MontG(!)McB ESA 1ACv2.

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Endangered Species Act 1AC (v2.1)

Letter to Senator James Inhofe, signed by Senator Malcolm Wallop, David A. Ridenour [Vice President, National
Center for Public Policy Research], Hon. Edwin Meese, III [Former U.S. Attorney General], Hon. Don Hodel
[Former U.S. Sec. of Interior & Energy] and 85 major national and state policy organizations, February 27, 2006
[http://www.nationalcenter.org/ESAPropertyRights022706.pdf] [Brackets added for clarity]
[The Endangered Species Act] has failed miserably in its
“As you know, the ESA
stated purpose: Recovering threatened and endangered species. In the
three-decade history of the Act, less than one percent of the species listed as
either endangered or threatened have recovered.
Failure comes at a steep price under the ESA. Not only have species
populations suffered, but the Act has cost billions of dollars and deprived
landowners of the use of their land and, often, their savings.
The Endangered Species Act has failed not because it isn’t strong enough,
expansive enough, or funded enough, but because its incentives are wrong.”

My partner and I agree with the Vice President of the National Center for Public Policy
Research, that the Endangered Species Act provides citizens with the wrong incentives. Today
we will be proposing a reform to reverse the incentives under the Endangered Species Act, and
thus we stand resolved: that the United States Federal Government should significantly reform
its environmental policy.

To start us off today, we’ll define the Resolution in

OBSERVATION 1: Definitions

All definition sources are available upon request.

Significant: sufficiently great or important to be worthy of attention. New Oxford American

Dictionary, 2nd Edition

Reform: “To change to a better state, form, etc.; improve by alteration, substitution, abolition,
etc.” 2009 Random House Dictionary

Environmental Policy: the official rules or regulations concerning the environment adopted,
implemented, and enforced by some governmental agency. “Environmental Science: A Global
Concern”, 7th Edition authored by: William P. Cunningham, University of Minnesota, Mary
Ann Cunningham, Vassar College, and Barbara Woodworth Saigo, St. Cloud State University.

Endangered Species Act: [A] “US law passed in 1973 to protect critically imperiled species
from extinction due to "the consequences of economic growth and development untempered by
adequate concern and conservation"” http://www.pbs.org/kqed/oceanadventures/glossary/

Now let’s look at an important fact about the Endangered Species Act in

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OBSERVATION 2: Background

The Endangered Species Act, or ESA, uses restrictions and penalties to control how the owners
of land that is inhabited by a protected species use their land. You can flow this first point as

1. ESA uses restrictions

Jonathan H. Adler [Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law &
Regulation at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law], “Perverse Incentives and the Endangered
Species Act,” RFF Weekly Policy Commentary, 4 August 2008 [brackets added for clarity]
[http://www.rff.org/Publications/WPC/Pages/08_08_04_Adler_Endangered_Species.aspx]
In the most basic terms, the ESA discourages the creation and maintenance of species habitat on private land by
penalizing it. Specifically, under Section 9 of the [Endangered Species] act, it is illegal for a
private landowner to engage in activities that could harm an endangered species, including
habitat modification, without first obtaining a federal permit. Knowing violations can lead to fines
of up to $25,000 and even jail time.

Such regulations can reduce private land values and antagonize private landowners who might otherwise
cooperate with conservation efforts. This is because Section 9 turns endangered species into
economic liabilities. The discovery of an endangered species on private land imposes costs
but few, if any, benefits.

I’d like to now consider the impact of these restrictions in

OBSERVATION 3: Harms

First, it’s important to note that the penalties enforced by the ESA are burdensome to
landowners. You can flow this simply as

1. Hurt Landowners

Landowners fear ESA regulations

Letter to Senator James Inhofe, signed by Senator Malcolm Wallop, David A. Ridenour [Vice
President, National Center for Public Policy Research], Hon. Edwin Meese, III [Former U.S. Attorney
General], Hon. Don Hodel [Former U.S. Sec. of Interior & Energy] and 85 major national and state
policy organizations, February 27, 2006
[http://www.nationalcenter.org/ESAPropertyRights022706.pdf]
“Today, private landowners live in fear of the ESA. Those who harbor endangered species on
their property or merely own land suitable for such species can find themselves subject to
severe land use restrictions.”

We can see then that the Endangered Species Act is harmful to property owners. What about the
endangered species themselves, though? The Act helps them at least, right? Actually, because the
ESA is such a burden to landowners, species on private land are targeted for eradication by those
scared to lose control of their land. You can flow this next point as

2. Hurt Species

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A. The Endangered Species Act gives incentives to hurt species.

David A. Ridenour [Vice President of the National Center for Public Policy Research],
“"TESRA" Endangered Species Act Reform Proposal Would Do More Harm Than Good,” National Center
for Public Policy Research [The NCPPA is a communications and research foundation supportive of a strong
national defense and dedicated to providing free market solutions to today's public policy problems],
August 2005 [http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA531TESRA.html][Yes, the brackets are added. If you no
like, Kritik us for it :P]
The Endangered Species Act has failed not because it isn't strong enough or expansive enough, but because
its incentives are wrong.
Today, private landowners live in fear of the ESA. Those who harbor endangered species on their property or
merely own land suitable for them often find themselves subject to severe land use restrictions. To avoid
such restrictions and the losses in property values that accompany them[endangered
species], many [private landowners] have been forced to preemptively "sterilize" their land
to keep rare species away. Such preemptive sterilizations benefit no one - least of all the
species the ESA was meant to protect.

