The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2000) Vol.

XXXVIII
From cp6acs to Nature, &xvq to Technology:
Heidegger on Aristotle, Galileo, and Newton
Trish Glazebrook
Colgate University
In the 1950s, Martin Heidegger claimed that the essence of
technology is itself nothing technological (WHD, 155/WCT, 135;
VA, 9/QCT, 4).l Rather, he argued that technicity is a way of
being that informs both human being and beings. I wish to
draw attention to two points of Aristotelian influence on this
well-known analysis of technology, and two points of
Heideggers resistance to that influence. First, Aristotle held
that to know is to become one with the thing known, and that
therefore different kinds of thing lead to different kinds of
knowledge. Heidegger translates Aristotle on this point in 1940
(GA 9, 276/BCP, 250; Physics 2.1.193a31-32). Heideggers
insight that the essence of technology is not a technological
thing but rather a way of revealing stands in agreement with
the Aristotelian correlation between knowledge and what is
known. Heidegger disagrees, however, that things inform
knowledge. Heideggers analysis of technicity shows that
knowledge correlates with things because it informs their very
being. That is to say, the danger of technicity is that it reduces
all the beings it encounters to resources available for techno-
logical exploitation.
Secondly, the essence of technology is for Heidegger a way of
revealing the being of nature. Hence, it is a way of knowing. To
say that technology is essentially a way of knowing is not to
mistake Heideggers ontological point for an epistemological
one. Rather, it is to suggest that Heidegger agrees with
Aristotle: to know is essential to human beings very being.
Aristotle opens the Metaphysics with the claim that all human
beings by nature desires to know (980a22). As Will McNeill has
pointed out, Heidegger discusses this claim in at least three
places.2 Likewise, Heidegger defines Dasein as the inquirer.
Trish Glazebrook is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Colgate
University. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Toronto in
1993. Her most recent publication appeared in Philosophy Today, and
she has a book forthcoming wi t h Fordham University Press called
Heideggers Philosophy of Science.
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Trish Glazebrook
Technicity is for Heidegger a way of knowing that is at the
essence of human being and that underwrites the human
experience of beings in modernity.
What I am suggesting, then, is that Heideggers analysis of
technology in the 1950s is informed by his reading of Aristotle
i n 1940. I will use thi s suggestion to argue further that i n
Heideggers analysis, the history of technology is embedded in
the history of science as a result of the Aristotelian metaphysics
of matter and form. Heideggers analysis of technology reveals
and resists a modern metaphysics of subjectivity by resisting
precisely that Aristotelian metaphysics.
In order to make this argument as clearly as possible, I will
use the term science broadly to indicate the human inquiry
into nature, unless I specify either Aristotelian science or
modern science. Such broad use of the term science is highly
unsatisfactory. Yet the question of what Heidegger means by
Wissenschuft is equally unresolved throughout his work. I have
elsewhere grappled with this issue. Here I restrict myself to the
question of the relation, both ancient and modern, between
science and technology for Heidegger, and I work with precise
Heideggerian formulations of what science is where it is
appropriate to do so. Accordingly, I use science to mean quite
generally the body of knowledge concerning nature for which
physics is paradigmatic, but to which biology is also integral.
Whatever it is that philosophers of science take themselves to
be philosophers of is the referent for my use of the term here.
I. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Much has been done with Heideggers analysis of technology.
Likewise, more recently Heideggers critique of science has been
brought to light.3 What then of the relation between technology
and science? Heidegger argues i n the 1950s that modern
science is grounded in the nature of technology (WHD, 1551
WCT, 135). He holds, furthermore, that the ancient distinction
between physics and production, between nature and artifact, is
collapsed in modernity. Heideggers work on Aristotle, Galileo,
and Newton tracks that collapse. I will show that in Heideggers
analysis, Aristotle understands nature as moving towards its
own end, while modern science precludes such a teleological
conception and thus makes nature available for technological
appropriation to human ends. This is for Heidegger the relation
between science and technology.
I n what is reportedly the last of his writings, an address to
the 10th annual Heidegger conference at DePaul University,
Chicago in May of 1976, Heidegger asks:
Is modern natural science the foundation (Grundlage) of modern
technology-as is supposed-or is it, for its part, already the
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Fromqduw to Nature, .r&xvq to Technology
basic form of technological thinking, the determining fore-
conception and incessant incursion of technological representa-
tion into the realized and organized machinations of modern
technology? (MNST, 3)
Foundation (Grundlage) literally means ground-laying.
Heidegger is asking in the first part of his question whether
modern natural science can be understood as the theoretical
groundwork that has its application in technology. Is science the
knowledge that makes technology possible? A quick look back to
the technology essay of 1955 reveals that modern science must
be more than the foundation of modern technology for
Heidegger. There he argues that technology is not just applied
science. Understanding technology to be applied science is not
wrong, but is sorely inadequate, for technology is in its essence
much more. It is a truth, a way of revealing. I n 1976, however,
Heideggers question suggests that it is in fact wrong, and not
simply inadequate, to consider modern science to be founda-
tional to technology.
The alternative i n Heideggers disjunction asks whether
modern science i s already i n essence technology; that is,
whether modern science has the representational thinking
definitive of technology, which Heidegger first called Ge-stell
i n 1950, as the form of its thinking. If the answer to thi s
question is yes, then science is not the foundation of technology,
but rather the self-assertion of instrumental reason. That is,
science is not ground laying for technology, but rather is itself
informed by technology. This development over the 1955 account
asks whether technology does not have priority, both logical and
ontological, over science. Heideggers answer to this question is:
absolutely. I n What Is Called Thinking? he argues that the
essence of science lies at the essence of technology. By way of a
more thorough substantiation of this interpretation, however, I
will retrieve Heideggers critical history of the relation between
science and technology through his work on Aristotle, Galileo,
and Newton.
I n a lecture courseron Aristotles Physics from 1940,
Heidegger arqes that cpua~s, nature, cannot be under,stood by
apalogy with wx uq artifacts. The difference between cpua~s and
mquq is for him a pre-Socratic distinction that he finds echoed
in Aristotles Physics. I t serves to demarcate theoretical from
productive knowledge for the Stagirite. Heideggers insight is
that what was for the pre-Socratics a difference so radical there
could be no identity even by analogy is not sustai ned i n
modernity. When he read Galileo and Newton in the 1930s,
Heidegger discovered that modern science is, not trivially but
rather essentially different from ancient OEwpLa. The difference
consi p i n the collapse of the ancient distinction between
O E u p L a , specifically theoretical physics, and &uq, production.
