ART 22.

PROOF OF MARRIAGE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
DE LA ROSA VS VDA. DE DAMIAN
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J .:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,
4
in SP Case No. 97668, which was
reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision
5
dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.
6
The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral
issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,
7
his nephews and nieces,
8
his illegitimate child,
9
and
the de facto adopted child
10
(ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa
11
Delgado by one Lucio Campo.
Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio
Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was
Ramon Osorio
12
with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with
Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of
Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the
ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives.
13
If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child
Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from
the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never
married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate
estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support
thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an
allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa
retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis
got married, his Partida de Casamiento
14
stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),
15
significantly omitting any mention of the name
and other circumstances of his father.
16
Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that
the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever
took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo
Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15,
1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-adjudication of the remaining properties
comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado
17
but whether a
marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived
together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point
out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal
certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or
unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as
husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning
more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact
been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of
evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J.
Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004,
503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of
America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his
marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;
18

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married
to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own,
they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These
children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect
as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate
child,
19
the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to
Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she
enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers
demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the
intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo
Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.
20

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the
intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate
child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo
died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she
presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.
21

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed
a petition for the adoption
22
of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath
"[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by
legal fiction."
23
The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters
Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his
predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia
Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.
24

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original
petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.
25
This petition was opposed by the
following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;
26
(2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and
(3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory
that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from
inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming
she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the
objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as
husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in
the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on
the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and
should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of
both estates.
27
The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the
late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are
hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City
of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in
accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving
heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent,
to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo
J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is]
considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator
therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa
has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby
APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the
appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such
estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA
ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to
render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of
sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
28

On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on
appeal was not filed on time.
29
They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
30
which
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
31
However, on motion for reconsideration and after
hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to
oppositors appeal in the interest of substantial justice.
32

In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals,
on the ground that oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period
was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed
the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision
33
read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial
justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to certain matters
of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to
the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred
absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and
should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration
proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for
the APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the
appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals
34
partially set aside the trial courts decision. Upon
motion for reconsideration,
35
the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.
36
The
dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have
been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas
and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the
intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision;
3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby
entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the
intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia;
thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon
his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her
acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all
her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including
all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed
administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and
to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrators qualification and
posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on
June 15, 1973 isREMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of
the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected
by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are
permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law
and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.
37

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband
and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record
of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness
38
attesting that they were not married, and
a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.
39

We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is
not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.
40
Once the presumption of marriage arises,
other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo
Rustia,
41
the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,
42
the declaration under oath of no less
than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado
43
and the titles to the properties in
the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
44
No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption
of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily relied
upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could
not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate
45
was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein,
46
such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual
order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety.Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
47

The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive
presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no
matter how strong, may overturn them.
48
On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of
which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence
to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio.
The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of
marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa
and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and
Caridad Concepcions Partida de Casamiento
49
identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).
50

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the
children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the
decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,
51
were her natural children.
52

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would
be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other
reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of
the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems
that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child
begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child
greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession
should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood.
The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its
basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such
difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten
with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate
children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of
legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and
sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either
of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.
53

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from
each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the
right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers
and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.
54
Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive
at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.
55
The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine
who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of
her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,
56
they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:
57

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is
allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so
in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis
supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child
58
of Guillermo Rustia.
As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or
recognition of paternity.
59
She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate
child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it
was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children
absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new
Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition
that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.
60
Recognition is compulsory in
any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father
(or mother)
61
by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing.
63

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through
the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary
recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her
birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment
through the courts.
64
Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a
dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.
65
On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.
66
In this case, intervenor
Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo
Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic
writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing
of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private
writing admitted by the father to be his.
67
Did intervenors report card from the University of
Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma
did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenors parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation.
Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of
death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972,
that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have
been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the
obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never
adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo
Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased
spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption
made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely
artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out,
otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must
be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.
68

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are
not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are
the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,
69
nieces and nephews.
70

Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the
decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of
the one to be appointed.
71
The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management
of the estates,
72
a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia.
They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia,
respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC
Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of
Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa
Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-
siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa
Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this
connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate)
shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose
respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr.
(who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes).
Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now
deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee
from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification
and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

