G.R. No.

150762 January 20, 2006

COVERDALE ABARQUEZ, y EVANGELISTA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review
1
assailing the 23 June 2000 Decision
2
and
the 7 November 2001 Resolution
3
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision
4
of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 ("trial court") in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56.
The trial court found Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista ("Abarquez") guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No.
94-135055.
The Charge
The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and attempted
homicide in two Informations,
5
as follows:
Criminal Case No. 94-135055
The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of
HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y
VILLANUEVA, who has already been charged for the same offense before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, under Crim. Case No. 93-129891 and mutually
helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one RICARDO
QUEJONG Y BELLO, by then and there stabbing him twice with a bladed weapon and
hitting him with a gun at the back, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
6

Criminal Case No. 94-135056
The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of
ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y
VILLANUEVA, who has already been charged for the same offense before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila under Crim. Case No. 93-129892 and mutually
helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of homicide directly by overt
acts, to wit: by then and there holding one JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI and
stabbing him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left arm, but the said
accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the
crime of homicide as a consequence, by reason of causes other than his own
spontaneous desistance, that is, the injury inflicted upon said JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y
UMALI is only slight and not fatal.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
7

Abarquez entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. The cases were tried jointly.
The Version of the Prosecution
On 21 November 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Buenjijo Paz
8
("Paz"), Ricardo Quejong
("Quejong") and their friends were in the house of one Boyet at 3342 San Jose St.,
Sta. Mesa, Manila. They were drinking liquor in celebration of the birthday of
Boyets son. About 7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong decided to go home. Boyet Tong,
Abarquezs son Bardie and Sonito Masula ("Masula") joined Paz and Quejong. They
proceeded towards the exit of San Jose St.
Meanwhile, about six or seven meters away from Boyets house, Alberto Almojuela
also known as Bitoy ("Almojuela"), a certain Ising and Abarquez also known as Dale,
were likewise drinking liquor in front of Almojuelas house. As the group of Paz was
passing towards the main road, Almojuela and his companions blocked their path.
Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?" Paz replied, "Why?" Almojuela got angry and
attacked Paz with a knife. Paz parried the attack with his left arm but sustained an
injury. Abarquez held Paz on both shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz
asked Abarquez, "What is our atraso, we were going home, why did you block our
way?" Abarquez answered, "Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil ka na, tumigil ka
na."
Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation, followed by a
scuffle. Paz tried to get away from Abarquez who continued restraining him. Upon
seeing Almojuela and Quejong fall on the ground, Paz struggled to free himself from
Abarquez. Paz approached Quejong and found him already bloodied. It turned out
the Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull up Quejong but failed.
Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the exit of San Jose St. to ask for help.
While Paz was running away, he heard Abarquez shout, "You left your companion
already wounded!"
When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground.
Almojuela and Abarquez were still in the area. Paz and his companions brought
Quejong to the UST Hospital. They next proceeded to Police Precinct No. 4 to report
the incident. However, there was nobody in the precinct. With Kagawad Villanio
Usorio, Paz went to the WPD General Headquarters to report the incident. At the
WPD General Headquarters, they learned that Quejong died at the UST Hospital.
Paz then had his injury treated by Dr. Vic Managuelod at Jose Reyes Memorial
Hospital. The medico-legal certificate showed that Paz sustained a 3-cm. lacerated
wound on his left forearm.
About 9:15 p.m., while SPO1 Danilo Vidad ("SPO1 Vidad") was at the WPD Homicide
Division, his station received a call from the UST Hospital informing them of the
death of Quejong. SPO1 Vidad and PO3 Ed Co went to the UST Hospital morgue and
investigated the incident. They learned that Almojuela, assisted by Abarquez,
stabbed Quejong. Upon the execution of sworn statements by Paz and Masula,
SPO1 Vidad booked Almojuela and Abarquez for homicide and frustrated homicide
and prepared the referral letter to the inquest prosecutor.
Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station. Almojuela voluntarily
surrendered to one SPO4 Soriano at Police Station No. 10 and was turned over to
the WPD Homicide Division.
Dr. Antonio Rebosa
9
("Dr. Rebosa"), a medico-legal consultant at UST Hospital,
conducted the post-mortem examination and autopsy on Quejong. Dr. Rebosa
reported that Quejong sustained two stab wounds and suffered from massive
hemorrhage due to penetrating stab wounds to the heart and left lung. According
to Dr. Rebosa, a sharp instrument probably caused the wound. Dr. Rebosa also
reported that Quejong sustained abrasions and contusions on the right upper body,
the wrist and on the lower extremities.
The Version of the Defense
Abarquez countered that on 21 November 1993, he was in his residence at 3363
San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. About 7:30 p.m., Almojuelas wife informed him
that the group of Paz was challenging Almojuela to a fistfight. Abarquez, being a
barangay kagawad, proceeded to Almojuelas house. Almojuelas house was about
twenty meters away from Abarquezs house. When he arrived at Almojuelas house,
Abarquez saw Almojuela on the ground being strangled by Quejong. Paz was
holding Almojuelas waist and boxing him at the stomach. Masula was near
Almojuelas head holding a piece of stone as if waiting for a chance to hit him.
Abarquez shouted at the group to stop. The group did not heed Abarquez, forcing
him to fire a warning shot into the air. Still, the group did not heed Abarquez who
then fired a second warning shot. Paz, Quejong, and Masula scampered away.
Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the group of Paz from
smoking marijuana. Almojuela then went inside his house while Abarquez went
home. On his way home, Abarquez met the Chief Tanod of the barangay and two
kagawads. Kagawad Rudy Lego ("Lego") advised him to report the incident to the
police. They all proceeded to Precinct No. 4 where Lego reported the incident to the
desk officer. The desk officer told them that a person had been stabbed. When
Abarquez reached their house, he saw policemen and media men with their
barangay chairman. He informed them that he had just reported the incident. Upon
the request of SPO1 Vidad, Abarquez then went to the police station to shed light
on the incident.
Almojuela testified that he was inside his house when his daughter informed him
that there was marijuana smoke coming to their window. He went outside to look
for the source of the smoke and saw Quejong, Paz, and Masula smoking marijuana.
Almojuela asked the group to move away as there were children inside the house.
He was on his way back to the house when Quejong tried to strangle him. Later,
Almojuela heard a gunshot. He also heard Abarquez shouting, "Tumigil na kayo."
Quejong, Masula, and Paz ran away.
Winfred Evangelista
10
("Evangelista") testified that he was resting in front of his
house when he heard a commotion. He noticed that Paz and Quejong were
quarreling. Evangelista saw Paz kicking Almojuela. Abarquez arrived to break up the
fight but he was told not to interfere. Abarquez was forced to fire a warning shot
and the persons involved in the commotion ran away.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision
11
dated 30 September 1997, the trial court found Abarquez guilty as
an accomplice in the crime of homicide. The trial court held that the prosecution
failed to prove that Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of
Quejong. Hence, Abarquez could not be convicted as a principal in the crime of
homicide. However, the trial court ruled that Abarquez, in holding and restraining
Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed Almojuela to pursue
his criminal act without resistance.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-135055, this Court finds the accused,
Coverdale Abarquez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide only
as accomplice and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor. In
Criminal Case No. 94-135056, the accused is hereby acquitted.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
12

Abarquez appealed the trial courts Decision before the Court of Appeals.
In its Decision
13
of 23 June 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
Decision. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in giving more credence to
the testimony of Paz. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was able to
establish that Abarquez aided Almojuela in fatally stabbing Quejong. The Court of
Appeals rejected Abarquezs allegation that he was merely at the crime scene to
pacify the quarreling parties.
In its 7 November 2001 Resolution,
14
the Court of Appeals denied Abarquezs
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
The issues
15
Abarquez raises before the Court may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt;
2. Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving more
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
Abarquez alleges that the prosecutions evidence does not satisfy the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support his conviction as an accomplice. He further
alleges that there was a misapprehension of facts and that the trial court and the
Court of Appeals reached their conclusion based entirely on speculation, surmises
and conjectures. Abarquez also assails the credibility of the witnesses against him.
The Ruling of This Court
The petition is meritorious.
The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and
weight of the testimony of a witness. The exception is if the trial court failed to
consider certain facts of substance and value, which if considered, might affect the
result of the case.
16
This case is an exception to the rule.
Concurrence in Criminal Design
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who,
not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts."
17

Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice: (1)
community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with,
the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance
by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to
the commission of the crime.
18
Mere commission of an act, which aids the
perpetrator, is not enough.
19
Thus:
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which
cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be
executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the
accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation.
20

Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence of the accused at the
crime scene cannot be interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged.
21

Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly
on the testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by Abarquez on the
shoulders, thus preventing him from helping Quejong who was grappling with
Almojuela. Paz testified:
q. And what happened in the exchange of words or altercations between Bitoy and
Ricardo Quejong?
a. They grappled with each other, sir.
q. When Bitoy and Ricardo grappled with each other, what did you do, if any?
a. I was intending to help Ricky but I was held back by Dale, sir.
q. And how this Dale hold you?
a. He held my two shoulders, sir.
PROSECUTOR F. G. SUPNET:
I would like to make it of record demonstrated being held by the accused holding
both shoulders, your Honor.
q. Now, when this Dale Abarquez held both on your shoulders, what happened
next, if any?
a. He got angry scolding us. While scolding me the two
who were grappling each other walking away, sir. (sic)
q. Now, you said Bitoy and Ricky were moving, what happened in the course of
grappling, if any?
You testified that Ricky and Bitoy were grappling each other, what happened in the
course of grappling? (sic)
a. They fell to the ground, sir.
q. After that what happened next, if any?
a. When I saw them fall I struggle and I was able to release from the hold of Dale
and I approach the two. I saw Ricky blooded so I was trying to pull him, sir. (sic)
q. You said you saw Ricky blooded, why was he blooded? (sic)
a. He was stabbed by Bitoy, sir.
q. And did you see what instrument did Bitoy used in stabbing Ricky or Ricardo?
(sic)
a. It was a knife, sir. (Witness indicating a length about 6 inches including the
handle).
q. Now, you said also that while the two were grappling while you were trying to
free yourself from the hold Dale Abarquez, "Pinagalitan kayo", in what way or
manner did Dale Abarquez reprimanded you? (sic)
a. You Jose is too brave, sir. (sic)
22

xxx xxx xxx
q. You said you were first attacked by Bitoy, is that correct?
a. Yes, sir.
q. After Bitoy pacified Bardy Abarquez, he went after Ricky Quejong, is it not?
23

a. They were just arguing, sir.
[q.] And it was during that time when you were held in both shoulders by the
accused [C]overdale Abarquez?
a. Yes, sir.
q. and that Coverdale Abarquez was infront of you, is it not?
a. Yes, sir on my side.
q. And he was holding your shoulder to pacify you and Bitoy from further
quarrelling you, is it not?
a. That is not the way of pacifying, sir.
q. How can you demonstrate how you were held on the shoulder by Abarquez?
ATTY. GASCON:
Make I make it of record your Honor that the interpreter act as the witness while
the witness act as the accused demonstrating holding both hands of interpreter
preventing the witness and saying Joey tumigil ka na, joey tumigil ka na.
COURT:
q. How many times?
a. Twice, Your Honor.
ATTY. GASCON:
The accused told you Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na because you were trying
to attack Bitoy, is it not?
a. How can I be charged, he was the one holding the knife, sir. (sic)
q. So what was the reason why the accused restrained you and told you Joey
tumigal ka na, Joey tumigil ka na. What would be the reason?
a. While I was just talking to Bitoy, when he told me to stop.
COURT:
Does the Court get from you that you are trying to explain to Bitoy when the
accused tried to hold you and prevent you?
a. Yes, sir.
q. That is why the reason you concluded that the accused is not pacifying you but to
stop you from helping the victim?
a. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q. The only word that the accused [C]overdale Abarquez uttered was Joey, tumigil
ka na, Joey tumigil ka na, is it not?
a. He uttered that you are MATAPANG, Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na.
24

Pazs testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuelas criminal
design. "Tumigil" literally means "stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz
from joining the fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying
to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been merely talking to
Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because Almojuela was already grappling with
Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquezs action as an attempt to prevent
him from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the trial court and
sustained by the Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while
restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop.
It was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping Almojuela. It is more
likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fight. Abarquezs act of
trying to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to Almojuela.
In People v. Fabros,
25
the Court explained:
To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and
participation in the criminal act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice
must have acted in conjunction and directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it
is essential that both were united in their criminal design.
xxx. The mere fact that the (accused) had prior knowledge of the (principals)
criminal design did not automatically make him an accomplice. This circumstance,
by itself, did not show his concurrence in the principals criminal intent.
Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to stop Almojuela. However, Paz
testified that Abarquezs son Bardie, who was one of Pazs companions, was the
one trying to pacify Almojuela. The trial court in its factual findings confirmed this
when it stated that while Abarquez was holding Paz, his son Bardie was pacifying
Almojuela.
26

The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his duties as a barangay
kagawad in not extending assistance to the then wounded Quejong. This, however,
does not necessarily show concurrence in Almojuelas criminal act. When Paz ran
away, Abarquez shouted at him that he left his wounded companion. Apparently,
Abarquez was not aware of the extent of Quejongs injury and he expected Paz to
look after his own companion.
When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be resolved in his
favor. Thus:
Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence stands as a
fundamental principle of both constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the
prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact establishing guilt. Every
vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be removed. The defense of the
accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. Within this framework, the
prosecution must prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need
not even speak at all. The presumption of innocence is more than sufficient.
27

We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is
in issue or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party
having the burden of proof loses.
28
Hence:
xxx The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to
produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the
accused of the crime charged is found lacking.
29

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 23 June 2000 Decision and
7 November 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450,
which affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 50 in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. We ACQUIT Coverdale
Abarquez y Evangelista as an accomplice in the crime of homicide in Criminal Case
No. 94-135055. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.































