PSYCHOLOGICAL

IMPACTS OF KASHMIR
CONFLICT
D EFROM
P A DEMOLITION
R T M E N TTO CONSTRUCTION
O F OF AN
A P P L I E D IDENTITY
P S Y C H O L O G Y
U n i v e r s i t y o f t h e
P u n j a b
L a h o r e

MS. SHAZIA IRFAN

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS
OF
KASHMIR CONFLICT
FROM DEMOLITION TO CONSTRUCTION OF AN IDENTITY

Kashmiri’ Perspective
MS. SHAZIA IRFAN
PREFACE
The misfortune of human
beings may be divided into two
classes: First, those inflicted
by the non-human
environment, and, second,
those inflicted by other people.
As mankind have progressed in
knowledge and technique, the
second class has become a
continually increasing
percentage of the total. In old
times, famine, for example,
was due to natural causes,
and, although people did their
best to combat it, large
numbers of them died of
starvation. At the present
moment large parts of the
world are faced with the threat
of famine, but although natural
causes have contributed to the
situation, the principal causes
are human. For six years the
civilized nations of the world
devoted all their best energies
to killing each other, and they
find it difficult suddenly to
switch over to keeping each
other alive. Having destroyed
harvests, dismantled
agricultural machinery, and
disorganized shipping, they
find it no easy matter to
relieve the shortage of crops in
one place by means of a
superabundance in another, as
would easily be done if the
economic system were in
normal working order. As this
illustration shows, it is now
man that is man’s worst
enemy. Nature, it is true, still
sees to it that we are mortal,
but with no progress in
medicine it will become more
and more common for people
to live until they have had their
fill of life. We are supposed to
wish to live for ever and to look
forward to the unending joys of
heaven, of which, by miracle,
the monotony will never grow
stale. But in fact, if you
question any candid person
who is no longer young, he is
very likely to tell you that,
having tasted life in this world,
he has no wish to begin again
as a ‘new boy’ in another. For
the future, therefore, it may be
taken that much the most
important evils that mankind
have to consider are those
which they inflict upon each
other through stupidity or
malevolence or both.
I think that the evils that men
inflict on each other, and by
reflection upon themselves,
have their main source in evil
passions rather than in ideas
and beliefs. But ideas and
FOREWORD
There is a speech that has
been spoken in many
languages by the leaders of
many countries. It goes like
this: “The intentions of our
country are entirely peaceful.
Yet, we are also aware that
other nations, with their new
weapons, threaten us. Thus we
must defend ourselves against
attack. By so doing, we shall
protect our way of life and
preserve the peace.” Almost
principles that do harm are, as
a rule, though not always,
cloaks for evil passions.
Excerpt of ‘Ideas that have Harmed
Mankind’
Bertrand Russell’s Unpopular
Essays
every nation claims concern
only for peace but, mistrusting
other nations, arms itself in
self-defense. The result is a
world that has been spending
$2 billion per day on arms and
armies while hundreds of
millions die of malnutrition and
untreated disease.
The elements of such conflict,
a perceived incompatibility of
actions or goals, are similar at
all levels, from nations in an Having a look on our own
arms race, to conflicted Middle history, we come to know that
Easterners. In the last decade our ancestors believed that
of the twentieth century, in after the British would have
country after country, men, gone, we’d become the
women, and children by the subjects of Hindus. As far our
millions were tortured and unique ideology, apart from
slaughtered, their homes the Hindus, as Muslims was
burned, their lives totally concerned, they believed to
disrupted. Millions of get a separate homeland and
individuals today are refugees struggled for it desperately,
from state terror and where they’d be able to spend
communal fighting; they live in their lives according to their
camps and in flimsy shelters; own beliefs. So inception of
they trudge through snowy Pakistan is associated with
hills carrying a few meager social dilemmas to which the
possessions. Today’s civil wars Muslims of Indian sub-
and state-sponsored mass- continent came across.
killings are “dirty wars.” It has
Nations and groups are found
been well said that they are
often, competing for scarce
deep rooted, highly
resources and gaining political
internationalized, fought
power. The effects of such a
ruthlessly with enormous
‘competition’ helped fuel the
human suffering, and difficult
Northern Ireland conflict,
to resolve.
where since 1969 hostilities
Social-psychological studies between the ruling Protestant
have identified several majority and the Catholic
ingredients of conflict. What’s minority have claimed more
striking (and what simplifies than 3,200 lives. (A comparable
our task) is that these population proportion would
ingredients are common to all number 515,000 in the United
levels of social conflict: Social States, 107,000 in Britain,
Dilemmas, Competition, 57,000 in Canada, and 36,000
Perceived Injustice, in Australia.)
Misperceptions. Let’s have a
After 9/11, war against
quick review of the past events
terrorism is what generally is
to illustrate how comes this list
associated with the ‘perceived
of conflict ingredients:
injustice.’ So, America justifies
demolition of Afghanistan as
the consequences of being two countries on military
victimized by the Muslims in buildup and arms-race
general and in specific terms, including the acquisition of
by Al-Qaeda. nuclear bombs is a result of
their confrontation over
In 2003, the United States
Kashmir. The official
began the Iraq war presuming
propaganda each government
(misperception) the existence
has directed against the other
of “a vast underground
created enmity, distrust and
network that would rise in
hatred in the respective
support of coalition forces to
populations of these countries
assist security and law
against their “mortal enemy”.
enforcement.” Alas, the
This has gone on for over six
network didn’t materialize, and
decades and there is no end in
the resulting postwar security
sight. This has poisoned the
vacuum enabled looting,
minds of Indian and Pakistani
sabotage, and persistent
people. As a result we see
attacks on American forces.
political polarization and
Although toxic forces can perennial tensions amongst the
breed destructive conflict, we people that stand in the way of
can harness other forces to settling the issues like Kashmir
bring conflict to a constructive and the normalization of
resolution. These forces of relations between the two
peace and harmony are listed neighbors. In addition, another
as contact, cooperation, ghastly development has been
communication and the rise of political and
conciliation. Now the question religious extremism in India
arises: How to bring these and Pakistan.
forces in action to resolve
Disputed ownership of Kashmir
issues between nations both
has resulted in a community
armed with nuclear weapons
socially, economically and
and extreme rivalry since their
more over the fact is to be
birth?
considered, psychologically
Since 1947, Pakistan and India paralyzed. People in Kashmir
are in invariable state of war are resilient to a great extent,
on Kashmir Conflict and went but they are challenged by a
for three deadly wars to claim lot of psychological and
Kashmir. The tremendous drain emotional difficulties. Most of
of resources incurred by the these difficulties are very
rarely talked about. Often they and also covers the ‘History of
are only expressed through Peacemaking in Kashmir.’
physical complaints. This
research paper is concerned
with ‘Psychological Impacts of Ms. Shazia Irfan
Kashmir Conflict on Kashmiris’

Contents
PREFACE.....................................................................................................................3
FOREWORD................................................................................................................4
CHAPTER 1.................................................................................................................8
HISTORICAL ORIENTATION..........................................................................................8
ETYMOLOGY............................................................................................................8
EARLY HISTORY.......................................................................................................8
MUSLIM RULE..........................................................................................................9
PRINCELY STATE OF KASHMIR.................................................................................9
BRITISH ERA............................................................................................................9
KASHMIR AFTER PARTITION OF INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT......................................11
DISPUTED LAND - - - POST 1947 ERA....................................................................11
DEMOGRAPHICAL FEATURES.................................................................................13
REFERENCES:.....................................................................................................13
CHAPTER 2...............................................................................................................15
KASHMIR CONFLICT..................................................................................................15
BACKGROUND.......................................................................................................15
PAK-INDO WARS AND VALLEY OF KASHMIR...........................................................15
INDIAN VIEW..........................................................................................................16
PAKISTANI VIEW....................................................................................................18
UNPREJUDICED VIEW.............................................................................................19
REFERENCES:.....................................................................................................20
CHAPTER 1...............................................................................................................21
VIOLENCE AND VICIOUS ASSAULTS ON HUMANITY IN PRACTICE..............................21
HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE............................................................22
 INSIDE TERRORISM................................................................................................26
PSYCHOSOCIAL DILEMMAS....................................................................................27
ETHNIC BASIS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA................................................35
UPSHOT OF KASHMIR TURMOIL.............................................................................36
REFERENCES:.....................................................................................................37
CHAPTER 2...............................................................................................................42
SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND KASHMIRIITES[1].......................................................42
Social Identity and the Kashmir Conflict................................................................43
REFERENCES:.....................................................................................................46
CHAPTER 1...............................................................................................................47
RESPONSIBILITY OF A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE IN KASHMIR.......................................47
SUSTAINABLE FUTURE...........................................................................................47
PAK-INDO PEACE TALKS........................................................................................47
INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACTIVISTS........................................................................52
CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................53
CHAPTER 2...............................................................................................................55
RESPONSIBILITY OF A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE IN KASHMIR.......Error! Bookmark not
defined.
PART 1: CONFLICT
CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL ORIENTATION
ETYMOLOGY
Many historians and locals believe that Jammu was founded by Raja
Jamboolochan in 14th century BCE. During one of his hunting
campaigns he reached the Tawi River where he saw a goat and a
lion drinking water at the same place. The king was impressed and
decided to set up a town after his name, Jamboo. With the passage
of time, the name was corrupted and became "Jammu". According to
one "folk etymology", the name "Kashmir" means "desiccated land"
(from the Sanskrit: Ka = water and shimeera = desiccate).
According to another folk etymology, following Hindu mythology,
the sage Kashyapa drained a lake to produce the land now known as
Kashmir.
In the Rajatarangini, a history of Kashmir written by Kalhana in mid-
12th century, it is stated that the valley of Kashmir was formerly a
lake. This was drained by the great rishi or sage, Kashyapa, son of
Marichi, son of Brahma, by cutting the gap in the hills at Baramulla
(Varaha-mula). When Kashmir had been drained, Kashyapa asked
Brahmans to settle there. This is still the local tradition, and in the
existing physical condition of the country, we may see some ground
for the story which has taken this form. The name of Kashyapa is by
history and tradition connected with the draining of the lake, and
the chief town or collection of dwellings in the valley was called
Kashyapa-pura name which has been identified with the Kao-
1r6.nupos of Hecataeus (apud Stephen of Byzantium) and
Kaspatyros of Herodotus (3.102, 4.44). Kashmir is the country
meant also by Ptolemy's Kao-ir,~pta.
Cashmere is an archaic spelling of Kashmir, and in some countries it
is still spelled this way.

EARLY HISTORY
Kashmir was one of the major centre of Sanskrit scholars. According
to Mahabharata evidence [1], the Kambojas had ruled over Kashmir
during epic times and that it was a Republican system of
government under the Kamboj [2]. The capital city of Kashmir
(Kamboj) during epic times was Karna-Rajapuram-gatva-Kambojah-
nirjitastava[3][4], shortened to Rajapura,[5][6][7][8] which has been
identified with modern Rajauri.[9] Later, the Panchalas are stated to
have established their sway. The name Peer Panjal, which is a part
of modern Kashmir, is a witness to this fact. Panjal is simply a
distorted form of the Sanskritic tribal term Panchala. The Muslims
prefixed the word peer to it in memory of Siddha Faqir and the
name thereafter is said to have changed into Peer Panjal.[10] The
Mauryan emperor Ashoka is often credited with having founded the
city of Srinagar. Kashmir was once a Buddhist seat of learning,
perhaps with the Sarvāstivādan school dominating. East and Central
Asian Buddhist monks are recorded as having visited the kingdom.
In the late 4th century AD, the famous Kuchanese monk Kumārajīva,
born to an Indian noble family, studied Dīrghāgama and
Madhyāgama in Kashmir under Bandhudatta. He later becoming a
prolific translator who helped take Buddhism to China. His mother
Jīva is thought to have retired to Kashmir. Vimalākṣa, a
Sarvāstivādan Buddhist monk, travelled from Kashmir to Kucha and
there instructed Kumārajīva in the Vinayapiṭaka.

MUSLIM RULE
In the 14th century, Islam gradually became the dominant religion
in Kashmir, starting with the conversion in 1323 of Rincana, the first
king of a new dynasty from Ladakh. The Muslims and Hindus of
Kashmir lived in relative harmony, since the Sufi-Islamic way of life
that ordinary Muslims followed in Kashmir complemented the Rishi
tradition of Kashmiri Pandits. This led to a syncretic culture where
Hindus and Muslims revered the same local saints and prayed at the
same shrines. The famous sufi saint Bulbul Shah was able to
persuade the king of the time Rinchan Shah from Ladakh to adopt
the Islamic way of life, and the foundation of Sufiana composite
culture was laid when Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists were co-
existing.
Several Kashmiri rulers, such as Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin, were tolerant
of all religions in a manner comparable to Akbar. However, several
Muslim rulers of Kashmir were intolerant to other religions. Sultãn
Sikandar Butshikan of Kashmir (AD 1389-1413) and his (former
Brahmin) minister Saif ud-Din are often considered the worst of
these. Historians have recorded many of his atrocities. The Tarikh-i-
Firishta records that Sikandar persecuted the Hindus and issued
orders proscribing the residence of any other than Muslims in
Kashmir. He also ordered the breaking of all "golden and silver
images".

