Levinas and Ethics of Care

ABSTRACT.
In this paper, we suggest the likely effects of the application of

Emmanuel Levinass philosophy to the care ethic, particularly as it is represent-
ed by the author Joan Tronto, one of the most cogent exponents of care ethics.
Thus, we ask: does Levinass philosophy have enough in common with the care
ethic to be able to overlap it and fruitfully address shared issues of pressing
importance? And, is Levinass philosophy different enough to challenge the care
ethic and help it grow in the ways that it must to become a more philosophical-
ly recognized and viable perspective? Our answer is affirmative in both regards.
This paper does not intend to criticize the philosophy of Levinas on the basis of
care ethics (as it is our conviction that care ethics has precious little on which to
criticize Levinas, apart from his view of women) but instead lends the care ethic
a perspective with the philosophical legitimacy that it has been hitherto lacking.
In terms of alterations to the care ethics, we believe first and foremost that, from
a Levinasian point of departure, it would be necessary for the care ethic to adopt
a greater awareness of asymmetry in the ethical relation, as well as become more
future-oriented towards the consequences of the individual agents (intentional
or non-intentional) actions.
KEYWORDS. Levinas, Tronto, care ethics, other, particularity, asymmetry
INTRODUCTION
I
t is our goal in this paper to explore whether or not a philosophical
foundation, in the vein of the ideas of Emmanuel Levinas, can be
Towards A Levinasian Care Ethic:
A Dialogue between the Thoughts of
Joan Tronto and Emmanuel Levinas
W. Wolf Diedrich
Doctoral student, K.U.Leuven
Roger Burggraeve
Faculty of Theology, K.U.Leuven
Chris Gastmans
Interfaculty Centre for Biomedial Ethics and Law,
K.U.Leuven
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ETHICS NETWORK 13, no. 1 (2003): 33-61.
2006 by European Centre for Ethics, K.U.Leuven. All rights reserved. doi:10.2143/EP.13.1.2011786
forged and grafted onto the care ethic perspective. To accomplish this,
we will narrow the discussion to two voices that of Levinas and that
of the contemporary care ethicist, Joan Tronto. In what follows, we will
evaluate the compatibility of these two authors relevant writings and
attempt to identify any potential stumbling blocks to a successful dialogue
between the two different, yet not overly divergent world views represent-
ed by each author. First, we will present some of the core concepts of
Tronto, then some basic ideas from Levinas, so that we may ultimately
compare two in the conclusion of this essay.
This paper is rooted in the conviction that Levinas can help lend the
kind of philosophical credence that many care ethics authors have been
requesting for some years now. In its reaction to an ethic of justice an
ethic that categorizes responses to situations based on universal principles
the care ethic, or care perspective, can also be viewed as a reaction to
the whole history of Greek metaphysical reduction in Western philoso-
phy. With its stress on the necessity of positively valuing particularity, the
care perspective emphasizes the viewpoint of the alien other, falling out-
side the scope of the Western canon of thinking. Insofar as this is the
case, it is our thesis that the tenets of an ethics of care stand close to the
ideas of certain other postmodern thinkers specifically, those thinkers
who have radically called into question the method of thinking about
reality that philosophy has for so long embraced. At stake in this compar-
ison the determination of whether or not the writings of Levinas would
be suitable for providing a philosophical grounding to the care perspec-
tive that is appropriate and other to the classical philosophical grounding
that lends shape to the autonomy-centred ethics of justice.
TRONTOS STANCE WITH REGARD TO THE ETHICS OF CARE DEBATE
In her 1993 book, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care,
Tronto offers the following definition of care, devised in collaboration
with Berenice Fisher:
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES MARCH 2006
34
Ethical Perspectives 13 (2006) 1
On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species
activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and
repair our world so that we can live in it as well as possible. That
world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of
which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web.
1
This definition has been disparaged as being too broad, vague, and amor-
phous.
2
However, it is precisely this definitions inchoate character that
makes it appropriate for typifying the care ethic. With so many different
authors positioning themselves in such different ways to qualify the care
ethic at the present time, the broadest definitions will be best for including
the widest range possible of care ethicists.
3
That being said, we are in no
way suggesting that Tronto is, or should be taken as, the representative of
care ethics. Nevertheless, since Tronto develops a coherent and easily trace-
able line of thought in her work, she is a very fitting candidate for initiating
a dialogue with philosophy, on behalf of the care perspective. Moreover,
unlike some care ethics authors, Tronto intimately concerns herself with
the question of how to bestow upon the care perspective greater currency
and respect in the social and political spheres. Trontos brand of care ethics,
if you will, maintains an exigent need for an apposite philosophical anthro-
pology capable of legitimating the care ethic for a sceptical intellectual audi-
ence many of whom perceive the care movement as merely speaking of
an ethics of friendship that is incompetent to treat serious moral dilemmas.
During a lecture presented at the Catholic University of Leuven,
Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care: Care, Ethics and Politics,
Tronto poses the following two questions with regard to the care ethic:
I. If care is promising as a concept, why has it not been concretely
implemented yet?
II. Is there a way to re-envision the care ethic taking the previous
question into account?
To answer the first question, Tronto proposes several hypotheses. These
hypotheses all revolve around the insight that even a moral concept as
35
DIEDRICHBURGGRAEVEGASTMANS
seemingly incorruptible as care can be misappropriated and abused. If care
is viewed as a practise in which one reaches out to those in need, then the
conquests of various missionaries of the Americas can be seen as a function
of care. After all, colonists also understood their mission in part as bringing
culture and religion (salvation) to the helplessly ignorant. Perhaps most detri-
mental to the serious consideration of the care ethic is a phenomenon
Tronto identifies as privileged irresponsibility. This entrenched prejudice
functions in Western societies by holding a predilection for thinking that
important people are not required to do less important tasks. That is, one
who occupies a position of relative authority or responsibility for a business
or organisation is not inclined to feel responsible for making sure that he
puts his rubbish in the correct container someone is hired to separate the
recyclables from the other trash, is the presupposition. Normal duties of
care are viewed as menial tasks for people with nothing better to do, or with
no possibility to make something better of themselves. People who are
involved in the abstract over-seeing of society are viewed as important, while
nurses who change bedpans are viewed as unimportant by comparison.
Obviously, this leads people to think that care is not a worthwhile value.
