Luque v Villegas

Facts:
Petitioners ( who are passengers from Cavite and Batangas who ride on
buses to and from their province and Manila) and some public service
operators of buses and jeeps assail the validity of Ordinance 4986and
Administrative Order 1.

Ordinance 4986 states that PUB and PUJs shall be allowed to enter Manila
only from 6:30am to 8:30pm every day except Sundays and holidays.

Petitioners contend that since they possess a valid CPC, they have already
acquired a vested right to operate.

Administrative Order 1 issued by Commissioner of Public Service states that
all jeeps authorized to operate from Manila to any point in Luzon, beyond
the perimeter of Greater Manila, shall carry the words "For Provincial
Operation".

Issue: 1. Whether or not the said regulations are valid.
2. Whether or not Ordinance 4986 destroys vested rights to operate in
Manila.

Held: 1. YES! Using the doctrine in Lagman vs. City of Manila, Petitioner's
Certificate of Public Convenience was issued subject to the condition that
operators shall observe and comply with all the rules and regulations of the
PSC relative to PUB service.

The purpose of the ban is to minimize the problem in Manila and the traffic
congestion, delays and accidents resulting from the free entry into the
streets of Manila and the operation around said streets.

Both Ordinance 4986 and AO 1 fit into the concept of promotion and
regulation of general welfare.

2. NO! A vested right is some right or interest in the property which has
become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy. As far as the State is concerned, a CPC constitutes neither a
franchise nor a contract, confers no property right, and is a mere license or
privilege.

The holder does not acquire a property right in the route covered, nor does
it confer upon the holder any proprietary right/interest/franchise in the
public highways.

Neither do bus passengers have a vested right to be transported directly to
Manila. The alleged right is dependent upon the manner public services are
allowed to operate within a given area. It is no argument that the
passengers enjoyed the privilege of having been continuously transported
even before outbreak of war. Times have changed and vehicles have
increased. Traffic congestion has moved from worse to critical. Hence, there
is a need to regulate the operation of public services.
JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 124293, November 20, 2000
FACTS:
The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a
government corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. for the construction, operation and
management of the Subic National Shipyard, Inc., later became the
Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the JVA,
NIDC and Kawasaki would maintain a shareholding proportion of 60%-40%
and that the parties have the right of first refusal in case of a sale.

Through a series of transfers, NIDCs rights, title and interest in PHILSECO
eventually went to the National Government. In the interest of national
economy, it was decided that PHILSECO should be privatized by selling
87.67% of its total outstanding capital stock to private entities. After
negotiations, it was agreed that Kawasakis right of first refusal under the
JVA be exchanged for the right to top by five percent the highest bid for
said shares. Kawasaki that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI), in which it was a
stockholder, would exercise this right in its stead.

During bidding, Kawasaki/PHI Consortium is the losing bidder. Even so,
because of the right to top by 5% percent the highest bid, it was able to top
JG Summits bid. JG Summit protested, contending that PHILSECO, as a
shipyard is a public utility and, hence, must observe the 60%-40% Filipino-
foreign capitalization. By buying 87.67% of PHILSECOs capital stock at
bidding, Kawasaki/PHI in effect now owns more than 40% of the stock.
ISSUE: Whether or not PHILSECO is a public utility
Whether or not Kawasaki/PHI can purchase beyond 40% of PHILSECOs
stocks
HELD: In arguing that PHILSECO, as a shipyard, was a public utility, JG
Summit relied on sec. 13, CA No. 146. On the other hand, Kawasaki/PHI
argued that PD No. 666 explicitly stated that a shipyard was not a public
utility. But the SC stated that sec. 1 of PD No. 666 was expressly repealed
by sec. 20, BP Blg. 391 and when BP Blg. 391 was subsequently repealed by
EO 226, the latter law did not revive sec. 1 of PD No. 666. Therefore, the law
that states that a shipyard is a public utility still stands.
A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law is
therefore required to comply with the 60%-40% capitalization under the
Constitution. Likewise, the JVA between NIDC and Kawasaki manifests an
intention of the parties to abide by this constitutional mandate. Thus, under
the JVA, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party,
Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its
total shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock.
The NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total
shares. As a government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned
corporation, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond
60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign
capitalization.
Kawasaki was bound by its contractual obligation under the JVA that limits
its right of first refusal to 40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO. Thus,
Kawasaki cannot purchase beyond 40% of the capitalization of the joint
venture on account of both constitutional and contractual proscriptions.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs.HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and
the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R.
No. 115381 December 23, 1994
FACTS :
Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No.
90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial
bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and
15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.

This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No.
92-009 providing, among others, that "The existing authorized fare range
system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall
be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be
replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded
fare range."

Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the
deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect
plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a
petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.

On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB
opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed
for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to
provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%)
percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%)
percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a
petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.

HELD: Yes. Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature
delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the
rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body
today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202
dated June 19, 1987. x x x However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions
of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to
delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other
public service.