The National Center for Policy Analysis explains:

B. The ESA gives landowners reason to destroy protected species.

H. Sterling Burnett [Environmental Policy Analyst with the National Center for Policy Analysis. Bryon
Allen was a Kock Foundation intern with the NCPA. The NCPA is a non-partisan, non-profit research and
education organization based in Dallas, Texas.] “How to Fix the Failed Endangered Species Act,”
National Center for Policy Analysis, November 1, 1998 [http://www.ncpa.org/commentaries/how-to-
fix-the-failed-endangered-species-act]
The ESA has failed because it creates perverse incentives to destroy species and their
habitat. More than 75 percent of the listed species depend on private land for all or part of their habitat. Yet
if people provide suitable habitat for an endangered species their land becomes subject to
severe regulation if not confiscation. As a former Fish and Wildlife service official stated, "The
incentives are wrong here. I have a rare metal on my property, its value goes up. But if a rare bird occupies
my land, its value disappears. We've got to turn it around to make the landowner want the bird on his
property."
Property owners are faced with three undesirable options: kill an endangered species
member - or "shoot, shovel, and shut up" - destroy habitat before a species sets up house, or
lose the use and value of their land. Clinging to this approach will condemn the very
species we want to protect.
Paying landowners when their property is restricted, in contrast, would keep them from facing a choice
between their own welfare and that of the endangered species.

To summarize, the restrictions posed by the Endangered Species Act embolden many
landowners to harm species in an attempt to keep their land restriction free. Today, we propose a
solution to this problem that we present in

Observation 4: Plan

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We propose the following simple mandate, to be implemented by any necessary federal body:

1. Section 9 of the ESA will be amended to repeal the penalties and regulation
currently imposed on private landowners.

Our enforcement will through Congress, the President, and any necessary federal agencies, and
our plan requires no funding as it is purely legislative.

Let’s finish today by looking at two benefits of our plan in

Observation 5: Advantages

Our first advantage stems directly from our plan text. By repealing the regulations and penalties
in the Endangered Species Act, landowners will no longer face devalued property, and lost
savings. Thus, our first advantage is

1. Landowners are benefited.

However, our advantages are not limited solely to humans. Our second advantage is

2. Protected Species.

Removing regulation will remove the largest obstacle to greater landowner participation.
Jonathan H. Adler [Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Center for Business Law
and Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law], “The Leaky Ark: The Failure of
Endangered Species Regulation on Private Land,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 15
September 2009, [http://www.aei.org/docLib/Adler.pdf]
Species listings trigger the regulation of government activities and private land. As a
consequence, the ESA inevitably penalizes private owners of species habitat, and thus
discourages the creation and maintenance of habitat conditions. Eliminating these negative
incentives requires eliminating the economic burdens imposed by species listings. Easing permit
conditions or providing modest assurances for good behavior may be all that the current statute allows, but any
lasting solution to the private land problem in species conservation requires much more. Protecting private
landowners from potential negative consequences of owning endangers species habitat – either by
ending the regulation of habitat modification or ensuring that landowners are compensated when their
ability to make reasonable use of their land is limited for the benefit of an endangered species would remove the
largest obstacle to greater landowner participation in conservation efforts.

Our plan removes that obstacle, and once that happens, the Endangered Species Act will become
much more effective.

Without penalties, the ESA will do more for species than it’s done in 32 years.
David A. Ridenour [Vice President of the National Center for Public Policy Research], “"TESRA"
Endangered Species Act Reform Proposal Would Do More Harm Than Good,” National Center for Public Policy

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Research [The NCPPA is a communications and research foundation supportive of a strong national defense and
dedicated to providing free market solutions to today's public policy problems], August 2005
[http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA531TESRA.html] [Brackets added for clarity]
For ESA reform to come close to working, both for species and for people, the perverse
incentives of the law must be eliminated. This can be achieved in a number of ways.
One way this might be achieved is by providing an economically viable means for landowners who lose property
rights under the ESA to receive full and fair compensation for their losses.
The draft TESRA legislation falls far short of this and, because it would expand the ESA to cover "invasive species"
and require landowners to transfer property titles to the federal government when compensated, could further
exacerbate problems.
Another possible reform would be to take away the federal government's blunt instrument of regulation in favor of
voluntary, time-sensitive leasing arrangements. This way, not only would landowners have the incentive to preserve
species, but the federal government's inventory of land - already to big for it to handle - wouldn't grow. These
leasing arrangements could be terminated, or not renewed, once a species has recovered, or either the landowner or
government determines they are no longer worthwhile. Yet another alternative [One way] is to exempt private
property entirely from the ESA. Eliminating the perverse incentives - even without establishing
a system of positive incentives - would do more for rare species than the ESA has done in its 32
years on the books.
If all else fails, the ESA could be repealed. Although the political will likely doesn't currently exist for repealing the
law, it's clear that endangered and threatened species would be better off without the ESA. If the ESA continues this
abysmal performance - more species de-listed due to data error and extinction than due to recovery - a popular
consensus for repealing the Act may develop.

The Endangered Species Act currently penalizes landowners who have endangered species on
their property. By eliminating these penalties, you will be benefiting America’s citizens, and you
will help protect imperiled species. I therefore urge an affirmative ballot, and I now stand open
for cross examination.

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