Province of Camarines Sur vs CA

May 17, 1993

FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Res. 129 authorizing the Prov. Gov. To
purchase/expropriate property to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops and
housing project for the government employees. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases for
expropriation against private respondents (San Joaquins).

RTC: denied motion to dismiss on the ground of inadequacy of price of San Joaquins.
CA: San Joaquins raised issue of a) declaring the resolution null and void, b) complaint for
expropriation de dismissed. CA asked Sol Gen to give comment.
SolGen: under the LGC, no need for approval by the OP of the exercise of the SP of the right to
eminent domin. However, approval of DAR must first be secured (since this involves appropriation of
agricultural lands).
CA: set aside order of RTC (without however disposing of the issues raised. The SC said that the CA
assumed that the resolution is valid and the expropriation is for a public use).

Issues:
1) WON the resolution is null and void. Corollary to this issue is WON the expropriation is for a public
use.
2) WON the exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case is restricted by the CAR Law?
3) WON the complaint for expropriation may be dismissed on the ground of inadequacy of the
compensation offered?

Held/ratio:
1) The expropriation is for a public purpose, hence the resolution is authorized and valid.
SC explained that there had been a shift from the old to the new concept of public
purpose:. Old concept is that the property must actually be used by the general public. The
new concept, on the other hand, means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which
tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community.
In this case, the proposed pilot development center would inure to the direct
benefit and advantage of the CamSur peeps. (How?) invaluable info and tech on agriculture,
fishery, and cottage industry, enhance livelihood of farmers and fishermen, etc.

2) No, (citing Ardana vs Reyes, SC here said that the implication of the Ardana case is that) the
power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform
program.
Old LGC does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure approval of the
Dept of Land Reform for conversion of agri to non-agri use. Likewise, no provision in the CAR
Law subjecting expropriation by LGUs to the control of DAR.
Moreover, Sec 65 of CAR Law is not in point because it is applicable only to lands
previously placed under the agrarian reform program. This is limited only to applications for
reclassification submitted by land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be
broadened or constricted by implication.
3) Fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation decalred in
the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded.
It is unconstitutional to fix just compensation in expropriation cases based on the
value given either by the owners or the assessor. Rules for determining just compensation
are those laid down in Rule 67 ROC, evidence must be submitted to justify what they
consider is the just compensation.

Heirs of Ardona vs Reyes
October 26, 1983

FACTS:
Phil. Tourism Authority filed complaints for expropriation by virtue of its charter (PD 564) and Proc.
No. 2052 decalring certain barangays and a proposed dam as tourist zones.
Petitioners filed MTD with the allegation that the taking is not impressed with public use under the
Consti.
Meanwhile, PTA already deposited amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties
pursuant to PD 1533. CFI then issued orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the
properties.

ISSUES:
1) WON the purpose of the taking in this case constitute public use? WON taking of property
for promotion of tourism falls under public use?
2) Assuming that PTA has right to expropriate, WON the properties subject to exprop may be
taken given that these are within the operate land transfer under the land reform
program? (This is the ratio cited in the case of CamSuR)
3) WON the non-impairment clause is violated?
4) WON the issuance of the orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession is
premature?
5) WON there is forcible ejectment as a consequence of the exprop under PD 583?

Held/ratio:
1) Yes, the thrust of all Consti provisions (there are 3!) on power to exprop is not to give a
restrictive view of the eminent domain provision. The policy objectives of the framers can
only be couched in general terms such as social justice, general welfare, public use, etc. This
is because, the power of eminent domain is essential to the existence of the government
and an attribute of sovereignty. The provisions in the Consti simply serves as forms of
restrain on the sovereign power which would otherwise be without limit. As such power of
eminent domain does not depend on a specific grant in the consti.

The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes, the idea that it is limited to
cases of use by the public has long been discarded. The concept of public welfare is broad
and inclusive.

(Also please see 2
nd
par page 235 )

2) Petitioners failed to show that the area being developed is indeed a land reform area.
Records show that of the 282 disputed hectares, only less than one hectare is affected by
peration land transfer. (SC here disposed of this issue by relying on the failure of
petitioners to prove their contention, however, this issue was appreciated in a different light
in the CamSur case. Wala lang... )

3) Invocation of the contract clause has no merit. The non-impairment caluse has never been a
barrier tot he exercise of police power and likewise eminent domain. Parties by entering into
contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good.

4) Not premature. Under PD 42 as amended by PD 1533, the government, its agency or
instrumentality, as plaintiff in an exprop proceedings is authorized to take immediate
possession, control and disposition of the property and improvements, with power of
demolition, notwithstanding the pendency of the issues before the court, upon deposit with
the PNB of an amount equal to 10% of the value of the property expropriated.

5) PD 583 has nothing to do with expropriation by the State of lands needed for public
purposes. Rather it refers to harassment of tenant-farmers who try to enforce emancipation
rights.

Filstream vs CA

FACTS:
Filstream is the owner of the premises occupied by private respondents.

Ejectment case:
Filstream filed an ejectment suit on the grounds of termination of lease and non-payment of rentals
which was upheld by the MTC. The decision on the ejectment suit became final and executor when
no further action was taken after it reached the CA.

Action for annulment of Deed of Exchange
During the pendency of the ejectment suit, an action for annulment was filed against Filstream. It
was at this stage that the city of Manila came into picture when the city approved an ordinance for
the expropriation of the properties of Filstream. The said properties were to be sold and distributed
to qualified tenants pursuant to the Land Use Devt Program of Manila.

Complaint for Eminent Domain
Manila filed for such complaint before the RTC. RTC then granted Manila a writ of possession.
Filstream filed MTD. Denied all the way to CA hence present Case # 1.

Meanwhile, writ of execution was issued by virtue of the finality of the ejectment case. Respondent
Manila move to stay/quash. Denied by lower courts, however, preliminary injunction granted by CA,
hence present case # 2.

SC consolidated!

Issues: (contention is between the right of Filstream by virtue of the finality of the ejectment case
versus right of Manila in exercising its power of eminent domain.)

WON Manila may exercise its power of eminent domain? WON Manila may exercise such power
given the circumstance of this case?

Held: City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent domain within its
jurisdiction, nevertheless, there are limitations to the exercise of this power. These limitations are
the constitution and other pertinent laws (see Section 19, LGC).

The pertinent law in this case is RA 7279, the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. Sections
9 and 10 of this law provides for priorities in the acquisition of land. Under said provisions, private
lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. Moreover, expropriation
proceedings are to be resorted to only whne the other modes of acquisition have already been
exhausted. Compliance with these provisions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards in
securing the right of owners of private property.

The City of Manila failed to show compliance with these provisions. Evidently there was a violation
of private petitioners right to due process.

While the state has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent domain for the general
good and that such right of the State takes precedence over interest of private property owners, still,
we must not lose sight that individual rights affected by the exercise of such right of the state are
also entitled to protection. Exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot override guarantee of
due process.