G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO BON, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the Court should
affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and
two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces. On that
score, we affirm. As a consequence though, we are ultimately impelled to confront
a question much broader in both scope and import. While the Court had
previously declined to acknowledge the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty through the 1987 Constitution,
1
we now find it necessary to determine
whether the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 resulted in the statutory
interdiction of the death penalty.
The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum term
of reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed on appellant by the Court of Appeals
for the two counts of attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the
appellate court prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which ended the
imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. The proximate concern as to
appellant is whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the
penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape,
should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
First, the antecedent facts.
I.
Eight (8) Informations
2
were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23
February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against
appellant, charging him with the rape of AAA
3
and BBB,
4
the daughters of his older
brother. Appellant was accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-
G, 6906-G, and 6908-G; while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos.
6689-G, 6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-G.
5
All these cases were consolidated for trial.
The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of
six (6) years.
Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him
as the man who had raped them. During trial, their respective birth certificates and
the medical certificates executed by the doctor who physically examined them were
entered as documentary evidence.
AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994
in the house appellant had shared with her grandmother.
6
She recounted that the
incident took place when she and appellant were alone in the house. Appellant
touched her thighs and vagina, removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Appellant threatened that she and her parents would be killed should she
disclose the incident to anyone. She thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her
grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in 1997, that she slept in the said
house, yet again she was sexually abused by appellant. She was then nine (9) years
old.
7

AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the
third time, again at the house of her grandmother.
8
The following year, when she
was twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth time by appellant. This time, she
was raped in an outdoor clearing
9
after having been invited there by appellant to
get some vegetables. While at the clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a
grassy spot and tried to insert his penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant
allegedly stopped.
10

It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother, CCC,
11
the
brutish acts appellant had done to her.
12
Her mother thus filed a complaint against
her uncle. AAA identified appellant in open court and presented as documentary
evidence her birth certificate to prove that she was born on 3 September 1988.
13

BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant in 1997 when
she was ten (10) years old, also at the house appellant shared with her
grandmother. While alone in the house, appellant poked a knife at her, removed
her clothes and inserted his penis in her vagina. Despite the pain she felt, she could
not resist appellant as he was holding a knife. She did not report the rape to her
parents out of fear of appellant's threat that he would kill her.
14
BBB further
testified that in 1998 and 1999, she was raped again by appellant on several
occasions, the rapes occurring under threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of
the time of day.
15

BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000.
16
On that
night, she was sleeping beside her sister AAA in the house of her grandmother
when she felt appellant touching her body. She pushed him away but appellant
pulled her three (3) meters away from AAA towards the door. As appellant was
holding a knife, BBB could not make any noise to alert her sister. Appellant ordered
her to remove her clothes and forced her to lie down. After he took off his clothes,
appellant placed himself on top of BBB and stayed there for three (3) minutes
"moving up and down." Thereafter, she put on her clothes and returned to where
her sister was. She added that although it was dark, she knew it was appellant who
had molested her as she was familiar with his smell. Since then, she never slept in
her grandmother's house again.
17

It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother.
Prior to that, however, she had already revealed the sexual abuses she had
underwent to her sister AAA. Upon learning of the same, her mother brought her to
the police station and her statement was taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the
hospital to be examined. Furthermore, BBB explained that she only reported the
abuses done to her on 14 June 2000 or five (5) months after the last rape because
she was afraid of appellant's threat of killing her and her family.
18

The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She testified that she
only knew of the abuses done on her daughters on 15 June 2000. Five months
earlier, CCC became concerned after observing that BBB, on the pretext of
preparing clothes for a game, was packing more than enough clothes. She asked her
other daughter, DDD, to dig into the matter and the latter told her that BBB was
planning to leave their house. Upon learning this, she sent somebody to retrieve
BBB. However, it was only five months after that incident that BBB confided to her
mother that she was raped by appellant. CCC lost no time in reporting the matter to
the authorities and had BBB and AAA examined in the hospital. After examination,
it was confirmed that BBB was indeed sexually molested.
19

CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to their daughters
because she was afraid that her husband might kill appellant. It was only after
appellant was arrested that she disclosed such fact to her husband. After the arrest
of appellant, his relatives became angry at CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided
talking to her since then.
20

The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the prosecution. Dr.
Purita T. Tullas (Dr. Tullas), medical officer of Gumaca District Hospital, testified that
she was the one who examined BBB and AAA, and thereafter, issued medical
certificates for each child. These medical certificates were presented in court.
21

The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, there were
no external sign of physical injury found on her body. However, Dr. Tullas found
that the labia majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping, her vaginal orifice was
admitting two fingers without resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at
"three (3) o'clock" and "eight (8) o'clock" which might have happened a long time
before her examination. Dr. Tullas concluded that there might have been sexual
penetration caused by a male sex organ for several times.
22

AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there were no
external physical injuries apparent on her body. AAA's labia
majora and minora were well coaptated and the hymen was still intact. On direct
examination, Dr. Tullas said that it could happen that the hymen would still be
intact despite sexual penetration with a person having an elastic hymen. On the
other hand, when asked on cross-examination, she stated that there was also the
possibility that no foreign body touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA.
23

Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his defense. He
averred in court that from 1994 to 2000, he lived in the house of his parents which
was about "thirty (30) arm stretches" away from the house of BBB and AAA. He
denied having raped BBB on 15 January 2000 because on said date he was at the
house of his sister, two (2) kilometers away from the house of his parents where
the rape occurred, from 11:30 in the morning and stayed there until early morning
of the following day.
24

He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB and AAA. He
claimed that he seldom saw the two minors. He further asserted that prior to the
institution of the criminal case against him he had a smooth relationship with his
nieces and the only reason the case was filed against him was that CCC, his sister-in-
law and the mother of his nieces, harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father,
who would call CCC "lazy" within earshot of other family members.
25

The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape.
26
The RTC pronounced
appellant's defense of denial and alibi as unconvincing, citing jurisprudence
declaring denial and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. The RTC concluded that
appellant failed to controvert the clear, candid and straightforward testimonies of
his nieces. It further considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the
victims and the relationship of the victims and appellant, the latter being the
former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree.
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the records of the
case were automatically elevated to this Court for review. However, in the
aftermath of the pronouncement of the Court in People v. Mateo
27
the present case
was transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of the RTC in
regard to six (6) of the eight (8) death sentences imposed on appellant.
28
The
appellate court ratiocinated, thus:
We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find no
cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court except in at
least two (2) cases. The prosecution's case which was anchored mainly on
the testimonies of private complainants [BBB] and [AAA], deserve full faith
and credit for being clear, precise and straightforward. Like the trial court,
We find no reason to disbelieve the private complainants. It was
established with certitude that the accused on several occasions sexually
assaulted his nieces. The perpetration of the crimes and its authorship
were proved by the victims' candid and unwavering testimonies both of
whom had the misfortune of sharing the same fate in the hands of their
own uncle. The sincerity of [AAA] was made more evident when she cried
on the witness stand in obvious distress over what their uncle had done to
her and her sister.
29

The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and
6908 to attempted rape. In these two (2) cases, it was alleged that appellant had
raped AAA in 1999 and on 11 June 2000, respectively. According to the appellate
court, it could not find evidence beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases
that appellant had accomplished the slightest penetration of AAA's vagina to make
him liable for consummated rape. It stressed that there was not even moral
certainty that appellant's penis ever touched the labia of the pudendum, quoting
portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes where AAA was asked if
appellant was then successful in inserting his penis into her vagina and she
answered in the negative.
30
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reduced the penalties
attached to the two (2) counts of rape from death for consummated qualified rape
to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for
attempted rape.
Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief
31
before this Court, assails the findings of the
Court of Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB as to what really
transpired on 15 January 2000. Particularly, appellant observes that BBB testified on
6 June 2001 as to her rape on 15 January 2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had
been sleeping side by side. However, when BBB again testified on 3 July 2002, this
time she stated that on that night, as she and her sister AAA were sleeping in their
room at their parents' house (and not at her grandmother's), the accused passed
through a window, entered their room and raped her again.
32
Appellant also latches
on the inconsistencies in BBB's testimony as to the length of the duration of her
rape on that day. In BBB's testimony on 6 June 2001, she said that appellant was
atop her for three (3) minutes while in the 3 July 2002 hearing, BBB stated that the
rape lasted for only half a minute.
It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was raped in
2001. Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and the Court of Appeals did
not consider material, were elicited while BBB was testifying in open court. Our
observations in People v. Perez
33
on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in
the testimony of rape victims who happen to be minors are instructive, thus:
We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial,
minor, and insignificant details.They bear no materiality to the
commission of the crime of rape of which accused-appellant was
convicted.[
34
] As pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's
Brief, the seeming inconsistencies were brought about by confusion and
merely represent minor lapses during the rape victim's direct examination
and cannot possibly affect her credibility. Minor lapses are to be expected
when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful
to recall. The rape victim was testifying in open court, in the presence of
strangers, on an extremely intimate matter, which, more often than not, is
talked about in hushed tones. Under such circumstances, it is not
surprising that her narration was less than letter-perfect.[
35
] "Moreover,
the inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known fact that a
courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of testimony and the
manner in which a witness answers questions."[
36
]
37

Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why BBB was
confused on some points of her two testimonies. Particularly in the Memorandum
for the People
38
filed with the RTC, the public prosecutor creditably explained the
inconsistencies, thus:
[BBB]'s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be contradictory to her first
testimony on June 6, 2001, with respect to the last rape on January 15,
2000, as regards the place of commissionhouse of her parents or house
of accused; and the length of time he stayed on her top 3 minutes or
half-minute. But she remained consistent in her declaration that on
January 15, 2000, her uncle inserted his penis into her vagina, and he was
moving while on her top then she felt something came out from him. He
was able to rape her because he threatened her with a knife or bladed
weapon. Further, the first she took the witness stand on June 6, 2001, she
was made to recall the last rape, the first rape and many acts of sexual
abuses [sic] against her. She was even confused about her age when she
was first raped by her uncle. After she testified on November 14, 2001, for
the separate charges of rapes in 1997, 1998 and 1999, she was able to
recall more clearly the last rape on January 15, 2000, which happened in
her own house. These noted discrepancies as to the exact place of
commission accused's house or victim's house is not an essential
element of the crime of rape and both houses are situated in Brgy. Villa
Padua Ilaya, Gumaca, Quezon, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court. x x x
39

In addition, we share the lower court's disbelief of appellant's proffered defenses of
denial and alibi. These two defenses are inherently the weakest as they are
negative defenses. Mere denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence
over the positive testimony of the offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not
enough for the defendant to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime
was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it is physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.
40

In the case at bar, appellant's alibi that he was at his sister's house barely two (2)
kilometers away when the rape took place on 15 January 2000 cannot be given
credence by this Court. If we are to thread this line of reasoning, appellant could
have easily left his sister's house in the middle of the night, raped BBB, and then
returned to his sister's house without much difficulty and without anybody noticing
his absence.
Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of an accused,
without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial.
41
The defenses of denial and alibi deserve
scant consideration when the prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence
identifying appellant as the perpetrator.
42
In this case, both BBB and AAA, minors
and relatives of appellant, positively identified him as their rapist in open court. The
lower courts found no issue detracting from the credibility of such identification.
It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the 15 January
2000 rape of BBB. He offers nothing to counteract the accusations against him
involving the seven (7) other specific acts of rape other than the averment that he
did not know anything about the allegations propounded on him, an infinitesimal
defense considering the evidence against him.
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the
grudge of CCC towards his deceased father. It is outrageous to even suggest that a
mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating experience of coming before
the court and narrating their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by
her father-in-law as lazy. In addition, CCC's father-in-law had died several years
before the criminal charges against appellant were ever instituted. If CCC truly
wanted to retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-in-law, she could have
done so when the latter was still alive. No member of a rape victim's family would
dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor of the family, more
specifically if such accusation is against a member of the family, unless the crime
was in fact committed.
43

Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or
ridicule if she has not in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for
the wrong done to her. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight
and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
44
The
weight of such testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary,
or indubitable proof that the accused could not have committed the rape, but in the
absence of such countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded utmost
value.
The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were properly
appreciated in this case. The minority of the victims and their relationship with
appellant were aptly established
in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the
Informations the ages of the victims when they were raped but the prosecution also
presented the birth certificates of BBB and AAA in court as documentary evidence
to prove that they were both minors when appellant raped them. Appellant, in
open court, also admitted that that he was the uncle of both victims being the
brother of the victims' father, and thus, a relative of the victims within the third
degree of consanguinity.
Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA
is understandably justified, considering that appellant repeatedly threatened to kill
them and their family should they disclose the incidents to anyone. It has been held
time and again that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of
a fabricated charge.
45
Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any
hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces a fear that if the
victim does not yield to the perverse impulses of the accused, something would
happen to her at the moment, or even thereafter, as when she is threatened with
death if she would report the incident.
46

