Cultura.

International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 9(2)/2012: 6176

61

On the Relationships between Syntax and Semantics with
regard to the Turkish Language

mer Naci SOYKAN
Faculty of Science and Letters, Mimar Sinan Fine Arts
University, Istanbul, Turkey
omernacisoykan@gmail.com

Abstract. A belief commonly held in linguistics and philosophy is that semantics is
defined by syntax. In this article, I will demonstrate that this does not hold true for
Turkish. A fundamental syntactical rule builds around the successive order of words
or speech units in a sentence. The order determines the meaning of the sentence,
which in turn is rendered meaningless if the rule is not observed. In a given lan-
guage, if a sentence retains meaning without this rule being applied, then the rule
cannot be said to determine meaning. Turkish, with its mathematical structure, is
one such language. In effect, the degree to which semantics is determined by syntax
varies considerably from one language to the other. If meaning is constructed
through dissimilar means in different languages, then it is not possible to talk about
a single theory of meaningfulness valid for all languages. Each language is uniquely
determined, and is a reflection of its proper cultural background. A theory of lan-
guage must take into account this cultural framework. In this paper, I shall deal with
a different way of constructing meaning whereby syntax does not determine seman-
tics, and present the linguistic possibilities it gives rise to.
Keywords: Language, syntax, semantics, Turkish, meaning (reference) and sense.

INTRODUCTION

We convey our thoughts and feelings either by expressing ourselves ver-
bally or through certain behavioral patterns, which in turn implies that
linguistic and cultural semiotics should be studied hand in hand. There is
a close relationship of mutual determination between the linguistic struc-
ture of a language and its underlying cultural background. Thus, when a
person speaks an unfamiliar language, we also fail to understand her ges-
tures and mimics. Syntax and semantics, two main branches of semiotics,
are therefore interrelated. However the nature of this interrelation shows
variations from one language to the other. In this article which deals with
the issue from the standpoint of philosophy of language, I offer some
new suggestions regarding the question of meaning determination
through a review of the nature of this interrelation in Turkish.
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Some studies on language (i.e. Morris 1964: 23, Chomsky, 1976: 75,
and Chomsky, 1957: 108) are built on the assumption that semantics de-
pends on syntax, and that it is syntax that determines meaning. A fun-
damental syntactical rule for language is the successive order of words or
speech units in the sentence. This order determines the meaning of a
sentence, and the sentence is rendered meaningless if this rule is not
obeyed. In any language, if a sentence retains meaning without the use of
this rule, it means that in the language concerned this rule does not de-
termine meaning. Turkish, being agglutinative in nature, is one such lan-
guage. The determination of semantics by syntax exhibits major differ-
ences in various languages, and if there are differing constructions of
meaning in various languages, it is not possible to talk about a single the-
ory of meaningfulness valid for all. In this paper a different construction
of meaning whereby syntax does not determine semantics is presented,
and certain linguistic possibilities born of this are shown.

WORDS, MEANING AND GRAMMAR

One may speak of the reference and sense of a word or sentence. When
words and sentences are taken as the hearing of voices and writings on
paper and other material surfaces, their references and senses are outside
of themselves. Reference and sense are in human intellect. More precise-
ly, when a word is recalled or uttered, its reference and sense come out
as a connotation in the intellect. When a word refers to an object or a
form, it is said that this is its reference. If a sentence causes the drawing
of a picture in the mind, this reference is at the same time its sense, and
this is the image drawn in the intellect. But, if the sentence is still consid-
ered meaningful although it does not cause the drawing of an image,
then where will its sense be? The answer to this question will be sought
in grammar. If words on their own have references, phrases and sen-
tences, which come together according to grammatical rules, have senses.
This means that sense is created by the rules of aggregation, namely
grammar. When I talk about the sense of a sentence, I mean the sense
of the sentence which does not have a reference as a whole, even though
some of the individual words it contains have references.
The first question that needs to be answered here is How and with
respect to what were the rules of grammar that make up the sense of a
sentence established? They are the measure themselves, not the meas-
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63
ured. Therefore, the explanation that it is wrong to say they exist with
respect to something and then to ask what that thing is is not satisfacto-
ry. We cannot simply say that this is the rule and stop there. The prob-
lem needs deeper examination. Although a few grammatical rules, such
as the subject of a sentence being in nominative form or a sentence be-
ing composed of at least a subject and a verb, are the same in every lan-
guage, many of them differ from language to language. Here, Ludwig
Wittgensteins differentiation of depth grammar and surface grammar
may work (1997: 664), although Wittgenstein did not sufficiently explain
this differentiation, and these concepts need further clarification. To this
purpose, we can, for instance, look at the distinction made by Jeff Coul-
ter between these two types of grammar:

