By GEORGE A.

MALCOLM,
Dean of the Col~ of Law, Unive1'sity of the Philippines.
The courts and public officers generally in the Philippines are guided in their
interpretation of thelawsby elementary principles tobefound intheCodes. * They
will also apply the rules of American statutory construction as set forth in standard
authorities. t Combining these provisions of the Codes with the leading doctrines
established by the Supreme Court of the Philippines and adding a few acceptable
and unimpeachable authorities, a miniature text on Philippine Statutory Construc-
tion would read as follows:
Each of the three departments of government and many officialsinthese depart-
ments may be required to pass upon constitutional questions. Only when legal
controversies arise do such issues pass out of the realmof the abstract. It is, there-
fore, the peculiar province and obligatory duty of the judiciary under the American
political system to declarelawsunconstitutional or invalid (thelatter themoreappro-
priate termbecause of the Philippine status), if they transgress the authority of the
legislature. So in the Philippines the courts will pronounce Acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature repugnant to the fundamental law to be invalid and
void. t The effect of invalidity is that the invalid act "is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes noduties; it affords noprotection; it creates no office; it is, inlegal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." The courts
will further apply the well estab~shed rille concerning partial invalidity. "Where
part of astatute isvoid asrepugnant to the Organic Law, whileanother part isvalid,
the valid portion, if separable fromthe invalid, may stand and be enfo~ced. But
in order to do this, the valid portion must be sofar independent of the invalid por-
tion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself
if they had supposed that they could not constitutionaJly enact the other. Enough
must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out
th& legislative intent. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing
results affecting the'main purpose of the Act in amanner contrary to the intention
*Especially Arts. 3, 4, 5, 7 of the Civil Code; and Sees. I, 2, 4, 287, 288, 294 of the Code of
Civil Procedure taken from the laws of California. Also See. 9, Revised Ordinances, City of Manila.
tCooley, Constitutional Limitations. 7th ed.,Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction (leading
authority); Black on Interpretation of Laws; and 36 Cyc. 929 will be found cited in the Philippine
Reports and the opinions of the Attorney-General.
t Ocampo . Cabangis (1910) 15PhiE626, 631; U. S.. Ten Y " (1912) 24Phil. 1, 10. Possibly
more J?roperly speaking "voidable" because a court can not "repeal" a law. Shepard . Wheeling
(1887) 30W. Va. 479; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 163.
'Norton . Shelby County (1886) 118U. S. 425, 442, 30 L. Ed. 178; 6R. C. L. 117. But see
Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. n,pp. 327, 365.
of the Legislature. The Iao&ua&eUBedin the invalid part 01a statute can have no
Iepl force or efficacy for any purpoee whatever, and, what remains mUllt expft88
the legislative will indepeQdently 01the void part, more the court hRano Power to
JeciaIate."
That the Supreme Court of the Philippines like the United States Supreme Court
Wlll exercise the power to nullify statutes cautiously and solemnly is shown by the
few laws held invalid. t Says Judge Cooley: "It must be evident to anyone that
the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judp, COII8Cioua
01the fallibility of the juman judgment, will shrink from exercising in any cue
where he can conscientiously arid with due regard to duty and official oath decline
the responsibility." t As a pneral rule, courts will not Pl\8S upon a const.itutional
question or decide astatutc/to be invalid unless that question israised and presented'
and is necessary to a determination of the case; on the other hand, the'fact thai a
statute hns been accepted as valid, and invoked and applied for many years in eases
where its validity was not raised or passed'on, does not prevent II. court from lat.er
passing on its validity whl'l'e that question is properly raised and presented.