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Trish Glazebrook
By thinking with Heidegger through Die Frage nach dem Ding
about Galileo and Newton, and through On the Being and
Conception of cp&a~s in Aristotles Physics B, 1 about Aristotle,
I show on the basis of the Bremen lectures that, in Heideggers
analysis, a trace of ancient &xvq remains at the essence of
modern science and likewise at the essence of technology. That
trace is Ge-st el l . This is the sense in which the essence of
science is for Heidegger the essence of technology, and in which
modern natural science is already the basic form of techno-
logical thinking, the determining fore-conception and incessant
incursion of technological representation into the realized and
organized machinations of modern technology.
11. cp&ars AND &xvq
The most obvious diFtinction between cpva~s and &xvq is
readily discernable. ~ U U L S is an object of a particular branch
of OE Wp k : it is the thing under study. TLxvq, on thy other
hand, is a division within knowledge, as are OecopLcx and
mp&&. Yet this difference, between the knowing and the
known, plays a role in neither Aristotles nor Heideggers
argument. Heidegger translates Aristotle:
Just as we (loosely) call by the name .rkxvq those things which
are produced in accordance with such a know-how, as well as
those which belong to this kind of being, so also we (loosely)
call by the name cpbacs those things which are in accordance
with cp6acs and hence belong to beings of this kind.4 (GA 9, 2761
BCP, 250; Physics 2.1.193a31-32)
Heidegger introduces the parenthetical word loosely, but this
is consistent with Aristotles intent. What is at stake is the
distinction between natural things and things that are
produced: it is the difference between things that Heidegger
wishes to elucidate. This distinction is fundamental, for it is on
the basis of this distinction between things that Aristotle
distinguishes the study of nature from the knowledge of how to
produce. Indeed, for Aristotle, to know is to become one with the
thing known, and different things therefore constitute and
require different kinds of knowledge. He regularly distinguishes
kinds of knowledge on the basis of distinct objects. Physics is
different from production for Aristotle in that each has its own
object, nature, and artifact, respectively. The difference between
artifacts and nature in Heideggers reading of Aristotle is that
they are generated, that is, move from potentiality to actuality
differently.
In the 1940 lecture course on Aristotles Physics, Heidegger
argues that an analogy between &xvq and ~ ~ U L S , in which
nature is understood as a self-making artifact, is a misinter-
From qubw to Nature, & X V ~ to Technology
pretation of the S ~ U X ~ E L &, the potential. I n Heideggers
reading, Antiphon changes [the G&vapeb &I from the
appropriated to something merely order-able and on hand
(GA 9, 298lBCP, 267). I n Antiphons account, a thing is consti-
tuted by an actualizing form imposed upon the potentiality of
matter i n both cp&ai s and &xuq alike. Matter is, under
Heideggers account of why Aristotle is not satisfied wi th
Antiphons view, simply what is available to be ordered and
used. Heidegger accuses Antiphon of taking the S&Y(YJI.EL Su to
be simply the power of material to receive an ordering form.
Aristotle, Heidegger argues, construes potentiality
differently. I t is that which is originally appropriate to being as
cp&abs. Heidegger herein finds in Aristotles Physics the
la7t echo of the original thoughtful projection of the Being of
cpuois as this i s still preserved for us in the fragments of
Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides. (GA 9,242/BCP, 224)
We read as early as On the Essence of Truth (WW, 189-1901
BW, 129), again in Introduction to Metaphysics (EM, 46lZM, 60-
611, and still again at Paragraph 111 of the Beitruge, that being
was c p&a~s for the Greeks, by whom we can only assume
Heidegger means those thinkers of whom he take7 Aristotle to
be a culmination. The thesi s that being was cpua~s for the
Greeks makes sense of Heideggers otherwise enigmatic claim
that i n a qui te basic sense, meta-physics is physics, i.e.,
knowledge of ( P~ULS (GA 9, 241lBCP, 223).
Heidegger sees Aristotle as a cusp. On one hand, he is the
last echo of the pre-Socratic interpretation of being as cpha~s.
On the other hand, Aristotle is the separation of physics from
metaphysics, for Aristotle is qui te clear i n Physics 1.2 that
physics directs itself toward T& QUOL K ~ , whose definitive
characteristic is motion. At Metaphysics 4.2, however, Aristotle
is at some pains to show that metaphysics is the science that
directs itself at being. He shows this by mFans of his analogy of
being. As there are many ways, i.e., mpos %u equivocals, i n
which to say that something is healthy (because it preserves,
produces, is symptomatic of, or is capable of health), and also
many ways to say something is medical (it possesses, i s
naturally adapted to, or is a function of medicine), so there are
many ways i n which a thing can be said to be. As the many
ways a thing can be said to be healthy take their meaning from
the focal instance of health, and likewise medical from
medicine, so the many ways in which a thing may be said to be
all t?ke their meaning from a focal instance of being: substance
Aristotle distinguishes the metaphysician from the physicist
by claiming that the formers inquiry is universal and deals
with primary substance (1005bl), whereas physicists must
(06uLa).
99
rish Glazebrook
have grasped first principles and causes already when they
come to a special study, and [should] not be inquiring into them
while they are listening to lectures on it (1005b4-5). So while
the physicist has, in Aristotles account, already established
what Heidegger called in Being and Time basic concepts (SZ,
9/BT, 291, and what he described as regional ontology in Basic
Problems of Phenomenology (GA 24, 17/BPP, 13), metaphysics
consists in the inquiry into substance, the focal instance of
being from which the many ways a thing can be said to be all
take their meaning. I n fact, Heideggers distinction between
metaphysics and the positive sciences in Basic Problems of
Phenomenology is much like Aristotles distinction between
metaphysics and physics. Whereas metaphysics has as its object
being, sciences assume a metaphysics and are directed at
particular beings.
Heidegger is, by the time he lectures on Aristotles Physics in
1940, already long familiar with the analogy of being. It was
central to his introduction to Aristotle through Brentanos
dissertation, On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, which
Heidegger first encountered in 1907 and which he later claimed
was the driving force behind Being and Time.5 In that text, he
argues that it is Aristotles analogy of being that put the
problem of being on what was, in principle, a new basis (PZ, 31
BT, 22) . Furthermore, Heideggers explication of mpos 4.
equivocals in his lectures on Metaphysics 9.1-3 in 1931 makes
it clear that he understands how the analogy of being works
( GA 33, 26-48, esp. 38-42/AM, 21-39, esp. 30-34). I n 1940,
Heidegger argues that metaphysics is that knowledge wherein
Western historical man preserves the truth of his relations to
beings as a whole and the truth about those beings themselves
(GA 9, 24l / BCP, 223), and he holds that the Greek word &ULS
harbors within itself decisions (GA 9, 241/BCP, 223) about
precisely that. Hence, Aristotles thinking of both metaphysics
and physics is decisive for Heidegger in the history of being.
