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1. SALIGUMBA VS. PALANOG

GR. 143365, DECEMBER 4, 2008
FACTS:
Spouses Palanog filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants, spouses Valeria Saligumba
and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses Saligumbas), before the Regional Trial Court. In the complaint, spouses Palanog
alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of a
parcel of land. The spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the subject premises and
had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land.
At the trial, only the counsel for spouses Palanogs appeared. It appeared that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria
Saligumba died. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor an order issued for the substitution of the
deceased spouses Saligumbas despite notices sent to them to appear, never confirmed the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr.
and Valeria Saligumba.
After a lapse of more than two years, the trial court rendered a judgment declaring spouses Palanog the lawful owners of
the subject land. No motion for reconsideration nor appeal having been filed.
After 10 years, Palanog filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the said decision. She further requested that the
heirs and children of spouses Saligumbas be impleaded as defendants.
Petitioners thus question the decision as being void and of no legal effect because their parents were not duly
represented by counsel of record. Petitioners further argue that they have never taken part in the proceedings nor did
they voluntarily appear or participate in the case. It is unfair to bind them in a decision rendered against their deceased
parents. Therefore, being a void judgment, it has no legal nor binding effect on petitioners. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is an action for quieting of title, which is an action involving real property, extinguished upon death of the party?
RULING:
NO. The case is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real property. It is an action
that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party
dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that after a party dies and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted.
If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to
be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.


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20. SPOUSES SHEIKDING BOOC and BILY BOOC, petitioners, vs. FIVE STAR MARKETING CO., INC.,
respondent [G.R. No. 157806. November 22, 2007.]
FACTS
The petitioners are present occupants of the third floor of the building apparently owned by Five Star marketing. They
were allowed to live there for free. However, on March 15, 1999 the plaintiff notified all building occupants that it had
withdrawn the privilege granted (rental free) to them coupled with a notice of rental rates in each premises concerned,
and further required to any interested occupants to negotiate and sign a lease agreement with plaintiff. The defendants
failed and refused to lease and vacate the premises. They claim that they are co-owners of the said building and that the
respondent is merely holding the property in trust for them.
An unlawful detainer case was filed by the respondents which were decided in favor of the petitioners in the lower
courts but was overturned by the CA finding in favor of Five Star Marketing hence this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners are co-owners of the building and therefore have a right of material possession over the same
RULING
No. The court affirms the ruling of the CA that the petitioners fail to prove that petitioners Booc, purchased the lot and
constructed the building with their own money.
The petitioners claim that the subject property was being held in trust for them by Five Star Marketing and as a rule, the
burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence and such proof must be clear and
satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements.
The petitioners were unable to present competent evidence to support their allegation of ownership of the lot in question.
And the preponderance of evidence lies in favor of respondent's claim of ownership. Surely, the Deed of Sale, TCT, Tax
Declarations and Official Receipts of tax payments in the name of respondent are more convincing than the evidence
submitted by petitioners

G.R. No. 163081 June 15, 2007
ANITA UNGAB-VALEROSO, joined in by her husband, RUSELO VALEROSO, Petitioners,
vs.
AMANCIA UNGAB-GRADO, FELIX UNGAB, represented by his son ROSENDO UNGAB, ESPENILA
UNGAB-JAICTIN and RUSTICINA UNGAB-TAMALA, Respondents.

Facts:
Subject of this case is a 14.3375-hectare land in Binuni, Kolambugan, Lanao (now Binuni, Bacolod, Lanao del Norte)
registered in the name of TimoteoUngab under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (P-41)-1,550. Petitioner Anita
Ungab is the only child of Timoteo, now deceased. Respondent Felix Ungab is the brother of Timoteo while the other
respondents are the heirs of Timoteos other brothers and sisters, namely Simeona, Eugenia, Lorenzo, Lazaro, and
Margarito.
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In 1972, the heirs of CiriacoUngab filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. II-74 in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte against the brothers, sisters and heirs of Timoteo for the partition, accounting and
reconveyance of the subject land. When the case was called for trial, the parties submitted a written compromise
agreement.
On February 15, 1973, the CFI rendered judgment adopting in toto the compromise agreement.
The parties did not have the land partitioned but divided the proceeds of the land in accordance with the decision.
However, in December 1996, Anita refused to give respondents their respective shares. Respondents then filed against
petitioners Anita and her husband RuseloValeroso, a complaint for recovery of possession, partition, enforcement of
compromise agreement and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 4048 with the RTC of Iligan City.
On December 1999, the RTC held that the compromise agreement bound all the parties thereto including their heirs and
assigns, and Timoteos affidavit whose presumption of regularity petitioners failed to overcome, and the compromise
agreement created an express trust which has not yet prescribed.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision but deleted the award of
attorneys fees.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether respondents are truly co-owners of the land, as shown by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment signed by Anita
herself?

