Sverine Autesserre, Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended

Consequences, African Affairs (2012), 1-21.

3 dominant narratives on conflict in the DRC

- its about exploitation of mineral resources (cause)
- it results in sexual exploitation of women and girls (effect)
- extend state authority (solution)

These are appealing arguments for policymakers on the ground, etc, resonate with foreign
audiences, but are unhelpful.

Since end of outright conflict - extensive deterioration of conditions in DRC. More IDPs
(Oxfam), armed groups inc. Congolese army, dropped to the lowest rank on the Index of
Human Development.

International efforts worsen situation?

Some benefits - w/o UN peacekeepers, African, Western diplomats - no peace (even
precarious one). Election.

UN mission - only force capable of protecting population from Congolese army, armed
groups.

Humanitarian agencies - only ones able to respond to epidemics.

But also many problems.

Why use simple narratives?
Why use these three?
What are the effects of focusing on these three?

Use of these lenses ends the consideration of the DRC as a forgotten conflict (MSF),
brings it to foreground, but also contributes to deterioration of situation.

Simple narratives - powerful. Frame conflict in a certain way - make action possible,
authorising, enabling, justifying specific practices, policies (e.g. regulation of the mineral
trade) while precluding others (e.g. resolution of land conflicts). Begin to be seen as the
only natural, conceivable ones. Simplicity - easily told by media, policymakers, aid
organisations, etc.

Also a product of the sort of people who look at it. Mostly, INGOs recruit based on
technical expertise (aid, diplomacy, peace-building), not country knowledge - short
briefings, short stays, rapid turnover, cant speak local language - simple, dominant
language means that people feel they can grasp most important themes, not feel lost.

OFten contested, but people usually interpret new information in the light of their existing
beliefs. Large bureaucracies resistant to change. -> any change becomes slow and
incremental. This is what happened with the growing focus on sexual violence, for
example.



Change can occur rapidly - when marginalised voices can upset the discourse at a time of
crisis.

Impact on discourse on the ground? Harmful impacts of humanitarian work/behaviour.
Take place at a macro/micro level.

Cause: conflict minerals?

Congolese minerals fund local, armed groups - atrocities vs. population. To end war,
violence, end trafficking.

First put forwards by Global Witness, UN Panel of Inquiry on the Congo. Rapidly snowballs
into a core part of understanding the conflict.

Other approaches? Armed groups, Rwandan/Ugandan attempts to eradicate armed
groups, violent competition between Congolese leaders.

On the ground - local drivers of tension - land issues, grassroots antagonisms over
traditional, administrative power.

Academics, locals - other economic sources. Cattle, charcoal, timber, drugs, taxation at
checkpoints. UN Integrated Bureau estimates - only 8% of all conflicts over natural
resources.

Eclipsed by minerals, though - resonates with non-Congolese audiences. Resource
curse.

Cause of the problem - identifiable individuals (soldiers in armed groups).
Effect - bodily harm to vulnerable people (Congolese population).
Suggests simple solution to complex problem (end illegal exploitation of resources).
Enables European public to easily understand, relate to it.

Also - media appeal. Michael Kavanagh, journalist: the fact that I say coltan is in cell
phones and your cell phone is supporting the conflict in Congo is a simplification of the
conflict, but I would say it anyway, because we as journalists are trying to make things less
foreign to a foreign audience. Reactions of Congolese elite/diaspora seem to legitimise
this.

Conflict minerals important, and focus on this - brings attention, limits business
involvement.

But also exacerbates problems. Diverts policy resources, actions, away from grassroots
antagonisms, fight against corruption, state administration reform.

Also - couldnt make much headway on their own without broader political, economic,
social reforms. Since the military leaders remained the principal power brokers, the
technical measures mostly menat that ordinary people suffered (no livelihood) while
leaders continued.

Sexual violence - rape/sexual torture. Margot Wallstrm - eastern Congo rape capital of
the world. Overwhelming focus vis a vis international, NGO, UN SC attention.



Buzzword.

Didnt always dominate discourse - even more sexual violence 1994-2003, but few
discussed it. 2002 HRW report war within the war, brings attention to it, then journalists,
NGOs, new editors focus on this.

Congolese populations on the ground - challenge it. Definitely happens, but other violence
- killings, forced labour, child soldiers, other torture.

PArticularly strong emotional impact though. Ultimate violation of self. Clashes with image
as peaceful, post-conflict country. Worse consequences - exclusion within own
communities.

Simultaneously makes the Congolese people more savage/barbaric, but also brings it
home to the other audiences. People know about sexual abuse from their own countries.

Obvious solution - support victims of sexual abuse.

Obviously extremely important - provision of much-needed help to victims.

But counter-productive? Diverts attention from other issues - UNDP doesnt talk so much
about all kinds of violent crime. EU police mission has only one unit outside capital, deals
with sexual violence. Aid agencies cant get funding/attention for issues not relating to
sexual violence.

At least 4-10% of victims boys/men?

FOR COURSEWORK: Public sources for this paragraph include Serena Cruz and Rosan
Smits, Increasing security in DR Congo: gender-responsive strategies for combating
sexual violence (Clingendael Conflict Research Unit, The Hague, 2011); Chris Dolan,
War is not yet over community perceptions of sexual violence and its underpinnings in
eastern DRC (International Alert, Goma, 2010); Eastern Congo Initiative, Landscape
analysis of commu- nity based organizations (Seattle, 2011), p. 79; Eriksson Baaz and
Stern, The complexity of violence, pp. 505; and Dsire Lwambo, Before the war, I was
a man: men and mascu- linities in eastern DR Congo (HEAL Africa, Goma, 2011).

Some groups - begin to use sexual violence as bargaining tool. Threats of rape. Mai Mai
Sheka - deliberate, systematic gang rapes so that hell get treated as a serious actor, get
government to negotiate with him - this took place, he was vindicated.

many other rebel leaders have used the same reasoning as Sheka and humanitarian
organizations have observed an increase in the use of sexual violence by armed groups
that have polit- ical claims.

More focus on the consequences of sexual violence than its causes (e.g. poverty, land
conflict, hostile civilmilitary relationships, disorganization of the army and the police,
weakness of the justice system, physical and economic insecurity, and oppressive gender
norms). International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy - 72% on treating victims
of rape, only 27% on preventing it.

Prevention better than post-rape support?



Solution - state-building.

Diplomats, I(N)GOs - more comfortable with a state-to-state approach, want counterparts
to interact with. Make problems facing Congo into law and order issues. Also - allows
INGOs and church structures providing health/education support (things that should be
state responsibility?) an exit strategy.

But state still highly predatory, corrupt - state officials responsible for most human rights
violations in East congo? Seen as harmful. Population survives in spite of the state, rather
than with its help.

On the ground - aware of this, but not much power.

Post mass rapes, deploy battalion of Congolese army - responsible for their own human
rights abuses. Trials for justice for victims poorly organised, end up becoming their own
sources of tension.