Legal Analysis and Probable Outcomes of

Bangladesh v. Myanmar (ITLOS, case no: 16):

Bangladesh Seeks Equitable Maritime Delimitation for
Sustainable Energy Development



Tafsir Matin Johansson






November, 2010






















2
TABLE OF CONTENTS


Introduction............................................................................................................................3


Chapter 1

1. Brief Analysis of Maritime Domestic Legislations (Bangladesh and Myanmar)....4
1.1 Constant Geomorphologic Peculiarities of the coastline of Bangladesh.......................4
1.2 Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1974 (Bangladesh)....................................4
1.3 Territorial Sea and Maritime Zones Law, 1977 (Myanmar)...........................................5
1.4 Shortcomings of the Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1974......................5

Chapter 2
2. Bangladesh v. Myanmar...............................................................................................6
2.1 Contradicting Claims.......................................................................................................6
2.2 Unauthorized Drilling by Daewoo: An Act Provocation? ..............................................7
2.3 Under the ITLOS authority..............................................................................................8

Chapter 3

3. Theory v. Reality: Implementing LOSC to Determine Validity of Maritime
Claims....................................................................................................................................10
3.1 Straight Baseline Determined........................................................................................10
3.2 Territorial Sea: An implicit acceptance by Myanmar....................................................11
3.3 Exclusive Economic Zone: Point of friction..................................................................12
3.4 Extended Continental Shelf Claims: Justification of Natural Prolongation...................13

Chapter 4
4. Incentives and Catalysts: Under Troubled Waters.................................................16
4.1 Catalysts of Dispute......................................................................................................16
4.2 Prospective Gas Reserves in Offshore Portions of Bangladesh....................................18
4.3 Sustainable Energy Development v. Foreign Exchange...............................................19
4.4 What if? ....................................................................................................................21

Conclusion..............................................................................................................................23

References...............................................................................................................................24
3
Introduction

Among the other maritime boundary disputes of Asia where economic and
development incentives play a major role, the recent dispute between Bangladesh
and Myanmar/Burma (referred to as Myanmar hereafter) has gained noteworthy
attention. Ambiguity and uncertainty roams around the coastal areas of these adjacent
states and results in deprivation for Bangladesh, which even after achieving national
sovereignty is in a continuous struggle with Myanmar to gain sovereignty in its
maritime boundary. A frustrating overlapping claim in the Bay of Bengal has
decreased the possibility of bi-lateral negotiations which ultimately narrows down
Bangladeshs right to peaceful exploitation and utilization of natural gas which may
be the answer to the existing energy crisis. Entered through separate declarations by
Union of Myanmar (4 November, 2009) and Government of Bangladesh (12
December 2009) a case (no: 16) is pending at the kind disposal of International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (referred to as ITLOS hereafter). The key objectives
of this paper is to analyze the maritime domestic legislations, trace back to the
question of facts of the pending case, scrutinize the reasons for invoking the
jurisdiction of ITLOS, examine the pertinent United Nations Convention on Law of
the Sea, 1982 (referred to as LOSC hereafter) apparatus suited to elucidate the
demarcation controversies, unveil strong prospects of the natural gas in offshore
blocks, address the energy and economic catalysts working behind it all and finally
conclude with a forecast of ordeals Bangladesh might face after adjudication of the
case.
In every chapter (where relevant) an endeavor has been made to achieve these
objectives by answering the following questions; (a) Was engaging the licensees in
exploratory activities in disputed territories on 1 November, 2008 by Myanmar an act
of provocation and a breach of International obligation? (b) Can the Extended
Continental Shelf claimed by Bangladesh be held to be valid and justified under
International Law? (c) Can equitable delimitation fill in the gaps of the existing
energy crisis dominant in Bangladesh? (d) What are the options Bangladesh can
depend on if for any case the final judgment of ITLOS does not adhere to equitable
delimitation?


4

Chapter 1

1. Brief Analysis of Maritime Domestic Legislations (Bangladesh and
Myanmar)

1.1 Constant Geomorphologic Peculiarities of the coastline of Bangladesh
Bangladesh emerged as a new state on 16 December, 1971. It sits in the north-eastern
part under South Asian geographical juxtaposition with Myanmar to its extreme
Southeast and the Bay of Bengal as its southern boundary.
1
It embraces the flow of
the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna rivers as joint delta, and compared
to other international coastlines it is different because, (a) no stable water line or
demarcation or landward and seaward area exists, (b) continual process of alluvion
and sedimentation creates shallow non-navigable areas and (c) the navigable channels
formed from such process change their courses at a rapid pace requiring soundings
and demarcation in order to pertain to the character of river mouths and inland
waters.
2
Due to these geo-morphological peculiarities it was difficult to define the
coastal baseline and hence depth method was adopted to fix the uncertainty of the
situation.

1.2 Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1974 (Bangladesh)
With a view to establishing its maritime boundaries, shortly after independence
Bangladesh introduced Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act
3
in 1974 which
entered into force on 13 April, 1974. It is a primary Act with respect to maritime
boundary claims. The entire act is divided into 9 sections. Succinct as it may seem,
this Act briefly states the rights and duties of coastal and non-coastal state in
Territorial waters (section 3), Contiguous Zone (section 4), Economic Zone (section
5), Conservative Zone (section 6) and Continental Shelf (Section 7). Section 8 and 9
embodies the actions that maybe exercised by the Government in controlling pollution

1
SK Noim Uddin and Ros Taplin, Paper on A Sustainable Energy Future in Bangladesh: Current
Situation and Need for Effective Strategies presented at !"# %&' ()*&+ ,&+#-&.+*)&./ 0)&1#-#&2# )&
345+.*&.6/# 7&#-89 .&' 7&:*-)&;#&+ <377 %==>?@ <%AB%C D):#;6#- %==>@ E.&8F)F@ !".*/.&'?G
2
Kriangshak Kittichaisaree, The Law Of The Sea and Maritime Boundary in Southeast Asia, Printed in
Singapore, Published by Oxford University Press, 1987, pp -29-30.
3
See Act XXVI of 1974.
5
and taking necessary measures for exploring, exploiting, managing and conserving
resources in the EEZ and Continental Shelf. A subsequent gazette notification by the
ministry of foreign affairs on April 13, 1974 highlights the measurements of territorial
sea and EEZ respectively.