Held:
YES.
We note, however, that even without the Affidavit of Timoteo, there is still evidence on record proving that the
respondents and Timoteo indeed own the land in common. For one, there is the Affidavit of Acknowledgment dated
August 4, 1960.
Petitioners contend that respondents cannot use the Affidavit of Acknowledgment signed by Anita and her mother as
Anita was misled in signing it. A question involving the due execution of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment would
require an inquiry into the appreciation of evidence by the trial court, a matter which this Court cannot do in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The truth or falsehood of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment is a question of fact,
of which this Court cannot take cognizance. Moreover, the Affidavit of Acknowledgment, being a notarized document,
enjoys the presumption of regularity. Petitioners mere allegation that Anita was misled by her mother into signing the
affidavit could not overcome this presumption.
As properly held by the trial and appellate courts, the execution of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment and the
compromise agreement established an express trust wherein the respondents, as trustors, reposed their confidence on
petitioner Anita and her mother, as trustees, that they will hold the land subject of the co-ownership. There are no
particular words required in the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. This
express trust is shown in the two documents. Express trusts do not prescribe except when the trustee repudiates the trust.


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16. LORENZO vs. POSADAS
FACTS: Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable amount of real and personal properties. Proceedings for
the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the CFI of Zamboanga. The will
was admitted to probate.
The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties
which, under the will, were to pass to nephew Matthew ten years after the two executors named in the will was
appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee until he resigned and the plaintiff Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue (Posadas) assessed
against the estate an inheritance tax, together with the penalties for deliquency in payment. Lorenzo paid said amount
under protest, notifying Posadas at the same time that unless the amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought
for its recovery. Posadas overruled Lorenzos protest and refused to refund the said amount. Plaintiff went to court. The
CFI dismissed Lorenzos complaint and Posadas counterclaim. Both parties appealed to this court.
*Plaintiff contends that the lower court erred:
In not allowing as lawful deductions, in the determination of the net amount of the estate subject to said tax, the amounts
allowed by the court as compensation to the "trustees" and paid to them from the decedent's estate.
ISSUE:
WON in determining the net value of the estate subject to tax, is it proper to deduct the compensation due to trustees?
RULING:
The SC modified the lower courts decision with respect to the deduction of compensation due to trustees.
Certain items are required by law to be deducted from the appraised gross in arriving at the net value of the estate on
which the inheritance tax is to be computed (sec. 1539, Revised Administrative Code). In the case at bar, the defendant
and the trial court allowed a deduction of only P480.81. This sum represents the expenses and disbursements of the
executors until March 10, 1924, among which were their fees and the proven debts of the deceased. The plaintiff
contends that the compensation and fees of the trustees, which aggregate P1,187.28 (Exhibits C, AA, EE, PP, HH, JJ,
LL, NN, OO), should also be deducted under section 1539 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides, in part,
as follows: "In order to determine the net sum which must bear the tax, when an inheritance is concerned, there shall be
deducted, in case of a resident, . . . the judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings, . . . ."
A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services (Barney vs. Saunders, 16 How., 535; 14
Law. ed., 1047). But from this it does not follow that the compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at
the net value of the estate subject to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which requires trustees' commissions to be
deducted in determining the net value of the estate subject to inheritance tax (61 C. J., p. 1705). Furthermore, though a
testamentary trust has been created, it does not appear that the testator intended that the duties of his executors and
trustees should be separated. (Ibid.; In re Vanneck's Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp., 893; 175 App. Div., 363; In re Collard's
Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp., 455.) On the contrary, in paragraph 5 of his will, the testator expressed the desire that his real
estate be handled and managed by his executors until the expiration of the period of ten years therein provided. Judicial
expenses are expenses of administration (61 C. J., p. 1705) but, in State vs. Hennepin County Probate Court (112 N. W.,
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878; 101 Minn., 485), it was said: ". . . The compensation of a trustee, earned, not in the administration of the estate, but
in the management thereof for the benefit of the legatees or devises, does not come properly within the class or reason
for exempting administration expenses. . . . Service rendered in that behalf have no reference to closing the estate for the
purpose of a distribution thereof to those entitled to it, and are not required or essential to the perfection of the rights of
the heirs or legatees. . . . Trusts . . . of the character of that here before the court, are created for the the benefit of those
to whom the property ultimately passes, are of voluntary creation, and intended for the preservation of the estate. No
sound reason is given to support the contention that such expenses should be taken into consideration in fixing the value
of the estate for the purpose of this tax.

