TT5 Edward Nickell 1

Why was the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) unable to maintain

itself?
Organisms must be best adapted to compete and survive in their ecological niche. A
constitution faces the same survival requirements in a given political niche. A constitution that
ceases to be the best suited to a nation will either adapt like the peppered moth or it will go the
way of the dodo. When France emerged from World War II it was a changed nation, yet the
hastily adopted form of the 4
th
Republic had few differences from the 3
rd
republic. The
atmosphere in liberation France was also a peculiar one that would not last, France would have
been a rapidly changing niche for any political system. The 4
th
Republic could not survive the
new hazards of French foreign policy and could not compete against the ideas of De Gaulle.
Looked at in this way the demise of the 4
th
Republic can be seen in three steps. Firstly, that it
was the French political scene in 1946 that shaped the republic. Secondly, France changed
greatly and was faced with new challenges during the course of the 4
th
republic. Finally, the 4
th

republic failed to adapt to these changes and was unable to maintain itself.
Emerging from the war France was still coming to terms with some of its less desirable
legacy. The experience of a strong authoritarian leader Marshall Petain gave the public good
reason to be wary of giving any leader in the 4
th
republic such influence. Even the clearest leader
available, De Gaulle, could not be placed in such a position as many element of the governance of
France, including the military, were still composed of those who had played minor roles in the
Vichy regime. To elect De Gaulle as leader would be intensely uncomfortable for the half of the
country that was unsure if it was morally responsible for anti-Semitism that had occurred
within its borders. With the authority that being on the winning side had given him, perhaps it
was inevitable that De Gaulle would become a strong leader and form the next long lasting
republic. If this is the case, the 4
th
republic may have been a mere delay in this happening, a
delay caused by the questions left over from the Vichy regime.
The resistance during Frances occupation remained heavily divided between the internal
socialist and communist resistance and the external resistance lead by De Gaulle. Three
different views for the 4
th
Republic emerged. The MRP wanted a 4
th
Republic that was largely
similar to the 3
rd
Republic, while the Communists and Socialists wanted a stronger assembly to
express the general will and in the hope of bringing about communism through legal means. De
Gaulle on the other hand was hoping for a strong presidency in the 4
th
Republic. With no clear
liberator there was also no clear path for a new France. The first attempt at a constitution and
the only real alternative to De Gaulle was made by the Socialists but rejected by the public. The
second attempt which was much closer to the goals of the MRP was approved, but only by 9
million votes for to 8 million against. Taking into account that 8.5 million voters abstained,
Hanley looks right in claiming the 4
th
Republic was born with only grudging approval. Settling
for neither of the two visions for France meant arriving at a bland compromise that was a
continuation of the 3
rd
Republic. This bland compromise was also a success in avoiding
authoritarianism, especially as until 1947 the PCF, Socialists and MRP were all involved in the
rebuilding of France.
Liberation France was filled with optimism. This is reflected in the growth the economy
and population saw after the war. Another effect of this optimism was that the French expected
to return to their international status as a world power, even after their humiliating defeat.
There was an ambitious streak in post war France. This need for status would turn out to be
TT5 Edward Nickell 2
unhealthy, especially during a period of time when European powers including Britain and
France were going to have to accept the process of decolonisation and independence. The 3
rd

Republic deliberately avoided another Petain, but forgot that it was only Petain after all who
managed to negotiate an armistice that allowed France to keep control of its empire. The 3
rd

Republic did not deal with the fact that for most of the world there was a perceived link
between government instability and weakness. The instability of the 3
rd
Republic was even
blamed for the occupation, as the lack of a decisive leader in France was a factor at key points
such as the remilitarisation of the Rhineland.
France was already in a weakened position in protecting its foreign policy interests. There
were tensions in the army left from what Horne calls all the rancour and divisions in the after
math of the war and Vichy Armistice Army. The inconsistent appointment of Resistance and
Vichy personalities to positions of high authority did not help. Horne points out another more
worrying factor, in that there was, a fresh sense of isolation from the nation. This isolation
could explain why at the end of the 3
rd
Republic there were many issues with orders being
disobeyed or contradictory orders being given, particularly in the conflict in Algeria.
France suffered several blows to status during the 3
rd
Republic. The war in Vietnam cost
more than what France received in Marshall aid and led to 75,000 casualties. After the war the
Army had fallen in numbers from 1.2 million to 490,000 and it would take until 1957 for
numbers to reach the initial levels again. Mitterand had decided that Vietnam and resistance to
Communism was part of la gloire and that the French must maintain heir presence as a
bastion of Western civilisation. This desire to maintain international status extended to the
army and the politicians of France more than it did to the public, as by May of 1953 65% of the
public in opinion polls wanted the war over but French deputies were keen to continue.
The new sale guerre form of conflict led the army to adopt new tactics. In its isolation
from the political strategies of Paris, the army began to engage in its own psychological warfare
and political intervention. This was seen again when the Army referred to the FLN in Algeria as
the viets and justified use of torture in 1957 as necessary in the fight against communism. The
development of political strategy in the army contributed to the militarys final plans to become
involved in Paris and the need for the 4
th
Republic to be dissolved and De Gaulle brought in. The
new desperation meant that deputies permitted this happening, whereas they had undermined
and removed earlier stronger leaders such as Mendes-France when they attempted to take bold
foreign policy steps. The fact that personalities such as Mendes-France had begun to emerge
were already an indicator that foreign policy issues were increasingly the main priority in
France. Over time the desire to protect Frances status grew whilst the fear of authoritarianism
faded. The 4
th
Republic could not compete with De Gaulle in satisfying these changed desires.
The 4
th
Republic could also have been aimed to move France to something similar to the
strong cabinet system of Britain. This is clearly an appealing solution to the wary but optimistic
environment outlined above, as it would provide the strong leadership needed for empire
without leading to authoritarianism. Unfortunately this would turn out to be a means as
unachievable as its ends. To start with, Britain is just too different a niche for our cabinet
organism to survive on the other side of the channel. France lacks a stable and apolitical
monarchy, France has many parties rather than a two party or even three party system, the
Catholic church retains influence in France even after the anti-clericalism of the 3
rd
Republic,
France was dealing with the legacy of occupation which Britain had avoided and France did not
TT5 Edward Nickell 3
have a continuation of its right wing political parties through the war as Britain did. France
arguably had a culture of incivisme that did not exist in Britain, in which atomised political
encourages local loyalties and prevents the co-operation that exists between different levels of
government in Britain. This incivisme exists because although it creates weak government, it is
an excellent form of defence against both foreign occupiers and against authoritarianism.
During the 3
rd
Republic the local press often published only within one region or certain
departments, it was able to remain independent of the national media. From the end of the war
onwards this localised power was in decline. The population of France also changed from being
majority rural to being majority urban during the 4
th
Republic, the incivisme culture that the 4
th

