Raw Cases Re LTD

No. L-31271. April 29, 1974.
*
ROMEO MARTINEZ and LEONOR SUAREZ, spouses, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
SECRETARY and UNDERSECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS & COMMUNICATIONS, respondents-appellees.
Land registration; Court may not adjudge title over non-registerable land.The Land Registration Court
has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of
the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private applicant.
Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of Certificate of
Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by
the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.
Prescription; Right of State to recover non-registerable land does not prescribe.The right of reversion
or reconveyance to the State of the public properties fraudulently registered and which are not capable
of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe. (Republic vs. Ramona Ruiz, et al., L-
23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348; Republic vs. Ramos, L-15484, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 47.)
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Jurisdiction; The Secretary of Public Works and
Communications has jurisdiction to order removal of obstructions to navigable waters.When it comes
to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications under
Republic Act 2056 to order the removal of obstruction to navigation along a public and navigable creek
or river included therein, has been definitely settled and is no longer open to question. (Lovina vs.
Moreno, L-17821, Nov. 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Taleon vs. Secretary of Public Works & Communications,
L-24281, May 16, 1961, 20 SCRA 69, 74.)
Special Contracts; Sales; Vendee two is aware of defect in the thing he buys cannot later complain
thereof.Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended that the appellants who were the
vendees did not know exactly the condition of the land that they were buying and the obstacles or
restrictions thereon that may be put up by the government in connection with their project of
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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648
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Martinez vs. Court of Appeals
converting Lot No. 2 in question into a fishpond. Nevertheless, they willfully and voluntarily assumed the
risks attendant to the sale of said lot. One who buys something with knowledge of defect or lack of title
in his vendor cannot claim that he acquired it in good faith (Leung Lee v. Strong Machinery Co., et al., 37
Phil. 664).
PETITION for review by certiorari of a judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Flores, Macapagal, Ocampo & Balbastro for petitioners-appellants.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor
Concepcion T. Agapinan for respondents-appellees.
ESGUERRA, J.:

Petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated November 17, 1969 in its
CA-G. R. 27655-R which reverses the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in favor of
petitioners-appellants against the Secretary and Undersecretary of Public Works & Communications in
the case instituted to annul the order of November 25, 1958 of respondent Secretary of Public Works &
Communications directing the removal by the petitioners of the dikes they had constructed on Lot No.
15856 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, which order was issued pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2056. The dispositive portion of the judgment of reversal of the Court of Appeals reads
as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and
another entered: [1] upholding the validity of the decision reached by the respondent officials in the
administrative case; [2] dissolving the injunction issued by the Court below; and [3] cancelling the
registration of Lot No. 2, the disputed area, and ordering its reconveyance to the public domain. No
costs in this instance.
The background facts are stated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
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VOL. 56, APRIL 29, 1974
649
The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez, now petitioners-appellees, are the registered owners
of two (2) parcels of land located in Lubao, Pampanga, covered by transfer certificate of title No. 15856
of the Register of Deeds of the said province. Both parcels of land are fishponds. The property involved
in the instant case is the second parcel mentioned in the above-named transfer certificate of title.
The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino Montemayor, who secured a titulo real
over it way back in 1883. After the death of Paulino Montemayor the said property passed to his
successors-in-interest, Maria Montemayor and Donata Montemayor, who in turn, sold it, as well as the
first parcel, to a certain Potenciano Garcia.
Because Potenciano Garcia was prevented by the then municipal president of Lubao, Pedro Beltran,
from restoring the dikes constructed on the contested property, the former, on June 22, 1914, filed Civil
Case No. 1407 with the Court of First Instance against the said Pedro Beltran to restrain the latter in his
official capacity from molesting him in the possession of said second parcel, and on even date, applied
for a writ of preliminary injunction, which was issued against said municipal president. The Court, by
decision promulgated June 12, 1916, declared permanent the preliminary injunction, which, decision, on
appeal, was affirmed by the Supreme Court on August 21, 1918. From June 22, 1914, the dikes around
the property in question remained closed until a portion thereof was again opened just before the
outbreak of the Pacific War.
On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of both parcels of land in his name,
and the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, sitting as land registration court, granted the registration
over and against the opposition of the Attorney-General and the Director of Forestry. Pursuant to the
Courts decision, original certificate of title No. 14318, covering said parcels 1 and 2 was issued to the
spouses Potenciano Garcia and Lorenza Sioson.
These parcels of land were subsequently bought by Emilio Cruz de Dios in whose name transfer
certificate of title No. 1421 was first issued on November 9, 1925.
Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed hands until eventually they were acquired by
the herein appellee spouses who hold them by virtue of transfer certificate of title No. 15856.
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650
To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the Committee on Rivers
and Streams, by then composed of the Honorable Pedro Tuason, at that time Secretary of Justice, as
chairman, and the Honorable Salvador Araneta and Vicente Orosa, Secretary of Agriculture and National
Resources and Secretary of Public Works and Communications, respectively, as members. This
committee thereafter appointed a Sub-Committee to investigate the case and to conduct an ocular
inspection of the contested property, and on March 11, 1954, said Sub-Committee submitted its report
to the Committee on Rivers and Streams to the effect that Parcel No. 2 of transfer certificate of title No.
15856 was not a public river but a private fishpond owned by the herein appellee spouses.
On July 7, 1954, the Committee on Rivers and Streams rendered its decision the dispositive part of
which reads:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez should be
restored to the exclusive possession, use and enjoyment of the creek in question which forms part of
their registered property and the decision of the courts on the matter be given full force and effect.
The municipal officials of Lubao, led by Acting Mayor Mariano Zagad, apparently refused to recognize
the above decision, because on September 1, 1954, the spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez
instituted Civil Case No. 751 before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against said Mayor Zagad,
praying that the latter be enjoined from molesting them in their possession of their property and in the
construction of the dikes therein. The writ of preliminary injunction applied for was issued against the
respondent municipal Mayor, who immediately elevated the injunction suit for review to the Supreme
Court, which dismissed Mayor Zagads petition on September 7, 1953. With this dismissal order herein
appellee spouses proceeded to construct the dikes in the disputed parcel of land.
Some four (4) years later, and while Civil Case No. 751 was still pending, the Honorable Florencio
Moreno, then Secretary of Public Works and Communications, ordered another investigation of the said
parcel of land, directing the appellees herein to remove the dikes they had constructed, on the strength
of the authority vested in him by Republic Act No. 2056, approved on June 13, 1958, entitled An Act To
Prohibit, Remove and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams, Dikes, Or Any Other Walls In Public
Navigable Waters, Or Waterways and In Communal Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works
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VOL. 56, APRIL 29, 1974
651
in Such Waters or Waterways And In Communal Fishing Grounds, And To Provide Penalties For Its
Violation, And For Other Purposes.1 The said order which gave rise to the instant proceedings,
embodied a threat that the dikes would be demolished should the herein appellees fail to comply
therewith within thirty (30) days.
The spouses Martinez replied to the order by commencing on January 2, 1959 the present case, which
was decided in their favor by the lower Court in a decision dated August 10, 1959, the dispositive part of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the decision, Exhibit S,
rendered by the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications null and void; declares the
preliminary injunction, heretofor issued, permanent, and forever enjoining both respondents from
molesting the spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez in their possession, use and enjoyment of
their property described in Plan Psu-9992 and referred to in their petition.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED;
As against this judgment respondent officials of the Department of Public Works and Communications
took the instant appeal, contending that the lower Court erred:
1. In holding that then Senator Rogelio de la Rosa, complainant in the administrative case, is not an
interested party and his letter-complaint dated August 15, 1958 did not confer jurisdiction upon the
respondent Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to investigate the said administrative
case;
2. In holding that the duty to investigate encroachments upon public rivers conferred upon the
respondent Secretary under Republic Act No. 7056 cannot be lawfully delegated by him to his
subordinates;
3. In holding that the investigation ordered by the respondent Secretary in this case is illegal on the
ground that the said respondent Secretary has arrogated unto himself the power, which he does not
possess, of reversing, making nugatory, and setting aside the two lawful decisions of the Court, Exhibits
K and I, and even annulling thereby, the one rendered by the highest Tribunal of the land;
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652
4. In not sustaining respondents claim that petitioners have no cause of action because the property in
dispute is a public river and in holding that the said claim has no basis in fact and in law;
5. In not passing upon and disposing of respondents counterclaim;
6. In not sustaining respondents claim that the petition should not have been entertained on the
ground that the petitioners have not exhausted administrative remedies; and
7. In holding that the decision of the respondents is illegal on the ground that it violates the principles
that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and in holding that the said
Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional on the ground that respondents threat of prosecuting
petitioners under Section 3 thereof for acts done four years before its enactment renders the said law
ex post facto.
The Court of Appeals sustained the above-mentioned assignment of errors committed by the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga and, as previously stated, reversed the judgment of the latter court. From
this reversal this appeal by certiorari was taken, and before this Court, petitioners-appellants assigned
the following errors allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING IN THE INSTANT CASE THAT PARCEL NO. 2 OF
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856 IS A PUBLIC RIVER AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF
ITS REGISTRATION BECAUSE THIS CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS TITLE IN
VIOLATION OF THE LAW AND THE WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REOPENING AND RE-LITIGATING THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER OR
NOT LOT NO. 2 OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856 REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA, IS A
PUBLIC RIVER NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN LONG RESOLVED AND SETTLED
BY THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT OF PAMPANGA IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING NO. 692 AND
IS NOW RES JUDICATA.
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VOL. 56, APRIL 29, 1974
653
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE REGISTRATION OF LOT NO.
2 OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE TORRENS
TITLE COVERING IT HAS BEEN VESTED IN THE PETITIONERS WHO ARE THE SEVENTH OF THE SUCCESSIVE
INNOCENT PURCHASERS THEREOF AND WHO IN PURCHASING THE SAME RELIED ON THE PRINCIPLE
THAT THE PERSONS DEALING WITH REGISTERED LAND NEED NOT GO BEHIND THE REGISTER TO
DETERMINE THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY.
The 1st and 2nd assignment of errors, being closely related, will be taken up together.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that Lot No. 2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 of the
petitioners-appellants is a public stream and that said title should be cancelled and the river covered
reverted to public domain, is assailed by the petitioners-appellants as being a collateral attack on the
indefeasibility of the torrens title originally issued in 1925 in favor of the petitioners-appellants
predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano Garcia, which is violative of the rule of res judicata. It is argued that
as the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Court was not reopened through a petition
for review filed within one (1) year from the entry of the decree of title, the certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto in favor of the appellants for the land covered thereby is no longer open to attack
under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and the jurisprudence on the matter established
by this Tribunal. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act cited by appellants expressly makes a decree of
registration, which ordinarily makes the title absolute and indefeasible, subject to the exemption stated
in Section 39 of the said Act among which are: liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws
or Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine Islands which the statute of the Philippine
Islands cannot require to appear of record in the registry.
At the time of the enactment of Section 496, one right
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654
recognized or existing under the law is that provided for in Article 339 of the old Civil Code which reads
as follows:
Property of public ownership is:
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed
by the State, and banks shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character. (Par. 1)
The above-mentioned properties are parts of the public domain intended for public use, are outside the
commerce of men and, therefore, not subject to private appropriation. (3 Manresa, 6th ed. 101-104.)
In Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769, this Court held:
A simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily make the
possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains title under the Torrens
system which includes by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens
system, he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included.
In Mercado v. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592, it was also said:
It is useless for the appellant now to allege that she has obtained certificate of title No. 329 in her favor
because the said certificate does not confer upon her any right to the creek in question, inasmuch as the
said creek, being of the public domain, is included among the various exceptions enumerated in Section
39 of Act 496 to which the said certificate is subject by express provision of the law.
The same ruling was laid down in Director of Lands v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga, 61 Phil.
644, as regards public plaza.
In Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. L-20300-01 and G.R. No. L-20355-56, April 30, 1965, 20 SCRA
704, it was held that the incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens
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VOL. 56, APRIL 29, 1974
655
certificate of title does not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable of registration.
It is, therefore, clear that the authorities cited by the appellants as to the conclusiveness and
incontestability of a Torrens certificate of title do not apply here. The Land Registration Court has no
jurisdiction over non-register able properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the
public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private applicant. Hence,
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of Certificate of Title
No. 15856 in the name of petitioners-appellants may be attacked at any time, either directly or
collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of
Limitations (Article 1108, par. 4, new Civil Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of
the public properties fraudulently registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or
private acquisition does not prescribe. (Republic v. Ramona Ruiz, et al., G. R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968,
23 SCRA 348; Republic v. Ramos, G. R. No. L-15484, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 47.)
When it comes to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works &
Communications under Republic Act 2056 to order the removal or obstruction to navigation along a
public and navigable creek or river included therein, has been definitely settled and is no longer open to
question (Lovina v. Moreno, G. R. No L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Taleon v. Secretary of
Public Works & Communications, G. R. No. L-24281, May 16, 1961, 20 SCRA 69, 74).
The evidence submitted before the trial court which was passed upon by the respondent Court of
Appeals shows that Lot No. 2 (Plan Psu 992) of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856, is a river of the
public domain. The technical description of both Lots Nos. 1 and 2 appearing in Original Certificate of
Title No. 14318 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, from which the present Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15856 was derived, confirms the fact that Lot No. 2 embraced in said title
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656
is bounded practically on all sides by rivers. As held by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil
Case No. 1247 for injunction filed by the petitioners predecessors-in-interest against the Municipal
Mayor of Lubao and decided in 1916 (Exh. L), Lot No. 2 is a branch of the main river that has been
covered with water since time immemorial and, therefore, part of the public domain. This finding having
been affirmed by the Supreme Court, there is no longer any doubt that Lot No. 2 of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 15856 of petitioners is a river which is not capable of private appropriation or acquisition by
prescription. (Palanca v. Com. of the Philippines, 69 Phil. 449; Meneses v. Com. of the Philippines 69 Phil.
647). Consequently, appellants title does not include said river.
II.
As regards the 3rd assignment of error, there is no weight in the appellants argument that, being a
purchaser for value and in good faith of Lot No. 2, the nullification of its registration would be contrary
to the law and to the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court as it would destroy the stability of the
title which is the core of the system of registration. Appellants cannot be deemed purchasers for value
and in good faith as in the deed of absolute conveyance executed in their favor, the following appears:
6. Que la segunda parcela arriba descrita y mencionada esta actualmente abierta, sin malecones y
excluida de la primera parcela en virtud de la Orden Administrative No. 103, tal como fue enmendada,
del pasado regimen o Gobierno.
7. Que los citados compradores Romeo Martinez y Leonor Suarez se encargan de gestionar de las
autoridades correspondientes para que la citada segunda parcela pueda ser convertida de nuevo en
pesqueria, corriendo a cuenta y cargo de los mismos todos los gastos.
8. Que en el caso de que dichos compradores no pudiesen conseguir sus propositos de convertir de
nuevo en pesquera la citada segunda parcela, los aqui vendedores no devolveran ninguna cantidad de
dinero a los referidos compradores; este es, no se disminuiriai el precio de esta venta. (Exh. 13-a, p. 52,
respondents record of exhibits)
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VOL. 56, APRIL 29, 1974
657
These stipulations were accepted by the petitioners-appellants in the same conveyance in the following
terms:
Romeo Martinez y Leonor Suarez, mayores de edad, filipinos y residentes en al Barrio de Julo,
Municipio de Malabon, Provincia de Rizal, por la presente, declaran que estan enterados del contenido
de este documento y lo aceptan en los precisos terminos en que arriba quedan consignados. (Exh. 13-a,
ibid)
Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended that the appellants who were the vendees
did not know exactly the condition of the land that they were buying and the obstacles or restrictions
thereon that may be put up by the government in connection with their project of converting Lot No. 2
in question into a fishpond. Nevertheless, they willfully and voluntarily assumed the risks attendant to
the sale of said lot. One who buys something with knowledge of defect or lack of title in his vendor
cannot claim that he acquired it in good faith (Leung Lee v. Strong Machinery Co., et al., 37 Phil. 664).
The ruling that a purchaser of a registered property cannot go beyond the record to make inquiries as to
the legality of the title of the registered owner, but may rely on the registry to determine if there is no
lien or encumbrances over the same, cannot be availed of as against the law and the accepted principle
that rivers are parts of the public domain for public use and not capable of private appropriation or
acquisition by prescription.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals appealed from is in accordance with
law, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the petitioners-appellants.
Makalintal, C. J., Castro, Teehankee and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., on leave.
Judgment affirmed. [Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 56 SCRA 647(1974)]
G.R. No. 92013. July 25, 1990.*
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL
MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary,
respondents.
G.R. No. 92047. July 25, 1990.*
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST
CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as members of the
PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION OF PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES IN
_______________

* EN BANC.
798

798
Laurel vs. Garcia
JAPAN, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Roppongi property is of public dominion.There can be no doubt that it is of public
dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the
respondents have failed to do.
Same; Same; Same; As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man
and can not be alienated.As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of
man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The
purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common
and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
Same; Same; Same; Roppongi property correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil
Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.The Roppongi property
is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the
State and intended for some public service.
Same; Same; Same; A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such.The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for
actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles,
66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public
service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite.The
respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a change of
intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property
for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be
definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from
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VOL. 187, JULY 25, 1990
799
Laurel vs. Garcia
the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the governments own deliberate and
indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino
Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on
correct legal premises.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not
relinquishment of the Roppongi propertys original purpose.A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy
to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi propertys original purpose. Even the failure
by the government to repair the building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated, there
simply was a shortage of government funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the
status and conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did
not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) does not authorize the Executive
Department to sell the Roppongi property.Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which
provides as one of the sources of funds for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the
properties of the Government in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being
classified as one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers
to properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or service. Rep. Act No. 6657,
therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely
enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform
Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man
cannot be tapped as a source of funds.
Administrative Law; Political Law; President can not convey valuable real property of the government on
his or her own sole will; Conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by Congress.
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will.
Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires
executive and legislative concurrence.
Same; Same; Same; Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989 asking for the deferment of the
sale of the Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize
its
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800
Laurel vs. Garcia
sale.Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of the
Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its sale. It is
a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of the Roppongi
property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting hearings on Senate
Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding investigation of
the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine government properties in Japan. [Laurel vs.
Garcia, 187 SCRA 797(1990)]
PETITIONS for prohibition and mandamus to review the decision of the Executive Secretary.

Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents
from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-
Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. We granted the prayer for a
temporary restraining order effective February 20, 1990. One of the petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047)
likewise prayes for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the
basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property inspite of strong public
opposition and to explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens
and entities in the bidding process.
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia, et al. were heard by the Court on March 13,
1990. After G.R. No. 92047, Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al. was filed, the respondents were required
to file a comment by the Courts resolution dated February 22, 1990. The two petitions were
consolidated
802

802
Laurel vs. Garcia
on March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of the parties in the Laurel case were deliberated upon.
The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the respondents filed a motion for an
extension of thirty (30) days to file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed by a second motion for an
extension of another thirty (30) days which we granted on May 8, 1990, a third motion for extension of
time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth motion for extension of time which we granted on June 5,
1990 but calling the attention of the respondents to the length of time the petitions have been pending.
After the comment was filed, the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 asked for thirty (30) days to file a reply.
We noted his motion and resolved to decide the two (2) cases.
I

The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots
being:
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has an area of
approximately 2,489.96 square meters, and is at present the site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery;
(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of around 764.72 square
meters and categorized as a commercial lot now being used as a warehouse and parking lot for the
consulate staff; and
(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyamacho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a residential lot
which is now vacant.
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national
development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and
property and their suffering during World War II.
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in
twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine
and Japanese governments (Article 2, Repara-
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Laurel vs. Garcia
tions Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on
procurement and utilization of reparations and development loans. The procurements are divided into
those for use by the government sector and those for private parties in projects as the then National
Economic Council shall determine. Those intended for the private sector shall be made available by sale
to Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities in national development
projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule
and listed under the heading Government Sector, through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June
27, 1958. The Roppongi property consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy (Annex M-D to Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became the site of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the Roppongi
building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the
Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan,
Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firmKajima
Corporationwhich shall construct two (2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and
renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction would be
the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and the
two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other building in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine
Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and
used by the Philippine government. No change of ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex B to Reply
to Comment) The Philippine government retains the title all throughout the lease period and thereafter.
However, the government has not acted favorably on this proposal which is pending approval and
ratification between the parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to
study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through
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Laurel vs. Garcia
Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executie Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to
avail of reparations capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four
properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first Whereas clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with
great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property
has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225 million. The first bidding was a failure
since only one bidder qualified. The second one, after postponements, has not yet materialized. The last
scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court. Later, the rules on bidding were
changed such that the $225 million floor price became merely a suggested floor price.
The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013
objects to the alienation of the Roppongi property to anyone while the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds
as a principal objection the alleged unjustified bias of the Philippine government in favor of selling the
property to non-Filipino citizens and entities. These petitions have been consolidated and are resolved
at the same time for the objective is the sameto stop the sale of the Roppongi property.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property?
Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of the government to
alienate the Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296 in making the
property available for sale to nonFilipino citizens and entities. He also questions the bidding procedures
of the Committee on the Utilization or Disposition of Philippine Government Properties in Japan for
being discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities by denying them the right to be
informed about the bidding
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Laurel vs. Garcia
requirements.
II

In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and the related lots were
acquired as part of the reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and consular use by
the Philippine government. Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one
of public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code (See infra).
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under property intended for public service
in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by any
one can attach to it, not even by the State. The Roppongi and related properties were acquired for sites
for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and other improvements (Second Year
Reparations Schedule). The petitioner states that they continue to be intended for a necessary service.
They are held by the State in anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it
cannot be appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be
alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20
[1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi property at the moment, the petitioner avers that the same
remains property of public dominion so long as the government has not used it for other purposes nor
adopted any measure constituting a removal of its original purpose or use.
The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioners contention by saying that the subject property is
not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located. They rely upon
the rule of lex situs which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer
and devolution of the title to a property. They also invoke Opinion No. 21, Series of 1988, dated January
27, 1988 of the Secretary of Justice which used the lex situs in explaining the inapplicability of Philippine
law regarding a property situated in Japan.
The respondents add that even assuming for the sake of argu-
806

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Laurel vs. Garcia
ment that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of public
dominion. It has become patrimonial property because it has not been used for public service or for
diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and because the
intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it to private use has been
manifested by overt acts, such as, among others: (1) the transfer of the Philippine Embassy to
Nampeidai; (2) the issuance of administrative orders for the possibility of alienating the four
government properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296; (4) the enactment by the
Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which
contains a provision stating that funds may be taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign
countries; (5) the holding of the public bidding of the Roppongi property but which failed; (6) the
deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future date; thus an acknowledgment
by the Senate of the governments intention to remove the Roppongi property from the public service
purpose; and (7) the resolution of this Court dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et
al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin the second bidding of the Roppongi property scheduled on
March 30, 1989.
III

In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this Court to rule on the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 296. He had earlier filed a petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the Court dismissed on
August 1, 1989. He now avers that the executive order contravenes the constitutional mandate to
conserve and develop the national patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. It also
allegedly violates:
(1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino
citizens. (Sections 2 and 3, Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth Act 141).
(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony (Section 10, Article VI, Constitution);
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Laurel vs. Garcia
(3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices;
(4) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of public concern (Section 7,
Article III, Constitution);
(5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or entities not wholly owned by Filipino
citizens of capital goods received by the Philippines under the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep.
Act No. 1789); and
(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Section 28, Article II, Constitution).
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the execution of an unconstitutional executive
order is a misapplication of public funds. He states that since the details of the bidding for the Roppongi
property were never publicly disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a few days before the scheduled
bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in Tokyo, and the accomplishment of requirements
and the selection of qualified bidders should be done in Tokyo, interested Filipino citizens or entities
owned by them did not have the chance to comply with Purchase Offer Requirements on the Roppongi.
Worse, the Roppongi shall be sold for a minimum price of $225 million from which price capital gains tax
under Japanese law of about 50 to 70% of the floor price would still be deducted.
IV

The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not dispute the fact that the Roppongi site and the
three related properties were acquired through reparations agreements, that these were assigned to
the government sector and that the Roppongi property itself was specifically designated under the
Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the
terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both
the Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
808

808
Laurel vs. Garcia
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application
to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the
State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot
be the object of appropriation. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on the
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26).
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as
property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed because the lot
has been idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until
there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
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Laurel vs. Garcia
being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a change
of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi
property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must
be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was
attributable not to the governments own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial
support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368
[1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi
propertys original purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the building in Roppongi is not
abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of government funds. The recent
Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of government properties in
Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose
of the properties.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an authority to sell, does not have a provision in its
text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for the government
sector. The executive order does not declare that the properties lost their public character. It merely
intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease
or other disposition. It merely eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789 that reparations goods
may be sold only to Filipino citizens and one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities. The text of
Executive Order No. 296 provides:
Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended, and of other laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, the abovementioned properties can be made available for sale, lease or any other
manner of disposition to non-Filipino citizens or to entities owned by non-Filipino citizens.
810

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Laurel vs. Garcia
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi and the three
other properties were earlier converted into alienable real properties. As earlier stated, Rep. Act No.
1789 differentiates the procurements for the government sector and the private sector (Sections 2 and
12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the private sector properties can be sold to end-users who must be Filipinos
or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality provision which was amended by Executive Order No.
296.
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources of funds for its
implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign
countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of public dominion
when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are alienable
and not to those reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the
Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future
funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No.
299. Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of funds.
The respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the Roppongi property by insisting
that Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should be the ones to insist that
in the sale of extremely valuable government property, Japanese law and not Philippine law should
prevail. The Japanese lawits coverage and effects, when enacted, and exceptions to its provisionsis
not presented to the Court. It is simply asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law should apply
without stating what that law provides. It is assumed on faith that Japanese law would allow the sale.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A
conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the
essen-
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Laurel vs. Garcia
tial validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on
land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters.
Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property
belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of
property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule
is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through
reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable
of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine
who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public
domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in
belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi
lot when there is no showing that it can be sold?
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by the
investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned
on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval does not
have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress
had already convened for more than a year.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public
dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 pro-
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812
Laurel vs. Garcia
vides:
Section 79 (f). Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party.In cases in which the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument conveying the
title to real estate or to any other property the value of which is in excess of one hundred thousand
pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers which, together with the
proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the
same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the
Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless the Government of the Philippines
unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in another officer. (Italics supplied)
The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292).
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President,
unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality. (Italics supplied)
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will.
Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires
executive and legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of the
Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its sale. It is
a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of the Roppongi
property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting hearings on Senate
Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding investigation of
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Laurel vs. Garcia
the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine government properties in Japan.
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not pass upon the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents assertion, we did not uphold the
authority of the President to sell the Roppongi property. The Court stated that the constitutionality of
the executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the constitutional question was neither
necessary nor finally determinative of the case. The Court noted that *W+hat petitioner ultimately
questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi property. In emphasizing that
the decision of the Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to finance the CARP x x x cannot be
questioned in view of Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that
the property became alienable nor did it indicate that the President was authorized to dispose of the
Roppongi property. The resolution should be read to mean that in case the Roppongi property is re-
classified to be patrimonial and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for
national economic development projects including the CARP. Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not
materialize. The petitions
before us question the proposed 1990 sale of the Roppongi property. We are resolving the issues raised
in these petitions, not the issues raised in 1989.
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property from public
domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the sale of the property, we see
no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issues raised by petitioner Ojeda.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly
raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of
a statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the Roppongi
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814
Laurel vs. Garcia
property should not be sold:
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the Filipino people in
reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese military
occupation, for the suffering of widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the
homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo properties are a
monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the
monuments of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do not expect economic or financial benefits
from them. But who would think of selling these monuments? Filipino honor and national dignity dictate
that we keep our properties in Japan as memorials to the countless Filipinos who died and suffered.
Even if we should become paupers we should not think of selling them. For it would be as if we sold the
lives and blood and tears of our countrymen. (Rollo-G.R. No. 92013, p. 147)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:
Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by the Japanese government in atonement for its past
belligerence, for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb and for deaths, physical dislocation and economic
devastation the whole Filipino people endured in World War II.
It is for what it stands for, and for what it could never bring back to life, that its significance today
remains undimmed, inspite of the lapse of 45 years since the war ended, inspite of the passage of 32
years since the property passed on to the Philippine government.
Roppongi is a reminder that cannotshould notbe dissipated. x x x. (Rollo-92047, p. 9)
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices
fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinosveterans
and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy
determination where both the President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties
importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be
faithfully followed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the peti-
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Laurel vs. Garcia
tions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the
sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining Order is
made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Gancayco, Corts and Medialdea, JJ., join Justice Felicianos dissent.
Cruz, J., See concurrence.
Feliciano, J., See separate dissent.
Padilla, J., See concurring statement.
Sarmiento, J., See Concurring Opinion. [Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797(1990)]
G.R. No. 66807. January 26, 1989.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. MELITONA
ALAGAD, SPOUSES CARMEN ALAGAD AND ESPIRIDION KOLIMLIM, JUSTO ALAGAD, CARLOS ALAGAD,
SPOUSES LIBRADA ALAGAD AND EMERSON ABANO, DEMETRIO ALAGAD, ANTONIO ALAGAD, REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Civil Cases Division),
respondents,
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pre-Trial; Estoppel; The State cannot be bound by, or estopped from the
mistakes or negligent acts of its officials or agents, much more, non-suited as a result thereof.With
respect to the first question, we hold that the Court of Appeals has been guilty of grave abuse of
discretion. It is well-established that the State cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or
negligent acts of its officials or agents, much more, non-suited as a result thereof. This is so because: x x
x [T]he state as a persona in law is the judicial entity, which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land under the basic doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the present
charter. It is charged moreover with the conservation of such patrimony. There is need therefore of the
most rigorous scrutiny before private claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded recognition,
especially so where the matter is sought to be raked up anew after almost fifty years. Such primordial
consideration, not the apparent carelessness, much less the acquiescence of public officials, is the
controlling norm.
Same; Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; Land Registration; Res Judicata will not apply if the court which
rendered the prior judgment had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.There is no merit either, in
claims that res judicata is an impediment to reversion of property. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this
court stated: x x x [a] certiorari of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic v. Animas, et al,, supra), and
the cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action therefor. This action cannot be barred by
the prior judgment of the land registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter. And if there was no such jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. x
x x In the case at bar, if
________________

* SECOND DIVISION.
456

456
Republic vs. Alagad
the parcel registered in the names of the private respondents were foreshore land, the land registration
court could not have validly awarded title thereto. It would have been without the authority to do so.
The fact that the Bureau of Lands had failed to appeal from the decree of registration could not have
validated the courts decision, rendered without jurisdiction.
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of Appeals. Sison, J.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Alberto, Salazar & Associates for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:

The Republic appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 affirming two orders of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Laguna2 dismissing its petition for annulment of title and reversion".3 The
facts appear in the decision appealed from:
On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel
of land situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-
116971, which was amended after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of
5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-226971, amd. 2.
The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground that applicants and their
predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under
a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public
domain. It appears that barrio folk also opposed the application. (LRC Case No. 189. G.L.R.O. Rec. No.
4922 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna).
By virtue of a final judgment in said case, promulgated January 16, 1956, supplemented by orders issued
on March 21, 1956 and August 13, 1956, defendants were declared owners of Lot 1 and the
_______________

1 Sison, Porfirio, J., Bidin, Abdulwahid and Veloso, Marcelino, JJ., Concurring.
2 Branch II; Purisima, Amante, presiding Judge.
3 Rollo, 32.
457

