Here the antman-tman superimposition is compared to a stump appearing in poor

light as a man as a result of which the properties of a man become falsely attributed to
the stump. A purva-paka (objection) is cited at this point arguing for what might be
called a dnta-drntika doa (fallacy arising from the incompatibility of the
analogy and the analogized):
sthu-puruau jeyau eva santau jtr anyonyasmin adhyastau avidyay. deha-
tmano tu jeya-jtro eva itaretara-adhysa iti na sama dnta.
Both the stump and the man are objects of cognition whom a cognizer superimposes on
each other due to ignorance. But in case of the mutual superimposition between the
body and tman, one is an object of cognition and the other is a cognizer. Thus, these
are not similar cases.
In defense, akara first of all argues that avidy.dhysa-mtra hi dnta-
drntikayo sdharmya vivakitam i.e., the only commonality between the analogy
and the analogized that is desired to be asserted is that both are superimpostions
caused by ignorance. He also addresses the problem arising from one of the objects
being the cognizer but for that we will return to the Brahmastra-bhya where the
prvapaka raises a similar query:
How can there be a superimposition of the object and its properties on the pratyag-
tman which cannot be an object? Everybody superimposes a different object only upon
an object placed in front of them. And you assert that the pratyag-tman cannot be an
object such that it can apprehended as you.
In other words, viayas can be superimposed upon each other. How can anything be
superimposed upon the viayin? In order for that to happen the viayin would have to
be a viaya, in which case it cannot be a viayin anymore. But this, of course, touches
the very core of Advaita philosophy which provides many examples of superimposition
occurring between viayas, the objects of cognition, to illustrate the idea that the
viayin, the cognizer who is the subject of cognition, is itself a product of
superimposition between what the cognizer truly is and what the cognizer is not. The
idea of a pratyag-tman becomes useful in this regard. This word is often translated as
the inner self, real self, etc. When the tman is problematized as a product of
superimposition between what the tman truly is and what it is not, the pratyag-tman
can be used to refer unequivocally to the tman as it truly is, and different from the
antman. Of course, this rule, as any other rule, is not universally followed and in most
cases the tman is used unproblematically even in Advaita, in which case it is
synonymous with the pratyag-tman. In this case, however, I think the word pratyag-
tman is used precisely to refer to the unadulterated tman free of any superimposed
antman properties. The problematized tman has arisen from the despoilation of the
pratyag-tman by the superimposition upon it of the antman