4
As to the second question, Trontos principal petition is that care ethi-
cists begin to think about how an ethic of care might work within the con-
text of existing political and social models, given the depiction of care that
she offers. In order to do this, she claims that care ethicists must begin to
take seriously the legal, social, political and ethical boundaries that have
been erected by society in order to prevent the positive valuation of caring
tasks, as well as care in general. Tronto holds that once we become mindful
of the boundaries, we can begin to deconstruct them, as they are human cre-
ations, and not the product of ingrained biological or natural programming.
TRONTOS POLITICS OF CARE
According to Tronto, care is a perspective, and likewise a litmus test,
through which the ethical quality of various forms of behaviour can be
36
evaluated according to both their efficacy and honesty in an ethical sense.
This caveat is critically placed, since, as Tronto reiterates in variously in
Moral Boundaries, by focusing on care, we focus on the process by which
life is sustained, we focus on human actors acting.
5
An ethic of care can
only be of aid to the society that implements it if, and only if, it is viewed
as a supplemental guide to otherwise functioning systems of justice.
Tronto makes the case that the universalists worry needlessly, since there
is no need to abolish the justice paradigm for care ethics to receive atten-
tion (even most reactionary care ethicists agree that we as a society would
be worse off without any notion of justice). Rather, there is only a need
to show where the justice paradigm is incomplete and re-draw the
boundaries of the understanding of political power, such that care can
become part of the paradigm instead of constantly dwelling pointlessly
outside the walls of the states legitimacy.
6
What is needed is a shift in
emphasis, the creation of a more caring form of justice, rather than the
full pendulum swing that is sometimes alluded to by other authors who
cant seem to conceive of how care and justice can share a stage at the
same time.
Attempting to challenge the boundary that prevents care from being
taken seriously in the public sphere, Tronto takes Aristotle as a chief
inspiration in formulating an ethic of care that contains a political dimen-
sion. In Aristotles ethics, a person cannot become good unless they live
and work in a good polis that is, politically structured society. As such,
Tronto considers Aristotle a moral maximalist, as he requires much of
individuals and their respective community in order for moral life to exist
at all.
7
For Aristotle, fostering and developing virtues is necessarily a social
event, not an isolated, individual project one performs ensconced in the
corner of a dimly lit room while contemplating theological and philosoph-
ical treatises. However, rather than seeing these two as inextricably inter-
woven and dependant upon one another, most moralists and politicians
since Aristotle wish either to make political life an instrument for realiz-
ing moral principles, or to make morality an instrument for political,
37
power-motivated ends.
8
Tronto instead agrees with Aristotle that morali-
ty and politics can and should dynamically interact with one another, and
that neither politics nor morality should have a sanctioned ascendancy
over the other. Because politicians and moralists are at loggerheads on
this issue, though, politics and morality have come to be two separated
realms of life. It is precisely this preternatural separation that concerns
Tronto. Tronto argues that the separation between politics and morality
can be stated differently as the separation between the public and the
private.
9
Tronto sees this boundary as social and not natural, and thus,
susceptible to deconstruction. The distinction between public and private
has led Western cultures to develop two distinct forms of morality that
have not been allowed to intermingle. On the one hand, there is the
morality of politics, a Machiavellian-type doctrine that is only concerned
with morality insofar as it can help the politician gain more power and
control over the public domain. On the other hand, there is the morality
of the home, the traditional sphere of women and the family.
10
It is in this
environment that relationships and concerns for particular individuals
come to the fore. Tronto regards the home as the original foundation for
the care ethic, and more or less praises the values that emanate from this
milieu. However, chief to Trontos argument is that the ethic of care is
useless in terms of its possibility to transform society for the better unless
the boundary (although not the distinction!) between the morality of the
private and the morality of the public is abrogated. Tronto urges her read-
ers that unless moral boundaries are taken seriously and seen for what
they are walls that accord legitimacy on one side and illegitimacy on
the other there can never be a culturally viable equality between men
and women. Women, as yet, seek equal footing with men in a context
where the boundary between public and private persists meaning equal
footing is defined only from the perspective of the public side of the
boundary. The implication of this view is far reaching: rather than talk, as
Carol Gilligan does, about care and justice as being two sides of a coin, a
coin whose two sides cannot be emphasized simultaneously, Tronto will
38
argue that care and justice are concepts that are distinguishable from each
other, but cannot ever be separated from each other in practise. That is to
say, a well-developed notion of justice is impossible without a well-devel-
oped notion of care, and vice versa. Tronto thus defines justice as the
continued care for the common good.
11
Tronto is in line with the conviction that an ethic of care should be
fundamentally a non-violent ethic.
12
However, constructing an overarch-
ing theory of care in her view will necessarily call for an end to the
celebrations of an ethic of care as a product of gender difference that
points to womens superiority, perhaps much to the chagrin of some fem-
inist care ethics authors.
13
This is not to say Tronto is not a feminist in her
own right, but merely that she sees the care ethic as having a more glob-
al import than what it was originally conceived to have. It is also worth
mentioning along these lines that Tronto admonishes people to be sensi-
tive to the fact that human beings comport themselves to their respective
realities neither according to a way posited by advocates of isolated auton-
omy, nor in way theorized by supporters of a caring paradigm that
excludes (or at least de-values) the value of principles. Care requires
autonomy and justice in order to fulfil its goals, since care strives, in most
circumstances, toward making others autonomous in their own right.
14
Should care lose sight of this, a care ethic will be a tool for imprisoning
others rather than helping or teaching others. In this way, Tronto pleads
for what other care ethicists have dubbed an understanding of relation-
al autonomy.
15
In this view, our autonomy is always heteronomous in
some sense, dependant upon anothers gift, as well as being contextually
dependant.
Thus, Levinas seems to appear in some of Trontos statements:
Caring seems to involve taking the concerns and needs of the other as
the basis for actionwhat is definitive about careseems to be a per-
spective of taking the others needs as the starting point for what must be
done.
16
In much of his writings, Levinas is concerned, if not almost
obsessed, with an ethics that is built not on autonomy, but rather,
39
heteronomy (more precisely, an ethics that understands heteronomy and
autonomy as connected existential realities). For Levinas, it is the other,
and not I, who is the genesis of any ethical relation. Because Tronto and
Levinas have the same basic point of departure when it comes to ethics,
we are warranted in asking the larger question of whether or not they allo-
cate a similar concept of political and ethical responsibility. To the extent
to which they do, we may begin to speak of a Levinasian care ethic. In
what follows, we will explore, to the extent possible in a short essay, the
ideas of Levinas in order to pursue this question.