At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G were not proven beyond reasonable doubt,
but only the two separate incidents of attempted rape.
It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender
commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.
47
In Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the
records show that there was no penetration or any indication that the penis of
appellant touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. This was evident in AAA's
testimony at the hearing on 17 October 2001, to wit:
Q Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you when
you were eleven years old?
A Yes, Mam. [sic]
Q What was that?
A He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he inserted
also his penis (into) my vagina. [sic]
Q Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?
A No, Mam. [sic]
Q Why?
A It was painful, Mam. [sic]
x x x x
Q How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina?
A Many times, Mam.
48
[sic]
AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G.
Q I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In Criminal Case No.
6908-G, also for Rape. When was the last time that this sexual abuse was
committed by your Uncle?
A June 11, Mam. [sic]
Q What year?
A June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]
x x x x
Q What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000?
A He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]
Q And after removing your clothes, what did he do to you?
A He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam. [sic]
x x x x
Q And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in your
vagina?
A Painful, Mam. [sic]
Q And what did you do when you feel painful?
A I cried, Mam. [sic]
Q When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any?
A He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic]
x x x x
Q And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your vagina?
A No, Mam.
49
[sic]
In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the penalty,
the CA declared:
It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to consummate rape.
Indeed pain may be deduced from the sexual act but accused cannot be
convicted of rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain. It is well-
settled that complete penetration of the penis into the vagina is not
necessary to convict for consummated rape since the slightest penetration
of one into the other will suffice. However, in People v. Campuhan, the
term "slightest penetration" was clarified to mean that there must be
sufficient and convincing proof of the penis indeed touching at the very
least the labias of the female organ. Mere epidermal contact between the
penis and the external layer of the victim's vagina (the stroking and the
grazing of the male organ upon the female organ or the mons pubis)
categorizes the crime as attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. There
must be positive proof of even the slightest penetration, more accurately,
the touching of the labias by the penis, before rape could be deemed
consummated. We, therefore, take exception to the finding of the trial
court that when the accused was trying to insert his penis into the child's
vagina, the act proved painful to [AAA,] which made the accused stop from
further executing the act. From the testimony of private complainant,
[AAA] in the afore-numbered cases, the prosecution failed to demonstrate
beyond any shadow of doubt that accused-appellant's penis reached the
labia of the pudendum of AAA's vagina. There is no basis then to apply the
rule that the introduction of the penis into the aperture of the female
organ (thereby touching the labia of the pudendum) already consummates
the case of rape. x x x
50

It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an
attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to
produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have
commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but
for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the
penetration, however slight, is not completed.
51

The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been
established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of
rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346,
the appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended.
II.
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the
six (6) counts of rape. The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled
"An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Section 2 of
the law mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the
death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the
guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment when appropriate. Since the passage of Rep. Act No. 9346, the
Court has had occasion to effectuate such reduction in recent cases such as People
v. Tubongbanua
52
and People v. Cabalquinto.
53

III.
The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2) counts of
attempted rape proves to be the more challenging but interesting question facing
the Court.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape of AAA, to
"an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum," for
each count of attempted rape. There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence
at the time it was meted prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of
the Revised Penal Code establishes the penalty to be imposed upon the principals
of an attempted felony:
ART. 51. xxx A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law
for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an
attempt to commit a felony.
54

What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for
attempted rape? Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which incorporates the
amendments introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the
parent of the victim. x x x
55

The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have
been under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty
two degrees lower than the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and
71 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.For the purpose of graduating the
penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive,
of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any
frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that
indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article
71 of this Code.
56

x x x x
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention, crucial
as it is to our disposition of this question. The provision reads:
Art. 71. Graduated scales. In the case in which the law prescribes a
penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given
penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating
such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in
which is comprised the given penalty:
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the
following graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine
57

x x x x
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than
death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court
of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty
comprised of three divisible periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
The purpose of the prescription of minimum and maximum periods under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect the privilege granted under the same law,
for prisoners who have served the minimum penalty to be eligible for parole per the
discretion of the Board of Indiscriminate Sentence.
58
Thus, convicts sentenced to
suffer death penalty or life-imprisonment are ineligible under that law, as are
persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty without minimum or
maximum periods.
59

Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for
attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal,
and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision
mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed
such sentence without complication. However, the enactment of the law has given
rise to the problem concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to
a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees
lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that
appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346?
If it so followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion
temporal.
IV.
Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for attempted rape
will affect not only appellant, but several classes of convicts as well. Before we
proceed with the discussion, the Court finds it necessary to make the following
qualification.
Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty was imposable
under two different frames of reference. This was especially made clear with the
1993 amendments to the Revised Penal Code through Rep. Act No. 7659, or the
Death Penalty Law. Under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty
was provided for in two ways, namely: as the maximum penalty for "reclusion
perpetua to death," and death itself as an automatic and exclusive penalty. Death
as the automatic penalty was mandated for the crimes of qualified bribery "if it is
the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present;"
60
kidnapping or
detention "for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person;"
61
destructive
arson wherein "death results;"
62
and rape qualified by any of the several
circumstances enumerated under the law.
On the other hand, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" was imposable on
several crimes, including murder,
63
qualified piracy,
64
and treason.
65
The imposition
of the death penalty for crimes punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death"
depended on the appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
generally outlined in Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Reference to
those two provisions was unnecessary if the penalty imposed was death, as
opposed to "reclusion perpetua to death."
There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the
penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by
"reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated, or on accomplices and accessories
to such felonies. Such situations do not relate to the case of appellant, who was
convicted of two (2) counts of attempted rape, which, if consummated, of course
would have carried prior to the enactment of Rep. Act 9346 the penalty of death,
and not "reclusion perpetua to death."
The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned from "reclusion
perpetua to death" differs from that based on the exclusive penalty of death. For
example, it has been held that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion
perpetua to death" is prision mayor.
66
In contrast, the Court has likewise held that
for qualified rape in the attempted stage, "the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower
than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged x x x is reclusion
temporal."
67
In People v. Tolentino,
68
we ruled that the accused, who had been
sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)-year old stepdaughter, was guilty only
of attempted rape. In explaining that "reclusion temporal" was the proper penalty,
the Court, through then Chief Justice Davide, explained:
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted
felony is the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for
the consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for the rape if it had
been consummated would have been death, pursuant to Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since [RT
69
] was eight
years old and TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of [RT's] mother.
The last paragraph thereof provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x x x
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is the
penalty lower by two degrees than death. However, with the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an
indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum shall be within the
range of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range of
reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code.
70

This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code.
Both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed
of two indivisible penalties the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective
graduated scale." Hence, in passing sentence on those convicted of attempted
felonies which warranted the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" if
consummated, the Court has consistently held that penalty two degrees lower than
"reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor. In contrast, if the penalty for the
consummated crime is the single indivisible penalty of death, as was prescribed for
several crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659, Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that "the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible
penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71". Thus, the proper
penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal.
It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did not
similarly arise after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty subject to its subsequent readoption at the choice
of Congress. Generally, the highest penalty imposed under the Revised Penal Code
was "reclusion perpetua to death," a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties.
As a result, the Court had no occasion, after the passage of the 1987 Constitution,
to consider the effect of the charter on penalties downgraded from a single
indivisible penalty. It was under Rep. Act No. 7659, passed in 1993, that some
commonly occurring crimes, such as qualified rape and kidnapping for ransom,
were penalized with the single indivisible penalty of death.
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes, such as
qualified rape as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, for which the
imposable penalty was death alone. Thus, our ruling will bear no direct effect on
the sentencing of accomplices and accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or
frustrated stage of felonies for which the imposable penalty was "reclusion
perpetua to death."
Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the penalty of
death does not refer to the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death."
V.
If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties for
convicts whose sentences had been graduated beginning from death pursuant to
Article 71, the Court would not hesitate to enforce such downgrading based on
clear statutory intent. However, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to
those penalties imposed on frustrated or attempted felonies, or on accessories and
accomplices.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven
(R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal
Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty
Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they
impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,
71
among others, were deemed to
have been amended by virtue of Rep. Act No. 9346, such amendment can be
justified under the ambit of the repealing clause, which reads, "all other laws,
executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly." While this clause may, given its breadth, initially
impress as the nature of a general repealing clause, it is in actuality an express
repealing clause. Section 1 specifically repeals all laws, executive orders and
decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty, and not merely such enactments
which are inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 9346.
Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization of the
particular phrase "insofar as they impose the death penalty." We can entertain two
schools of thought in construing this provision, both of them rooted in literalist
interpretations. First, it can be claimed that the present application of the penalties
for attempted rape of a minor (among many examples) does not "impose the death
penalty," since none of the convicts concerned would face execution through the
application of the penalty for attempted rape. Hence, the statutory provisions
enforced in determining the penalty for attempted rape, or other crimes not
punishable by death, are not amended by Rep. Act No. 9346.
On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for
attempted rape of a minor necessarily calls for the application, if not its literal
imposition, of death as a penalty, in the context of applying the graduated scale of
penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. If we were to construe
"impose" as to mean "apply," then it could be argued that Article 71 was indeed
amended by Rep. Act No. 9346. After all, the application of Article 71 to crimes such
as attempted rape of a minor call for the actual operation of the death penalty not
only in theory, but as a means of determining the proper graduated penalty.
On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of thinking is enhanced
by its innate conservatism, limiting as it would the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346. It
also can be understood if confronted with the option of employing either a liberal
or a conservative construction, there is a natural tendency to employ the
conservative mode. Further, the reasoning is seemingly consistent with that
employed by the Court in People v. Muoz,
72
a decision which will be thoroughly
analyzed in the course of this discussion.
If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the "imposition" of
the death penalty to actual executions, this could have been accomplished with
more clarity. For example, had Section 1 read instead "insofar as they sentence an
accused to death," there would have been no room for doubt that only those
statutory provisions calling for actual executions would have been repealed or
amended. The inability of Congress to shape the repealing clause in so specific a
fashion does leave open the question whether Congress did actually intend to limit
the operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 to actual executions only.
But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the legislative
intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the prohibition of the law to the physical
imposition of the death penalty, without extending any effect to the graduated
scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.
VI.
There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative intent, the
interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits its effects only to matters relating to
the physical imposition of the death penalty.
Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous results is in the
case of accomplices. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
kidnapping for ransom was punishable by death. Let us say X and Y were tried for
the crime. X was charged as a principal for having directly participated in the
kidnapping. Y was charged as an accomplice for having allowed X to use his house
to detain the victim, even though Y was abroad at the time of the crime and
otherwise had no other participation therein. Both X and Y were convicted by final
judgment. Since X could no longer be meted the death penalty, he is sentenced
instead to reclusion perpetua. Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the
penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion temporal. Yet following the
"conservative" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346, the graduation of penalties
remains unaffected with the enactment of the new law. Thus, under Article 71,
which would still take into account the death penalty within the graduated scale, Y,
as an accomplice, would be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the same penalty as
the principal.
It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346, by
retaining the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71, was to equalize the
penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes previously punishable by death.
We do not doubt that the legislature has the theoretical capability to amend the
penal law in such fashion. Yet given the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties
for principals and accomplices, a step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in
criminal law, one could reasonably assume that a legislature truly oriented to enact
such change would have been candid enough to have explicitly stated such intent in
the law itself. Of course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or in the
provisions, explicates the intention to equalize the penalties for principals and
accomplices in any crime at all.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange that
the penalties for principals and accomplices are equalized in some crimes, and not
in others. Let us return to our previous example of X and Y, but this time, assume
that they were charged for simple kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that
would have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Since the crime is not
punishable by death, Rep. Act No. 9346 would have no effect in the imposition of
the penalty for simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X would have been sentenced
to reclusion perpetua as the principal, while Y would have been sentenced
to reclusion temporal as an accomplice.
Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for
ransom, the lesser penalties are justified. Since Y was merely an accomplice to the
crime of simple kidnapping, the imposition on him of a lighter penalty than X is in
accord with the Revised Penal Code and established juridical and legal thought. Less
justifiable would be the notion that in kidnapping for ransom, the principal and the
accomplice would receive the same penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the
principal suffers a higher penalty than the accomplice. Frankly, there is no rational
explanation for such a disparity, and no legal justification other than the recognition
that Congress has the power to will it so.
Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to frustrated
and attempted felonies which were punishable by death if consummated. The
consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable
by reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage
would, under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower
from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the
same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated
and frustrated felony. However, the anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we
recognize that those felonies previously punishable by death are improbable of
commission in their frustrated stage, unlike several felonies punishable by
"reclusion perpetua to death,"
73
such as murder, which may be frustrated.
Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death are
capable of commission in their attempted stages and that the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is "a penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony." The Court has thus
consistently imposed reclusion temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than
death, as the maximum term for attempted felonies which, if consummated, would
have warranted the death penalty.
74
If it were to be insisted that Rep. Act No. 9346
did not affect at all the penalties for attempted felonies, then those found guilty of
the subject attempted felonies would still be sentenced to reclusion temporal, even
though the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony" would now be prision mayor.
It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that would
sanction a penalty for some attempted felonies that is only one degree lower than
the consummated crime would, again, be disharmonious and inconsistent with the
Revised Penal Code and established thought in criminal law. Conceding again that
the legislature has the discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees fit, a
regime that foists a differential theoretical basis for the punishment of different
attempted felonies resulting in discriminatory penalties is not only irrational but
also, to say the least, highly suspect. Considering that physical liberties are at stake,
it would be a most cruel joke if such discriminatory effects ensued not from
deliberate legislative will, but from oversight.
VII.
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties
for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies, clearly results in
illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no similar flaws ensue
should we construe Rep. Act No. 9346 instead as not having barred the application
of the death penalty even as a means of depreciating penalties other than death. In
particular, the operative amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties
for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies lies in Article 71,
which ranks "death" at the top of the scale for graduated penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in Article 71
will have the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to
accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies to the level consistent
with the rest of our penal laws. Returning to our previous examples, Y, the
convicted accomplice in kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty
of reclusion temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the principal X would
bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be consistent with Article 52 of the
Revised Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference to
"death." Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence as
the principal, an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated.
Thus, the same standard would prevail in sentencing principals and accomplices to
the crime of kidnapping in ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of simple
kidnapping.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having
eliminated the reference to "death" in Article 71 would run across the board in our
penal laws. Consistent with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of
attempted qualified rape would receive the penalty two degrees lower than that
prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.
There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this
"expansive" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute
should be so construed not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize
with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible systema uniform system of jurisprudence.
75
"Interpreting and
harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. x x x x This manner
of construction would provide a complete, consistent and intelligible system to
secure the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasi-
legislative acts."
76
There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the
Revised Penal Code unless the later statute is construed as having downgraded
those penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article
71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application
of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and
accomplices.
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are
strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.
77
If the
language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of
the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting
substantial justice.
78
The law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual.
79
It is
this philosophy of caution before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty
that animates one of the most fundamental principles in our Bill of Rights, that
every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction would not have
been necessary had Rep. Act No. 9346 ineluctably stated that the repeal of all laws
imposing the death penalty did not engender the corresponding modification of
penalties other than death, dependent as these are on "death" as a measure under
the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Admittedly, if this were indeed
the intent of Congress, and such intent were unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act
No. 9346, the resulting inequities and inconsistencies we had earlier pointed out
would have remained. If that were to be the case, we would have acknowledged,
perhaps tacitly, that such inequities and inconsistencies fell part of the legislative
intent. It does not speak well of a Congress to be deliberately inconsistent with, or
ignorant of its own prior enactments. Yet ultimately, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346
is not expressive of such rash or injudicious notions, as it is susceptible to a reading
that would harmonize its effects with the precepts and practices that pervade our
general penal laws, and in a manner that does not defy the clear will of Congress.
VIII.
One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly
amend any of the penalties other than death in our penal laws would most certainly
invoke our ruling in People v. Muoz,
80
decided in 1989. Therein, a divided Court
ruled in that the constitutional bar on the imposition of the death penalty did not
enact "a corresponding modification in the other periods [in penalties]", there being
no expression of "such a requirement in Article III, Section 19(1) of the
Constitution or indicat[ion] therein by at least
clear and unmistakable implication."
81
In so concluding, the Court made the oft-
cited pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987 Constitution "which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty."
82