PRINCELY STATE OF KASHMIR

By the early 19th century, the Kashmir valley had passed from the
control of the Durrani Empire of Afghanistan, and four centuries of
Muslim rule under the Mughals and the Afghans, to the conquering
Sikh armies. Earlier, in 1780, after the death of Ranjit Deo, the Raja
of Jammu, the kingdom of Jammu (to the south of the Kashmir
valley) was captured by the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh of Lahore and
afterwards, until 1846, became a tributary to the Sikh power.[11]
Ranjit Deo's grandnephew, Gulab Singh, subsequently sought
service at the court of Ranjit Singh, distinguished himself in later
campaigns, especially the annexation of the Kashmir valley by the
Sikhs army in 1819, and, for his services, was created Raja of
Jammu in 1820. With the help of his officer, Zorawar Singh, Gulab
Singh soon captured Ladakh and Baltistan, regions to the east and
north-east of Jammu.[11]

BRITISH ERA

In 1845, the First Anglo-Sikh War broke out, and Gulab Singh
"contrived to hold himself aloof till the battle of Sobraon (1846),
when he appeared as a useful mediator and the trusted advisor of
Sir Henry Lawrence. Two treaties were concluded. By the first the
State of Lahore (i.e. West Punjab) handed over to the British, as
equivalent for (rupees) one crore of indemnity, the hill countries
between Beas and Indus; by the second[12] the British made over to
Gulab Singh for (Rupees) 75 lakhs all the hilly or mountainous
country situated to the east of Indus and west of Ravi" (i.e. the Vale
of Kashmir).[11] Soon after Gulab Singh's death in 1857, his son,
Ranbir Singh, added the emirates of Hunza, Gilgit and Nagar to the
kingdom.
The Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu (as it was then called) was
constituted between 1820 and 1858 and was "somewhat artificial in
composition and it did not develop a fully coherent identity, partly
as a result of its disparate origins and partly as a result of the
autocratic rule which it experienced on the fringes of Empire."[14] It
combined disparate regions, religions, and ethnicities: to the east,
Ladakh was ethnically and culturally Tibetan and its inhabitants
practised Buddhism; to the south, Jammu had a mixed population of
Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs; in the heavily populated central Kashmir
valley, the population was overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, however,
there was also a small but influential Hindu minority, the Kashmiri
brahmins or pandits; to the northeast, sparsely populated Baltistan
had a population ethnically related to Ladakh, but which practised
Shi'a Islam; to the north, also sparsely populated, Gilgit Agency,
was an area of diverse, mostly Shi'a groups; and, to the west, Punch
was Muslim, but of different ethnicity than the Kashmir valley.[14]
After the Indian Rebellion of 1857, in which Kashmir sided with the
British, and the subsequent assumption of direct rule by Great
Britain, the princely state of Kashmir came under the paramountcy
of the British Crown.
Ranbir Singh's grandson Hari Singh ascended the throne of Kashmir
in 1925. The Maharajah Hari Singh never represented the will of his
subjects, creating tension between the Hindu rulers and the Muslim
population of Kashmir. Muslims in Kashmir detested him, as they
were heavily taxed and had grown tired of his insensitivity to their
religious concerns. The Dogra rule (the name of the municipal
governments) had excluded Muslims from the civil service and the
armed services. Islamic religious ceremonies were taxed.
Historically, Muslims were banned from organizing politically, which
would only be tolerated beginning in the 1930s. In 1931, in
response to a sermon that had tones of opposition to the
government, the villages of Jandial, Makila, and Dana were
ransacked and destroyed by the Dogra army, with their inhabitants
burned alive. A legislative assembly, with no real power, was
created in January, 1947. It issued one statement that represented
the will of the Muslim people: "After carefully considering the
position, the conference has arrived at the conclusion that
accession of the State to Pakistan is absolutely necessary in view of
the geographic, economic, linguistic, cultural and religious
conditions…It is therefore necessary that the State should accede to
Pakistan".
This is one of the rare instances that an elected block of the people
of Kashmir had been given the chance to speak. Representing the
subjects who elected them, they sought accession with Muslim
Pakistan. Prem Nath Bazaz, founder of the Kashmir Socialist Party in
1943, a reliable primary source of history, reiterated that a majority
of Kashmiris were against the decision of the Maharajah in his book,
The History of The Struggle of Freedom In Kashmir. He writes, "The
large majority of the population of the State, almost the entire
Muslim community and an appreciable number of non Muslims was
totally against the Maharjah declaring accession to India." This
statement, and the decision reached by the legislative assembly are
important because they dispel any belief that the Kashmiris'
religious ties with Pakistan did not necessarily indicate a will to
unite. Indeed, the ethnic bond between Kashmir and Pakistan
influenced a majority of the people to seek accession with Pakistan.
The Hindu Maharajah would not listen, and continued to delay his
decision about which nation to join.

KASHMIR AFTER PARTITION OF INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT

Ranbir Singh's grandson Hari Singh, who had ascended the throne
of Kashmir in 1925, was the reigning monarch in 1947 at the
conclusion of British rule of the subcontinent and the subsequent
partition of the British Indian Empire into the newly independent
Union of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. As parties to the
partition process, both countries had agreed that the rulers of
princely states would be given the right to opt for either Pakistan or
India or—in special cases—to remain independent. In 1947,
Kashmir's population was "77% Muslim and 20% Hindu"[15] To
postpone making a hurried decision, the Maharaja signed a
"standstill" agreement with Pakistan, which ensured continuity of
trade, travel, communication, and similar services between the two.
Such and agreement was pending with India. In October 1947,
Pashtuns from Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province invaded
Kashmir. The ostensible aim of the guerilla campaign was to
frighten Hari Singh into submission. "Instead the Maharaja appealed
to Mountbatten[16] for assistance, and the Governor-General agreed
on the condition that the ruler accede to India."[15] Once the
Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession, "Indian soldiers
entered Kashmir and drove the Pakistani-sponsored irregulars from
all but a small section of the state. The United Nations was then
invited to mediate the quarrel. The UN mission insisted that the
opinion of Kashmiris must be ascertained, while India insisted that
no referendum could occur until all of the state had been cleared of
irregulars."[15] However, this chain of events is disputed by Pakistan,
which claims that the Indian army entered Kashmir before the
Instrument of Accession was signed.
The Pakistani government immediately contested the accession,
suggesting that it was fraudulent, that the Maharaja acted under
duress, and that he had no right to sign an agreement with India
when the standstill agreement with Pakistan was still in force.

DISPUTED LAND - - - POST 1947 ERA

According to the instruments of partition of India, the rulers of
princely states were given the choice to freely accede to either India
or Pakistan, or to remain independent. They were, however, advised
to accede to the contiguous dominion, taking into consideration the
geographical and ethnic issues.
In Kashmir, however, the Maharaja hesitated. The Maharaja, fearing
pressure from Pakistan army which entered Kashmir, agreed to join
India by signing the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947.
Kashmir was provisionally accepted into the Indian Union pending a
free and impartial plebiscite. This was spelled out in a letter from
the Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, to the Maharaja
on 27 October 1947. In the letter, accepting the accession,
Mountbatten made it clear that the State would only be
incorporated into the Indian Union after a reference had been made
to the people of Kashmir.
In the last days of 1948, a ceasefire was agreed under UN auspices;
however, since the plebiscite demanded by the UN was never
conducted, relations between India and Pakistan soured,[15] and
eventually led to two more wars over Kashmir in 1965 and 1999.
India has control of about half the area of the former princely state
of Jammu and Kashmir; Pakistan controls a third of the region, the
Northern Areas, or historically known as regions of Gilgit and
Baltistan; and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. According to
Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Although there was a clear Muslim
majority in Kashmir before the 1947 partition and its economic,
cultural, and geographic contiguity with the Muslim-majority area of
the Punjab (in Pakistan) could be convincingly demonstrated, the
political developments during and after the partition resulted in a
division of the region. Pakistan was left with territory that, although
basically Muslim in character, was thinly populated, relatively
inaccessible, and economically underdeveloped. The largest Muslim
group, situated in the Vale of Kashmir and estimated to number
more than half the population of the entire region, lay in Indian-
administered territory, with its former outlets via the Jhelum valley
route blocked."[17]
The UN Security Council on 20 January 1948 passed Resolution 39,
establishing a special commission to investigate the conflict.
Subsequent to the commission's recommendation, the Security
Council ordered in its Resolution 47, passed on 21 April 1948, that
the invading Pakistani army retreat from Jammu & Kashmir and that
the accession of Kashmir to either India or Pakistan be determined
in accordance with a plebiscite to be supervised by the UN. In a
string of subsequent resolutions, the Security Council took notice of
the continuing failure by India to hold the plebiscite. However, no
punitive action against India could be taken by the Security Council
because its resolution requiring India to hold a Plebescite was non-
binding, and the Pakistani army never left the part of the Kashmir
they occupied as required by the Security Council resolution 47. The
Government of India holds that the Maharaja signed a document of
accession to India October 26, 1947. Pakistan has disputed whether
the Maharaja actually signed the accession treaty before Indian
troops entered Kashmir. Furthermore, Pakistan claims the Indian
government has never produced an original copy of this accession
treaty and thus its validity and legality is disputed. However, India
has produced the instrument of accession with an original copy
image on its website. Alan Campbell-Johnson, the press attache to
the Viceroy of India states that "The legality of the accession is
beyond doubt."
The eastern region of the erstwhile princely state of Kashmir has
also been beset with a boundary dispute. In the late 19th- and early
20th centuries, although some boundary agreements were signed
between Great Britain, Afghanistan and Russia over the northern
borders of Kashmir, China never accepted these agreements, and
the official Chinese position did not change with the communist
takeover in 1949. By the mid-1950s the Chinese army had entered
the north-east portion of Ladakh.[17] : "By 1956–57 they had
completed a military road through the Aksai Chin area to provide
better communication between Xinjiang and western Tibet. India's
belated discovery of this road led to border clashes between the
two countries that culminated in the Sino-Indian war of October
1962."[17] China has occupied Aksai Chin since 1962 and, in addition,
an adjoining region, the Trans-Karakoram Tract was ceded by
Pakistan to China in 1965.
In 1949, the Indian government obliged Hari Singh to leave Jammu
and Kashmir, and yield the government to Sheikh Abdullah, the
leader of a popular political party, the National Conference Party.
Since then, a bitter enmity has been developed between India and
Pakistan and three wars have taken place between them over
Kashmir. The growing dispute over Kashmir also lead to the rise of
militancy in the state. The year 1989 saw the intensification of
conflict in Jammu and Kashmir as Mujahadeens from Afghanistan
slowly infiltrated the region following the end of the Soviet-Afghan
War the same year. [1]

DEMOGRAPHICAL FEATURES
In the 1901 Census of the British Indian Empire, the population of
the princely state of Kashmir was 2,905,578. Of these 2,154,695
were Muslims, 689,073 Hindus, 25,828 Sikhs, and 35,047 Buddhists.
The Hindus were found mainly in Jammu, where they constituted a
little less than 50% of the population.[18] In the Kashmir Valley, the
Hindus represented "only 524 in every 10,000 of the population (i.e.
5.24%), and in the frontier wazarats of Ladhakh and Gilgit only 94
out of every 10,000 persons (0.94%)."[18] In the same Census of
1901, in the Kashmir Valley, the total population was recorded to be
1,157,394, of which the Muslim population was 1,083,766, or 93.6%
of the population.[18] These percentages have remained fairly stable
for the last 100 years.[19] In the 1941 Census of British India,
Muslims accounted for 93.6% of the population of the Kashmir
Valley and the Hindus constituted 4%.[19] In 2003, the percentage of
Muslims in the Kashmir Valley was 95%[20] and those of Hindus 4%;
the same year, in Jammu, the percentage of Hindus was 67% and
those of Muslims 27%.[20] In the same Census of 1901, four divisions
were recorded among the Muslims of the princely state: Shaikhs,
Saiyids, Mughals, and Pathans. The Shaikhs were the most
numerous, with clan names (known as krams) including "Tantre,"
"Shaikh," "Mantu," "Ganai," "Dar," "Damar," "Lon" etc.[18] The
Saiyids, it was recorded "could be divided into those who follow the
profession of religion and those who have taken to agriculture and
other pursuits. Their kram name is "Mir." While a Saiyid retains his
saintly profession Mir is a prefix; if he has taken to agriculture, Mir
is an affix to his name."[18] The Mughals who were not numerous
were recorded to have kram names like "Mir" (a corruption of
"Mirza"), "Beg," "Bandi," "Bach," and "Ashaye." Finally, it was
recorded that the Pathans "who are more numerous than the
Mughals, ... are found chiefly in the south-west of the valley, where
Pathan colonies have from time to time been founded. The most
interesting of these colonies is that of Kuki-Khel Afridis at
Dranghaihama, who retain all the old customs and speak Pashtu."[18]
The Hindu population of Kashmir Valley in 1901 was recorded to be
60,641.[18] Among the Hindus of Jammu province, who numbered
626,177 (or 90.87% of the Hindu population of the princely state),
the most important castes recorded in the census were "Brahmans
(186,000), the Rajputs (167,000), the Khattris (48,000) and the
Thakkars (93,000)."[18]
REFERENCES:
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir#cite_ref-0
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir#cite_ref-1
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir#cite_ref-2
4. Political History of Ancient India, from the Accession of
Parikshit to the ..., 1953, p 150, Dr H. C Raychaudhuri - India;
Ethnic Settlements in Ancient India: (a Study on the Puranic
Lists of the ..., 1955, p 78, Dr S. B. Chaudhuri; An Analytical
Study of Four Nikāyas, 1971, p 311, D. K.Barua - Tipiṭaka.
5. Bhandarkar, R. G. (2001). Asoka. p. 31.
6. Pillai, Madhavan Arjunan (1988). Ancient Indian History.
p. 149.
7. Awasthi, A. B. L. (1992). Purana Index. p. 79.
8. Misra, Shivenandan (1976). Ancient Indian Republics: From the
Earliest Times to the 6th century A.D. p. 92.
9. Watters. Yuan Chawang. Vol I. p. 284.
10. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir#cite_ref-
imperialgazet-gulabsingh_10-1.
11.Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. "Kashmir:
History." page 94-95.
12. http://www.kashmir-
information.com/LegalDocs/TreatyofAmritsar.html
13. From the text of the Treaty of Amritsar, signed March 16, 1846.
14. Bowers, Paul. 2004. "Kashmir." Research Paper 4/28,
International Affairs and Defence, House of Commons Library,
United Kingdom.
15.Stein, Burton. 1998. A History of India. Oxford University
Press. 432 pages. ISBN 0195654463. Page 368.
16.Viscount Louis Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of British India,
stayed on in independent India from 1947 to 1948, serving as
the first Governor-General of the Union of India.
17. Kashmir. (2007). In Encyclopædia Britannica, from
Encyclopædia Britannica Online.
18. Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford University
Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
19. Rai, Mridu. 2004. Hindu Ruler, Muslim Subjects: Islam and the
History of Kashmir. Princeton University Press. 320 pages.
ISBN 0691116881. page 37.
20. BBC. 2003.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_fu
ture/html/default.stm
CHAPTER 2