1.3 Territorial Sea and Maritime Zones Law, 1977 (Myanmar)
This law enacted by Myanmar entered into force on 9 April, 1977. It includes a
preamble and is divided into 7 chapters with an annex and a schedule which gives a
detailed indication as to the fixed points between which the straight baselines are
drawn. Myanmar based (a) a 12 Nautical Miles (referred to as nm hereafter) claim as
territorial sea with a right of innocent passage intended to serve the purpose of non-
coastal state, (b) a 24 nm contiguous zone from the baseline with a view to
safeguarding the security of Myanmar with punishments for infringement of custom,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations, (c) a 200 nm EEZ from the baseline for
exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of its natural resources and
(d) and a 200 nm continental shelf reserving exclusive sovereign rights for itself.

1.4 Shortcomings of the Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1974
Since UNCLOS 1 had already laid down the set rules of International Law prior to
the implementation of the Act of 1974, it would have been wise for Bangladesh to
enact this domestic legislation keeping the model of UNCLOS 1 in focus. The
insufficiencies of this act may be drawn on the basis that the proposition of baseline
lacks separate and distinct definition and has been conjoined with the proposition of
territorial sea. Since baselines are essential to locate the starting point of the maritime
boundary, there is a dearth of an individual paragraph in the Act of 1974 which should
have portrayed the geographical complexities in determining the baseline which
apparently is the primary reason of delimitation difficulties for Bangladesh.
Furthermore, there is an absence of further explanation as to which baseline i.e.
straight or normal has been used to fix the starting point of the territorial sea,
although a gazette notification of Ministry of foreign Affairs published in 1974,
highlights this idea with legal explanations. But from a legal perspective this
explanation ought to have been incorporated in the primary act itself so as to eliminate
any further questions in this matter. Under section 4(1) of the Act of 1974
Contiguous Zone has been demarcated from the outer limits of the territorial sea to a
6
distance of 6 nm whereas UNCLOS 1 (although Bangladesh was not a party to this
convention) has enabled the parties to claim a distance of 12 nm. Despite the effort to
launch the idea of EEZ under section 5(1) of the Act of 1974, the term any zones of
the high seas remains ambiguous and contradicts with the location of conservative
zones under section 6 which states such areas of the sea adjacent to the territorial
waters. Although Bangladesh has advocated an extension in the continental shelf
beyond 200 nm at a very later stage, article 7(1) of Act of 1974 indicates a tailored
definition of continental shelf that lacks interpretation of geographical proportions
unlike the Act of 1958 which depicts a strict measurement of 200 meters. The
supposition of a separate article on High seas remains absent in the Act of 1974
without which the act is incomplete rendering the entire act to some extent
incompetent to meet the standards of UNCLOS 1. Nevertheless, the Act of 1974
reflects a very primary will yet absolute intention to delimit its maritime boundary
which is the inherent right of every sovereign state.

Chapter 2

2. Bangladesh v. Myanmar

2.1 Contradicting Claims
Bangladesh and Myanmar are parties to the UNCLOS. Bangladesh ratified the
convention on 27 July, 2001 and Myanmar ratified the convention on 21 May, 1996.
The coastal formation of Bangladesh is concave unlike Myanmar, which has a long
convex coastline. After the promulgation of the Act of 1974, Bangladesh had three
rounds of talks with Myanmar, the first in November 1985, the second in February
1986 and the third one in May 1986.
4
In trying to settle the maritime dispute
Myanmar proposed the equidistance principle from Oyster Island (Myanmar) to St.
Martins Island (Bangladesh), the implementation of which would draw the line of
boundary towards the concaved coast slashing the legitimate sea area and halving the
exclusive economic zone of Bangladesh.
5


4
Shiabur Rahman, Maritime Boundary yet to be demarcated, Bitter disputes with India, Myanmar
feared, News from Bangladesh, Friday 21 April, 2006,
<www.bangladeshweb.com/view.php?hidRecord=102044>, visited on 9 October 2010.
5
Dr. Badrul Imam, Why Bangladesh should win the arbitration?, The Daily Star, 28 October 2009,
<http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=111566>, visited on 11 October 2010.
7
The equidistance principle in such case is not acceptable and goes against the
spirit of article 74 and 83 of UNCLOS where it is clearly stated that states with
adjacent or opposite coasts must form an agreement also termed as equitable
solution.
Although article 74 and 83 of UNCLOS does not set any perimeter as regards
to equitable delimitation, it is presumed that considerations are given, inter alia, to
geomorphologic peculiarities, indented coastlines, overlapping claims between
adjacent states, dependence of the inhabitants of the coast on living and non-living
resource.

2.2 Unauthorised Drilling by Daewoo: An Act of Provocation?
Although the 1974 Agreed Minutes Between Bangladesh Delegation and Burmese
Delegation regarding the Delimitation of Maritime Boundary failed to see the light of
ratification, a Friendship line was drawn via bilateral negotiations in 1979 between
both the contending states. But this so-called Friendship line was shattered on 5
November, 2008 when Myanmars Junta chartered a Korean Company, Daewoo
(which subcontracted four ships of which two were registered in Bahamas, one in
Belize and one in India) under the watchful eye of three Burmese (Myanmar)
warships approximately 50 nm southwest of Saint Martins Island.
6
In response to this
illegal act three Bangladeshi naval ships (Abu Bakar, BNS Madhumita and BNS
Nirvoy) were dispatched to hinder the illegal drilling in the Bay but were denunciated
by the Burmese navels of trespassing.
7
Myanmar subsequently stopped the
expedition after diplomatic palavers between the two countries, but it was claimed by
Myanmars government that the expedition was successful. Chapter 3, Article 12 of
the statute of International Law Commission
8
reiterates that,
There is a breach of an International Obligation by a state when an act of that
state is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation,
regardless of its origin or character.