Wittgenstein makes the distinction between surface and depth grammar precisely in
order to alert us to the difference between aspects of the use of words which can be
easily grasped and aspects which are not so readily available. (1999: 169)

There seem to be no difficulty understanding Wittgensteins words on
surface grammar.
Other analysts make similar comments. For example, Gordon P.
Baker defines surface grammar as the immediate impression we have of
the use of a word (2001: 306). This statement is not different from what
Wittgenstein himself said about surface grammar (Wittgenstein, 1997:
664). However, Wittgensteins remarks on depth grammar are not so
clear. He says that surface grammar is not sufficient for the depth gram-
mar of the word to mean. One cannot grasp the meaning of the word
via its direct impression on us. A deeper grammatical investigation is
needed for this purpose. While investigating how the human mind re-
lates to social construction, Coulter quotes Gordon C. F. Bearn in that
grammatical investigations are investigations of the uses of words in
various situations. Hence these investigations are not concerned with
language in a narrow sense; they include or touch upon every aspect of
our life with words. For instance, Wittgenstein says, it is part of the
grammar of the word chair that this is what we call to sit on a chair
(1999: 170). The word sedes, meaning chair in Latin, originates from se-
dere, to sit. Similar examples can be found in other languages, so that
grammatical investigations are not only about the use of words in varying
situations, being also concerned with language in a narrow sense.
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64
The fact that the human mind develops as a social construction does
not exclude its close relation to language and grammar. As Baker pointed
out (2001: 305), what Rudolf Carnap meant with the logical syntax of
language and Ryle meant with logical geography relate to the logical
dimension of sentence structure. The following remark by Wittgenstein
supports this argument: Whether a proposition entails another proposi-
tion must be clear from the grammar of the proposition (1990: 256). If
a sentence originates from another sentence, this means there is a logical
connection between them. Other remarks by Wittgenstein in support of
this are the following: Essence is expressed by grammar. () Grammar
tells what kind of object anything is (1997: 371, 373). What Wittgenstein
meant here is depth grammar of course. In fact, in his abovementioned
paper, Baker depicts the first sentence as Essence is expressed by depth
grammar (2001: 303). This type of grammar should not only be Ger-
man grammar but also the grammar of every language. What is meant by
grammar in the assertion that something is expressed in the grammar of
every language is clearly nothing but the logical structure, which is uni-
versal. I understand depth grammar as the logical aspect of logic or
grammar. Since logic is universal, it is clear that its rules will not change
from language to language. However, since rules of surface grammar
change and affect identification of the sense of a sentence, the idea that a
universal theory of meaning is not possible gains more support.