Intestate Estate of the deceased Lee Liong. RAFAEL A. DINGLASAN, ET ALS. v.s. ANG CHIA, as
Administratrix of the above intestate, LEE BING HOO alias CLARO LEE, and LEE BUN TING
Facts:
Rafael Dinglasan filed a civil case in the CFI of Capiz against Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee and one Lee Bun
Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land located in Capiz. He also filed a motion for the
appointment of a receiver. The counsel for defendants objected on the basis that there was a pending case in the same
court concerning the intestate estate of Lee Liong. The plaintiffs withdrew the motion and filed an amended complaint
seeking the inclusion of Ang Chia (widow), the administratix of the estate, as a party-defendant. The plaintiffs also filed
in the intestate proceedings a verified claim in intervention and a motion praying that a co-administrator of the estate be
appointed and the bond of the administratrix be increased. The plaintiffs made of record the pendency of the civil case
and prayed that the intestate proceedings be not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated. Thereafter, the
administratrix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention and objected to the motions made by the plaintiffs. The
trial court denied the petition for a co-administrator but increased the bond to P5,000 and stated that it would act thereon
if a motion to close the intestate proceedings is presented in due time and is objected to by petitioners. It also took
cognizance of the pendency of said civil case. The administratrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond and
instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the ground that the heirs had
already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The petitioners objected. Subsequently, the CFI of Capiz
issued in the intestate estate proceedings an order holding in abeyance the approval of their petition for an extra-judicial
partition the closing of said proceedings until after the final termination of the civil case of the same court. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue:
WON the lower court may hold the closing of the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the separate
civil action.

Held:
Yes. A probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of ordinary case because to hold
otherwise would render some rules in the ROC nugatory. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides
that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator"
What practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its
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termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the
ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of
property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and
should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. Section 17, Rule 3 also implies that a probate
case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an ordinary case wherein an administrator is made a party. To
hold otherwise would be also to render said rule nugatory. Thus, the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil
case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far
reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate.

Vda De Lopez vs Lopez
35 SCRA 81
Facts:
On October 13, 1962 Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased, filed with the
lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate children with the deceased. The
lower court approved the project of partition and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal
purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez,

represented by their mother,
Lolita B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they were illegitimate
children of the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that
their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to them. The motion was opposed by the judicial
administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was
already in the hands of the distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy,
which should be an independent action against the individual distributees..
Issue/s:
(1) whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late; and
(2) whether or not such motion was the proper remedy.
Held:
1. The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did not become
final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or orders in ordinary actions. Thus, Section 2 of
Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in Special Proceedings." And judgments or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty
(30) days from notice to the party concerned. In this case appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days
from the date of the order of closure. The remedy was therefore invoked on time.
2.
In the recent case of Uriarte vs. Uriarte, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, May 29, 1970, this Court, thru Justice Arsenio
Dizon, pointed out that there are two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status and interest in the
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estate of the deceased parent, to wit: (1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and (2) to ask for its
reopening if it has already been closed.
Demands and claims filed by any heir, legatee or party in interest to a testate or intestate succession, shall be acted upon
and decided in the same special proceedings, and not in a separate action, and the judge who has jurisdiction over the
administration of the inheritance, and who, when the time comes, will be called upon to divide and adjudicate it to the
interested parties, shall take cognizance of all such questions.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE,
Respondents.