Aristotle is decisive for Heidegger in that he is the turning
point who first severed physics from metaphysics. But at the
same time, argues Heidegger, contained in Aristotles Physics is
a last echo of pre-Socratic wisdom. That echo Heiqegger calls
the basic notion of Western metaphysics: ~YTEXEXLOL ( GA 9,
282/BCP, 255h6 ~UTE~E XL OL is the counterpart to the ~&UOL(I.EL
b. It is actuality in contrast to potentiality. What the term
means, however, is not so clear, and the source of much debate.
Aristotle does not define actuality, but argues instead that
actuality must be grasped by analogy with potentiality. He gives
a list of examples that is worth reprinting:
Actuality, then, is the existence of a thing not in the way which
we express by potentially; we say that potentially, for instance,
a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is
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From (pubw to Nature, &p q to Technology
in the whole, because it might be separated out, and we call
even the man who i s not studying a man of science, if he i s
capable of studying; the thing that stands in contrast to each of
these exists actually ... it is as that which is building is to that
which is capable of building, and the waking to the sleeping,
and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has
sight, and that which has been wrought to the unwrought. Let
actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the
potential by the other. (Metaphysics 9.6.1048a31-b5)
The fi rst point to be noted i s that the tyms actuality and
potentiality apply equally well in cases of T E X V ~ , like making a
statue or building a house, v d in cases pf q & a ~ s , like knowing,
waking, and sight. Both quaw and mxvq can be said to be
actually or potentially. How, then, do:s Heidegger intend to
understand th: difference between quai s and & X V ~ on the
basis of ~ V T E ~ E X E L C X ? Heidegger argues that the difference
between nature and artifact lies in how each comes into being,
how each moves from potentiality to actuality. Hence he claims
that ~ V T E A ~ X E L C X must be understood on the basis of Aristotles
account of motion. I t is, the movement that is the actuality of
q 6 a ~ s versus that of TEXv q that distinguishes the two. What,
then, of this motion?
Heidegger tells us that Antiphon held the difference between
motion and rest to be that between the fleeting and the eternal.
Eternal are the elements, which are the material substratum of
the ever-changing things encountered in experience. Antiphon
takes a thing to be matter onto which an actualizing form has
been imposed. But, Heidegger points out, the process of growth
and decay happens without interruption. The substratum may
be permanent, but thi s does not distinguish it from the
changeable because change is itself a constant for the Greeks
(GA 9, 27OlBCP, 245). Heidegger is satisfied nei ther with
Antiphons account of actuality nor his account of motion.
An alternative account of actuality, one that can be gleaned
from Aristotles list of actualities set against potentialities, is
that actuality is an activity. Seeing is an activity in a sense that
having ones eyes closed is not. Likewise, building in contrast to
the builder who is not building, and waking i n contrast to
sleeping, are activities. This is consistent with Metaphysics
9.3.1047a31. Here Aristotle says that actuality is an activity
and that its primary sense is movement. AcFordingly, Heidegger
is right to claim that understanding ~ V T E ~ E X E L C X depends upon
understanding Aristotles concept of motion. I n what sense,
then, is actuality a motion for Aristotle?
One need not read far into Aristotles Physics to realize that
his conception of motion is broader than the modern restriction
of motion to locomotion. I t includes also quantitative change:
growth and decrease; qualitative change: alteration; and sub-
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Trish Glazebrook
stantial change: generation and destruction. Heidegger argues
that to generation, yhmw, the movement of a thing that is its
coming into being, is reserved the task of marking out the
Being of cpbo~s (GA 9, 288/BCP, 259). Now this seems an odd
claim about Aristotle, given that at Phyf i cs 2.1.192b14-20,
precisely where Aristotle distinguishes (PUULS from T & X U ~ , he
claims that things that exist by nature contain thei r own
principle of motion in respect of place, or of growth and
decrease, or by way of alteration (192b16), and he omits
generation from the list. I t is exactly here that generation
should be mentioned, if i t is to be !he fulcrum by means of
which Heidegger can pry cpda~s and wxuq apart. Yet Heidegger
is well aware of this omission. Rather than overlooking it, he
makes it central to his argument.
Heidegger argues that
yhveacp i s that kind of being-moved which Aristotle omitted
when he listed the types of movement in his introductory
characterization of ~ l v q a c p as p e~aPo X* ; , because to i t he
reserved the task of marking out the being of Q & L ~ as ~ O P Q ~ .
(GA 9, ~ ~ ~ I B C P , 259)
When Aristotle asks about the bei y of cp&a~s at Physics 2.1, he
asks whether cpua~s is matter ( u Xq ) or form (popcpi ). His
answer is that nature is both, but it is first and foremost form
since it is the form that makes the thing actual, when i t has
attained to fulfillment (193138). When Aristotle first charac-
terizes motion, he leaves generation aside since i t is very much
a special case for him. Actualization as the attainment of form,
i.e., generation, coming into being, demarcates nature from arti-
fact for Aristotle, but does not fit well i nto his conceptual
modeling of motion.
I n the Physi cs, Aristotle begins inquiry by aski ng the
number and nature of the principles of cpbaw. He argues at 1.2
that c p & aL s is characterized by motion, and claims that he need
not prove this claim (as the geometer is under no obligation to
prove axioms) since it is obvious to those who look that at least
some things i n nature are i n motion and, by induction, T&
~ ~ U U L K & move. His answer to the question of the :umber of
principles of cp;a~s is based on this thesis. Since TCY VUUL K ~
move, there are either two or,three principles, depending on
whether one treats T& ~~UUL KCX as simple or composite. Taken
simply, there are three principles: some feature of a substance
prior to modification, the feature after modification, and the
substance that persists throughout modification. For example,
unmusical, musical, and the man who becomes musical. Taken
instead as composites of substance and attribute, there are two
principles: the unmusical man and the musical man. Both of
these models of motion rely on there being some thing that
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From ( P U ~ L S to Nature, & X V ~ to Technology
undergoes change. But, since generation is precisely the coming
into being of a thing, and destruction is its passing away, it is
not clear how generation is a motion at all, never mind the
motion that demarcates the being of cp&acs.
One way to respond to this problem is to argue that prime
matter, i.e., formless material, is the underlying substratum
that persists during generation. I n Heideggers account,
however, this is precisely Antiphons wrongheaded account that
Aristotle rejects in favor of a deeper one, for prime matter is the
potential reduced to what is merely order-able and on hand
in such an account (GA 9, 298/BCP, 267). Aristotles account is
indeed more subtle, for he argues at Physifs 5.1 that generation
is a special kind of motion. It is p&T(YPohq but not in the sense
of alteration, growth, or locomotion, which are Kkuqacs.