It is time to re-examine Muoz and its continued viability in light of Rep. Act No.
9346. More precisely, wouldMuoz as precedent deter the Court from ruling that
Rep. Act No. 9346 consequently downgraded penalties other than death?
It can be recalled that the accused in Muoz were found guilty of murder, which
under the Revised Penal Code, carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. The subject murders therein were not attended by any
modifying circumstance, and thus penalized in the penalty's medium term.
Jurisprudence previous to Muoz held that the proper penalty in such instances
should be "the higher half of reclusion temporalmaximum," with reclusion
temporal maximum, divided into two halves for that purpose. Muoz rejected this
formulation, holding instead that the penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
Towards this conclusion, the Court made the above-cited conclusions relating to the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty, and the charter's effects on the other
periods. Six justices dissented from that ruling, and as recently as 1997, a member
of the Court felt strongly enough to publish a view urging the reexamination
of Muoz.
83

It would be disingenuous to consider Muoz as directly settling the question now
befacing us, as the legal premises behind Muoz are different from those in this
case. Most pertinently, Muoz inquired into the effects of the Constitution on the
proper penalty for murder; while herein, we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act
No. 9346 on the proper penalty for attempted qualified rape. Muoz may have
pronounced that the Constitution did not abolish the death penalty, but that issue
no longer falls into consideration herein, the correct query now being whether
Congress has banned the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346. Otherwise
framed, Muoz does not preclude the Court from concluding that with the
express prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty Congress has
unequivocally banned the same.
Muoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1), Article III, which
provided that "[n]either shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it." Muoz and its progenies, have interpreted that provision as prohibiting the
actual imposition of the death penalty, as opposed to enacting an amendatory law
that eliminates all references and applications of the death penalty in our statutes.
It can also be understood and appreciated that at the time Muoz was decided, it
would have been polemical to foster an unequivocal pronouncement that Section
19(1), Article III abolished the death penalty, since the very provision itself
acknowledged that Congress may nonetheless subsequently provide for the penalty
"for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes," as Congress very well did just
four (4) years after Muoz. No such language exists in Rep. Act No. 9346. Of course,
the legislature has the inherent and constitutional power to enact laws prescribing
penalties for crimes, and the Constitution will not prohibit Congress from
reenacting the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Yet
it was that express stipulation in the Constitution that dissuaded the Court from
recognizing the constitutional abolition of the death penalty; and there is no similar
statutory expression in Rep. Act No. 9346, which could be construed as evocative of
intent similar to that of the Constitution.
The doctrine in Muoz that the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of the
death penalty did not enact a corresponding modification of other penalties is
similarly irrelevant to this case, which calls for an examination as to whether such
corresponding modifications of other penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act
No. 9346, and not the Constitution.
For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether Rep. Act No.
9346 intended to delete the word "death" as expressly provided for in the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Muoz did not engage in an
analogous inquiry in relation to Article 71 and the Constitution, for what was
relevant therein was not the general graduated scale of penalties, but the range of
the penalties for murder. Herein, at bare minimum, no provision in Rep. Act No.
9346 provides a context within which the concept of "death penalty" bears
retentive legal effect, especially in relation to Article 71. Unlike the
Constitution, Rep. Act No. 9346 does expressly stipulate the amendment of all
extant laws insofar as they called for the imposition of the penalty of death.
The impression left by Muoz was that the use of the word "imposition" in the
Constitution evinced the framer's intent to retain the operation of penalties under
the Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, one might try to construe the use of
"imposition" in Rep. Act No. 9346 as a means employed by Congress to ensure that
the "death penalty", as applied in Article 71, remain extant. If the use of
"imposition" was implemented as a means of retaining "death" under Article 71, it
would have been a most curious, roundabout means indeed. The Court can tolerate
to a certain degree the deliberate vagueness sometimes employed in legislation,
yet constitutional due process demands a higher degree of clarity when
infringements on life or liberty are intended. We have ruled, on due process
grounds, as arbitrary and oppressive a tax assessed on a standard characterized as
"nothing but blather in search of meaning."
84
In the matter of statutes that deprive
a person of physical liberty, the demand for a clear standard in sentencing is even
more exacting.
Yet in truth, there is no material difference between "imposition" and "application,"
for both terms embody the operation in law of the death penalty. Since Article 71
denominates "death" as an element in the graduated scale of penalties, there is no
question that the operation of Article 71 involves the actual application of the
death penalty as a means of determining the extent which a person's liberty is to be
deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346 unequivocally bars the application of the death
penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such statutory provisions requiring the
application of the death penalty, such effect necessarily extends to its relevance to
the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the
operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in
our penal laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No.
9346 is not swaddled in the same restraints appreciated by Muoz on Section 19(1),
Article III. The very Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the
imposition of the death penalty once thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No.
7650. Within the same realm of constitutional discretion, Congress has reversed
itself. It must be asserted that today, the legal status of the suppression of the
death penalty in the Philippines has never been more secure than at any time in our
political history as a nation.
Following Muoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987 Constitution, might not
have willed the abolition of the death penalty and instead placed it under a
suspensive condition. As such, we affirmed the characterization of the death
penalty during the interregnum between the 1987 Constitution and its reimposition
through law as being "in a state of hibernation."
85
No longer. It reawakened then
it died; because the sovereign people, through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the death
penalty. Only by an Act of Congress can it be reborn. Before that day, the
consideration of death as a penalty is bereft of legal effect, whether as a means of
depriving life, or as a means of depriving liberty.
Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death penalty, we do
not acknowledge that Muozlacked legal justification when it was decided; that its
application as precedent prior to Rep. Act No. 9346 was erroneous; or that previous
sentences imposed on convicts on the basis of Muoz were wrong. Muoz properly
stood as the governing precedent in the matter of sentences that passed finality
prior to Rep. Act No. 9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts on its doctrines
entrenched its footing in criminal law jurisprudence.
IX.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in the
Philippines, also effectively classified the crimes listed therein as "heinous," within
constitutional contemplation. Such reclassification under Rep. Act No. 7659 was
accompanied by certain legal effects other than the imposition of the death
penalty, such as the increase in imposable fines attached to certain heinous
crimes.
86
The categorization of certain crimes as "heinous", constituting as it does
official recognition that some crimes are more odious than others, has also
influenced this Court in adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the
victims of these crimes. Hence, a general inclination persists in levying a greater
amount of damages on accused found guilty of heinous crimes.
It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act
No. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as
"heinous". The amendatory effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the
application of the death penalty but not to the definition or classification of crimes.
True, the penalties for heinous crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of
the new law. Still, what remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes,
by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by themselves. Accordingly,
Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and
other damages that adhere to heinous crimes.
X.
Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through Rep.
Act No. 9346 and the corresponding modification of penalties other than death
through that statute, we now proceed to discuss the effects of these rulings.
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is
immediate. Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code,
shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For
example, in the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted
rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees
lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no
longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead,prision
mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the
free-standing penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the
ranged penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death," as often used in the Revised Penal
Code and other penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter
penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However,
we did earlier observe that both "reclusion perpetua" and death are indivisible
penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty
prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty
next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties
prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier noted, our
previous rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to
death" is prision mayor.
Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this
new ruling, favorable as it is to persons previously convicted of crimes which, if
consummated or participated in as a principal, would have warranted the solitary
penalty of death. We see no choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code states that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal[
87
]
x x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same." Given that we have ruled that
Rep. Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such crimes, the benefit of Article
22 has to apply, except as to those persons defined as "habitual criminal[s]."
Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly recognized that its enactment would have
retroactive beneficial effects, referring as it did to "persons x x x whose sentences
were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act."
88

It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code, there may be convicts presently serving their original
sentences whose actual served terms exceed their reduced sentences. It should be
understood that this decision does not make operative the release of such
convicts, especially as there may be other reasons that exist for their continued
detention. There are remedies under law that could be employed to obtain the
release of such prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as the Public Attorney's Office
and non-governmental organizations that frequently assist detainees possess the
capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners who are so
entitled by reason of this ruling.
XI.
We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of Rep. Act
No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding
reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from
two (2) counts consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six
(6) counts of rape, we downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with
no eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2)
counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed
by the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium
period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum.
Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages andP10,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each count of attempted rape, it being the prevailing rate of indemnity as
pronounced in the recent case of People v. Miranda.
89

Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence
90
in awarding to BBB and
AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count of consummated rape.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court sentences appellant Alfredo J.
Bon to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the
six (6) counts of consummated rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos.
6699, 6902, and against BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905, and 6907.
Appellant is further ORDERED to indemnify AAA and BBB for the crime of
consummated rape, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of them.
For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No. 6906 and
6908, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccionalas minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) of prision mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape.
In addition, appellant is ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts
of attempted rape in the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as
moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 166617 July 3, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
AGUSTIN ABELLERA y CAMANA,
***
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
The subject of this petition for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00097
1
affirming respondent Agustin Abellera y Camanas
conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275 of Las Pias City,
2
for
statutory rape, two counts of simple rape and attempted rape committed against
his minor daughters AAA and BBB.
The antecedent facts follow.
In 1986, then seven-year-old AAA was at home attending to the laundry when
respondent arrived drunk. When respondent tried to grab her, she pushed him
away but he was too strong for her. Respondent undressed her, removed her
underwear and forced himself on her. She felt excruciating pain. Thereafter,
respondent warned her not to tell anybody what happened, otherwise he would kill
her.
On August 4, 1992, AAA, then already 14 years old, was with her youngest sister
when respondent instructed her to go home immediately. The moment she arrived,
respondent began undressing her. Thereafter, he inserted his penis into AAAs
vagina. Pointing a knife at the latters neck, respondent warned her not to tell
anyone about the incident.
In 1996, AAAs younger sister, BBB, went through the same ordeal in respondents
hands. On April 2, 1996, BBB was washing the dishes at home when respondent
arrived drunk and ordered her to undress. Thereafter, he took off his clothes and
dragged her inside a room. She cried and pleaded with her father to stop but he
warned her not to refuse him otherwise he would kill her, her mother and her
siblings. Respondent then positioned himself on top of her, sucked her breasts,
inserted his fingers, then his penis, into her. After the dastardly act, he told her to
take a bath and go to sleep.
On October 7, 1996, respondent sent BBBs brother on an errand. After the boy left,
he undressed her and forced her to lie down. She begged respondent not to repeat
what he had done to her in the past but the latter took no heed. Instead, he again
threatened to kill her if she refused. She kicked respondent in the groin which
forced him to stand up in pain.
On the same day, BBB reported the incident to barangay officials. Respondent was
arrested and brought to the Las Pias police station where he was detained.
Subsequently, the following Informations were filed against him:
Criminal Case No. 97-0007 for statutory rape:
Sometime in 1986, in the Municipality of Las Pias and within the jurisdiction of the
Court, the [respondent], being the father of [AAA], then a seven (7) year old minor,
through moral ascendancy and influence and by means of force and intimidation,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously [had] carnal knowledge with [AAA] against her
will and consent.
3

Criminal Case No. 97-0007-A for Violation of RA 7610
4
in relation to Art. 335
5
of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC):
On or about the 4th day of August 1992 in the [M]unicipality of Las Pias and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the [respondent], being the father of [AAA], then a
fourteen (14) year old minor, through moral ascendancy and influence and by
means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with [AAA] against her will and consent.
6

Criminal Case No. 96-0460 for rape:
On or before the 2nd day of April 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the [respondent], being the father of [BBB], a 14 year-
old minor, through moral ascendancy and influence and by means of force and
intimidation, willfully and unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
said minor against her will and consent.
7

