White over
Black, and Miller, The Wolf by the Ears. See Miller also for Jeffersons views
on women. Maryland Abolitionists quoted in Jordan, p. 448.
117. Intellectuals working in areas with well-defined criteria of excellence are less
affected by the lack of recognition, although undoubtedly it is always frustrat-
564
Notes to Page 461
mg, because they are less dependent on it for the assessment of their abilities.
The craving for status explains both the Unionist preferences of the intellec
tuals and their opposition to American ideals.
118. Alexis de Tocqueville, Conversation with Mr. Livingston (from Journey to
America), The Annals of America, vol. V, p. 482.
119. I must disagree with the authoritative statement on this subject, Richard Hof-
stadters Anli-lntellectualism in American Life {New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1963). The vision of the bookan intellectuals response to McCarthyismis
obstructed by the authors sympathies arid dislikes. Sharing in these sympathies
should not prevent one from seeing the fallacy of the argument. Hofstadter
defines anti-inteilectuaiism as a resentment and suspicion of the life of the
mind and of those who are considered to represent it; and a disposition con
stantly to minimize the value of that life (p. 7), thus confounding contempt
for culture and disregard for professional intellectuals, and putting emphasis
on the contempt for culture. He considers it, with certain largely perfunctory
reservations, a problem of more than ordinary acuteness here, a problem of
special urgency and poignancy (p. 20), though willing to admit in passing that
the situation in England might be almost as bad (he quotes a contemporary
British intellectual, saying: No people has ever despised and distrusted the
intellect and intellectuals more than the British [ibid.]). Hofstadter, however,
provides no evidence whatsoever to support this claim. He admits in one sen
tence that this is not, as it perhaps should be, a comparative study (ibid.),
but comparison is absolutely essential to his argument. When one claims that
American society is anti-intellectual, the question necessarily must be asked: in
comparison to what? I f it is a tendency of societies as such, or of societies on a
certain level of development, or of democratic societies, to be anti-intellectual,
this claim, relative to American society, can only aspire to the status of exposi
tion to a particular context of a general rule. For the daim of American anti-
intellectualism to be a meaningful argument about the distinctiveness of the
American society, American society should be proved to be markedly more
anti-intellectual than other societies with a comparably developed culture.
Moreover, it should be established that this is a characteristic general to the
American population rather than, for example, to one or another of its elites,
whose attitudes, given that this is a pluralistic society, might not be representa
tive of the attitudes of society. Finally, it should be specified whether anti-
intellectualism refers to a hostility to intellectuals or to a contempt for the in
tellect and its preoccupationsculture.
It is evidently not true that the masses of American society, historically, have
been more hostile to intellectuals than, say, the masses of Russian or French
societies. As to the intellect, they have, conspicuously, valued it more than their
respective counterparts, although it cannot be said that they have uniformly
valued all aspects and forms of culture. The elite sectors in European societies,
' however, are uniformly respectful both of intellectuals and of culture, which
has not been so among American elites. Whatever they think of culture, Amer
ican elites, in general, do not defer to intellectuals. The inteUectualism of the
European elites is explained in part by the fact that they are to a large extent
composed of intellectuals, while in America professional intellectuals (rather
Notes to Pages 462463
565
than men thinking on their own time) have played a less prominent role in the
leadership of society. In other societies national identity was created by intellec
tuals who made sure that it would henceforth be associated with their high
status within the nation. In America, on the 'other hand, professional intellec
tuals as a group emerged significantly later than national identity and therefore
they do not have the centrality within the consciousness of their compatriots
enjoyed by intellectuals elsewhere.
What Hofstadter sees as ancj-mcellectuaiism" is in fact an indifference to
intellectuals. But to admit this would make the special interest of intellectuals
deploring this phenomenon ali too transparent. It is always safer to represent
ones personal concern as a disinterested concern for the general good. The very
frequency with which American intellectuals talk about the anti-iwellectualism
of their society underscores the existence of a special interest. In Russia the
word intelligent is used by the people as a word of abuse, but one rarely
encounters Russian intellectuals accusing Russia of anti-inteilectualism.
Similarly, regarding the claim of the crass materialism of Americans, it must
be admitted that the human race is deplorably materialistic. Consumer soci
eties differ from those that are not so called by the fact that in them there are
things to be consumed, not by the greater urge to consume or lesser spirituality.
In fact, as the events of the last two years in Eastern Europe have shown us,
consumer deprivation, if anything, makes people more rather than less materi
alistic.
120. Dudley quoted in Bridenbaugh, Spirit of 76, p. 27; Duche, Ezra Stiles, and
Edmund Burke in Boorstin, Colonial Experience, pp. 316,204,201.
121. Boorstin, Colonial Experience, pp. 182, 172184 passim, 205; Merle Curti,
American Paradox: The Conflict of Thought and Action (New Brunswick,
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1956), pp. 15-16.
122. Boorstin, National, p. 155. Hezekiah Niles, Niles' Weekly Register, November
11,1815, quoted in Kohn, American Nationalism, p. 43.
123. See Chapter 3, fn. 142. A Russian visitor indeed noted the difference. Pavel
Svinin wrote in his Opyt zhivopisnogo puteshestvia po severnoi Amerike (A
Picturesque Voyage through North America, 1815, believed to be the first
account of the United States by a Russian traveler): You should not look for
profound philosophers and celebrated professors in America; but you will be
astonished at the correct understanding of the humblest citizen respecting the
most abstract matters . .. Everyone studies the geography of his country,
knows the rudiments of arithmetic, and has a genera! idea of other sciences.
That is why every muzhik here not only would not be surprised by an eclipse of
the moon or the appearance of a comet, but could discuss these phenomena
with a fair degree of intelligence. Quoted in Abbott Gleason, Pavel Svinin,
in Marc Pachter, ed., Abroad in America: Visitors to the New Nation, 1776
1914 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1976), p. 13.
124. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. II, p. 58.
125. See Bernard Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 26-27, on the laws con*
cerning education, and in genera! on the importance and pervasiveness of edu
cation in colonial America,
566
Notes to Pages 463473
126. Boorstin, Colonial Experience, pp. 242, 314315. Baiiyn (Education, p. 35),
writes about Franklinsidea of education: It was a subtle revolution too often
interpreted as somehow peculiarly utilitarian. Indeed, he did expect education
to be useful, as who did not; but his revolution consisted in the kind of utility
he had in mind. He wanted subjects and instruction that trained not for limited
goals, not for close-bound, predetermined careers, but for the broadest possible
range of enteiprise. He had no argument with the classics as such. What he
objected to was the monopoly of the higher branches of education which de
nied the breadth of preparation needed for the open world he saw.
127. David A, Wasson, Atlantic Monthly, October 1858, p. 527. Quoted in Curti,
Roots, p. 72.