VOL. 169, JANUARY 26, 1989
457
Republic vs. Alagad
remaining portion, or Lot 2, was declared public land. Decree No. N51479 was entered and Original
Certificate of Title No. 0401, dated October 18, 1956, was issued in the names of defendants.
In August, 1966, Civil Case No. 52 of the Municipal Court of Pila, Laguna, was filed by defendants to evict
the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. On August 8, 1968, judgment was rendered in the eviction
case ordering the defendants therein to return possession of the premises to herein defendants, as
plaintiffs therein. The defendants therein did not appeal.
The foregoing anterior proceedings triggered the filing of the instant case. On October 6, 1970, as
prayed for in the complaint, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of
Laguna or his deputies from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 52, and the
defendants from selling, mortgaging, disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the
area.
This case was set for pre-trial on July 6, 1971. Despite notice of the pre-trial, Atty. Alejandro A.
Ponferada, Special Attorney, Bureau of Lands, representing plaintiff Republic, did not appear. On July 16,
1971, the court a quo dismissed the complaint. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, was set
for hearing, and finally denied by the court a quo, Hence, this appeal.
Plaintiff filed its record on appeal on March 13, 1972. It appears that the appeal was dismissed by this
Court for failure to show in the record on appeal that the appeal was perfected on time. Plaintiff went to
the Supreme Court on a petition for review on the action of this Court. On November 19, 1982, the
Supreme Court set aside the dismissal resolution of this Court and ordered Us to reinstate and give due
course to plaintiffs appeal.4
In commencing proceedings below, the Republic claims that the decree and title *rendered and issued
in LRC Case No. 189, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. L-4922] insofar as the 1.42 hectare northwestern portion on end
of Lot 1, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, is concerned, are void ab initio,5 for the following reasons:
(a) That said 1.42 hectare northwestern portion or end of Lot 1, Psu-116971, Amd, 2, like the adjoining
Lot 2 of the same survey plan
________________

4 Id., 5455. The Supreme Court case referred to is Republic v. Court of Appeals (No. L-35718, November
19, 1982, 118 SCRA 409).
5 Id., 34.
458

458
Republic vs. Alagad
containing 2.8421 hectares, had since time immemorial, been foreshore land reached and covered by
the waters of the Laguna de Bay (Republic vs. Ayala y Cia, L-20950, May 31, 1965; Antonio Dizon, et al.,
vs. Juan de G. Rodriguez, et al., L-2035556, April 30, 1965);
(b) That moreover said 1.42 hectare portion is actually now the site of Barrio Aplaya, formerly a sitio of
Linga, Pila, Laguna, having been occupied by the barrio people since the American occupation of the
country in the early 1900s where they established their houses;
(c) That the barrio people of Aplaya thru the years since the early 1900s have filled up and elevated the
land to its present condition of being some feet above the level of the adjoining Lot 2 of plan Psu-
116971 and the rest of Lot 1 of the same survey plan so much so that this barrio site of Aplaya where
there are now sixtyeight (68) houses occupied by more than one hundred (100) families is no longer
reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna de Bay; and
(d) That were it not for the fillings made by the barrio people, the land in question would not have been
fit for human habitation, so much so that defendants and their predecessors-in-interest could not have
acquired an imperfect title to the property which could be judicially confirmed in a registration case, as
in fact said defendants and their predecessors-in-interest have never been in actual possession of the
land in question, the actual occupants thereof being the barrio people of Aplaya;6
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that under Section 20, of Rule 20, of the Rules of
Court, dismissal was proper upon failure of the Republic to appear for pre-trial. It likewise ruled that the
judgment, dated January 16, 1956, in the said LRC No. 189 has long become final, titles to the properties
had been issued (in favor of the private respondents), and that res judicata, consequently, was a bar.
In its petition, the Republic assails the decision insofar as it sustained the lower court: (1) in dismissing
the petition for failure of the Republic to appear for pre-trial; and (2) in holding that res judicata is an
obstacle to the suit.
I.
With respect to the first question, we hold that the Court of Appeals has been quilty of grave abuse of
discretion. It is well-
_______________

6 Id., 3435.
459

VOL. 169, JANUARY 26, 1989
459
Republic vs. Alagad
established that the State cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of its
official or agents,7 much more, non-suited as a result thereof.
This is so because:
. . . [T]he state as a persona in law is the judicial entity, which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land under the basic doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the present
charter. It is charged moreover with the conservation of such patrimony. There is need therefore of the
most rigorous scrutiny before private claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded recognition,
especially so where the matter is sought to be raked up anew after almost fifty years. Such primordial
consideration, not the apparent carelessness, much less the acquiescense of public officials, is the
controlling norm. . .8
The cases of Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines9 and Nilo v. Romero,10 cited by the Court of
Appeals in support of its decision, are not applicable. In Ramos, we applied estoppel upon finding of bad
faith on the part of the State (the Central Bank) in deliberately reneging on its promises. In Nilo, we
denied efforts to impugn the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the defendant had been
erroneously represented
_______________

7 Republic v. Court of Appeals, No, L-56077, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 156; Director of Lands v. Court
of Appeals, No. L-58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689; Republic v. Aquino, No. L-33983, January 27,
1983, 120 SCRA 186; Republic v. Court of Appeals, No. L45202, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 742;
Republic v. Heirs of Felix Caballero, No. L-27473, September 30, 1977, 79 SCRA 177; Manila Lodge No.
761 v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-410012, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 162; Balmaceda v. Corominas &
Company, Inc., No. L-21971, September 5, 1975, 66 SCRA 553; Republic v. Marcos, No. L-32941, July 31,
1973, 52 SCRA 238; Yao Mun Tek v. Republic, No. L-23383, January 28, 1971, 37 SCRA 55; Zamora v.
Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-23272, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 77; Luciano v. Estrella, No. L-31622,
August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 769; Republic v. Marcos, No. L-29675, 29 SCRA 517; Aguinaldo de Romero v.
Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 814 (1919).
8 Republic v. Marcos, supra, 244245.
9 No. L-29352, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 565.
10 No. L-15195, March 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 926.
460

460
Republic vs. Alagad
in the complaint by the City Attorney when it should have been the City Mayor, on a holding that the
City Attorney, in any event, could have ably defended the City (Davao City). In both cases, it is seen that
the acts that gave rise to estoppel were voluntary and intentional in character, in which cases, it could
not be said that the Government had been prejudiced by some negligent act or omission.
There is no merit either, in claims that res judicata is an impediment to reversion of property. In
Republic v. Court of Appeals,11 this Court stated:
. . . [a] certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic v. Animas, et al., supra), and the
cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the
prior judgment of the land registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter. And if there was no such jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. For it is a
well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following
requisites must concur; (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter
and identity of cause of action (Municipality of Daet vs. CA, 93 SCRA 503; Mendoza vs. Arrieta, et al., 91
SCRA 113). x x x12
In the case at bar, if the parcel registered in the names of the private respondents were foreshore land,
the land registration court could not have validly awarded title thereto. It would have been without the
authority to do so. The fact that the Bureau of Lands had failed to appeal from the decree of registration
could not have validated the courts decision, rendered without jurisdiction.
II.
Property, according to the Civil Code, is either of public dominion or of private ownership."13
Property is of public
______________

11 Supra.
12 At 748748.
13 CIVIL CODE, art. 419.
461

VOL. 169, JANUARY 26, 1989
461
Republic vs. Alagad
dominion if it is:
(1) ... intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;14
or if it:
(2) ... belong[s] to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.15
All other property of the State, it is provided further, which is not of the character mentioned in ...
article *420+, is patrimonial property,"16 meaning to say, property open to disposition"17 by the
Government, or otherwise, property pertaining to the national domain, or public lands.18 Property of
the public dominion, on the other hand, refers to things held by the State by regalian right. They are
things res publicae in nature and hence, incapable of private appropriation. Thus, under the present
Constitution, "[w]ith the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated."19
Specifically:
ART. 502. The following are of public dominion:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
________________

14 Supra, Art. 420, par. (1); emphasis supplied.
15 Supra, par. (2).
16 Supra, Art. 421.
17 Com. Act. No. 141 (1936), Sec. 8; see also Sec. 6.
18 See PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 416(1982).
19 CONST. (1987), Art. XII, Sec 2. Under the 1973 Constitution, "[w]ith the exception of agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated
..." [CONST. (1973). art. XIV, sec 8.] The Charter of 1935, in turn, says that, "[n]atural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land shall not be alienated . . ." [CONST. (1935), art. XIV, sec. 1.]
462

462
Republic vs. Alagad
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds
themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands, and their beds;
(5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds, which are also of public dominion;
(6) Subterranean waters on public lands;
(7) Waters found within the zone of operation of public works, even if constructed by a contractor;
(8) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands belonging to private persons, to the State, to a
province, or to a city or municipality from the moment they leave such lands;
(9) The waste waters of fountains, sewers and public establishments.20
So also is it ordained by the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:
Art. 44. Natural ponds and lakes existing upon public lands and fed by public waters, belong to the
public domain.
Lakes, ponds, and pools existing upon the lands of private individuals, or the State or provinces, belong
to the respective owners of such lands, and those situated upon lands of communal use belong to their
respective pueblos."21
Assuming, therefore, for purposes of this petition, that the lands subject of the Republics reversion
efforts are foreshore in nature, the Republic has legitimate reason to demand reconveyance. In that
case, res judicata or estoppel is no defense.22
______________

20 CIVIL CODE, supra, art. 502.
21 See FRANCISCO, THE PHILIPPINE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 156 (1951)'. Nota Bene; The
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 has been modified by the Presidential Decree No. 1067, A DECREE
INSTITUTIONALIZING A WATER CODE. THEREBY REVERSING AND CONSOLIDATING THE LAWS
GOVERNING THE OWNERSHIP, APPROPRIATION, UTILIZATION, EXPLOITATION, CONSERVATION AND
PROTECTION OF WATER RESOURCES." (The Water Code of the Philippines).
22 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra; also, Republic v. Lozada, No. L-43852, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA
503.
463

VOL. 169, JANUARY 26, 1989
463
Republic vs. Alagad
Of course, whether or not the properties in question are, indeed, foreshore lands is the core of
controversy. According to the trial court, the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,"23 and hence, available for disposition and
registration. As we have pointed out, the Government holds otherwise, and that as foreshore land, it is
not registerable.
The question, so it follows, is one of fact: Is the parcel foreshore of is it part and parcel of the public
domain?
Laguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake.24 Thus:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth; it contains fresh water coming
from rivers and brooks or springs, and is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According to the
definition just quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake.25
And, "*i+nasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, so Colegio de San Jose further tells us, we must resort to
the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to
determine the character and ownership of the parcels of land in question."26 The recourse to legal
provisions is necessary, for under Article 74 of the Law of Waters, [T]he natural bed or basin of lakes . . .
is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth."27 and in which case, it
forms part of the national dominion. When Laguna de Bays waters are at their highest ordinary depth
has been defined as:
. . . the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the
regular, common, natural, which oc
_______________

23 Rollo, id., 17; emphasis in the original.
24 Government v. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil. 423 (1929); also Republic v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-
43105, L-43190, August 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 532.
25 Supra, 426. According to this decision, LAKE ... *means+ *a+ body of water formed in depressions of
the earth. Ordinarily fresh water, coming from rivers, brooks, or springs are connected with the sea by
them.'"
26 Supra, 426427.
27 Spanish Law of Waters (1866), supra, art. 74.
464

464
Republic vs. Alagad
curs always or most of the time during the year .. 28
Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the extraordinary action of nature, rainfall for
instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of
water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public
dominion, and land capable of registration as private property.
A foreshore land, on the other hand, has been defined as follows:
"... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the
tides x x x"29
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide."30
If the submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite
its proximity to the waters.
The case, then, has to be decided alongside these principles and regretfully, the Court cannot make a
ruling, in the first place, because it is not a trier of facts, and in the second, it is in possession of no
evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition.31 We therefore remand the case to the court
a quo to determine whether or not the property subject of controversy is foreshore. We, consequently,
reverse both the Court of Appeals and the trial court and reinstate the Republics complaint.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
_____________

28 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, 538, citing Government v. Colegio de San Jose, supra, at 426.
29 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, 539; Government v. Colegio de San Jose, supra, 428429.
30 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, 539.
31 See Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46048, November 29, 1988, 10, citing Ankron v.
Government, 40 Phil. 10 (1919), citing Jocson v. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil. 560 (1919).
465

VOL. 169, JANUARY 26, 1989
465
Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Leogardo, Jr.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Case remanded to trial court for further proceedings.
Note.There is no res judicata or bar by prior judgment where a Court of First Instance acting as a court
of limited jurisdiction as a land registration court resolved a highly controversial matterownership of
titled property and cancellation of torrens title previously issuedbeyond its judicial competence to
pass upon. (Calimlim vs. Ramirez, 118 SCRA 399.) [Republic vs. Alagad, 169 SCRA 455(1989)]
No. L-39473. April 30, 1979.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LASTIMADO,
respondents.
Land Registration; Reopening of decree of registration; Essential elements for reopening.The essential
elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: a) that the petitioner has a real
and dominical right; b) that he has been deprived thereof; c) through fraud; d) that the petition is filed
within one year from the issuance of the decree; and e) that the property has not as yet been
transferred to an innocent purchaser.
Same; Same; Same; Same; State should he afforded opportunity to present evidence of fraud in grant of
decree of registration.We find reversible error. Although there was an agreement by the parties to
submit for resolution the Opposition to the Petition for Review, which was treated as a motion to
dismiss, the trial Court, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, should not have dismissed the
Petition outright but should have afforded petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of
the facts alleged to constitute actual and extrinsic fraud committed by private respondent. Thus, in the
case of Republic vs. Sioson, et al., it was held that the action of the lower Court in denying the petition
for review of a decree of registration filed within one year from entry of the decree, without hearing the
evidence in support of the allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is
predicated, is held to be in error, because the lower Court should have afforded the petitioner an
opportunity to prove it.
Same; Same; Fraud; Fraud required to justify review of registration decree; Extrinsic and collateral fraud
distinguished.However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral and
the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered. The following ruling spells out the difference between extrinsic and
intrinsic fraud; Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any
fraudulent
________________

* FIRST DIVISION.
649

VOL. 89, APRIL 30, 1979
649
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
scheme executed by a prevailing litigant outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his
agents, attorneys for witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and
fairly his side of the case. But intrinsic fraud takes the form of acts of a party in a litigation during the
trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation
of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case. The fraud is one that affects and
goes into the jurisdiction of the Court.
Same; Same; Cadastral Proceedings; Republic Act 931; Land inside military reservation cannot be the
object of cadastral proceedings or reopening under Republic Act 931.If the allegation of petitioner
that the land in question was inside the military reserva tion at the time it was claimed is true, then, it
cannot be the object of any cadastral proceeding nor can it be the object of reopening under Republic
Act No. 931.
Same; Same; No conversion of land into private property despite longer possession of land; Reasons;
Agency having jurisdiction to register under the Torrens System land forming part of public forest.
Similarly, if the land in question, indeed, forms part of the public forest, then, possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the
Torrens Systems.
Same; Same; Estoppel, not a case of; Inaction of Office of Solicitor General to oppose cadastral
proceedings not a bar to States recovery of public land; Reasons.Even assuming that the government
agencies can be faulted for inaction and neglect (although the Solicitor General claims that it received
no notice), yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by the State as it cannot be estopped by the
mistake or error of its officials or agents. Further, we cannot lose sight of the cardinal consideration that
State as a persona in law is the juridical entity, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land under basic Constitutional precepts, and that it is moreover charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
PETITION for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Eduardo G. Makalintal for private respondent.
650

650
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review (Appeal) by Certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 30, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. Sp-01504 denying
the States Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent, Isabel Lastimado, filed on September 11, 1967, in the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, Branch I, a Petition for the reopening of cadastral proceedings over a portion of Lot No. 626 of
the Mariveles Cadastre, consisting of 971,0569 hectares, pursuant to Republic Act No. 931, as amended
by Republic Act No. 2061, docketed ad Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1097 In the absence of any
opposition, whether from the Government or from private individuals, private respondent was allowed
to present her evidence ex-parte. On October 14, 1967, the trial Court rendered a Decision granting the
Petition and adjudicating the land in favor of private respondent. The trial Court issued an order for the
issuance of a decree of registration on November 20, 1967, and on November 21, 1967, the Land
Registration Commission issued Decree No. N-117573 in favor of private respondent. Eventually,
Original Certificate of Title No. N-144 was also issued in her favor. Private respondent thereafter
subdivided the land into ten lots, and the corresponding titles. Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 18905
to 18914 inclusive, were issued by the Register of Deeds.
On June 3, 1968, or within one year from the entry of the decree of registration, petitioner filed a
Petition for Review pursuant to Sec. 38, Act No. 496, on the ground of fraud alleging that during the
period of alleged adverse possession by private respondent, said parcel of land was part of the U.S.
Military Reservation in Bataan, which was formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines only on
December 22, 1965, and that the same is inside the public forest of Mariveles, Bataan and, therefore,
not subject to disposition or acquisition under the Public Land Law. Respondent field an Opposition
651