THE CASE OF THE TURKISH LANGUAGE

It might be accepted that, like logic, mind and reason are common to all
people. Accordingly, it might be said that while the rules of depth gram-
mar stem from the mind, the rules of surface grammar depend on lin-
guistic agreement. These rules define the syntactic structure of language,
and surface grammar contains this syntactic structure. Since the ordering
of words in a phrase or sentence depends on agreement, it means it is
not a logical ordering. Take, for example, the phrase a friend of Alis in
English. In Turkish, the word that corresponds to a friend takes second
place in the phrase. In other words while the determinant comes before
the determinatum in English, the ordering in Turkish is just the opposite.
One cannot ask why this is so, since this is simply linguistic agreement
and hence there is no logical connection in the ordering. In other words,
one cannot say that English is more logical than Turkish, or vice versa.
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65
This shows that rules of surface grammar have no logical connection and
therefore are not universal. I do not wish to say that these rules are not
logical. The conditions under which each language has developed, and
the lifestyles of people speaking them vary. For example, while men wear
pants in one society, they wear skirts in another. It would be absurd to
categorize these two modes of dress as logical-illogical. Differences in
surface grammar rules in different languages are analogous.
Let us continue our investigation by forming a short sentence from
our token phrase. A friend of Alis married (Alinin bir arkada evlen-
di). This sentence is uttered in the same form in Turkish, except for the
places of the elements of the noun phrase. If the verb at the end of the
sentence appeared instead at the beginning, there would be no change in
meaning. In English, we are not allowed to apply this transposition
which is casual in Turkish. We cannot say: Married a friend of Alis.
We can say: Did a friend of Alis marry? However, the meaning of the
sentence changes, and becomes an interrogative sentence. The verb
married or any other word, cannot appear anywhere between a friend
of Alis, which, as in English, is also a noun phrase in Turkish. The
noun phrase is a linguistic unit and cannot be divided. In sentences such
as: Every alteration must have a cause the verb itself may appear at the
beginning of the sentence, Must every alteration have a cause, turning
the sentence into a question. Since non-universal surface grammar rules
fall under syntax, and since syntax determines meaning, this situation
serves as an example for my claim that there cannot be a universally valid
rule about meaningfulness.
A regular Turkish sentence is composed of these five elements: Sub-
ject, adverb, complement, object and verb. Although they might be
composed of more than one word or have suffixes, the elements should
be taken as a unit. In other words, they cannot be divided and no word
can be inserted between them. Let us give an example for each of these
elements in the same order: Ali, |geen yl (last year)|New Yorkta
(in New York|birev (a house)|kiralad (rented) (Ali|rented|a
house|in New York|last year). In Turkish, the sentence would usually
appear in the order given above. However, in Turkish these five ele-
ments could be ordered arbitrarily and each new sentence thus obtained
would nevertheless be yield the same sense. Mathematically, there are
120 (5! = 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 = 120) possible Turkish orderings, all of them
with the same meaning. Let us just offer three examples: Geen yl bir ev
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66
kiralad Ali New Yorkta/Kiralad New Yorkta Ali geen yl bir ev/New
Yorkta bir ev kiralad Ali geen yl.
In Turkish, since the suffix is inseparable from the word stem, suf-
fixed words constitute units and appear as single words. Hence, such a
word can be permutated within the sentence without the latters meaning
suffering any changes. Again, lets take the example of a sentence com-
posed of five units: Dn gece|stanbulda|bir eve|hrsz|girdi (Yester-
night|in Istanbul|to a house|thief|entered = Last night, a thief entered
a house in Istanbul). All 120 permutations of this sentence bear the same
meaning. Now, lets consider the example of a sentence composed of
four units: Yarn|hava|yamurlu|olacak (Tomorrow|weather|rainy
|will be = It will rain tomorrow). All 24 possible permutations of this
sentence (4! = 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 = 24) will have the exact same meaning.
Whereas the permutability of words within a sentence validly applies to
the examples given above, it would not be true to say that in every Turk-
ish sentence word order can be shuffled. Here, it should only be noted
that Turkish is capable of providing such a possibility.
To a certain degree, the same may be achieved in English. Most native
speakers of English will understand this syntactically ill-formed sentence
Rented in New York a house last year Ali, although it would not be
clear if this is a question or an affirmation, since the verb at the begin-
ning indicates the first possibility. Besides, with semantics not being de-
termined by syntax, this re-ordering of speech units in the sentence is
not possible in any other European language outside the Turkish lan-
guage group.