Note that, The Daily Star is the largest English Newspaper and has been circulating since 14 January
1991.
6
Sayed Zain Al Mahmood, Troubled Waters, The Daily Star Weekend Magazine, Volume 8, Issue 94,
13 November 2009, < www.thedailystar.net/magazine/2009/11/02/current_affairs.htm>, visited on 9
October 2010.
7
See Myanmar brings warships to explore Bangladesh waters, The Daily Star, published on 3
November, 2008, < www.bangladesh-web.com/view.php?hidRecord=229280>, visited on 11 October
2010.
8
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute_e.pdf>, visited on 31 October
2010.
8
A careful analysis would further elaborate that the Bay of Bengal being a
disputed zone for both Bangladesh and Myanmar, it is apparent that unauthorized
exploration of resources by Myanmar was a violation of Article 74(3) of LOSC which
conveys the message not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final
agreement. Under the legal regime, this could be termed as a deliberate act by
Myanmar as it had cognizance of the Act of 1974 implemented by Bangladesh. Then
again, the further declaration made by the Myanmar government to reiterate the same
act is seen as a gesture of threat and manifests transgression. A legal argument can be
drawn from the fact that the exact location of Daewoos exploration was to the east of
friendship line that Bangladesh put forward in 1975 as a possible boundary.
9

Although it is claimed as a possible boundary, in the absence of a legitimate
agreement, confusions arose as to the exact status of the EEZ for Bangladesh as it was
poorly defined in the Act of 1974. But considering the fact that three naval ships
escorted the respective drilling rig brings forth the notion that Myanmar was prepared
to protect the drilling rig from being ceased and detained by Bangladesh government,
at the occurrence of which Myanmar government would have been attributed under
international law for breach of international obligation i.e. liability for breach of
article 74 and 83 of ITLOS. Owing to the fact that the Act of 1974 was still in force
and bi-lateral negotiations were previously established within 1979-2005, Myanmars
attempt to employ a drilling rig for carrying out unlawful exploration is seen as
prejudiced to Bangladeshs right to equitable delimitation and a clear sign of
provocation, to the peril of Bangladesh.

2.3 Under the ITLOS Authority
The urgency to define its Maritime boundary and disappointing bilateral negotiations
led Bangladesh to submit its claims to Arbitral proceedings pursuant to articles 286
and 287 of UNCLOS and in accordance with the requirements of annex XV
(Arbitration). The letter of notification was duly communicated to Myanmar
government on 8 October, 2009. Immediately after notification, an antagonistic spark
ignited between the bordering states. Owing to the fact that both the parties could not

9
Jared Bissinger, The Maritime Boundary Dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar: Motivations,
Potential Solutions, and Implications, (Research Note), Asia policy, Number 10, July 2010,
<www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/Preview/AP10_D_Maritime_preview.pdf>, visited on 11
October, 2010.

9
reach a consensus on nominating the arbitrators to the Tribunal by mutual consent, a
case was logged into the ITLOS registry on the 14 December, 2009 and was entered
into the list of cases that very day (Case number 16). It is a fact that the mentioned
case is first of its kind to enter into the ITLOS registry and hence, exemplified the
broad jurisdiction of the Tribunal itself. The following table gives us an understanding
of important dates prior to the proceeding and the schedule as fixed by representatives
integral to the proceeding,

8 October, 2009 Notification of Arbitration proceedings
forwarded by Bangladesh.
4 November, 2009 Declaration by Myanmar of acceptance of
ITLOS jurisdiction
12 December, 2009 Declaration by Bangladesh of acceptance
of ITLOS jurisdiction.
13 December, 2009 Letter forwarded to the Tribunal referring
to declarations made by both parties.
14 December, 2009 (a)Filing of declarations in ITLOS
registry of declarations made by both
parties.
(b) Certified copy of notification
communicated to Myanmar.
25 and 26 January, 2010 Consultations held by president of the
Tribunal with representatives of both
countries regarding questions of
procedures.
1 July, 2010 Memorial submitted by Bangladesh.
1 December, 2010 Time-limit for filing counter-memorial by
Myanmar.
15 March, 2011 Time-limit for filing reply by Bangladesh
1 July, 2011 Time-limit for filing reply by Myanmar.

Source: http://www.itlos.org

10
With the respective case pending, Bangladesh has also left the option of bi-
lateral negotiations open in order to achieve an amicable settlement with the opposing
state. This is evident from the two rounds of talks in 2010, the first in which Myanmar
shifted from its obstinate position to equity and equidistance of resources and the
second one in which Myanmar itself proposed to a friendship line which is an
imaginary line down to St. Martins Island in the north-east part of the Bay.
10
The
Dhaka officials held that such a proposal was a deliberate excuse of wasting time to
bring forth a resolution by means of bi-lateral negotiations.
11
A more logical
explanation would be that, Myanmar is making effort to cover-up the showdown
immediately after the institution of arbitral proceedings by Bangladesh which was a
display of animosity and wreaked violation of international obligation. Not only has
Myanmar succeeded in having total disregard for domestic laws
12
but also portrayed
as being inconsistent in fulfilling international requirements
13
.

