Francisco vs.

House of the Representatives

GR no. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003
Ponente: Carpio Morales (J)

FACTS:
1) Following Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.

2) Secs. 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) provide for the
following:

Section16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of
endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third
(1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.
Section17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same
official.
3) On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."

4) On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution, which provides for the following:.
A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to
the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
5) The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent
to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

6) Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

7) Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of paragraph 5 Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives is constitutional.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.
Held:
1. It is unconstitutional. The second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3
of Article XI of the Constitution. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was
filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2. From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power;
it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From
this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which
are not truly political in nature.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House
of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of
the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.


































COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. GUERRERO
EN BANC, G.R. No. L-20942 September 22, 1967
Petitioner: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Respondent: A.D. Guerrero, Special Administrator, in substitution of Nathaniel I. Gunn, as Administrator of the Estate of the late Paul I. Gunn
Ponente: Fernando, J.

FACTS:
1. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied the claim for refund in the sum of P2,441.93 filed by the administrator of the estate of Paul
I. Gunn.
2. The deceased operated an air transportation business under the business name and style of Philippine Aviation Development.
3. 61,048.19 liters of gasoline was actually used in aviation during the period from
October 3, 1956 to May 31, 1957.
4. The estate, as claimed, was entitled to the same rights and privileges as Filipino citizens operating public utilities including privileges in the
matter of taxation.
5. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disagreed.
6. The matter was brought to the Court of Tax Appeals and ordered the petitioner to refund to the respondent the sum of P2,441.93.
7. Court of Tax Appeals decision was reversed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code allowing Filipinos a refund of 50 percentum of the specific tax paid on
aviation oil, could be availed by citizens of the United States and all forms of business enterprises owned or controlled directly by them in
view of the privilege under the Ordinance to operate public utilities in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon,
citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.

DECISION:
1. No. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to it, to grant respondent Administrator the opportunity
of proving whether the estate could claim the benefits of Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code, allowing refund to citizens of
foreign countries on a showing of reciprocity. With costs.

RATIO DECIDENDII:
1. To the extent that a refund is allowable, there is in reality a tax exemption. The rule applied with undeviating rigidity in the Philippines is
that for a tax exemption to exist, it must be so categorically declared in words that admit of no doubt. No such language may be found in
the Ordinance. It furnishes no support, whether express or implied, to the claim of respondent Administrator for a refund.
2. From 1906 to 1966, it has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that
if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. (Catholic Church vs Hastings and Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. vs Acting
Commissioner of Customs)
3. At the time when the Ordinance took effect in April 1947, the strict rule against the exemption was undisputed and indisputable. Such
being the case, it would be a plain departure from the terms of the Ordinance to predicate a tax exemption where none was intended. (Gold
Creek Mining Corp. vs Rodriguez 1938)
4. The Ordinance is designed for a limited period to allow what the Constitution prohibits; Americans may operate public utilities. (Martin vs
Hunters Lessee (1816) I Wheat 304)
(Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process (1921) 83)
5. Tax exemption is not to be presumed and that if granted, it is to be most strictly construed. No such grant was apparent on the face of the
Ordinance. No such grant could be implied from its history, much less from its transitory character.








Philippine Bar Association vs COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
Dec ember 19, 1985
January 7, 1986 ( Court noted that its act of dismissing the petitions had not been formally stated it its basic Resolution of December 19, 1985,
dispositove portion inserted )

FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for the prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 ( Snap Elections special national elections on February 7, 1986
) for the offices of the President and Vice President of the Philippines. Petitioners including Philippine Bar Association petitioned for issuance of an
injunction restraining respondent ( Comelec ) from holding the election, stating that BP 883 is in conflict with the constitution, in a way that it still
allows the President to continue to hold office even after the calling of the special elections.
Senator Pelaez submitted his argument that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create the actual vacancy required in
Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution. The letter states that the President is irrevocably vacating the position effective only when election is held
and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath of office ten (10) days after his proclamation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 883 is unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court stop and prohibit the holding of the elections.

HELD:
Petitions are dismissed and prayer for issuance of an injuction restraining respondents from holding the election is denied, for the reason that
there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.