128. Jared Eliot, Essays upon Field Husbandry in New England, as it is or may be
Ordered (Boston, 1760); Pennquoted in Boorstin, Colonial Experience,
pp. 264, 307.
129. Emerson, The American Scholar, pp. 5658.
130. By Oliver'Wendell Holmes.
131. Channing, Remarks, p. 261.
132. Walt Whitman, Complete Poetry and Collected Prose, ed. Justin Kaplan (New
York: The Library of America, 1982), Leaves of Grass, preface of 1855,
pp. 5,8-10,14-15,17,24-26.
133. Whitman, Complete Poetry, Letter to Emerson, August, 1856, p. 1328.
Leaves of Grass was not recognized as a great masterpiece until the twentieth
century. Whitman shared the fate of other now admittedly great literary figures
of his time, such as Thoreau and Melville, whose genius, largely unnoticed at
the time when they expected praise, was acknowledged only in retrospect.
134. Business early became the focus of intellectuals criticism of American society;
it was seen as the perfect embodiment of its failings. See Hofstadter, Anti-
intellectualism, pp. 233ff. Unlike the case in Europe, in America businessmen
enjoyed the soda! consideration intellectuals would have liked to consider their
own prerogative and felt deprived of.
135. Whitman, Complete Poetry, pp. 936-938,932,935,974.
136. Edgar Allan Poe, Mellonta Tauta, quoted in Kohn, American Nationalism,
p. 45, and Some Words with a Mummy, a Tale, in Poe, Poetry and Tales, ed.
P. F. (New York: The Library of America, 1984), p. 820.
137. Quoted in Boorstin, National, p. 289. More to this effect can be found in
Henry James, The American Scene, 1907.
138. Edgar Allan Poe, Prospectus of the StylusEssays and Reviews, ed. G. R.
Thompson (New York: The Library of America, 1984), p. 1035.
139. For example, Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism; Daniel Beil, Resolving the
Contradictions of Modernity and Modernism, Transaction!Society, 27 and 28
(Spring 1990).
140. Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism, pp. 400404.
141. Rufus Choate, American Nationality, The Annals of America, vol. IX, p. 56.
142. A Confederate opinion, quoted in Reid Mitchell, Civil War Soldiers: Their Ex
pectations and Their Experiences (New York: Viking, 1988), p. 11. (See
Mitchell on the participants reasons for fighting in general.) Lincoln, Reply to
the signed editorial in New York Tribune, The Prayer of Twenty Millions,
August 22,1862, The Annals of America, vol. IX, p. 348.
Notes to Pages 474479
$67
143. Daniel Webster, Speech at the Senate, March 7, 1850, The Annals of America,
voi. VIII, pp. 2627, 25. See Mitchell, Civil War Soldiers, on the views of
Northern soldiers regarding slavery.
144. John C, Calhoun, Speech at the Senate, delivered by James A. Mason, March
4, 1850, The Annuls of America, vol. VIII, pp. 17-18, 19,20.
145., Lincoln, Speech on Kansas-Nebraska Act, October 1854, Complete Works,
voL II, p. 246.
146. Consider, for example, the following pronouncements: We must become na
tional, nay, provincial, and cease to be imitative cosmopolitans . . . We want
American customs, habits, manners, dress, manufactures, modes of thought,
modes of expression, and language. We should encourage national and even
State peculiarities . .. Take language, for instance. It is a thing of natural
growth and development. . . It is never ungrammatical as spoken by children,
but always expressive, practical, and natural. Nature is always grammatical,
and language, the child of nature, would continue so but for rhe grammarians
. , . The rules of art destroy art. This is not Friedrich Schiegel, but the Ameri
can George Fitzhugh {Cannibals All!, pp. 59,63).
147. Quoted in Boorstin, National, p. 218; see in general the chapter Metaphysical
Politics. Also see Arieli, Individualism, The Great Debate on the Nature of
the American Ideal.
148. The battle cry of freedom was that of the South as well as the North, as we
learn from James McPherson, Battle Cry of' Freedom: The Civil War Era (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1988). See Mitchell, Civil War Soldiers, on the
value of freedom among Confederate soldiers; Boorstin, National, pp. 215
218, on attitudes toward public opinion; the quotation is from Kohn, Ameri
can Nationalism, p. 108.
149. Fitzhugh, Cannibals All!, p. 63.
150. Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South, pp. 6871. Sociology for the South and an
other apology for slavery, A Treatise on Sociology, by the Mississippian Henry
Hughes, which also appeared in 1854, were the two first American books to
present themselves as sociological and to have the word sociology in their
titles. It is interesting that Northern intellectuals at this time did not favor so
ciology. Lowell, for example, considered it a fearful science and found soci
ologists (who came from Europe) to be hardest to bear. Lowell, On a Cer
tain Condescension of Foreigners, Writings (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside
Press, 1890), vol. ill, p. 245.
151. Fitzhugh, Cannibals All!, ch. 1, The Universal Trade, pp. 1517,20; Sociol
ogy for the South, pp. 249250.
152. Lincoln,Fragment On Slavery, July 1,1854, Complete Works, vol-H,p. 186.
153. F. L. Olmsted, Slavery in its Effects on Character, and the Social Relations of
the Master Class, New-York Daily Times, January 12, 1854, The Annals of
America, vol. VIII, p. 242. Olmsted noticed Southerners tendency to reinter
pret their principles in accordance with their interests, rather than abandon the
former. The South, he wrote, endeavors to dose its eyes to every evil the
removal of which will require self-denial, labor, and skill If, however, an evil is
too glaring to be passed unnoticed, it is immediately dedared to be constitu
tional, or providential, and its removal is dedared to be either treasonable or
impioasusually both; and, what is worse, it is improper, impolite, ungentle-
568 Notes to Pages 480488
manly, unmanlike (ibid., p. 239). Unlike Fitzhugh, Olmsted was not a sociol
ogist, but a landscape artist* Yet he was evidently capable of sociological in-
sight-
154. Lincoln, Speech on Kansas-Nebraska Act, p. 227.
155. Lowell, Condescension in Foreigners, Writings, vol. Ill, p. 246. Emerson,
Journals, quoted in Curti, Roots, p. 169. Charles Sumner, Are We a Nation?
Address delivered on November 19, 1867, Works (Boston; Lee and Shepard,
1877), vol. XII, pp. 187-249,193.
156. Yale address quoted in Curti, Roots, p. 171. j . R. Lowell, *Reconstruction,'*
1865, Writings, vol. V,p. 212. Sumner, Works, p. 191.