Chapter 3

3. Theory v. Reality: Implementing LOSC to Determine Validity of Maritime
Claims

3.1 Straight Baseline Determined
Proposal of a separate paragraph by Bangladesh as regards to delta and other natural
conditions to article 4(1) of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention appears in an
amalgamated form in article 7(2) of the LOSC which determines use of straight
baseline for concaved coastlines,
Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural conditions the
coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points may be selected along the furthest seaward
extent of the low-water line and, notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water line,
the straight baselines shall remain effective until changed by the coastal State in accordance
with this convention.
14



10
Rezaul Karim, Daily Star (Bangladesh): Dhaka readies for long legal battle, Burmanet news
Tuesday, 22 June 2010, < www.burmanet.org/news/2010/06/22/daily-star-bangladesh-dhaka-readies-
for-long-legal-battle-%E2%80%93-rezaul-karim/>, visited on 14 Oct 2010.
11
Ibid.
12
Act of 1974.
13
Not accepting to reach a bi-lateral negotiation or any other peaceful means prior to the proceeding
under article 279 of UNCLOS. (emphasis mine).
14
Kriangshak Kittichaisaree, Supra note 3, p. 30.
11
It is vibrant that the theory of delta advocated by Bangladesh is tailor made to
suit its purpose and that Bangladesh opted to implement this provision to meet
international standards and to bring harmony in the delimitation procedure. Prior to
the commencement of LOSC, Bangladesh declared its straight baselines on depth
criteria in a subsequent gazette notification of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1974.
15

The depth method does not fall within the purview of normal nor straight baseline
but corresponds to the latter in some aspects.
16
This declaration of the use of depth
method is not explicitly mentioned in article 7(2) of LOSC but is consistent with the
term other natural prolongation which establishes the validity of the use of straight
baselines. It is argued that Bangladesh can use the straight baseline approach by
selecting appropriate points along the furthest sea-ward extent of the low water line
and this must be done (a) to suit different conditions
17
and (b) with due regards to the
maritime boundary of the adjacent state. The judgment of Anglo-Norwegian fisheries
Case (1951) is considered to be a pioneer in this theory which ultimately achieved a
place in LOSC in a reshaped form. Then again, the judgment in Qatar vs. Bahrain
(1991) expresses the view that straight baseline is an exception to the normal rules
and can qualify if conditions are met i.e. if the coastline is deeply indented and cut
into or there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.
18

In practice Bangladesh has failed to get its baselines agreed upon by Myanmar but
is continuing its use of the sea zones upto 200 nm without any objection or hindrance.
Since the determination of baseline is the fundamental issue of maritime delimitation
without which the continuing regimes cannot be established, Bangladesh has
apparently drawn the line by the Act of 1974 and long-standing practice of exploiting
the living resources by the inhabitants of St. Martins Island.

3.2 Territorial Sea: An implicit Acceptance by Myanmar

15
Mohammed Nazmul Hoque (UN-The Nippon Foundation Fellow, 2005-2006), The Legal and
Scientific assessment of Bangladeshs Baseline in the Context of Article 76 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea,
<www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/hoque_0506_b
angladesh.pdf.>
16
S.M Masum Billah, Delimiting Sea Boundaries by Applying Equitable Principles, The Daily Star,
Law and our rights, Issue no: 140, 17 October 2009, < www.thedailystar.net/law/2009/10/03/>, visited
on 14 October 2010.
17
See LOSC article 14 which states that the coastal State may determine baselines in turn by any of the
methods provided for in the foregoing articles to suit different conditions.
18
See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 6
th
edition, (Cambridge University Press, United States of
America, 2008) p. 562.
12
Territorial sea has been claimed under section 3 (2)
19
of the Act of 1974. A
subsequent gazette notification
20
via Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this claim has been
developed to 12 nm from the baseline. However, Article 15 of LOSC infers that
where the coast of two states are opposite or adjacent to each other neither of those
opposite or adjacent states is entitled to extend their territorial sea beyond the median
line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. However, it is also stated that
historic title and other special circumstances can be an exception to the provision of
median line which leads to identify the conformity of the Act of 1974 with the LOSC.
The claim for a 12 nm territorial sea by Bangladesh is rational. In 1974, Bangladesh
and Myanmar signed the Agreed Minutes Between the Bangladesh Delegation and the
Burmese Delegation Regarding the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between
the Two Countries which is said to have delimited the maritime boundary in the
territorial sea guided by the Act of 1974.
21
Talks occurred sporadically between the
signatories and a communication gap seemed to exist resulting in non-ratification of
the agreement. But the non-ratification frustrations and dearth of bi-lateral
agreements did not act as an obstacle in the exploiting of straddling fish or other
natural resources within the territorial boundary. It seemed Myanmar had implicitly
accepted the 12 nm claim made by Bangladesh in the Act of 1974.

3.3 Exclusive Economic Zone: Point of friction
The subsequent notification made after the Act of 1974 specifies the 200 nm EEZ
asserted by Bangladesh.
22
In practice the EEZ is inadequately defined as they consist
of two parallel lines extending southward on the meridians of longitude, from

19
Act 0f 1974, section 3 (2) provides that, [w]here a single island, rock or a composite group thereof
constituting the part of the territory of Bangladesh is situated seawards from the main coast or baseline,
territorial waters shall extend to the limits declared by notification under sub-section (1) measured from
the low waterline along the coast of such island, rock or composite group.
20
Gazette notification by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. LT-1/3/74 (paragraph 2) states that, [t]he
limits of the sea referred to in paragraph 1 shall be 12 nautical miles measured seaward and the
baselines set out in paragraph 3 so that each point of the outer limit of the sea to the nearest point
inward on the baselines is twelve nautical miles.
21
Re: Delimitations of the Maritime Boundaries among Bangladesh, India and Myanmar in the Bay of
Bengal, Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 13 December 2009,
<www.itlos.org/case_documents/2009/document_en_317.pdf.>, visited on 14 October 2010.
22
Gazette notification by Ministry if Foreign Affairs, No. LT-1/3/74 (Final paragraph) states that, In
exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 5 of the Territorial Waters and Maritime
Zones Act, 1974 (Act no. 16 of 1974), the Government is pleased to declare that the Zone of the high
seas extending to 200 nautical miles measured from the baselines shall be the economic zone of
Bangladesh.
13
baselines corresponding to Bangladeshs coastline up to the outer limits of the
continental margin
23
. This reality has brought frictions as to the use of resources in
the EEZ between the adjacent countries whereas article 74 of LOSC announces an
equitable solution on the basis of agreements under International law. Although the
equidistant proposal was rejected by Bangladesh, Myanmars conduct was congruous
with what Bangladesh proposed as a friendship line which was considered an
honesty boundary, but the fact that no bi-lateral agreement was agreed upon by both
states paved the way for a confrontation in 2008 where Bangladesh with a view to
establishing sovereign rights interfered with drilling activities and Myanmar with the
same view threatened the interference as trespassing. Rest is assured; the claim for a
200 nm EEZ is previously established by the norms of International law and the Act
of 1974 maxims the chances of Bangladeshs rightful claim in the respective zone.