THE OTHER IN THE WRITINGS OF LEVINAS
In nearly all of his writings, and especially in his magnum opus of 1961,
Totality and Infinity, Levinas tries to describe how it is possible, in philo-
sophical terms, to have a relationship with the other that is non-allergic.
In contradistinction to the Greek method of philosophising, Levinas
wants to reject the notion that the other has quiddity (that-ness, or what-
ness), and as such, amend some of what may be called the racist tenden-
cies of Western thought.
17
Traditionally, people in the West have made a
habit, an institution even, of dividing their world into two parts: the
realm of truth and the realm of falsehood, or the spheres of the sacred
and profane, or spirit and matter the list of examples can be enumer-
ated ad infinitum. Whatever words one may use as paradigmatic terms to
illustrate this phenomenon, the underlying idea is that in life only good
and evil exist, and only the good is praiseworthy. By dividing the world
such, and emphasizing the need to choose only one path to the detriment
of the other, people in the West have striven to make universality domi-
nate particularity. The favoured pastime of empire building (whether it
be the Greek, Roman, French, Spanish, English, German, or American)
is a concrete example and consequence of this way of thinking about the
world.
40
Western society has long maintained an allergic relationship to these
alien others, in its thought and its treatment of them. Thales, at the birth
of Western philosophy, inaugurates the canon of Greek thinking by look-
ing for the substrate, the principle of unity for all reality. Once the substrate
is identified, all things are viewed as a mere function of the principle.
Likewise, all people are reduced to a function of thought. Instead of allow-
ing their voice to be heard, their particularity must be overcome so that
they are nothing more than an echo of the pre-selected arche. It is at this
point that the switch is surreptitiously and almost seamlessly made from
dialoguing with the other to codifying, categorizing, and instrumentalizing
the other. The other, instead of being considered in terms of his who-
ness is now considered in terms of his what-ness. More specifically, by
assuming a static, comprehensible nature to the human person the
question who amounts to a what.
18
Instead of making an allowance for
the person in and of himself, secondary characteristics and specific quali-
ties are considered first sex, colour of skin, race, religious beliefs, etc.
The other which stands in defiance to my way of compressing and squeez-
ing the world into an intelligible totality must be bested, and never listened
to on his or her own terms. This is, according to a certain view, the under-
side of the legacy of Western philosophy and Western society.
Levinas wants to aver that exteriority, or the group that falls outside
the empire, does not connote a failed unity. Levinas believes that Western
thought has always viewed exteriority negatively because it only thinks of
separation in terms of lack or need, instead of recognizing a Good that is
beyond the totality.
19
One of the principle goals of Totality and Infinity is to
show that it is precisely separation that makes truth possible.
20
In
Levinass view, separation and distinctions lie at the base of intelligibility,
not unity or singularity. Because of this conviction, he stands in direct
opposition to the Greek understanding of plurality as chaos. God creates
in order to have multiplicity, and this multiplicity destroys the chaos of
the Hebrew tohu wa bohu, the formlessness of unified reality bereft of
individuality.
41
Levinas thinks that individuals may have, at least in certain circum-
stances, a non-allergic relationship to otherness; however, the philosoph-
ical tradition has not been able to recognize this fact previously in an ade-
quate way, due to the very way philosophy functions. For Levinas,
Western philosophy would seem to function primarily by identifying the
knower with the known, with the identification making the two separate
entities one in thought.
21
Thus, Levinas tries to provide an account of a
relationship between the self and the other that exists, at least for a cer-
tain duration, apart from the structures of thought. The place and mode
for this special type of relationship is in and through the dialogue
encounter.
In a non-technical manner of speaking, the problem can be stated in
the following way: as soon as I finish a conversation with another person,
as soon as I pause to reflect, I have the opportunity to think. Once I think,
I will try to understand what my discussion partner is saying in categories
already familiar to me. I have the chance to dissect the discussion, to
understand it by way of any number of philosophical, psychological or
scientific mediations. Essentially, I will translate the vocabulary of the
other into my own vocabulary, imposing upon the other my ideas of what
the other has said. In this way, I have reduced the otherness of the other
(his alterity) to the sameness of my thought. I do not allow the other to
appear in her light, but the light that I lend to her.
It is because of this truism of human experience that Levinas encour-
ages his readers to take a step back before drawing conclusions about the
inter-subjective relationship. Levinas pays critical attention to the moment
of dialogue before the pause, that is, before the presence of reflective and
categorical thought. Before the mediation of my thought, the thought of
the same, there is a moment of immediacy. It is in this moment that the
other is, or can be, before me in and of herself. Levinas describes this
moment as coming into contact with the face of the other. When I recognize
the face of the other, I do not recognize any specific quality or amalgam of
qualities pertaining to the other person. To the contrary, I recognize the
42
other outside of any role he may hold in regular or public life. The face is
a living, naked presence
22
. A non-Levinasian example might make the pic-
ture clearer: I see a businessman walking down the street, no-nonsense
briefcase in hand, dressed in a fashionable Armani suit, Ray Ban sunglass-
es, chatting away on his cellular phone, oblivious to the world around him.
I see a businessman. Then, as I see that man attempt to cross the street, he
is mugged and stabbed by a robber. I run up to the man to see if he is okay.
I see the same man before me lying on the ground, humiliated, pleading for
helpbut what I see is no longer a businessman I see a man stripped
of his role, I see his face. It is signification without specification, a sig-
nification that cannot be assembled.
23
For Levinas however, generally speaking, I witness the face of the
other in and through dialogue, and not as in the above example, since lan-
guage constitutes the relation to the other (there can be no relation to
another person without language, in other words).
24
As such, this immedi-
ate moment of coming into contact with the face is a moment of transcen-
dence, a kind of deliverance, if you will, from the ordinary structures of
being.
25
According to the Darwinian dictates of being, or the conatus essen-
di as Levinas calls it (referring quite explicitly to Spinoza), I should and will
normally seek self-preservation at any cost without regard for the other,
just as it is in the animal kingdom. The order of being, or the conatus,
instructs us that natural selection brutally and consistently selects only the
self-insistent, clever, and powerful for continuation in the species.