Criminal Case No. 96-0461 for attempted rape:
On or about the 7th day of October 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias and within
the jurisdiction of this court, the [respondent], being the father of 14 year-old [BBB]
through moral ascendancy and influence, and by means of force and intimidation
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the commission of rape directly by
overt acts by pulling [BBB] inside the bedroom of their house, forcibly removing her
panty, lying her down and placing himself on top of her[,] removing his shorts with
the manifest intent of having carnal knowledge with her against her will but the
accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the
crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, because the complainant vigorously resisted and she was able to
run away.
8

Respondent pleaded not guilty to the charges. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.
Aside from AAAs and BBBs testimonies in court, the prosecution presented their
birth certificates proving their relationship to respondent and establishing their
ages during the rape incidents.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. In Criminal (Crim.) Case Nos. 97-
0007, 97-0007-A and 96-0460, he insisted it was impossible for him to commit the
crimes since his wife was always at home. In Crim. Case No. 96-0461, he claimed
that, on October 7, 1996, he was in his neighbors house fixing a karaoke appliance.
He later on "joined a drinking spree" there. According to respondent, his daughters
filed the cases only because they were angry at him for not sending them to school.
Respondents neighbor, Allan Alvero, corroborated respondents testimony saying
he was in his house on October 7, 1996.
AAAs and BBBs mother, youngest sister and aunt also testified in respondents
defense. According to them, the whole family attended AAAs graduation on April 2,
1996 and, on October 7, 1996, BBB was not home but studying in Cabanatuan City.
After trial, the court a quo found respondent guilty of the charges. The dispositive
portion of its decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
[respondent] AGUSTIN ABELLERA Y CAMANA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in
the Informations as follows:
a. of Rape in Criminal Case No. 96-0460 committed against his daughter
[BBB] in 1996 for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659;
b. of Statutory Rape in Criminal Case No. 97-0007 committed against his
daughter [AAA] in 1986 for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
[Reclusion Perpetua];
c. of Rape in Criminal Case No. 97-0007-A committed against his daughter
[AAA in 1992] for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty [Reclusion
Perpetua]; and;
d. of Attempted Rape in Criminal Case No. 96-0461 committed against his
daughter [BBB] in 1996 for which he is sentenced to a prision term of
fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal; and to pay [AAA] and [BBB] the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and costs.
9

This case was first brought to us on automatic review. However, following People v.
Mateo,
10
we transferred it to the CA. There, respondent assigned the following
errors to the trial court: (1) giving full credence to the testimonies of the
complainants; (2) rejecting his testimony, his wifes and youngest daughters and (3)
convicting him.
In a decision dated January 21, 2005, the CA affirmed with modification the trial
courts decision convicting respondent. The CA ruled:
The trial court correctly imposed upon [respondent] the penalty corresponding to
each case, save in Crim. Case No. 96-0461 where [respondent] was charged with
attempted rape of then [14-year old BBB], i.e., by use of force and intimidation. For
said crime, the trial court sentenced him to a prison term of fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal.
Under paragraph 1, Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime
of rape is reclusion perpetua. According to Article 57 the penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed
upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony. Following the graduated scale
in Article 71the penalty imposable upon *respondent+ in the attempted rape
is prision mayor. Absent any modifying circumstance, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor or
from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years; while the minimum term is one degree lower
than prision mayor, i.e., prision correccional, from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years.
Moreover, the impositions by the trial court of the civil liabilities [need] clarification
and modification. In line with the current jurisprudence, civil indemnity is imposed
without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of the offense. Moral
damages should be awarded taking into account that [AAA] and [BBB] were minors
at the time of rape, and considering too[,] the immeasurable havoc on their female
psyche as a result of the abominable crimes.
For the rapes committed against [AAA] in Crim. Case Nos. 97-0007 and 97-0007-A,
[respondent] shall be held to pay her P75,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively, as
civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages in each case, or the total
amount of P225,000.00. For the simple rape committed against [BBB] in Crim. Case
96-0460, the sum of P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity and as moral damages; and
for the attempted rape against her in Crim. Case No. 96-0461, the amount
of P25,000.00 representing the civil indemnity and the like sum as moral damages --
- are imposed [respectively] upon [respondent].
WHEREFORE, the appealed Joint Decision of conviction is AFFIRMED, finding
[respondent] AGUSTIN ABELLERA y CAMANA guilty of rape as separately charged in
the four (4) Informations. However, in Crim. Case No. 96-0461, the penalty
is MODIFIED in that he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of [t]wo (2)
[y]ears and [f]our months of prision correccional, as minimum, to [e]ight (8) [y]ears
and [o]ne day of prision mayor, as maximum. The civil liabilities of [respondent]
are MODIFIED, to the extent that he is hereby ordered to pay the rape victims, as
follows:
a) for the statutory rape against [AAA] in Crim. Case No. 97-0007, the sum
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
b) for the simple rape against [AAA] in Crim. Case No. 97-0007-A, the sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
c) for the attempted rape against [BBB] in Crim. Case No. 96-0461, the sum
of P25,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
11

Respondent now assails the CA decision.
After a careful study of this case, we affirm respondents conviction for statutory
rape,
12
two counts of simple rape
13
and attempted rape.
14

Respondents guilt was clear beyond the shadow of a doubt.
In Crim. Case No. 97-0007 (statutory rape), AAA testified:
q: What happened during that year 1986 if you remember?
a: It was nighttime[.] I do not remember the [exact] time, our father arrived and he
was drunk.
q: Where were you then?
a: I was at our house, sir.
q: What happened when your father arrived on that particular time?
a: I was fixing our laundry when he grabbed me.
q: What did you do when your father grabbed you while fixing your clothes?
a: I resisted, sir.
q: What did your father do when you resisted?
a: He forced me to undress including my panty, sir.
q: Did he succeed in undressing you?
a: Yes, sir.
q: What happened after your father was able to remove your dress and panty?
a: He forcibly entered his penis, sir.
15

In Crim. Case No. 97-0007-A (simple rape), AAA stated:
q: Madam Witness, on the night of August 4, 1992, do you remember where were
you then?
a: Yes, sir.
xxx
q: What were you doing on that particular date and time?
a: I just arrived from selling balut, sir.
q: Madam Witness, while you were inside your house during that particular date
and time, do you remember what happened next, if any?
a: Yes, sir.
xxx
q: What happened next?
a: When we reached the house[,] I was shocked because he suddenly entered my
room and undressed me.
q: What did you do when your father undressed you?
a: I told him not to do what he was thinking.
q: What did your father do when you [told] him not to do what he intended to do?
a: He told me, "I will kill you if you will not obey me."
q: What did you do when your father said [he will kill you]?
a: I was crying and begging. (Witness started to cry).
xxx
q: What did your father do after that?
a: [H]e removed my panty and he forcibly inserted his penis [into] my private parts.
q: Was he able to insert his penis to your private parts?
a: Yes, sir.
q: What did you do when your father inserted his penis to your vagina?
a: I tried to resist and prevent him at the same [time,] I was crying and begging him
not to do [it].
q: What else happened after you resisted?
a: He continued and forced his penis [into] my vagina until he succeeded.
16

In Crim. Case No. 96-0460 (simple rape), BBB narrated:
q: Madam Witness, at about 8 oclock in the evening of April 2, 1996, do you
remember where were you then? xxx
a: On April 2[,] my father arrived drunk.
q: What happened next after your father arrived drunk?
a: He asked me to undress myself, sir.
xxx
q: After you undressed yourself what did your father do?
a: He also undressed himself.
xxx
q: Madam Witness, what did your father do when removed his clothes?
a: He brought me inside the room, sir.
xxx
q: What did you do when your father pulled you or drag you?
a: I was begging him not to do what he [intended] to do.
xxx
q: When you say he proceeded to [do] his intention, what do you mean by that?
a: He put his body on top of me.
q: What happened when your father placed his body on top of you?
a: He sucked my breast, sir.
q: What else did your father do to you?
a: He inserted his finger in my private parts, sir.
q: What happened next when your father inserted his finger into your organ?
a: He likewise inserted his penis, sir.
17

In Crim. Case No. 96-0461 (attempted rape), BBB said:
q: Madam Witness, on October 7, 1996, at about 7 o clock in the evening, do you
remember where were you then?
a: I was at home, sir.
q: What were you doing inside your house?
a: I was fixing our clothes.
q: When you were fixing your clothes, do you remember
if anything unusualhappened?
a: Yes, sir.
xxx
q: *W+here there other persons in the household?
a: Only my brother but he was sent for an errand.
xxx
q: After your father asked your brother to leave the house, do you remember what
happened next?
a: He forcibly removed my panty, sir.
q: What did you do when your father removed your panty?
a: He laid me down, sir.
xxx
q: After your father pulled you down, what happened next?
a: He [undressed] himself, sir.
q: How about you[,] what were you doing when your father was undressing
himself?
a: I was begging to him not to repeat what he did to me in the past, sir.
xxx
q: What did your father tell you, if any?
a: "If you do not follow, I will kill you."
q: What did you do when your father [told you] those words?
a: Because I did not want the same thing to happen to me again[,] I kicked him.
xxx
q: What did he do when you kicked him?
a: He stood up, sir.
18

AAAs and BBBs testimonies in the trial court were telling. There is no question
respondent indeed committed the crimes charged. His contention that the lower
courts erred in giving full credence to his daughters testimonies deserves no merit.
Testimonies of victims of tender age are credible, more so if they are without any
motive to falsely testify against their offender.
19
Their revelations that they were
raped, coupled with their willingness to undergo public trial where they could be
compelled to describe the details of the assault on their dignity by their own father,
cannot be easily dismissed as concoctions.
20
It would be the height of moral and
psychological depravity if they were to fabricate sordid tales of sexual defloration
(which could put him behind bars for the rest of his life) if they were not true.
21

Respondents alibi that he could not have committed the crimes in the presence of
his wife was utterly lame. It was disproven by the categorical and positive
identification by his daughters that he was their rapist. Besides, there is no rule that
rape can only be committed in seclusion.
22

Respondents contention that he was allegedly in his neighbors house during the
October 7, 1996 rape incident was likewise untenable. For this defense of alibi to
prosper, respondent should have proven that he was in some place where it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis during the commission of
the crimes.
23
In this case, even assuming that respondent was in his neighbors
place, he was nevertheless still near his house and his daughters.
Similarly, not even the testimonies of respondents wife and youngest daughter
sufficed to negate the overwhelming evidence pointing to respondent as the sole
perpetrator of the crimes.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and (3) when the woman is under 12
years of age.
24
The third instance is "statutory rape" or carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years old.
25

On the applicable penalties, we affirm the imposition of reclusion perpetua in Crim.
Case Nos. 97-0007 and 97-0007-A (for simple rape).
26
In Crim. Case No. 96-
0460,
27
however, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
should instead be imposed pursuant to RA 9346
28
which prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty.
29

In Crim. Case No. 96-0461, we agree with the CA that the proper penalty for
attempted rape is the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for
the consummated felony.
In the scale of penalties in Article 71
30
of the RPC, the penalty two degrees lower
than death is reclusion temporal. However, with the abolition of the death penalty
by RA 9346, the highest remaining penalty is reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the
penalty lower by two degrees than reclusion perpetua is prision mayor, from which
the maximum penalty for attempted rape shall now be taken.
31
As the CA correctly
imposed, "absent any modifying circumstance, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor or
from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years; while the minimum term is one degree lower
than prision mayor, i.e.,prision correccional, from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years."
32

On damages, we see no error in the CAs award of civil indemnity and moral
damages in Crim. Case Nos. 97-0007 and 97-0007-A. However, in Crim. Case No. 96-
0460, since the death penalty was originally imposed on respondent, the award of
civil indemnity should be increased to P75,000
33
and moral damages
to P75,000.
34
Exemplary damages of P30,000 must also be awarded in these cases to
deter others with perverse tendencies from sexually abusing young girls of their
own flesh and blood.
35
1avvphi1
Moreover, in the light of recent jurisprudence,
36
the award of civil indemnity in
Crim. Case No. 96-0461 should be increased to P30,000. Exemplary damages
of P10,000 are likewise in order.
37

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00097 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Court finds respondent
Agustin Abellera y Camana GUILTY of:
(1)statutory rape in Crim. Case No. 97-0007 for which he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA P75,000
as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary
damages;
(2) simple rape in Crim. Case No. 97-0007-A for which he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA P50,000
as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary
damages;
(3) simple rape in Crim. Case No. 96-0460 for which he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and
ordered to pay BBB P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages
and P30,000 as exemplary damages;
(4) attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 96-0461 for which he is sentenced to
suffer the minimum penalty of 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. He is
likewise ordered to pay BBB P30,000 as civil indemnity, P25,000 as moral
damages and P10,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.