Every statute is presumed to be valid. The United States Supreme Court aha
announced time and again that "the courts ought not to declare a law to be un-
constitutional, unless it is clearly so. If there is doubt, the expressed will of the
l~ture should besustained." The Supreme Court of these Islands concordantly
has said: "Courts are slow to pronounce :;tatutes invalid or void. The question
of the validity of every statute 1.-; first determined by t.he legislative department
of the government itself, and the courts should resolve every presumption in favor
of its validity. Courts are not justified in adjudging statutes invalid, in the face of
the conclusion of the legislature, when the question or its validity isat all doubtful."t
Again and more specifically-"In construing l\ statute enacted by the Philippine
Commission wedeem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be repug-
nant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly suseeptible of an-
other construction not in conflict with the higher law."t The same line of reason-
ing was followed when the Philippine courts came to consider ordinances. "Judi-
cial authority to declare an ordinance unreasonable is l\ power to be cautiously exer-
cised." .
Barrameda . Moir (1913\ ~5 Phil. 44. 47, citing rases. See Pollock r. Far.mer'. Loan Bnd
Trust Co. (1895) 158U. S. 601, 63", 39L. Ed. 1108; 6. R. C. L. 121.
tThe United States Supreme Court has annulled Congre ional legislation in but 33 cases.
B. F. Moore, The SUi>~emeCourt and Unconstitutional Legislation, Appendix I. In the Phil-
ippines, Casanovas . Hord (1907) 8 Phil. 125 (Act 1189, sec. 134); Omo . Insular Government
(1908) 11 Phil. 67 (Act 648); Weigall . Shuster (1908), 11 Phil. 340 (customs laws); BarramedB
. MOlr, id., (Acts 2041 and 2131); McGirr . Hamilton (1915) 13O. G. 878 (Act 1627, sec. 16), etc.
: Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 227. Read Ch. VII thereof.
McGirr . Hamilton, id., citing Cooley'. Constitutional Limitations, id., p. 231 and decisions
of the United States Supreme Court; V. S.. Noriega (1915) XIII 0..G..2154. See 6 R. C. L. 76.
. Munn . Illinois (1877) 94 U. S. 113, 123,24 L. Ed. 77, followed in U. S.. Grant, 18 Phil.
122, 140. To same effect Fletcher . Peck (1810), 6Cranch, 87, 128, 3 L. Ed. 162; SinkirilFund
Cases (1879), 99 U. S. 700, 718, 25 L. Ed. 496; Powell . Pennsylvania (1888), 127 U. 8. 678, 32 L.
Ed. 253; 6 R. C. L. 97.
*tUnited States . Ten Y u (1912) 24Phil. 1, 10.
: Inrs Guarilla (1913)24 Phil. 37,46.
1 City of :\Ianila . Manila E. It. and L. Co. (1912), 23 Phil. 547, 551.
APPLICATION OF LAW r
Ordinarily the courts merely apply the law to a statement of facts. "The
first and fundamental duty of the courts, inour judgment,. is to apply the law. Con-
struction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that applica-
.tion is"impossible or inadequate without them." They are the very last "functions
which a court should exercise. The majority of the laws need no interpretation
or construction. They require only application, and if there were more application
-and less construction, there w()u~dbe more stability in the law, and more people
would know what the law is." *
CARDINAL RULE OF CONSTRUCTION
AB above suggested, the (',()urtsmust in somecases necessarily interpret or con-
strue the law. The one cardinal rule of statutory construction then is to ascertain'
and give an effect 10tIWintention of the law making body. The Codeof Civil Procedure
legislates this into formallaw by providing Jhat: "In the construction of a statute,
the intention of the legislature * * * "isto bepursued; and when ageneral and
part~cular provision are inconsistent, tp.~.latter is paramount to the former. So a
particular intent will control a generaLone that is inconsistent with it." t The
Supreme Court of the Philippines indorses the principle by stating that "where the
language of astatute isfairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construc-
tion should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent
of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a
construction should berejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions
of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by
its enactment." t Nevertheless the Legislature must use words which in some
way express intent, for acourt can not amend the law to make it agree with what it
is believed the Legislature must have. intended.