157. Francis Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 1853, ed. X D. Woolsey
(Philadelphia, 1874), p. 295. Quoted in Kohn, American Nationalism,
pp. 141142. (Before he immigrated, Lieber was a German patriot and a dis
ciple of Jahn. Invited to teach gymnastics in Boston, he soon taught political
science Erst at the University of South Carolina and then at Columbia, and
became the founder of the Encyclopedia Americana. On Lieber and organic
theorists in general, see Kohn; Curti, Roots, pp. 174179; Curti, "Francis Lie
ber and Nationalism, The Huntington Library Quarterly, 4 [April 1941],
pp. 263292,) Mulford quoted m Kohn, p. 127.
158. Michael Walter, What Does It Mean to Be an American9? Paper delivered at
the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J., October 1989.
159. On the place of ethnicity in American society, see in particular Philip Glea
son, American Identity and Americanization, in Stephen Thernstrom, ed.,
Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Har
vard University Press, 1980).
160. Horace Kaliens Culture and Democracy in the United States (New York: Boni
and Liveright, 1924) is an example of such early reinterpretation of dual iden*
tity in America, I am relying in this note on Gleason's ("American Identity)
and particularly Walzers (What Does It Mean) reading of Kallen.
161. Consider the shock of Henry James upon discovering ethnicity in The Amer
ican Scene.
162. The accepted view seems to be that they were. But it is based on a misunder
standing of the nature of national identity, and the projection onto the past of
what to the present appear as self-evident truths.
163. Like any dual allegiance, that of ethnic Americans contains a potential for
disunion. The perpetuation and cultivation of "ethnic identities is at least as
dangerous as the recognition of state sovereignties, particularly because most
of these identities are essentially exclusive.
164. Daniel Bell, Utopian Nightmare, review of 1984 by George Orwell, New
Leader; 25 (June 1949), p. 8.
Afterword
1. The right of control over ones property is a central element of the definition of
liberty, and therefore status, in America, which gives a rather spiritua! turn to
its proverbial materialism. John Dickinsons Liberty Song quoted earlier,
Note to Page 488
569
contains some lines touching upon this. The f irst verse, calling on Americans to
join hand in handsends with the f ollowing:
Our purses are ready,
Steady* Friends, steady,
Not as $lave$t but as freemen our money well give.
However dear they held their purses, it was not the necessity to part with some
of their contents that incensed them, but the f act that they were deprived of the
right to decide when and why to do so. Americans would rather go to war than
be taxed without being represented, f or
To die we can bear,*but to serve we disdain,
For shame is to f reemen more dreadf ul than pain.
To draw a contemporary parallel, Sadam Hussein would be well advised to
peruse the songs of the American Revolution bef ore undertaking to dictate to
rhe United States how much it should pay per barrel of oil. It is the indignity of
accepting such dictationthe inf ringement on their libertynot the expense
of several more cents per gallon, which makes Americans willing to go to a f ar
greater expense, andmuch more importantto sacrif ice their lives, to stop
him. It is one thing to submit to the indif f erent laws of supply and demand, a
completely dif f erent one to suf f er the imposition of somebodys will.
Index
Abolitionists, 455,458
Absolutism, 96,119-121* 124, 126,129-
131,132-133, 144, 16S, 284-287,292
Act of Appeals, 32, 36,51
Adams* Henry, 471
Adams, John, 410, 413, 417, 419, 428,
430,441
Adams, John (geographer), 81
Aguesseau, Henri Francois d\ 144
Aksakov, Konstantin, 264, 266
Aiembert, Jean !e Rond d1, 92, 151, 253
Alen^on, Due d, 109
Alexander I, 260261
Alexis, Tsar, 191, 218
American independence, 420421, 425
American Revolution, 413, 442, 476, 480-
French involvement in, 180-482; attitude
toward in Russia, 262; impact on German
nationalism, 354
American universal iism, 423, 446447
Anglophilia, 178, 180, 224, 441
Anglophobia, 178179,181, 183; lack of in
America, 421,421 n47
Anna, Empress of Russia, 198199, 208,
209,231,234
Anomie, 35-16, 23
Anti-Federalists, 42S
AnriHnteUectuaHsm, 460-461, 461nl l 9;
and universities, 470472
Anti-Semitism, 25,378-386,387,388,395,
395n237; the term, 380n208
Avion Reiser, 302-309,310, 316,317, 324,
333,334, 342,382
Antraigues, E. H, L. A. de Launey, Comte d\
147,171172
Arc, Jeanne d\ 95
Argenson, Rene Louis de Voyer, Marquis d\
147,159
Armada, 62
Arminius, 282,284,321 >328
Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 321, 361,365,368,
369,370,371,375,377
Arnim, A. von*, 361,379,383
Arnold, Gottfried, 315317
Articles of Confederation, 427
Ascham, Roger, 42, 43, 46, 70
Aitiard, Francois Alphonse, 18.1
Autocracy, 267
Aylmer, John, 60, 73
Bach, J . S,, 32ln$3
Bacon, Francis, 7980
Bakunin, Mikhail, 269
Bale, John, 42-43, 45
Balzac, Guez de, 115-116,119,155
Bancroft, George, 446-449
Banvard, John, 437
Bate, John, 49
Beaune, Colette, 95,98
Bebel, Heinrich, 282
Beethoven, Ludwig van, 338339
Belinsky, Vissarion, 26S269
Bellay, Joachim du, 103
Belloy, Pierre de, 110
BelJoy, P. L 3. de, ISO
Bemis, Cardinal de, 165
Bestuzhev, Alexander, 262
Bible: English, 51-55, 53n57, 60, 86; Old