G.R. No. 168641 April 27, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CLEMENTE BAUTISTA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines
assailing the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 22, 2005 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 72784, reversing the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19,
Manila and dismissing the criminal case for slight physical injuries against
respondent on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida
Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangay of Malate,
Manila, but no settlement was reached. The barangay chairman then issued a
Certification to file action dated August 11, 1999.
2

On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries against herein respondent and his co-
accused. After conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-
Ong issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of
an Information against herein respondent. Such recommendation was approved by
the City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A.
Sulla, but the date of such approval cannot be found in the records. The
Information was, however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the
time the Information was filed, the 60-day period of prescription from the date of
the commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed. The
MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari, but the RTC
denied said petition and concurred with the opinion of the MeTC.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On June 22, 2005, the
CA rendered its Decision wherein it held that, indeed, the 60-day prescriptive
period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint with the OCP of
Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had
prescribed by the time the Information was filed with the MeTC, reasoning as
follows:
In the case on hand, although the approval of the Joint Resolution of ACP Junsay-
Ong bears no date, it effectively terminated the proceedings at the OCP. Hence,
even if the 10-day period for the CP or ACP Sulla, his designated alter ego, to act on
the resolution is extended up to the utmost limit, it ought not have been taken as
late as the last day of the year 1999. Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC
only on June 20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months into the next year. To use
once again the language of Article 91 of the RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was
"unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him (the accused)" for a
time very much more than the prescriptive period of only two (2) months. The
offense charged had, therefore, already prescribed when filed with the court on
June 20, 2000. x x x
3
(Emphasis supplied)
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed Orders of both
courts below and Criminal Case No. 344030-CR, entitled: "People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, -versus- Clemente Bautista and Leonida Bautista, Accused," is
ordered DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
4

Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the foregoing CA
Decision. The Court gives due course to the petition notwithstanding the fact that
petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the CA before
the filing of herein petition. It is not a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
5

The Court finds merit in the petition.
It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively
interrupted the running of the 60-day prescriptive period for instituting the criminal
action for slight physical injuries. However, the sole issue for resolution in this case
is whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating
prosecutors recommendation to file the proper criminal information against
respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor.
The answer is in the negative.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philipppine Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the investigating
prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of an information against respondent,
the period of prescription began to run again. The Court does not agree. It is a well-
settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office suspends the
running of the prescriptive period.
6

The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's
approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an information be
filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the
complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that
respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information
but such mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the interests of the
State and the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte,
7
it is unjust to deprive the
injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
8

The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by the
petitioner in the present petition considering that the delay occurred not in the
conduct of preliminary investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the
Information after the City Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor to file the information.
The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the delay in
the filing of the information. The Court will not be made as an unwitting tool in the
deprivation of the right of the offended party to vindicate a wrong purportedly
inflicted on him by the mere expediency of a prosecutor not filing the proper
information in due time.
The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors apparent lack of a sense of urgency in
fulfilling their mandate. Under the circumstances, the more appropriate course of
action should be the filing of an administrative disciplinary action against the erring
public officials.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 02-103990 is hereby REINSTATED.
Let the Secretary of the Department of Justice be furnished a copy of herein
Decision for appropriate action against the erring officials.
SO ORDERED.












G.R. No. 179035 April 16, 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JESUS PAYCANA, JR., appellant.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
Appellant Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged
1
with the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37.
Appellant pleaded not guilty during the arraignment.
2
Pre-trial ensued, in which
appellant admitted that the victim Lilybeth Balandra-Paycana (Lilybeth) is his
legitimate wife.
3

Appellant sought to exculpate himself from the crime by setting up self-defense,
claiming that it was his wife who attacked him first. In view of the nature of self-
defense, it necessarily follows that appellant admits having killed his seven (7)-
month pregnant wife, and in the process put to death their unborn child.
The prosecution presented Tito Balandra (Tito), the father of the victim; Angelina
Paycana (Angelina), appellants eldest daughter who personally witnessed the
whole gruesome incident; Barangay Tanod Juan Paraal, Jr.; Dr. Stephen Beltran,
who conducted the autopsy; and Santiago Magistrado, Jr., the embalmer who
removed the fetus from the deceaseds body.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 26 November 2002, at around
6:30 in the morning, appellant, who worked as a butcher, came home from the
slaughter house carrying his tools of trade, a knife, a bolo, and a sharpener.
4
His
wife was preparing their children for school and was waiting for him to come home
from his work. For reasons known to him alone, appellant stabbed his wife 14
times.
5
Tito, whose house is at back of appellants house, heard his daughter
shouting for help. When he arrived, he saw his daughter lying prostrate near the
door and her feet were trembling. But seeing appellant, who was armed, he
stepped back. Angelina told Tito by the window that appellant had held her
mothers neck and stabbed her.
6

Appellant claimed that he wrested the weapon from Lilybeth after she stabbed him
first. According to him, they had an altercation on the evening of 25 November
2002 because he saw a man coming out from the side of their house and when he
confronted his wife about the man, she did not answer. On the following morning,
he told her that they should live separately. As appellant got his things and was on
his way out of the door, Lilybeth stabbed him. But he succeeded in wresting the
knife from Lilybeth. And he stabbed her. He added that he was not aware of the
number of times he stabbed his wife because he was then dizzy and lots of blood
was coming out of his wound.
7

The trial court found appellant guilty in a decision dated 14 April 2005.
8
The case
was automatically appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 122 Section
3(d) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
9
The appellate court denied appellants
appeal in a decision dated 30 May 2007.
10
Appellant filed a notice of appeal dated
14 June 2007 before the Court of Appeals.
11

The Court is not convinced by appellants assertion that the trial court erred in not
appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor.
Self-defense, being essentially a factual matter, is best addressed by the trial
court.
12
In the absence of any showing that the trial court failed to appreciate facts
or circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion,
the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better
position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling reason, therefore, exists for
this Court to disturb the trial courts finding that appellant did not act in self-
defense.
Appellant failed to discharge the burden to prove self-defense. An accused who
interposes self-defense admits the commission of the act complained of. The
burden to establish self-defense is on the accused who must show by strong, clear
and convincing evidence that the killing is justified and that, therefore, no criminal
liability has attached. The first paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code
13
requires, in a plea of self-defense, (1) an unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, (2) a reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to
prevent or repel it, and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
14

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, that can validly be invoked.
15
Appellants claim of self-defense was
belied by the eyewitness testimony of his own daughter Angelina, which was
corroborated by the testimony of his father-in-law Tito and the medical findings.
Angelinas testimony was very clear on how her father strangled and stabbed her
mother just as she was about to greet him upon arriving home. She begged her
father to stop, and even tried to grab her fathers hand but to no avail.
16
Tito ran to
appellants house as he heard his daughter Lilybeths screaming for help, and he
saw her lying prostate near the door with her feet trembling. He moved back as he
saw appellant armed with a weapon. Angelina told him by the window that
appellant had held her mothers neck and stabbed her.
17

Moreover, Dr. Rey Tanchuling, a defense witness who attended to appellants
wound, testified on cross-examination that the injuries suffered by appellant were
possibly self-inflicted considering that they were mere superficial wounds.
18

In any event, self-defense on the part of appellant is further negated by the physical
evidence in the case. Specifically, the number of wounds, fourteen (14) in all,
indicates that appellant's act was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined
effort to kill his victim.
19
The victim died of multiple organ failure secondary to
multiple stab wounds.
20

The Court agrees with the trial courts observation, thus:
Angelina who is 15 years old will not testify against her father were it not
for the fact that she personally saw her father to be the aggressor and stab
her mother. Telling her grandfather immediately after the incident that
accused stabbed her mother is part of the res gestae hence, admissible as
evidence. Between the testimony of Angelica who positively identified
accused to have initiated the stabbing and continuously stabbed her
mother and on the other hand, the testimony of accused that he killed the
victim in self-defense, the testimony of the former prevails.
21

The RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly convicted appellant of the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion in the killing of his seven (7)-
month pregnant wife.
Bearing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, the crime of parricide
22
is
committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the
offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage
certificate. The testimony of the accused of being married to the victim, in itself,
may also be taken as an admission against penal interest.
23

As distinguished from infanticide,
24
the elements of unintentional abortion
25
are as
follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon such
pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is
intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in
the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it is
necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of independent
existence.
26
However, even if the child who was expelled prematurely and
deliberately were alive at birth, the offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus
with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not viable.
27
In the present case, the unborn
fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times.
The case before us is governed by the first clause of Article 48
28
because by a single
act, that of stabbing his wife, appellant committed the grave felony of parricide as
well as the less grave felony of unintentional abortion. A complex crime is
committed when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.
Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying
circumstances. Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for
the most serious crime (parricide) is death. However, the Court of Appeals properly
commuted the penalty of death imposed on the appellant to reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
29

Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence) is automatically granted to the offended party, or his/her heirs in
case of the formers death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of
the commission of any of the aforementioned crimes (murder, homicide, parricide
and rape). Moral and exemplary damages may be separately granted in addition to
indemnity. Moral damages can be awarded only upon sufficient proof that the
complainant is entitled thereto in accordance with Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, while
exemplary damages can be awarded if the crime is committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances duly proved. The amounts thereof shall be at the
discretion of the courts.
30
Hence, the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded by the
trial court to the heirs of Lilybeth is in order. They are also entitled to moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as awarded by the trial court.
31

In addition to the civil liability and moral damages, the trial court correctly made
appellant account for P25,000.00 as exemplary damages on account of relationship,
a qualifying circumstance, which was alleged and proved, in the crime of parricide.
32

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 89418-19. November 21, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODOLFO ASPILI, ERNESTO
MAGBANUA, EDUARDO MENDOZA, RODOLFO SALES, ROBERT AGUIRRE and
PACIFICO REBUTIDO,Accused-Appellants.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Enrique A. Javier, Sr. counsel de oficio for Accused-Appellants.


SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIMES; SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED WITH RAPE, COMMITTED IN THE CASE AT BAR; PENALTY
THEREOF; SAID CRIME NOW DESIGNATED AS PIRACY IN PHILIPPINE WATERS. The
Court finds, at the outset, that the trial judge erred in designating the offense
committed by the appellants as rape with homicide aggravated by robbery in band.
For one, neither in law nor in jurisprudence is there an aggravating circumstance as
robbery in band. More importantly, the evidence shows that what was committed
is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. The
overwhelming evidence reveals that the original design of the malefactors was to
commit robbery in order to facilitate their escape from the penal colony. Their
original intent did not comprehend the commission of rape. Hence, the crime of
rape cannot be regarded as the principal offense. In this case, since it attended the
commission of robbery with homicide, the rape is deemed to aggravate the crime
but damages or indemnification for the victim may be awarded. (See People v.
Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136 [1958]; People v. Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]). Instead of
ignominy, it is the rape itself that aggravates the crime (People v. Mongado, 28
SCRA 642 [1969]). With respect to the deaths of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque,
the appellants are clearly liable therefor since, as held by this Court in People v.
Mangulabnan, (99 Phil. 992 [1956]) it is immaterial that the death of a person
supervened by mere accident, provided that the homicide is produced by reason or
on occasion of the robbery. Since rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of
robbery, the offense committed by the appellants is the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, aggravated by rape, punishable under Paragraph 1 of Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). It does not matter if the technical name
assigned to the offense is rape with homicide and with robbery in band, for the real
nature of the crime charged is determined not by the title of the complaint, nor by
the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated, but by
the facts recited in the complaint or information. (See People v. Oliviera, 67 Phil.
427 [1939]) As the acts constituting robbery with homicide were clearly set forth in
the complaint and proven during trial, then the appellants may be held liable for
such crime, regardless of the erroneous designation of the offense. In passing, it
may be mentioned that the crimes committed by appellants are now denominated
as piracy in Philippine waters, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532. We
find it unnecessary to retroactively apply the provisions thereof in favor of the
appellants because the acts committed by them are likewise punishable therein
by reclusion perpetua.

2. ID.; AGGRAVATIG CIRCUMSTANCES; RECIDIVISM, IN BAND AND ABUSE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH, ALSO ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR; NOCTURNITY AND
CRAFT, NOT CONSIDERED. We find no merit in the appellants contention that
the lower court erred in considering recidivism as an aggravating circumstance. All
the appellants are recidivists. They were serving sentence at the Sta. Lucia Penal
Colony by virtue of a final judgment of conviction when they committed the above-
mentioned offenses. Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza and
Pacifico Rebutido have previously been convicted of the crimes of frustrated
homicide, serious physical injuries, theft, and murder and trespass to dwelling,
respectively. Both Rodolfo Sales and Roberto Aguirre have previously been
convicted of robbery in band. We likewise uphold the trial courts finding that the
crime was aggravated because it was committed by a band. All the six appellants
were armed when they boarded the vessel and perpetrated their dastardly acts.
There is also abuse of superior strength, since most of the victims were women and
children ranging from 2 to 9 years old. However, the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and craft should not have been considered by the lower court. There was
no showing that the appellants purposely sought the cover of night when they
committed the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Neither did the
appellants employ craft, since they had already boarded the vessel when they
pretended to buy Tanduay Rum in exchange for the dried fish and chicken they
were carrying. Even without such pretense, they could nonetheless have carried out
their unlawful scheme.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS; REQUIREMETS AND
RESTRICTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL HAVE
NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT AND DO NOT APPLY TO CONFESSIONS TAKEN BEFORE
JANUARY 17, 1973. The interlocking extrajudicial confessions executed by the
appellants are admissible even if they were not informed of their right to counsel.
These confessions were all taken in January 1970, long before the 1973 Constitution
took effect. Article III Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, for the first time,
concretized the present right of persons under custodial investigation to counsel,
how to be informed of such right and the effect of non-compliance. The
requirements and restrictions surrounding this constitutional guarantee, however,
have no retroactive effect and do not apply to confessions taken before January 17,
1973, the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. (See Magtoto v. Manguera,
63 SCRA 4 [1975])


D E C I S I O N

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The appellants seek a reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Palawan, 4th Judicial Region, Branch 48, finding them guilty of the crime of rape
with homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of robbery in band, taking
advantage of nighttime, recidivism, abuse of superior strength and craft.