Practieally speaking, common senseisthe best guidefor the devious and obscure
path of legislation. Chief Justice Fuller inlanguage followedby ~)UrSupreme 90urt
has said that "nothing isbetter settled than that statutes should receive a sensible
construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible. so as
to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion." **
SUBSIDIARY PRINCIPLES
Only afewof the moreimportant subsidiary principles of legislation and canons
of construction by which the courts endeavor to ascertain the legislative intent can
be mentioned.
*lizArraga HermanOll t. Y ap Tico (1913) 24 Phil. 504, 513, followeq in Lambert t. Fox. (1914)
26 Phil. 588 and in Y angeo t. Croasfield (1915) 13 O. G. 191. In accord U. S. t. Fisher (1804)
2Craneh 358, 2 L. Ed. 304.
tSec. 288.
t United States t. Toribio (1910) 15Phil. 85, 90; also Uy Chaco Sons t. Collector of Customs
(1913) 24Phil. 548 and other eases.
, United States t, Ambata (1904) 3 Phil. 327. But compare with U. S. t. Go Chico (19Q9)
14Phil. 128 and Lamb t. Phipps (1912) 22Phil. 456, 493.
**Lau Ow Bew t. U. S. (1892) 144 U. S. 47, 59, 36 L. Ed. 340; followed in Lamb t. Phipps
(J912) 22Phil. 456, 493. To same effect, U. S. t. Kirby (1869) 7Wall. 482, 19L. Ed. 278, followed
in InraAllen (1903) 2Phil. 630.
In the interpretation of the Code of Civil Procedure certain words named in ita
section 1are to have the meaning therein provided "unless the context shows that
another sense was intended." Moreover, "words in the present tense include the
future tense,and in the masculine gender include the feminine and neuter genders-;
and words in the plural include the singular, and in the singular include the plUrllJ
number." - But this enumeration does. not require a strict construction of other
general words. "If in the laws months, days, or nights are referred to, it shallbe
understood that the months are of thirty days, the days of twenty-four hours, and the
nights from the setting to the rising of the sun. If the months are indicated by
their names, they shall be computed by their actUAl number of days." t And,
"unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act isrequired by law
to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and
if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded." t Language used in
8. statute which has a settled I\Ildwell-kno~ meaning, sanctioned by judillial deci-
sion, is presumed to be used in that sense by the legislative body.' A word used
in a statute in a given sense is presumed to be used in the same sense throughout
~helaw. -- .Tariff laws are to be construed according to the commercial understand-
ingof the terms used; and such terms are to be taken int.h;eirordinary and comprehen-
sive meaning unless it can be shown that they have' acquired a special or restricted
meaning. -t Our Supreme Court has been called upon to construe specific words in
a number of other cases. -t It rightly holds to the view that "where language isplain,
subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of a particular
judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful." -. Chief Justice
Marshall, in t.hehistol'ic case of Gibbons t'. Ogden, said: ".As men whose intentions
require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly
express t.he idt'.as they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our
Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed
words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said." -
'The Civil Code provides: "Laws are repealed only by other subsequent laws,
and disuse or any custom or practice to the contrary shall not prevail agailist t.heir
observ&llce." --t Express repC<.'\lsare to be encouraged. Repeals by implication-
implied reE>.a.ls--arenot favored. If the statutes can stand t.ogether consistently,
* The words 80 interpreted. are "person," "writiIlR:," "oath," "of umlound mind," tlbond,"
Hand," "or," "writ," "process," "action/' "pleadings," "dollars," "P(~8," "territory of the United
States."
tCivil Code, art. 7.
: Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 4. See U. S. v. Tiqui (1902) 1Phil. :106.
Kepner v. U. S. (1904) 195 U. S. 100. 11Phil. 669.
- Froehlich & Kuttner v. Collector of Customs (1911) 18Phil. 461,480.
-tCalder &Co. v. U. S. (1907) 8Phil. 334. following Elliot v. Swartwout (1830) 10 Pet. 137.