KASHMIR CONFLICT
BACKGROUND
In 1947, British rule in India ended with the creation of two new
nations, the Union of India and the Dominion of Pakistan and the
abandonment of British suzerainty over the 562 Indian princely
states. According to the Indian Independence Act 1947, "the
suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it,
all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of
this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States",[1] so
the states were left to choose whether to join India or Pakistan or to
remain independent. Jammu and Kashmir had a predominantly
Muslim population but a Hindu ruler, and was the largest of the
princely states. Its ruler was the Dogra King (or Maharaja) Hari
Singh.
In October 1947, Pakistani tribals from Dir entered Kashmir
intending to liberate it from Dogra rule. Unable to withstand the
invasion, the Maharaja signed The Instrument of Accession that was
accepted by the Government of India on October 27, 1947.[2]

PAK-INDO WARS AND VALLEY OF KASHMIR

The irregular Pakistani tribals made rapid advances into Kashmir
(Baramulla sector) after the rumours that the Maharaja was going
to decide for the union with India. Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir
asked the Government of India to intervene. However, the
Government of India pointed out that India and Pakistan had signed
an agreement of non-intervention (maintenance of the status quo)
in Jammu and Kashmir; and although tribal fighters from Pakistan
had entered Jammu and Kashmir, there was, until then, no iron-clad
legal evidence to unequivocally prove that the Government of
Pakistan was officially involved. It would have been illegal for India
to unilaterally intervene (in an open, official capacity) unless Jammu
and Kashmir officially joined the Union of India, at which point it
would be possible to send in its forces and occupy the remaining
parts.
The Maharaja desperately needed the Indian military's help when
the Pathan tribals reached the outskirts of Srinagar. Before their
arrival into Srinagar, India argues that Maharaja Hari Singh
completed negotiations for acceding Jammu and Kashmir to India in
exchange for receiving military aid. The agreement which ceded
Jammu and Kashmir to India was signed by the Maharaja and Lord
Mountbatten.[3]
The resulting war over Kashmir, the First Kashmir War, lasted until
1948, when India moved the issue to the UN Security Council. The
UN previously had passed resolutions setting up for the monitoring
of the conflict in Kashmir. The committee it set up was called the
United Nations Committee for India and Pakistan. Following the set
up of the UNCIP the UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on
April 21, 1948. The resolution imposed that an immediate cease-fire
take place and said that Pakistan should withdraw all presence and
had no say in Jammu and Kashmir politics. It stated that India
should retain a minimum military presence and stated "that the
final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in
accordance with the will of the people expressed through the
democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted
under the auspices of the United Nations". The cease fire took place
December 31, 1948.
In 1965 and 1971, heavy fighting again broke out between India and
Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 resulted in the defeat of
Pakistan and Pakistan Military's surrender in East Pakistan
(Bangladesh). The Simla Agreement was signed in 1972 between
India and Pakistan. By this treaty, both countries agreed to settle
all issues by peaceful means and mutual discussions in the
framework of the UN Charter.
In mid-1999 insurgents and Pakistani soldiers from Pakistani
Kashmir infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir. During the winter
season, Indian forces regularly move down to lower altitudes as
severe climatic conditions makes it almost impossible for them to
guard the high peaks near the Line of Control. The insurgents took
advantage of this and occupied vacant mountain peaks of the Kargil
range overlooking the highway in Indian Kashmir, connecting
Srinagar and Leh. By blocking the highway, they wanted to cut off
the only link between the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh. This resulted
in a high-scale conflict between the Indian Army and the Pakistan
Army.
At the same time, fears of the Kargil War turning into a nuclear war
provoked the then-US President Bill Clinton to pressure Pakistan to
retreat. Faced with pressure from the international community,
Pakistan Army withdrew the remaining troops from the area ending
the conflict. India reclaimed control of the peaks which they now
patrol and monitor all year long.
Newly elected US President Barack Obama has also shown his keen
interest in taking measures to end the rivalry between Pakistan and
India, and to resolve Kashmir Conflict to restore the peace in
Kashmir valley, in fact, to ensure the peace in Asia as a whole.

INDIAN VIEW
The Indian claim to Kashmir centers on the agreement between the
Dogra Maharaja Hari Singh, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and
Lord Mountbatten according to which the erstwhile Kingdom of
Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of the Union of India
through the Instrument of Accession. It also focuses on India's claim
of secular society, an ideology that is not meant to factor religion
into governance of major policy and thus considers it irrelevant in a
boundary dispute. Another argument by India is that, in India,
minorities are very well integrated, with some members of the
minority communities holding positions of power and influence in
India. Even though more than 80% of India's population practices
Hinduism, a former President of India, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, is a
Muslim while Sonia Gandhi, the parliamentary leader of the ruling
Congress Party, is a Roman Catholic. The current prime minister of
India, Manmohan Singh, is a Sikh and leader of opposition, Lal
Krishna Advani, is a Hindu. Indian viewpoint is succinctly
summarized by Ministry of External affairs, Government of India.[4]
[5]

 India holds that the Instrument of Accession of the state of

Jammu and Kashmir to India, signed by the Maharaja Hari
Singh (erstwhile ruler of the State) on 26 October, 1947, was
completely valid in terms of the Government of India Act
(1935), Indian Independence Act (1947) and international law
and was total and irrevocable.[6]
 The Constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir had
unanimously ratified the Maharaja's Instrument of Accession to
India and had adopted a constitution for the state that called
for a perpetual merger of the state with the Indian Union. India
claims that this body was a representative one, and that its
views were those of the Kashmiri people at the time.
 India believes that all differences between India and Pakistan
including Kashmir need to be settled through bilateral
negotiations as agreed to by the two countries when they
signed the Simla Agreement on July 2, 1972.[7]
 India does not accept the Two Nation Theory that forms the
basis of Pakistan.
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 was never able
to be implemented as Pakistan failed to withdraw its forces
from Kashmir which was the first step in implementing the
resolution.[8] Now the resolution is obsolete since the
geography and demographics have been permanently altered.
 [9]
The resolution was passed by United Nations Security
Council under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.[10]
Resolutions passed under Chapter VI of UN charter are
considered non binding and have no mandatory enforceability
as opposed to the resolutions passed under Chapter VII.[11]
 India is a secular state and the many ethnic minorities in
Kashmir would be treated as second class citizens in Islamic
republic of Pakistan.
 Indian Government has repeatedly asked Pakistan not to allow
its territory to be used for terrorist attacks against India.[12]
 India has asked United Nations that It should not be leave
unchallenged or unaddressed claims of moral, political and
diplomatic support for terrorism, which were clearly in
contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolution
1373 which is a Chapter VII resolution that makes it mandatory
for member states to not provide active or passive support to
terrorist organizations.[13][14] Specifically it has pointed out that
Pakistan Governments support to Terrorist organizations Jaish-
e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba is in direct violation of this
resolution.[15]
 Indian Government has repeatedly called on United States to
declare Pakistan a Terrorist state.[16][17][18][19]
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 [20] tacitly
accepts India's stand that all outstanding issues between India
and Pakistan need to be resolved by mutual dialogue ( and
does not call for a plebiscite)
 The state of Jammu and Kashmir was made autonomous by
Article 370 of the Constitution of India.[21]
 India points to the recent state elections held in phases in
November–December 2008. High turnouts were seen in spite of
calls for boycott by Kashmiri Muslim separatists.[22]. The Pro
Indian Party National Conference emerged as the winner.[23]
 In a diverse country like India, disaffection and discontent are
not uncommon. Indian democracy has the necessary resilience
to accommodate genuine grievances within the framework of
our sovereignty, unity and integrity. Government of India has
expressed its willingness to accommodate the legitimate
political demands of the people of the state of Jammu and
Kashmir.[24]

PAKISTANI VIEW
Pakistan's claims to the disputed region are based on the rejection
of Indian claims to Kashmir, namely the Instrument of Accession.
Pakistan insists that the Maharaja was not a popular leader, and
was regarded as a tyrant by most Kashmiris. Pakistan also accuses
India of hypocrisy, as it refused to recognize the accession of
Junagadh to Pakistan and Hyderabad's independence, on the
grounds that those two states had Hindu majorities (in fact, India
occupied and forcibly integrated those two territories).
Furthermore, as he had fled Kashmir due to Pakistani invasion,
Pakistan asserts that the Maharaja held no authority in determining
Kashmir's future. Additionally, Pakistan argues that even if the
Maharaja had any authority in determining the plight of Kashmir, he
signed the Instrument of Accession under duress, thus invalidating
the legitimacy of his actions.
Pakistan also claims that Indian forces were in Kashmir before the
Instrument of Accession was signed with India, and that therefore
Indian troops were in Kashmir in violation of the Standstill
Agreement, which was designed to maintain the status quo in
Kashmir (although India was not signatory to the Agreement, signed
between Pakistan and the Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir).[25][26].
From 1990 to 1999 some organizations report that Indian Armed
Forces, its paramilitary groups, and counter-insurgent militias have
been responsible for the deaths 4,501 of Kashmiri civilians. Also
from 1990 to 1999, there are records of 4,242 women between the
ages of 7-70 that have been raped.[27][28]. Similar allegations were
also made by some human rights organizations.[29]
In short, Pakistan holds that:
 The popular Kashmiri insurgency demonstrates that the
Kashmiri people no longer wish to remain within India.
Pakistan suggests that this means that either Kashmir wants
to be with Pakistan or independent.
 According to the two-nation theory which is one of the theories
that is cited for the partition that created India and Pakistan,
Kashmir should have been with Pakistan, because it has a
Muslim majority.
 India has shown disregard to the resolutions of the UN by not
holding a plebiscite.
 The Kashmiri people have now been forced by the
circumstances to rise against the alleged repression of the
Indian army and uphold their right of self-determination
through militancy. Pakistan claims to give the Kashmiri
insurgents moral, ethical and military support.
 Recent protests in Indian administered Kashmir show a large
number of people showing increased anger over Indian rule
with massive rallies taking place to oppose Indian control of
the state.[30]
  Pakistan also points to the violence that accompanies
elections in Indian Kashmir[31] and the anti Indian sentiments
expressed by some people in the state.[32]
 Pakistan has noted the wide spread use of extra-judicial
killings in Indian-administered Kashmir carried out by Indian
security forces while claiming they were caught up in
encounters with militants. These fake encounters are common
place in Indian-administered Kashmir and the perpetrators are
spared criminal prosecution. These fake encounters go largely
uninvestigated by the authorities.[33] [34]
 Pakistan points towards reports from the United Nations which
condemns India for its human rights violations against
kashmiri people.[35]

UNPREJUDICED VIEW
For the last six decades India has maintained its occupation of the
Kashmir Valley by political manipulation and brutal military force.
The massacres of the Kashmiri Muslims by Indian forces amount to
war crimes under international law; however, the ultimate
responsibility for this genocidal policy lies with the New Delhi
rulers. If Indian government wants to continue with the occupation
of Kashmir and also expect that people of Kashmir will forego their
demands for freedom because they face a great military and
economic power like India, which has extended its cooperation with
other imperialist powers like America and Zionist Israel, then one
thing is certain: the situation will get worse; violence and terror will
flourish.
The 10-million Muslims of the Kashmir Valley want independence
from Indian colonial rule and oppression. The best course left for
India is to make a break with its previous policy, and accede to the
right to self-determination of the Kashmiris. This will not weaken
India; instead, it will show the strength of Indian democracy as well
of the humane aspects of Indian cultural tradition.
Whether the people of the Kashmir Valley decide to join India or
Pakistan, or they opt for full independence should be for them to
decide. No matter what decision they make to determine their
future as stipulated by the UN resolutions should be their and their
alone. However, it is far from certain that they will choose to join
Pakistan, but if they do so that should not worry India. In such a
case, Hindu Jammu and Buddhist Ladakh will certainly join India.
Thus, by a wise and courageous step Indian leaders can create the
political conditions under which a new era of good neighbourly
relations between India and Pakistan can materalise if they allow
the people of the Kashmir Valley to control their own destiny
instead of the inhumane treatment and humiliation at the hands of
the Indian state and its armed forces. Once the main bone of
contention between India and Pakistan is removed then the two
former rivals and “enemies” can become friends and concentrate on
socio-economic problems of their people within a peaceful
atmosphere. An independent and self-governing entity in the
Kashmir Valley will bring hope and good-will to its neighbours. By
removing the biggest unresolved problem of Kashmir that has
fueled hostility and has caused immeasurable damage, the two
countries will also be able to contain the forces of communalism and
religious fanaticism that plague India and Pakistan.
REFERENCES:
1. http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1947/cukp
ga_19470030_en_1
2. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,793895,00.
html
3. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,977469,00.
html?promoid=googlep
4. http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/kashmirissue.htm
5. http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/19jk01.pdf
6. http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/19jk01.pdf
7. http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/sim-ag.htm
8. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1399992/A-brief-history-of-
the-Kashmir-conflict.html
9. http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/kashmir/kashmir_mea/UN
.html
10. http://www.pakun.org/statements/Security_Council/2003/05132
003-01.php
11. http://www.dawn.com/2004/08/05/op.htm
12. http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/04/17/pakistan.india.
talks/index.html
13. http://www.un.int/india/ind892.pdf
14. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/index.cfm?docid=5108
15. http://secint04.un.org/india/ind575.pdf
16. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/414485.stm
17. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9403E5D61539F934A25754C0A9649C8B63&sec=&spon=&
partner=permalink&exprod=permalink
18. http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/BB05Df01.html
19. http://www.dawn.com/2009/02/08/top4.htm
20. http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1172%281998%29.pdf
21. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501021007-
356124,00.html
22. http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-11/2008-11-17-
voa33.cfm?CFID=86869934&CFTOKEN=89052312
 23. http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/28/indian.kashmir
.vote/index.html
24. http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/kashmirissue.htm
25. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1762146.stm
26. http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Pages/Brief.htm
27. http://www.mediamonitors.net/suliman1.html
28. http://www.countercurrents.org/kashmir-hashmi310307.htm
29. http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/asia/india.html
30. http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/08/18/asia/OUKWD-
UK-KASHMIR-PROTESTS.php
31. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7744724.stm
32. http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/08/top10.htm
33. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6367917.stm
34. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/01/29/india-prosecute-
police-killings-jammu-and-kashmir
35. http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/1058F3E39
F77ACE5C12574B2004E5CE3?opendocument

