Obama, Mitchell, Israel, and What Lies Ahead INSS Insight No.

91, January 27,

2009
Bart, Roni

President Barack Obama holds a balanced stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and his
appointment of former senator George Mitchell as special envoy for peace in the Middle East
reflects this. Still, the stance and the envoy are expected to challenge Israel in a way that might
cast a pall on the relationship between the two nations.

Obama shares the American consensus that America is committed to Israel – its
existence, right to security and self-defense, and prosperity – based on the Judeo-Christian
Biblical heritage, the democratic values of the two countries, and common strategic interests.
He supports the two-state solution, is committed to making every effort to promote peace in the
region, and already on the second day in office again excluded Hamas as a partner for dialogue
as long as it fails to meet the well known conditions laid down by the international community.

Nonetheless, beyond these basic views, the president presents a balanced position that
stands out on the American political scene by virtue of its evenhandedness. Obama promised
that his administration would help “Israelis to identify and strengthen those partners who are
truly committed to peace,” a diplomatic formulation for the notion of applying pressure. Indeed,
when before his election the president spoke of concrete steps, he specified only demands of
Israel regarding the roadblocks and the settlements. He did not mention any demands of the
Palestinians, such as fighting terrorism or legislative reforms. He also has often stressed
“Palestinian suffering,” demonstrating a definite sensitivity for this issue. Thus, one of the
changes the new president brings is a new balance between Israel’s security needs and its right
to self-defense on the one hand, and the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians and their right
to freedom on the other.

Mitchell’s appointment reflects this posture. First, Mitchell, former Democratic Senate
majority leader, is a man of significant political stature as well as of international standing (as
successful mediator in the Northern Ireland conflict), a standing more distinguished than that of
professional diplomats such as Dennis Ross and others. He therefore stands to enjoy greater
freedom of action while his superiors are busy with other international issues. Mitchell is very
highly regarded as having played a critical role in attaining the Good Friday Agreement in April
1998 thanks to his commitment, patience, energy, and deep understanding of the situation.
Second, because his appointment came just two days after Obama’s inauguration and he was
immediately dispatched to the Middle East, Obama is keeping his promise to be actively
involved in the conflict early in his term. Third, it has surely not escaped the president, who
referred directly to “the Muslim world” in his inauguration speech, that an Arab-American (as
Mitchell defines himself because of his Lebanese Marronite mother) is assuming a role in the
diplomatic process that was hitherto largely filled by Jewish Americans. And fourth, Mitchell
proved to be impeccably balanced when he headed the 2000-2001 international committee
investigating the outbreak of the second intifada. In the famous Mitchell Report, he divided the
responsibility equally between the two sides, and invented ex nihilo the connection between a
Palestinian struggle against terrorism and an Israeli freeze on the settlements. (In the Oslo
accords, the Palestinian obligation to combat terrorism is explicitly mentioned, but there is no
hint of an Israeli commitment of any sort regarding the settlements.) From the Palestinian and
Arab world’s point of view – so far so good.

When he was appointed, Mitchell declared, not for the first time, that “there is no conflict
that cannot be ended.” This statement is reminiscent of Kissinger’s critical analysis that
American foreign policy is characterized by a pragmatic-legalistic approach, as if all problems
could be solved if only people sat down and talked about them, as if there are no irresolvable
problems or at least irresolvable according to an American timetable and/or in an American
style. In this context, it is worth remembering that the leading trio – Obama, Clinton, and Mitchell
– are all jurists. In any case, Mitchell sees not inconsiderable similarity between the conflict in
Northern Ireland and the Israeli-Palestinian one. Therefore, it stands to reason that the main
lessons he learned from Ireland, as he documented in 2007, point to his expected direction:
building trust before taking ambitious steps through mutual, simultaneous efforts; public finger-
pointing for not meeting the challenges, and sanctions in response to unacceptable regressions;
improving the texture of civilian-economic life critical to the success of the peace process; and
including violent groups in the process, even at the cost of slowing it down, in order to increase
legitimacy and support. On the basis of his record and the administration's professed urgency, it
seems possible to sketch an initial outline of America’s coming conduct with regard to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In the coming two months, Mitchell will focus on Gaza because of its immediacy and the
need to wait for a new Israeli government to form. President Obama spoke of the need to
reopen the Gaza crossings and rehabilitate the area, albeit not with Hamas but with the
Palestinian Authority and under European supervision. Nonetheless, even if Hamas does agree
to the PA’s involvement, it will not agree to complete self-neutralization. A joint crossings
agreement between Hamas and the PA on its own, let alone as a precursor to or part of the
establishment of a unity government, will create a problem for the Obama administration in
terms of disqualifying the organization as a legitimate partner to the process. As even the Bush
administration more than tacitly accepted the inclusion of Hizbollah in the Lebanese government
(as a partner with veto rights, no less), it is hard to believe that the dialogue-seeking Obama
administration will not find a way to ignore and/or bypass the policy of ostracism.

Assuming that at some point the sides will return to the Annapolis framework, one may
expect two innovations. In the immediate day-to-day track of the obligations included in the first
stage of the Roadmap (itself based to a large extent on the Mitchell Report), the administration
will strive to create a mechanism to supervise the fulfillment of these commitments. Even
without such a mechanism, it is very possible that Obama will show less patience than showed
by his predecessor for Israeli foot-dragging on the settlements, outposts, and crossings, and
less patience than he may show for Palestinian foot-dragging on its combating terrorism and
instituting governmental reforms. Regarding negotiations over a permanent settlement, the
president’s sense of urgency and the envoy's Irish experience will make themselves felt. There
will be no more Bush- and Rice-like waiting for the sides to inch forward. In presenting its own
mediation proposals, the United States will likely prefer the Carter model and not the later
Clinton one. In terms of contents, the starting point for American stances will likely be the
Clinton parameters from late 2000. All of this is in keeping with the president’s vow two days
after his inauguration of “active and aggressive involvement.”

Flexibility towards Hamas in order to rehabilitate Gaza and maybe even to allow Abu
Mazen joint governing; concrete strict demands regarding Israel’s conduct in the West Bank;
partial or full adoption of the Arab initiative in which the president sees “constructive elements”;
and insistent involvement in negotiations over the permanent settlement – none of these will be
to the liking of any Israeli government, not even a Kadima-headed center-left government that
includes at least one right-wing party. A delicate American attempt to affect the composition of
the next government is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. Diplomatic courtesy, especially
between two nations as close to one another as Israel and the United States, demands that
America wait until the democratic process in Israel is fully completed. However, if the figure
forming the government has the option of choosing between a relatively hawkish composition
and a relatively dovish one, the administration could conceivably leak something about its
initiatives in order to hint that a hawkish government might have a problem with Israel’s ally.
Therefore, we may expect cloudy to stormy weather – depending on the outcome of the Israeli
elections – in the relations between Israel and the United States.