Wicksteed and Cornford distinguish the two in the Loeb edition
of the Physics by translating the former as transition and the
latter as movement. A thoughtful account of Aristotle looks
not to prime matter to think the enigma of generation.
Aristotles universe has nowhere in it unformed matter waiting
for some form to be imposed upon it. Rather, generation is a
special case of motion. I t is a transition of substance to
substance. Formed matter becomes differently formed matter.
Heidegger explains this difficult point in Aristotle by
arguing that Aristotle understood motion in the sense of coming
to be in terms of rest. He argues that the
purest manifestation of being-moved is to be sought where rest
does not mean the breaking off and stopping of movement, but
rather where being-moved gathers itself up into standing still,
and where this ingathering, far from excluding being-moved,
includes and for the first time discloses it. (GA 9,284/BCP, 256)
Rest does not happen when movement stops, but rather is a
fulfillment. This is the sense in which actuality is an activity for
Aristotle. It is an activity that Heidegger reads as also a
stillness, a gathering up of movement into an end. In his 1930
lecture course on Metaphysics 9. 1-3, Heidegger gave the
example of a runner at the starting line immediately prior to a
race. The runner is still, but the stance and composure of the
runner are a gathering together that can only be dissipated by
subsequent running. I t is in this moment of stillness immedi-
ately prior to running that the runner is most clearly actualized
in Heideggers account (GA 33, 218lAM 187-188). A thing is
actual under Heideggers reading of Aristotle when it is
gathered together and lies before the speaker such that it can
be called that thing,? whether it is produced or natural. A piece
of bronze is not called a statue, nor an acorn an oak tree, except
potentially. How, then, does the gathering together of a thing in
actuality distinguish what is natural from what is produced?
103
Trish Glazebrook
I n the Physics, Aristotle says that ( P~ UL S is a source or
cause of being moved or at rest (192b8). It js a generative
cause, for Of things that exist, some exist by cpua~s, some from
other causes (192b8). TLxvq is precisely another such cause.
Heidegger argues that these are not efficient causes (GA 9, 2461
BCP, 227; cf. GA 9, 254lBCP, 233). Rather each is an origin, an
&pxG, from which a thing comes to be what it is: a thing in
nature such as a tree, for yxample, or an artifact such as a
house. In the case of both cpua~s and &vq, the iUpx6,is also
th,e final cause, the TEAOS. This is to say, the end of cpua~s is
cpua~s in that things that come to be from nature move toward
other things that are specifically identical. Trees tend toward
generating more trees, for example. Elsewhere Aristotle
describes human procreation as a striving toward the divine by
attempting to become one and eternal in the species.8 Likewise
in the case of T E X V ~, the final cause is also the &px$, for the
final cause is the reason, and the reason forms the starting-
point, alike in the works of art and in the works of nat~re. ~
&ULS and &vq are both &pxG and 7kAos.
The difference between q6aw and &xvq is that an artifact
reaches its stillness, that is, comes to be what it is, differently
than a natural thing. An artifact is actual when production is
finished and the thing has been made present in production.
For Aristotle, in Heideggers account,
the issue here is to show that artifacts are what they are and
how they are precisely in the being-moved of production and
thus in the rest of having-been-produced. (GA 9, 251lBCP, 230-
231)
The rest of having-been-produced is indeed here crucial in
distinguishing cp&aw from &xvq, for at Metaphysics 9.6
Aristotle distinguishes processes that include their end from
those that do not. The latter is typical of production. That is to
say, production does not include its end in that producing and
completed production are separate. When production reaches its
end, production ceases. The carpenter, fo: example, stops
building when the house is actual. Not so, cpua~s. An oak tree,
for example, does not stop growing once it is actua1,ly an oak
tree. Tkxvq has a clear finishing point not found in cpua~s. This
is precisely Heideggers point when he says that
&pr( has a special kind of rest ... characterized as having-
been-completed, having-been-produced, and, on the basis of
these determinations, as standing-forth and lying present
before us. (GA 9,25OlBCP, 230)
Artifacts move, that is, come to be what they are, differently from
nature.
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From (pub~s to Nature, s k x q to Technology
The difference between, them is that in the case of &ar s,
the &px4 and d A 0 p is <PUULS itself. But when somethiqg is
produced, it is the thing produced that is both hpx4 and TEAOC
and not &xvq, knowledge of production. A doctor produces
health, not medicine, and a builder produces a house, not
carpentry. Insofar as doctors do produce medicine and
carpenters carpentry, they do so toward the further, and for
Aristotle therefore higher end of health and houses,
respectively. On the other hand, a tree tends towards other
trees, and comes from a tree. Every tree has a tree as its cpse.
Both the origin and end of quai s is p a r s . If the end of T E X V ~
is not i k x v q but rather the thing produced, likewise the origin
of &xvq is outside of the thing produced. The artist of artisan
is the cause of the artifact. I n fact, definitive of mxvq for
Aristotle is the artists prior conception of the thing to be made.
The end of d x v q is the thing made in conformity with that
E~SOS. Aristotle argues that Art indeed consists in the
conception of the result to be produced before its realization in
the material.O Natural things come to be analogously from a
moving cause, but in their case the impulse to growth is
internal, that is, it is contained within them.
The externality of the efficient cause of an artifact has
crucial implications for the relation between matter and form in
an artifact versus that relation in a natural thing. Heidegger
argues that popcpq, form,
is not an ontic property present in matter, but a mode of Being ...
[It is] the act of standing in and placing itself into the
appearance, in general: placing into the appearance. (GA 9, 2761
BCP, 250)
Form has, then, a priority with respect to actuality, for a things
actuality is determined by its form. And the form determines
actualities first and foremost in cp;arp, for it is in q&aw that
this placing into appearance brings itself about. @ b s is being
for the Greeks in the sense in which Aristotle defines cp&ars as
that which moves itself (1921315). The realization of form in
nature requires no external agent.
I n Heideggers reading of A,ristotle, then, the relation of
matter to form is different in cpuars and wxvq. Aristotle says
that the artist chooses material with a view to function,
whereas in the products of nature the matter is there all along
(194137-8). The matter is there all along in that the process of
growth in which the form shapes the matter is,continuous.
Trees come from trees and tend,toward trees. @uar s is, as it
were, always on the way to cpuars. Wood is therefore not
incidental to a tree, which cannot but be of wood. A statue, on
the other hand, is made by a sculptor, not by a statue. The
matter is incidental to the statue, for not only could the statue
105
Trish Glazebrook
be made from some other material, also bronze made into a
statue could just as well have been made into something else.