PART 2: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

AGAINST KASHMIRIITE IDEOLOGY
CHAPTER 1

VIOLENCE AND VICIOUS ASSAULTS ON HUMANITY IN

PRACTICE
Psychological and emotional injuries may be the most enduring
effects of major conflicts between nations in the present era, yet
historically, they may be the least addressed in terms of rebuilding
a society and preventing violence. In recent world conflicts,
terrorism has been purposely utilized against civilians as a means of
attacking the self-esteem and morale of “the enemy,” as well as
simple retribution. In fact, this is what has been happening in
Kashmir valley since 1989 (beginning of insurgency as called by
India, and interpreted as ‘freedom movement’ by Pakistan).
Kashmiriites are the victims of violence. They are being: brutally
murdered, displaced, and expropriated (direct violence); assaulted
economically and socially (structural violence); and victimized on
religious and racial grounds (Cultural violence).
Insurgency in Kashmir has existed in various forms, mainly on the
Indian administrated side of the disputed territory of Jammu and
Kashmir. Kashmir has been the target of a campaign of militancy by
all sides in the conflict. Thousands of lives have been lost since
1989 due to the intensified insurgency. Casualties include Muslim
and Hindu civilians (men, women, and children), Indian Armed
Forces, and Kashmiri and foreign militants.
The Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan has been accused by
India of supporting and training mujahideen[1][2] to fight in Jammu
and Kashmir.[3][4] While, International Human Right Groups have
accused Indian army of committing grave Human rights violations in
Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir.[5]
A 1996 Human Rights Watch report accuses the Indian military and
Indian-government backed paramilitaries of "committ[ing] serious
and widespread human rights violations in Kashmir."[6] One such
alleged massacre occurred on January 6, 1993 in the town of
Sopore. TIME Magazine described the incident as such: "In
retaliation for the killing of one soldier, paramilitary forces
rampaged through Sopore's market setting buildings ablaze and
shooting bystanders. The Indian government pronounced the event
'unfortunate' and claimed that an ammunition dump had been hit by
gunfire, setting off fires that killed most of the victims."[7] In
addition to this, there have been claims of disappearances by the
police or the army in Kashmir by several human rights
organizations.[8][9]
Many human rights organizations such as Amnesty International
and the Human Rights Watch (HRW) have condemned human rights
abuses in Kashmir by Indians such as "extra-judicial executions",
"disappearances", and torture;[10] the "Armed Forces Special Powers
Act", which "provides impunity for human rights abuses and fuels
cycles of violence. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)
grants the military wide powers of arrest, the right to shoot to kill,
and to occupy or destroy property in counterinsurgency operations.
Indian officials claim that troops need such powers because the
army is only deployed when national security is at serious risk from
armed combatants. Such circumstances, they say, call for
extraordinary measures." Human rights organizations have also
asked Indian government to repeal [11] the Public Safety Act, since "a
detainee may be held in administrative detention for a maximum of
two years without a court order."[12]
Islamic militants are accused of violence against the Kashmir
populace.[13] Thousands of civilian Kashmiri Hindus have been killed
in Kashmir over the past 10 years by Islamic militants organisations
or Muslim mobs.[14] Human rights organisations put the figure of the
number killed since the late 80's at 11,000.[15] Tens of thousands of
Kashmiri Pandits have emigrated as a result of the violence.
Estimates of the displaced varies from 170,000 to 700,000.
Thousands of Pandits have to move to Jammu because of terrorism.
[16]

HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE[17]

Before the onset of conflict in Kashmir, the term Human Rights was
not popularly known but, when the conflict started in the early 90's,
human rights became a major issue in Kashmir and all sections of
the Kashmiri society got involved in Human Rights issues.
They sent memorandums to the United Nations for humanitarian
intervention in Kashmir. Overnight, groups like Amnesty
International became a household name. Professionals like doctors,
lawyers, social activists, bureaucrats and retired judges constituted
District and local level committees.
Physicians for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International, and other international human rights groups began
reporting on human rights in Kashmir. A number of reports were
published expressing deep concern at human rights abuses
committed on all sides, particularly a systematic pattern of human
rights abuses and impunity by the Indian government.
But the Indian government has banned international human rights
groups like Amnesty International from visiting. Even the ICRC was
banned for a number of years and was only permitted limited access
to officially listed prisons and Joint Interrogation centers to ensure
the fair and humane treatment of the thousands of imprisoned
Kashmiris. ICRC operations in Kashmir are severely curtailed by a
very restrictive Memorandum of Understanding with the Indian
government which does not permit unfettered access, unannounced
visits to detention centers, or access to the “unofficial” prisons and
detention centers.
Given that inte international human rights groups have not been
permitted to rnational visit Kashmir, the primary responsibility of
human rights documentation, research and advocacy has fallen on
local Kashmiri actors. It has been a lonely and dangerous endeavor
those who have taken up this important work.
For the most part, Kashmiri society was not adequately prepared to
contend with the crisis of human rights issues that has dominated
life in Kashmir since the early 1990’s. Proper Human Rights work
has not been properly addressed and understood by Kashmiri
political groupings involved in an independence struggle. At the
beginning of the 1990’s, Indian human rights organizations visited
Kashmir and reported human rights situation through their reports.
Groups from South India, such as the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberty
Council (APCLC), also documented the human rights situation in
Kashmir, but these reports were dismissed by the government of
India as misleading and intended to “demoralize” the army.
In Kashmir, the Kashmir Bar Association and the Jammu Bar
association also did some documentation but it was not done in a
professional manner. The only organization, which documented the
human right violations in Kashmir in an organized manner, was the
Institute of Kashmir Studies (IKS). The Institute of Kashmir Studies
(IKS) was founded in the year 1992. The IKS emerged as an
organized institute and, according to its commitment, it was to
provide intellectual impetus, assist and coordinate research on
issues and problems relevant to Kashmir.
It had many objectives but most of its activities remained confined
to human right documentation. The human right division of the IKS,
under the name and style of Jammu and Kashmir Human Rights
Awareness and Documentation Centre (J&K HRADC), undertook
studies on human rights, to highlight the human right violations
perpetrated on the people of J&K.
IKS published almost 40 publications mostly relating to human
rights violations. The information by IKS was disseminated to more
than 400 organizations in India and internationally. Since the IKS
office bearers were also affiliated with a right-wing political party,
they had a lot of human and financial resources which enabled their
work. But independent observers questioned the reports of the IKS
as it was accused of politicizing human right issues. After the
detention of its chairman in November 2002, who was detained
under the Public Safety Act, the president of Jamaat –e- Islami took
over the responsibility of IKS. Soon after the detention of its
chairman, the president of Jamaat suspended the activities of IKS.
Thus, political forces interfered in the human rights work of the IKS,
while the credibility of the well-researched IKS reports were
impacted by perceived involvement of the very same.
Recent efforts to initiate objective well-founded human rights
documentation work in Kashmir have graduated to a higher level as
Kashmir civil society has stepped in. At present, the Public
Commission on Human Rights (PCHR), an independent organization
of Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (CCS), is
documenting human right situation on a monthly basis through its
publication “Informative Missive” which is also available on the
website: http://geocities.com/informativemissive. Besides the
Informative Missive, the Kashmiri Women’s Initiative for Peace and
Disarmament (KWIPD), a constituent of CCS, through its quarterly
magazine “Voices Unheard” is documenting and disseminating
violations against women and children. Please see
http://www.geocities.com/kwipd2002. The CCS also monitored the
Jammu & Kashmir assembly elections last year in November 2002,
through its report Independent Election Observer’s Team Report.
Besides CCS, the Department of Sociology from the University of
Kashmir has written reports regarding the effect of violence on
Kashmiri society. Thousands of people have been the victims of
enforced disappearances by the government. Another CCS member,
the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP), has
brought together hundreds of Kashmiri families whose members
have been the victims of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances
(EID) by the Indian government. The APDP is a collective
campaigning organization that seeks truth and justice on this
severe human rights issue in Kashmir. Recently, in April 2003, APDP
organized a worldwide hunger strike, coordinated in different cities
across the world, pressing for an end to disappearances,
prosecution of perpetrators, and appointment of a commission to
probe into all enforced disappearances. The APDP, along with other
CCS member organizations, has helped families pursue legal cases
as well as highlight this issue through reports, videos, and
seminars.
Impunity is granted to the security forces under Section 6 of the
Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) which reads as, no
prosecution, suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted
except with the prior sanction of centre, against any person in
respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the
powers conferred by this Act. There are innumerable cases in which
the army officials have carried out liquidations and assassinations
of non-combatant Kashmiris, but no action has been taken against
them. This has occurred not withstanding the Supreme Court’s
directive that, while deciding the legal validity of AFSPA, the
complaints against armed forces must be investigated.
The whole system of human right violations functions on the basis
of impunity, and legal impunity is one of the facets. The other facets
are political impunity which sustains itself on an institutionalized
lie. When it comes to political assassinations, the perpetrators are
convinced they have better served their country by torturing,
killing, or making the enemy disappear, and all this convinces the
perpetrators that they are unaccountable and have license to do
anything in the name of patriotism and the territorial integrity of
India.
This paper examines the psychological impact of terror-related
violence on Kashmir’s social environment. Historically, both state
and non-state actors have resorted to the same approaches in
terrorizing civilian populations, while using different weapons and
techniques. For both, the goals of terror are political. However, the
challenges of social and economic order cannot be adequately
undertaken unless we clearly understand the psychology of political
violence. These concepts in many ways guide domestic and foreign
policy, but have clear distinctions. On the one hand, a distinction
can be made between violence undertaken because persons have a
right to defend their home, and actions undertaken supposedly to
“alter the behaviors and attitudes of multiple audiences,”[18]
whether they are ‘conspiratorial’ or not.
Kashmir’s experience could prove important in analyzing the
psychological impact of political violence. Together with its
atmosphere of fear, the Kashmiri militants have created an
atmosphere of widespread discontent. In this regard, “the secrecy
of planning and the visibility of results” may be illustrative of a
more general phenomenon in which individual and population
vulnerability to violence is linked to terror. At least this has been
the position of researchers who have been active in the field, and
the particular case of Kashmir.
He who murders a man…it is as if he murdered the entire human
race; and if anyone saves a life, it is as if he saved the lives of all
mankind.
-Qur’an
The violent oppression, and injuries of great persons, (and I would
add nations) are not extenuated, but aggravated by the greatness
of their persons; because they have least need to commit them.
-Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
These two statements – the first found in the Qur’an, the holy book
of Islam, and the second by Thomas Hobbes, a seventeenth century
European scholar – express a dominant theme of contemporary
writings on modern political terrorism. Political terrorism, we are
told, wrestles between the role of ideas and its political
organization.
On the one hand, powerful ideological forces are creating a complex
movement, “especially under the banner of Islam”[19] thus
diminishing the traditional significance of the nation-state. On the
other hand, political organizations command “moral inhibitions”[20]
as a reasonable alternative “to alter the attitudes and behavior of
multiple audiences.”[21] As one writer has put the issue however,
“terrorism and our conceptions of it depend on…context…and on
how groups and individuals who participate in or respond to the
actions we call terrorism relate to the world in which they act.”[22]
Kashmir’s experience could prove important in contextualizing
political terrorism. Terror-related violence has left a death toll
running into tens of thousands and a population brutalized by
fighting and fear. Together with its atmosphere of fear, the
Kashmiri militants have created an atmosphere of widespread
discontent.
The advent of political terrorism has put the question of the
relationship between ideas and political organizations in a new
guise, but it is in fact an old issue. In the nineteenth century for
example, “the failure of nonviolent movements contributed to the
rise of terrorism.”[23] The result is paradoxical. Terrorism works as a
“protest leading to reform of underlying conditions;”[24] and, it
works to “destroy the infrastructure”[25] of the society. In effect,
“the nonstate or substate users of terrorism – are constrained in
their options by the lack of active mass support and by the superior
power arrayed against them.”[26] Let’s consider the Palestinian-
Israeli struggle. “Terrorism followed the failure of Arab efforts at
conventional warfare against Israel.”[27] Whereas the Palestinians
gave primacy to “winning their struggle through violence,”[28] Israel
emphasized political determination for relations. “Decoded, the
grievance can be summed up to the social and economic conditions
in the country.”[29] These issues are as central to human destruction,
as both opening statements with respect to the subject of modern
political terrorism, as it is important to deconstructing the milieu of
fear in Kashmir. Whereas the Qur’an advocates altruism, Hobbes
discusses and describes what humankind is capable of. In Kashmir,
what appears to one as the logical and desirable seems to another,
a matter ideological irrationality.

This paper will first look at the impact of terror-related violence on

Kashmir’s social environment. Then, assess the overarching goal of
political terrorism in Kashmir. Taken together, this paper examines
the trajectory of terror-related violence, its historical associations,
and reaches in mental health.

INSIDE TERRORISM

The study of terrorism focuses undue attention on the state level

impact. These realist and neo-realist notions of security position
states as unitary actors and the most important entity in the
international system. That said, the idea of terrorism is generally
considered one and the same with protecting the territory and
national interests of a state from external and increasingly internal
aggression or interference. Only threats to the security and
existence of states have been considered detrimental to global
security and thus worthy of global action. However, the factors that
engender insecurity among the people living within states are not
limited to the perpetuation of the state. The mental health and
broadly speaking security of people within states are related to
their quality of life, and therefore terror-related violence must
include a number of social and economic issues. According to the
World Health Organization’s (WHO) 2002 World Report on Violence
and Health, more than 1.6 million people died because of violence,
including collective violence such as conflicts within or between
states.

This complex notion of political terrorism wrestles between a

relationship of terror-related violence and social fear. In
contextualizing the issue, “it is critically important to assess the
effects of terrorism on society and on the political process, as well
as the responses to terrorism by society and by political
structures.”[30] On the one hand, politics largely determines the
framework on social activity and channels it in directions intended
to serve the interests of the public. On the other hand, the political
process itself tends to create an “imbalance between the resources
terrorist are able to mobilize and the power of the incumbent
regime.”[31] This in turn leads to a transformation of the political
system and social environment. It also fosters a reciprocal
interaction between politics and fear of “violence in the pursuit of
change.”[32]

A number of varying and somewhat overlapping definitions of

terrorism exist.