Facts:
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death,
her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate.
On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition
and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new
administrator. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January
3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering NeliaSilverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the property
located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead
of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order.
This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by private
respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed
her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.
Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the
reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005
against private respondent to vacate the premises. Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition dated May 2, 2007 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer
for the issuance of a TRO.
Issue:
W/N the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which
are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41.
Held:
The Orders are interlocutory and thus, cannot be appealed.
The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that NeliaSilverio-Dees appeal was against an
order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2)
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that NeliaSilverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under
Sec. 3 of Rule 41.
Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated December 12, 2005
which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005, her appeal is of an order
denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges that private respondent employed the wrong remedy in
filing a notice of appeal and should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
instead.
A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an
interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon.
Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the interlocutory
order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed
separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.
In the instant case, NeliaSilverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to
vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is
not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights
therein. The purported authority of NeliaSilverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never
approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3
IntsiaRoad,Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory
and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice
of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed.
The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has now
lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.

JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS vs JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA AND
ALEJANDRO LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972

FACTS:

Jacinta Limson de Lopez was married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no children but they have legally
adopted Juanita Lopez then single but now married to Federico Guilas. Before the adoption of Juanita, Jacinta executed
a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir and executor. Doa Jacinta did not execute another will or
codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.

Nevertheless, in a project of partition executed by both Alejandro Lopez and Juanita Lopez Guilas, the right of
Juanita Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was recognized and Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441, both situated in Bacolor Pampanga
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were adjudicated to Juanita Lopez-Guilas as her share in the estate of Dona Jacinta. The rest of the estate of the
deceased was allotted to Don Alejandro.
On April 23, 1960, the trial court approved the said project of partition and on August 28, 1961, the same court
approved the correction of clerical errors appearing in the project of partition. On April 10, 1964, Juanita filed a separate
ordinary action to compel Alejandro to deliver immediately to her lots nos. 3368 and 3441 which were allocated to her
under the project of partition.
Alejandro opposed and claims that by virtue of the order dated April 23, 1960 and order of December 15, 1960
which "ordered closed and terminated the present case", the testate proceedings had already been closed and terminated;
and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after
such closure of the estate, when she could have filed a petition for relief of judgment within sixty (60) days from
December 15, 1960 under Rule 38 of the old Rules of Court.
Juanita contends that the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the order of
the court declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings, determines the termination of the probate proceedings; and
that she is not guilty of laches, because when she filed on July 20, 1964, her petition for the delivery of her share
allocated to her under the project of partition, less than 3 years had elapsed from August 28, 1961 when the amended
project of partition was approved, which is within the 5-year period for the execution of judgment by motion .
The trial court issued an order suspending the consideration of the action for delivery of the shares considering
that the action for the annulment of the project of partition is a prejudicial question. Juanita then filed an amended
complaint on the action for delivery, where she acknowledges the partial legality and validity of the project of partition
insofar as the allocation in her favor of the Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441, the delivery of which she is seeking. She then filed
a motion seeking to set aside the order suspending the consideration of the action for delivery on the ground that she
already admitted the partial legality and validity of the project of partition and it is longer a prejudicial question to her
petition of July 20, 1964 for the delivery of her share.
The trial court denied Juanita's motion on the ground that the parties themselves agreed to suspend resolution of
her petition for the delivery of her shares until after the civil action for annulment of the project of partition has been
finally settled and decided. The MR was denied
ISSUE:

WON Juanita is guilty of latches.

HELD:

NO. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts
and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. As long as the order of the distribution of the estate
has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated; because a judicial
partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided
the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed. The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his
share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-
Page 10 of 17

opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent
action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which secures for the heirs or legatees the
right to "demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession", re-states the aforecited doctrines.
In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of her share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is
just more than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition was approve and within 5 years
from April 23, 1960 when the original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two lots
allocated to her under the project of partition had not yet expired. And in the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised
Rules of Court of 1964 and the jurisprudence above cited, the order dated December 15, 1960 of the probate court
closing and terminating the probate case did not legally terminate the testate proceedings, for her share under the project
of partition has not been delivered to her.

. TIMBOL V. CANO
Facts: Mercedes Cano died leaving her only son FlorantoTimbol as sole heir. Her brother, Jose Cano, was appointed
judicial administrator. Jose proposed that the agricultural lands of the estate be leased to him at P4,000 which was
approved by the court. The court later on approved the reduction of rent to P2,400 and the conversion of some of the
agricultural lands to a subdivision. A year later, a project of partition was approved by court designating Florante as the
sole heir and he was appointed judicial administrator. He then proposed moved that the area designated for the
subdivision be increased but was opposed by Jose because the enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land
leased to him and his tenants will lose their landholdings. Nevertheless, the court approved Florantes petition hence the
case at bar.