ART 26. VALIDITY OF MARRIAGES CELEBRATED ABROAD

REPUBLIC VS IYOY
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July
2001,
[1]
affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in
Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,
[2]
declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint
[3]
for
declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the
said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial
Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus,
Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration
of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of
respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a
letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said
request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their
children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987,
Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in
Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might
not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the
Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in
1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown
reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been
openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely
Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and
abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between
them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a
ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and
72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim
[4]
with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted
therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen
Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five
children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his
Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and
she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of
the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to
contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since
the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial
reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole
breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of
her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well
as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A.,
except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for
divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus
requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent
Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued
that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen,
her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that
respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She
also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to
him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also
prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that
respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with
interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,
[5]
the RTC
afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated
in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
[6]


Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his
Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the
allegations in his Complaint;
[7]
(2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health
Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent
Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16
December 1961;
[8]
and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein
Fely openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus.
[9]


Felys counsel filed a Notice,
[10]
and, later on, a Motion,
[11]
to take the deposition of
witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories,
before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said
witnesses reside. Despite the Orders
[12]
and Commissions
[13]
issued by the RTC to the
Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses
upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking
into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence
and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05
October 1998,
[14]
considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case
was thus deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following
findings

The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a
reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly
credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as
striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and
support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the
defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the
United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic]
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is
married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.

Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest
before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the
marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It
appears to be the case in this instance.

Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals
her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is
the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident
that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital
obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in
question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed
at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The
evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court
finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her
excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital stability. That
such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is
shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for
these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus
L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.
[15]


Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to
law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its
Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible
error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-
appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the
declaration of nullity of their marriage

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN
AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A
DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY
THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision
is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married
to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench,
the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and
thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art.
26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse
eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff
would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to
honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain
shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain
married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital
covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court
finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given
relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the
parties.
[16]


After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,
[17]
denied its Motion
for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per
se constitute psychological incapacity.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in
accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals
committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.
[18]


In his Comment
[19]
to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological
incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus
and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned
the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to
institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to
intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence,
this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding
of psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, reads

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of
cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
[20]
the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus

. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated
[21]


The psychological incapacity must be characterized by

(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.
[22]


More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,
[23]
which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted
in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as
legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[24]


A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,
[25]
further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as
a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds
that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their
marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any
other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2)
the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husbands surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this
Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.
[26]
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.
[27]


As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
[28]


The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed
respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her
abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her
American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged
incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not
identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily
established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be
proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is
incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,
[29]
respondent Crasus must
still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina
[30]
that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
[31]
No less
than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
[32]


II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to
the case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to
the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely
herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,
and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even
until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not
have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that
only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State
in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the
Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48
provides

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his
Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages.
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the
Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.
[33]
His Office
is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services
of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government
and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.
[34]


The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest
of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal
defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute
to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or
defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is
brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals.
[35]
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case
is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for
taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable
and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the
Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the
State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in
several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta
[36]


In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this
Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of
the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)]
reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding
the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the State
[37]


Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
[38]
which became effective on 15 March 2003,
should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General
to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the
Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of
the said Rule are reproduced below

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the
petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the
court proof of such service within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date
the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its
own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other
pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of
the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision,
with or without the memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor,
shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the
dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general
circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from
notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal.

(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may
appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from
notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall
serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same
Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled
to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.
[39]


WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of
Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO II
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J .:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can
the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling
on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision
[1]
dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
itsResolution
[2]
dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had
declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the
impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art.
26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him
by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE
[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation.
[5]
Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law
that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not
of judicial determination.
[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to
remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
[7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
. . .
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that
the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe
for judicial determination.
[8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between
two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come
about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26
thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by
the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings
[9]
on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph
2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose
spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are
divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce
even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly
divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here
and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law
only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of theCivil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.
[10]
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.
[11]
In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the
same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so
long as they come within its spirit or intent.
[12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment
would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering
that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand,
legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence,
the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.
[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that
his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can
be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
[14]
Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.
[15]
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a
Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to
remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J .:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision
1
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag
City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari
2
under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.
3
On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.
4
Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his
wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
later, on January 8, 2006.
5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,
7
the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
8
in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
9
Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic
v. Orbecido III;
10
the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse."
11

THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,
12
Gerbert filed the present petition.
13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to
that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation
he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute
the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his
Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file
with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,
14
both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition
of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void
15
and
voidable
16
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.
17
Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,
19
enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code
to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
20
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.
21
In
both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after
a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to
[the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse."
23
The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse
a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.
24
Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;
25
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of
the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under
this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce
is valid according to his or her national law.
27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country."
28
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
29
The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity,
30
but failed to include a copy of the Canadian
law on divorce.
31
Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata
32
between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition
of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on
the mere presentation of the decree.
34
We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence,
the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."
35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
x x x x
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but
also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,
36
and Department of Justice Opinion
No. 181, series of 1982
37
both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine
court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but
it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;
38
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;
39
and that the time and place for hearing
must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
40
As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding
41
by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in
terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon
City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure
question of law. The petition assails the Order
1
dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality
of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines
2
on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
4
On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;
5
and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).
6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.
7
The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
x x x x
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing,
or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."
8
Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband
or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"
9
and not a civil action
which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong."
10
In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of
the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as
void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines
11
on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.
12

In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
13
Thus, Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy
would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of
Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."
14
Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register
Law (Act No. 3753)
15
in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.
16
The Civil Register Law
imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a
copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved
or annulled marriage was solemnized."
17
Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.
18
The
petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family
Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred"
when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC
may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court
19
which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case."
20
Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed"
the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with
the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect,
prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.
21
The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"
22
in the proceeding because he
"is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he
now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."
23
On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its
ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x
as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited
by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."
24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.
25
The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."
26
Braza
emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack
such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."
27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.
28
Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 5
29
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of
Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.
30
The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.
31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that
the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the
case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.
32
The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-
Llave v. Republic
33
which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void
and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the
one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior
marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.
35
In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,
36
this Court held
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."
37
WhileCorpuz concerned
a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected
the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
"[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and
status x x x."
38
The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro
39
and Nial v. Bayadog
40
which
declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."
41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them
to comment on the petition.
42
Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she
was previously married to Fujiki.
43
Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.
44
On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the
petition.
45
She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.
46

The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,
47
this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
48

I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
49
Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of
office.
50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition,
51
the service of summons,
52
the investigation of the public
prosecutor,
53
the setting of pre-trial,
54
the trial
55
and the judgment of the trial court.
56
This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."
57
The interpretation of the
RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,
58
this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."
59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.
60
Article 15 of the
Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states
that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,
61
as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.
62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
63
Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules
of evidence.
64
Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained
a divorce decree abroad.
65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy.
While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage,
66
which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact."
67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning thecivil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances
68
) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage.
69
These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"
70
and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.
71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,
72
but a spouses
right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.
73
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage.
74
In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"
75
it refers to the husband or the wife of the
subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife
under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is
the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
76
which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a
public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.
77
If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,
78
there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does
not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.
79
Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse."
80
Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact
that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that
a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
81
Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x
can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.
82
The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
83
support pendente lite of the
spouses and children,
84
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses,
85
and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.
86
A direct action
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of
the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."
87
In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." InRepublic v.
Orbecido,
88
this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"
89
under the
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that
results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign
citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which
is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo
90
which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served."
91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of
entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact
92
that needs to be reflected in
the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1wphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
93
The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run
when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution
dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-
11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.


ART 27-34. MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL,
INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
D E C I S I O N
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J .:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to
resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking
for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their
father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second
marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death.
[1]

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void
their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the
Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage.
[2]
Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules.
[3]
However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
reinstated the petition for review.
[4]

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration.
[5]
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code,
[6]
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant
to Article 80(3)
[7]
in relation to Article 58.
[8]
The requirement and issuance of marriage license is
the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.
[9]
This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution."
[10]
Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
family life which shall be protected by the State.
[11]
This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"
[12]
and case law considers it "not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment."
[13]

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license
is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
[14]
referring to the marriage of a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The
rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status.
[15]
To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."
[16]
The only issue that needs to
be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil
Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment
to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years
and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law.
The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order
to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
local civil registrar.
[17]
The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons
under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof
and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void,
[18]
subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting
of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,
bigamy and concubinage and adultery.
[19]
The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated
in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code
[20]
cannot be applied even
by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit
"at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place
[21]
and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
[22]
That is why the action or defense for
nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties
to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of
the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution,
[23]
and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article
50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the
contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be
noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death
of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.
[24]
"A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."
[25]
"Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights
upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent
by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
[26]
But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage
[27]
and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect.
[28]
For the same reason, the law makes either the
action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
[29]
Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then
the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises,
a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE
CASTRO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J .:
This is a petition for review of the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
69166,
2
declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner;
and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married,
thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had
regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the
plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that
they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as
husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro.
Since the childs birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a
government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.
3
In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support
her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."
4