9L. Ed. 373, and Arthur v. :Morrison (1877) 96 U. S. 108. 24 L. Ed. 704.
-: E. G. Lamb v. Phipps (1912)22 Phil. 456. 492; [II TOGuaritla (1913) 24 Phil. 37; Y angeo
v. Cr088field (1915) 13O. G. 191. and Ops. Atty. Gen. P. t. index "word. and phr e.
-. Y aDlleo v. Cr088field, id.
- (1824) 9 Wheat. 1. 187-189, 6 J . Ed. 23.
**t Art. 5. ,
the later statute should not beconsidered 88repealing the earlier one. "It isamost
_ant violation of the rules of statutory construction to giveto astatute ameaning
which, in effect and i~reality, repeals it altogether, where any other reasonaBle
.,on&tructioni8pOSllible."* "Before a statute can beheld to have repealed a prior
statute by implication, it must appear, first, that the two statutes touch the same
aubjectmatter, and, second, that the later statute is repugtiant to the earlier." t
As an example. of arepeal. by implication, where a later statute providesI' punish-
mltnt inadifferent degreefromthepuni8hment provided inan earlier statute for the
doingoromitting to doacertain act, thelegiSlator thereby clearly manifests hiSinten-
tion that at least, 80far as the later statute is inconsiStent with the former statute,
it shall bedeemed to repeal such for~r statute by implication. t
The Civil Code in article 3provides-"Laws shall not have aretroactive effect
unless otherwise prescribed therein." Our Supreme Court says-"All statutes are
to beconStrued as having only aprospective operation unless the purpose and inten-
tion of the Legislature to give t.hemaretrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used.. In every case of doubt, the doubt
must besolved against the retrospective effect." However, curative statutes can
.lawfully be enacted. A rll;tificationby the Legislature is equivalent to a mandate
to perform an act in the first instance, and will be so considered by the courts. **
Adefect in authority may be cured by thesubsequent adoption of theAct. *t When
.scurative statute isenacted, acasemust bedetermined onthe lawasit stands when
judgment is rendered. *t
Whether t.hereshall be a strict or liberal construction depends upon the nature
of the Act.. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in fact all remedial
laws, are t,obe liberally construed. * Laws regulating citizenship should receive
a bberal construction in favor of the claimant of it. *** As a general rule, in the
interpretation and construction of public grants, such as of titles and franchises,
*Marin . Naci nceno (1911) 19Phil. 238.
t Caider6n . Dominicans (1914) 12O. G, 1698. See Iso Uy Chaco Sons . Collector of Cu.-
tolDs (1913) 24 Phil. 548.
t United States . Reyes (1908) 10Phil. 423.
1Montilla . Agustinian Corporation (1913) 24Phil. 220, citing U. S.. American Sugar Co.
(11106)202U. S. 563; 50L. Ed. 1149and other c. es. "The courts uniformly refuse togiveto statutes
aretrospective operation, whereby rights previously vested are injuriously affected, unless com-
pelled to do so by language so clear and positive .to leave no room to doubt that such was the
.ntention of the legislature. In U. S.. Heth, 3Cranch 413, 2L. Ed. 479, this court said that 'words
ina .tatllte ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear, strong, and impe-
rative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the lcgislature
cannot be otherwise satisfied;' and such is the settled doctrine of this court. Murray . Gibson,
15How. 423,14 L. Ed. 755; McEwen . Den, 24How. 244, 16L. Ed. 672; Harvey . Tyler, 2Wall.
347, 17L. Ed. 871; Sohn . Waterson, 17Wall. 599, 21L. Ed. 737; Twenty Per Cent. Cases (1814)
20 wan. 187,22 L. Ed. 339."-Harlan, J., in Chew Heong . U. S. (1184) 112 U. S. 536, 559, 28
L. Ed. 770. See Inhabitants of Goshen . Inhabitants of Stonington (1822) 4Conn. 209, 10Am.
Dec. 121.