Testament, 52-53; Vulgate, 5253, 283;
King James, 52; Luther's translation of,
283,284
Bill of Rights (1689), 42
Biron, Ernst Johann, 234
Blok, Alexander, 271272
Blue Flower, 342,386, 395
B odin, Jean, 110
Boehme, Jakob, 319
Boie, Hi Ch., 354
572 I ndex
BoUeau, N,, 145
Bolsheviks, 270
Bons Frangais, 113,118
Boorstin* Daniel, 421, 43 6
Boulainviiliers* Henri de, 145, 172
Bourbon, 99,120
Boyle, Robert, 8182
Brentano, C., 361, 3S1
Bridenbaugh, Carl, 424
Brissot (de Warville), J . E=181
Brunschwig, Henri, 292, 322, 325* 326,
327, 356
Bryan, Samuel, 426
Burke, Edmund, 414, 424,462
Cahiers de dolsance, 147, 166, 185
Calhoun, John, 474-475
Calonne, Charles Alexandre de, 165
Calvinism, 105,108, 285, 315-316
Camden, William* 67* 70
Cameralism, 285
Campe, Joachim., 354
Capetians, 93, 94
Capitalism, 150, 377, 378, 385, 387, 388,
393, 395^237, 448, 476-477,489- iden
tification with England, 180, 377
Carew, Richard, 69
Carey, Mathew, 442
Carolingian Empire, 92
Cartwright, Thomas, 73
Catherine II (empress of Russia), 191,198
203, 209-214, 217, 219,220-221,230,
234-235,248-249
Catherine of Aragon, 32
Catherine de Medids, 104106
Catholic Holy League, 105107,109,110
Catholicism in France, 94, 95* 97,106,
111-112,113,187
Celtis* Conradus, 282
Chaadaev, P.* 255, 264,266, 268269
Chamisso, Adeibert, 381
Channmg, William Ellery, 443, 466
Chanson de Roland, 93
Chansons de ge$te>101
Chapman, George, 45
Charlemagne, 92
Charles I (King of England), 4041, 71
Charles II (King of England), 77
Charles V, Habsburg, 244, 280* 284, 371
Charles VII (King of France), 94
Charles I X (King of France), 105
Charron>Pierre, 104
Charter on the Nobility 1785), 202203,
212-213, 215
Chartier, Alain, 102
Chastelet, Paul Hay du, 114
Chaucer, Geoffrey* 43>6S69, 78
Chaussinand-Nogaret, Guy, 133134,148,
152-153
Chernyshevskii, N. G,, 270
Chevigny, Sieur de, 138
Choate, Rufus, 472
Church, TS F., 124
Church Councils, 4-5, 279-280,282
Citron, Suzanne, 98
Civil War (American), 403, 443-444, 473,
477, 480, 483
Classicism, German, 323,335, 344
Clausewtes, Kari von, 361, 370
Clay, Henry, 474
Clinton, DeWitt, 438
Code Michaud, 99, 117
Colbert* jean-Baptiste, 126
Columbus, Christopher, 406
Communism, 391
Condillac, Etienne Bonnet de* 324
Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicholas de
Caritat, Marquis de, 159,176
Confederacy, 403, 479
Conring, Hermann, 286
Constitution, 401, 413414; English, 35
36,156; Frenchj 9798, 356; British, 401,
413414, 416, 422, 441; American, 425,
426, 431* 473-474, 480
Constitutional Convention, 462
Continental Congress, 412* 416, 431
Cooper, James Fenimore, 443, 450454
Cooper, Thomas, 32, 3435
Corneille, Pierre, 127
Cosmopolitanism, 156,157, 232,233, 249,
313,314, 354,365, 379
Cotton, Robert, 70
Cotton, Roger, 62
Courland, Duke of* 199
Court and Country, 32, 73, 400
Coverdale, Miles, 52
Coyer, Abbe, 134, 146,162
Cranmer, Thomas, 57
Crevecoeur, Hector St. Jean de, 40S,
434-436
Crockett, Davy, 26, 434, 436
Crompton, Richard, 66
Cromwell, Oliver, 75-76,106,233,40J
Cromwell, Thomas* 29
Crusader State, 93, 98
Cultural independence (American), 441-.442
Curti, Merle, 424
Cushman, Robert, 404,405
Daniel, Samuel, 70, 78, 249
Darigrand, Jean-Baptiste, 150
Death, the value of, 321,339-341
Decembrist Uprising* 261262
Declaration of Independence, 412, 422-424
451-454,462, 478
Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizen, 179
Democracy, 10* 24,50,369, 399*428 429
430,446,449, 451, 468,472,479,484 *
488-489
Derzhavin, Gavrila, 219220,248, 258
Descartes, Rene* 82
Desmoulins, CaraiUe, J 83
Dickinson, John, 411, 413, 415, 420,424
425,457
Dickinson, Samuel, 409
Diderot, Denis, 179t 253, 324
Diggers, 75
Divine Right* theory of, 109-113,115 121
126, 129,155,165,175 ? '
Division of labor, 345nl40
Dohm, Christian Wilhelm, 380 ,
Domat, jean, 126
Drake, Francis, 61
Drayton, Michael, 64, 67, 69
Dryden, John, 76, 78, S5
Duche, Jacob, 461
Duclos Charles, 156, 299
Dudley, Edmond, 3 5
Dudley, Joseph, 461
Duiany, Daniel, 410
Dumas, Alexandre, 125
Durkheim, Emile, 17, 19
Education:
in England: attitude toward, 45-46,53;
as a venue of mobility, 49
in France* as a venue of mobility, 143
in Russia? attitude toward, 213, 242,
248; development of, 235-237
In Germany; attitude coward, 294295,
332; as a venue of mobility* 296
in America: attitude toward, 461465,
462nl23,463nl26
Edward VI, 37,58
Eisenstadt, S. N.* 205
Eliot, Jared, 464
Elizabeth Romanov, 198-200,209-210
Elizabeth Tudor, 37-38,60, 6265, 67,
70-72
Eiyot, Thomas, 32-35,43, 45-46, 70
Emerson, Ralph Waldo* 444, 446,448-449,
465,467, 480
hncyclopedie, 149,151,161,163--164,
210, 215
Engels, Friedrich, 391
English Common Law, 50
Enlightenment, 152,255,277,310-311,
314,323, 350,352,372,378-380,465;
Aufklarung 294-296,310-314, 319,323,
324, 325, 326,328,330,333,345, 347,
350,353, 354,358,359, 372,374,378,
379,382
Equality: concept of, 30,57,75,100-179,
185,258,269,348-350,370,399*401,
408,435,447,467,484; economic, 439;
and inequality, 44945$, 456457,478;
sexual, 458; and reason, 459-460; and
anti-inteilectualism, 469-472
Erasmus, 49
Ethnicity (ethnic nationalism), 3,11-13, 65,
99, 238,258, 319, 368-369,476, 482-
483,490
Evelyn, William, 418
Federal Convention, 427
Federalists,428-430, 438
Fendon, Archbishop of Cambrai, 132
Fichte, J . G 267,300,328-329, 348,354,
361363,365-368, 375, 381, 3S3,393
Figgis,Neville, 111