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed
upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental
advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,
5
the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed
grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to
provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to
be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared
that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition,
the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the
paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal
knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners "forgetfulness should not be used as a
vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible."
6
Moreover, the
Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he
voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for
the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very
same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal,
to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in
actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is
void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of
nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have
been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the
marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent.
7
The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC
No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De
Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly
annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against
the appellant.
8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals.
9
Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated
without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage
license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived
together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.
10
Petitioner additionally argues that there
was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an
ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant
action for support. Citing several authorities,
11
petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the
subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent
proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of
another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented
would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and
would increase the burden of the courts.
12
Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of
his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs paternity and filiation, the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.
13

In her Comment,
14
respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart
the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the
appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally,
but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and
straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about
their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the
trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and
filiation.
15

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for
the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for
support. Citing the case of Nial v. Bayadog,
16
it states that courts may pass upon the validity of
a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the
existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the
trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without
a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it
concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
not valid.
17
In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an
illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.
18

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for
support and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked.
19
Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
20

Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,
21
the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for
death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute
nullity.
22

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable.
23
In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner
and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead,
they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five
years.
24
However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was
asked during cross-examination, thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and
wife for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
25

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous
and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license.
26
In the instant case, there was no "scandalous
cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage
void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore
entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
27
Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.
28

The Certificate of Live Birth
29
of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in
an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the
father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on
November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila;
30

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only
by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondents own admission in the course of
his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they
were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At times, they
would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became
pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While
respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the
pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and
"C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-
2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant
is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E,"
"E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.
31

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision
1
of the
Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the
marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay
City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.
2
In lieu of a marriage
license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,
3
also dated 24 November 1986, attesting
that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint
4
for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he
did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for
at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live
as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-
arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them.
They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to
Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal
could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship.
Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It
was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He
alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When
he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa.
When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
him on account of their age difference.
5
In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.
6
The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.
7

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision
8
dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both
parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable
consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs
against [Jose].
9

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the
story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign
a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual,
as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to
sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that
could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her
brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three
months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for
a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D.,
wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does
not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he
was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed
her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of
Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage
contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the
Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she
answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was
procured through fraud.
10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited
Article 87
11
of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must
be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.
12

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
13

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86
14
of the
Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87
(4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground
that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by
said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the
time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose
in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for
annulment of his marriage to Felisa.
15

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under
Article 76
16
of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an
affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76
did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-
faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to
which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56
17
of the
Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong
to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in
Article 7
18
of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in
the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa
was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another
one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.
19

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v.
Bayadog,
20
and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public
that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license,
save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.
21

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution
22
dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of
merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa
filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the
appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the
two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution.
23

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY
OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE
FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.
24

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.
25
She
differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal
case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability.
Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any
liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a
considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by
petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling
in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.
26
To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is
the Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the
validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the
solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally
obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact
that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that
the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband
and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage
contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also
bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary
evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following
documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988
wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the
Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had
lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2
May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58
27
makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.
28
Article 80(3)
29
of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract.
30
This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,
31
whereby the absence of a
marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of
a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.
32

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at
the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages,
33
(3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.
34

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,
35
as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.
36

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."
37
One of the central
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly
38
but reasonably construed.
39
They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provisions rather than the exception.
40
Where a general rule is established by
statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
implication.
41
For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man
and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of
five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article
76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in
the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes
that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts
42
in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration
of their marriage.
43
The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced
to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.
44
The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house.
45

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the
truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.
46
Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject
to this Courts review.
47
It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case
the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.
48

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted
from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
49
Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
50
The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November
1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code
51
that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from
the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud
against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent
by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.
52
The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of
an invalid one as well.
53
To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our
laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least
five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage
license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity,
Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room
for application where there is a law.
54
There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.
55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to
Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
56
Jose and Felisas
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except
that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and
may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.
57
It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and
continuity that is unbroken.
58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to
Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if
any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

CARLOS VS SANDOVAL
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N


REYES, R.T., J .:


ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized
during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15,
2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision
[1]
of the Court
of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment
[2]
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of
property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six
parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the
Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically
reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.


Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area
of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.


Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a
non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island ofLuzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by
Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S,
points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road
widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
(130) SQ. METERS, more or less.



PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of
Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang,
Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River;
and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing
an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.


PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de
Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el
SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde
el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150)
METROS CUADRADOS.


PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De
Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el
SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts.
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad
de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150)
METROS CUADRADOS.
[3]


During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn,
undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name
of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered
by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered
in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of
land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before
the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties
submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise,
the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of
the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing
the remaining land of the first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,
[4]
2,331 square meters
of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-
square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed
on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the
supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the
contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135,
against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of
nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum
of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo
and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the
adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent
Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by
such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material
averments of petitioners complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding
the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo. Respondents
declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased TeofiloCarlos with another
woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that
their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized
the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo
II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as
parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground
of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his
own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony
of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony,
respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.
[5]


Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court
its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents) Motion
for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion
for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval
and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by
the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of
the requisite marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the
natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the
sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from
date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of
land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered
by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said
Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name
of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff
and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue
another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of
defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of
plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of
defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff
herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs evidence on
his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, appearance
fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.
[6]


Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter
alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an
illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
[7]


The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the
court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid
safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment
from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being
an action to recover upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on
summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere
fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the
disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first
paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the
rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary
judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing
safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the
matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13,
1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact,
however, that appellees own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived
together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their
marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her
participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more thorough
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary
nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the
effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage
should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
(Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on
summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that
the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it
may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal
requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure
to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract
evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside
from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandovals
affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the
following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of
the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage
license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the
said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad
Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason
that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage
Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same.

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the
considered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as
well as the motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a
trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary evidence of
marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should
appellants non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof
that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes
the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial courts
rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative
father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandovals
statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellants prior claims
regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer
that he is the illegitimate son of appellees brother, to Our mind, did not
altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his
right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as
such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find
appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased
from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole,
insufficient to support what could well be a minors total forfeiture of the rights
arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous
statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration regarding the illegitimate
filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the
fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that
the trial court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial
on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to
the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.
[8]


On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the
Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners Motion for reconsideration
under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned
marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a
grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite
the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated
and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not
theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable
Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals
committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section
1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead
of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions,
made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or
otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the
facts.
[9]
(Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a
trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse
in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be
proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is
confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19
[10]
of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the
Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise
considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on
summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that
the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x
[11]


But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was
correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the application
of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of
marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule,
which took effect on March 15, 2003
[12]
is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial
of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed
except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.
[13]
In
that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of
summary judgments.


Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of
marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is
applicable to all kinds of actions.
[14]
(Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful
right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the
declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State
should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment
was rendered.
[15]


Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public
prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is
no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be
presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public
prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General
will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.
[16]


II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed
by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by
stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On
the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek
its dissolution.
[17]
(Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to
build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital
life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life
play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with
the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988.
[18]


The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of
marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
[19]


It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003
[20]
is prospective
in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,
[21]
viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under
the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its
application.
[22]
(Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in
1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern
depends upon when the marriage took place.
[23]


The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.
[24]
But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must
appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit.
[25]
Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-
interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest.
[26]


Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to
be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not
the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
[27]


Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,
[28]
where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no
specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must
be prosecuted or defendedin the name of the real party-in-interest and must be
based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the
children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

x x x x

In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree
and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos
remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as
bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the
instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner
Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
[29]
(Underscoring
supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-
party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on
succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and
the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
[30]


Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents
Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect
to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
[31]


Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a
collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he
still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code
provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring
supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes
collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.
[32]
Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.
[33]


If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate,
or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that
collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the
decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other
siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the
estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article
1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to
seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent
Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire
estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of
marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,
adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo,
then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be
protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may
be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the
presence of descendant, illegitimate,
[34]
or even an adopted child
[35]
excludes the collateral
relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the
validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to
dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence
that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the
deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II
is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to
the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand
of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should
not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error
by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.
[36]


We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in
the case, petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent
couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative
filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of
respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For
the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be
afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family
Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is
the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the
legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
[37]


Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action
concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has
to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in
controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on
the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of
marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted
son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISSthe action for nullity of marriage for lack of
cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision
is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to
give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.