** Government of the P. I. . Standard Oil Co. (1911) 20 Phil. 30, following U. S. Supremp
Court decisions.
*t Chuoco Tiaco . Forbes (1913) 228U. S. 549, 57L. Ed. 960.
*t U. S.. Heins.en (1907) 206U. S. 370, 51L. Ed. 1098.
*1Code of Civil Proeedure, sec. 2; Zamora . Cit), of Manila (1907) 7Phil. 584.
***Roa . Collector of Customs (1912) 23Phil. 315,338; Boyd . Thayer (1892) 143U. S. 135,
36 L. Ed. 103.
- IIIIIl !' .U Il l l I) 4 .p. U II; l IIi l l l L .l l l l l i Il l P Ii II&; 1III4 111'4 " " ,," - -
1'IIJLlIIlIIIIl.'WW'Il" ltbii IIft"I'tON
tW COD8tnlction IlhouWbe .. ..,...-tthe eIaimaI the IOY erIlDleIlt
.rather than of theiDdividuaI.. bte .JucItIe 8CIaryayl l :" nis al fl Deral rule
inthe interpretation of all 8tatUteI ~t or d_iee uponaubjeeteor eit ,
not t.o extend their J)I'O"riIiona by iIIlpliat-iolt beyond the elear import .of the
1anKtl8lP!used,or t.oenlarge their operatioD 8088to embrace matters not specifieaUy
pointed out, althOUghstanding onaeloeeanalogy, Inevery e.-, therefore, of doubt.,
such statutelll are construed most strongly against the government, and infavor of the
subjects or citizens, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to Ix>
imposed, beyond what the stat.utes expressly .and clearly import." t I.ikewiae
penailltatutes and statutes in derogation of general rights or uuthorizing summary
proceedings are generally strictly construed. t
"Courts must administer the law," said Mr. Just.ice Ladd iuan t'Mly opinion,
"not as they think it ought to be but as they (we) find it and without regard to con-.
sequences." Where a statute is plain an4 unambiguOIis, I'xpediency or practie.a.l
utility can not be considered.' "The wisdom or advisability of aparticular statute
is not a question for the court.s to determine-that is a question for the lrgislature
to determine." So "courts are not justified in measuring their opinion with the
opinion of the legislative department ~f the government, 1\8expret\llC'(iin st:J.tut~,
upon questions of the wisdom, justice. or advisability of II. particular It\w. Al-
though these are the general rules, nevertheless, the court may consider ('ffrets lmd
consequences in proper cases and adopt a construction which willprodu('1' t.hemOtlt
beneficial results.t The Code of Civil Procedure recoguiZl',s thill fact by providing
that "when a statute . is equally Ilusr.eptiblc of two intt'rpret.t\tions, onl'
in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former ill to lX' luloptffi." t
Arguments of convenience often address themselves strongly to th, court. Thl'
physical condition of the country which must of necessity l\ffect the !?pl'mtion of 1\
statute can be considered by a court. An attempt to enforcl' I\n impollSibll'!l\Ilt
will not be countenanced. And, finally, where a 1(1)1'11.1 interpretation of a stahlt.!'
would thwart the purpose of the legislature or lead to lIobsurrl consequl'nces, the
court isjustified inlooking through the form to the 1I11bst.u.nr.e; inlIlIchcascs the spirit.
U. s.-. Aitken (1913) 25 Phil. 7. 22. T~pical instance. Ilivcn in Hall's C ". nn Cnn.titu-
tional Law, p. 833, note. See Charles River Bridgc . Warrcn Bridge (1837) 11 P"t. 420, 9 I .
Ed. 773.
tU. s..Wigglesworth, 2Story, 369, followed in Froehlich &Kuttner . Collector of Customs
(1911) 18Phil. 461, 481. T08ame effect are Ctle Br08., Wolf &Son8. McCoy (1912) 21Phil. 300;
Partington . Attorney-General, L. R. 4 H. L. 100; and many American e es.
tTenorio . Manila Railroad Co. (1912) 22 Phil. 411; Top""io . Paredes (1912) 23 Phil.