VOL. 89, APRIL 30, 1979
651
thereto, which was considered by the trial Court, as a Motion to Dismiss, and on December 20, 1968,
said Court (Judge Tito V. Tizon, presiding) issued an Order dismissing the Petition for Review mainly on
the ground that the Solicitor General had failed to file opposition to the original Petition for reopening
of the cadastral proceedings and was, therefore, estopped from questioning the decree of registration
ordered issued therein. On January 28, 1969, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied by
the trial Court in its Order dated May 20, 1969, for lack of merit.
Petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal and a Record on Appeal, which was objected to by private
respondent. On July 15, 1972, or three years later,* the trial Court (Judge Abraham P. Vera, presiding)
refused to give due course to the appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial
Court denied it in its Order of October 14, 1972 on the ground that the proper remedy of petitioner was
a Certiorari petition, not an ordinary appeal, and that the Order sought to be appealed from had long
become final and executory as petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was pro-forma and did not
suspend the running of the reglementary period of appeal.
On November 9, 1972, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals
claiming that the trial Court gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction when,
without the benefit of hearing, it summarily dismissed the Petition for Review; and since said Petition
raised certain issues of fact which cannot be decided except in a trial on the merits, the dismissal of the
Petition on the basis of private respondents Opposition, considered as a Motion to Dismiss, constituted
a denial of due process of law. Petitioner then prayed that the Order of the trial Court, dated December
20, 1968 dismissing the Petition for Review, be declared null and void, and that said trial Court be
directed to
_________________

* The delay was due to the fact that soon after the filing of the Record on Appeal, the entire records of
the case were transmitted to the Department of Justice in connection with the administrative
investigation of Judge Tito V. Tizon.
652

652
give due course to the Petition for Review; or, in the alternative, to give due course to petitioners
appeal.
On September 30, 1974, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial Courts dismissal of the Petition for
Review stating:
x x x We cannot find any allegation in the petition for review which shows that private respondent had
committed fraud against petitioner. Its representations and officials were duly notified of private
respondents petition for reopening and registration of title in her name. In said petition, the technical
descriptions of the portion of Lot No. 626 of the Mariveles (Bataan) Cadastre, subject-matter of the
petition were expressly stated, the boundaries, specifically delineated. The alleged ground that the land
forms part of a forest land exists at the time petitioner was duly notified of said petition. Failure to file
opposition is in effect, an admission that the petition is actually not part of a forest land. Indubitably,
therefore, no justifiable reason exists for the annulment of the Order, dated December 20, 1968 (Annex
D-Petition) of the lower court dismissing herein petitioners petition for review of the decree issued in
favor of private respondent Lastimado.1
The Court of Appeals then disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the respondent Judge has not committed any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in the issuance of an Order, dated December 20, 1968 (Annex D-
Petition) dismissing herein petitioners petition for review, the present petition for review is hereby
denied.
The issuance of the writ of mandamus as prayed for in the petition is no longer necessary as this Court,
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and authority to supervise orderly administration of justice,
has already resolved on the merits the question whether or not the dismissal of the petition for review
had been done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.2
From this Decision, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review (Appeal) by Certiorari assigning the
following errors to the Court of Appeals and to the trial Court:
________________

1 pp. 18-19 of CA Decision at pp, 54-55, Rollo.
2 p. 19 CA Decision at p. 55, Rollo.
653

VOL. 89, APRIL 30, 1979
653
1. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding that there can be possession, even
for the purpose of claiming title, of land which at the time of possession is subject to a military
reservation.
2. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding that such land which is subject to a
government reservation, may appropriately be the subject of cadastral proceedings, and hence, also of a
petition to reopen cadastral proceedings.
3. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding that a parcel of land which is part of
the public forest is susceptible of occupation and registration in favor of private individual.
4. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Republic of the
Philippines is not estopped from questioning the decree of registration and the title issued pursuant
thereto in favor of respondent Lastimado over the parcel of land in question.
5. The Lower Court erred in dismissing the petition for review of the Republic of the Philippines.
6. The Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioners petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) provides:
Section 38. Decree of registration, and remedies after entry of decree.
If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application
or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions
stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice of
citation, or included in the general description To all whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in
the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within
654

654
one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. x x
x.3
The essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: a) that the
petitioner has a real and dominical right; b) that he has been deprived thereof; c) through fraud; d) that
the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and e) that the property has not as
yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.4
However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon
which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered.5 The following ruling spells out the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic
fraud:
Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme
executed by a prevailing litigant outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his
side of the case. But intrinsic fraud takes the form of acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such
as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the present action of the
case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case.6
The fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the Court.7
In its Petition for Review filed before the trial Court, petitioner alleged that fraud was committed by
private respondent when she misrepresented that she and her predecessors-ininterest had been in
possession of the land publicly, peacefully,
________________

3 As amended by Sec 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630
4 Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17 (1972)
5 Ibid.
6 ibid.
7 De Almeda vs. Cruz, 84 Phil. 636, 641, 643 (1949); Sterling Investment Corporation vs. Ruiz, 30 SCRA
318 (1969)
655

VOL. 89, APRIL 30, 1979
655
exclusively and adversely against the whole world as owner for more than forty years when, in fact, the
subject land was inside the former U.S. Military Reservation, which was formally turned over to the
Republic of the Philippines only on December 22, 1965, and that she likewise contended that her rights,
as derived from the original and primitive occupants of the land in question, are capable of judicial
confirmation under existing laws, when the truth is, said parcel of land is within the public forest of
Mariveles, Bataan, and is not subject to disposition or acquisition by private persons under the Public
Land Law.
The trial Court ruled, and was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that no fraud was committed by private
respondent, which deprived petitioner of its day in Court as there was no showing that she was aware of
the facts alleged by the Government, so that she could not have suppressed them with intent to
deceive. The trial Court also noted that petitioner had failed to file an opposition to the reopening of the
cadastral proceedings despite notices sent not only to the Solicitor General as required by Republic Act
No. 931, but to the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry as well. It then concluded that the
remedy granted by section 38 of the Land Registration Act is designed to give relief to victims of fraud,
not to those who are victims of their own neglect, inaction or carelessness, especially when no attempt
is ever made to excuse or justify the neglect. With the foregoing as the essential basis, the trial Court
dismissed the Petition for Review.
We find reversible error. Although there was an agreement by the parties to submit for resolution the
Opposition to the Petition for Review, which was treated as a motion to dismiss, the trial Court, in the
exercise of sound judicial discretion, should not have dismissed the Petition outright but should have
afforded petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of the facts alleged to constitute
actual and extrinsic fraud committed by private respondent. Thus, in the case of Republic vs. Sioson, et
al.,8 it was held that the action of the
_________________

8 9 SCRA 533 (1953)
656

656
lower Court in denying the petition for review of a decree of registration filed within one year from
entry of the decree, without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that actual and
extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is predicated, is held to be in error, because the lower Court
should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it.
If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the military reservation at the time it
was claimed is true, then, it cannot be the object of any cadastral proceeding nor can it be the object of
reopening under Republic Act No. 931.9 Similarly, if the land in question, indeed, forms part of the
public forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
Cadastral Court to register under the Torrens System.10
Even assuming that the government agencies can be faulted for inaction and neglect (although the
Solicitor General claims that it received no notice), yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by the
State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its officials or agents.11 Further, we cannot
lose sight of the cardinal consideration that the State as persona in law is the juridical entity, which is
the source of any asserted right to ownership in land under basic Constitutional precepts, and that it is
moreover charged with the conservation of such patrimony.12
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 30, 1974, dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus filed before it, as well as the Order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan
(Branch I) dated December 20, 1968, dismissing the Petition for Review, are hereby set aside and the
records of this case hereby remanded to the latter Court for
_________________

9 Republic vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238 (1973)
10 Director of Lands vs, Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 (1975)
11 Republic vs, Marcos, supra.
12 Ibid.
657

VOL. 89, APRIL 30, 1979
657
further proceedings to enable petitioner to present evidence in support of its Petition for Review.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman) Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., no part. [Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648(1979)]
No. L-24548. October 27, 1983.*
WENCESLAO VINZONS TAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA,
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respondents-
appellees, RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors.
Motions; Actions; Pleading and Practice; While, as a rule, a motion to dismiss theoretically admits the
truth of facts alleged in the complaint. This rule is subject to certain exceptions.A perusal of the
records of the case shows that petitioner-appellants contentions are untenable. As already observed,
this case was presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the petition to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted (Rule 16 [g], Revised Rules of Court), on the ground that the
timber license relied upon by the petitioner-appellant in his petition was issued by the Director of
Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab initio. This motion supplanted the general demurrer
in an action at law and, as a rule admits, for the purpose of the motion, all facts which are well pleaded.
However, while the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts, the motion does not admit
allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally
impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document
included in the pleadings to be unfounded.
_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.
303

VOL. 125, OCTOBER 27, 1983
303
Tan vs. Director of Forestry
Same; Same; Same; Where a motion to dismiss was heard with the submission of evidence, the court
cannot be limited by the rule that such motion admits the truth of allegation in the complaint.It must
be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein answers were interposed and
evidence introduced. In the course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to introduce
evidence in support of the allegations in his petition, which he readily availed of. Consequently, he is
estopped from invoking the rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion to
dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. If there were no hearing held, as in
the case of Cohen vs. U.S. (CCA. Minn., 1942, 129 F. 2d 733), where the case was presented to District
Court upon a motion to dismiss because of alleged failure of complaint to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, and no answer was interposed and no evidence introduced, the only facts which the
court could properly consider in passing upon the motion were those facts appearing in the complaint,
supplemented by such facts as the court judicially knew.
Same; Same; Same; Same.Furthermore, even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion
to dismiss for insufficiency of cause of action will be granted if documentary evidence admitted by
stipulation disclosing facts sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the court to go beyond disclosure in the
complaint (LOCALS No. 1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the International Longshoremens Association
vs. Southern Pacific Co., 6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7,
1952; 131 F. 2d 605). Thus, although the evidence of the parties were presented on the question of
granting or denying petitioner-appellants application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court
correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss. Moreover, in applying said
evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition,
pointed out that, there is no reason to believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments and
evidence (p. 478, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, nor presented
new arguments in his motion for reconsideration (pp. 482-484, CFI rec.). This omission means
conformity to said observation, and a waiver of his right to object, estopping him from raising this
question for the first time on appeal. Issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal (Matienzo vs. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 276).
304

304
Same; Same; Same; Rules of procedure are not to be applied rigidly.Moreover, petitioner-appellant
cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint states no cause
of action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in the complaint. The rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help
secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be
defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of justice;
the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party, said rigid
application cannot be countenanced (Vol. 1, Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157, citing
cases).
Forestry Law; Evidence; Court takes judicial notice that area has been declared a forest reserve on April
30, 1964.Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We therefore take
judicial notice of the fact that, on April 30, 1964, the area covered by petitioner-appellants timber
license has been established as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve by virtue of Executive
Proclamation No. 238 by then President Diosdado Macapagal.
Same; Same; Petitioners timber license is void.We fully concur with the findings of the trial court that
petitioner-appellants timber license was signed and released without authority by then Acting Director
Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio.
Same; What is important for validity of a timber license is the date of release thereof not the alleged
date of signing stated thereat.The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the
impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of
Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the date of the release or issuance, and not
the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-appellants timber license might have been
signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is
acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any
authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any
legal right under such void license. This is evident on the face of his petition as supplemented by its
annexes which includes Ordinary Timber License No. 20-64 (NEW).
305

VOL. 125, OCTOBER 27, 1983
305
Same; Administrative Law; Acts of Secretary of Natural Resources should be appealed and the President
first before court action.To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the
respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who
issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing
it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review
on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take
that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Where administrative appeal is available special civil action of certiorari cannot
be availed of.Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove
that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy (Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz.,
No. 4, 956). In the case at bar, petitioner-appellants speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the
President of the Philippines.
Forestry; Administrative Law; Actions; Constitutional Law; State is immune from suit for actions of
officers acting within scope of their authority, as in revocation of timber license.Petitioner-appellant
not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note that his action is a suit
against the State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State
gives its consent to be sued (Kawananakoa vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec.
16, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellants
timber license, were acting within the scope of their authority. Petitioner-appellant contends that this
case is not a suit against the State but an application of a sound principle of law whereby administrative
decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the citizens against
oppression (p. 122, CFI rec.). But, piercing the shard of his contention, We find that petitioner-
appellants action is just an attempt to circumvent the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He
cannot use that principle of law to profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The
promotion of public welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property,
rights and interest of the State.
306

306
Forestry Law; Administrative Law; Contracts; A timber license may he revoked any time pursuant to its
express terms.Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellants timber license is valid, still respondents-
appellees can validly revoke his timber license. As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and
regulations included in the ordinary timber license states: The terms and conditions of this license are
subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to
expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A timber license is an
instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case.
Same; Same; Civil Service; Director of Forestry under the administrative control of Department
Secretary.As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the
Director of Forestry. The utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and
supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest only upon
license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of
Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (Sec. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the
exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309,
May 5, 1981).
APPEAL from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. VII.

Camito V. Pefianco, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Solicitor General for respondent Director.
Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ravago Comml Co.
Anacleto Badoy for respondent Atanacio Mallari.
Mariano de Joya, Jr. for respondent Jorge Lao Happick, Jr.
307

VOL. 125, OCTOBER 27, 1983
307
MAKASIAR, J.:

This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
prohibitory injunction (p. 2, rec.), which dismissed the petition of petitioner-appellant Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan on the ground that it does not state a sufficient cause of action, and upon the respondents-
appellees (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry) motion to
dismiss (p. 28, rec.).
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a
certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or
before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.). This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located
within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned
over by the United States Government to the Philippine Government (p. 99, CFI rec.).
On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after
paying the necessary fees and posting the required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their
offers before the deadline (p. 29, rec.).
Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the
same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia
issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry, which read as follows:
It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve for
watershed purposes. Prepare and submit immediately a draft of a proclamation establishing the said
area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo, Zambales. It is also desired that the bids received by
the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of the timber license in the area during the
308

308
public bidding conducted last May 22, 1961 be rejected in order that the area may be reserved as above
stated. xx xx
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
(p. 98, CFI rec.).