However, when I meet the face, I realize that I am confronted with a
uniquely human choice, a possibility to disobey the rules of being. The face
exhibits a strange authority over me. I realize before the face that instead
of being condemned to drown in my egoistic arrangement of the universe,
I have the possibility to be brought out of myself, to learn and be taught
by the other in such a way that I am not merely reducing all exterior things
to my pre-determined categories of understanding. True language consists
in being taught to give by the face, in the inversion of my objectifying gaze,
or cognition.
26
The content of the others instruction is ethical; it is a call
43
to learn through action, through response. This is what Levinas means by
responsibility in and through the other. The other calls out to me, asks of
me. I cannot ignore this call once heard; I can only choose either to
respond to the other or not to respond to the other.
To put it alternately, the other teaches me in and through the priori-
ty of the saying over the said. By this terminology, Levinas means to
imply that the imminent and dynamic vehicle of saying in the present
tense (dialogue) is the appropriate forum to discover the non-thought ori-
ented teaching of the other. The medium of the said, that which is writ-
ten or recorded in some fashion, is inevitably the product of reflective
thought, and as such, represents a formal masking of the face, or the
nakedness of the other. The said always proceeds from the role we play
in ordinary life and retains more of a static and fixed quality. Furthermore,
when we in the West invert the ethical relation and give precedence to the
said through our scientific modes of understanding, we give pride of place
to ontology at the same time. As we discovered earlier through the reduc-
tion of who-ness to what-ness, reducing human nature to an intelligible
and unchangeable substrate leads inevitably toward categorizing the other
among the realm of things. The core insight that Western thinking neg-
lects, and that Levinas in turn emphasizes, is that being and ontology are
not fundamental before I can think of the others being I am already
speaking to him, already in relation to him:
I have spoken to him, that is to say, I have neglected the universal being
that he incarnates in order to remain with the particular being he is. Here
the formula before being in relation with a being, I must first have
comprehended it as being loses its strict application, for in compre-
hending being I simultaneously tell this comprehension to this being.
27
It is in this context that we can understand the meaning of Levinass state-
ment, In language qua said everything is conveyed before us, be it at the
price of a betrayal.
28
The betrayal Levinas speaks of is none other than the
betrayal of our own categories. Through ontology we mean to make a 1:1
44
correlation between our ideas of others, and in fact the entire cosmos that
we inhabit, and the actual realities of these persons and things in and of
themselves. While there is no detriment per se when we confuse our idea
of things with what they are in and of themselves, there is an enormous
price to pay in the moral sphere for confusing our ideas of others with who
others are in and of themselves. In a simplistic sense, this is Levinass pri-
mary complaint and critique of the traditional concept of knowledge.
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE THIRD PERSON
To properly understand the way Levinas sees ethics as operative within a
political sphere, it is necessary to un-say, at least partially, what we have
said thus far with regard to Levinass philosophical outlook. The reason
for this back stepping is obvious when we consider that we cannot con-
ceive of a political theory that does not generalize to some degree using
abstraction. Here it becomes evident that the thrust of Levinasian philos-
ophy is not as anti-intellectualist as our expose of responsibility in the sec-
ond person might have made it seem.
29
As soon as we move away from
the isolated ethical situation in which I am considering merely the other
in the immediacy of the moment, we cannot help but acknowledge in and
through our impartial intellect the complex web of relations to others that
persists before, during and after the person-to-person ethical encounter.
To live in society means to live with others whom I do not know or do
not immediately come into contact with, but whom nevertheless my
actions indirectly affect. There is always an other who is not present at the
moment, to whom I have an ethical obligation. When I am confronted
with the arresting face of the other, I am also confronted with that per-
sons other, or the third party for whom I am an other as well:
30
Certainly, my responsibility for everyone can also manifest itself by
limiting itself: the ego may be called in the name of this unlimited
45
responsibility to concern itself about itself as well. The fact that every
other, my neighbour, is also a third party in relation to another neigh-
bour, invites me to justice, to weighting matters, and to thought[this]
unlimited responsibilityjustifies this concern for justice and for self
and for philosophy.
31
Two vital aspects must be noted in the preceding quotation. Let us con-
sider them both separately. Chronologically, the first point of significance
has to do with the idea of serving the ends of responsibility by limiting
responsibility. If I allow the other to partake of my resources and myself
infinitely, concomitant with the infinite nature of her call to me, I neglect
my responsibility to other others, who have the potential to call to me just
as urgently. Building on this premise, since I am an other to another other,
I need to conserve my energies. I should not expend all that I have to give
in one relation, since another other calls me to responsibility for myself
(responsibility in the first person) in a way that the other does not. This is
the case due to the asymmetrical priority of the other intrinsic to respon-
sibility in the second person. However, the character of this responsibili-
ty in the third person is not of the same order as the intentional ethics
involved with responsibility in the second person. An ethics that concerns
itself with other others is examining the way that my actions affect others
with whom I live in community, irrespective of whether or not I intend
these actions. Thus, we are now dwelling in the legal or political realm.
Ethics of this kind can be particularly difficult, especially since there are
so many effects, so many consequences that issue from my behaviour that
I do not in the least intend:
The comedy begins with the simplest of our movements, each of which
carries with it an inevitable awkwardness. In putting out my hand to
approach a chair, I have creased the sleeve of my jacket. I have
scratched the floor, I have dropped the ash from my cigarette. In doing
that which I wanted to do, I have done so many things I did not want.
That act has not been pure, for I have left some traces. In wiping out
these traces, I have left otherswe are thus responsible beyond our
intentions.
32
46
If I can never expect any particular intentional act to have a determinate
number of effects that I have power over as the person who wills this act,
I must begin to seriously accept the notion I am responsible in ways that
I myself cannot understand all at once (or at least, prior to acting). I act
in a sense that escapes me. The objective meaning of my actions sudden-
ly prevail over my intentions.
33
My interiority, or the fact that no one can
stand in my place to make my decisions for me, loses its importance once
accused by a third party.