This concept focuses on the politics of the people. Martha Crenshaw

defines political terrorism in terms described as “the direct activity
of small groups.”[33] To provide a perspective on the nature of
political terrorism, Crenshaw points to the social, political and
economic context of the individual political actors. “There is nothing
automatic about the choice of terrorism. Like any political decision,
the decision to use terrorism is influenced by psychological
considerations and internal bargaining, as well as by reasoned or
strategic reactions to opportunities and constraints, perceived in
light of the organization’s goals.”[34] Walter Reich, in an analysis of
the psychology of terrorism borrows his definition from the U.S.
State Department:

“Premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against

non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine state
agents, normally intended to influence an audience.”[35]

This definition, like Crenshaw’s tending to isolate the condition

under which decisions are made, which Reich defines as the act of
“premeditation.” Others prefer to look at terrorism as a conscious
design “to create power where there is none or to consolidate
power where there is very little.”[36] Of course, these analyses are
not without emphasis on the last half of the nineteenth century but
it captures the increasing complexity and difficulty of defining the
issue. For example, since 1947 the conflict between India and
Pakistan over the territorial rule of Kashmir has shaped attitudes
towards terrorism. What started as essentially an indigenous
popular uprising against external rule has created a social
environment “beleaguered by terrorism, repression, misery and
destitution.”[37]

Political terrorism has been largely characterized as a “movement

of political violence….fueled by ethnic, religious and linguistic
factors.”[38] The inconsistencies and failures of government policies
in Kashmir have allowed “social elements to encourage votaries of
political violence through passive as well as active support.”[39]
Further, “peasants in villages formerly under the militants’ sway
have been disillusioned with killings, rapes, and criminal
activities.”[40] It is in this context that the concept of political
terrorism can be best understood. In Kashmir, political terrorism is
largely characterized by “movements of political violence directed
against the state, and in turn, involves repressive measures that
are often seen as a state of terrorism.”[41]

PSYCHOSOCIAL DILEMMAS

The dispute in Kashmir has derelict the psychosocial environment.

According to researchers at the University of Kashmir’s Population
Research Center, based in the Indian administered capital, Srinigar,
the demographic and health picture of the State constitutes a cause
for “serious and urgent”[42] concern. “The dispute…continues to
have an adverse affect on the health of Kashmiris.”[43] Researchers
at the International Institution for Population Sciences (IIPS) agree.
In 1998-99, at the height of the separatist movement, field officers
conducted a study of ‘important aspects of health.’

The project, titled National Family Health Survey (NFHS-2) covered

a number of topics with important policy implications such as
nutrition, primary health care, reproductive health, women’s
autonomy, and domestic violence. They collected information from
2,786 households between April 22 1999 and September 20, 1999,
and interviewed 2,744 eligible women in these households. One
health investigator on each survey team also took blood samples to
assess the prevalence of diseases in Jammu and Kashmir. The
findings suggest health and other societal neglect may be a
consequence of terror-related violence.

For example:
  49.8 percent of Women reported accessing government health
facilities for sickness;
 69.8 percent of Women are reportedly illiterate;
 55.5 percent of Women are involved in making decisions about
their own health care, but only one-fourth make these
decisions by themselves, and only about one-tenth of Women
do not need permission to go to the market or to visit friends
or relatives.
 Under 5, childhood mortality rate is 80.1 percent. “Male
children are much more likely to have received all vaccinations
than female children (61 percent compared to 50 percent).”[44]

In addition, “twenty-two percent of ever-married Women have

experienced beatings or physical mistreatment since age 15, and 9
percent experienced such violence in the 12 months preceding the
survey. Most of these Women have been beaten or physically
mistreated by their husbands.”[45] Researchers suggest that the
proliferation of political terrorism has “led to the neglect of the
preventive, promotive, public health and aspects of health care.”[46]

Two theoretical perspectives explain the role of political terrorism

on the health of Kashmir. First, “terrorism is assumed to display a
collective rationality.”[47] That is, “the benefits of a successful
terrorist campaign would presumably be shared by all individual
supporters of the group’s goals, regardless of the extent of their
active participation.”[48]

The second perspective is strategic choice. “The wide range of

terrorist activity cannot be dismissed as irrational and thus
pathological, unreasonable, or inexplicable.” Since Women are the
inactive participants, expected to benefit from the struggle,
insulating society from access to quality health services seems a
reasonable sacrifice for all. In Origins of Terrorism, Crenshaw
pushes the argument a step further with evidence that in a similar
context, “terrorism can be understood as an expression of political
strategy.”[49]

Political terrorism she argues “is a willful choice made by an

organization for political and strategic reasons, rather than as the
unintended outcome of psychological and psychosocial factors.”[50]

A strategic analysis report conducted in New York and Germany

indicates however that “average citizens may adopt a collectivist’s
conception of rationality because they recognize that what is
individually rational is collectively irrational.”[51] For example, “the
central question about the rationality of some terrorist
organizations, such as the West German groups of the 1970s or the
Weather Underground in the United States, is whether or not they
had a sufficient grasp of reality – some approximation, to whatever
degree imperfect – to calculate the likely consequences of the
courses of actions they chose.”[52] This is not to suggest terrorist
activity is ‘reasonable’ or ‘rational.’ Rather, “rational expectations
may be undermined by fantastic assumptions about the role of the
masses,”[53] and “the misperception of conditions can lead to
unrealistic expectations.”[54] The reasoning suggests, “that the
belief that terrorism is expedient is one means by which moral
inhibitions are overcome.”[55]

A community survey done by Médecins Sans Frontières in 2005

found high levels of ongoing violence across the region, with
civilians caught in the middle. The majority of people surveyed
stated having been exposed to crossfire (86%) and round-up raids
(83%). High numbers of people reported being subjected to
maltreatment (44%), forced labour (33%), kidnapping (17%), torture
(13%) and sexual violence (12%). [56]

Exposure to violence has potentially important implications for

mental health [57]. This paper presents the findings of the
community assessment survey done by Médecins Sans Frontières in
2005. The study, which was done to inform program planning,
assessed the mental health and socio-economic impact of the
ongoing violence, and the sources of support. Following excerpts
from the Médecins Sans Frontières survey revealed that:

Psychological distress was mostly expressed through symptoms

such as nervousness, tiredness, being easily frightened and
headache (Table 1). The prevalence of suicidal ideation is striking:
one-third of those surveyed had had thoughts of ending their life in
the past 30 days. Over a third of respondents were categorized as
suffering from psychological distress (SRQ ≥ 12) using the Indian
validated SRQ (33.3%, 170; CI: 28.3–38.4). The design effect for the
SRQ was 1.4. Females scored significantly higher (43.8% vs. 24.1%,
OR 2.5; CI: 1.7–3.6; p < 0.001).

Feelings of personal insecurity were significantly associated with

psychological distress (SRQ ≥ 12) for both males and females (Table
2). Psychological distress among males was significantly (p < 0.01)
associated with all self-experiences (defined as 'ever happened to
you') and most consequences of violence. Psychological distress
among females was significantly (p < 0.01) associated with
witnessing events (except hearing about/witnessing rape), as well
as the self-experience of some events (maltreatment,
arrested/kidnapped) and feelings of lack of safety and
independence.

For both genders, not feeling safe is associated with at least twice
the odds of suffering from psychological distress (Table 3). For
males, violation of modesty, forced displacement, and disability
were all associated with a significantly increased likelihood (three
times the odds) of suffering from psychological distress. For
women, the witnessing of people being killed or tortured or
dependency on outside assistance doubled the odds of suffering
psychological distress.

The majority of respondents (63.9%, 326) had recently visited a

health postor clinic: nearly half had visited a health facility more
than once (46.3%, 235) in the past 30 days. Overall, nearly half
(49.6%, 253) of respondents rated the health facilities as poor.
Women more frequently rated their physical health as bad or very
bad (male: 24.1% vs. female: 36.3%, OR 1.8; CI: 1.2–2.6; p < 0.005),
and visited the health facilities more than men (male: 40.0% vs.
female: 54.7%, OR 1.8; CI: 1.3–2.6; p = 0.005). The number of
women who had been on medication for six or more days was
significantly higher than men (male: 30.7% vs. female: 46.0%, OR
1.9; CI: 1.3–2.8; p < 0.001). A high level of psychological distress
(SRQ ≥ 12) was significantly (p < 0.01) associated with poor or very
poor self-rated health for both males (OR 4.4) and females (OR 3.4).
For males this was also associated with a higher likelihood of
visiting the clinic two times or more

(Table 4). For both males and females, high psychological distress
was also associated with a higher likelihood of being unable to or
having to cut back on work or performance of daily activities.
The most common ways of
coping were withdrawal
(isolation, not talking to
people) and aggression (Table
5). Religion was also reported
as a helpful source of support.

The data presented in this

article were gathered to
inform MSF's programme to
provide mental health support
in Kashmir. Using the SRQ (a
tool that has been validated
in other Indian studies) we
found the population had
been exposed to high levels of
violence which resulted in
one third of the respondents
suffering from psychological
distress and considering
suicide. For both genders,
currently not feeling safe was
associated with psychological
distress. For males 'violation
of modesty', displacement,
and disability were associated
with psychological distress while risk factors for females included
witnessing killing and torture. Respondents with high psychological
distress rated their own health and socio economic functioning as
poor. The most common coping mechanism was withdrawal.

Overall, one-third of respondents reported psychological distress.

This compares to a prevalence of 36% found in a study done in
among Afghan women in a refugee camp [58] using the same
instrument and similar cutoff score, but differs substantially from
another SRQ study done in a non-conflict area in India [59] where 18%
prevalence of psychological distress was found among low-income
urban women, using a relatively low cut-off score (7/8). (Using this
lower cut-off would have given a prevalence of psychological
distress of 71.4%). The contextual difference in these studies –
exposure to chronic violence as compared to 'common' stressors of
daily life for women in low urban settings – may account for this
difference.

The Self Reporting Questionnaire (SRQ) showed that a third of

respondents had contemplated suicide. Suicidal thoughts are
common for depressive disorders [60] but do not always lead to a
suicide attempt. Our findings are in line with a previous study that
reported high suicide rates in this region [61]. A high prevalence of
suicidal thoughts is more often reported among populations
suffering from chronic violence, with a similar prevalence (33%, 96,
n = 297) reported in a population of Afghan refugee women in
Pakistan using the same questionnaire (SRQ).

In our study women had significantly higher psychological distress

than man. This is in line with other studies showing women
suffering more from anxiety disorders than men after confrontation
with violence [62]. Feeling safe was found in other studies to be an
important precondition for being able to deal with adverse
traumatic experiences [63][64], and this was also found in our study.

For males, the most important risk factors for developing

psychological distress were 'violation of modesty', displacement and
disability. It is possible that these experiences are the most
distressing because they interfere with the cultural values and roles
of males in Kashmir society: upholding their dignity and being able
to protect and feed their families. Those who self-experienced
'violation of modesty' had a threefold chance of suffering from
psychological distress (p = 0.001). 'Violation of modesty' is
regarded as very degrading and in the few studies on male sexual
violence is associated with multiple perpetrators and high levels of
physical beating [65][66], which can further contribute to psychological
distress.

For women most psychological distress was associated with feelings

of powerlessness – dependency on others for daily living, and
witnessing killing and torture. Women have lower confrontations
with violence, which can be partly explained by their being largely
confined to the home [67]. The significant association of witnessing
and psychological distress among females may relate to feelings of
helplessness and guilt caused by the witnessing may be more
traumatic than experiencing the violence themselves.

Both males and females with high levels of psychological distress

rated their own health as much poorer compared to those who did
not have high levels of psychological distress (male: OR 4.4; female:
OR 3.4). Non-specific health complaints have been associated with
(traumatic) stress in other studies. It is also possible that people do
not understand the relationship between physical symptoms and
mental stress or have difficulty to articulate their emotional status
and use physical symptoms to articulate mental distress.

High psychological distress among males was significantly

associated with visiting health services more frequently. Increased
use of medical services by those suffering from traumatic-stress
related problems are common, with up to a 25% increase in number
of visits to health care facilities reported in other studies. We found
this relationship in our survey for males, but not for females. This
may be explained by the fact that for both cultural and security
reasons females depend on male escorts in order to access health
services, restricting their movements.

In our population, high psychological distress is associated with

substantially increased likelihood of socio-economic dysfunction,
and this has been reported in both Western and Asian contexts.
Socio-economic dysfunction can have broad implications, for
example by reducing capacity of
females to give care to the
children or for males to generate
income (according to traditional
roles).

The most common coping

mechanisms such as withdrawal
(self-isolation, stop speaking)
and aggression may also be
symptomatic of depression
and/or anxiety disorder (including post-traumatic stress disorder,
PTSD). Religion and family assistance are mentioned less frequently
as sources of support. This is in contrast to a study conducted in
Afghanistan that showed religion and reading the Koran as the two
main coping mechanisms for two being confronted with violence [68].

It is also concluded that the high levels of violence confronted by

the Kashmiri population have resulted in high prevalence (33%) of
mental health problems. Poor self-rated health and likelihood of
poor socio-economic functioning were associated with high levels of
psychological distress. Mental health problems in this context of
chronic violence should receive full attention through the provision
of appropriate community-based services that would improve
access to care and reduce the burden on the health system.

With killings, torture, rapes, molestations, disappearances and

detentions becoming the order of the day in Kashmir, psychiatric
disorders have seen a sharp increase post-1989. In 1989, about
1,700 patients visited the valley's lone psychiatric hospital and by
the year 2003, the number had gone up to 48,000. Before the onset
of the armed struggle, certain disorders that were not known to
Kashmiris started showing a significant presence amongst the
civilian population. The Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PSTD), one
of the psychiatric diseases, which was completely unrecognised
before 1990 has witnessed a major upsurge. Major Depressive
Disorder (MDO) follows this. There are other mental diseases like
bipolar disorder, panic, phobia; general anxiety and sleep disorders
that have also shown four-fold increase as told by Dr Arshad of the
Psychiatric Diseases Hospital in Srinagar. Substance Use Disorder or
drug addiction and suicidal tendencies has been another
repercussion of the ongoing conflict in Kashmir. Dr Arshad further
added that the patients who come to seek help are largely in the
productive age group of 25-30 years [69]. Dr Mushtaq Marghoob, a
leading psychiatrist of the valley states that women bear the brunt
of every tragedy. They have to support the family after the death of
their husbands, fathers, sons or brothers. Dr Arshad further adds
that women form a major part of the patients who are suffering
from PSTD (almost 50 per cent). For women whose husbands have
died, psychotherapy has failed to produce desired results.

