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Absorption of Crime:
EUGENE GONZALES, ET AL. vs. NARCISO ABAYA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez

FACTS:
1. In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny, July 23, 2003, a total of 321 soldiers entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier
Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the
building, they declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the
Republic.
2. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared a state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the said soldiers.
3. In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. After several hours of
negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the
premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks.
4. Subsequently, an Information for coup detat was filed against them with the RTC, at the same time that they were tried at court
martial for conduct unbecoming an officer.
5. They question the jurisdiction of the court martial, contending that the already RTC ordered that their act was not service-connected
and that their violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the crime of coup detat.



ISSUE:
1. Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of coup dtat before the regular courts.
2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable.

HELD:
1. Yes. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners
concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation
allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or
behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same
dismissal from the service imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to
cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the
Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC).
The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-
connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away.
Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore,
void.

2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d'etat.
Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute,
unlike here where different statutes are involved.
Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil
courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War.
Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.