34
To live as conscious of these facts demands
vigilance from the subject an ever watch-full eye that surveys its sur-
roundings in spite of how it thinks it is relating to its surroundings. By
spending an hour of my time talking with one person about an issue of
mutual concern, I neglect fifteen minutes of time that might have been
critical for helping another friend later in the same day. Alternatively, even
more minimally, by simply taking the first available chair to sit in a full and
bustling caf, I deprive another person of the possibility to enjoy the envi-
ronment of that caf as well. Some of the unintended consequences of
our actions are relatively benign (such as the example with the chair at the
caf), while others entail decidedly more gravity.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF APPLYING THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEVINAS TO THE
CARE ETHIC
Asymmetry as Opposed to Symmetry
The starkest contrast between the philosophy of Levinas and that of the
care ethicists centres on the notion of the asymmetry of the ethical rela-
tionship. For those unfamiliar with Levinass work, this notion is often
one of the most challenging to comprehend, and difficult to accept, due
to its radical conclusions. Acquiescing to the idea that the other always
stands in a position of height in relation to me can be confounding for
those raised in a milieu that prizes equality and egalitarianism as the
47
paragons of moral virtue. The complicatedness of the issue is in fact
two-fold: first, the idea that the other is my master or teacher can cause
one to fear that I, the subject, am nothing more than doormat for the
other, a passive listener to her ethical appeals and then a slave to her arbi-
trary bidding. As soon as I assert myself in the dialogue, if I question or
evaluate the moral value of her teaching for me, I tamper with the ethical
nature of the encounter and it ceases to be ethical, strictly speaking. The
second complication arises from the contradiction that, when I meet the
other, what I see is the naked, shivering, vulnerable face, without form or
the role that I customarily attribute to the person in question. How can
this vulnerability, this utter lack of authority or grandeur, be interpreted
as a teacher who is lofty, who descends from a position of height to meet
me? In addressing these two contentions, we can move further toward
bridging the gap between Tronto and Levinas.
As to the first complication, the general disagreement from a care ethi-
cist such as Tronto would stem not so much from the proscription to
analyse the value of what the other says before listening or responding to
the other, but from the inequality inherent in the asymmetrical ethical rela-
tion. The issue of becoming a doormat for the other is something of a spu-
rious concern for one who is acquainted with the way that Levinass phi-
losophy is designed, however. As soon as one realises that my responsibil-
ity for third parties calls me to be responsible for myself as well, the door-
mat concern is alleviated. For Levinas, theres a twist: personal responsi-
bility is only derived from my responsibility to others (I take care of myself
so that I can be able to take care of other others as well), and not derived
from a duty towards myself. I am not important in the ethical picture
except in relation to others. As to the question of not evaluating the con-
tent of the others ethical charge to me, the pseudo-scholastic method of
meticulously prognosticating the possible moral advantages and disadvan-
tages before deciding to commit to one action or another is a practice care
ethicists have shunned from the beginning, in favour of immersing oneself
into a situation and becoming well versed with the narratives of all relevant
48
parties involved in a moral dilemma. Mentally assessing before-hand
what impact an action might have on those involved takes a secondary
position (it is not neglected altogether!) to first getting involved in a sit-
uation, accepting the otherness of the other points of view, and familiar-
izing oneself with the stories of each individual person, rather than
imposing ones own grand narrative upon the situation at hand.
However, throughout this whole experience, the care ethicist assumes
that she has as much to teach to others, in the eventuality of the ensuing
conversation, as she has to learn. The field of dialogue is manifestly level.
Granted, the care ethicist will speak of the others needs as coming first,
of even sacrificing oneself for the needs of the other, but never at the
expense of totally neglecting oneself. The care of oneself is still part of
the ethical representation; it does not belong to any other domain. While
Levinas would not necessarily disagree that such an approach can be
fruitful in terms of doing good, he would add that the only aspect of the
care ethicists approach that is ethical, properly speaking, is the aspect of
the ethicists ability to be open to learn from the other, and not the aspect
of the ethicist teaching the other. As soon as I wish to teach the other, I
am once again conversing in concert with my own egoistic drives. In a
certain sense, Levinas just wants to make clear the distinction that it is
the egoistic or selfish quality of the interaction that cannot be accepted
from an ethical point of view. The actual product of egoistic involvement
may very well lead to a subsequent good for all involved, but such is acci-
dental to the consideration of being immersed in the ethical sphere.
Ethics is something very special and specific for Levinas; it is not an
umbrella term for various practises. Ethics takes place outside the con-
fines of being, it un-fetters us from egoism. Many things which other
ethicists would be quick to call morally or ethically good, Levinas hesi-
tates to praise in the same way. It is not that he disputes the good of cer-
tain caring actions; it is only that certain caring actions (namely, those
that proceed from egoistic concerns) are not ethical because they do not
take one out of oneself to a level of transcendence. One could say that
49
the difference here arises from Levinas thinking on a primarily meta-
ethical level (the level of responsibility in the second person), whereas
Tronto is thinking only on a concrete ethical level (the level of responsi-
bility in the third person, for Levinas).
The reason Levinas is intent to make the aforementioned distinction
will become evident as we address the second contention to his doctrine
of asymmetry how it is that the other can maintain an elevated posi-
tion over me, especially when it is the case that whenever I come into con-
tact with the face of the other, I see nothing but helplessness. The answer
to this question has much to do with the theological component to
Levinass thought. The other stands in a position over me because the
other is that person who pulls me out of myself, which effects transcen-
dence.
35
The other stands above me as the only one who offers an alter-
native to dwelling within the labyrinthine circuits of my own interiority.
By not destroying this helpless face, I realise my possibility to be some-
thing other than an ego ruling a world of my own creation. The dimen-
sion of height comes into play when I realise the possibility to be other to
myself, and thus to transcend, to ascend. It is here that we see more clear-
ly why Levinas talks of ethics in terms of metaphysics. If being ethical has
to do with self-transcendence, doing the good has more of a meaning
than just doing the good for the others, caring for others, making the
world a better place. Ethics has to do with escaping the endless cycle of
the there-is,
36
it has to do with true liberation and freedom a libera-
tion that takes place not apart from the human community, as in the mys-
tical ecstasies of cloistered saints, but one that takes place throughout
human interactions, within our responsibility to others. It is a liberation
that entails a doing, or exercise concept, and not a liberation that is a free-
dom-from anything that might hinder a subject that would prefer to
be un-encumbered.
37
Thus, when Levinas philosophises about ethics, he
means to speak of something more than just how to bring the most
amount of good into a given situation, but he also wishes to comment
on what is the meaning of being ethical. Stress on meaning, in terms of
50
self-transcendence, is absent in the ethical writings of Tronto. It is the
concept of the meaning-full-ness of ethics by which we think they might
very well profit.