Financiers, 131,149150
Fitzhugh, G-, 477-478
Fleur delys, 91, 95,102,179
Fontaine, Charles, 103
Fontenelle, B. Le Bovier, Sieur de, 82
Fonvisin, Denis, 221223, 233234, 249,
252-253,255-257, 260
Ford, R, 152
Foxe, John, 60, 61, 63, 67
5 74
I ndex
Francke, August Hermann, 315
Francois 1(King of France), 99, 105-106,
120
Francois II (King of France), 105
Francophobia in Germany* 372, 375
Franklin, Benjamin, 182, 407408, 410
411,414,418, 424, 438
Franks, 92, 97, 108, 377
Frederick rhe Great, 285 , 287, 290* 291,
292, 310, 312, 313, 372, 380s 380n210
French Revolution* 92, 124,134,147,150,
152-154,166-167,169,173, 177, I SO-
181, 183, 186, 262, 430; impact on Ger
man nationalism, 352357, 359, 373,
375, 390, 393
Freneau, Philip, 419
Friedrich Wilhelm I, 285, 28S, 289
Friedrich Wilhelm, the Great Elector, 285,
288,289,291
Fronde, 124125,138, 155
Fugg&rei, 281
Furet, Francois, 152
Furetiere, Abbe, 160164
Fyodor, Tsar, 205
Galloway, Joseph, 410
Garrison* William Lloyd, 454
Garve, Christian, 302, 342
Gascoigne, George, 4546, 49
Gaston d'Orleans, 117,119120
Gauls, 92, 108
Gellert, Christian Fiirchtegott, 300
Genius, the idea of, 301, 323, 334339,
344,351352, 360
Gentz, Friedrich von, 381
Geo-political framework of American na
tionality, 423, 431
German university system, 282, 293296;
University of Halle, 294, 298,326, 362;
University of Gottingen, 294296; Uni
versity of Berlin, 295; University of Kon
igsberg, 323324
Gertpanophilia in France* 377nl96
Germany as a pan-human nation, 366,393
Gilbert, WilHam, 80
GlanviU, Joseph, 5
Gneisenau, N. von, 361
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 292, 299
300, 302, 309, 313-314, 323-324, 326,
328329, 331-337, 339, 340,343-345,
345nl 40,375, 381,383
Gogol, Nikolai Vasilievich, 257, 268
Golovkin, Count, 198
Goodrich, Samuel Griswold, 445446
Googe, Barnabe* 45
Gorbachev, M. S., 192, 250nl l 6
Gordon, Adam, 408
Gower, John, 6869
Grandes chroniques de France, 93
Granovsky, T. N., 267
Great Awakening, 471
Great Northern War, 196-197, 226
Greeley, Horace, 473
Grimm, M., 159
Grimm, brothers, 361
Griinewaid, M., 321&83
Guise, ducal family of, 105
Guyon, J.-M- B. de La Motte, Mme du
Chesnoy, 303
Habsburgs. See Hapsburgs
Hakluyt, Richard, 61, 68
Hall, Edward, 42
Hailey, Edmond, 81
Hamann, Johann Georg, 323324, 327
328, 331333,336
Hamilton, Alexander, 424, 428, 441
Hancock, John, 414
Hapsburgs, 123, 280
Hardenberg, K, von, 361, 362, 373* 379
Harrison, William, 61, 6768
Hart, Levi, 458
Harvard University, 462, 464
Harvey, Gabriel, 68
Hegel, G. Wf R, 266, 348, 350, 3S8s 391
Heine, Heinrich, 314, 383
Heivetius, 149
Henri II (King of France}, 104-106,120
Henri III (King of France), 106
Henri IV (King of France), 106107, 109,
120-121
Henry VII (King of England), 36-37, 50
Henry VIII (King of England), 37,43, 50-
51,58, 68
Henry, Patrick, 423,482
Herder, j- G-, 232,321, 324-325, 328,
330-333, 336-337, 344-345,345nl40,
374, 377, 382
Herz, Henrietta, 362, 381
Herzen, A., 263-264, 267-270
Hess, Moses, 383
Higginson, John, 406
Index
575
Higonnet, Pardee, 152
Hitler, Adolf, 3S4
Hobbes, Thomas, 73
Hofstadter, Richard, 471
Hohenstaufens, 279
Hohenzollerns, 285, 287288
HoltJach, P.-H. D., Baron d1, 179
Holderlin, F., 332, 354
Holocaust, 55* 384
Holy Roman Empire* 93, 97,279-280,
282-284, 286,312, 358
Hooker* Richard., 37* 62* 72
Hoover, Arlie, 327
Hopkinson, Francis, 4X0
Hotman, Francois, 104}108-109,I I S,
125, 217
Huguenots, 105-106,108-109,129,289
Humanism, 30,100, 279; German, 282
283,380
Humboldt, Alexander von, 381
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 361, 364, 371,
381,382, 382n214
Hundred Years War, 95, 97, 101
Hutten, Ulrich von, 281-282
Jdeais and interests* 458459
Immigration to North America, 71, 404-
405, 434-437, 440, 482-483; and
emigration, 470
Inglis, Charles, 411
Innocent III, Pope, 94
Intellectuals, 22
French* 100; incorporation into the
French elite, 149*151; attitude to
ward money, 151; English compared
to French* 157
Russian: intelligentsia, 211,250; chang
ing composition of since 1860s,
270nl49; of 1917, 273; noble, 216,
218, 237, 247-249; non-noble, 235,
237239,242-247,249
German: Biidungsburgertum, 277,293
310,312, 314* 31$, 321, 324,326,
344- 350,351, 352, 363,372,373,
374,375, 378,379, 381, 382,388;
population, 296; as an alternative
middle class, 297; trained unemploy
ability among, 297; free-lance, 298-
300; the intellectual as the alienated
man, 345; anti-noble sentiment, 354;
turn to nationalism, 359360
American, 440; preoccupation with cul
tural independence, 442-444; aliena
tion of, 460461, 469470; in com
parison with European intellectuals,
461, 46l nl l 9,465; claim to leader
ship, 466; attitude toward business,
468; and universities, 471472
Interregnum, 40
Ivan III, 204
Ivan IV, the Terrible, 204, 207, 217, 221,
233
jahn, F. Turnvater, 170,361,367-370,
481nl57
James I (King of England), 38, 39-40,
71,73
James, Henry, 438,455,458* 469
Jansenists, 131,132, 132n73
Jaucourt, L. de* 161,163165
Jefferson, Thomas, 412, 423,426,429-431*
438, 441-442, 459
Jewel, John, 63
Johnson, Edward, 407
Joly, Claude, 125
Jonson, Ben, 70
Judaism, 380,382, 386,388
jurieu, Pierre, 129
Kahovsky, Peter, 261, 262
Kaiser, Gerhardt, 321
Kant* Immanuel, 301,310,311,324,348,
391
Kantemir, Antiokh, 218219,231, 255
Karamzin, Nicholay* 227,230* 232234,
249-250,250nl l 6,255,256,259
Karl August, Duke of Weimar, 325,344