The facts for the prosecution are summarized by the Solicitor General, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On December 28, 1969, the M/L Elsa left Puerto Princesa City for Dumaran,
Palawan. On board were Catalino Nadayao, the patron of the vessel; Pepito
Severino and two other crew members; and thirteen (13) passengers among whom
were Narcisa Batayola, Daisy Gonzales, Josie Gonzales, Yolanda Arque, Wenifredo
Magallanes, a certain Bunag and several children ranging from two (2) to nine (9)
years of age. All in all, 17 persons were on board M/L Elsa with some cargoes
consisting of liquor like tanduay, beer, coke, etc. The vessel left Puerto Princesa at
3:00 oclock in the morning, navigating towards the lighthouse but due to big waves
and strong winds, the launch was forced to seek shelter at Balon, Sta. Lucia, Puerto
Princesa City, arriving thereat about 6 to 7:00 oclock in the morning where they
were stranded because of the bad weather and the damaged rudder of the launch
(TSN, 2-18-70, pp. 169-176).

While at the aforementioned place, near the site of the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony, in
the afternoon between one and three oclock, two persons went aboard the M/L
Elsa. They were identified by Josie Gonzales as Pacifico Rebutido and Rodolfo Aspili,
and after Pepito Severino handed to them the liquor they left the launch (TSN, 8-26-
70, pp. 437-442).

It was later established that said two accused together with the other four, namely:
Ernesto Magbanua, Rodolfo Sales, Roberto Aguirre and Eduardo Mendoza, all
convicts colonists of Sta. Lucia Penal Colony, had been drinking liquor (tanduay)
since the morning of December 28, 1969 even as they hatched the plan to escape
from the Penal Colony with the use of M/L Elsa. The buying of the tanduay served
also the purpose of acquainting the herein accused that the crew and passengers of
M/L Elsa were innocent, peaceful and unarmed (TSN, 11-26-40, pp. 307-312).

Between 7 and 8 oclock in the evening of the same day, the six accused carried out
their agreed plan to escape and, fully armed with pistols and boloes, they boarded
the launch bringing with them chicken and dried fish. Upon boarding the launch,
they placed themselves in strategic positions. Magbanua talked to the patron of the
launch who ordered the engine operator, Pepito Severino, to fetch four bottles of
tanduay. While in the act of handing the tanduay to Magbanua, the latter suddenly
thrust his bolo at Severinos abdomen, at the same time pointing a pistol at him
shouting walang kikilos (nobody moves). This prompted Severino to jump into the
sea, after seeing also the rest of the accused draw their bolos. Witnessing all these
hostile acts and having evaded a stab by Rodolfo Sales who nevertheless chased
him, Catalino Nadayao was constrained to jump overboard. Some passengers and
the rest of the crew who were frightened by the shouting of Magbanua and the
ensuing commotion likewise jumped into the sea (TSN 2-20-70, pp. 183-193; 3-17-
70, pp. 196-197). Among the passengers who jumped overboard were Daisy
Gonzales and Yolanda Arque.

Only five persons were left in the launch who did not jump overboard. Josie
Gonzales tried to jump overboard but Ernesto Magbanua, one of the accused,
prevented her by holding both arms. Magbanua pulled and dragged her. Josie
struggled to free herself but to no avail. Magbanua succeeded in dragging her over
the cargoes where he pinned her down. While in that lying position he forcibly
raped her for about five to ten minutes. At that time, Magbanua was pointing a gun
at Josies head. After Magbanua was through, Rodolfo Sales approached her, took
off his pants and laid on top of her for about 3 to 5 minutes. At the time Sales was
raping Josie, Magbanua was still holding her and pointing a gun at her. After Sales,
Pacifico Rebutido approached her and likewise raped her. Josie tried to evade but
she was already weak and only felt pain (TSN, 8-26-70, pp. 458-463; 8-27-90, pp. 1-
23).

On the other hand, Narcisa Batayola likewise attempted to jump but Magbanua also
held her at the back portion of her dress and told her to return to the place where
she and the other children were originally hiding. She saw the accused ransacking
the cargoes and taking the contents thereof. Moments later, Roberto Aguirre then
with a pistol held Narcisa on the shoulders while Eduardo Mendoza held her legs
and wrestled her down. Aguirre had sexual intercourse with her followed by
Mendoza. Thereafter, Rodolfo Aspili brought her out toward a sawali and right
there and then made her lay down in a slanting position. When Aspili was having
sexual intercourse with her, nobody was holding her but she could no longer resist
as she was already exhausted and weak (TSN, 11-16-70, pp. 147-167).

Subsequently, the six accused left the launch and boarded their banca. Thereafter,
Josie and Narcisa together with the children jumped into the water and swam to
the bakawan to hide. They were rescued by the Baracuda Launch. In the process,
the dead bodies of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque were found.

Necropsy examination on the cadavers of Daisy and Yolanda showed that both died
of suffocation by drowning as blood was coming out from their nose, mouth and
opening of both ears due to rapture of tempanic membrane (TSN, 2-17-70, pp. 109-
124).

Dr. Dueas, the examining physician, likewise found that Josie Gonzales and Narcisa
Batayola both had undergone sexual penetration recently.

Subsequently, both Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola filed separate complaints
charging the herein, six accused with the crimes of Rape with Homicide and
Robbery in Band." (Brief for the plaintiff-appellee, pp, 2-8, Rollo, p. 334)

On the basis of the above-mentioned alleged acts committed by the accused, the
following criminal cases were filed:cralawnad

1. Criminal Case No. 3

for

Rape with Homicide and with Robbery in Band

COMPLAINT

"The undersigned complainants, after having been duly sworn to oath in
accordance with law, accuse RODOLFO ASPILI, ERNESTO MAGBANUA, EDUARDO
MENDOZA, RODOLFO SALES, ROBERTO AGUIRRE and PACIFICO REBUTIDO, of the
crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND WITH ROBBERY IN BAND, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 28th day of December, 1969, in Sitio Balon, Sta. Lucia Sub-
Colony, Municipality of Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who are all
serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment in the Iwahig Penal Colony, Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
forcibly boarded the motor launch named M/L ELSA which was then at anchor
seeking shelter in the vicinity due to bad weather and while on board the said
vessel the accused Ernesto Magbanua, Rodolfo Sales, and Pacifico Rebutido, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with deliberate intent and
lewd designs and by means of force, violence and intimidations using guns and
boloes for the purpose, had sexual intercourse one after the other with the herein
complainant JOSIE GONZALES, a minor 13 years of age, against her will, she being
one of the 17 passengers aboard the said vessel while the rest of the accused were
either having carnal knowledge with another victim NARCISA BATAYOLA, likewise a
minor 15 years of age, by means of force and intimidation and against her will;
while the others were ransacking the baggages of the passengers and on the
occasion of such acts of the accused, panic took place aboard the said vessel thus
forcing the other passengers to jump overboard for fear of bodily harm, and as a
consequence thereof, DAISY GONZALES age 15, and YOLANDA ARQUE, age 9, both
passengers of the said vessel were drowned; and further on the occasion thereof,
all the accused took and carried away, unlawfully and feloniously and against the
will of the owners thereof, cash amount of money, personal belongings and cargoes
aboard the vessel amounting to no less than TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency."

CONTRARY TO LAW and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by an
armed band, in an uninhabited place, recidivism and or reiteration, with evident
premeditation, superior strength and with the use of craft, fraud or disguise, and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4111 in relation to Article 160 of the same Code." chanrobles.com.ph : virtual
law library

SGD. PABLO GONZALES SGD. JOSIE GONZALES

Father-Complainant Complainant

(Rollo, pp. 15-16)

2. Criminal Case No. 4

for

Rape with Homicide and with Robbery in Band

COMPLAINT

"That on or about the 28th day of December, 1969, in Sitio Balon, Sta. Lucia Sub-
Colony, Municipality of Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who are
all serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment in the Iwahig Penal Colony, Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another,
forcibly boarded the motor launch named M/L ELSA which was then at anchor
seeking shelter in the vicinity due to bad weather and while on board the said
vessel, the accused Roberto Aguirre, Eduardo Mendoza and Rodolfo Aspili, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with deliberate intent and lewd
designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, using guns and boloes for
the purpose had sexual intercourse, one after the other, with herein complainant,
Narcisa Batayola, a minor 15 years of age, against her will, she being one of the 17
passengers aboard the same vessel while the rest of the accused were either having
carnal knowledge with another victim, Josie Gonzales, likewise a minor 13 years of
age, by means of force and intimidation and against her will; while the others were
ransacking the baggages of the passengers and on the occasion of such acts of the
accused, panic took place aboard the said vessel, thus forcing the other passengers
to jump over board for fear of bodily harm, and as a consequence thereof, Daisy
Gonzales age 15 and Yolanda Arque, age 9, both passengers of the said vessel were
drowned; and further on the occasion thereof, all the accused took and carried
away unlawfully and feloniously and against the will of the owners thereof, cash
amount of money, personal belongings and cargoes of the vessel amounting to no
less than P2,000.00, Philippine Currency.

"Contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstances of night time, by an armed
band in an uninhabited place, recidivism and/or reiteration, with evident
premeditation, superior strength and with the use of craft, fraud or disguise, and
penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4111 in
relation to Art. 160 of the same Code.

Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Philippines, January 7, 1970

(SGD.) CRISTITO ARQUE (SGD.) NARCISA BATAYOLA Y ARQUE Guardian-Uncle-
Complainant Complainant"

(Rollo, pp. 179-180)

The facts for the defense are summarized by their counsel as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The true facts of the cases are those testified to by Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo
Mendoza, Roberto Aguirre, Rodolfo Sales and Manolo Espino stated briefly
hereunder as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

At about 9:00 oclock in the morning of December 28, 1969, Ernesto Magbanua and
Roberto Aguirre left their nipa hut at Santa Lucia Penal Colony and went to the
Prison Brigade of the said colony to get their dirty clothes. At the brigade they met
three (3) private persons, passengers or crews of Motor Launch Elsa. They were
eating Camote Cassava with the Capataz of the colony on duty, a certain person
called Rudy.

From the brigade, Magbanua and Aguirre proceeded to the hut of Pacifico
Rebutido. There they saw Pacifico Rebutido, Rodolfo Aspili, Rodolfo Sales and
Eduardo Mendoza drinking tanduay which were brought to Rebutidos hut by the
three (3) private persons from the Motor Launch Elsa.

At about 6:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same date, Ernesto Magbanua and his
companions returned to the colony brigade for the usual daily checking and
counting of prisoners. After the checking-up, the group returned to the nipa hut of
Pacifico Rebutido and there planned to escape from the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony
situated in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. They agreed to hire the Motor Launch Elsa
anchored about ten (10) arms length from the wharf of Sta. Lucia Penal Colony in
Balon, Puerto Princesa, Palawan with money, chickens and dried fish.

At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of that date the group, defendants-appellants
herein, went to the Motor Launch Elsa using the banca of the colony and bringing
with them money, chickens and dried fish. Ernesto Magbanua boarded the launch
ahead of the rest, talked to the patron of the launch to bring them to liberty and
offered money, chickens and dried fish for their fares. His companions likewise
boarded the motor launch, Rebutido being the last to board the same at the time
when the patron of the launch was still thinking and considering the offer of
Magbanua. But when Rebutido reached the deck of the launch, he stepped on a
loose board and fell inside the engine room. The impact of his fall was so loud that
the patron jumped overboard into the sea shouting to his crews and passengers to
likewise jump into the sea. Only two women, a man and small children remained in
the launch. Magbanua told the remaining persons on board the launch not to jump
overboard because they did not have bad intentions.

Magbanua and his companions then searched for those who jumped into the sea
for anyone who may not know how to swim in order to save him. And they found a
small boy about nine (9) years of age struggling to swim. They saved him by using a
pole and pulling him towards the launch. When asked why he jumped overboard,
the boy said that he jumped because he heard the Captain of the launch shouting to
them to jump into the sea.

When the herein appellants found no more persons on the sea around the launch,
Rodolfo Aspili and Eduardo Mendoza went down to the engine room with one male
passenger of the launch and tried to start the engine. It was at that moment when
Magbanua who remained on the deck saw Josie Gonzales at the prow of the launch.
He asked her to accomodate him for a sexual intercourse, but Josie pointed him
instead to Narcisa Batayola saying that Batayola is the one having experience on the
matter. When told that he (Magbanua) did not like Batayola, Josie agreed to a
sexual intercourse if Magbanua will not harm her. She undressed herself when told
to undress. Then Magbanua opened the zipper of his pants and let Josie hold his
penis. While Josie was holding his penis, Magbanua made her lie down. He inserted
his penis inside the vagina of Josie who complained of pains. It took Magbanua
about five (5) minutes to insert only two inches of his penis inside the vagina of
Josie Gonzales. At that same moment, Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico Rebutido pulled
Magbanua up from Josie Gonzales reminding Magbanua that their agreement was
only to escape and what he was doing to Josie Gonzales was not part of their
agreement.