A Denunciation of Self Actualisation
Exactly how to balance conflicting responsibilities, rather than the com-
peting rights of the justice paradigm, against the backdrop of the multi-
plicity of relationships that we always find ourselves engaged in is a ques-
tion that Tronto tackles in her work. Trontos response is that we must
have a politically sound version of the care ethic that is not the enemy of
justice, but its collaborator; for, it is through the practise of justice that we
use our mental capabilities to prioritise, organise, and structure the minu-
tiae of daily life. It is only with such a structure in place that care can be
maximized and made effectual. Levinas is in accord with Tronto on the
issue of using justice, or philosophical thinking, as a vehicle to promote
and make the most of care, or responsibility, in the second person in his
terms. However, what remains unresolved is the exact character of this
justice or philosophical thinking that is to order and augment the original
ethical impulse.
We argue that an unavoidable implication of the logical premises of
an ethic of care is that it is unable to uphold or support a liberal political
view. If we examine some of the core presuppositions of the care ethic,
this quickly becomes evident. To begin with, the care ethic honestly
accepts the reality of human finitude, in all of its senses. Debunking the
myth of the fully autonomous self-made man is a key fixation for Tronto.
The fact that I cannot do anything I want, that I am limited by my respon-
sibilities to those around me, and that those responsible for my own
upbringing and socialisation condition my identity in large part before
I ever come to a self-conscious reflection and mastery of that identity, are
all components of finitude in a broad sense. Finitude, in the specific sense
of death, is something not to live in spite of, but in awareness of for the
51
care ethicist. If I am to be defined then by my care for others and their
care for me, it scarcely seems to follow that such a world-view could be
accurately expressed through the means of liberalism, where the ultimate
end is to be as isolated and free from the hindering concerns of others as
possible. Liberalism, the political embodiment of the Romantic-
Enlightenment ethic of self-actualisation, becoming the authentic me
regardless of what that means for others, is nearly the complete antithesis
of an ethic that strives to put the others concerns first. We have no
choice but to unfasten the care ethic from some of its feminist leanings if
we are to be rationally consistent about what it means to espouse a care
ethic. Those who still wish to argue for abortion within care ethics must
do so via a completely different approach than the one that has been used
until now (presuming logical consistency is something they care for in the
least). How that might be done is not a pressing anxiety for the current
project.
The character of a Levinasian care ethic must be such that it is
evident that all forms of autonomy are rooted in a formally preceding
experience of heteronomy. The freedom of ethics, as opposed to the free-
dom of being (or egoism), is always dependant and conditioned upon the
initiative of the other. The confusion over notions of freedom is some-
thing that the care ethic can only be promoted by clarifying. Egoistic free-
dom, the freedom that attempts to make me feel more at home in the
world, is liberal freedom, whereas ethical freedom would be faithfully
incarnated in a republican ethic that sees civic duty and the active cultiva-
tion of responsibility as the constituents of liberty. While there is no need
to make more of this distinction than necessary for fear of overdrawing
the antinomy, suffice it to say that a distinction exists and is helpful.
Because there is a distinction, it does not mean that one pole must be cho-
sen and the other excluded. As Levinas reiterates repeatedly in his writ-
ings, egoistic freedom makes ethical freedom possible, since separation
and difference are the grounds for truth and the means for avoiding total-
ity. The two can intermingle without great distress as long as they do not
52
become one in the mind. What is important is that we place proper accent
on which element is the ethical element so that we are left with a conclu-
sive notion of what our ethics is all about.
The inherent oversight that we detect in the works of Tronto (as well
as many other care ethics authors) is that they assume care to be a self-
evident practice that should obviously be carried out due to the way the
world in their view is regimented, and yet they are shocked to find that
caring practises are being continuously marginalized and not taken seri-
ously at the upper strata of power. While we believe Trontos explanation
of why care has had difficulty being accepted (through perversions of care
and the boundaries set up at the political and public level) to be persua-
sive, we think it is incomplete at the same time. Most ethical systems
encourage people that by doing certain actions they will attain happiness.
That happiness might be hedonistic pleasure, it might be spiritual or inte-
rior, or it may be communal. However, the care ethic is not built on such
a foundation. The reason to care has to do with exigencies in the emo-
tional realm. No payoff of happiness is (or can be) promised. In fact, care,
especially in the literature that uses mothering as the embodiment of care
par excellence, is often filled with disappointment and tribulation, and lit-
tle security. Therefore, we suggest that Levinass notion of responsibility
could fill in the care ethic, since at its base is a very solid motivation for
care: namely, transcendence leading to liberation of excessive and oppres-
sive in-dwelling. However, we must immediately qualify the previous
statement by adding that responsibility for Levinas is not something that
is consciously enacted by individuals, but something we are confronted
with in spite of ourselves (i.e., I do not create the face to face encounter
that awakens my sense of responsibility in the form of questioning; it
comes to me from outside). Thus, if the occasions in which we realise that
we are called to responsibility are not of our own choosing, it follows that
a Levinasian care ethic would be much less prescriptive than what many
might prefer. All we can add is that if we are mindful of responsibility in
a Levinasian sense, and are careful to make it part of our philosophical
53
reflection, we are much more likely to be aware of the moments when we
are confronted with the face of the other and called to responsibility, and
we are much more likely to answer that call favourably rather than turn
away back into ourselves.
There are indeed those in the ethical community who will say that if
an ethical theory cannot offer systematic and tangible advice no matter
what the circumstance if it cannot tell you what to do with certainty
it is useless. The presumption of people who might articulate such a state-
ment is no doubt something like the following: the reason there are ethi-
cists in the world is because people fundamentally do not know what to
do when it comes to making moral decisions, and are in need of the guid-
ance of enlightened authorities (whether they want it or not, we might
add). As abrasive and parochial as such a position may come across to
some readers, there is definitely something, from a philosophical outlook,
to say for such a position. It is completely justifiable, even necessary and
helpful, to question the value of an ethic that has difficulty suggesting very
determinate behaviour, since such an ethic is so easily given to misinter-
pretation and misappropriation. In the ethical realm, a misunderstanding
can lead to the perpetration of a moral evil, which is exactly what moral-
ity is aimed at avoiding. Under the influence of a pretence to knowledge
of the dictates of care that is malformed, a person can focus all of their
energies on one particular person while excluding the concerns of many
others, and thus generate more harm to others than what they might have
had they acted otherwise. While part of an ethic of care or a Levinasian
ethic is accepting the fact that sometimes the needs of the one outweigh
the needs of the many, neither would espouse the idea of habitually ignor-
ing or not paying due attention to the many.