3.4 Extended Continental Shelf Claims: Justification of Natural Prolongation
Till date the extended Continental Shelf claim by Bangladesh remains the centre of
attention among the other territorial regimes that need International intervention. Two
important principles have been laid down in article 76
24
of LOSC, (a) the natural
prolongation of seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas to the outer edge of the
continental margin or (b) a distance of 200 nm from the baseline in cases where the
outer edge does not extend upto that distance.
Bangladesh has claimed a Continental Shelf till the last point of the
continental margin i.e. Bengal fan, which exceeds 200 nm. In such case it is entitled
to an additional 150 nm or more area beyond 200 nm of the extended Continental
Shelf of the central Bay of Bengal. The extended claims by Myanmar in the EEZ and
Continental Shelf is intersecting with Bangladesh and those additional claims have
made Bangladesh a zone locked state.
25
Moreover, Myanmars claim which denies
Bangladesh any portion of its extended Continental claim beyond 200 nm is

23
Re: Delimitations of the Maritime Boundaries among Bangladesh, India and Myanmar in the Bay of
Bengal, Supra note 21.
24
Article 76 of LOSC states, [t]he sea bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its
territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that
distance.
25
Sam bateman in Simon Roughneed, Burma, Bangladesh Border Buildup, 21 October 2009,
<www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/dark-side-of-natural-resources/oil-and-natural-gas-in-
conflict/48422.html>, visited on 16 October 2010.
14
inconsistent with H.-+ I,@ .-+*2/# J> of LOSC. Bangladesh has sent a diplomatic
protest note to the United Nations against the claims of Myanmar over the extended
continental shelf in the Bay of Bengal.
26
Myanmar and India made their submissions
to UN commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (referred to as CLCS
hereafter) on December 16, 2008 and May 11, 2009, where the extended demand falls
within Bangladeshs EEZ.
27
Bangladesh is preparing to submit its contentions of
broadening its Continental Shelf horizon to CLCS over 150 nm (277 kilometers) or
more area beyond 200 nm by July 27, 2011.
28
In the Continental Shelf Case
29
the
criteria of natural prolongation were examined and endorsed by the International
Court of Justice (referred to as ICJ hereafter) and an arbitral tribunal. Denmark and
Netherlands intended to delimit the prolongation of the shallow waters of North-Sea
to be effected on equidistance principle the implementation of which would unduly
curtail the share of Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of proportionality to the
length of its North-Sea concaved coastline. Then again, both Denmark and
Netherlands contended that the whole matter was governed by Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention of the Continental Shelf of 29 April, 1958, designated by them as being
equidistance-special circumstances.
30
In the opinion of the court article 6 of the
1958 convention represented the rule of binding customary International law on states
and that equidistance clearly could not be identified with the notion of natural
prolongation because it would frequently cause the areas of the territory of one state
to be attributed to the other.
31
The basic principles in the matter of delimitation were
derived by the Truman Proclamation (28 September, 1945) by the court, which infers
that the object of agreement between the states concerned must be in accordance with
equitable principles.
32
As may be observed, the principle of equity is germane to
claims where by reason of natural prolongation respective claims overlap and that rule
of law calls for an equitable solution as opposed to equidistance delimitation which
may lead to inequity and cut off a coastal state from its inherent right. The

26
Staff Correspondent, Dhaka protests at UN against Yangon claim, The Daily Star, 11 September
2009, <www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=105308>, visited on 16 October, 2009.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany v. Netherlands), 20 February 1969, ICJ, Advisory opinion.
30
Ibid., Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and orders of the International Court of Justice,
p.73, paras. 1-2, <www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/52/5563.pdf>, visited on 17 October 2010.
31
Ibid., p. 74, para. 4.
32
Ibid., p. 75, para. 4.
15
opportunity to review the scope of special circumstances and to consider its
relationship with equitable principles arose in The Anglo-French Continental Shelf
case (1977-78) where the Court of Arbitration was of the view that both features were
serving the same object.
33
Ultimately the Court of Arbitration was drawn to illuminate
the ICJ judgment that, There is no legal limit to the considerations which States may
take into account for the purpose of making sure that they apply equitable
procedures...., and made a significant contribution on the developing jurisprudence
on continental shelf by putting a moderate gloss on many of the dictums in the North
Sea cases.
34
In the Libya-Malta case
35
, Libya was of the view that natural
prolongation involving geographical as well as geological and geomorphologic
remains the fundamental basis to legal title of Continental Shelf areas. Malta had a
dissenting opinion and relied on spatial concept i.e. distance principle (article 76 of
LOSC) independent of all mentioned characteristics. The ICJ incurred that,
Neither is there any reason why a factor has no part to play in the establishment of title
should be taken into account as a relevant circumstance for the purposes of delimitation. It is true
that in the past the Court has recognised the relevance of geophysical characteristics of the area of
delimitation if they assist in identifying a line of separation between the continental shelves of the
parties.
36


Since the area of the Continental Shelf does not extend more than 200 miles
from the coast of the parties concerned, the principle of natural prolongation was
considered impertinent by the Court and finally the general configuration of the
coasts of the parties, their oppositeness, and their relationship to each other within the
general geographical context was taken in account.
37