A woman from Batmaloo, Srinagar saw the body of her brother who
was killed in custody by soldiers of the Indian army, the body had
been split open and his heart had been taken out. The shock
rendered her in a state of disturbed bereavement and PSTD ever
since. According to Dr Marghoob, women have become increasingly
suicidal and are resorting to sleeping pills, injections and
inhalations [70]. Even though a large number of people visit the
Psychiatric Diseases Hospital in Srinagar, however, this is only a tip
of the iceberg as large numbers of patients visit hospitals at the
district and sub-district levels.

Nearly every person, particularly women, suffer from general

anxiety and the uncertainty pertaining to the security of their family
members. This always keep them in a state of unrest and anxiety.
Even in their houses people are harassed, beaten up or taken into
custody by the troops. The fact that the situation doesn't seem to
get any better, doesn't promise a better mental state of the civilian
population, especially women, in Kashmir.

In past few years, murders, rapes, torture, custodial deaths, and

enforced disappearances have witnessed an upsurge, but the
response of the state in addressing these atrocities doesn't promise
hope for justice. The official figures of these atrocities are far too
less than the reported ones. The factual human rights situation in
Kashmir has always been rendered invisible by the national security
concerns of the government and the state centric approach of the
Indian media [71]. Living in this environment of hopelessness, there
are people like Parveena who are still willing to give a tough fight to
powers-that-be. Parveena says, "I am determined to fight till my
last breath, with or without anyone's support". People like Parveena
need to be lauded for their determination.

It is being constantly projected in the mainstream media that the

situation in Kashmir has improved, but the ever-increasing rate of
human rights violations in the valley tell us a different story. People
continue to suffer while the much-hyped slogan of Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh proclaiming 'Zero Tolerance' towards human
rights abuse stares him hard in the face!

ETHNIC BASIS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA[72]

Conflict influences health outcomes, and is used as a perpetual

mechanism of moral disengagement. To borrow a thought of David
Rapoport, researcher at the University of California, Los Angeles,
one of the most ‘arresting’ issues of political terrorism in Jammu
and Kashmir has been the “revival of terrorist activities to support
religious purposes,”41 and the mitigating role “self sanctions
plays…in the regulation of inhumane conduct.”

The demographic health picture is a good indicator of the State, and

constitutes a case for this analysis. It suggests normal “self-
sanctions can be disengaged by reconstructing conduct as serving
moral purposes, obscuring personal agency in detrimental
activities, disregarding or misrepresenting the injurious
consequences of one’s actions, or by blaming and dehumanizing the
victims” as has been evidenced by the Kashmir study. Religion is an
important aspect of the dispute.

Partition in 1947, gave India’s Muslims a State of their own:

Pakistan. This common faith underpins Pakistan’s claims to
Kashmir, where many areas are Muslim dominated. The Muslim
population of the Indian-administered State, Jammu and Kashmir is
over 60 percent, making it the only State within India where
Muslims are in the majority. The argument of religiosity is also
important because of the dichotomy in Islam. The Shia and Sunni
Muslims have distinct ideology. For example, “formal religious
education is a pattern common throughout Sunni Islamists
movements; which unlike Shia counterparts, are profoundly hostile
to the religious establishment.” In the case of Kashmir, the majority
of Muslims are Sunni.

Second, according to Albert Bandura the overarching relevance of

religion suggests ‘intensive psychological’ mechanisms at play for
the actors involved in this context. On the one hand, religion does
not play a role because “victims are incidental to the terrorists’
intended objectives and are used simply as a way to provoke
psychosocial conditions designed to further broader aims.”

On the other hand, third party violence (Women and children in

Kashmir who do not access health care services out of fear) “is a
much more horrific undertaking than political violence in which
particular political figures are targeted.” In effect the “threat to
human welfare stems mainly from deliberate acts of principal rather
than from unrestrained acts of (religious) impulse.”

Third, research by Crenshaw and others point to the fact that

political terrorism bears some economic logic. “Terrorism has an
extremely useful agenda-setting function.”

Crenshaw insists that individual actors calculate the cost and

benefit. “If it provokes generalized government repression, fear
may diminish enthusiasm for…..” but, “if the reasons behind
violence are skillfully articulated, terrorism can put the issue of
political change on the public agenda.” In Kashmir, the benefits of
the struggle for independence of the whole or part of the State;
outweighs costs of health, especially for Women. “By spreading
insecurity – at the extreme, making the region ungovernable – the
organization hopes to pressure the regime into concessions or
relaxation of coercive controls” by India and Pakistan. “Political
opportunism and internal rivalries sharpen the emphasis on militant
politics, particularly when religious symbolism and revivalism are
used to mobilize followers.”

However, “given the existence of so many psychological devices for

disengagement of moral control, societies cannot rely entirely on
individuals, however righteous their standards, to provide
safeguards against (psychosocially) destructive ventures.”

UPSHOT OF KASHMIR TURMOIL[73]

Another important aspect of terror-related violence in Kashmir is its

associations and contemporary interpretations. “In its
contemporary form, political violence raises new issues of public
policy for the State and necessitates a reexamination of societal
and economic processes.” There are several groups pursuing the
rival claims of Kashmir.

Not all are armed, but since the dispute erupted in 1989, the
number of armed separatists has grown from hundreds to
thousands. The most prominent are the Pakistani Hizbul
Mujahideen.

November 1999: “Today, I announce the break-up of India,

Inshallah. We will not rest until the whole of India is dissolved into
Pakistan.”

Indian-administered Kashmiris have also been victims of “brutal…

Human Rights violations.”
Sources claim “four hundred thousand Kashmir Pandits have been
pushed out of the Valley by the terrorists.”

This fact is corroborated by the sharp increase in the incidences of

domestic violence and infant mortality during this period. Another
“twenty thousand people have been killed in Kashmir alone since
1990.”

The strategy of political terrorism has been “one of surrogate

warfare,” especially on the part of Pakistan. Walter Laqueur:
“Pakistan helped to transform the conflict between communities in
Kashmir into a jihad, a holy war, complete with Islamists vying for
martyrdom.” In this regard, the social environment is considered
“more vulnerable to full-scale attack.”

In 1998, both India and Pakistan declared nuclear powers, and

threatened attack. Although the United States intervened, “the
incidence showed how dangerous the situation had become and how
easily a major terrorist attack could have led to war with
incalculable consequences.” Further, “the rising fear has led the
international community to initiate a covert process of bringing
Kashmiri militants and moderates together in order to discuss ways
of resolving the conflict peacefully.”

One scholar suggests “independence and freedom are very

different, and all too often the attainment of one meant the end of
the other, and the replacement of foreign overlords by domestic
tyrants, more adept, more intimate, and less constrained in their
tyranny.”

Along with the high rate of population growth and displacement, the
mortality rate for Women and children are distressingly high.
Almost one third of the total deaths occur among children below the
age of 5 years; infant mortality is around 65 per thousand live
births. And, the severity of malnutrition is exceptionally high.
Wallace suggests that unless government abandons “heavy-handed
military action” with militants, these “problems, including political
violence…come back full circle to politics.”

According to the IIS report, awareness of AIDS is particularly low

among women from households with low standard of living, Women
who are not regularly exposed to any media, and illiterate Women.
“Less than one-third (32 percent) of Women in Jammu and Kashmir
have even heard of AIDS.”

Among Women who have heard of the disease, 46 percent learned

from the radio, suggesting that government efforts to promote AIDS
awareness have been marginal. Only 2 percent reported learning
about the disease at a public health facility. With only one in four
women allowed exposure to mass media in Jammu and Kashmir,
AIDS programs will have to find innovative ways of reaching these
hard to reach Women. Another feature of the findings is that health
centers across the Valley lack basic infrastructures and are not well
equipped with the basic facilities to provide health. The majority of
health centers does not have their own buildings and are
functioning from rented or abandoned buildings, which do not have
proper sanitation, water supply, and electricity.

The conflict has created a major problem to the general health, and
a widespread epidemic threatens all. Since Kashmiris are reluctant
to travel for health services, a strong community outreach initiative
is needed. Wallace rightly suggests the “dangers involved in
repression as well as militant factionalism provide powerful
inducements to seek a safer style.”

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CHAPTER 2

SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND KASHMIRIITES[1]

The term social identity is defined, by the eminent British Social

Psychologist Tajfel, as; “that part of an individual’s self-concept
which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social
group (or groups) together with the value and emotional
significance attached to that membership.” Tajfel, together with
Turner also proposed the Social Identity Theory in the mid-late
1970s. This theory postulates that humans categorize and attach
themselves and others into groups as a way of describing peoples’
attributes, including ones’ own, and in doing so it is assumed that
humans have a basic need to see themselves positively compared to
others. To help categorize, there is also a tendency to exaggerate
the perception of intra-group similarities and the perception of
inter-group differences. This process of identification with a group
serves to provide a sense of security and increases self-esteem, and
also helps humans to simplify and make sense of the complex world
by organising people into groups. However, by simplifying the
world, there is a natural tendency to stereotype. Thus, it can be said
that “stereotypes spring less from malice of the heart than the
machinery of the mind.”

This answers how and why individuals acquire a social identity.

Social Identity Theory goes further to state that group attachment
is stronger if an individual lacks a positive personal identity or self-
esteem. This leads to increase identification of the individual with,
for example, a religious extremist group for a sense of belonging
and a stable identity, and thus self-esteem. The black-and-white
categorization and notions that these groups tend to provide, also
helps the individual make sense of the complex world. The stronger
the attachment to a group, the stronger would be the process of
stereotyping and group bias, and it is this process which underpins
ethnocentrism, and thus, one can begin to see the link between
social identity and conflict. An early theory which explores this
relationship between social identity and conflict has been expressed
by Sumner, a Sociologist and an Anthropologist, in 1906 in his
concept of ‘ethnocentrism’ which is a characteristic of all human
social groups where;
“one’s own group is the centre of everything, and all others are
scale and rated with reference to it. … Each group nourishes its own
pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities,
and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own
folkways the only right ones … ethnocentrism leads a people to
exaggerate and intensify everything in their own folkways which is
peculiar and which differentiates them from others.”

But how social categorization and identity actually results in violent

conflict requires further elaboration. Many societies exist where
there are distinct group identities living harmoniously together,
such as the orthodox Jewish community and the fundamentalist
Muslim community in North London, despite the Arab-Jewish
tensions in the Middle-East. Some other factor must be required in
the equation which equals to violent conflict. This is thought to be a
threat to one’s own identity or to the existence of the group which
one belongs to, which then arouses negative out-group attitudes
and antagonisms. This threat can be due to either realistic or
subjective factors and in many cases the threat has elements of
both.

The Human Needs Theory of the Social Psychologist Burton,

speculates that humans have basic physical needs, such as food and
shelter, but also certain ontological needs such as identity,
recognition and security. These needs are themselves not a source
of conflict, except for when they are violated or suppressed; where
the denial of social and psychological needs is a more important
cause of conflict than physical needs. The pursuit of ethnic identity,
for example, justifies violent behaviour and can also be at the
expense of life itself. He used the term ‘structural violence’ to
describe damaging deprivations, including economic ones, caused
by social institutions and policies which, and perhaps deliberately,
are discriminatory and suppress human needs. At the political level,
the alienation that this causes leads to a low-turn out in electoral
processes and the formation of alternative groups with which to
identify.

However, many societies exist with determinants of conflict or

where one’s identity can be threatened, such as poverty, oppression
or lack of national identity. Thus, as mentioned, apart from the real
threats to identity, there must also be a subjective element to it to
arouse conflict. This role is powerfully played by the politics of
identity; in the quest for power or to achieve political ends, leaders
can manipulate personal experiences, create or exacerbate
differences in ethnic, religious or other groups via social discourse
to mobilize support and even invoke conflict. Via school and mass
media, political rhetoric and symbolism also evokes past injustices
and suffering. This exploitation of personal experiences helps
identify, bind and mobilize people together into an abstract group.
In addition, the exaggerated differences created between different
groups, not only helps people make sense of the world, as
discussed, but also helps in demonizing the other groups to create
‘enemies’. Needless to say the psychology of this simple
categorization is also applicable to leaders themselves, implying
that their stereotypes may ‘spring less from malice’.

Social Identity and the Kashmir Conflict

Racine, a Social Scientist, argues that the identity factor has

marked the political history of South Asia in the last fifty years; with
the religious, ethno-linguistic, caste-based and other forms of
diversity, the list of categories is never exhaustive and the birth of
Pakistan is probably due to the pressure of all these multiple
identities. Indeed, the people of the various regions in Kashmir
differ vastly in terms of their cultural, ethno-linguistic, religious or
other forms of identity resulting in a complex social heterogeneity;
the region held by India (IJK) consists of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhist
and Sikhs. Not only are these different religious populations further
differentiated by caste, sects, ethnicity and language, there is
generally no clear geographical boundaries demarcating each
group. On the Pakistani side, although nearly all are Muslims, Shias
dominate the Northern Areas and Sunnis are the majority in AJK
(Azad Jammu & Kashmir). In addition, the people in the Northern
Areas are culturally distinct from each other as well as those in AJK.
And although maps tend to depict the Northern Areas as part of
Kashmir, there is a growing population in this region, particularly in
Gilgit who do not even see themselves as Kashmiri nor Pakistani.