Republic was adapted to account for was in decline during those years. Setting asides those
differences, France retains a tightly centralised system, making it more vulnerable to the
progression from strong government to authoritarianism than Britain would be. The division
between Labour and the Conservatives in Britain is of a different nature to the difference
between the Communists and the right in France. In Britain, the parties are arguing over
technicalities within the same generally accepted moderate liberal system. In France, the PCF is
advocating a move outside of that system entirely. As Pickles summarises, the British system
presupposes we are already so agreed that we can afford to Bicker.
The environment of post-liberation France consisted of two irreconcilable desires, to
avoid strong leaders and a return to authoritarianism, and to maintain Frances international
status and empire, or la gloire. To survive these desires in the short term, the 4
th
Republic
needed to move towards a system of strong government that did not depend upon leadership of
personality. Though this worked in the short term, it could not be maintained in the long term
because of the deeper cultural environment of France.
The events of Vietnam and then Algeria made foreign policy a greater issue than a fear of
authoritarianism. This change in the desires of the French was the main change in the
environment that the 4
th
Republic had to survive in. However it is not alone in changes during
the time period that could have placed strain upon the republic. During the 4
th
Republic there
was a vast increase in legislative business and government involvement in French life. After the
Great War the assembly would have 168 sittings in a session, even at the start of the 4
th
republic
there were only 218 sittings in a session. In its 1950-51 session, the assembly had 343 sittings.
Despite the increase is legislative business, there was no change made to the political
institutions to accommodate this.
The fact that the political environment in France changed in a way that lead to the
abandonment of the 4
th
Republic is not necessarily a reason to brand it as a failure. In many
cases, the 4
th
Republic was a response to needs such as avoiding authoritarianism and through it
communism, or the need for a government that would not stifle economic recovery through
dirigisme. However having achieved these goals, the needs of France would have moved on and
the 4
th
republic would no longer be addressing the new needs.
Organisms must be best adapted to compete and survive in their ecological niche. A
constitution faces the same survival requirements in a given political niche. A constitution that
ceases to be the best suited to a nation will either adapt like the peppered moth or it will go the
way of the dodo. When France emerged from World War II it was a changed nation, yet the
hastily adopted form of the 4
th
Republic had few differences from the 3
rd
republic. The
atmosphere in liberation France was also a peculiar one that would not last, France would have
TT5 Edward Nickell 4
been a rapidly changing niche for any political system. The 4
th
Republic could not survive the
new hazards of French foreign policy and could not compete against the ideas of De Gaulle.
Looked at in this way the demise of the 4
th
Republic can be seen in three steps. Firstly, that it
was the French political scene in 1946 that shaped the republic. Secondly, France changed
greatly and was faced with new challenges during the course of the 4
th
republic. Finally, the 4
th

republic failed to adapt to these changes and was unable to maintain itself.
The political environment of France at the end of the war featured divisions between the
resistance and Vichy legacies and divisions within the resistance legacies, the 4
th
Republic was
adapted not follow any direction so clearly as to alienate the others. The political atmosphere in
France had the irreconcilable waryness of authoritarianism and optimism for its international
status. The 4
th
republic was adapted to attempt in the face of this impossibility to achieve both
goals. The political environment more generally after the war was that nations were vulnerable
to the domination of personalities, especially in the form of their liberators. This domination
would give rise to a centralised strong authoritarian power, which could then be hijacked by the
forces of communism. The 4
th
Republic was adapted to allow the communists involvement in
the reconstruction of France but to limit their means to enforce dramatic change. However
towards the end of the 4
th
Republic, the waryness became a less significant part of the landscape
of France, whilst the vulnerability of France in its foreign policy became a great concern, the 4
th

Republic was not adapted to this, but De Gaulle was. As a new political organism, the 5
th

Republic and the ideas behind it would out compete the 4
th
Republic, leading to the end of the
latter.