Hence, it can be estimated that natural prolongation is a vital factor only in
overlapping continental shelf areas beyond 200 nm or the outer limits of the
continental shelf. However, much of the Continental Shelf of Bangladesh is the result
of silt deposits channeling through her and it is not considered to be steep as it runs in
a steady and gradual slope from the coast of Bangladesh which ultimately leads it to
be a natural prolongation in the southward direction.
38
This natural prolongation, in

33
E.D. Brown, The International Law of the Sea; Volume 1, Introductory Manual, Printed and Bound
by Hartnolls Limited, Published (1994) by Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited (England), p. 173,
paras. 1-3.
34
Ibid.
35
Continental Shelf (Libiyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Malta), ICJ reports, 1985, (Judgment of 3 June 1985).
36
Ibid., p. 26, para. 40.
37
Ibid., p. 48 [A(2), B(1)].
38
Barrister Harun ur Rashid, Law of Maritime Delimitation, The Daily Star, published on 10 May,
2008, < www.thedailystar.net/pf_story.php?nid=35825>, visited on 18 October, 2010
16
case of Bangladesh if calculated from the breadth of the territorial sea to the outer
edge of continental margin, exceeds 200 nm. The outer edge of the margin is
calculated with reference to the foot of the continental slope, this being the point
where the continental slope gives way to the continental rise.
39
From this point, a
state might either exercise jurisdiction for a further 60 nm seawards, or as far as a
point where the depth of the sedimentary rock overlying the Continental rise is more
than 1% of the distance of that point and is subject to on the two alternative
limitations: it cannot exceed 350 nm from the baseline, or more than 100 miles from a
point at which the depth of the water is 2,500 meters.
40
So, an extended claim by
means of natural prolongation on behalf of Bangladesh is self-explanatory and that
Bangladesh can also claim another 150 mile or more from the limit of the EEZ based
on the geo-physical characteristics of the extended Continental Shelf.
Although the International Courts and Tribunals seek to solve the conundrums
of claims brought forth by the contending parties via International legal apparatus, the
pressure dramatically increases when geographical features are complex in nature and
the parties are obstinate in their claims and do not intend to come to a common
platform. The broadened claims based on natural prolongation by both Bangladesh
and Myanmar is sui generis in nature, but in order to reach an unbiased settlement
the place of contradiction should be taken up for joint-development by both countries.
But any communications in this regard made by Bangladesh has been disregarded by
the Government of Myanmar.

Chapter 4

4. Incentives and Catalysts: Under Troubled Waters

4.1 Catalysts of Dispute
An issue that has been unattended by both disputing countries for approximately 3
decades, a swift and dramatic increase in assiduity draws a question as to why this
disputed territory has become a debated issue. From the November 2008 antagonistic
stand-off over Daewoos unlawful operation to Myanmars submission of the

39
Malcolm D Evans, International Law, 2
nd
Edition, 2006, Published by Oxford University Press
(U.S.A), p. 642, para. 3.
40
Ibid.
17
extended Continental Shelf and no further intention in drawing a conclusion to end
this rivalry by means of bi-lateral negotiation have highlighted its intriguing interest
in what remains under troubled waters. The presence of thick sequences of reservoir-
quality sandstones together with organic-rich shales including anticlinical structures
makes basins highly prospective for natural gas and hydrocarbon exploration.
41

Basins bearing oil, gas and mineral resources sometimes extend in areas of
overlapping claims and the Bengal Basin, a major part of which is occupied by
Bangladesh is reportedly abundant with straddling fish stocks and mineral resources
including Hydrocarbon. An increasing energy demand coupled with decreasing
energy supplies has raised the desperation to define the legal status of maritime
boundaries between Bangladesh and Myanmar. The claim for extended continental
shelf rises from the pursuit of prospective energy resources that remain hidden
beneath the troubled waters of Bengal Basin. Advances in offshore drilling
technologies have apparently fuelled the urgency in the action of both the countries.
The only sentiment that may echo from these contradicting claims is to delimit the
boundaries so that the oil and gas explorations may commence for each state without
any objections from the other. For the year 2009, Myanmar has confirmed reserves of
natural gas of 10 Trillion Cubic Feet (referred to as tcf hereafter) and ranked 36 in the
world.
42
On the other hand the confirmed reserves for Bangladesh for the same year
are 5 tcf and ranked 43 in the world.
43
The given table depicts that the proven
reserves of natural gas for Bangladesh is 50% less than that of Myanmar.
Proven Natural Gas Reserves in Bangladesh and Myanmar (2009) [Billion Cubic
Feet = bcf]
Country Production
(bcf)
Consumption
(bcf)
Net
Export/Imports
(bcf)
Proven
Reserves
(bcf)
World
Rank
Burma
(Myanmar)
438 136 302 10 36

41
M Badrul Imam; Hussain, M, A review of Hydrocarbon Habitats of Bangladesh, 2002, Volume 25,
Issue 1, Scientific Press Limited, Journal of Petroleum Geology (King Fahd University of Petroleum
and Minerals), p. summary,
<www.isi.kfupm.edu.sa/journals/pdf/A/a_review_of_hydrocarbon_habitats_in_bang_imam_isi_00017
3785100002.pdf>, visited on 23 October 2010.
42
Data appears in Proven Reserves, U.S Energy Information Administration,
<tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=BM>, visited on 23 October 2010.
43
Ibid., <tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=BG>, visited on 23 October, 2010.
18
Bangladesh 632 632 0 5 43

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
Although prospective gas reserves in the offshore area are difficult to assess,
United States Geological Survey has estimated the probability without disclosing as
to how the gas resources are allocated between both the countries.