This social heterogeneity is reflected in the complex political

cleavage constituted by conflicting national identities and state
allegiances. In the Indian side there are three such divisions; pro-
India, pro-Pakistan and pro-independence for Kashmir and social
identity do not necessary correspond to political aspirations, for
example, the Muslims of Jammu, who are not Kashmiri-speaking, do
not necessary support the demands of independence of Muslims in
the valley but support accession and integration with India. Pro-
Pakistan and pro-independence allegiances are also present in the
Pakistani side, but in the Northern Areas, those who do not identify
themselves as Pakistani or Kashmiri are not only demanding
independence from both India and Pakistan, but also from the rest
of Kashmir, arguing that Gilgit & Baltistan were never part of
Kashmir. To add to the complexity many people in Baltistan,
together with many in Ladakh, including both Muslims and
Buddhists, are also demanding ‘Greater Ladakh’ as a separate
entity combing various areas of Ladakh and the Northern Areas.
This is because they see themselves as belonging to one ethnic
group, and to preserve and express their ethno-cultural identity. As
a resident of Baltistan states “..we have no recognition, people
don’t know us, if someone asks ‘where are you from?’ and we reply
‘Baltistan’, they respond by asking ‘you mean Balochistan?’ or
‘where is Baltistan?’, even those within Pakistan .. a person can live
without clothes but not without identification ..we want to live our
lives with an identity.” Similarly many locals also want to see
Kashmir as an independent state as a means to show there Kashmiri
identity and in Ladakh, the demand for ‘Union Territory’ is also to
give Ladakhis a voice and raise their own identity, as Samphel,
Congress Party politician, argues also stating that it was the talk of
the identity issue which actually led to this demand. Merely from
this observable myriad of consciousness of identities and conflicting
political allegiances, one can construe a contributing factor to the
intractable nature of the Kashmir dispute.

With regards to how the threat to identity, by the denial of physical

and ontological needs, have contributed to the Kashmir conflict can
be potentially traced right back from the Mughal period. However,
one can argue, from the theoretical perspective presented above,
that it is the modern day policies of state governments that have
been largely responsible for the insurgency movement today. The
process of constitutional integration and the demands for abolition
of Article 370 to bring IJK on par with other states of India,
particularly threatened the security of the Kashmiri identity making
them more adamant in retaining their distinct identity. At the same
time the suppression of civil liberties in the name of ‘national
interest’ and integration, such as the stringent use of preventive
detention laws, kept dissent and any challenge to power checked.
Unable to express their discontent and with their identity being
under threat, the Kashmiri community thus sought political space
for expression to assert its identity and to make sure that its dignity
was not compromised. The result has been that the dissent shifted
to the ‘extra-systemic space’ which took the form of alienation and
militancy. A stark example of India’s repression in the current era,
which many point to as the trigger for militancy, is the rigged
elections in 1987 against the influential Muslim United Front and
the arrest of its contenders and supporters en masse. In the
Northern Areas, a region which is under direct control by the
Government of Pakistan, the denial of voting rights at the National
Assembly since partition, together with the imposition of repressive
laws such as the Frontier Crime Regulation (1947-74), probably
contributed and is contributing to the independence movement
there. Research carried out by the Kashmir Study Group revealed
that there was a strong sense of alienation among Kashmiri Muslims
with both India and Pakistan due to their repressive policies,
including economic ones, and lack of interest of the Kashmiri
people.

Ganguly, a Political Scientist, also attributes the origins of the

insurgency to the unparallel developments between the
mobilization of people, which was also aided by the mass media,
and their need for expression of their discontent and identities. He
also highlights the theory of the ethnic ‘security-dilemma’ to
explain the origins of violence in Kashmir. If an ethnic group feels
threatened, their group-identity will become more significant with
increased attachment and in-group identification, leading to greater
negative misperceptions of others resulting in hostilities towards
them. These hostilities then makes other groups feel threatened,
stimulating the same processes and culminating into a cycle of
action and reaction. This corresponds to the Social Identity Theory
and demonstrates the link between identity and conflict in the
region.

From an alternate perspective, interestingly, an Indian official

stated that by giving Kashmir a ‘special status’ in trying to preserve
its identity and restricting non-Kashmiris from moving into Kashmir,
India has caused more problems in IJK. Whereas Pakistan has
dispersed the Kashmiri identity by allowing others move into AJK.
This view also corresponded with the views of a Pakistani official,
who conveyed that in AJK there was not a threat to the Kashmiri
identity in terms of its loss of culture. This is thought to be due to
the nature of the Kashmiri identity in AJK being different from IJK
where in the former, the Kashmiri identity is not so strongly held as
in IJK with the religious factor playing a major role in the identity of
people in AJK. The other reason is due to integration; open borders
which allows Pakistanis and Kashmiris in AJK to move freely and
work well together, hence, there are no clash of identities. This also
corresponds with the author’s recent findings in the region where
Kashmiris in IJK saw there identity as distinct from any other, many
adding that its values such as peace-loving, religious and
brotherhood, did not match any other people of the world. Most also
did not see themselves as Indian and stated that neither did the
rest of India see Kashmiris as Indians, and complained of the
discrimination they faced when travelling outside of Kashmir. On
the other hand, many of the Kashmiris interviewed on the Pakistan
side also saw themselves as Pakistanis and stated that people in
the rest of Pakistan also accepted them as Pakistanis, this being
exemplified by the hospitality they showed to Kashmiris during the
October 2005 earthquake.
The role identity politics has played in the insurgency movement
can said to have its origins during the British period with the rise of
Hindu and Muslim nationalistic ideology. The justification for
partition also manufactured differences between Muslims and
Hindus and is clearly expressed in Jinnah’s Two-Nation Theory
rhetoric;

“The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religions,

philosophies, social customs and literatures. They neither
intermarry nor dine together and, indeed, they belong to two
different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas
and conceptions. Their aspects of life and on life are different. .. To
yoke together two such nations under a single State, .. must lead to
growing discontent and final destruction ..”

A more recent water-shed example of the play of leaders being the

Ayodhya movement which started mobilizing Hindu public opinion
from the mid-1980s, and created a powerful Hindu-Muslim cleavage
based on the issue of the Babri mosque. The demolition of this
mosque triggered violence between Hindus and Muslims killing
1,700 people, simply to increase the electoral strength of the
Bharatiya Janata Party. The repercussions of this tragic event was
that it also made the Kashmiris more determined for independence
and re-confirmed Jinnah’s Two-Nation Theory in the minds of many
Pakistanis and thus, further intensified the Kashmir conflict. The
misperceptions and prejudices carried by these movements are also
applicable to leaders themselves where Lamb argues that
“propaganda can all too easily turn into dogma believed implicitly
by those who carried it in the first place.” This can lead to
conflicting diplomatic positions which can be difficult to leave from,
as has been in the case over Kashmir.

REFERENCES:

1. http://www.kashmirwatch.com/showbiz.php?
subaction=showfull&id=1222248365
PART 3: PEACEMAKING
CHAPTER 1

RESPONSIBILITY OF A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE IN KASHMIR

SUSTAINABLE FUTURE

We must recognize that . . . we are one human family and one earth
community with a common destiny. We must join together to bring
forth a sustainable global society founded on respect for nature,
universal human rights, economic justice, and a culture of peace.
Towards this end, it is imperative that we, the peoples of the earth,
declare our responsibility to one another, to the greater community
of life, and to future generations.
(Anonymous)

PAK-INDO PEACE TALKS

The “patently rigged” 1987 elections – which “conveyed a message

that the Kashmiris of the valley simply would not be allowed or
trusted to freely exercise their franchise,” especially coming as they
did after Farooq’s dismissal in 1984, which had demonstrated the
central government’s contempt for constitutional norms – proved
incendiary. A Kashmiri movement for democracy began in the
valley, including mass demonstrations against rigged elections and
affirmations of Kashmiriyat as the cohesive force holding together a
multiethnic Kashmiri nation desirous of self-determination. 1987
saw sporadic bursts of violence, riots, and strikes, but “a
fundamentally qualitative change in the scope and extent of
violence occurred during 1988. … Violence and instability in the
valley became endemic in 1988,” with the violence orchestrated and
deliberate, the targets carefully chosen, and the aims of militants
extending beyond unseating Farooq’s regime (which was voted out
of office in December 1989). Bombings, strikes, and demonstrations
had become endemic by 1989.

However, Kashmiri activists were far from unanimous in their aims.

Some wanted a plebiscite so they could join Pakistan, some wanted
plebsicite with a “third option” of independence of the entire state
as it existed in 1947, some (Hindus and Sikhs of the Jammu region)
considered themselves part of the Indian Union, and some (Buddhist
Ladakhs and Shia Muslims of the Kargil area) did not support the
protest movement.

A government crackdown, including a new bill to curb the press in

August 1989, left the valley in a “state of siege.” However, the
central state showed its weakness by caving into JKLF demands for
the release of several jailed militants in exchange for the release of
Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of the new minister for home affairs,
kidnapped in December 1989. This period was also one of growing
communal tension within India and a spate of communal violence
that began with the police’s firing on a protest among local Muslims
at the reopening of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in February 1986.
With Hindu-Muslim violence throughout the state, the army and
paramilitary forces were increasingly called upon to maintain law
and order, but the governor hinted that Hindus’ safety could not be
guaranteed. By early 1990, tens of thousands of Hindus had fled to
Jammu. The government passed the draconian Jammu and Kashmir
Disturbed Areas Act in July 1990, giving security forces impunity
even to kill, yet the violence continued.

A combination of Farooq’s ineffectual governance and Congress’s

preoccupation with larger problems (corruption scandals, its
shrinking electoral base, the chance of war with Pakistan in 1987,
etc.) increased the influence of the MUF. Then, with the success of
the Afghan resistance and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989, plus Pakistan’s readiness to divert arms to Kashmir,
thousands of recruits started to cross into Azad Kashmir and
Pakistan’s North-West Frontier province starting in late 1989 for
training. Among the earliest recruits were candidates who had been
kept out of the 1987 elections, especially from the MUF.

The bulk of the recruits, however, were young, unemployed college

graduates. Muslim students blamed Indian rule for their limited
prospects, despite the role of corrupt state regimes in siphoning off
much of the development aid provided by the Indian government. In
1989, militant groups boycotted the state elections, and “The more
the democratic political process lost its meaning, the more a full-
scale insurgency came to be unleashed”.

By the mid-1990s, the Kashmir valley was largely in control of

militant groups. In its first six years, the insurgency killed over
15,000 insurgents, security personnel, hostages, and bystanders,
and around 200,000 (mostly Hindu Kashmiris) fled their homes and
businesses in valley for Jammu and elsewhere in India. Property
damage has been extensive, as well. Despite imposition of official or
unofficial curfews after dusk, human rights violations, kidnappings,
and extortion by militants, the abuses, indiscriminate harassment,
rapes, and arson of Muslim property by paramilitary forces worked
to swing popular opinion toward militant groups and the cause of
azadi (sovereignty). Faced with the Gulf War and its economic
effects, as well as divisions within the government, the regime of
Narasimha Rao (who came to power in June 1991 after the
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi) could devote limited attention to
Kashmir.

Nearly 400,000 Indian Army and paramilitary troops (from the

Indian Army, Border Security Forces, Central Reserve Police Force,
Indo-Tibetan Border Police, and Rashtriya Rifles) have been
deployed in the state, in India’s most substantial counterinsurgency
operation to date.

Security-related activities have taken up nearly 60 percent of the

annual administrative expenses of the state. Counterinsurgency
measures have all along included torture of militants and suspected
militants to extract information, coerce confessions, or mete
punishment.

In addition to severe, widespread torture by the military (which has

extensive powers and virtual impunity under the Jammu and
Kashmir Public Safety Act of 1978, the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities [Prevention] Act 1987, and other laws), Amnesty
International and other human rights groups have reported killings,
torture, and hostage-taking by militants. In response, and amid
mounting diplomatic pressure, the Indian government permitted a
team of international jurists to visit Kashmir in 1993, set up a
National Human Rights Commission (though granting it only limited
investigative powers), and increased human rights education and
efforts to improve the army’s image. Even so, military officers are
seldom investigated; any young Muslim man has been likely to be
taken as a suspect and arrested, tortured, killed, or disappeared;
children frequently cannot attend schools and the standard of
education has declined; general lawlessness prevails; militancy has
become a way of life for many Kashmiri youths; medical facilities
are insufficient; and substantial injuries and deaths have occurred
among civilians caught in crossfire. Militant tactics such as attacks
on women not wearing burqa in the early days of the insurgency or
the kidnapping of civilians (including foreign tourists) also alienated
many civilians, even though key militant groups condemned certain
such atrocities.
Security forces have battled “at least a dozen major insurgent
groups of varying size and ideological orientation, as well as dozens
more minor operations”. The most prominent groups are the
nominally secular (despite its Muslim leadership and attacks on
Hindusin 1989 and 1990), pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF), which seeks unification of and sovereignty
for the Pakistan- and India-controlled portions of the state; and the
radical Islamic, pro-Pakistan Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and the
similarlyinclined Hizbollah, Harkat-ul-Ansar (with members of
Pakistani, Afghani, Lebanese, Egyptian, Algerian, Saudi, Syrian, and
Sudanese origin), and Ikhwanul Muslimeen.2 These
“fundamentalist” Islamic, irredentist groups demand and Islamic
state associated with Pakistan, though they have failed to impose
strict customs such as requiring veiling for women. Thirty or so of
these militant groups joined in the Kul-Jammat-e-Hurriyat-e-Kashmir
(All Kashmir Freedom Front, Hurriyat), seeking a plebiscite on self-
determination, an Islamic Kashmiri society, and unification with
Pakistan while dissociating themselves from militancy. By 1993, the
JKLF seemed to have lost military ascendancy to HUM (which got
more arms and support from Pakistan), although it still claimed to
have 85 percent of the people’s political support, with most
Kashmiris preferring sovereignty to joining Pakistan. The JKLF and
other groups were torn between working toward a nonviolent
political solution or pursuing militant action, as well as rift by
personal disagreements and rivalries. Moreover, Indian Muslims
outside Kashmir have been reluctant to lend support to the
Kashmiri Muslim cause since the state’s withdrawal would
encourage anti-Muslim sentiments in India and give the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) a political advantage.

The insurgency has sharpened communal differences among Hindus

in Jammu, Buddhists in Ladakh, and Muslims in valley, trumping
other shared values of Kashmiri nationalism. The Praja Parishad
Party has campaigned for devolution of the state into three
autonomous regions (Jammu, Ladakh, and Kashmir) and the
integration of Jammu with India. The party feels the Hindu region
has been discriminated against by the Muslim-dominated state
because of cultural and linguistic differences and fears a plebiscite,
if held, would favor Pakistan. Ladakh has also campaigned for
autonomy through the Ladakh Buddhist Association, founded in
1989. The Indian government had given eight communities in
Ladakh scheduled tribe status by 1989, but the region remained
restive.