If a Levinasian care ethic is susceptible to these criticisms, the ques-
tion must be asked, what is the contribution of an ethical theory with very
little normative pertinence? An acceptable answer to this query depends
upon how much one is willing to accent the value of a perspective.
Because there is such a great amount of concentration on objects and
54
circumstances in present moral education, the idea of a general life-orien-
tation, or perspective, as being important for shaping not only our ethical
character but also our ethical decisions as well is occasionally marginal-
ized. A Levinasian care ethic, if there could indeed be such a thing, would
want to emphasize that some of the most important elements of the
moral equation are not external factors that can easily be references, but
rather are motivations (not necessarily in the strict psychological sense)
rooted in particular relational experiences that call our comfortable com-
portment to reality under scrutiny. Unless we allow ourselves to learn and
be taught by another through such experiences, the kind of ethical person
one may become, the kind of care one will give, will necessarily be exca-
vated of a deeper quality that makes sense of why a human being acts in
an ethical way at all. To put it another way, unless we learn to let our
responsibility in the second person inform both our responsibility in the
first and third person, the type of responsibility that is manifested will be
devoid of the essential characteristics that make responsibility what it is: a
response.
Besides the benefit of emphasizing the importance of perspective, an
ethical theory that refrains from normative application also has the flexi-
bility to avoid making its moral conclusions oppressively burdensome.
One of the potentially dangerous propensities of law-based moral systems
is expectation of adherence in every situation, without exception. There is
a healthy (even moral!) sense in which we need to be exempted occasion-
ally from the dictates of our own morality, lest we are crushed by the
weight of its grave and serious commands. As Burggraeve comments, we
must be heedful so as to assure that even our morality, which should
break up totalities, does not become a totality unto itself.
38
Any system,
no matter how conceptually perfect, can become a totality if it is not con-
fronted at times with another voice. Undoubtedly, such a suggestion will
throw many conservative ethicists into disquiet. They might ask, will this
not lead to ethical anarchy if people can freely choose when and when not
morality should be binding? However, even in systems that do claim to
55
offer a method for discerning the correct action in any moral circum-
stance, when we pay attention to the people that promote such systems,
we inevitably notice that they cannot stand the test that they propose to
others. In many ways, such a question is a pertinent note to end on, since
it draws us to the core of this entire project. In opting for a Levinasian
care ethic, we opt at the same time to forsake any notion of an overarch-
ing solution, of a grand unifying theory, if you will. If we were to make
Levinas or care ethicists into normative ethical thinkers, we would run the
risk of turning them into moralisers. We can never define as such what
must be done, and thus, the normative level that has been so eagerly
sought after is nothing other than the level of human creativity. It is not
up to the ethicist in the picture that we have been portraying to decide
definitively what people should do and when. It is instead the job of the
ethicist to help people become more aware of the responsibility that is
periodically manifesting itself before our eyes, and to encourage people to
accept that responsibility as a means to caring, understanding the ways we
are inter-related as humans, and ultimately finding meaning in this life by
way of what is otherwise to it.
CONCLUSION
Moving toward a Levinasian care ethic then implies some concrete revi-
sions to care theories as they currently exist, at least in the writings of
Tronto. In order to speak of a care perspective in a Levinasian sense, it
must be accentuated that every caring relation is one in which the one for
whom I am caring stands in a position over me, as my teacher. In this
revision (or addition) is contained the insight that any ethical action has
intimately to do with a resignation of the egoistic illusion of mastery of
the world around me, as well as mastery over the consequences and out-
come of my actions. Nevertheless, I am at the same time called to respon-
sibility beyond the intentions of my actions, for the exact reason that
56
I cannot control the consequences of my own ethical behaviour. In the
caring relation I am called to take part in a continuous process of respon-
sibility that extends into the future indefinitely. Because another caring
relation always exists apart from the caring relation that I preoccupy
myself with at any given moment, I must remain vigilant in my awareness
that there are always other others who call me to responsibility as well.
Therefore, the tools of organisational thought (or justice) are indispensa-
ble for the care ethic, in terms of allowing me not to over-care or under-
care in any particular relationship. In organisational thought, I secure a
space for myself that assures I will not be over-claimed by my own ethi-
cal impulse. The character of this organisation is most properly viewed in
the political perspective of exercise concepts, and not in liberal concepts
of opportunity that fail to evince the interconnectedness of humanity, as
well as the imperative to care for others in our society. Finally, a
Levinasian care ethic encourages us to understand the ethical good not as
a project of the egos creation, but rather, as an interruption to the proj-
ect of the ego. In this light, caring is not something I necessarily want to
do, but is something that I (according to my sensibilities) find abnormal
and difficult. The willingness to care always comes from outside of me,
and therefore, I deserve no glory in the accomplishments of my caring
actions. Care is a love that I cultivate only with labour.
An ethic of care has a future in ethical discourse at large if its critics
discontinue their unsympathetic belief that it is nothing more than an
applied ethic of altruistic friendship built on emotional sentiment, inca-
pable of addressing the high demands of other normative conceptions of
how ethics must function. We present this paper as a step in the direction
toward convincing such critics otherwise. Ultimately, however, one can
only make so many arguments on paper for what is intended to be an
ethic of action. In a very real sense, responsible caring is not truly intelli-
gible in the abstract thought of one who apprehends its meaning and
place in the world. Despite any commentators best intentions and hard
academic work, care and responsibility exist only in doing and practicing
57
them, and no amount of argument or reasoning can sway the recalcitrant
other toward seeing the validity of a caring perspective if that other does
not have the opportunity to see responsibility already being practised in
the world around her. That which can be contributed in papers such as
this one is a greater awareness of what responsibility and caring entail, so
that when the recalcitrant other surveys her world, she will know how to
identify these ethical practices for what they are, and hopefully, add to
their momentum.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Burggraeve, Roger. The Wisdom of Love in the Service of Love: Emmanuel Levinas On Justice,
Peace and Human Rights. (unpublished manuscript) Faculty of Theology, K.U.
Leuven: Leuven, 2002.
Gastmans, Chris. Toward an Integrated Clinical Ethics Approach: Caring, Clinical and
Organizational. Healthy Thoughts: European Perspectives on Health Care Ethics. eds. R.K.