Mop& and h q , form and matter, belong together necessarily
in nature, but incidentally in art.?-
Furthermore, because in artifacts there is no necessary
relation between matter and form, an artifact has no tendency
to growth and decay within itself, except insofar as it is made
from some material (192b14-21). Wood rots because it is wood,
not because of, but rather in spite of the fact that it has been
made into a bed. Art does not destroy the original relation
between matter and form. Rather the tendency of nature
toward its own end persists throughout production. Aristotle
credits this observation to Antiphon:
Antiphon points out that if you planted a bed and the rotting
wood acquired the power of sending up a shoot, it would not be a
bed that would come up, but wood-which shows that the
arrangement in accordance with the rules of art is merely an
incidental attribute, whereas the real nature is the other, which,
further, persists continuously through the process of making.
(193a13-17)
The imposition of form onto matter by the artist does not
overcome the tendency of that material to change governed by
the form to which it is not incidental. Wood does not rema?n a
bed forever, but rots. Accordingly, the artist borrows from QUULS
material that is still subject to the governing form to which it
stands in necessary relation.
This point is decisive for Heidegger, for it means that
Aristotles distinction between Q ~ S and &xuq is not a simple
contrast between equals. The insurmountable difference is that
Q&ULS moves according to an inner nature, whereas artifacts
are brought into being by an external cause who can only
borrow the material. Wood is appropriate to a tree, but
appropriated in the case of a bed. Antiphons point about
planting a bed shows that he is onto something, but Aristotle
will not swallow his doctrine whole. For Aristotle, as for
Antiphon, Q ~ U L S is prior to T E X U ~ in that the material ordered
by mxuq is still governed in its changes by Q ~ U L S from yhich it
has its source, Heidegger argues therefore that T E X U ~ is
dependent on Q~ UL S, for, in the case of the a;t of medicine, for
example, &xuq can only coorjerate with QUULS, can mor,e or
less expedite the cure; but as wx u q if can never replace QUULS
and in its stead become itself the &pxq of health as suyh (GA 9,
257fBCP, 235). Aristotles sense of the priority of QUULS goes
deeper than Antiphon:s. T E X U ~ is derivative upon Q ~ U L S for
Aristotle, for from QUULS the artisan must always borrow
matter on which to impose artistic form. Heidegger sees in
Aristotle here the last echo of the pre-Socratic insight that
106
From Q U ~ S to Nature, &xvq to Technology
being is cp;acs, since ( P~UL S is not simply the imposition of form
onto matter, but rather their primary and appropriate belonging
together. Matter is formed in c p h s with an appropriateness
that is not merely an ordering of what is on hand the way an
artist organizes material into the work.
Where the matter is incidental to the form, as in the case of
an artifact, the form guides production but does not itself do the
producing. The form merely shows up. It plays an accompanying
role in serving to guide the artist, but i t is the artist and not
the form that does the producing ( GA 9,29O/BCP, 260-261).
Hence the artist requires something beforehand: an idea or
model of what is to be made, a paradigm (.rrcup&tk~ypcu).
Heidegger notes that if cpua~s required a .rrcup&6ecypa, an
animal could not reproduce itself without mastering the science
of its own zoology (GA 9,_29O/BCP, 261). Definitive of ~ k x v q is
that the appearance ( ~180s ) of the thi ng to be produced
precedes its appearance ( ydvea~s ) as a thing, in that the idea
exists i n the mind of the craftsperson prior to production.
Production is the imposition of form onto matter, and as such,
an appropriation of that matter from nature.
Texvq is produced by something that is not itself T ~ X U ~ .
@ k s , on the other hand, is that which comes into being of its
own accord. This is for Heidegger the original Greek distinction
between cp6ucs and T E X U ~ . I t is a distinction so radical for
Heidegger that he argues cp6acs cannot be understood by
analogy to ~ 6 x v q. Such an analogy, argues Heidegger,
fails from every conceivable point of vi ew. That means: we must
understand the Being of Q ~ L S entirely from itself, and we
should not detract from the astonishing fact of Q&LS ... by
overhasty analogies and explanations. (GA 9,292/BCP, 262-263)
&ac s must be understood on its own terms. Hence for
Aristotle, it warrants a separate branch of study. T& ~ ~ U U L K ~
are not simply self-making artifacts. Under Heideggers account,
rather, cp6acs is a self-placing into appearance. It is the source
of the beings in the question with which Heidegger ended What
is Metaphysics? and began Introduction to Metaphysics: why are
there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?
Aristotle is a cusp in Heideggers account in that he echoes
the pre-Socratic insight that being is cp6acs. This means for
Aristotle, Heidegger rightly sees, that cpuacs is teleological. T&
~ ~ UUL K & move toward their own end. Heideggers insight goes
much deeper than the obvious reading of Aristotles teleology,
that fire moves upward toward the periphery of the cosmos,
while earth moves down toward the center. Heidegger has
captured the richness of the Aristotelian cosmos. Yet Aristotle
has also set up a metaphysics that determines things as formed
matter, with a priority to form. This conception is more suited
107
Trish Glazebrook
to artifacts, which are an instance of form imposed upon matter,
than to nature. Hence Aristotle is both the culmination and end
of pre-Socratic wisdom for Heidegger, and the beginning of a
history of metaphysics that subsequently understands cpha~s by
analogy to ~k x v - q . Perhaps thi s thesis could be filled out by
examining medieval conceptions of nature as divine artifact.
Rather, however, the most insightful fulfillment of this claim on
Heideggers part is his critique of modern science. Therein he
will argue that Aristotles distinction is collapsed in modernity
such that the essence of modern science is the essence of
technology.
111. MODERN SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND NATURE
I n the modern epoch, Heidegger argues, being has with-
drawn and the question of being is f0rg0tten.l ~ In 1940, he
claims that today the truth about beings as a whole has
become entirely questionable(GA 9, 241/BCP, 223). Modern
metaphysics reached this state, he argues, through a history of
interpretations of the Being of cp&rLs (GA 9, 241/BCP, 224).
Aristotles Physics serves to understand that history at its
incipience. This is not the first time Heidegger looks to physics
to account for a crucial moment in the history of metaphysics.
He suggests i n 1935 in Die Frage nach dem Ding that to
understand modern metaphysics, one must see why it was both
possible and necessary for Kant to write a Critique of Pure
Reason. That i s seen by looking to the history of physics,
specifically to Galileo and Newton in contrast against Aristotle.
I n The Age of the World Picture i n 1938, Heidegger again
looks to science to understand the modern epoch. Science is not
incidental, nor merely symptomatic of modernity for Heidegger.