Issue: W/N the probate court has jurisdiction to annul rights under the contract of lease though it would prejudice the
lessee

Held: YES
In probate proceedings, the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent, grants letters of administration of the
party best entitled thereto, supervises and controls all acts of administration, hears and approves claims against the estate
of the deceased, orders payment of lawful debts, authorizes sale, mortgage, or any encumbrance or real estate, directs
the delivery of the estate to those entitled. The lease was obtained with the courts approval hence if the probate court
has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation or reduction of the subject of the lease.

And though lessee may be prejudiced by the reduction, reduction alone cannot bar the reduction of the land leased
because such reduction is necessary to raise funds to pay and liquidate the debts of the estate under administration.

Page 11 of 17

Ariagavda. De Guerrea, Et al. vs. Suplico
G.r. No 144320 April 26, 2006

Facts:

Ricardo Gurrea, represented by and through his counsel Atty. Enrique Suplico (the defendant), filed an Opposition in
Special Proc. No. 7185. Inconsideration of said representation, Ricardo Gurrea agreed to pay Atty. Suplico "a contingent
fee of twenty (20%) of whatever is due me, either real or personal property" . During the pendency of the proceedings
and upon the oral instructions of Ricardo Gurrea, Atty. Supliconegotiated with the other heirs of AdelinaGurrea
regarding the transfer of the piso (apartment building) in Spain to Ricardo Gurreas daughter, Juliet Gurrea de
Melendres. Ricardo Gurrea further instructed Atty. Suplico not to enter into any settlement with the heirs unless the piso
is transferred to his daughter. Finally, the transfer of the piso worth P64,000.00 was executed and the heirs arrived at an
amicable settlement regarding the estate of AdelinaGurrea. Hence, Ricardo Gurrea withdrew his Opposition and the
heirs then drew up a project of partition which was eventually approved by the probate court.

As payment of his attorneys fees, Ricardo Gurrea offered the San Juan lot to Atty. Suplico who was initially hesitant to
accept the same as the property is occupied by squatters. However, in order not to antagonize his client, Atty. Suplico
agreed to Ricardo Gurreas proposal with the further understanding that he will receive an additional commission of 5%
if he sells the Baguio property. Thereafter, the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was drafted. The said deed was
presented to Ricardo Gurrea for his signature.

On August 20, 1975, the deed was finally signed by Ricardo Gurrea at the office of Atty. Pama, in the presence of the
latter, Atty. Suplico, Victor Tupas and another person, the last two acting as witnesses.Later, on October 7, 1980, Atty.
Suplico registered the deed and obtained a title/TCT to the San Juan property under his name. Ricardo Gurrea died on
October 22, 1980. After his death, his heirs instituted Special Pro. No. 2722 for the settlement of Ricardo Gurreas
estate.

In the said proceedings, Atty. Suplico filed several claims for unpaid attorneys fees (no claim was filed relative to
Special Proc. No. 7185); however, all were dismissed withfinality . Also in the same case, the estates administrator,
Carlos Gurrea, filed an Inventory of Properties left by the decedent, which did not initially include the property subject
of this case. The said lot was included only subsequently in the Amended Inventory.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING THE TRANSFER OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS DULY EXECUTED
BY RICARDO GURREA VIOLATES ARTICLE 1491 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND, THEREFORE, NULL
AND VOID.

Page 12 of 17

Ruling: Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code provides:1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting
attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall
apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may
take part by virtue of their profession. According to the evidence for the defendant, a Motion for Termination of
Proceeding and Discharge of the Executor and Bond dated June 20, 1975was filed in the case, alleging in paragraphs 3
and 5 thereof, that the executor Angel E. Ordoez has already turned over to the respective heirs and devisees all their
respective shares in accordance with the Project of Partition duly approved by the Court. Thereafter, more than one
month from the filing thereof, the Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed on August 20, 1975. Hence, at the time
of the execution of the questioned document, it may be concluded that Special Proceedings No. 7185 had been
terminated. The property in San Juan is no longer the subject of a litigation and may be alienated by the client to his
lawyer as payment of attorneys fees rendered. It is clear from the above-quoted ruling of the trial court that its sole
basis in concluding that Special Proceedings No. 7185 had been terminated and that the subject property is no longer the
object of litigation at the time the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed on August 20, 1975 is the
allegation of the executor, Angel E. Ordoez, in his Motion for Termination of Proceeding and Discharge of the
Executor and Bond dated June 20, 1975, that he had already turned over to the respective heirs and devisees all their
respective shares in accordance with the project of partition duly approved by the probate court.