238. But not alw~, U. S.. Go Chico (1909) 14Phil. 128quoting from U. A. e. Wiltberl!"r, (1820)
5Wheat. 76, 5 L. Ed. 37.
, Vel co . Lopez (1903) 1Phil. 720.
U. S.. Ten Y u (1912) 24 Phil. I, 10. See aloo Sharpie e. Ml\yor of Philadelphia (18,;;l)
21Pa. 147,59 Am. Dec. 759; 6. R. C. L .pp. 104-111.
.tBlack on Interpretation of Lawo, pp. 100 ./ q. "In obscuri. inspiei 80lere 'Iuod verioimi-
liuo est, aut quod plerumque fieri oolet." Dig. 50, 17, 114.
tCode of Civil Procedure, oee. 294.
, U. S.. Y ap Kin Co. (1912) 22Phil. 340, followinll :\f:lr.hllll, C.. J., in 11. H. ". Fisher (1804)
2C~anch 386, 2 L. Ed: 304.
Gomez . Hip6lito (1903) 2Phil. 7:l2.
9rreall()n of the law should prevail over the letter. * '''For the letter kill,th but
the spirit giveth life." t This must be taken to be the authoritative view of the
supreme court of the Philippines, for in the caseof in re Allen, not.withstanding the
I!tricter doctrine to befound insomeother cases, Mr. Justice McDonough, speliking
for the court, held that wherealiteral int.erpretation of any part of a statut.e would
operate unjustly, or lead to absurd resillts, or isincousistent with the meaning of an
Act asawhole, it should berejected. In such cases, hesaid, it must bepresumed that
the legislature intended exceptions toits language whichwould avoid such results. t
Again in the Flag Law Case, Mr. Justice Moreland said that literally hundreds of
casesmight becited to sustain this proposition: "Language israrely sofreefromam-
biguity asto beincapable of being used inmore t~n onesense, and the literal inter-
pretation of a statute may lead to ,anabsurdity, or evidently fail to give the real
intent of the legislature. When this isthe case; resort ishad to the principle that the
spirit of a lawcontrols the letter, so that a thing which is within the intention of a
statute isasmuch within the statute asif it werewithin the letter, and athing which
is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the
intention of the makers, and the statute should be so construed as to advance the
remedy and suppress the mischief contemplated by the framers."
So also "clerical errors or misprints, which, if uncorrected, would render the
statute unmeaning or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation
* * * will be corrected by the court and the statute read as amended, provided
the true meaning isobvious, and the real meaning of the legislature is apparent on
the face of the whole enactment." **
The English text of Acts of the Philippine Commission and Legislature governs
"except that in obvious cases of ambiguity, omission, or mistake the Spanish
text may beconsulted to explain the English text." *t Judicial notice will betaken
of the origin, history, and operation of statutes. For statutes borrowed from or
modelled upon Anglo-American precedents, a review of their legislative history and
judicial interpretation isproper. *t Statute.'lof American originshould be.construed
according to the jurisprudence of the United States. * Courts will giveweight to
* Rector of Holy Trinity Church . U. S. (1892) 143 U. S.457, 36L. Ed. 226.
t 2Corinthians ~, 6, quoted in Carles . State (1909) 3 Okla. Crim. Rep. 73, 86, 104 Pac.
493, a decision of the Supreme Court 0 Oklahoma confessing "to want of respect for precedents
which were found in the rubbish of Noah's Ark, and which have outlived their usefulness, if they
ever had any," and declining to hold the omission of. the word "the" before the words "State of
Oklahoma" In the caption of the information, fatal. See 5Op. Atty. Gen. P. I. 609.
tIn Te Allen (1903) 2Phil. 630, following U. S.. Kirby (1869) 7 Wall. 482, 19L. Ed. 278,
and Heydenfelt . Daney Gold Mining Co. (1877) 93 U. S. 634, 23 L. Ed. 995. Compare with
Velasco . Lopes (1903) 1Phil. 720and U. S.. Ambata (1904) 3Phil. 327.