Rather, i t is essential. I t is that on the basis of which the
modern epoch is determined. It is against this background that
Heideggers claim in What Is Called Thinking? that the essence
of science lies i n the essence of technology must be read.
Determinative of modernity for Heidegger is that the ancient
priority of nature over artifact disappears in the modern failure
to sustain an essential distinction between science and techno-
logy. How, then, does modern science collapse that distinction?
I n Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft in 1916,
Heidegger contrasts the time-concept at work in the discipline
of history against that i n physics. He uses Galileos free fall
experiment to distinguish the modern scientific method from
Aristotles. Whereas ancient science proceeded by making gener-
alizations on the basis of a series of observations, Galileos
method is i nstead to formulate a hypothesis. He makes an
assumption and then seeks i ts validation i n experimentation
(GA 1, 419). Thereafter, Heidegger argues, physics strives
108
Fromcpubic to Nature, &xvq to Technology
towards equations, in which are laid down the most general,
lawlike relations with regard to the processes in the relevant
areas [of physics] (GA 1, 420), and the object of physics-we
can now say, in brief-is the lawfulness of motion (GA 1,421).
Galileos method of a priori formulation of hypotheses has in
Heideggers view the effect of homogenization.
Heidegger argues that thi s lawfulness is only possible
because of Galileos determination that just as the uniformity of
motion can only be grasped on the basis of the uniformity of
times and spaces, so the uniformity of acceleration can be
conceived simply, without complication, on the basis of equal
time intervals. Thus time has become a homogenous positional
order-a scale, a parameter (GA 1, 424). And also space is now
however endless, each space-point equal to any other, likewise
each direction to any other (GA 1, 422). The directionality of
the cosmos, which for Aristotle had a clear up and down, is lost.
I n short, Galileos methodology entails a mathematical pro-
jection of nature i n which time and space are uniform and
homogenous.
Heidegger goes back to this claim eleven years later in Being
and Time. I n $69, he argues that the consequence of the
theoretical attitude is that a beings place becomes a matter of
indifference . . . a spatiotemporal position, a world-point, which
is in no way distinguished from any other ( SZ, 361-362/BT,
413). So no thing has any special place that distinguishes it
from any other thing. Here he is describing the transition from
concernful dealings to the theoretical attitude. He says that the
understanding of being changes over. What is significant about
the theoretical atti tude is the way it projects the being of
nature (SZ, 362/BT, 414). Whereas in concernful dealings, where
Dasein first has a world, things are constituted by the context
of equipmentality and thei r involvement, i n the theoretical
attitude such involvement does not belong to beings. Rather, a
thing is encountered as an entity with mass ... a corporeal
Thing subject to the law of gravity (SZ, 361/BT, 412). Places,
times, and things are treated as alike i n the mathematical
projection of nature.
Heidegger returns again to the mathematical projection of
nature in the winter semester of 1935-1936. Here, in Die &age
nach dem Ding, he takes it up in the context of Newtons law of
inertia:
Every body continues in its state of rest, or uniform motion in a
straight line, unless it is compelled to change that state by
force impressed upon it. (FD, GQIMSMM, 256)
The first thing Heidegger notes about this law is that before
Newton stated it, nature was experienced in such a way that it
would have been senseless. Yet afterwards, i t is self-evident.
109
Trish Glazebrook
With this law, then, a change in understanding is brought about
such that the principle of inertia not only makes sense, but is
fundamental in its simplicity and obviousness. This change is a
shift i n the understandi ng of beings, as Heidegger found
definitive of the theoretical attitude in $69 of Being and Time.
The difference between Aristotle and Newton lies for Heidegger
in what is actually apprehended as appearing and how it is
interpreted (FD, 63/MSMM, 259). Both apprehend nature, but
differently.
For Aristotle, (P;ULS was that which moves of its own accord.
A things essence, i ts form, popcpq, its principle of origin and
growth, and subsequent powers determine its proper place, and
its place governs its movement (FD, 69/MSMM, 266) . The fiery
moves upward and earth toward the center. I n doing so, each is
moving toward its end, and Heidegger will argue i n 1940
reading Aristotles Physi cs that not only the fiery and the
earthy, but all natural things move themselves toward their end
for Aristotle, an end determined by their essential nature. I n
the same text, Heidegger notes for the third time that in the
modern conception of nature, all places, as constellations of
points, are determined by infinite space that is everywhere
homogenous and nowhere distinctive (GA 9, 249/ BCP, 229) . In
modern physics, there is no distinction between places.
Aristotles teleology in conceptualizing nature is eradicated at
least in part by the undifferentiated homogeneity of space in
modern physics.
Furthermore, the object of Newtonian physics moves not on
the basis of an internal essence, but on the basis of external
force. Under the modern scientific conceptio? of motion, things
are apprehended not in terms of essence or TEAOF, but as bodies
interpreted by measurable, universal qualities such as mass. No
distinction i s made between thi ngs on the basis of motion
toward an end. I n fact? the motion in question in understanding
nature is no longer yevea~s , coming into being, actualization.
Rather, it is confined in Newtons physics to locomotion.
For Heidegger, thi s means that the concept of nature has
changed from Aristotle to the moderns:
nature is no longer the inner principle out of which the motion
of the body follows; rather, nature is the mode of the variety of
the changing relative positions of bodies, the manner in which
they are present in space and time. (FD, 68l MSMM, 264)
Heidegger attri butes the crucial move that thus brings the
history of science into its modern epoch to Galileo. He finds in
Galileos Discoursi the antecedent to Newtons law of inertia.
When Galileo claims that the difference in the time it takes two
bodies to fall is due to the airs resistance, not to the i nner
nature of the bodies, he is understanding all bodies to be alike:
110
Fromcpuuw to Nature, &xvq to Technology
All determinations of bodies have one basic blueprint, according to
which the natural process is nothing but the space-time deter-
mination of the motion of points of mass. (FD, 71IMSMM, 267)
All bodies alike are object: both nature and artifact objectify as
bodies. The conclusion that can be drawn when this insight is
put against the reading Heidegger eves of @istotle in 1940 is
that the distinguishing feature of TCU quuuca, that they propel
themselves toward thei r &Aos, is no longer available to
demarcate nature from artifact in modern physics.
Galileo is decisive for Heidegger in that his determination of
bodies as objects for science was based on an a priori conception
of body. He decided upon their nature in advance. Heidegger
echoes i n Die Frage nach dem Ding hi s claim made twenty
years earlier in Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft:
Galileos science proceeds on the basis of an a priori conception.
I n 1935, he calls that a priori conception the mathematical.