On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the
findings and recommendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that it would be beneficial to
the public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under certain conditions, and We
quote:
Respectfully forwarded to the Honorable, the Executive Secretary, Malacaang, Manila, inviting
particular attention to the comment and recommendation of the Director of Forestry in the preceding
indorsement in which this Office fully concurs.
The observations of responsible forest officials are most revealing of their zeal to promote forest
conservation and watershed protection especially in Olongapo, Zambales area. In convincing fashion,
they have demonstrated that to declare the forest area involved as a forest reserve rather than open it
for timber exploitation under license and regulation would do more harm than good to the public
interest. To convert the area into a forest reserve without an adequate forest protection force, would
make of it a Tree Zone and Logging Paradise, to the ever Problem Loggers of Dinalupihan, Bataan . . .
an open target of timber smugglers, kaingineros and other forms of forest vandals and despoilers. On
the other hand, to award the area, as planned, to a reputable and responsible licensee who shall
conduct logging operations therein under the selective logging method and who shall be obliged to
employ a sufficient number of forest guards to patrol and protect the forest conservation and
watershed protection.
Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry had already conducted a public bidding to
determine the most qualified bidder to whom the area advertised should be awarded. Needless to
stress, the decision of the Director of Forestry to dispose of the area thusly, was arrived at after much
thought and deliberation and after having been convinced that to do so would not adversely affect the
watershed in that sector. The result of the bidding only have to be announced. To be sure, some of the
participating bidders like Mr. Edgardo Pascual, went to much expense in the hope of winning a
309

VOL. 125, OCTOBER 27, 1983
309
virgin forest concession. To suddenly make a turn about of this decision without strong justifiable
grounds, would cause the Bureau of Forestry and this Office no end of embarrassment.
In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the Director of Forestry be allowed to proceed with
the announcement of the results of the bidding for the subject forest area (p. 13, CFI rec.).
The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement dated February 2, 1962, signed by Atty. Juan Cancio,
Acting Legal Officer, respectfully returned to the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources for appropriate action, the papers subject of Forestry Notice No. 2087 which
was referred to the Bureau of Forestry for decision (p. 14, CFI rec.).
Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposals, the area was awarded to herein petitioner-
appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against
this award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for
reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozonwho
succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in officeissued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of
1963, pertinent portions of which state:
xxx xxx xxx
SUBJECT: xx x xx
(D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses.
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the
area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber
licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000 hectares each;
3. This Order shall take effect immediately (p. 267, CFI rec.).
310

310
Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
replacing Secretary Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon assumption of office, he immediately promulgated on
December 19, 1963 General Memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the authority delegated to the
Director of Forestry, under General Memorandum Order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber licenses,
which order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963. Pertinent portions of the said Order read
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963
1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and nature of the work of the Department, the
authority delegated to the Director of Forestry under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May
30, 1963, to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than
3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000
hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the issuance of new licenses and renewals of
licenses, including amendments thereto, shall be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all other previous orders, directives, circulars,
memoranda, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Order are hereby revoked (p. 268, CFI rec.;
italics supplied).
On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963, Ordinary
Timber License No. 20-64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was
signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Office of the
Director of Forestry (p. 30, CFI rec.; p. 77, rec.). It was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources as required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.
On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources
311

VOL. 125, OCTOBER 27, 1983
311
praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao
Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration, O.T.L. No.
20-64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof
was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.
On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial Company, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber License
No. 20-64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued by the Director of
Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio. The dispositive portion of said order reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of the opinion and so holds that O.T. License No. 20-
64 in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan should be, as hereby it is, REVOKED AND DECLARED without
force and effect whatsoever from the issuance thereof.
The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, if
there be any, in the area in question and shall see to it that the appellee shall not introduce any further
improvements thereon pending the disposition of the appeals filed by Ravago Commercial Company and
Jorge Lao Happick in this case (pp. 30-31, CFI rec.).
Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources denied the motion in an Order dated March 25, 1964, wherein this paragraph
appears:
In this connection, it has been observed by the Acting Director of Forestry in his 2nd indorsement of
February 12, 1964, that the area in question composes of water basin overlooking Olongapo, including
the proposed Olongapo Watershed Reservation; and that the United States as well as the Bureau of
Forestry has earmarked this entire watershed for a watershed pilot forest for experiment treatment
concerning erosion and water conservation and flood control in relation to wise utilization of the forest,
denudation, shifting cultivation, increase or decrease of crop harvest of
312

312
agricultural areas influenced by the watershed, etc. . . . . (pp. 38-39, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.).
On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, acting on the separate appeals
filed by Jorge Lao Happick and Ravago Commercial Company, from the order of the Director of Forestry
dated April 15, 1963, awarding to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan the area under Notive No. 2087, and rejecting
the proposals of the other applicants covering the same area, promulgated an order commenting that in
view of the observations of the Director of Forestry just quoted, to grant the area in question to any of
the parties herein, would undoubtedly adversely affect public interest which is paramount to private
interests, and concluding that, for this reason, this Office is of the opinion and so holds, that without
the necessity of discussing the appeals of the herein appellants, the said appeals should be, as hereby
they are, dismissed and this case is considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is concerned (p. 78,
rec.).
On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, petitioner-appellant filed the instant case before the court a quo
(Court of First Instance, Manila), Special Civil Action No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant claims that
the respondents-appellees unlawfully, illegally, whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without
or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing
timber license without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by
depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due process of law, and in effect, by
impairing the obligation of contracts (p. 6, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant prayed for judgment making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents-appellees; declaring the orders of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated March 9, March 25, and April 11, 1964, as well
as all his acts and those of the Director of Forestry implementing said
313

VOL. 125, OCTOBER 27, 1983
313
orders, and all the proceedings in connection therewith, null and void, unlawful and of no force and
effect; ordering the Director of Forestry to renew O.T.L. No. 20-64 upon expiration, and sentencing the
respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the petitioner-appellant the sum of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.000) by way of pecuniary damage, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) by way
of moral and exemplary damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as attorneys fees and costs.
The respondents-appellees separately filed oppositions to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, Ravago Commercial Company, Jorge Lao Happick and Atanacio Mallari, presented petitions
for intervention which were granted, and they too opposed the writ.
The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss dated April 24, 1964, alleges the following grounds: (1)
that the court has no jurisdiction; (2) that the respondents may not be sued without their consent; (3)
that the petitioner has not exhausted all available administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does
not state a cause of action; and (5) that purely administrative and discretionary functions of
administrative officials may not be interfered with by the courts. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources joined the motion to dismiss when in his answer of May 18, 1964, he avers the
following special and affirmative defenses: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2) that the petitioner has no cause of action; (3) that venue is
improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from suit without its consent; (5) that the court has no
power to interfere in purely administrative functions; and (6) that the cancellation of petitioners license
was dictated by public policy (pp. 172-177, rec.). Intervenors also filed their respective answers in
intervention with special and affirmative defenses (pp. 78-79, rec.). A hearing was held on the petition
for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, wherein evidence was submitted by all the parties
including the intervenor, and extensive discussion was held both orally and in writing.
After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the court a quo, from the evidence received, resolved not
only the question on
314

314
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but also the motion to dismiss, declared that the petition
did not state a sufficient cause of action, and dismissed the same accordingly. To justify such action, the
trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, stated that the court feels that the evidence presented
and the extensive discussion on the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction should also be taken into consideration in resolving not only this question but also the motion
to dismiss, because there is no reason to believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments and
evidence (p. 478, CFI rec.). His motion for reconsideration having been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.),
petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this Court.
I
Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court, claiming that the trial court erred in:
(1) holding that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action; and
(2) dismissing the petition [p. 27, rec.].
He argues that the sole issue in the present case is, whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a
sufficient cause of action (p. 31, rec.). Petitioner-appellant, in his brief, presented a lengthy discussion
on the definition of the term cause of action wherein he contended that the three essential elements
thereofnamely, the legal right of the plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the defendants and the act
or omission of the defendant in violation of that rightare satisfied in the averments of this petition
(pp. 31-32, rec.). He invoked the rule that when the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no
cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no
other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde. He further invoked the rule that in a motion
to dismiss based on insufficiency of cause of action, the facts
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315
alleged in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted for the purpose of the motion (pp. 32-33,
rec.).
A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellants contentions are untenable. As
already observed, this case was presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the
petition to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Rule 16 [g], Revised Rules of Court), on the
ground that the timber license relied upon by the petitioner-appellant in his petition was issued by the
Director of Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab initio. This motion supplanted the general
demurrer in an action at law and, as a rule admits, for the purpose of the motion, all facts which are well
pleaded. However, while the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts, the motion does not admit
allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally
impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document
included in the pleadings to be unfounded (Vol. 1, Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed.,
p. 505, citing cases).
It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein answers were interposed and
evidence introduced. In the course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to introduce
evidence in support of the allegations in his petition, which he readily availed of. Consequently, he is
estopped from invoking the rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion to
dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. If there were no hearing held, as in
the case of Cohen vs. U.S. (C.C.A. Minn., 1942, 129 F. 2d 733), where the case was presented to District
Court upon a motion to dismiss because of alleged failure of complaint to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, and no answer was interposed and no evidence introduced, the only facts which the
court could properly consider in passing upon the motion were those facts appearing in the complaint,
supplemented by such facts as the court judicially knew.
In Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado V.
Sanchez, held that
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316
the trial court can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action
even without a hearing, by taking into consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition
thereto. Pertinent portion of said decision is hereby quoted:
Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is lack of cause of action. The Court below granted the
motion, dismissed the petition. The motion to reconsider failed. Offshoot is this appeal.
1. The threshold questions are these: Was the dismissal order issued without any hearing on the
motion to dismiss? Is it void?
WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed on February 1, 1961 and set for hearing on
February 10 following. On February 8, 1961 petitioners counsel telegraphed the court, (r)equest
postponement motion dismissal till written opposition filed. He did not appear at the scheduled
hearing. But on March 4, 1961, he followed up his wire, with his written opposition to the motion to
dismiss. Adverting to the 5-page motion to dismiss and the 6-page opposition thereto, we find that the
arguments pro and con on the question of the boards power to abolish petitioners position minutely
discussed the problem and profusely cited authorities. The May 15, 1961 8-page court order recited at
length the said arguments and concluded that petitioner made no case.
One good reason for the statutory requirement of hearing on a motion as to enable the suitors to
adduce evidence in support of their opposing claims. But here the motion to dismiss is grounded on lack
of cause of action. Existence of a cause of action or lack of it is determined by a reference to the facts
averred in the challenged pleading. The question raised in the motion is purely one of law. This legal
issue was fully discussed in said motion and the opposition thereto. In this posture, oral arguments on
the motion are reduced to an unnecessary ceremony and should be overlooked. And, correctly so,
because the other intendment of the law in requiring hearing on a motion, i.e., to avoid surprises upon
the opposite party and to give to the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion, has
been sufficiently met. And then, courts do not exalt form over substance (italics supplied).
Furthermore, even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to dismiss for insufficiency
of cause of action will be granted if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts
sufficient to defeat the claim
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VOL. 125, OCTOBER 27, 1983
317
enabled the court to go beyond disclosure in the complaint (LOCALS No. 1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512
of the International Longshoremens Association vs. Southern Pacific Co., 6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107;
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952; 131 F. 2d 605). Thus, although the evidence of
the parties were presented on the question of granting or denying petitioner-appellants application for
a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of the
motion to dismiss. Moreover, in applying said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, the
trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, pointed out that, there is no reason to believe that the
parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence (p. 478, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant did not
interpose any objection thereto, nor presented new arguments in his motion for reconsideration (pp.
482-484, CFI rec.). This omission means conformity to said observation, and a waiver of his right to
object, estopping him from raising this question for the first time on appeal. Issues not raised in the
trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (Matienzo vs. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107
SCRA 276).
Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that
the complaint states no cause of action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in
the complaint. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in importance are
made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the
substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced (Vol. 1, Francisco, Civil
Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157, citing cases).
What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the public at large, more particularly the
welfare of the inhabitants of Olongapo City and Zambales province, whose lives and properties are
directly and immediately imperilled by forest denudation.
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The area covered by petitioner-appellants timber license practically comprises the entire Olongapo
watershed (p. 265, CFI rec.). It is of public knowledge that watersheds serves as a defense against soil
erosion and guarantees the steady supply of water. As a matter of general policy, the Philippine
Constitution expressly mandated the conservation and proper utilization of natural resources, which
includes the countrys water shed. Watersheds in the Philippines had been subjected to rampant
abusive treatment due to various unscientific and destructive land use practices. Once lush watersheds
were wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timber cutting by licensed concessionaries and illegal
loggers. This is one reason why, in paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary
timber license it is stated:
The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of
Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so
require (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.).
Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We therefore take judicial notice
of the fact that, on April 30, 1964, the area covered by petitioner-appellants timber license has been
established as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238 by
then President Diosdado Macapagal which in parts read as follows:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1824 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, I,
Diosdado Macapagal, President of the Philippines do hereby withdraw from entry, sale, or settlement
and establish as Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve for watershed, soil protection, and timber
production purposes, subject to private rights, if any there be, under the administration and control of
the Director of Forestry, xx xx the following parcels of land of the public domain situated in the
municipality of Olongapo, province of Zambales, described in the Bureau of Forestry map No. FR-132, to
wit: xx xx (60 O.G. No. 23, 3198).
Petitioner-appellant relies on Ordinary Timber License No. 20-64 (NEW) for his alleged right over the
timber concession
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VOL. 125, OCTOBER 27, 1983
319
in question. He argues thus: The facts alleged in the petition show: (1) the legal right of the petitioner
to log in the area covered by his timber license; (2) the legal or corresponding obligation on the part of
the respondents to give effect, recognize and respect the very timber license they issued to the
petitioner; and (3) the act of the respondents in arbitrarily revoking the timber license of the petitioner
without giving him his day in court and in preventing him from using and enjoying the timber license
issued to him in the regular course of official business (p. 32, rec.).
In the light of petitioner-appellants arguments, it is readily seen that the whole controversy hinges on
the validity or invalidity of his timber license.
WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner-appellants timber license was signed
and released without authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore
void ab initio. WE hereby quote such findings:
In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry
was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not
more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares
(Exhs. 2-A and 2-B Ravago, embodied in Annex B; Exh. B). The petitioner contends that only 1,756
hectares of the said area contain commercial and operable forest; the authority given to the Director of
Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license of not more than 3,000 hectares does not state that the
whole area should be commercial and operable forest. It should be taken into consideration that the
1,756 hectares containing commercial and operable forest must have been distributed in the whole area
of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license states, Please see attached sketch and technical description,
gives an area of 6,420 hectares and does not state what is the area covered of commercial and operable
forest (Exh. 1-Ravago). Also Annex B of the petition, which was marked as Exhibit B, states:
Under Notice No. 2087, a tract of public forest containing 6,420 hectares located in Olongapo,
Zambales was declared available for timber utilization and development. Pursuant to this Notice, there
were received bid proposals from the following persons: x x x x.
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Wherefore, confirming the findings of said Committee, the area described in Notice No. 2087 shall be
awarded, as it is hereby awarded to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, subject to the following conditions: xx xx.
In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no
more authority to grant any license. The license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on
December 19, 1963, and released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 (Exh. 1-Ravago). The authority
delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license was contained in general
memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was revoked by general memorandum order No.
60, which was promulgated on December 19, 1963. In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no
longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab
initio (pp. 479-480, CFI rec.).
The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to
December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of
greatest importance is the date of the release or issuance, and not the date of the signing of the license.
While petitioner-appellants timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was
released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out
by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January
6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license. This is
evident on the face of his petition as supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary Timber
License No. 20-64 (NEW). Thus, in the case of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et
al. (105 Phil. 250, Feb. 28, 1959), this Court held that if from the face of the complaint, as supplemented
by its annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to the properties it claims to have been levied upon
and sold at public auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity, the said complaint
does not give plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same case, this Court further
held that, in acting on a motion to dismiss,
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321
the court cannot separate the complaint from its annexes where it clearly appears that the claim of the
plaintiff to be the owner of the properties in question is predicated on said annexes. Accordingly,
petitioner-appellants petition must be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.
II
Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no
avail as respondents-appellees have failed, neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow
petitioner-appellant to continue operation in the area covered by his timber license. He further alleged
that he has neither recourse by way of appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law except thru this special civil action, as the last official act of the respondent-
appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in declaring void the timber license referred to
above after denying petitioner-appellants motion for reconsideration, is the last administrative act.
Petitioner-appellant relies on the case of Demaisip vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (106 Phil. 237, Sept.
24, 1959), wherein it was held that the failure of the plaintiff to appeal from the adverse decision of the
Secretary to the President cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory
that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is that the
action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by
the latter (Villena vs. the Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451; p. 7, CFI rec.).
To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive
Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the
Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal
the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that
appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his
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322
administrative remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo vs. Fuertes (5 SCRA 399, 400, June 29,
1962), held that:
At any rate, the appellants contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is
the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal
from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the
Director of Lands he had exhausted all the administrative remedies, is untenable.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing
all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take
in an administrative case.
In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps (22 Phil. 491-92, July 22, 1912), this Court stressed the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, thus:
When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of the
government the courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. (Jao Igco vs.
Shuster, 10 Phil. Rep. 448; Ekiu vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 651; U.S. vs. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161; U.S. vs. Ju Toy, 198
U.S. 253; Chiu Yow vs. U.S., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201). The administrative remedies afforded by law must first
be exhausted before resort can be had to the courts, especially when the administrative remedies are by
law exclusive and final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely and absolutely
to the discretion of particular branches of the executive department of the government. When the law
confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive department of the government to dispose of
particular questions, their judgments or the judgments of that particular department are no more
reviewable by the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be reviewed
and modified by them (italics supplied).
Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no
other speedy and adequate remedy (Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In
the case at bar, petitioner-
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323
appellants speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines.
Accordingly, it is settled to the point of being elementary that the only question involved in certiorari is
jurisdiction, either want of jurisdiction or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion shall warrant the
issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari when the same is so grave as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law (F.S. Divinagracia AgroCommercial Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 191 [April 21, 1981]). The foregoing is on the assumption that there is
any irregularity, albeit there is none in the acts or omissions of the respondents-appellees. Certiorari is
not a substitute for appeal as held time and again by this Court (People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465), it
being a time honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must first
exhaust the administrative remedies available (Garcia vs. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 944, April 18, 1969).
Moreover, from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources complained of,
petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appealing therefrom to the Chief Executive. In
other words, before filing the present action for certiorari in the court below, they should have availed
of this administrative remedy and their failure to do so must be deemed fatal to their case [Calo vs.
Fuertes, et al., G.R. No. L-16537, June 29, 1962+. To place petitioners case beyond the pale of this rule,
they must show that their case fallswhich it does notwithin the cases where, in accordance with our
decisions, the aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative remedies within his reach in the ordinary
course of the law [Tapales vs. The President and the Board of Regents of the U.P., G.R. No. L-17532,
March 30, 1963; Mangubat vs. Osmea, G.R. No. L-12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose
Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-11078, May 27, 1959; Pascual vs. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-11959, Oct. 31, 1959;
Marinduque Iron Mines, etc. vs. Secretary of Public
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324
Works, G.R. No. L-15982, May 31, 1963; Alzate vs. Aldaba, G.R. No. L-14407, Feb. 29, 1960 and Demaisip
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-13000, Sept. 25, 1959+ (Ganob vs. Ramas, 27 SCRA 1178, April 28,
1969).
III
Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note that
his action is a suit against the State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot
prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued (Kawananakoa vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs.
U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution).
The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellants timber license, were acting within the
scope of their authority. Petitioner-appellant contends that this case is not a suit against the State but
an application of a sound principle of law whereby administrative decisions or actuations may be
reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the citizens against oppression (p. 122, CFI rec.). But,
piercing the shard of his contention, We find that petitioner-appellants action is just an attempt to
circumvent the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle of law to profit
at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The promotion of public welfare and the
protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights and interest of the State.
Accordingly, the rule establishing State exemption from suits may not be circumvented by directing the
action against the officers of the State instead of against the State itself. In such cases the States
immunity may be validly invoked against the action as long as it can be shown that the suit really affects
the property, rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer nominally made party
defendant (SINCO, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724; see also Angat
River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers Union, G.R. No. L-10943-44, Dec. 28, 1957, 102 Phil.
789, 800-802; Mobil Phil. vs. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 1121-1125;
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VOL. 125, OCTOBER 27, 1983
325
Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association, 1 SCRA 340, 341, 343).
Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their
capacity as officers of the State, representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental
powers. A private individual cannot issue a timber license.
Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in the government losing a
substantial part of its timber resources. This being the case, petitioner-appellants action cannot prosper
unless the State gives its consent to be sued.
IV
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellants timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can
validly revoke his timber license. As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations
included in the ordinary timber license states: The terms and conditions of this license are subject to
change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an
earlier date, when public interests so require (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A timber license is an instrument
by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). In the case of Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal
(56 Phil. 123), it was held that:
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A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder
may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when
public interests so require.
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the
proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug.
30, 1968). The State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and
welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24, 1970).
V
As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director of
Forestry. The utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision
of the Director of Forestry. However, while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative Code provides
that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest only upon license from the
Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to
the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Sec. 79[c],
Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers of
the subordinate officer (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of
control of the Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set
aside acts of subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969; Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148).
Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority to
revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting
evidence, the revocation of petitioner-appellants timber license was a wise exercise of the power of the
respondent-
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327
appellee (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.
Thus, this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as corollary to
which the alleged right to them of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into and
more often than not rejected. We do so again (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate
Our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national patrimony as ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., in the result.
De Castro, J., on leave.
Order affirmed. [Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302(1983)]
G.R. No. 32266. February 27, 1989.*
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner, vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
Land Registration; Public Lands; Public Forests; Mangrove Swamps, Classification Of; Mangrove swamps
are classified as forest lands but said classification is descriptive only of its legal nature and status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.Mangrove swamps or manglares
should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the
aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we
have no authority to ignore or
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* EN BANC.
599

VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 27, 1989
599
Director of Forestry vs. Villareal
modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition
remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive
department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or
unconstitutional, assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The
law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case
that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been
made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it.
And so we shall.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The previous description of mangrove swamps as agricultural lands covers
only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917
became effective.Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural
lands should be understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested
before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively
legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by
the due process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was
much later classified as timberland.
Same; Same; Same; Tax declarations are not sufficient to prove possession and much less prove
ownership in favor of the declarant.Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent
were practically the only basis used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the
land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest
ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases.
Same; Same; Alienable Public Lands; Mangrove Swamps; Mangrove swamps form part of the public
forests and are not alienable under the Constitution.It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to
the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which
remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public
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600
forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the
subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as
alienable agricultural land.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pea & Marcos for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:

The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as
they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the
Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private
ownership. The private respondents claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed
by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the
application was approved by the Court of First Instance of Capiz.1 The decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari
claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks
that the registration be reversed.
________________

1 Record on Appeal, pp. 41-63, Rollo p. 18; Decision penned by Judge Ignacio Debuque.
2 Rollo pp. 15-17; Decision penned by Concepcion, Jr., J., Serrano and San Diego, JJ., concurring.
601

601
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the
land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is the
legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore not
disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before us is
legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier
American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands
were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This
classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it
was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the classification of public
lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even
permitted the legislature to provide for other categories.3 This provision has been reproduced, but with
substantial modifications, in the present Constitution.4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only
agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated.5 Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141.
Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first
reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation. In the leading case of Montano v. Insular
Government,6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglares were defined by the Court as:
x x x mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plants
which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting
their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the
_______________

3 Sec. 10, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution.
4 Sec. 3, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
5 Sec. 1, Art. XIII, 1935 Constitution.
6 12 Phil. 572.
602

602
mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent cultivated by
man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa
palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that
they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in general
American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation, and
they may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom had grown of
converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along
the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive
industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public
disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that
mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code
of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined.For the purpose of this chapter public forest includes,
except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove
swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the
Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry:7
x x x the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act (Act of
Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this translation and that a better transla-
_______________

7 39 Phil. 560.
603

603
tion would be terrenos madereros. Timber land in English means land with trees growing on it. The
manglar plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs
or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called timber land.
xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the general
character of the land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase
agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term forestry under the Spanish law, the Act of
Congress of July 1st, 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or
agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural
public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot
affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have considered them
agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act
No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias,8 promulgated on
March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice
Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the application there are
mangrove lands as shown in his opponents Exh. I, but we think this opposition of the Director of
_______________

8 58 Phil. 21.
604

604
Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest
lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and
Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry,9 with Justice
Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even
quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:
x x x Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and
sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do
not convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of
the public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan,10 the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated
the ruling in the Mapa case that all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the contrary
view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled
that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming
part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,13 the Court was more positive when it
held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
_______________

9 79 SCRA 130.
10 151 SCRA 88.
11 79 SCRA 461.
12 123 SCRA 441.
13 126 SCRA 69.
605

605
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is
not thickly forested but is a mangrove swamps. Although conceding that a mangrove swamp is
included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as
first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot
885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the
property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was
already private land better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
Forested lands do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classsified as forest is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court,14 where this Court agreed with
the Solicitor Generals submission that the land in dispute, which he described as swamp mangrove or
forestal land, were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve
days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical
pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove
_______________

14 151 SCRA 679.
606

606
swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the
authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is
now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made such
implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer our
public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed and in
accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid
down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being
correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other,
pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural
resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of
making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time
to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or
open to disposition shall be
607

607
classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar
manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reservesRevocation of same.Upon the recommendation
of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, the President of the Philippines
may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the
establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not
be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be
administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of
any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such proclamation, and upon such revocation such
forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been
made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes.Lands in public forest, not including
forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and
more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be
kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the
Philippines as de-
608

608
fined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so
determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise
of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is
accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been
challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional, assuming the requisite conditions, to justify
our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We
repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands
is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul
it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be
understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest
lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due process
clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,15
where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later
classified as timber-land.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps
of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from
1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse
possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of his application
for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land
pursuant to the certification the Director of
_______________

15 G.R. No. L-46048, November 29, 1988.
609

609
Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of
Lands,16 to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of
such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into
agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly inofficious. The Director of Lands was
not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the
authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as
a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or
forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of
Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales
patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands
forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and
not released for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the forest land has been declared
alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter how long cannot convert it into private
property.
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricul-
_______________

16 Brief for the Applicant-Appellee, pp. 5-6, Rollo, p. 20.
610

610
tural in nature, the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably
meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of
the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the fact
that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that
the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land
has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty years as
required by the Spanish Mortgage Law.17 These matters are not presumed but must be established with
definite proof, which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis used
by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax declarations
are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant,
as we have held in countless cases.18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the
subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or
manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the
Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as
forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
________________

17 Republic of the Philippines v. CA and Miguel, G.R. No. L-60847, May 21, 1988, citing Director of Lands
v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, Fernandez Hermanos v. Director of Lands, 57 Phil. 929, Querol v. Querol, 48 Phil.
90; Archbishop of Manila v. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593 and Carino v. Insular Government, 8 Phil. 150.
18 J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Villanueva, 104 Phil. 643; Masaganda v. Argamosa, 109 SCRA 53; Director
of Lands v. C.A., 133 SCRA 701; De Guzman, v. C.A., 148 SCRA 75.
611

611
People vs. Tachado
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of
title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Corts, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan (C.J.), no partmy brother-in-law is part of the law firm representing respondent.
Decision set aside. [Director of Forestry vs. Villareal, 170 SCRA 598(1989)]
G.R. No. 88883. January 18, 1991.*
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LIWAN CONSI,
respondents.
Land Titles and Deeds; Mineral Lands; Property; Ownership; For all physical purposes of ownership, the
owner is not required to secure a patent, as long as he complies with the provisions of mining laws.It
is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek
Mining Corporation case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a
patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all
practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent (Republic v. Court of Appeals,
160 SCRA 228 [1988]). In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has
faithfully complied with all the requirements of the law regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia
Mineral Claim.
_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.
72

72
Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; Acquisitive Prescription; Since the subject lot is mineral land, private
respondents possession thereof no matter how long did not confer upon him possessory rights over the
same.It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question
by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935
prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested
rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the
private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by
them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes (Ibid.). On the matter of
possession, private respondent contends that his predecessor-in-interest has been in possession of said
lot even before the war and has in fact cultivated the same. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,
160 SCRA 288 1988, this Court held: x x x even if it be assumed that the predecessor-in-interest of the
de la Rosas had already been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the
concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The
property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the
rights of the mining locators nor where they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the
mining of the land. x x x. Since the subject lot is mineral land, private respondents possession of the
subject lot no matter how long did not confer upon him possessory rights over the same.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Mario C.V. Jalandoni for petitioner.
Joy B. Labiaga for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside; (a) the decision** of the
Court of Appeals dated March 13, 1989 in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 13528 entitled Liwan Consi vs. Hon. Judge
Ruben C. Ayson, et al. declaring that
_______________

** Penned by Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo concurred in by Justices Jose A.R. Melo and Nicolas P. Lapea,
Jr.
73

VOL. 193, JANUARY 18, 1991
73
both the petitioner and private respondent hold possessory titles to the land in question, and (b) the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located
sometime between December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1930, a period of six (6) days, by A.I. Reynolds
in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better known as the Philippine
Bill of 1902, in a so-called Declaration of Location. The said Declaration of Location of mineral claim was
duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime on January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim,
together with other mineral claims, was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Company, the earlier
corporate name of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc. (Atok for short; herein petitioner) in a Deed of
Sale executed on November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok has been in continuous and exclusive
ownership and possession of said claim up to the present (Rollo, Annex B, p. 21).
Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim. The Fredia mineral claim
together with other mineral claims owned by Atok has been declared under Tax Declaration No. 9535
and that in view of Presidential Decree No. 1214 an application for lease was filed by Atok covering the
Fredia mineral claim (Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a lot below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at
Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a house thereon sometime in 1964. The lot is covered by
Tax Declaration No. 9462. When he first constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay he was told
that it was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one
prohibited him from entering the land so he was constructing a house thereon. It was only in January
1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the said house that people came to take pictures and told
him that the lot belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi has been paying taxes on said land which his
father before him had occupied (Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of Atok, that a
construction was
74

74
being undertaken at the area of the Fredia mineral claim by private respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano
Reyes instructed the cashier to go and take pictures of the construction. Feliciano Reyes himself and
other security gaurds went to the place of the construction to verify and then to the police to report the
matter (Rollo, Ibid.).
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Liwan Consi (Rollo,
Annex C, p. 32).
On January 29, 1987, after due hearing, the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon, presided over by Judge
Irving rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this case against Liwan Consi is hereby ordered dismissed. (Rollo, Annex A, p. 20).
Petitioner ATOK appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet, Branch
VI, presided over by Judge Ruben Ayson (Rollo, Petition, p. 3). On December 5, 1987, the RTC rendered
its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon dated
January 29, 1987 appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and a new one entered in its place
ordering the defendant Liwan Consi and all those claiming under him to vacate the premises of the
Fredia Mineral claim at Tuding, Itogon, Benguet immediately, and to restore possession thereof to the
plaintiff Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The defendant, Liwan Consi, is further ordered to remove and demolish his house constructed in the
premises of the land of Fredia mineral claim at Tuding, Benguet, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30).
From said decision, Liwan Consi filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review (Rollo, Petition, p.
4). On March 13, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the subject forcible entry action. Costs against
private respondent.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex C, p. 48).
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VOL. 193, JANUARY 18, 1991
75
The Court of Appeals further ruled in part to wit:
The determination of whether the subject lot is mineral land or agricultural awaits the decision of the
Secretary of Natural Resources in a proceeding called for that purpose. Thus, there is a chance that the
subject property may be classified as alienable agricultural land. At any rate, the mining company may
not so readily describe Liwan Consi as a squatter as he also has possessory rights over the property.
Such rights may mature into ownership on the basis of long-term possession under the Public Land Law.
Thus it is Our holding, that both Consi and ATOK are of equal legal footing with regards the subject lot.
Both hold possessory titles to the land in questionthe petitioner through his long term occupancy of
the same; the respondent mining firm by virtue of its being the claim locator and applicant for a lease on
the mineral claim within which the subject lot is found. But it was established that the petitioner has
been in actual and beneficial possession of the subject lot since before the Second World War in the
concept of owner and in good faith. (Rollo, Annex C, pp. 47-48).
On June 16, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner ATOK
(Rollo, Annex D, p. 50).
Hence, the petition.
The main issue in this case is whether or not an individuals long term occupation of land of the public
domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim.
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek
Mining Corporation case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a
patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all
practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent (Republic v. Court of Appeals,
160 SCRA 228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with
all the requirements of the law regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to
76