SEMANTIC AND REFERENTIAL VALUES OF
THE LINGUISTIC SIGN

How is then sense determined in Turkish? Independently of whether
every, some or none of the speech units of a sentence have sense, if one
of them does not affect the others syntactically, then their ordering has
no role in the sense of the sentence. A more or less unordered sentence
does not equate with a loss of sense. Such a sentence may be called a
modular sentence. To use an analogy, if the positions of individual pieces
of a modular furniture set in a room are interchanged, their function will
not be lost even if its appearance changes. In this analogy, the furniture
set corresponds to a sentence, the pieces of furniture to linguistic units,
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67
and the appearance and function of the furniture within the room in a
house, to the appearance and sense of the sentence. Furthermore, the
verb to rent names an action, but this action has no image that can be
simulated in the mind. However, although the unit he rented
(kiralad) has no specific meaning due to the same ineffectuality, the
mind identifies the object as connected to a house or some type of
lodgings and the sentence is understood.
One question arises at this point: What is it that allows the interchange
of speech units in our mind, or how does this condition take place? We
will return to this question again below. For now, I want briefly to say:
Since speech units do not affect each other in terms of meaning and
there is no connection between them to complement or distort the
meaning, the mind will have no difficulty changing their places in the
sentence although it may not sound pleasant. Due to this lack of connec-
tion, if a relation between sentence and being exists, that is, when sen-
tence designates something that exists, then this connection can be es-
tablished between units of sentence and that being in a similar way as
the connection between the whole sentence and that being. This also
allows the formation of a sentence as a whole in line with the order of
the occurrence of Being. We will return to this problem again below.
Thinking is the formation of a language in the human mind. In Platos
words,

thought and speech are the same, only the former, which is a silent inner conversa-
tion of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. () But the
stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name
of speech. (1961: 441)

Similar considerations are to be found in Aristotle, who affirms that

Spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of
spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are
spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of affections of the soul
are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of actual things
are also the same. (Aristotle, 1991: 16a 48)

Similarly, for Sextus Empiricus,

There was another disagreement among them; some placed the true and false in the
region of the thing signified, others in that of utterance, others in that of the motion
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68
of thought. And the Stoics stood for the first opinion, saying that three things were
connected with one another, the thing signified and the signifier and the object. Of
these the signifier is the utterance (for example, the utterance Dion); the thing
signified is the actual state of affairs revealed by it, and which we apprehend as it
subsists in our thought, and which foreigners do not understand even though they
hear the utterance; and the object is the externally existing thing (for example, Dion
himself). And of these, two are bodies, namely the utterance and the object, while
one is incorporeal, namely the state of affairs signified and sayable, which is true or
false. (Sextus Empiricus, 2005: 1112)

This means that language is needed in order to think, and words must
be stored in mind in order to form a language. Thinking takes place
when the mind makes connections between words stored in memory.
Accumulation and storage of ideas in human memory goes hand in hand
with language acquisition. In recollection, human memory brings back a
re-presentation (re-localization in space and time) of an object named by
a sign. However, sometimes the object might be recalled as a mental im-
age, without necessarily recalling the linguistic sign (word) associated to
it. This phenomenon may be described with the expression it is on the
tip of my tongue. Conversely, thinking can occur with words that have
no specific representations outside language under de re/de dicto distinc-
tion made by Robert B. Brandom. (2002: 9495) In de dicto, conceptual
content is understood as a role in reasoning, that is, what I explain as
reference/sense distinction, which includes understanding words with
and without reference.
The understanding of the sentence It rained and the roads got wet,
that describes the condition of an object, is possible by imagining the
described situation. More abstract forms of reasoning such as the follow-
ing statement by Immanuel Kant do not describe any object condition:
Judgements of experience, as such, are all synthetic (2000: 142). In or-
der to understand this sentence one needs to learn expressions such as
judgments of experience and synthetic whose definitions are not
sentences that describe object conditions. This is how philosophical dis-
course is created. Understanding here takes place by means of such exer-
cises. However well-educated one may be, one cannot be expected to
understand the sample sentence if one is not familiar with Kantian phi-
losophy. The difference in understanding is not just between philoso-
phers and non-philosophers, but also among philosophers themselves.
For example, some philosophers claim they do not understand Martin
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69
Heidegger. This shows that they are alien to Heideggers language, like
the art history professor who was alien to philosophical discourse.
1