While Pakistan has denied playing the role India claims it has in
furthering militancy in Kashmir, it has played a critical part. It is
estimated that Pakistan has provided training to several thousand
Kashmiri militants, as well as serving as a staging ground,
sanctuary, and source of arms and resources for them. In 1993,
Pakistani aid to militants (particularly protégés of Pakistan’s
Jamaat-I-Islami party rather than secular militias) was estimated at
over $3 million per month.

That aid was suspended temporarily due to pressure from the US,
but then resumed on a smaller scale in 1994. Also, large numbers of
both Pakistani and Afghan fighters have joined Kashmiri militant
groups, bringing increasingly more sophisticated arms and
communications. In particular, emigration of Afghan mujahideen to
Kashmir picked up after the collapse of the Najibullah regime in
Afghanistan in 1992, with an estimated 1,000 having arrived by
1995. Some joined with HUM and others with pro-Pakistani groups.
These fighters tended to be especially vicious in their tactics and
strategies, and to show little regard for the local population.

India and Pakistan opened bilateral talks in January 1994 after over
a year’s hiatus, but these quickly foundered. Pakistan sought to
internationalize the Kashmir issue anew by getting a resolution
condemning India’s human rights abuses in Kashmir passed at the
March 1994 UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva. India
foiled that attempt, condemning Pakistan, in turn, for training and
arming militants.

Presidential rule had been extended in February 1992, with no

obligation to revert to an elected government. However, Narasimha
Rao announced on 15 August 1994 that a political process would be
initiated for normalization of affairs in the valley. The government
released some top political activists and other detainees and
announced plans for a state election. However, prominent Kashmiri
leaders, including Hurriyat members (who felt the polls were a
façade for the benefit of international critics and lacked confidence
that India would really return the rights they had eroded over the
years) and Farooq Abdullah (who demanded a return to autonomy
qua pre-1953 and a substantial economic package for the state),
said they would boycott the polls.

Then in October, militants stole and burned the Srinagar electoral

rolls. Moreover, institutional roadblocks complicated plans. No
census had been conducted in the state in 1991, so electoral
constituencies had not been delimited since 1971, plus the civil
administrative machinery had virtually collapsed and state-level
government employees were too demoralized to be counted on to
serve in polling duties. Still, promising to return Kashmir to its
status as of 1975, the government made preparations for elections
in December 1995, though Hurriyat still refused to participate. A
violent standoff between insurgents and the Indian army at the
Charar-e-Sharief shrine near Srinigar in May 1995 set off another
round of protests and ended the plans for an election.

1996 brought renewed efforts at normalization, as the government

both attempted to suppress or negotiate with militants (not least to
create an alternate political base to Hurriyat) and to win the public
over with elections. The May 1996 general election (in which Rao
was defeated) extended to Kashmir – the first elections held in the
state since 1989. Only the BJP, Congress, and independents
participated, and the polling took place amid heavy security. The
National Conference grudgingly agreed to participate in the state
elections, held in September 1996.

Farooq Abdullah was reelected as chief minister and the state

returned to civilian rule. Turnout was limited, and both Hurriyat and
Pakistan dismissed the results. The government also created
several counterinsurgency movements ahead of the elections,
assembling over 1,000 fighters to try to “liberate” part of the valley
from militants. However, political violence continued. The following
year marked the fiftieth anniversary of Indian independence.
Kashmiri activists used celebrations as chance to demonstrate their
defiance against Indian rule, raising Pakistani flags, holding protest
rallies, and reiterating demands for a UN-sponsored referendum.

A BJP-led coalition government under Atal Behari Vajpayee came to

power for the first time in March 1998. The regime declared that all
of the former Jammu and Kashmir, including the parts now held by
Pakistan, belonged to India. The government also raised public
awareness of India’s nuclear program with a series of tests in May
1998, unleashing an immediate, outraged response from the
international community. Pakistan announced later that month that
it, too, had conducted tests, also prompting international
disapproval and sanctions. Once both countries agreed to a
moratorium on nuclear testing and committed to signing the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by September 1999, sanctions were
relaxed. The two governments agreed to resume formal talks to
ease tensions. These began in late 1998 and included visits and
memoranda of understanding. India and Pakistan agreed in the
Lahore Declaration of February 1999 to intensify efforts to resolve
all issues, including Kashmir, to ease visa restrictions, and not to
interfere in each other’s internal affairs, plus to abide by the
moratorium on nuclear tests unless extraordinary events warranted
their resumption.
However, within a few months, India and Pakistan were again close
to war, with severe attacks along the LOC, especially in Kargil
district. Pakistani-linked militants took over Indian-occupied
defensive positions and India retaliated with aerial bombardments
in Kargil in May 1999. Pakistan then shot down several Indian
aircraft. These clashes were supplemented by a crackdown on
political dissent in the Kashmir valley and curbs on the media both
in India and Pakistan (which could not halt a “cyber-war” of
propaganda from both sides), and were particularly worrisome
given the nuclear threat. Pakistani Prime Minster Nawaz Sharif
requested an urgent meeting with US President Clinton in July, then
issued the Washington Declaration, saying his government would
take “concrete steps” to restore the LOC and requesting the
militants to withdraw. Nawaz Sharif was criticized for this
diplomatic surrender; he was ousted by Musharraf in a bloodless,
domestically-supported coup in October. The Kargil clashes and
outcome brought both domestic political criticism and human and
financial losses on both sides, also entailing a huge loss to
Pakistan’s international credibility. Then, India shot down a
Pakistani naval aircraft in August 1999. The violence in Kashmir
increased to an average of an estimated seven deaths per day
between fall 1999 and summer 2000. India stepped up security, but
both sides sought a de-escalation of the conflict. Both the BJP
(which ultimately won) and Congress pledged in campaigning for
the September 1999 elections that they would reopen talks with
Pakistan if elected. Pakistan launched a series of initiatives in 2000-
01 to attempt to curtain arms trading and possession, and both
sides attempted (without success) to negotiate ceasefires in 2000.
Both Pakistan and India still sought international favor for their
positions, as at the September 1999 UN General Assembly session
or with Pakistan’s endorsing a call for Clinton to mediate in bilateral
talks.

Musharraf and Vajpayee held a failed summit at Agra in July 2001.

The talks included unofficial discussion of an autonomy package for
both India- and Pakistan-controlled areas, returning the state to its
pre-1952 status. Pakistan wanted Kashmir formally recognized as
the central issue of conflict between the two countries, which India
was finally ready to grant. However, India demanded that Pakistan
eschew support for violence in return, which Pakistan would not do.
India declared both Jammu and the Kashmir valley “disturbed
areas” and gave security forces free rein.

With the events of 11 September 2001, Pakistan became a key US

ally in the war on terrorism. Pakistan broke its links with the Taliban
and tried to curb Islamic extremists. However, an attack by Islamic
extremists on India’s parliament on 13 December 2001 (killing
fourteen) led India to cancel transport links with Pakistan, recall its
ambassador, and send 500,000 troops to the border. In January
2002, under US pressure, Musharraf announced to the Pakistani
people that the country would no longer allow its soil to be used for
terrorism, then soon arrested almost 2,000 Islamic militants and
closed over 300 of their offices. Colin Powell urged India to
reciprocate, but fearing that the mujahideen would just relocate to
Azad Kashmir, India said its troops would remain through the
spring. In response to India’s non-cooperation, in March, Pakistan
released most of the militants it had detained. State elections have
been scheduled for September 2002 and the government is trying to
get talks going with Kashmiri groups to ensure wide participation –
but doing so will require making concessions to give citizens hope
of more than just a change of leadership.

Those who want an independent Kashmir may be as much opposed

to Pakistan’s “occupation” of Azad Kashmir as with India’s position
in valley, even though Pakistan is officially committed to accept the
right of self-determination. Azad Kashmiris are now waiting for their
own constitutional position to be finalized and the Northern Areas
have never been integrated into Pakistan, either. The JKLF in
particular has attempted to foster an independence movement in
the latter. The Pakistani government has instituted reforms to
satisfy demands for constitutional representation, but has not
formally integrated the Northern Areas because doing so would
jeopardize Pakistan’s demand for the whole issue to be resolved
under the terms of UN resolutions.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACTIVISTS

International actors have played a role in validating India and

Pakistan’s claims to pursuing a “just cause,” mediating between the
two states, and censuring abuses by either state, but also in
intensifying the conflict. Both India and Pakistan have sought
international assistance throughout the conflict, initially from the
UN and subsequently also from potential mediators such as the US.
However, India has distanced itself from attempts at international
mediation since the 1948- 49 UN resolutions. The 1972 Simla
agreement with Pakistan allowed India to claim the issue to be just
bilateral rather than international. When Pakistan subsequently
called for third party mediation to break the deadlock, India
refused.

International attention and censure has helped to keep human

rights abuses and the nuclear threat somewhat in check. American,
British, and European legislators and human rights activists have
investigated and lodged complaints, particularly with intensifying
international focus on human rights abuses in the 1980s, on the two
states’ nuclear capabilities in the 1990s, and on combating (Islamic-
oriented) terrorism more recently (since that campaign implicates
most of the countries with a stake in Kashmir and since Kashmiri
insurgents had close ties with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan). However,
these critics could do little else, especially with both India and
Pakistan implicated, the chance of destabilizing the subcontinent
further if a plebiscite were held, and as western business interests
gained more of a foothold in the region, making western
governments less willing to antagonize India. Western inability to
pressure India effectively has been popularly interpreted as a lack
of resolve and has added to anti-western feeling, since it seems to
demonstrate a double standard with regard to democracy and
human rights. Moreover, most Kashmiris probably are dissatisfied
with their current image as being part of a transnational, terrorist
war of religious zealots. The greater attention given Kashmir by the
US amidst the latter’s attacks on Afghanistan may help force a
solution. Also, Pakistani support for the insurgency has become
more tenuous given Pakistan’s unstable position and renunciation
of support for the Taliban, as well as the pressure on Pakistan to
crush local militant organizations and cease backing militant groups
in Kashmir.

While India’s charges of a “foreign hand” that has “hijacked” the

cause in Kashmir are probably overstated, it is not just Pakistani
support that has exacerbated the conflict. The Indian government
claims that militants have come not only from Pakistan and Azad
Kashmir, but from Afghanistan and (in smaller numbers) Sudan,
Egypt, and Lebanon. Pakistan claims its support is only moral and
diplomatic as opposed to material and financial as India alleges. A
February 1993 report by the US House of Representatives’ “Task
Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare” stated that
Pakistan sponsored and promoted separatism and terrorism
especially in Kashmir as a long-term strategy. The 500-mile LOC has
remained open, despite efforts to seal it, and international jurists
concluded in the 1990s that there were links between groups in
Azad Kashmir and operations in Indian-held Kashmir although per
the Simla agreement, Pakistan was obliged to discontinue any
military assistance.

CONCLUSION

The threat of terror-related violence and the factor of fear make the
Kashmir dispute potentially “one of the most dangerous disputes in
the world.” Historically, both state and non-state actors have
resorted to the same approaches in terrorizing civilian populations,
while using different weapons and techniques. However, the
psychosocial environment is inextricably linked to politics. Political
terrorism is undertaken because persons have a right to defend
their home, and supposedly to “alter the behaviors and attitudes of
multiple audiences,” whether they are ‘conspiratorial’ or not. In its
ends, it is sometimes seen as a “reasonably informed choice among
available alternatives”

It remains to be seen to what extent India and Pakistan will yield to

the dispute.

There is gross inadequacy of health and psychosocial services, and

negligence. In most of the health centers the abandoned and
dilapidated facilities that have been supplied to health
professionals are so old that they have either become redundant or
are a health risk.

Another important aspect of the findings in the studies reviewed is

that proper records are not being maintained by the health centers,
and health awareness materials are not being duly distributed due
to illiteracy, violence and fear. As these and other issues are central
both to the contemporary debate on modern political terrorism and
to the argument of this paper, Kashmir’s experience is very
important in contextualizing political terrorism and deconstructing
the milieu of fear. Terror-related violence has left a death toll
running into tens of thousands and a population brutalized by
fighting and fear. Together with its atmosphere of fear, the
Kashmiri militants have created an atmosphere of widespread
discontent. In this regard, “the secrecy of planning and the visibility
of results” may be illustrative of a more general phenomenon in
which individual and population vulnerability to violence has
created a veil of terror.

Terror-related violence is paradoxical. Terrorism works as a form of

“protest leading to reform of underlying conditions;” and, it equally
“destroys the

infrastructure” of the society involved. In effect, “the nonstate or

substate users of terrorism – are constrained in their options by the
lack of active mass support and by the superior power arrayed
against them.”

Just as the Qur’an advocates altruism, and Hobbes synthesizes what

humankind is capable of, likewise, these issues are central to the
conflict in Kashmir. What appears to one as the logical and
desirable seems to another, as undoubtedly unfair. “Those who
make peaceful evolution impossible, make violent revolution
inevitable.”

The implications of this vexing analysis are that the trajectory of

terror-related violence on Kashmir’s psychosocial environment has
significant reaches on the mental health of the society.

CHAPTER 2

HOW CAN THIS BE

John Connon and W. Harrison Childers

Mothers moaning soft and low

Sad to see their children go

Off to fight the latest foe

How can this be?

A father bows his head and cries

As he begins to realize

Sons will fight and sons will die

How can this be?

We can talk about hatred

We can talk about war

We can talk about killing

While we all keep score

We can count all the bodies

And count them once more

How can this be?

Madly plunging into war

Marching to the lies once more

Who knows what they’re dying for?

How can this be?

It’s the same old trajedy

What a hollow legacy

No one learns from history

How can this be?

We can talk about hatred

We can talk about war

We can talk about killing

While we all keep score

We count them once more

How can this be?

Children have to pay the price

For debts they do not owe

Time and time again they pay

The children can’t say no

Grieve for every wounded child

Sharpenel, mines, and bombs gone wild

Innocence and love defiled

How can this be?

Now this madness all must cease

The entire world cries out for peace

Sing along and share the dream

When will this be?

It’s up to you and me.