4.2 Prospective Gas Reserves in Offshore Portions of Bangladesh:
With the exception of Daewoos exploration in 2008, no recent surveys or
seismographic work has been done leaving both countries uncertain about potential
energy resources.
44
However gas discoveries in proximate waters and a promising
geological make-up have led the governments to consider the clandestine gas reserves
explored to their benefits.
45
Evidence may be deduced from NEC-25 block in the
Bengal Basin which is approximately 300 km from the overlapping claims and holds
approximately 3-5 tcf.
46
Then again, the Dhirubhai fields as well as well as other
discoveries in the Indian deep-sea blocks D-4 and D-6 have drastically changed the
perspectives of International oil companies Significant regarding the Bay of Bengal.
47

Significant gas discoveries estimated around 5-6 tcf were made by Myanmar in A-1
and A-3 gas block in Rakhain coast, offshore from Myanmar town of Sittwe and
100 km from the Teknaf coast of Bangladesh.
48
China has proposed to construct a
pipeline from A-1 and A-3 gas fields in the Bay of Bengal to the Chinese borders and
signed contracts with Myanmar to explore oil and gas in three blocks which is a
distance of 900 Kilometres (referred to as km hereafter).
49
Not so much exploration
work has been undertaken on the five offshore blocks by Bangladesh except
discovery of Sangu gas field with about .848 tcf of recoverable gas. Although
prospective gas reserves in the offshore area are difficult to assess, United States
Geological Survey has estimated the probability without disclosing as to how the gas
resources are allocated between both the countries. The probability (95%) of
prospective offshore gas reserves for Bangladesh is 4,776 tcf while the the number for

44
Supra note 9. p. 113.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid., p. 114.
47
Ibid., p. 114.
48
Khurshed Alam, Maritime Boundary Dispute and Oil and Gas Exploration in the Bay of Bengal, The
Daily Star, 2 August 2008, < www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=48489>, visited on 24 October 2010.
49
Ibid.
19
Myanmar is 3,883 tcf.
50
With minimum proven gas reserves and an augmenting
economic growth of Bangladesh, deep-sea exploration and gas reserves in offshore
portions has added a new dimension in alternative gas supply.
The startling point to be noted here is that these respective offshore blocks
declared by Myanmar overlaps our claimed boundary in the EEZ and surveys
commenced by Bangladesh in this area was previously inhibited by Myanmar
Government. Moreover, in a transitional period of gas shortage Bangladesh requested
Myanmar for importing gas from the off-shore gas blocks to which Myanmar
appeared to have regretted with the excuse that Myanmar was already committed in
supplying gas to India and China although the pipeline for importing gas to
Bangladesh would have been shorter compared to India and China.
51
On 7 May 2008,
in Bangladesh, seven oil and gas companies submitted their bids for 15 offshore
bocks, but due to vehement opposition from neighbouring countries including
Myanmar this bidding was postponed.
52
Over the years none of the major
International Oil Companies (referred to as IOC hereafter) such as, Chevron, Exxon-
Mobil, Shell have responded to Bangladeshs bid in developing minerals in the off-
shore blocks. A significant reason for postponing the bid is that IOCs seek a
certainty of legal rights for gas extraction and mineral resource development in
maritime zones they wish to explore and in view of the explorations conducted by
Myanmar it has become imperious for Bangladesh to do the same to strengthen her
claims over the disputed territories.

4.3 Sustainable Energy Development v. Foreign Exchange
As Sean Turnell
53
once stated that as regards to Bangladesh, its all about getting a
source of cheap and reliable energy so as to power its developing industrialization
amd for Myanmars regime, on the other hand, the motivation is to sell the gas.
54
For
Bangladesh, the odyssey of natural gas production began in 1960 and three decades
into independence, natural gas is its significant source of commercial energy. Energy,

50
Supra note 9, USGS, Bangladesh: Assessment Results Summary-Allocated Resources; and USGS,
Burma: Assessment Results Summary-Allocated Resources.
51
Ibid.
52
Staff Correspondent, Sea Border Talks Start Today, The Daily Star, 15 September 2009,
<http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=54877>, visited on 25 October 2010.
53
A Myanmar expert and Economist at Macquarie University, Australia
54
See Maritime Dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar, Narinjara News, 18 July 2010,
<http://www.shwe.org/archives/maritime-dispute-between-bangladesh-and-myanmar/>, visited on 25
October 2010.
20
to be more precise electricity is a pre-requisite for industrial development and it is a
fact that Bangladesh has never enjoyed 100% electrification. The national
Government is finding it hard to address these issues because the current gas wells are
already running at full capacity. More than 80% of natural gas are developed by
foreign energy companies and subsidiary companies and are allocated in satisfying
the growing domestic needs for electricity. The resultant growth of electricity demand
has largely been met by domestic natural gas resources which generates 85% of the
countrys electricity.
55
As the older fields of these domestic natural gas resources
become exhausted, the incentives to exploit more technically challenged resources
have paved its way. But if the maritime boundaries are properly defined, the just
and equitable delimitation will ensure Bangladesh with abundant supply of natural
gas. Since Bangladesh is acquainted with Sustainable Energy Development and
Renewable Energy Projects, viable approaches need to be amplified and a
transparent strategy needs to be formulated to preserve and transform these future
abundant supplies into renewable energy and ultimately pave the way for
sustainable energy development (See Flowchart).

Increasing Demand of Natural Gas

Present Natural Gas Reserves Being Drained from Over Usage

Need For Energy Security

Incentives to Exploit Technically Challenged Resources

Extracting Natural Gas from Offshore Blocks

Transforming Natural Gas into Renewable Energy

Enhancement of Energy Security

Sustainable Energy Development

Flowchart: Towards Sustainable Energy Development


55
Supra note 9. p. 117.
21
On the other hand, Myanmars need for natural gas is seen as a major
foreign currency lifeline of the government. Over the last couple of years 10%-15%
of Yadana and Yetagun fields served the domestic purpose and as more power
production comes online from Shwe and Zawtika fields, even less gas is planned
for use in power generation.
56
According to Myanmar Government electricity
generation will drop from 39.8% in 2005 to 4.3% of total production in 2030 due to
the fact that large hydropower projects are being undertaken.
57
Hence, it is quite clear
that any new development of natural gas or mineral reserves in offshore regions will
exclusively be used in export purpose and diversify the destinations of gas exports.
Then again, the sales of natural gas to Thailand makes up almost the entirety of
Myanmars natural gas exports (See Income from Burmas Natural Gas Exports)
leaving the remaining earnings to add to an economy that has already plateaud to a
developed platform.