At about the same time that Magbanua was having sexual intercourse with Josie
Gonzales, Roberto Aguirre was also having sexual intercourse with Narcisa Batayola.
Before the intercourse, Aguirre saw Batayola about to jump into the sea. He
prevented her from jumping overboard by holding her. Then he went around the
deck of the launch to see if there were still persons swimming on the water, leaving
Batayola at the prow of the launch. Seeing none, he returned to Batayola and asked
her to have sexual intercourse with him. At first Batayola refused. But later she
undressed herself when told to undress. Aguirre made her lie down and he inserted
his penis inside the vagina of Narcisa Batayola without any difficulty. He made two
successive sexual intercourse with Narcisa Batayola, after which they both dressed
up. They were in that situation when Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico Rebotido arrived,
pulled Aguirre away and they boarded their banca because they saw someone
flashlighting the premises at the shore. Magbanua also called Aspili and Eduardo
Mendoza at the engine room and they likewise boarded their banca and proceeded
to the mangrove swamp to escape. On the way, they noticed that Aspili was left
behind." (Appellants Brief, pp. 3-6)

The two cases were consolidated and, after hearing, the lower court rendered
judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape with homicide. The
dispositive portion of the decision is set forth below:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, haloed by the illuminating light of all aforegoing facts, laws,
jurisprudence and arguments, this Court finds all the herein accused, namely:
Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza, Jr., Rodolfo Sales, Roberto
Aguirre and Pacifico Rebutido guilty of the crimes of Rape with Homicide, with the
aggravating circumstances of Robbery in Band, taking advantage of nighttime,
recidivism, abuse of superior strength and craft, in the above-entitled Criminal Case
No. 3, beyond reasonable doubt, and sentences all of them to Reclusion Perpetua,
and all, likewise, guilty of the same but separate crime with all the same
aforementioned aggravating circumstances, in the above-entitled Criminal Case No.
4, beyond reasonable doubt and imposes upon all of them, another separate
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, both penalties to be served successively, with all its
accessory penalties too in both cases, further, all same six (6) herein accused are
sentenced and ordered to pay actual damages jointly and solidarily as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. P265.00 to Josie Gonzales;

2. 24.00 to Narcisa Batayola;

3. 36.00 to Pepito Severino and

4. P1,675.00 to Catalino Nadayao, for and the other passengers, named by him
to have suffered losses, in an amount corresponding to each, respectively,

and furthermore, the same six (6) aforenamed accused are sentenced and ordered
to pay, jointly and solidarily, moral damages, in the amount of P25,000.00 to each
of Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola, their heirs and assigns respectively, as
moral damages, and ultimately to indemnify in the same manner, the parents, their
heirs and assigns of deceased Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the amount of
P30,000.00 for each and every death of the said two (2) deceased, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in all the aforecited civil liabilities. It
is further directed that an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Rodolfo Sales
and Pacifico Rebutido and not to be returned until they were in the custody of the
law." (Rollo, pp. 290-291)

We agree with the trial court that the prosecution correctly presented the facts of
the case.

The appellants raise the following assignments of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
I


"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS HEREIN ARE RAPE WITH HOMICIDE WITH THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF ROBBERY IN BAND, NIGHTTIME, SUPERIOR
STRENGTH, RECIDIVISM, AND CRAFT.
II


THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS HEREIN
CONSPIRED TO COMMIT THE OFFENSES OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND
CONVICTING ALL OF THEM OF THE SAID CRIMES." (Rollo, pp. 326-327)

The Court finds, at the outset, that the trial judge erred in designating the offense
committed by the appellants as rape with homicide aggravated by robbery in band.
For one, neither in law nor in jurisprudence is there an aggravating circumstance as
robbery in band. More importantly, the evidence shows that what was committed
is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape.

The records disclose that the appellants took control of the vessel M/L Elsa by
threatening the crew and passengers with their boloes and pistols. (TSN, pp. 452-
459, August 26, 1970; pp. 137-148, November 16, 1970) Narcisa Batayola, a
prosecution witness, testified that after the commotion that ensued when
appellants wielded their weapons, some of the appellants immediately started
ransacking the cargoes and taking the contents thereof (TSN, p. 148, November 16,
1970) These acts of the appellants therefore manifest an unlawful intent to gain,
through violence and intimidation of persons, by taking the vessel and personal
property of the crew and passengers, which comprises the crime of robbery.

The overwhelming evidence reveals that the original design of the malefactors was
to commit robbery in order to facilitate their escape from the penal colony. Their
original intent did not comprehend the commission of rape. Hence, the crime of
rape cannot be regarded as the principal offense. In this case, since it attended the
commission of robbery with homicide, the rape is deemed to aggravate the crime
but damages or indemnification for the victim may be awarded. (See People v.
Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136 [1958]; People v. Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]). Instead of
ignominy, it is the rape itself that aggravates the crime (People v. Mongado, 28
SCRA 642 [1969]).

With respect to the deaths of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the appellants are
clearly liable therefor since, as held by this Court in People v. Mangulabnan, (99
Phil. 992 [1956]) it is immaterial that the death of a person supervened by mere
accident, provided that the homicide is produced by reason or on occasion of the
robbery.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Since rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, the offense
committed by the appellants is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
aggravated by rape, punishable under Paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). It does not matter if the technical name assigned to the offense is
rape with homicide and with robbery in band, for the real nature of the crime
charged is determined not by the title of the complaint, nor by the specification of
the provision of the law alleged to have been violated, but by the facts recited in
the complaint or information. (See People v. Oliviera, 67 Phil. 427 [1939]) As the
acts constituting robbery with homicide were clearly set forth in the complaint and
proven during trial, then the appellants may be held liable for such crime,
regardless of the erroneous designation of the offense.

With the foregoing pronouncements, the Court no longer deems it necessary to
deal with the appellants argument in their first assignment of error that assuming
arguendo that they are guilty of committing rape, the crimes of rape and homicide
should be viewed as separate and distinct offenses. We have already ruled that the
crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the rape
being considered merely as an aggravating circumstance.

We find no merit in the appellants contention that the lower court erred in
considering recidivism as an aggravating circumstance. All the appellants are
recidivists. They were serving sentence at the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony by virtue of a
final judgment of conviction when they committed the above-mentioned offenses.
Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza and Pacifico Rebutido have
previously been convicted of the crimes of frustrated homicide, serious physical
injuries, theft, and murder and trespass to dwelling, respectively. Both Rodolfo
Sales and Roberto Aguirre have previously been convicted of robbery in band.

We likewise uphold the trial courts finding that the crime was aggravated because
it was committed by a band. All the six appellants were armed when they boarded
the vessel and perpetrated their dastardly acts. There is also abuse of superior
strength, since most of the victims were women and children ranging from 2 to 9
years old.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

However, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and craft should not have
been considered by the lower court. There was no showing that the appellants
purposely sought the cover of night when they committed the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide. Neither did the appellants employ craft, since they
had already boarded the vessel when they pretended to buy Tanduay Rum in
exchange for the dried fish and chicken they were carrying. Even without such
pretense, they could nonetheless have carried out their unlawful scheme.

With respect to the second assignment of error, the appellants contention that
there was no conspiracy in the commission of rape becomes immaterial in view of
the fact that all of them directly participated in its commission. Appellants
Magbanua, Sales and Rebutido took turns in raping Josie Gonzales, while appellants
Aguirre, Mendoza and Aspili ravished Narcisa Batayola. The Court accords more
weight and credence to the testimonies of complainants Gonzales and Batayola.
These two girls, 13 and 15 years old respectively, would not subject themselves to
the rigors of a public trial if they were not motivated by an honest desire to punish
their assailants. Moreover, their narrations were corroborated by the testimony of
Dr. Juanito Duenas who physically examined Gonzales and Batayola and found that
both indeed had just undergone sexual penetration.

The interlocking extrajudicial confessions executed by the appellants are admissible
even if they were not informed of their right to counsel. These confessions were all
taken in January 1970, long before the 1973 Constitution took effect. Article III
Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, for the first time, concretized the present right
of persons under custodial investigation to counsel, how to be informed of such
right and the effect of non-compliance. The requirements and restrictions
surrounding this constitutional guarantee, however, have no retroactive effect and
do not apply to confessions taken before January 17, 1973, the date of effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution. (See Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 [1975])

At any rate, even without considering these extrajudicial confessions, the Court is
convinced that the guilt of appellants has been incontrovertibly established beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution.

The Court, however, finds that the trial judge erred in imposing upon the appellants
two separate penalties of reclusion perpetua, both penalties to be served
successively. The basis for this imposition by the lower court is its finding that the
appellants are guilty of two crimes of rape with homicide, one for the rape of Josie
Gonzales and the other for the rape of Narcisa Batayola. We have already
pronounced, though, that the rape committed is merely an aggravating
circumstance. Since the appellants are found guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide aggravated by rape, recidivism, in band and abuse of
superior strength, then, applying Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, only one penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed.cralawnad

In passing, it may be mentioned that the crimes committed by appellants are now
denominated as piracy in Philippine waters, punishable under Presidential Decree
No. 532. We find it unnecessary to retroactively apply the provisions thereof in
favor of the appellants because the acts committed by them are likewise punishable
therein by reclusion perpetua.

Considering the perversity accompanying the crime, the heinous nature not only of
the offense but its manner of commission, and the refusal of the accused to learn
from their earlier convictions, the Court strongly feels that the sentences herein
imposed must be fully served. Any official who goes over any applications for
pardon or parole is urged to read the records of the case before acting on the
applications.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 3 and 4 is AFFIRMED but
MODIFIED. The appellants are found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide with the aggravating circumstances of rape, recidivism, in band and
abuse of superior strength and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The award of actual damages is hereby affirmed. The awards
representing indemnity for the deaths are increased to P50,000.00 for each victim
while the moral damages for the rapes are increased to P30,000.00 for each victim.

SO ORDERED.





























G.R. No. L-3513 September 29, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO ROQUE Y VILLENA and ALEJANDRO PEREZ Y ALONZO, defendants.
ALEJANDRO PEREZ Y ALONZO, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Jose G. Bautista for
plaintiff-appellee.
Romero & Romero for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.:
Alejandro Perez and Alberto Roque were convicted of murder in the Court of First
Instance of Manila and sentenced to a penalty of not less than 8 years of prision
mayor and not more than 14 years and 8 months ofreclusion temporal, plus
indemnity and costs. From this sentence Alejandro Perez appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but that court has certified the case to us on the ground that the penalty
that should be imposed is life imprisonment. The other accused did not appeal.
It appears from the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution that about
midnight of May 1, 1947, while Elpidio Soriano, Joaquin Cristobal, and Rogelio
Villafranca were gathered together telling stories at one end of the Pealosa
wooden bridge in the City of Manila, two men approached from the other end and,
without any warning, attacked them with gunfire. Jumping off the bridge into the
water below, Cristobal succeeded in getting away unhurt; while Villafranca, though
it hit a bullet in each arm, also managed to escape in the same manner. But Soriano
was not so fortunate, for, unable to escape, he was riddled with shot and died on
the spot with five bullet wounds..
Information gathered by the police that same night pointed to Alberto Roque and
Alejandro Perez as the malefactors. But the two had fled and were not captured
until some days later when the police came upon them as they were eating
together in a house on Asuncion Street, armed with the very guns they had used in
the commission of the crime. Taken to the police station and subjected to
questioning, they gave their account of the shooting as well as the part played by
each. Their statements were taken down in writing and thereafter authenticated by
them with their signatures.
It may be gathered from those statements that some three months prior to the
shooting the deceased and his brother "Pacing" had killed one Bienvenido
Victorio alias Bombay, a housemate and close friend of Roque, and since then
Roque and Perez had been worried with the thought that the deceased was also
after them, taking them for members of Bombay's gang. They were in this state of
mind when, walking along the estero on the night in question, they spotted Soriano
on the bridge conversing with some companions. Armed as they were with a gun
and seeing that here was a chance to eliminate a threat to their life, Roque
approached Soriano and at close range opened fire, as did also Perez who was
following not far behind. After seeing Soriano drop as a result of the fusillade and
with the rest of the group scampering for safety, Roque and Perez left the place and
passed the remainder of the night in a cemetery. Early the next morning they went
to Batangas and there stayed in the house of Perez's brother until they returned to
Manila on the 26th of the same month, the day they were arrested by the police.
At the trial appellant declared that he was not at the scene of the crime for he was
then in Marulas, Polo, Bulacan. But the alibi is so weak that it is no longer insisted
on this appeal. What is now claimed is that appellant did not fire at the deceased
and it was not in connivance with his co-accused, who was the only one who did so.
As against the contention that appellant did not fire at the deceased, we have
Roque's confession to the contrary. Villafranca it is true, testified that appellant
fired upward (disparo hacia arriba). But the witness did not say that all of the four
shots which appellant admits in confession to have fired were not aimed at
anybody, while on the other hand it is evident that he did not see appellant fire all
the four shots because, according to him, the very first bullet hit him in the left arm
and he immediately jumped off the bridge. It is likewise true that, according to the
findings of the ballistic expert, the two bullets recovered from the body of the
deceased were fired from the pistol supposedly used by Roque. But there is no
proof that all of the five wounds of the deceased and the two wounds sustained by
Villafranca were all produced by bullets fired from the same gun, while the five
shots which Roque fired according to appellant's confession are not sufficient to
account for all of the seven wounds.
In any event, regardless of whether or not the deceased was hit any appellant's
bullets, there is enough proof of conspiracy between him and his co-accused to
make him jointly liable for the killing of the deceased. Asked why he went with
Roque in order to kill the deceased, appellant says in his confession that it was
because the deceased and his brother "Pacing" wanted to kill him also. It thus
appears that appellant and his co-accused had a common motive for eliminating the
deceased. And it also appears that they were acting in concert, for according to
their confession they exchanged guns before they attacked and as Roque advanced
appellant followed, thus giving him cover, and even contributed to his offensive
power by also firing himself. They also fled and hid together here in Manila and also
in Batangas where they lived with appellant's brother for some time. Afterwards
they returned to Manila together and they were still together when arrested.
The crime committed is murder qualified by treachery, considering that the attack
was sudden and the victim was in no position to defend himself. But the fact that
appellant was only 17 years old when the crime was committed constitutes a
mitigating circumstance. This is so despite the passage of Republic Act No. 47,
reducing the age limit of minor delinquents entitled to suspension of sentence.
(People vs. Macabuhay, 83 Phil., 464; People vs. Garcia, 85 Phil., 651; and
People vs. Tapang, 88 Phil., 721. The penalty for murder should, therefore, be
imposed in the minimum degree.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court sentenced appellant to a
penalty below the range prescribed by law. To correct this error, appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 10 years of 1 day of prision mayor to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Modified as to the penalty, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.