In the present case, there is no proof to show that at the time the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed,
the probate court had issued an order granting the Motion for Termination of Proceeding and Discharge of the Executor
and Bond. Since the judge has yet to act on the above-mentioned motion, it follows that the subject property which is the
subject matter of the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest, is still the object of litigation, that is Special Proceedings
No. 7185. Furthermore, we agree with the petitioners undisputed contention that when the deed of Transfer of Rights
and Interest was executed, the title over the subject lot was still in the name of AdelinaGurrea and that it was only on
October 7, 1980 that the title was transferred in the name of Ricardo. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. In the present case, while the subject lot was assigned as Ricardos share in the project of partition
executed by the heirs of AdelinaGurrea, the title over the subject lot was still in the name of the latter and was not yet
conveyed to Ricardo when the Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed. It having been established that the subject
property was still the object of litigation at the time the subject deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the
assignment of rights and interest over the subject property in favor of respondent is null and void for being violative of
the provisions of Article 1491 of the Civil Code which expressly prohibits lawyers from acquiring property or rights
which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
. ANCHETA VS. DALAYGON G.R. 139868

FACTS:Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have
resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died, leaving
a will and she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard (husband), who was also designated as executor. The will was
admitted to probate before the Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as
Page 13 of 17

executor due to Richards renunciation of his appointment. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner)
of the QuashaAsperilla Ancheta Pena &Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.
Richard married CandelariaGuersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly
and Kevin.
Audreys will was also admitted reprobate by then to Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh
Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding. As administrator of Audreys estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an
inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audreys conjugal share in real estate with improvements
located at Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, (Makati property); (2) a current bank account in Audreys name; and (3)
shares of stock.
Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and
interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by the
Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in
turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the QuashaAsperillaAncheta Pena &NolascoLaw Offices, as
ancillary administrator.
Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, Atty.
Ancheta was appointed as ancillary administrator.
Petitioner filed in Special Proceeding, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and project of
partition of Audreys estate, with Richard being apportioned the undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333
shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the undivided interest in the
Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court and directing the Register of
Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the
Estate of W. Richard Guersey ( undivided interest) and Kyle ( undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G
Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the
Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.
12

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding also filed a project of partition wherein
2
/
5
of
Richards undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while
3
/
5
thereof were allocated to
Richards three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a
legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy. Since Richard
left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire
undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondents opposition, and in its Order disapproved the project of partition
insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richards entire undivided interest in the
Makati property to respondent.
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of the trial courts
Orders. Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the
State of Maryland on the distribution of Audreys estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since
Page 14 of 17

Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not
merely thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.,
to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.
CA annulled the trial courts Order, petitioner filed motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA
and they filed a petition for review.
ISSUE: WON the Petitioner commits a fraud in the performance of duties as Ancillary Administrator of Audreys
Estate?
HELD:Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust
and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that
trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same
degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar
transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her will and as
dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Audrey s was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland U.S.A and she was residing in the Phil. The last Will and
Testament probate before the MaryLand Court and reprobate in the Phil. Court. Clear showing that petitioner knows the
national law of the decedent.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas action appears to have breached his duties and
responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be
considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendants position, as
well as the resultant frustration of the decedents last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to
extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the
latters last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues
involved in the case.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is
governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and
Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
Page 15 of 17

