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INSS Insight
No. 76, October 28, 2008
Shalom, Zaki
A lively discussion has developed recently concerning the IDF's new response policy in
the event of a renewed confrontation with Hizbollah. An article in Haaretz by Amos
Harel; an interview given by GOC Northern Command Gadi Eizencout to Yediot
Ahronot; the INSS Insight of early October by Gabriel Siboni; and a forthcoming piece
in Strategic Assessment by Giora Eiland are among the recent forums for this debate.
Maj. Gen. Eizencout called the IDF's new response policy vis-à-vis Hizbollah
the "Dahiyah doctrine": "What happened to the Dahiyah neighborhood of Beirut in
2006 will happen to each village from which Israel is fired on. We will apply
disproportionate force and inflict huge damage and destruction. In our mind, these are
not civilian villages but army bases…the next war must be decided quickly,
aggressively, and without seeking international approval…Hizbollah understands very
well that firing from villages will lead to their destruction." Gen. Eizencout explained
that during the Second Lebanon War, the IDF attempted to prevent massive missile fire
directed at Israel mainly through an effort to attack the missiles and their launchers in
pinpoint fashion. From now on, he clarified, the policy will be different. "This won't be
another 'launcher hunt' – that's total nonsense. When the other side has thousands of
missiles and rockets, you don't have the option of hunting them. You might see one or
two impressive operations, but the home front will get hit."
This is indeed a new policy of exercising force against Hizbollah, different from
the policy implemented during the Second Lebanon War. Apparently the goals of the
policy and the publicity surrounding it are to amplify Israeli deterrence and dissuade
Hizbollah from escalating operations and reigniting the fire in the north. The policy's
success depends on the assessment formed among Hizbollah leaders concerning the
policy's credibility and Israel's determination to actually exercise it.
In this context, it is important to examine the new policy and its intrinsic risks
from Israel's viewpoint. The policy is unequivocal with respect to the nature of an IDF
response to a provocative action on the part of Hizbollah. In contrast, it contains a
discernable vagueness as to the circumstances under which the policy would be
activated. In essence, it does not provide a clear answer to the following questions:
These and other questions have no clear answer. Hizbollah can assume that the
new response policy relates solely to scenarios resembling those of July-August 2006,
namely: a comprehensive military conflict in which Hizbollah levels massive missile
fire at northern border settlements and cities such as Nahariya, Acre, Haifa, Afula, and
Hadera.
Even in extreme circumstances such as this, Hizbollah can assume that Israel
would seriously hesitate before implementing such a policy of force against Hizbollah
and civilian villages as implied by the principles of the new policy. Certain arguments
and past examples are likely to lead Hizbollah to the conclusion that Israel would
abstain from implementing the new response policy:
Hizbollah may likely conclude that in the final analysis, Israel will avoid implementing
the new policy of response being trumpeted today. If so, Hizbollah is liable to test
Israel's credibility and determination through a varied assortment of scenarios. As such,
proclamations of a new response policy carry with them no small risk. If there is no
unequivocal resolve to realize this policy - which seems highly likely – the result may
well be the erosion rather than strengthening of Israel's deterrent capability.