Signs (whether linguistic or not; i.e. Charles Sanders Peirces distinc-
tion between icon/index/symbol) with an informative or referential
function convey knowledge concerning objects of the real world. But
there are also signs (including beings that do not exist in reality giants,
unicorns, etc.) that do not have an informative-referential function, that
is, without a referent. These establish nevertheless, an abstract quasi-
referential relationship with a mental representation (purely cognitive
category, which does not require the existence of the real object). In the
distinction between linguistic signs with a reference and those words
with no reference but which are meaningful, it might be useful to turn to
Gottlob Freges differentiation between the expressions evening star
and morning star. He claims that although they have the same refer-
ence they do not have the same sense (1966: 41). For Frege a phrase
such as the celestial body which stands furthest from earth (1966: 42)
has no reference but sense and takes place in language not in the external
world.
A similar distinction is made by David J. Chalmers while he discusses
the two dimensions of semantics: Typically, one semantic value is asso-
ciated with reference and ordinary truth-conditions, while the other is
associated with the way that reference and truth-conditions depend on
the external world (2006: 574). This means that linguistic signs (words)
are retained in memory whether they have specific representations or
not, a difference signaled by Augustine between signs which have a
meaning in a natural manner and, on the other hand, signs established
by usage and convention (Augustine, 163). Words with no object im-
age associated to them can be recalled. It is the use of verbal language
that allows the higher levels of conceptual thought (for an extended dis-
cussion see Soykan 2009). In the case of artistic sign, the poetic func-
tion takes precedence over the referential function (Jakobson, 1960:
371), and the artist tends to convey ambiguous and suggestive psycho-
mental representations rather than attempt to offer true-value (objec-
tive) perceptions. Here, semantic values may overshadow the referential
values associated to the sign. The distinction between the function of a
sign in a system (langue in the case of linguistic signs) and the function of
that the same sign possesses in the concrete act of its usage (parole in the
case of linguistic signs) allows for their inclusion in a certain discursive
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70
isotopy supports a (mode of) signification, for instance, philosophical or
artistic. While representation is function of language, denotative refer-
ence is a function of the message.
Setting aside the fact the relationship the mind establishes with the
world by means of signs, we are faced with the difficulty of the relation
between language and existence, or rather, non-existence. The linguistic
expression of non-Being (meon) has a correspondence in reality so that
the non-existent exists (Plato, 1961: 236e ff.) or in Heideggers words,
Language is the house of Being (1971: 65). But language should be
able to mention the non-existent without assigning a Being to it and this
should not cause a contradiction. Turkish clearly propounds this by us-
ing both the existent and non-existent in plural form. If plurality can be
assigned to the non-existent too, then it is not simply an ontic feature. In
Turkish, the plural suffix is grammatical, not ontic. However, in English
and many other languages, there is a differentiation of countable and un-
countable. Such a differentiation requires the placement of words in one
of these two classes, taking into account the objects to which the words
refer, showing a binding consent between language and the external
world. If there is no such distinction in a language, if every name can be
pluralized, then such a bond cannot be said to exist. Turkish is such a
language and states explicitly that non-existent things are available in lan-
guage only. This shows that seeking a correspondence between language
and reality is irrelevant in Turkish.