76
mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the
locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any
further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become
the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and
Atok (Ibid.).
As in the instant petition, the record shows that the lot in question was acquired through a Deed of Sale
executed between Atok and Fredia Mineral Claim.
The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public
domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent
therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid
location of mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public and the property of the locator.
When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the
right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface
ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral
right of adjoining locators; and this is the locators right before as well as after the issuance of the
patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the
mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues. (St. Louis Mining & Mineral Co. v.
Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 605, 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322)
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue
of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited
the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing
at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them
and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes (Ibid).
On the matter of possession, private respondent contends that his predecessor-in-interest has been in
possession of said lot even before the war and has in fact cultivated the same.
77

VOL. 193, JANUARY 18, 1991
77
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 288 1988, this Court held:
x x x even if it be assumed that the predecessor-in-interest of the de la Rosas had already been in
possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim
but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they are
claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the rights of the mining locators nor where they
seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. x x x.
Since the subject lot is mineral land, private respondents possession of the subject lot no matter how
long did not confer upon him possessory rights over the same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities
except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the
dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal,
the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings.
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has been in continuuous and exclusive possession of the
Fredia mineral claim while private respondents possession started only sometime in 1964 when he
constructed a house thereon. Clearly, ATOK has superior possessory rights than private respondent,
Liwan Consi, the former being the one longer in possession.
It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it was really petitioner who was in actual physical
possession of the property. Having been deprived of this possession by the private respondent,
petitioner has every right to sue for ejectment.
With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be declared and held that petitioner Atok has the
exclusive right to the property in question.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 13,
78

78
Galido vs. Commission on Elections
1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet
dated June 16, 1989 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., No part, petitioner used to be my client before my appointment to the Court.
Petition granted; decision reversed and set aside. [Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
193 SCRA 71(1991)]
G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997.*
SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE BUENAVENTURA,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J.
PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and other DOES,
respondents.
Natural Resources; Land Registration; Land Titles; Regalian Doctrine; Before the Treaty of Paris on April
11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and
dominion of the Spanish Crown, hence, private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal
concessions.The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th
century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest
were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of
land could only be acquired through royal concessions which were documented in various forms, such
as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant, (2) Concesion Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title
by Purchase; and, (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish
Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
Same; Same; Same; Laches; It is a trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to
include certain properties in a reservation for provincial park purposes when the question should have
been raised 83 years ago.Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in
interest were in open, adverse and continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to their
registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only in December 1913, the very same year they
were acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously, in February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were
surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government had already surveyed the area in preparation for its
reservation for provincial
_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.
393

VOL. 266, JANUARY 21, 1997
393
Palomo vs. Court of Appeals
park purposes. If the petitioners predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a
number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have undoubtedly known about the
inclusion of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this point to argue
that the government had no right to include these properties in the reservation when the question
should have been raised 83 years ago.
Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; The principle of estoppel does not operate against the Government for
the acts of its agents.As regards the petitioners contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles
without government opposition, the government is now estopped from questioning the validity of the
certificates of title which were granted. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals,
the principle of estoppel does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents.
Same; Same; Same; The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.Assuming that the decrees of
the Court of First Instance were readily issued, the lands are still not capable of appropriation. The
adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases
applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.
Same; Same; Same; It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons.It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land
cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable.
Same; Same; Same; Tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land
inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in
land registration cases.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to
oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification for petitioners to plead good faith
394

394
in introducing improvements on the lot.Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to
the matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis
that Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time the lands in question were surveyed for
Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands were covered under the
reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch
as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299
filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 1948 contains the following note, in conflict with
provincial reservation. In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the
government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification for the petitioners to
plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Alfredo E. Kallos for petitioners.
ROMERO, J.:

The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay which form part of
the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park. The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, William Cameron Forbes issued
Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park purposes some 440,530 square meters of land
situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of
the Philippine Commission.1
_______________

1 Act 648 of the Philippine Commission entitled, An Act authorizing the Governor-General to reserve
for civil public purposes and from sale or settlement, any part of the public domain not appropriated by
law for special public purposes, unless otherwise
395

VOL. 266, JANUARY 21, 1997
395
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District, United States of America,
ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego
Palomo on December 9, 1916;2 December 28, 1916;3 and January 17, 1917.4 Diego Palomo donated
these parcels of land consisting of 74,872 square meters which were allegedly covered by Original
Certificate of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 1735 to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen
Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.6
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio
Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950.7 The
Register of Deeds of
_______________

directed by law and extending provisions of Act Numbered 627 so that public lands desired to be
reserved by the Insular Government for public use, or private lands desired to be purchased by the
Insular Government for such uses, may be brought under the operation of Land Registration.
2 As shown by Expediente No. 7, GLRO Record 9822 which became the basis for the issuance of alleged
OCT No. 1955 (169) and Expediente No. 10 GLRO Record 9868. It should be noted however that the
Register of the Deeds does not have any record of any OCT issued pursuant to GLRO Record 9868.
3 As shown by Expediente No. 6, GLRO record 9821 which became the basis for the issuance of the
alleged OCT No. RO-1956 (173) and Expediente No. 8 GLRO Record 9823 which became the basis for the
issuance of alleged OCT No. RO 1954 (176).
4 As shown by Expediente No. 5 which became the basis for the issuance of alleged OCT No. RO 1953
(513).
5 OCT 513 covered Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of Plan II-9299 while OCT 169, 176 and
173 covered Lot Nos. 2, 1 and 3 of Plan II-9205. Another alleged OCT with an unspecified number
covered Lot No. 4 of Plan II-9205.
6 Exh. 21.
7 Exhs. B.
396

396
Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912,3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953.8
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced
by Executive Order No. 40 into the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park, under the control, management,
protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the
Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public
Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon9 and
introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner
Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels
of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the
Philippine Islands.
In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad
Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First Instance of Albay for Injunction with
damages against private respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado,
_______________

8 TCT 3911 (Exh 1-A) originated from OCT No. RO-1953 (513) (Exh 1); TCT 3912 (Exh 2-A) originated from
OCT No. RO 1954 (176) [Exh 2] while TCT 3913 (Exh. 3-A) originated from OCT No. RO 1955 (169) [Exh 3]
and TCT No. 3914 (Exh 4-A) originated from OCT No. RO-1956 (173) [Exh 4].
9 Aside from tax receipts marked as Exh. 9-U to 9-H covering the years 1977, 1983 and 1984, tax
declaration Nos. 1838, 1528, 1527, 1526, 1536, 1840, 1835, 1842, 1833, 1841, 1832, 1834 and 1839
marked as Exh 6, 6-A to 6-L, also presented in evidence marked as Exh 19 was a Certificate of
Appreciation awarded by the Province of Albay in 1956 to petitioner Ignacio Palomo for prompt and up
to date payment of tax obligations.
397

VOL. 266, JANUARY 21, 1997
397
Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development who entered the land covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut down bamboos
thereat, totally leveling no less than 4 groves worth not less than P2,000.00.
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for annulment and
cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the
petitioners and subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded with the petitioners as defendants were the Bank
of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi Branch and the Register of Deeds of Albay.
The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was dismissed because the loan of P200,000 with the
Bank was already paid and the mortgage in its favor cancelled.
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted upon agreement of the parties and on July 31,
1986, the trial court rendered the following decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, dismissing the complaint
for injunction and damages, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated September 14, 1953, as well as the
Original Certificate of Titles Nos. 153,10 169, 173 and 176 and Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911,
T-3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the Register of Deeds of Albay and all transactions based on said titles.
(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all improvements on the lands in question
that are found therein and introduced by the defendants;
________________

10 Should be OCT 513.
398

398
(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, Plan II-9299 and Lots 1, 21,11 3 and 4 of Plan
II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park;
(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered to cancel the alleged Original
Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and 176, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T-
3913 and T-3914.
Costs against the defendants.
So Ordered.12
The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no sufficient proof that the Palomos have established
property rights over the parcels of land in question before the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-
American War at the end of the century. The court further stated that assuming that the decrees of the
Court of First Instance of Albay were really issued, the Palomos obtained no right at all over the
properties because these were issued only when Executive Order No. 40 was already in force. At this
point, we take note that although the Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands appointed as one of the
Commissioners in the relocation survey of the properties stated in his reamended report that of the
3,384 square meters covered by Lot 2, Plan II-9205, only 1,976, square meters fall within the reservation
area,13 the RTC ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205 cancelled.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the findings of the lower Court;
hence this petition raising the following issues:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming in toto the
decision of the lower court.
________________

11 Should be Lot 2.
12 Rollo, pp. 63-64.
13 Records, p. 62. The Republic, in fact, never claimed the entire 3,384 square meters as shown by the
Relocation Plan of II-6679 (marked as Exh H-3-T) when surveyed for Civil Case T-143 and 176.
399

VOL. 266, JANUARY 21, 1997
399
2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates of title and subsequent transfer certificates of
titles of the petitioners over the properties in question is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the
matter.
3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by the petitioners in the premises in favor of the
government is against our existing law and jurisprudence.
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not the alleged original certificate of titles issued
pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in
1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the
19th century recognized the property rights of Spanish and Filipino citizens and the American
government had no inherent power to confiscate properties of private citizens and declare them part of
any kind of government reservation. They allege that their predecessors in interest have been in open,
adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years prior to their registration in
1916-1917. Hence, the reservation of the lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then Governor-
General Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of private property without due process of law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number of decisions of the Court of First
Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America which state that the
predecessors in interest of the petitioners father Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open and adverse
possession of the lands from 20 to 50 years at the time of their registration in 1916.
We are not convinced.
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before the
Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the
exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could
400

400
only be acquired through royal concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo
Real or Royal Grant, (2) Concesion Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase;
and, (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage
Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners predecessors in interest derived title from
an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon the declarations in Expediente No. 5,
G.L.R.O. Record Decision No. 9820, dated January 17, 1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9821,
dated December 28, 1916; Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O Record No. 9822, dated December 9, 1916;
Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823, dated December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of
the United States of America presided by Judge Isidro Paredes that their predecessors in interest were in
open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years.14 The aforesaid
decisions of the Court of First Instance, however, were not signed by the judge but were merely
certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of court.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse
and continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the
lands were surveyed only in December 1913, the very same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo.
Curiously, in February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the
government had already surveyed the area in preparation for its reservation for provincial park
purposes. If the petitioners predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a
number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have undoubtedly known about the
inclusion of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a
_______________

14 Exhibits 14, 15, 15-A, 16, 16-A, 17, 18, 18-A.
401

VOL. 266, JANUARY 21, 1997
401
trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to include these properties in the
reservation when the question should have been raised 83 years ago.
As regards the petitioners contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles without government
opposition, the government is now estopped from questioning the validity of the certificates of title
which were granted. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of
estoppel does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents.15
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were readily issued, the lands are still not
capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. As
testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were
never declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the
present.16 Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the
forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into
private property,17 unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
_______________

15 Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110 (1974); Cruz v. CA, 194 SCRA 145; Sharp
International Marketing v. CA, 201 SCRA 299; Republic v. IAC, 209 SCRA 90; GSIS v. CA, 218 SCRA 233.
16 TSN, 27 September 1977, pp. 18-19.
17 Vano v. Government of P.I. 41 P 161 [1920]; Li Seng Giap y Cia v. Director, 55 Phil. 693 [1931];
Fernandez Hnos. v. Director, 57 Phil. 929 [1931]; Military Reservations v. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238 [1973];
Republic v. CA, 154 SCRA 476; Vallarta v. IAC, 152 SCRA 679; Director of Forest Administration v.
Fernandez, 192 SCRA 121.
402

402
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land
inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in
land registration cases.18
Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of
improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was
already in force at the time the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also
apparently knew that the subject lands were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition
for reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work Order
Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas in
1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated
September 11, 194819 contains the following note, in conflict with provincial reservation.20 In any
case, petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to oppose the
registration of the lands in question is no justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in
introducing improvements on the lots.
Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the
reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the
bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143,21 were within the perimeter of
________________

18 Reyes v. Sierra, 93 SCRA 472; Masagana v. Argamosa, 109 SCRA 53; Ferrer Lopez v. CA, 150 SCRA 393;
Carag v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313; Director of Lands v. IAC, 195 SCRA 38.
19 Exhibit H-4.
20 Exhibit H-5.
21 Petitioners alleged that 4 bamboo groves in the lots covered by TCT 3913 and/or 3914 were
eradicated by employees of the Office of Parks and Wildlife, now Bureau of Forest and Development.
403

VOL. 266, JANUARY 21, 1997
403
the national park,22 no pronouncement as to damages is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT
3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area falling within the reservation zone.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification. [Palomo vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 392(1997)]
No. L-29675. September 30, 1969.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY,
petitioners, vs. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, JUDGE, Court of First Instance of Baguio City, KOSEN PIRASO,
SAMAY PIRASO, CoTILENG PlRASO, PETER PARAN and MARTINA PlRASO, DAISY PACNOS, SPOUSES
ALBINO REYES and ISABEL SANTA MARIA, and ARTURO TONGSON, respondents.
Land titles; Registration; Republic Act 931; Reopening of proceedings of registration does not apply to
land not the object of cadastral proceeding.Under Republic Act 931, only persons "claiming title to
parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings" are granted the right to petition for a
reopening thereof if the other conditions named therein are successfully met. Therefore, if the parcels
of land were not the object of cadastral proceedings, then this statute finds no application.
Same; Same; Same; Does not apply to parcels of Iand already alienated, reserved, leased or disposed of
by Government.The power of the court to order the reopening of proceedings under Republic Act 931
is limited "to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government.
ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C. Zaballero, Solicitor Rosalio A.
De Leon and Major Santiago O. Tomelden (Staff Judge Advocate, PMA) for petitioner.
Crisologo Law Office for respondent Arturo Tongson.
Raul L. Correa and Francisco Ventura for respondents spouses Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria.
Luis R. Gaduang for respondents Kosen Piraso, et al.
FERNANDO, J.:

It is by statute provided that all persons "claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of
cadastral proceedings" in actual possession of the same at the time
518

518
Republic vs. Marcos
of the survey but unable for some justifiable reason to file their claim in the proper court during the
time limit established by law, "in case such parcels of land on account of their failure to file such claims,
have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings"
Instituted within the fortyyear period next preceding June 20, 1953, the time of the approval of this
particular enactment, are granted "the right within five years" from said date to petition for a reopening
of the judicial proceedings but "only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alien-
ated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
Government, x x x."1
The jurisdiction of respondent Judge Pio R, Marcos to act in accordance with Republic Act No. 931 in
connection with the petition for a reopening filed by respondent Kosen
________________

1 Republic Act No. 931 specifically provides: "Section 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that
have been the object of cadastral proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in actual possession
of the same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper court
during the time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file
such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the. public domain, by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted
the right within five years after the date on which this Act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of
the judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as
amended, only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased,
granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, and the competent
Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government, through the Solicitor
General, and if after .hearing the parties, said court shall find that all conditions herein established have
been complied with, and that all taxes, interests and penalties thereof have been paid from the time
when land tax should have been collected until the day when the motion is presented, it shall order said
judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken on such parcels." Under Republic Act No.
2061, an Act approved on June 30, 1968, the period for the reopening of judicial proceedings under the
above statute was extended to December 31, 1968.
519

VOL. 29, SEPTEMBER 30, 1969
519
Republic vs. Marcos
Piraso, joined by his kinsmen, likewise respondents, all surnamed Piraso, is assailed in this certiorari and
prohibition proceeding, included in which are the other respondents, Daisy Pacnos and the spouses
Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria, petitioners being the Republic of the Philippines and the
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy.
In the language of the petition: "This is an original action for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court whereby herein petitioners seek to annul and
set aside: (1) The Order, dated July 13, 1967 x x x denying the Motion to Dismiss dated January 26, 1967
filed by the City Fiscal of Baguio City in behalf of oppositors-government agencies, and thus insisting on
assuming jurisdiction over the case (without the requisite publication in the Official Gazette of the
petition) and over the subject matter (a military reservation); (2) The Decision, dated October 7, 1967 x x
x decreeing the registration of a parcel of land with an area of 28,215.58 square meters x x x within the
so-called 'U.S. Fleet Naval Reservation Center' in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos; (3) The Order of
August 2, 1968 x x x which in effect denied the Motion to Annul Decision dated February 9, 1968 filed by
the Solicitor General, and instead ordered the issuance of a decree over the same parcel of land in favor
of respondent Albino Reyes; x x x and (4) The Order, dated August 24, 1968 x x x allowing respondents
Kosen Piraso, et al. to adduce their evidence of alleged ownership x x x, all issued in Civil Reservation
Case No. 1, LRC Record No. 211 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, entitled In the Matter of the
Petition for Reopening of Judicial Proceedings, Kosen Piraso, et al., petitioners'."2
It was likewise therein alleged that Civil Reservation Case No. 1 "settled the ownership, private and
public, of the Baguio townsite, terminating with the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City
dated Novem-
________________