Lie, P.T. Schotsmans, B. Hansen & T. Meulenbergs. Leuven: Peeters Publishers,
2002.
Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Womens Development. Cambridge,
Massachusets, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Koehn, Daryl. Rethinking Feminist Ethics: Care, Trust and Empathy. London and New York:
Routledge, 1998.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other. European Perspectives:
A Series in Social Thought and Cultural Criticism. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1998.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Is Ontology Fundamental?. Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical
Writings. eds. A. Peperzak, S. Critchley, and R. Bernasconi. Indiana University Press:
Bloomington, 1990.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Nine Talmudic Readings. Trans. Annette Aronowicz. Bloomington &
Indianopolis: Indiana University Press, 1990.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Martinus Nijhoff Philosophical
Texts 3. Nijhoff The Hague, 1981.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Duquesne Studies:
Philosophical Series 24. Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Trace of the Other in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie (Sept. 1963, v605
n23) transl. A. Lingis. Kluwer Publishing: Leuven.
Sevenhuijsen, Selma. Citizenship and the Ethics of Care: Feminist Considerations on Justice,
Moraliy and Politics. London and New York: Routledge, 1998.
58
Tronto, Joan. Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care. Signs: Journal of Women
in Culture and Society. Volume 12. Issue 4. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987.
Tronto, Joan. Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care: Care, Ethics and
Politics. Lecture, 14 March, 2003. Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven,
Belgium.
Tronto, Joan. Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, Gender Studies.
London and New York: Routledge, 1994.
Verkerk, Marian A. The Care Perspective and Autonomy. Medicine, Health Care and
Philosophy. Volume 4. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
NOTES
1. Joan Tronto. Moral Boundaries, 103.
2. Joan Tronto, Lecture, 14 March 2003.
3. Marian Verkerk offers a short and very cogent overview of the confusion concerning
what care ethics is all about. In her article The care perspective and autonomy, she reveals that
most misconceptions of the care ethic stem from two false assumptions: (a) that care ethics is
merely a form of applied ethics, and (b) that care ethics can be reduced to an ethics of friendship
or an ethics of personal relationships. Verkerk argues instead that care ethics can be best present-
ed as a moral perspective or orientation [rather] than as a full-blown ethical theory (103) an
argument for which this essay will have much support.
4. These examples are taken from Trontos lecture.
5. Tronto, Moral Boundaries, 154.
6. Ibid., 157.
7. Ibid., 30.
8. Ibid., 8-9.
9. Ibid., 10.
10. Ibid.
11. Tronto, Lecture, 14 March 2003.
12. Tronto, Lecture, 14 March 2003. Tronto mentioned in her lecture that Gilligans studies
on dissociation are useful for understanding how it is possible in the first place for (mainly) men
continually to engage in and sow the seeds of war. As a basis for her talk, she quoted Simone Weil,
who wrote: But nothing the peoples of Europe have produced is worth the first known poem that
appeared among them. Perhaps they will yet rediscover the epic genius, when they learn that there
is no refuge from fate, learn not to admire force, not to hate the enemy, nor to scorn the unfortu-
nate. How soon this will happen is another question. In The Iliad: Poem of Force (1939).
13. Joan Tronto, Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care, 662.
14. Tronto, Lecture, 14 March 2003.
15. See C. MacKenzie & N. Stoljar (eds) Relational Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy,
Agency and the Social Self (Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford, 2000).
59
16. Tronto, Moral, 105.
17. Levinas, Totality, 69.
18. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 27.
20. Ibid., 60.
21. Ibid., 48.
22. Ibid., 66.
23. Levinas, Otherwise, 27.
25. Ibid., 52.
26. Ibid., 67 & 75.
27. Ibid., 7.
28. Levinas, Otherwise, 6.
30. Ibid., 213.
31. Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, 50.
32. Levinas, Is Ontology Fundamental, 4.
33. Levinas, Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, 20.
34. Ibid., 23.
35. Thought and Interiority are the very break-up of being and the production (not the
reflection) of transcendence. We know this relation only in the measure that we effect it; this is
what is distinctive about it. Alterity is possible only starting from me, Levinas, Totality, 40. This is
an unusual quotation because of its seemingly instrumental overtones. In French, the word pro-
duction means a wide variety of things that are not necessarily connoted in its English cognate
(e.g. the activity of provoking a phenomenon, the way by which something comes into being, a
collection of works, etc.) There is some danger for misunderstanding in phrasing the problematic
in the way that Levinas has here, since it can make it seem as though the other is merely a means
to my own transcendence of myself, which implies that ultimately, ethics is still about a kind of
egoistic enterprise (even if that enterprise has to do with the destruction of the ego!). However,
this point just underscores the difficulty of thinking at the edge of the human capacity for concep-
tualization, not as a refutation of the self-less-ness of Levinass philosophy. Levinass point in this
quotation is to say that egoism is indispensable to the project of ethics, even if it is not formally a
part of what we would call the ethical. Without an ego to bring the other into relief, one would
become lost in the other and simply form another totality. Without an I there can be no other,
which is to say that transcendence must have something to transcend. The use of thought and
interiority in the quotation, terms which we have thus far taken to be synonymous with egoism,
are employed to point out that egoism is the condition of possibility for something other than ego-
ism to occur in ones experience. It is the other that is nevertheless our deliverance from our ego-
ism, not ourselveswhich is why I have made mention of this quotation as being possibly mis-
leading.
36. Due to certain limitations of length in this essay, we have not explained Levinass rather
important concept of the il-y-a, or roughly translated into English, there-is. While a footnote at
60
this juncture surely will not compensate for this omission, suffice it to say that the there-is is a
state of anxiety endemic to the very base of being human, concerning the disappearance of the self
or singularity into a monolithic, undifferentiated totality.
37. We have made mention at several points in this essay of a kind of freedom that is not
classical, liberal, negative freedom. The positive freedom of which Levinas speaks shares propin-
quity with Hannah Arendts as well as Charles Taylors notions of freedom. Both of these thinkers
can be of great interest if one wishes to seek out other authors talking about the same ideas, just
from a much more political perspective.
38. Roger Burggraeve, The Wisdom of Love in the Service of Love: Emmanuel Levinas On Justice,
Peace and Human Rights.
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In this paper, we suggest the likely effects of the application of

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