MODULARITY IN TURKISH LANGUAGE

There is yet another example that illustrates the aforementioned distinc-
tion between the domain of language and being in Turkish language and
culture. Every Turkish tale begins with the stereotypical saying once
there was, once there wasnt, so that the permission to state those that
vanish without leaving a trace of existence is given at the outset, along-
side those that exist. There are many such absurd sayings with pleasant
and poetic effect in Turkish folk songs and nursery rhymes; for instance
Camels become town criers, fleas become barbers, I rock my moth-
ers cradle tngr mngr. Such usage shows how impact of a particular
culture upon language. Here, not ambiguity, but absurdity is at stake. In
turn, absurdity should be regarded as possessing a poetic function. The
following verses from Yunus Emre illustrate this point: ktm erik
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71
dalna/anda yedim zm (I climbed up unto the branch of a plum-tree/I
ate the grape thereupon). In order to attain the absurd, reason, as it seeks
a correspondence between the utterance and its reference, is decoyed
into a pitfall: I rock my mothers cradle tngr, I eat a grape on a plum
branch, etc.
In the case of the German language, Heideggers statement Das
Nichts selbst nichtet; 1981: 34) translated from Was ist Metaphysik by David
Farrell Krell as The Nothing itself nihilates (1978: 105) is uncommon
in German as it is in English. This duplication of subject and verb Ni-
hilo nihilates or similar phrases such as The rain rains (Das Regnen
regnet) are not used in those languages (the normal use would be It
rains/Es regnet). However, this kind of use is very common in Turkish,
for example in Yamur yaar El eller Uzun uzar and similar expres-
sions. The phrase The nothing itself nihilates (In Turkish: Hi kendi
hiler) has a linguistic potential in Turkish, and since, there is no one-to-
one correspondence between language and reality in Turkish, one cannot
infer from this phrase that something relating to Being is said, since it
can include the existent and non-existent. If speech were only possible
about Being, then one would not be able to speak about mistakes or
dreams.
Turning back to the discussion on the connection between Being and
language or rather the connection between language and what it articu-
lates, left unconcluded above, let us take a sentence where each speech
unit has a meaning: After work, I bought 1 kg of fish from the fish
market ( dn balkdan bir kilo balk aldm). In Turkish, the order-
ing of speech units in the sentence matches exactly the order of their oc-
currence in time: after work/I bought from the fish market/1 Kg of fish.
A Turkish speaker there would see a slight mismatch in English due to
syntax constraints in that language. As stated above, in Turkish, the or-
dering of speech units does not define the sense of the sentence nor de-
termine meaning. Nevertheless, the sentence is understood in both lan-
guages independently of the order of speech units. However, this does
not apply in longer stretches of text, made up of a number of sentences or
functional units whose order may alter the relationship among proposi-
tions, that is, context-dependency (on this, see Cappelen and Lepore,
2005).
The examples discussed above are not context-dependent, so that
meaning is there even when it is not in a context. For example, the
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72
meaning of Kants statement Judgements of experience, as such, are all
synthetic quoted above, does not change from one context to another.
One either understands this sentence or one does not. Although the ne-
cessity to know the definitions of the concepts which constitute the sen-
tence in order to understand it may be conceived as an example of con-
textualism, this by no means contradicts the kind of understanding that I
mention, since there are not different forms of understanding that vary
from context to context. The claim that those definitions could have
been made differently, thus changing the meaning of the sen-
tence simply does not make sense because the sentence would then be
another sentence. In another example from Kant, Every alteration must
have a cause. The Turkish of this sentence has three elements: Every
alteration (her deimenin)|a cause (bir nedeni)|must have (olma-
ldr). All possible orderings of these three elements give us six sentenc-
es: Her deimenin bir nedeni olmaldr/Bir nedeni olmaldr her deimenin/Her
deimenin olmaldr bir nedeni/Bir nedeni her deimenin olmaldr/Olmaldr her
deimenin bir nedeni/Olmaldr bir nedeni her deimenin. Each one of these six
sentences offers the same sense. Each element is meaningful in itself.
The meaning of one does not affect the others. For this reason, none of
them needs to precede or come after another.
In sentences where speech units have no representation, meaning ob-
tained by the replacement of speech units is even more stable than in
other kinds of sentences. This independence of sense from syntax in
Turkish or, in other words, the modular structure of the language, brings
us to the conclusion that Turkish is a mathematical language. Interesting-
ly, Johannes Lohmanns characterization of Turkish as a language with-
out history (210) can be explained from this perspective, since mathe-
matical structures such as 2+3=5 are the same today as they were five
hundred years ago. Furthermore, in Turkish, the body of nouns and the
roots of verbs do not change. The meanings given to words that suffixes
are specified.
For example, the suffix -cik is a diminutive that regularly conveys af-
fection. If I address a certain Ali as Alicik, this means that I consider him
to be midget and cute. In the same way, a small hill, tepe in Turkish, can
be called tepecik. In case a word takes more than one suffix, the suffixes
are lined up according to a definite order that leaves no room for confu-
sion. E. g., in Turkish the sentence you must do is translated with a
single word: yapmalsn. The order of suffixes attached to the word stem
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73
is stable at all times: yap-me-a-l-sn. The regularity of suffix order confers
simplicity, clarity and ease to the Turkish language. When one of the
words in the sentence becomes obsolete, it can be substituted with a new
word that conveys the same meaning, in much the same way as we do
cut and paste, yet the sentence preserves its original meaning notwith-
standing. E.g., a verse by Yunus Emre reads: Yunus eydr bu sz Yunus
utters these words. The word eydr used here has become obsolete to-
day. We replace it with syler, and the same meaning is preserved even if
we leave the rest of the sentence unmodified. This is a further result of
the fact that the meaning of this word is independent from its syntactical
position. Due to this anachronism, the poetry of Yunus Emre, a Turkish
language poet from seven hundred years ago, can be easily understood
and read with pleasure today.
The equal sign in an arithmetical sentence corresponds to a copula in a
verbal sentence. If the places of numbers on the left of the sign are
changed, the equality is preserved, but if the place of the equal sign is
changed, equality is abolished. In Turkish, the word to which the copula
is affixed does not change the meaning of the word, no matter where it is
placed because the copula is not separate but affixed to a word. In Turk-
ish, the copula is not a separate word but a suffix. Since this suffix is al-
ways affixed to a verb, the verb, like other words, can also change its
place in the sentence; therefore the meaning of the sentence remains the
same.
When you take this characteristic of Turkish together with its modular
structure mentioned above, Turkish can conveniently be described as not
only an arithmetical but also a mathematical language. Permutability of
word order seems to be tantamount to self-reflexivity of language. Ma-
rie-Laure Ryan says: Self-reflexivity is also found in all the representa-
tional arts, as well as in computer languages and mathematical systems
(Ryan, 2012). The properties of Turkish I presented in this paper make it
a strong candidate, I believe, for being used in machine translation. The
text to be translated is written in Turkish first, and then translated opera-
tionally into the desired language.
In order to convince those who do not speak Turkish as to the validity
of what I have explained about the modular structure of Turkish and my
philosophical reflections on this, let us consider a hypothetical situation.
Consider a language whose only grammatical rules are these: Each word
is always in the same form. For each tense and case, there are separate
mer Naci Soykan / On the Relationships between Syntax and Semantics