TO: GROUP 1

FROM: ABE & GRETCHEN

SUBJECT: SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

A105 Alih v. Castro, GR L-69401, 23 June 1987, En Banc, Cruz [J]
RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD RAMSID ASALI, BANDING USMAN,
ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and
NURAISA ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA
CITY, COLONEL ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL
DEFENSE COMMAND, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IdC MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE
MARINES AND 1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PONENTE: CRUZ, J
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On November 25, 1984, the Philippine marines operated an oppressive cruel form of domination by way of besiege on the
premises of the petitioners, the Alih family, at Gov. Alvarez St., Zamboanga City.
The Military operation carried out was of without a court order or a search warrant and warrant of arrest. The pursuit act of the
military was on the basis of their superior order, on the ground that there were purported loose firearms, ammunition, and
explosives, and that the Alih Family, the petitioners, was the key suspect on the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. The
articles however was despoiled efficaciously by the military.
A burst of gunfire ensued during the raid, as a result of the immediate retaliation of the petitioners to deter the attack of the
military, resulting from number of casualties. Parenthetically, the military arrested six male occupants, later underwent finger-
printing, paraffin testing and photographing over their objection.
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners, the Alih family, filed a suit to the court in Zambaonga City Regional Trial Court; a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order, and subsequently, to recuperate the articles seized
from them to preclude as to being used as an evidence against them.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the act of the military of search and seizure were constitutional as defined and provided in Article VI, Section 3
of the 1973 Philippine Constitution.
Whether or not the articles apprehended may preclude as an evidence against the petitioners in any apparent imminent
proceedings.
RULING:
The court so ordered that the search on November 25, 1984 of the respondents led by Major General Castro on the petitioners premises
was illegal and the articles apprehended as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the
seized articles shall remain in the legal custody pending the outcome of the criminal cases that may have been or may later be filed against the
petitioner.
REASONS FOR THE DECISION:
The acts of the respondents were a violation of the Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Philippine Constitution,
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

and of the Article IV, Section 4(2).
Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
United States vs. H.N. Bull

GR L-5270, Jan 15, 1910

ELLIOTT, J.:
Facts: On the 2
nd
day of December 1908, a Norwegian streamer/vessel, known as the Standard, engaged in the transport of animals
commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried six
hundred and seventy-seven (677) heads of cattles and carabaos, without proving suitable means for securing the said animals which
resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to have died while in transit. This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to
provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission. H.N. Bull however contended that no Philippine court has
jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while inside the territorial waters of
the Philippines.
Ruling: No court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over any crimes or offenses committed in a foreign ship on the high seas or within
the territorial waters of any other country, but in the moment it entered into territorial waters, it automatically would be subject to the
jurisdiction of the country. The offense, assuming that it originated in Formosa, which the Philippines would have no jurisdi ction,
continued until it reached Philippine territory which is already under jurisdiction of the Philippines. Every state has complete control and
jurisdiction over its territorial waters.
In vi ew of the foregoi ng i ssue, the defendant i s thereby found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty
pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Reasons for the Decision:
Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the
ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are
touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction
of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a
portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law
Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient and dangerous to society and
would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to degradation if such individual merchants did not owe
temporary and local allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has said that the merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose
of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace,
unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)









DIGEST RELATING TO CONSTI
Macariola vs. Asuncion Case Digest
Macariola v. Asuncion
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
114 SCRA 77
FACTS:
Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition.
Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola.
On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal.
On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963,
later amended on November 11, 1963.
On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by
purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.,
Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals with acts
unbecoming of a judge.
Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated , among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce.
ISSUE: Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him an
act unbecoming of a Judge?
HELD: Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation
to the persons disqualified therein. The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take place
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010
which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence,
the lot in question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondents order date
October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant
to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but
from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the decision
in Civil Case No. 3010.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision
in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there
was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines,
Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty , the
political laws of the former sovereign , whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless
they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.







WHOLE DIGEST

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics may be enforceable and hold Judge Asuncion liable for breaching the said article through
association with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he
was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
II. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him
III. Whether or not Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act
IV. Whether or not Judge Asuncion was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely
fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practicing attorney when
in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar

FACTS:
June 8, 1963- Decision was rendered by Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010-
1. Declaring the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive
owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots
Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to the estate of
Francisco Reyes Diaz;
2. Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as
surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art.
996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided among the plaintiffs Sinforosa
R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in
such a way that the extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of
two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to
receive equal shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33);
3. Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment shall have become final to submit to this court, for approval a project of
partition of the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the parties may, by agreement, deemed
convenient and equitable to them taking into consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and value of the properties involved;

Decision became final due to lack of appeal.

October 16, 1963- a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion

October 23, 1963- Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the
respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved partition project
(The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes Macariola)

November 11, 1963- Order of October 23, 1963, was amended only for the purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective adjudicates in conformity with the project of
partition

July 31, 1964- Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued
transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).