2 Petition, pp. 1-2.
520

520
Republic vs. Marcos
ber 13, 1922."3 Prior to said case, however, a military reservation known as the U.S. Fleet Naval
Rehabilitation Center consisting- of Lots 140 and 141 of the Baguio' Cadastre with an aggregate area of
29 hectares, more or less, was set aside pursuant to Executive Order No. 1254 of October 10. 1910,
issued by the then President William Howard Taft of the United States, as attested by Proclamation No.
114 of the then Governor-General W. Cameron Forbes, and Executive Order No. 5139 of June 19, 1929,
issued by the then President Herbert Hoover, as attested by Proclamation No, 260 of the then Governor-
General Dwight F. Davis. After independence, the United States relinquished to the Republic of the
Philippines all claims to title over the military bases including the aforesaid lots, their relinquishment
being formalized by an agreement of December 6, 1956.4 Then came this categorical assertion in the
petition that the land involved in this proceeding "is limited to what is admittedly, and by
unquestionable proof, within the so-called U.S. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center, Lots 140 and 141,
Baguio Cadastre."5
From a summary of the facts appearing in the Petition, the need for including the other respondents
was made clear. It was therein set forth that on May 21, 1965 the Pirasos, respondents herein, relying
on the controlling statute set forth at the opening of this opinion, sought the reopening of Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Rec. No. 211 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, praying for the
issuance in their favor of title to a parcel of land designated as LRC-SWO-6132 (Lots 140 and 141, Baguio
Cadastre) consisting of 290,283 square meters, more or less, situated in Baguio City. On September 11,
1965, respondent Daisy Pacnos filed an opposition. She sought in a pleading dated March 14, 1966 to be
allowed to introduce evidence to prove her alleged right to registration of a portion of the land,
consisting of an area of
________________

3 Ibid., p. 2.
4 Ibid., Annexes A, B, B-1 & C.
5 Ibid., p. 3.
521

521
Republic vs. Marcos
28,215.52 square meters, subject of the proceedings. This motion was granted in an order of the
respondent Judge dated May 16, 1966.
On January 26, 1967, the First Assistant City Fiscal of Baguio City, in behalf of all the government
agenciesoppositors, filed a motion to dismiss the main petition and other related petitions, alleging
thereto the following grounds: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition; (2) that the causes of action alleged in the petition are barred by prior judgment or by the
statute of limitations; (3) that the petition states no cause of action.
On July 13, 1967, the respondent Judge denied the said motion to dismiss. Then came on October 7,
1967, a decision by respondent judge, decreeing the registration of a portion of the land (28,215.58
square meters of Lot 140, Baguio Cadastre), subject matter of the Pirasos' petition in favor of
respondent Daisy Pacnos. The Solicitor General received his copy of this decision on December 4, 1967.
There was a motion. for reconsideration filed by the City Attorney of Baguio of December 9, 1967,
denied by respondent Judge on December 15, as "having been filed out of time."
On January 3, 1968, the City Fiscal of Baguio City joined by petitioner Superintendent of the Military
Academy and the Director of Lands jointly filed a notice of appeal. There was on February 7, 1968, an ex
parte motion for extension of time to submit a record on appeal, An opposition thereto was filed by
counsel for respondent Daisy Pacnos. On February 15, 1968, the Solicitor General f iled a motion to
annul the decision dated October 7, 1967, based on lack of jurisdiction.
On August 2, 1968, respondent Albino Reyes filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a decree in his
favor, having previously manif fested to respondent Judge that respondent Daisy Pacnos had transferred
her right to him. On the same day, respondent Judge issued an order con-
522

522
Republic vs. Marcos
sidering that the motions for reconsideration and the motion to annul decision filed by the Solicitor
General and other government lawyers "have been rendered academic and of no moment on account of
the filing of the notice of appeal on January 3, 1968," but in his opinion of no avail the time to do so
having lapsed. Moreover, no record on appeal was submitted. He likewise directed in said order the
issuance of a decree to respondent "Albino Reyes, married to Isabel Sta. Maria, Filipino, with residence
at Dagupan City," Another order specifically to that effect came from respondent Judge on the day in
question. The last order of pertinence to this petition came from respondent Judge on August 24, 1968,
setting for hearing on September 11, 1968 the claim of the respondents, surnamed Piraso.
Then on October 18, 1968 came this petition for certiorari and prohibition. The next day, this Court
adopted a resolution requiring respondents to file within ten days from notice an answer, not a motion
to dismiss. A preliminary injunction was likewise issued without bond.
Subsequently, on November 8, 1968, the petitioners, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion for
leave to amend the petition, alleging that the property, "subject matter of the case which respondent
Daisy Pacnos succeeded in obtaining a favorable judgment of registration x x x and which respondents
Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria subsequently succeeded in securing a decree of registration" was
thereafter transferred on August 16, 1968 to one Arturo Tongson, who, thereby, would be affected by
the outcome of the petition. The proposed amendment, according to this motion, would consist of his
inclusion as one of the respondents. Accompanying his pleading is the amended petition for certiorari
and prohibition. On November 21, 1968, we adopted a resolution in the following tenor: "The motion of
the Solicitor General for leave to amend petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction in L-29675 (Republic of the Philippines, et al. vs. Hon. Pio R. Marcos, etc..
523

523
Republic vs. Marcos
et al.), is [Granted]; the amended petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for preliminary
injunction is hereby accepted. Respondent Arturo Tongson is required to file, within 10 days from notice
hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss) to said amended petition."
In the meanwhile, even before the motion for leave to file amended petition was filed, respondents, the
Pirasos, submitted their answer on November 4, 1968. To the assertion in the petition, fundamental in
character, that the reopening sought by private respondents refers to lands "admittedly and by
unquestionable proof, within the socalled U.S. Fleet Naval Reservation Center," the Pirasos answered in
this wise: "The land in question is not a military reservation under the Republic of the Philippines
although it was formerly reserved and placed under the control of the Navy Department for the use as
Naval Hospital and for other purposes of the Navy during the American regime (U.S. Government)
pursuant to Executive Order No. 5139 (Annex 'B' of the petition), and was subsequently released or
turned over to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the U.S.-Philippine
Military Bases Agreement on Dec. 6, 1956 but the same has not been reserved for military purposes by
the Republic of the Philippines."6 They would hedge further by the disclaimer of any acceptance on their
part that the land subject of the petition forms part of the naval reservation, with the further
qualification that in any event, even if it be admitted that there is such a reservation by the government,
such lot is subject to private rights.
That respondents Pirasos could not very well explicitly deny the allegation that the lot in question forms
part of the naval reservation is quite apparent from its memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument
filed on April 7, 1969, wherein in disputing the point raised by petitioners that the lower court acted
without jurisdiction,
________________

6 Answer of respondents Pirasos, p. 4.
524

524
Republic vs. Marcos
they stated the following: "Contrary to the allegation of the City Attorney, we humbly state categorically
that the land involved In this case is no longer a reservation in its strict sense. It ceased to be a Naval
Reservation of the United States of America upon the termination of its sovereignty over the islands. It
was f ormerly reserved and placed under the control of the U.S. Naval Department for the use of Naval
Hospital and for other purposes of the Navy during the American Regime (U.S. Government) pursuant to
Executive Order No. 5139 (Annex 'B" of the petition), and was subsequently released or turned over to
the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases
Agreement on December 6, 1956, The said parcel of land (Lot 140 of the Baguio City Cadastre) until this
time was not reserved for military purposes by the Republic of the Philippines."7
The answer of respondents, Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria, to the amended petition filed on
November 21, 1968, expressly admits what petitioners so emphatically insist on that this petition before
us "is limited to what is admittedly, and by unquestionable proof, within the so-called U.S. Fleet Naval
Rehabilitation Center, Lots 140 and 141, Baguio Cadastre."8 For the first paragraph. of their answer is
explicitly worded thus: "1. That they admit the allegations of the Petition with respect to the Nature of
the Case x x x and with respect to the Parties and Jurisdictional Averments x x x."9 The above assertion
of the petitioner was thus given confirmity by respondents Reyes and Santamaria. Nonetheless, they
would seek to blunt the force of their admission by alleging: "That they deny the allegations in par. V-A-
1 of the Petition, the truth being that the land In question, particularly the area decreed in the name of
the answering respondents, is not part of a military reservation. The proclamation declaring
________________

7 Memorandum for Respondents, p. 5.
8 Petition, p. 3.
9 Answer of respondents Reyes and Santamaria, par. 1.
525

525
Republic vs. Marcos
certain areas to be naval reservations of the Government of the United States (Annex B of the Petition)
expressly states that such reservations are 'subject to private rights if any there be.' Upon the
Philippines' becoming independent in 1946 the said areas, by virtue of Executive Agreements, reverted
to disposable lands administered by the Bureau of Lands of the Republic of the Philippines."10
There is a similar express admission in the answer filed on December 13, 1968 by respondent Arturo
Tongson, its wording being almost identical with the answer of Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria:
'That in so far as they are borne out by and made part of the records of the case, he admits the
allegations of the Petition with respect to the nature of the case x x x and with respect to the Parties and
Jurisdictional Averments x x x,"11 Again, this particular respondent did attempt to weaken the force of
the above admission by the assertion that the land decreed in favor of respondent Albino Reyes is not
part of the military reservation. He would justify this seeming contradiction thus: "At any rate, when said
areas were turned over to the Philippine Government by virtue of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases
Agreement, the land in question reverted to the disposable lands administered by the Bureau of Lands
of the Republic of the Philippines."12
In the light of the allegation in the petition and the admissions made in the answers of respondents, the
Pirasos, Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria as well as Arturo Tongson, even as sought to be qualified, it
would seem to be fairly obvious that the lots in question sought to be reopened in the proceeding
before respondent Judge Marcos form part and parcel of a naval reservation. It cannot escape attention
that the above private respondents did try by highly sophistical reasoning, invoking distinctions far from
persuasive, to avoid the legal effect of the admissions as to the location of the disputed lots within
________________

10 Ibid., par. 3.
11 Answer of respondent Tongson, par. 1.
12 Ibid., par. 3.
526

526
Republic vs. Marcos
a reservation. They must have realized that unless successful in this attempt, doomed by failure from
the .outset, the facts being- simply against them, the jurisdiction of respondent Court can, as petitioners
have done, be successfully impugned. That is what petitioners did; they must be sustained.
1. Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a, manner far from ambiguous, It is quite explicit and categorical. Only
persons "'claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings" are
granted the right to petition for a reopening' thereof if the other conditions named therein are
successfully met. It cannot admit of doubt, therefore, that if the parcels of land were not the object of
cadastral proceedings, then this statute finds no application. Considering that as far back as October 1,0,
1910, the then President of the United States, William H. Taft, issued an executive order reserving for
naval purposes the lots now disputed, they could not have been the object of the cadastral proceeding
involving the Baguio townsite reservation, decided only on November 13, 1922.13
The Cadastral Act14 was enacted on February 11, 1913, taking effect on its passage. As is made clear in
the first section thereof, when public interest requires that titles to any land be settled and adjudicated,
in the opinion of the then executive, the Governor General, he could order the Director of Lands or a
private surveyor named by the landowners, with the approval of the Director of Lands, to make a survey
and plan of such lands.15 Clearly, it does not include the survey of lands declared as reservations.
An earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903,16 specifically governs the subject matter of reservations. As
provided therein: "All lands or buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within
the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be
________________

13 G.L.R.R. Res. No. 211 (1922).
14 Act No. 2259.
15 Section 1, Act No. 2259.
16 Act No. 627.
527

VOL. 29, SEPTEMBER 30, 1969 52
527
Republic vs. Marcos
military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act, and
such. of said lands, buildings, and interests therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall
become registered land 'in, accordance with the provisions of said Land Registration Act, under the
circumstances hereinafter stated." The validity of this statute was sustained as against the allegation
that there was a violation of the due process clause, in a 1910 decision, Jose v. Commander of the
Philippine Squadron.17
In a 1918 decision, this Court had occasion to indicate clearly that the proceeding under this statute,
while analogous too, is not covered by the Cadastral Act. Thus: "It will thus be seen that Act No. 627
contemplates a sort of cadastral proceeding wherein private owners may be forced to come in and
register their titles, under penalty of forfeiture of all right in the land included in the reservation in case
they fail to act. The validity of a law of this character cannot be questioned; and this court has uniformly
upheld the Act now under consideration."18
What is even more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the part of the private respondents to
seek a reopening under Republic Act No. 931 is our ruling in Government v. Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. a 1926 decision.19 We there explicitly held: "The defendant's contention that the
respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to order the registration of portions of a legally
established military reservation cannot be sustained. The establishment of military reservations is
governed by Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides that All lands
or build-ings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the
areas now or hereafter
________________

17 16 Phil. 62.
18 Archbishop of Manila v. Barrio of Santo Cristo, 39 Phil. 1, 19.
19 49 Phil. 495, 498.
528

528
Republic vs. Marcos
set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the
Land Registration Act, x x x.'"
The conclusion is therefore inescapable that, as contended by petitioners, respondent Judge is devoid of
jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 931.
2. This lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge is made more patent by another specific
restriction of the right of a person to seek reopening under this statute. For the power of the Court to
order such reopening is limited "to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved,
leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government x x x."20
Included in the petition is an executive order of the then President Herbert Hoover of June 19, 1929,
declaring to be a naval reservation of the Government of the United States "that tract of land known as
lot no. 141, residence Section D, Baguio naval reservation. heretofore reserved for naval purposes x x x."
If there were still any lingering doubt, that ought to be removed by this reaffirmation of a presidential
determination, then binding and conclusive as we were under American sovereignty, that the lot in
question should be a naval reservation.
3. The private respondents are thus bereft of any right which. they could assert under Republic Act No.
931. Such, an enactment is the basis of whatever standing that would justify their reliance on the
specific power granted courts of first instance to reopen cadastral proceedings. Such jurisdiction is thus
limited and specific. Unless a party can make it manifest by express language or a clear implication from
the wording of the statute too strong to
_________________

20 Section 1, Republic Act No. 931.
529

VOL. 29, SEPTEMBER, 30 1969
529
Republic vs. Marcos
be resisted, he may "not set in motion the judicial machinery under such specific grant of authority. This,
private respondents have failed to.do as the statute in terms that are crystal clear and free from
ambiguity denies them such a right. Petitioners have made out their case for certiorari and prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the order of respondent Judge
of July 13, 1967, denying the motion to dismiss dated January 26, 1967 filed by the City Fiscal of Baguio
City in behalf of oppositors-government agencies; his decision, dated October 7, 1967, decreeing the
registration of a parcel of land with an area of 28,215.58 square meters within Lot 140, Baguio Cadastre,
or within the so-called "U.S. Fleet Naval Reservation Center" in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos; his
order of August 2, 1968 which in effect denied the motion to annul decision dated February 9, 1968 filed
by the Solicitor General, and instead ordered the issuance of a decree over the same parcel of land in
favor of respondent Albino Reyes; and his order, dated August 24, 1968 allowing respondents Kosen
Piraso. et al. to adduce their evidence of alleged ownership. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted
perpetually restraining respondent Judge from further taking cognizance of and further assuming
jurisdiction over.the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1 LRC Rec. No. 211 as sought by the private
respondents. The preliminary .injunction issued is hereby made permanent. With costs against private
respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on official leave.
Petition granted. [Republic vs. Marcos, 29 SCRA 517(1969)]

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