Whereas Heidegger previously held that modern science is
mathematical in that it uses laws and formulae, he suggests in
1935 that the mathematical essence of modern science lies in
its project ( Ent wurf ) . The mathematical is, he argues, that
about things that we already know. Therefore we do not first
get it out of things, but, in a certain way, we bring i t already
with US (FD, 57/MSMM, 252). Numbers are projected in this
way, and are the most familiar form of the mathematical,
Heidegger reasons, but in fact the mathematical is simply the a
priori. A priori in physics is the fundamental conception of a
thing brought to experience. Modern physics projects things as
objects. I n The Question Concerning Technology twenty years
later, Heidegger will formulate the a priori project of objectivity
i n modern physics as a coherence of forces calculable i n
advance [eine vorausberechenbaren Zussamenhang von Kraftenl
(VA, 25/QCT, 21).
Accordingly, modern physics is for Heidegger idealism. It is
founded upon a priori formulation of hypotheses. Heidegger
points out that Galileos science argues against the evidence of
ordinary experience (FD, 69/MSMM, 2661, since there is in fact
a difference, albeit slight, in the time it takes bodies of different
weight to fall from a tower. Galileo attributes the difference to
the airs resistance, not itself visible, rather than to the inner
nature of the bodies or their preference for a particular place.
Likewise Newtons law of inertia makes idealism decisive since
it speaks of a body, corpus quod a viribus impressis non cogitur,
a body which is left to itself ( FD, 69/MSMM, 265), not
impressed by any forces, but there is no such body. Heidegger
grounds modern science in 1935 in a Cartesian metaphysics of
subjectivity. I t is mathematical for him i n that i t treats ideal
objects and brings to experience from ideas an a priori deter-
mination.
111
Trish Glazebrook
I n 1935, Heidegger overlooks one further conclusion, pre-
sumably because he does not have the crucial i nsi ght into
Aristotles physics until 1940. That modern science does not
take bodies to move on the basis of essence, but rather on the
basis of external compulsion means that from the perspective of
modern science, nature is purposeless. How could nature be
thought teleologically, if motion is not y h a ~ s but locomotion,
and causes are not final but efficient? If Aristotles cosmos is
analogous to an accelerated film of a flowers bursting open,
then Newtons is analogous to billiard balls tracked against
graph paper. The conceptual elimination of ends from nature
prepares for thei r technological appropriation, for nature
rendered purposeless is available for humay ends an! purposes.
The ancient distinction between 0 ~ o p ~ a and TEXv q could
therefore never serve to distinguish science from technology.
There remains no basis on which to distinguish their objects.
Aristotles construal of motion in the special sense of generation
has no place i n the modern scientific treatment of motion as
change of place. The natural and the produced are subject to the
same gravitational constant. The construal of c p h s and ~ k x v q
as generative causes is further precluded by the conceptual
restriction of causality to efficient causes rather than final
causes. Locomotions have efficient causes. This is explicit in
Newtons laws of motion which concern moving bodies subject to
external forces.
The basis upon which Aristotle drew a distinction between
&xvq and 0 ~ 0 p k is precluded by the modern conception of
nature. Hence the relation between science and technology in
modernity cannot be simply a modern formulation of the
Aristotelian distinction. I n Heideggers account, in fact, modern
science i s radically different from 8Eo p h . I n Science and
Reflection, he defines science as the theory of the real [die
Theorie des Wirklichenl (VA, 42fSR, 157). But he argues that
there is only a shadow of the earljer meaning of B~opeCv in the
modern theory. Aristotles 8EWp L a was contemplative, but the
very term contemplation has come through the Roman
contemplari. The core of this word, templum, comes from the
Greek ~ k p v e ~ v , which means to cut or divide:
In t k w p k transformed into contemplatio there comes to the
fore the impulse, already prepared i n Greek thinking, of a
looking-at that sunders and compartmentalizes. A type of
encroaching advance by successive interrelated steps toward
that which is to be grasped by the eye makes itself normative
in knowing. (VA, 50-51/SR, 166)
Specialized science contains a shadow of BEopkx in its urge to
inspect its objects, but the contemplative wonder typical of
Aristotles theoretical knowledge is now an active inspection
112
From ( P W~ ~ L F to Nature, &xvq to Technology
and manipulation of those objects. Heidegger argued that
modern science manipulates its objects in a postscript to What
Is Metaphysics? (GA 9, 3091WMp:357) and the Beitrage at $72-
80. I n The Age of the World Picture, he says that assault rules
i n the scientific representation of objects ( GA 5 , 108/AWP,
Appendix 9,149-150).
Likewise, i n Science and Reflection, Heidegger argues
that scientific opservation is not reflective in the sense that
Aristotles BEOpLa was. Heidegger understands observation as
an entrapping and securing refining of the real (VA, 51-521
SR, 167). The tendency toward division in Romanized contem-
plation i s an assaul t upon its object, a manipulation that
determines that object by confining it to a particular realm of
beings determined as the object-area of a specialized science.
Such a limited view of nature is necessary in that physics, for
example, requires a determined realm of objects in order then
to proceed with investigation of that realm. Specialization is
not incidental to modern science, but rather the condition of
i ts possibility. Heidegger has held this insight since his tal k
of basic concepts in Being and Time (SZ, 9lBT, 29) and positive
sciences in Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA 24, 17-181
BPP, 13). By Science and Reflection, however, he holds that
thi s methodological condition for modern science i s not a
condition for the possibility of any knowledge whatsoever.
RefleFtion is also a possibility for knowing, and anci ent
fkmpt.cu, although Aristotle opens the possibility of modern
science by himself distinguishing physics from metaphysics
and determining nature as form, offers another possibility for
knowing than the representati onal thi nki ng of modern
science.
Nor is technology the modern equivalent of ancient &xuq in
Heideggers view. I n The Question Concerning Technology,
Heidegger argues that technology is a way of revealing [eine
Weise des Entbergensl (VA, 16/QCT, 12) that is a challenging
... [that] sets upon nature (VA, 18lQCT, 14-15) to unlock and
expose its energy for stockpiling. Technology i s,a way of
revealing, but not in the sense i n which ancient n o i q aw was
the creative act that brought & X V ~ into being, for modern
technology does not bring forth i n Heideggers view; i t
challenges forth. This is of course Heideggers critique of science
as a manipulation and assault. Indeed, throughout What Is
Called Thinking? in 1951-1952, Heidegger will argue not j ust
that modern science and technology are similar, but that the
essence of science lies in the essence of technology. He names
that essence of technology Ge-stell: a way of revealing things
that sets them up as a standing reserve of resources available
for human disposal. He argues that the herald of Ge-stell, a
herald whose origin is still unknown (VA, 25lQCT, 22) is
modern physics.