Kheraskov, M. M., 213,249
Khomiakov, A. S., 264,266
Kiev Academy, 236,238, 245
Kireevskii, Ivan, 266,270
Kleist, Heinrich von, 326, 379
Klinger, F. M 324* 344
Kiopstock, F., 300,314,321,341,355
Kmazhnin, Ya. B., 215, 251
Knigge, A., 292
Kreistage, 288-289
Krieger, Leonard, 287
Kurakin, Kniaz, 207
l a Bruyere, 128,136,138-139,145,149,
161,218,283
576 I ndex
Lafayette, M. J. P. Y R. G. du Motier, Mar
quis de, 179nl99, 181
Landrate, 288, 290
Landtage, 288
Language* 7, 13; English, 69-70, 78;
French, 9799; Russian* 243245, 247,
249; German, 319, 363,367, 369; French,
German opinion o, 376, 385
La Roque, G- A., 145
Latimer, Bishop, 57, 60
Latin American colonies* 403
Lavater, J . K., 323, 336
Lavoisier, A* L de, 149
Le Bret, Cardin, 116117
Lebrun, Ponce-Denis E., 183
Lee* Richard Henry, 420
Legislative Commission of 17671768, 212,
214-217
Legitimes, 137
Leibniz* Gottfried "Wilhelm von, 294-295
Lelandj. John, 49
Lenin, Vladimir Ilich, 263, 270
Lenz, Jakob Michael Remhoid, 324, 334,
340,342-344, 360
Leo, Heinrich, 377
Leonard, Daniel, 416,417
Lermontov, Mikhail Yurievich, 258
Lesage, Alain Rene, 150
L&$$-ma}este, 96,116118,166
Lese-nation, 161,166
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 299, 310, 311,
314,372, 380
Levesque, P. C., 232233
Liberty (freedom):
in England, 30, 65, 71-78,79, 83, 86
in France, 144,151,152,157, 158,
163, 167,168* 171,175-486
in Russia, 257258,269
in Germany, 348, 349, 370,390
in America, 399,400-401, 407-408,
420,423, 426, 428,430- 431,435,
440442, 447-448, 456-457, 467,
473-474, 4g4; religious, 405-406;
as self-government, 412-413,422-
423, 439* 472, 476; English liberties,
j American entitlement to* 415416;
identified with states* rights, 429; and
slavery, 454-455,476-477; and rea
son, 459460
Lieber, Francis, 4S1, 48l nl 57
Lincoln, Abraham, 445,447,452-454*
473_474,476,479-480
List, Friedrich* 377, 442
Literacy, 5354, 87,461463
Livingston, William, 463
Locatelli, 230231
Locke, John, 400
Louis IX (King of France), 96
Louis XI (King of France), 96, 233
Louis XIII (King of France)* 99,113-114*
116,119-124,138
Louis XIV (King of France), 112,124,126
132,136-138,141,143,145-146,155,
159, 178, 289
Louis XV (King of France)* 124,165
Louis XVI {King of France), 166
Lomonosov, M. V*, 242244,246249
Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth, 443
Louisiana Purchase, 432, 442
Lowell, James Russell, 435, 443-444,
480-481
Loyseau, Charles, 112
Luther, Martin, 2S1, 283, 32l n83,338, 370
Luther, Seth, 439-440
Lutheranism, 280, 284, 316, 353
Lvov, N. A., 257
Lydgate, John, 68
Lyly, John, 67
Mably* Gabriel Bonnot de, 172,179180,
185
Machiaveili, Niccold, 44
Mackay, Charles, 449
Madison, James, 427-428,445
Maistre, Joseph de, 5
Mandektam, O-* 274
Manifesto on Noble Liberty* 199, 212, 213
Marat, jean Paul, 179
MariBac, Louis de, 114
Marfowe, Christopher, 32, 45, 67
Marr, Wilhelm* 380^208,395
Marwicz, F. A. L. von der, 362,379
Marx, Karl* 17* 263, 266, 269-270,
345nl40, 377, 383, 385, 386,388-392,
395,489; and Fitzhugh, 477478
Marxism, 24, 267nl42, 270, 387, 3S8, 393,
394
Mary Tudor, 37,51,54-55* 57-59, 66, 71,
86-87
Massefin, jean, 102
Mather, Cotton, 404406
Matveev, A, A., 223
Maximilian, Emperor, 196,282
Mayflower404, 413
Index
577
Mayhev^Jonachan, 415
Mazarin, Cardinal, 125,128, 130
Mazepa, 195
McGuffey, William Holmes, 445-446
Mcllwain, Charles, 113
McNally, R. T-, 263
Meehan-Waters, B-, 206 -207
Meinecke, Friedrich, 322
Melville, Herman, 443
Mendelssohn, Felix, 385
Mendelssohn, Moses, 310, 380, 380n210
Mercantilism, 285
Merrier, Louis-Sebastien, 150
Merck, Johann, 344
Meres, Francis, 68,70
Mexican War, 474
Meyerbeer, Giacomo, 385
Michele, Ambassador, 58
Middle classes, 48,184-186, 277, 289,290,
295,291, 293-310
Milton, John, 76-77, 86,412
Mirabeau, Honore Gabriel Riqueti* Comte
de, 373, 380
Moine, Robert de, 93
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de
La Bredeet de, 5, 8,157-158,168-169,
178-179, 202,213,221
Montmorency, Francois de, 117
Montreuil, Jean de, 98
More, Thomas, 69
Morgues* Mathieu de, 120
Moritz, Carl Philipp, 302, 304, 305s307,
309,317
Mornet, Daniel, 158
Morris, Gouvemeur, 427, 432
Moscow University, 213, 236-239, 247, 249
Moser, J ., 332
Moser, K. von, 334
Mousnier, Roland, 123,136
Mueller, G* P., 246
Muennich, B. C.t 234
Mailer, Adam, 346, 347, 366,367
Muller, Johannes, 355356
Miinchhausen, Baron von, 294-295
Murrin, John, 400,419, 424
Muscovy, 191, 193,204-205
Napoleon I, 261-262, 356,377
Napoleonic campaign in Germany, 287,358,
359, 373,375,378
Nash, Thomas, 67-69
National Assembly, 169
National Socialism, 24, 384, 387, 395
Nationalism, definition, 3, 67
Nativisra, 438,483
Nepluyev* 1.1., 225
Newton, Isaac, 8182
Nicholas 1,262
Nietzsche, F., 15
Nikolai, Ch., 310,311, 314
Niles, Hezekiah, 462
Nobility, 22
in England: rede6nirion of social hier
archy, 45,47,49,86; destruction of
the old nobility, 47; Henrician aris
tocracy, 47-48, 57,487; gentry, 47-
48; and nationalism, 47,86; patriotic
service, 47; squirearchy, 48; and
middle class, 48
in France: supplanted by professional
officers, 104,105; provincial, 105,
139; privileges of, attacked by Riche*
lieu, 119120; attitude toward the
state, 121; noblesse de robe>122,
136,137; during Fronde, 124; under
Louis XIV, 129,133,144; 18th cen
tury France, 133-134,144,152-154,
166, 215,488; gradations within,
134135; rules of precedence, 138