U. S.. Go Chico (1909) 14Phil. 128, 139, quoting from 26Am. &Eng. Encyc. of Law, 602.
Seealso Uy Chaco Sons . Collector of Customs (1913) 24Phil. 548.
** Lamb . Phipps (1912) 22Phil. 456, 493.
*t Act 1788; Zamora . City of Manila (1907) 7Phil. 584 and other Philippine cases. Similsr
regulation and rule in Louisiona as to English and French. See Viterbo . Freedlander (188'0
120U. B. 707, 30L. Ed. 776and Louisiana cases.
*tU. B.. De Gusman (1915) 13O. G.. 1173. Beealso sec... , .upra.
*iThe rule for the Philippines, U. S.. De Gusman, id.; and for Porto Rico, Dias . Porto
Rico Railway Co. (1914) 21Porto Rico 73.
the contemporaneous CODSt.'ruCt_ ,..,. upoIl a statute by the executive officers
whoBeduty it is t.oetlforce it,_ uftleea...eh interpretation ill clearly erroneous,
will ordinarily be controlled thereby. It is &role well established in the inter-
pretation of customlawsthat, wheretbcre bas been &10nI acquiescence inaregulation
by which t.herighta of parties fOl"years have been detrrmincd and adjusted, such
inteqx-etation should be followed in the absence of the most <'.o,;cnt. and pcnluasivc
lftUIOIUI to t.hecontrary, t
Often it is imperative to decide if 1\ lItatuh' ill mandatory or direct.ory. t l\.
statute is said to be mandatory when it requires that ('('rtain action shall be taken
.by those to whomthe statute is addrt-JlSed,without. I('avinp;them any choice or dill-
cret.ioninthe matter, or when, inrespect toaf'tion tnk('n under thestatute, there mlplt
be exact and literal compliance with itll terms, or c1llcth(~act done will beab!lOlutely
void. A statute which directs the manner in which certain action shall be taken
or certain official duties performed is said to be directory when its nature and terms
ate such that disregard or it, or want of literafcomplianc(' with it, though conlllituting
aD irregularity, will not ab!lOlut.elyvitiate the prO(x~tings taken under it.
Such aconstruction ill, if possible, to be adopted Its will give('lfect.to 1\1I1)rovi-
Biomof astatute. Statut.es in pari mnlerUL ar(' tobeconstrul'fltogeth('l'. "(nt(~r-
ptetare at concordare leges legibus est optimus interJ)f(tandi mO(lus;" that ill, to
interpret and (t.odo it insuch a way a.~)to harmonize laws with ItLWtl, isan nndcllt
maxim of the law. *t
By the rule of ejusdem generis when a stntuh~d('scribell thill~ of a 11lL!til,ular
class or kind accompanied by wordll of a generic (~hal'lLctcl' preceded hy the wonl
"other," the generic word will usually beIimitl'flto thin~ of a kindred natuw with
tbo8e particularly enumerated, unleSl!there be something in the f'ontext. or histOl'y
of the statute to repel such inference. *t But this rule must. give way if I,ontmry
to the intent appearing fromother parts of the luw. *
Punctuation can be re!lOrtedto. "The conKtruc.tionfinally ndopted shoulr1hf'
based upon !lOmethingmore substantial than the mere punetuation found in the
printed Act. If the punctuation of the statut~ gives it ameanin~which iKrelL.~nahlc
and in apparent accord with the legi>llativewill, it may be used a..~an lulditiOIllLI
arguDl('nt for adopting the literal meaning of t.heworelMof the statute UIl thus pUIII'-
tuated. But an argument based upon punctuation alone ill not conl'lullive, und the
* In re Allen (1903) 2Phil. 630, following l',mndycr . McC<HlIlauKhLy (lK!") 140 C. H. :11;:1.