March 6, 1965- Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge
Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes
August 31, 1966- spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.
At the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan,
Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary
January 31, 1967- Judge Asuncion and wife withdrew from corporation
August 9, 1968- Complaint was filed by Bernardita Maxariola
November 9 or 11, 1968- Bernardita Maxariola herein instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled
"Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking
the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent
Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages.
RULING: No merit.
RATIO:
Issue 1:
Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold
any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active
service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting
attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting
attorney.

xxx xxx xxx

5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate
territory.

1. Partakes of the Nature of Political Laws
Although the provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it,
however, partakes of the nature of political laws as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public
officers and employees, like justices and judges.

-By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise ...
those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon
the transfer of sovereignty. While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new
sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. However,
such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may
be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by
Congress in time of peace.

2. Deemed Abrogated because of change of sovereignty. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the
effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States and then to the Republic of the Philippines.

The present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the
"Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of
August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce
must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly
re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.


Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that
on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "

3. Judge Asuncion and wife has withdrawn on January 31, 1967
- the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares
that:

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be
involved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such
investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them
without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his
judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ...

-Judge Asuncion and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to
third parties only 22 days after incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation
-Corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up
to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation.


ISSUE 2
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action,
either in person or through the mediation of another:
Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take
part by virtue of their profession

1. Prohibition only applies to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified
therein.
-The sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Decision
had long become final because no appeal was done.
2. Judge Asuncion has not bought the land in question from the plaintiffs but from a previous buyer, Dr. Arcadio Galapon.
3. The subsequent filing on November 9, 1968 can no longer alter or affect the facts that the sale was consummated after the
finality of the decision of the orders.
4. Although Judge Asuncion should have required the signature of the parties particularly, Mrs. Macariola on the project of
partition submitted to him for approval, whatever error was committed was in good faith and was assured by the counsel of
Mrs. Macariola that he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition. Affidavits led the investigator to believe
that Mrs. Macariola knew the contents of the project of partition and gave her conformity (Certified Copy of OCT wherein
Francisco Reyes approved the partition project and Certified Copy of Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Mrs. Macariola
selling the lot to Dr. Decena.)
5. Mrs. Macariola admitted to going to Tacloban in connection with the sale hence, she could not have been kept ignorant of the
proceedings in the Civil Case 3010.No evidence was passed regarding Mrs. Macariolas complaint that only insignificant lands
were given to her.No evidence to show that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as mere dummy of Judge Asucncion in acquiring the
lot. The lot was bought in good faith and of valuable consideration.

ISSUE 3

It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which
he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.



1. No connection to his Judicial office and no undue advantage in its business operations
-No showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or
takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance.

As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on
public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to
intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has
to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have
no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon
C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).

-Corporation did not benefit in anyway and was not involved in any Litigation in which either party were a plaintiff or defendant.
Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D.
Nepomuceno when Judge Asuncion was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on
January 31, 1967.

2. No provision and no prohibition
-No provision in our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines or law expressly prohibiting members of Judiciary in
engaging in any lawful business
-It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any
prohibition to that effect. Under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not
involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.

3. Engaging in private business without a written permission from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt
practice as defined by law.
-In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits
an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with
any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of department, the
same, however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because
the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any
interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any
officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without a written permission from the Department
Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.

4. Does not apply to Judiciary members
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold
that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12
of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary.

Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."

It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as
amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution. Judges are not
subordinate civil service officers

-Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not
in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the
recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary
(now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and
prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges. And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution,
only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of
the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which they
belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the
department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the
only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes
only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.







Digests (Mary Michelle T. Ong)

JAVELLANA vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY etal.
GR L-36142, March 31, 1973
EN BANC, CONCEPTION (CJ): 6 concur, 4 dissenting
Facts:
A Ratification Case:
On January 20, 1973, three (3) days after the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102, Josue Javellana filed a case against the Executive Secretary and the
Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the
provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935.
The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in
behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. Javellana alleged that the President (Marcos) had
announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without,
or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed
Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the
election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
Issue:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable or political and therefore non- justiciable, question?
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict,
compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people?
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
Held:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and thereforenon-justiciable, question?
On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members
of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and
Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote,
stating that "in as much as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has
actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court
may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar,
Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance)
conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?
On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of
the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV,
section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and
participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still
maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies,
especially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that
I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved
the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political
sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part
required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been
substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance
with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people?
On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the
Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973
Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression,
by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice
Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the
ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared
to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of
the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law."
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined
by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle
restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution."
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?
On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted
to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the
final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond the
competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable."
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give
due course to the petitions.
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance
thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their
votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is
not in force;
with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four
(4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This
being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.