Income from Burmas Natural Gas Exports
58

Fiscal Year Income (Billion Dollars)
2007-2008 2.53
2008-2009 2.38
2009-2010 (first five months) 1.2 +

4.4 What if?
With a case hanging in the balance with ITLOS, there are two sides to be considered
by Bangladesh, (a) if the pleaded equitable claims are adjudicated, (b) if the
adjudication is made on the principles of equidistance. With regards to the first
possibility, it can be assumed that the war will not be over even if Bangladesh wins.
The Government of Bangladesh has to rise to the occasion to invite bids all over
again where it has to consider the pros and cons of every agreement entered into with
IOCs for its own benefit, which may be time consuming and not be able to meet the
increasing demand at the right time. Time is a luxury that the Government cannot
afford owing to the fact that there are chances that the delimited territories (after

56
Supra note 9. p. 123, para. 2.
57
Ibid.
58
See Burmas August gas exports to Thailand earn 588 million dollar, Democracy for Burma,
<http://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2009/11/17/burmas-august-gas-eports-to-thailand-earn-
588-million-dollars/>, visited on 26 October 2010.
22
adjudication) may be unattended by the Government for years to come. Previous
actions of the Government brings forth the notion that, it failed miserably to amend
the Act of 1974 for the last two decades, after the LOSC came into force in 1982.
Then again, there were opportunities to claim the extended continental shelf from
1982 till 2005, before Myanmar approached the CLCS for extended claims.
Moreover, the Government must bear in mind that the natural gas extracted from the
sea-bed must be used to address the prevailing energy-crisis and if imported, the
money should be utilised in developing Sustainable Energy Projects. Equitable
delimitation just might be the answer taking into account proper time-management,
proper usage of the exploited natural gas, and development of energy sectors and last
but not least to expand and modernise the Renewable Energy Projects.
The other side of the coin lets us investigate some of the tribulations Bangladesh may
undergo. The existing gas reserves of Bangladesh can support domestic demands for
the next 50 years. Although it is believed that Bangladesh is financially incapable of
importing gas, no further statements have been given by the Government as to
alternative sources of energy if for any case the domestic gas wells run dry. Then
again, if Myanmar enacts the same 50 km restriction around the overlapping claims
as it did around the Shwe fields then the consequences could be devastating for
livelihood of the Bangladeshi coastal fishermen.
59
Less employment in the coastal
areas of Bangladesh could lead to more refugees and increased vulnerability among
the Muslim Rohingya could foster a more fertile recruiting ground for transitional
Islamic groups that span the Bangladesh-Myanmar border
60
. Moreover, Bangladesh
would have to improve her diplomatic relations with Myanmar and plead to sign a
Memorandum of Understanding (referred to as MOU hereafter) so that it can jointly
develop any blocks given by Myanmar and only then extract the natural gas required
to satisfy domestic needs. But in view of the previous failed attempts by Bangladesh
to reach a bi-lateral agreement may not shed light on joint-development and even if
Myanmar shows signs of sympathy towards Bangladesh and establishes a MOU, it
cannot be estimated as to what conditions Myanmar may impose on Bangladesh in
return of the approval given to develop blocks within its territory. Only time can tell
what lies in the wake of this so-called developing third-world country.


59
Supra note 9. p. 139.
60
Ibid.
23
Conclusion

(a) Any act in the disputed zone that takes place without the knowledge of the
opposite state may not be supported under International Law. Since the 1974 Agreed
Minutes Between Bangladesh Delegation and Burmese Delegation regarding the
Delimitation of Maritime Boundary were neither ratified, nor domestically enforced,
Myanmar may establish the alibi that the exploration took place within their
respective boundary. As previously stated, the frustration arose from the lack of a
geographical definition of maritime borders. In order to prove the illegality of
Myanmars contentions, Bangladesh may have to resort to the intimidating messages
conveyed from the Myanmar Naval ships. Hence, a proper analysis of the facts of the
incident coupled with the transmitted messages concretely establishes the fact that
engaging Daewoo to carry out a drilling operation (on 1 November, 2008) in the
disputed waters was an illegal act rendering Myanmar responsible for breach of
International obligation. (b) By applying the apparatus of LOSC, it is quite clear that
Bangladesh can claim a Continental Shelf to the outer edge of the Continental
Margin. Since the Continental Shelf itself is a natural prolongation, an extended claim
of 150 nm is held to be valid under International Law, but in order to place any claim
before CLCS, Bangladesh needs to adduce proper documents and survey reports to
establish the claim as required by CLCS. Considering the paradigm of landmark
judgments prior to and after LOSC, it is easily apprehended that the extended claim of
Continental Shelf is valid and a justified claim under the doctrine of International
Law. (c) Equitable delimitation may in a certain way fill in the gaps of the existing
energy crisis of Bangladesh. With the equitable share of the sea-bed, Bangladesh
can extract the necessary resources but if careful considerations are not given to
developing the sustainable energy projects, then the gaps may widen and place the
energy crisis in a degrading position in the long run. (d) If the final judgment
corresponds to equidistance delimitation, Bangladesh will have to explore the given
territories and utilize the full potential that certain territory has to offer. It can be
assumed that, sharpening the diplomatic strategies and approaches may bring
flexibility among the states for a joint-development project. From a legal
justification, Bangladesh seems to hold a strong case in its support, and maybe one
day this continuous combat may cease and the resources under troubled waters may
be the answer to the ongoing energy crisis.
24
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