33 L. Ed. 363.
tKuenzle & Streiff . Collector of' Customs (l901'1) 12 Phil. 117 citinll; Ilot .rt.o" r. I>owni!,lI:.
(1888) 127 U. S. 607, 32 L. Ed. 269; U. S.. Healey (11111;')HiO 1". H. 1:11i; 411 I.. (0;,1. :\fl!l: ~lerMLt
. Cameron (1890) 127 U. S. 542. 34 J. Ed. 772.
~Bee Gardiner . R{,mulo (1914) 26 Phil. );21.
, Black On Jnterpretation of J.aws, Ch. XIII.
**Code of Civil Pr""edure, see. 287.
tSee Black on Interpretation of Laws, pp. 341-:14!J.
*t Murp,hy, Morris & Co. Collector of Customs (l!lUll) It Phil. 4r>li, co"sLruinK "Other
~facbillery; , 36 Cyc. 1119; Black on Interpretation of Laws, pp. 2U:l-2I!J .
, l'. 8. . Santo Nillo (1909) 1:1Phil. HI.
courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give the Act
the effect intended by the Legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect.punct~a-
tion marks, and inserting others when necessary." *
Thewill of the Legislature canbeeduced by necessary inferencefor it isimprac-
tic.ableto give directions for every detail of application. "That which is implied
in astatute is as much apart of it So'! what is expressed." t Various other intrinsic
and extrinsic aids to interpretation will be adopted by the courts if necessary. t
likewise, presumptions in aid of construction can be indulged in by the courts.
That the rules of interpretation under the civil lawaresurprisingly similar to
those of the Anglo-American, of which the previous discussion is mainly a com-
pendium, isshownby aquotation fromManresa:
"The following ruleli of interpretation are generally accepted.
Thl;!provisions of the Codeor of any other lawshould not beinterpreted
separately. Consequently, the rules established for the interpretation
of contracts may well beapplied inthe interpretation of the laws. If the
terms of alawareclear andleavenodQubt asto the intention of the legis-
lature the literal senseof its provisions shall beobserved. If the words
should appear contrary to the evident intention of the legislature, the
intention shall prevail. In order to judge as to the intention of the legis-
lator, attention must principally be paid to the contemporaneous and
subsequent laws. However general the terms of a law may be, there
should not be understood as included therein thin~s 'and cases different
from those with regard to which the law-makers intended to legislate.
If any provision should admit of different meanings, it should beunder-
stood in the sense most suitable to give it effect. The provisions. of a
law shall be interpreted in relation to one another, giving to those that
are doubtful the meaning whichmay appear fromthe consideration of all
of them together. Words which may have different meanings shall be
understood inthat whichmay beinaccordance with the object of thelaw.
The usages and customs of the country shall alsobetaken into considera-
ration. As has been said in our comment on the preceding article, in
no case should an interpretation which is contrary to the law b e given.
So the principle which says that where the same reason exists, there
must bean identical provision of the law, can not besuccessfully set up
whenthere isalegal princi:--'~applicable tothecase. Where the lawdoes
not distinguish we should not also distinguish. In casesnot excepted,
the exception confirms therule. In the lawswherethere areexceptions,
interpretation by analogy can not be applied. Where the law grants
the gre.atest, it should be understood as allowing or granting the less;
but if it prohibits the less; it must also be understood as prohibiting the
greatest. In penal laws or in franchises liberal interpretation can not
beallowed, but it may beapplied to those laws which are favorable." **
*u. S.. Hart (1913)26Phil. 149, 152.
tHanchett . Weber, 17Ill. App. 114. Just aswithaconstitution-:\lcCullough . :\bryland
(1819)4Wheat. 316, 4L. Ed. 579.
t SeeBlackonInterpretation of Laws, Chs. VI, VII.
ISeeBlack id., Ch. IV.
** Manresa, Comentario. al C6di(Jo Civil, Vol. I, p. 74.