139; provincial nobility* 139; infla
tion of titles, 140,* revocation of
ennoblements, 140; contempt for
robins* 142143; attitude toward fin
anciers, 142143, 148; opposition to
absolutism, 144,168; and sexual li
cense, 144; redefinition and reorgani
zation in the 18th century, 145-147*
151,154; and nationalism, 154,168;
English compared to French, 157; ex
clusion from the nation,
171-172
in Russia: dvoryane, 202, 204, 206,
211, 218-222, 235,242, 260,488;
mestnichestvo, 205; and Table of
Rasks, 208-209, 215-218, 222;
Catherinian, 212,214215, 217; def
inition in the Charter, 212213; atti
tude toward education, 213; attitude
toward service, 215-216; as intellec
tuals,, 216,218, 247-250; turn to
nationalism, 220, 222,227
in Germany, 280-281, 287288, 294,
372; knights, 280, 283284; princes*
281, 283285; attack on economic
578
I ndex
Nobility {continued)
privileges of, 288; social privileges of,
289290 j economic superiority of,
289; aristocratization of army and
dvil service, 292; stability of social
hierarchy* 292, 302
Nogcnt, Guiberr de, 93
Norden, John, 63
Northwest Ordinance, 433, 474, 4S3
Novalis (Hardenberg, Friedrich von), 328,
329}335, 340, 347, 351, 355, 357, 390
Novikov, N. I., 214, 24S, 251,255, 259
Oberman, Heiko, 380
Offerers, 104,122-123,128, 133,140,154
Oldenburg, Henry, 8182
Olmsted, Frederick Law* 479
Osterman, A. L, Baron, 231, 234
Otis, James, 411
Ovid, 273
Pages, Georges, 128-129
Paine, Thomas* 411, 414, 419421, 424
425
Panin, N. I., 257
Parker, Matthew, 60
Pariemenrs, 101, 122, 128-130, 165; of
Paris, 141-143,147,158
Parliament (English), 29, 3641* 44, 5051,
65, 71-73, 75-78, 416-417; House of
Commons, 3940, 4950, 72; Hoase of
Lords, 41, 59
Pascal, Blaise* 128
Patch, Sam, 26
Peace of Westphalia, 284nS
Peacham* Henry, 4546, 68, 70
Penn, William, 464
People, the concept of, 4, 6, 78,14,258-
260, 369* 399, 426
Pepys, Samuel, 76
Periodical press in Russia, 214, 214n48
Peter 1(of Russia)* 191-203, 205-207* 209-
2X0j 212, 219-220, 223-225, 231, 233,
241,243*250, 2S9
Peter III (of Russia), 198-200, 209-211,
- 235
Philip Augustus (King of France}* 94, 96
Philip IV (le Bei) (King of France), 94, 99
Philippe de Novare, 99
Phillip, John, 64
Pbilosopbes, 149,155-157,178* 200,287
Physiocrats, 176
Pietism, 277, 314-321, 321n83, 322, 323*
325-331, 333, 338, 349, 355, 358, 360,
367* 389,471; Moravian Brethren
{Herrnhuter)^ 315, 318; the cuit of the
Passion on the Cross, 320, 341; attitude to
death, 321
Plantagenets, 96, 101
Ple$sis-Mornay, P. du, 108109
Plumer* W., 432
Poe, E. A., 46970
Pole, Reginald, 44
Politiques, 106107, 110
Polozki, Simeon, 226, 236
Polydore Vergil, 42
Polysynodie, 148
Pososhkov, I T., 226, 22S
Poynet, John, 58, 109, 217
Preuss, Hugo, 290
Princes o the blood, 96
Prohibitory Act of December 1775, 420, 422
Prokopovich, Feofan, 225226, 236
Proletariat, 392393
Protestantism. See also Pietism; Puritanism
English, 51-52,57-58, 61, 63, 66, 77,
86, 279, 283; Marian persecution of,
55-57, 59, 87
French, 105,109,127
German* 2B4, 315* 319, 357; Landes-
birchen, 284 .
Provincial intendants, 123, 12S129
Pufendorf, S., 165, 286
Puritan Rebellion* 52, 7374, 77
Puritanism, 7273, 77; changing attitude to,
85, 86; compared with Pietism, 315; m
America, 405406
Pushkin, A- S., 192* 248, 258
Puttenham, George, 45
Rabaut-Saint-Erienne, J.-P., 169
Race, 7, 368* 369, 383, 3S5,481
Racine, jean Baptiste, 92, 127
Racism, 369, 38S, 394,479
Radishchev, Aleksandr Nikolaevich, 214,
230, 247
Raleigh, Walter* 66, 68
Randolph* Edmund, 427
Randolph, John, 411
Raynal, Guillaume Thomas Fran$ois, 156
Raznochinzy67n93, 236^86, 2373259*
270nl49
Index
579
Reading public: in Russia, 232n79; in Ger
many 300, 309, 309n58; in America, 462
Reason, value of: in England, 30, 31, 46,
78-79, 86; in France, 182; in Russia,
255-258; in Germany, 310, 312, 326,
327,330, 332,335, 345, 350, 357,364;
in America, 399, 400,401,408,412,
429-430,447,459-460, 471
Reason of state, 113,115
Reformation: in England, 44,51-53* 61, 63,
65, 76, 86; in France, 106; in Germany,
277-27% 281* 282, 284, 315,357,379,
3S0, 390; German nationalism as an heir
of, 361; in American context, 405
Renaissance, 30, 44, 47, 99, 103,225,226,
279,282
Ressentiment, 15-17,23,177-178, 222-
223, 227-228, 234, 250, 253- 254, 256,
258,265, 269, 313,371, 372, 373,374,
383,386, 391,394, 395,422,4S8
Restoration, 41,74, 77, 400-401
Reuchlin, Johannes, 283
Rhodes, J-, 66
Richelieu, Armartd Jean du Plessb, Cardinal
and Due de, 51,112-323, 126, 128-130,
138,140,155,175
Richter, Jean Pau, 351, 381
Rider, John, 32, 34
RitschI, Albrecht, 318
Roman law, 281
Romanovs, 192
Romanticism, 24-25,277, 314,322-352,
353,357, 358, 350,391,392,481;and
music, 321n83, 338,339; Sturm und
Drang, 322-324, 32S, 330, 334, 33$,
339,344, 355,372, 375; art, Romantic
idea of, 336, 337, 338, 339,351; Catholi
cism of the Romantics, 340,340nl27,
341, 357; Romantic view of modern soci
ety, 345, 347,353; Romantic ideal of so-
cial reality, 348, 351* 352, 353, 391
Rome: as civilization of antiquity, 80,100,
103 j as embodiment of Western civiliza
tion, 272n 153t 273, 283, 446. See also
Russia
Rome, papacy, 29,32, 34, 93^95, 97,100,
104,106, 280281j Englands break
from, 48,51-52; Babylonian captivity and
Great Schism, 279
Ronsard, R de, 103
Roosevelt, Theodore, 483
Rouget de E-isle, C- L., 183
Rousseau, Jean-jacques, 149,151-152,155,
157,159, 163* 169-176,179,182,185,
232 .