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.Whena will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of
the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be
disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed
of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state
or country.
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court.
5. BERNARDO v. CA February 28, 1963
FACTS:
EusebioCapili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Eusebio died and his properties were disposed in his
will to his wife Hermogena and his 6 cousins which included Deogracias Bernardo, the executor. The wife died and she
was substituted by her collateral relatives, upon executor Bernardo's petition. Petitioner-executor filed his project of
partition, but was opposed by collateral relatives claiming that of the properties disposed of in the will are part of the
spouses conjugal partnership. Probate court heard evidence. Petitioner contended that it was donated by the wife to the
husband so it was not part of CPG and that the oppositors cannot question the validity of the donation in the probate
proceedings. Oppositors rebutted that since it was donated during marriage, it was void; hence, the husband did not own
it and cannot dispose it by will. Probate court ordered the donation voided and that executor submit another project of
partition. Petitioner filed Motion for New trial (MNT) on the ground that probate court had no jurisdiction, but was
denied. Petitioner filed for appeal to CA, but was also denied. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a probate court can determine a question of ownership over property during distribution.
HELD:
YES. Probate court has to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the testator's estate to be distributed to the
heirs who are parties to the proceedings.
As a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings," except:
a. where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case
the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate
action.

b. when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question
as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon
c. all parties give consent so that matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by
the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced

Page 16 of 17


2 EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR., vs. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ

G.R. No. 167321 July 31, 2006
Facts
Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the devisees therein. Upon
Loretos death a certain Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will. While the petition for the
probate of the will was pending, the devisee Oscar Casa died, intestate. Aquino filed a pleading entitled Appointment
of Administrator signed by Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden, all
surnamed Casa, praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as administrator of the estate of the deceased
and that he be substituted for the deceased. Petitioner contested the same.

Issue: Whether or not a person nominated as administrator by purported heirs of a devisee or legatee in a will under
probate may validly substitute for that devisee or legatee in the probate proceedings despite the fact that such
administrator is not the court-appointed administrator of the estate of the devisee or legatee?

Ruling:
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator of his estate,
because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the
deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is not
necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate. Said heirs may
designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial courT.


G.R. No. L-852 March 19, 1949
LEONIDA MARI and CARIDAD EVANGELISTA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ISAAC BONILLA and SILVINA ORDAEZ, defendants-appellants.
FACTS;
Casimiro Evangelista is a registered owner of a parcel of land (homestead) as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title
No. 4905, of the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija, consisting of 7.0652 hectares more or less situated at Valdefuente,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija;
Page 17 of 17

That Casimiro Evangelista was married to Leonida Mari plaintiff herein on February 7, 1920 at Rizal Nueva Ecija and
during their marriage and while living together as spouses they begot two children Caridad and Deogracias Evangelista
all surnamed Evangelista;
That Casimiro Evangelista died intestate on or about 1938 at Platero, Cabanatuan Nueva Ecija;
That on January 10, 1944 Deogracias Evangelista alleging to be the only heir of Casimiro Evangelista executed a
declaration of heirship. saidDeogracias Evangelista sold on the same date January 10, 1944 the property in question to
the defendants spouses, Isaac Bonilla and SilvinaOrdaez. That after the said sale on January 10, 1944 original
certificate of title No. 4905 was cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certificate of title No. 19991 was issued in the
spouses Isaac Bonilla and SilvinaOrdaez;
Judge Catalino Buenaventura gave judgment for plaintiff without costs. This is an appeal from that judgment.
ISSUE: WON A PERSON OR HEIR WHO DEPRIVED TO PARTICIPATE IN A PARTITION SHALL BE
BOUND BY SUCH PARTITION.
HELD:
Section 4 of rule 74 provides that, "If it shall appear at anything within two year after the settlement and distribution of
an estate . . . that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate such heir or
other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the court in the manner herein provided for purpose of satisfying
such participation." Far from shielding defendants against loss the adjudication and the rule under which it was made
gave them a clear warning that they were acting at their peril. "A judicial partition in probate proceeding does not bind
the heir who were not parties thereon. No partition judicial or extrajudicial could add one iota or particle to the interest
which the partitioner had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership and
certainly none of the co-owner may convey to the other more than his own true right. A judicial partition in probate
proceeding is not final and conclusive and not being of such definitive as to stop all mean of redress for a co-heir who
has been deprived of his lawful share such co-heir may still within the prescriptive period bring an action
for reivindicacionin the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated. Broad perspective of
public policy are set out in the opinion of the court in support of the wisdom of allowing a co-heir the benefits of the law
of prescription even after a partition judicial or extrajudicial has been had."
The judgment is affirmed with cost of this appeal against appellants.