113
Trish Glazebrook
Heidegger suggests that the ordering attitude and behavior
at work in technology was first visible i n modern science as
exact, experimental science:
Because physics, indeed already as pure theory, sets nature up
to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance, it
therefore orders its experiments precisely for the purpose of
asking whether and how nature reports itself when set up this
way. (VA, 25/QCT, 21)
Modern physics orders nature by setting it up to appear as a
coherence of forces calculable i n advance. The scientific
determination of nature makes possible its further ordering as
resource, as a standi ng reserve of energy, i n Heideggers
account. Without the scientific object, then, technology would
not be possible, for modern science precludes nature appearing
as having its own ends. I t renders nature conceptually free of
teleology and therefore makes nature available to assume the
ends human being assigns. Accordingly, technology presents the
illusion that it is simply applied science. I n fact, i t is much
more. I t is a way of revealing that, to use the terminology of
Being and Time, reinscribes the present-at-hand as ready-to-
hand; i t takes over as resource what science represents as
object. Science strips nature of its involvements, and technology
appropriates nature to human inv01vernent.l~
Not only technology, but also then science, has its Ge-stell in
Heideggers account. The essence of science lies at the essence
of technology for him in that modern science and technology
both have Ge-stell, projective understanding, at their essence.
But with identity also comes difference: technology challenges
nature as standi ng reserve, science as object. Physics, for
example, i n i ts experimental set up, orders nature as a
coherence of forces calculable i n advance. To say that the
essence of science is the essence of technology is to say that
each has its Ge-stell, its a priori conception accorcing to which
it then seeks to order nature. A trace of ancient mxvq remains
then in both modern science and in technology, for definitive of
T E X U ~ for Aristotle was that the artist conceived of the thing to
be produced prior to production and t hy set about bringing the
thing into being. More so than CIEmpLa, something of mx uq
remai ns i n the modern experiment i n that the scientist
proceeds on the basis of an idea that is to be produced in the
experiment. The metaphysics of subjectivity that underwrites
modern science can be traced back to Aristotles conception of
production.
Heideggers claim about such foundational notions for
knowledge as nature, motion, cause, and theory has consistently
been that they have their origin in Greek thinking. Further,
that the Greek legacy has come down to the modern era
114
From cpubw to Nature, &x q to Technology
severely narrowed. I n that histqry, cphms is reduced to nature
understooq as useful object, K c u q a w dwindles ty change of
place, i YL 7 t . a is confined to efficiency, and Beo p L a becomes
speciali-zation. I n several places he calls that narrowing the
Romaniza-tion of thinking. I have sought to show that Galileo
and Newton, who wrote in Latin, are its source. They bring to
fruition an Aristotelian metaphysics in which form actualizes
matter when imposed upon it. Aristotle himself does not reduce
c p h a~p to d x u q . The richness of final causes and motion as
actualization, and therefore the fullness of cp6o~p, are integral
to Aristotles distinction. Yet Aristotle makes possible the
disappearance of that distinction. It cannot be sustained in
modernity, for the essence of modern science is from i ts very
incipience in Galileo the essence of technology: the projective
understanding of a metaphysics of subjectivity, in which the
knower can remain oblivious to the reduction of the thi ng
known to its prior determination by reason.
IV. CONCLUSION
To return, then, to the original question:
Is modem natural science the foundation of modem technology-
as is supposed-or is it, for its part, already the basic form of
technological thinking, the determining fore-conception and
incessant incursion of technological representation into the
realized and organized machinations of modern technology?
Heideggers work on science, particularly on the physics of
Aristotle, Galileo, and Newton, shows that i n hi s analysis
modern natural science is already the basic form of techno-
logical thinking. Science is not simply the foundation of
technology. Rather, it is the essence of technology fed back into
itself. Only because science shares its essence with technology
can technological representatio?, i.e., Ge-stell, be at home in
modernity. A trace of ancient w x u q remains in the modern
epoch in technology, but only because i t is first found at the
essence of science. Heideggers insight is that the history of
Western science makes possible global domination by tech-
nology. Science disposes of natures ends; technology imposes
human purpose.
References to Heidegger are cited using abbreviations (given
in the Reference section following) with the German first, followed
by the English translation, and to Aristotle using Bekker number.
* McNeill, 1999, 21-22.
See especially Babich (1995, Part 5) and McNeill (1999) who
uncover Afistotles influence on Heideggers ongoing entanglement
with @EOPL(Y.
115
Trish Glazebrook
This is Sheehans (1975) translation of Heideggers translation
of Aristotle. Hardie and Gaye in Mckeon (1941) render these lines:
For the word nature is applied to what is according to nature and
the natural in the same way as art is applied to what is artistic or
a work of art.
According to Sheehan (1975, 87), i t is common knowledge that
the analogy of being served as the driving force behind Being and
Time. Seigfried (1970, 4) confirms thi s when he transl ates
Heideggers inaugural address to the Heidelberg Academy of
Science, in which Heidegger says that the quest for the unity in the
multiplicity of Being ... remained, through many upsets,
wanderings, and perplexities, the ceaseless impetus for the treatise
Being and Time. Cf. The Understanding of Time i n
Phenomenology and in the Thinking of the Being-questiop, 201.
Aristotle has two words for actuality: EVTEXEXELCK and
~ V ~ ~ ~ E L C K . The difference is not significant here, but for a beautifully
concise yet clear account of the two words, see Blair (1978).
Hen$e the connection between gathering together ( he y e w) and
saying (Aoyog) that Heidegger makes so much of in Logos from
Vortrage und Aufsatze, translated in Early Greek Thinking.
De Anima 415a28-bZ.
De Partibus Animalium 639b15.
lo De Part i bus Ani mal i um 640a32; cf. Nicomachean Et hi cs
l1 Physics 2.1.192b14-16; De Partibus Animalium 641b12-16.
l3 Heidegger says this at many places, but see especially SZ, 2-41
BT, 21-24 where Heidegger argues that the question is taken as
superfluous since the concept of being is indefinable, self-evident and
the most universal of concepts. Cf. Nihilism as Determined by the
History of Being in Nietzsche 4.
l4 Zimmerman (1977, especially 81-82) and J ung and J ung apply
Heideggers thinking to ecological questions.
REFERENCES
1140a13.
l2 Cf.192b22-3.
Aristotle. De Ani ma. I n The Basic Works of Ari st ot l e, edited by
Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 1941.
. Metaphysics. Translated by Hugh Tredennick. Loeb Classical
Library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933.
. Nicomachean Ethics. I n The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited
by Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 1941.
. De Part i bus Ani mal i um. I n The Basic Works of Ari st ot l e,
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