74
words for suffixes and prefixes. Each of them is used together with the
relevant word, without another word in between. Humans communicate
by using such words, and the ordering of words, or more precisely the
speech units, is not important because, in the framework of the above-
mentioned rules, they would necessarily not affect the senses of each
other. The senses of sentences derived from all possible orderings will
remain the same. Someone expresses his intention, then stops and adds
nothing. But after a while, he expresses a second intention. Is this possi-
ble? Why not? Since an intention can be expressed by a speech unit,
someone can mean something by such a use of speech units. Since
meaning something is internal speech, if someone means something with
the words he uses, there is no reason that his interlocutor would not un-
derstand what he means, given that both of them have minds. The mind
will combine words that do not affect each other regardless of their place
in the sentence in a way that will be understood by those who use this
language. Of course, Turkish has grammatical rules, but even when the
same syntactical rules are not applied in the way I mentioned in this arti-
cle, the sentence retains its sense. This was what I wanted to express
when referring to the non-determination of semantics by syntax, and that
the order of speech units is not a condition for understanding the sen-
tence. It is generally said that the fewer the number of rules in any field,
the more such minimalism will be preferred, based on the principle of
economy. That principle is valid in language too, and Turkish has the
privilege of being such a language.

CONCLUSIONS

In Turkish, conservation of the meaning of a sentence resides in its pos-
sible permutations. This shows that, unlike in English, in Turkish, syntax
only defines semantics loosely. English syntax is much more restrictive,
as shown in the examples above. A few changes in the positions of
words in an English sentence changes an enunciation into a question.
This does not happen in Turkish, hereby showing that grammatical rules,
or at least some of them, are not universal. Furthermore, the paper has
shown that when rules prevent a violation of logic, they are universal. If
not, they are only conventional, and differ from language to language.


Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 9(2)/2012: 6176

75
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Notes

1
I do not think this distinction I make has any equivalent in the literature. For this
reason, if you allow me, I would like to recount something I heard from a German
art history professor. He said I attended a philosophy meeting as a member of the
audience. I understood nothing of what was being said, although everyone spoke
German.