Royal Society of London, 8084
Royalty, cult of, 9597,102, 111
Russia: as a pan-human nation, 257>258,
265267; as the Third Rome, 271272,
274
Russian Academy of Sciences, 236239,
243,247
Russian Revolution, 220,270-271
Saint-Simon, Ducde, 131,138-140,142
Salic law, 94,96,100-102, 106,108, 111
Sancy, Achille de, 118
Satan as a German phenomenon, 376
Saveile, Max, 422
Saville, George, 418
Schama, Simon, 152, 155
Scharnhorst, Gerhard Johann David von,
353, 361
Scheler, Max, 15
Scheming, Friedrich, 348,356
Schenkendorf, Max von, 370
Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich von,
299,302,314,383
Schlegei, Caroline, 356
Schlegei, Dorothea, 356, 381
Schlegei, Friedrich, 325-326,328-329,
331-332,335-337,339-340, 341nl30,
343-3-44, 351-352, 355-357,361,3 63,
366, 369,371-372, 381,383,391
Schlegei, WUhelm, 299, 325,349,356,381
Schleiermacher, F. D. E., 318, 325, 329,331,
341,347, 361,362, 381
Schloezer, A. L., 246
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 5
Schopenhauer, Johanna, 355
Schubart, Christian, 313
Science, 24-25, 79-86,242, 242nl 02,356,
379,388*390,394,464
Scott, Waiter, 299
Scythians, 273,389
Seguier, Pierre, 137
Segur, Louis Philippe, Comte de, 147,152,
1S1
Seneca Falls Declaration, 455456
Serfdom, 230,258-260,289
Seven Years War, 159,180, 210,290-291,
411
580 Index
Seyssei, Claude de, 104
Shafirov, P. K t97, 226, 243
Shaftesbury, 3rd Earl of (Anthony Ashley
Cooper), 399,401-402
Shakespeare, William, 32, 67, 69,306-307,
342, 376,443,463, 465
Shcherbatov, M. M*5216-217,221-222
Shennan, J . 144
Sidney, Philip, 6869, 79
Sieyes, Abbe Emmanuel Joseph, 172
Simmeij Georg, 471
Sirmond, Jean, 116
Skelton, J ,s68
Slav-Greek-Latin Academy, 236
Slavery, 411; Southern, 429-430, 453-455,
457,458,473-475,478; and liberty, 476
Slavic soul, 256258
Slavophilism, 263271
Smith, Adam, 320, 345nl40, 377, 417, 421
Smith, Sydney, 443
Smith, Tliomas, 35, 37, 67, 72
Smith, William, 415
Sobornosf, 266
Society of orders, 132,487
Sociology, Northern and Southern opinions
of, 477nl50
Soloviev, Vladimir, 272
Spener, Philipp Jakob, 315
Spenser, Edmund, 68* 70
Sprat, Thomas, 76383-85
Staei, Mme La Baronne de, 296
Stamp Act, 415,419
Starkey, Thomas, 44,49
State:
in England, 35, 38
in France, 91,104,111-112,115-116,
1I S119,122; central administra
tion, 120121,123; government bu
reaucracy under Louis XIV, 128-129,
131,155,163-165
in Russia, 193,193n2,194,196-197,
201, 210; Norman theory of, 246;
Russian vs. Western, 267
in Germany, 284287,288, 320, 346,
347,348,349, 369 Standesuat, 284,
287; Polizeistaat, 285; territorial
state, 286nl 2,287; development of
bureaucracy, 286nl2
in America, 427
States1rights, 429, 431, 481
Stein, Karl vom, 361, 373,375, 377
Stein, Lorenz von, 393
Sdllingfieet, Edward, 401
Scone, Lawrence, 4$, 73
Stuarts, 71, 73
Suard, J,-B.-A., 149
Sumarokov, Alexsandr, 21721S, 221, 224,
228230, 242, 247,283
Sumner, Charles, 4804S1
Table of Ranks, 196,208,215-218,222
These nobiliaire, 168
Thirty Years Wat, 285,287, 315
Thomasius, Christian, 294
Thoreau, Henry David, 457
Tfiynne, William, 43, 78
Tieck, Ludwig, 325-326,338, 361
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 1617,50,148,
152,176,182,186, 262,435,444-456,
461,463
Tocqueville effect, 16,152153, 213,
312,456
Toenmes, Ferdinand, 17
Tolstoy, Peter, 223
Trediakovskii, V K., 223, 239-240,244
Treitschke, Heinrich von, 377,379
Troeltsch, Ernst, 322
Trollope, Frances* 435
Trotsky, Leon, 394
Tudor, Frederic, 43$
Tudors, 44, 50, 86
Tuke, Brian, 78
Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques, 159
Turner, Nat, 454
Uhland3Ludwig, 341nl30
Ukranians, 195,226,236, 238-239,
245* 258
Union (American), 403,422, 424*-428,
431,432-433,440-441,445, 472-474,
479-480
University of Paris, 4,99,100
Valois, 95-96, 104, 106
Varnhagen, Rahel, 381382
Vergennes, Charles Gravier, 181
Versailles, 136
Vury, Jacques de, 93
Vocabulary of nationalism, 3141, 97,103,
128,160163,193,195, 225-226, 364,
426-427
Voltaire, 92,152,156,157,178,203,215,
218,230
Volynskii, Artemii, 234
Index
581
Wackenroder, Wilheim, 326
Wagner; Richard, 385
Waldeck, George Frederick von, 286
Wallis, John, 81-82
Waher, Michael, 482
War, anitude toward, 339, 348, 370, 371
Wat o'f 1812,432,442
War of the Roses, 44
Warner, William* 67, 69
Wars of liberation, 277, 360, 372, 373,
379,384
Wars of Religion, 108,110,129
Washington, George, 262,418,431
Webbe, William, 68
Weber, Max, 17-18,104, 315,318,384
Webster, Daniel, 440, 473474
Webster, Noah, 442
Weishaupt, Adam, 314
Werther, 306, 333, 334, 339, 340, 342,344
West, 14; Russian attitude toward, 192,
222-224,227, 228-234,240-241,250-
254,257, 261-270, 272-273; German at
titude toward, 371375, 377-379, 383-
387, 389-390, 392-395
West (American), 432-434,437,438,
440, 475
Westernism, 263271
Weymouth, George, 406
Whitgift, Archbishop, 73
Whitman, Wafe 466469
Wieland, Christophe Martin, 299,312
Wilkins, John, 80
Wilson, Woodrow, 483
Wolff, Christian* 295
Wolsey, Thomas, Cardinal, 42
Women, position of, in America, 450451,
455-456
Wyatt, Thomas, Sr., 44
Wyatt, Thomas, jr., 59
Zernatto, Guido, 45
Zhutovskii, 227
Zinzendorf, Nikolaus Ludwig von, 315-317

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