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Matriculation No: CSC Index No: CSC45058
Title: Term Paper (Qn 5)
Course and Code: SAF009-14: Maritime Security Studies
Lecturer/Tutor: Euan Graham
Submission Date: 23 Jun 2014, 0830 hours
Word Count: 3780 words excluding bibliography

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Signed: Date: 23 Jun 2014___________


1
How significant for maritime stability and security in the Indo-Pacific is
Chinas agreement to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), at
the most recent Western Pacific Naval Symposium, in Qingdao? What
further policy recommendations would you recommend for containing
inter-state maritime tensions at the regional or local level?
Introduction
The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is undoubtedly the main
protagonist in the region that has come to be characterised as the Indo-Pacific,
the part of the world spanning the shores of East Africa and West Asia across the
Indian Ocean to the East Asian periphery of the Pacific Ocean by way of the
South China Sea (SCS). This region has become the centre of gravity of the
globalized world in the post-Cold War era with the economic, military and
demographic pivots shifting from the European landscape to the Asian seascape.
One third of global bulk cargo traverses the Indo-Pacific bound for the
manufacturing centres of Asia and carrying finished products to the rest of the
world, two thirds of global oil shipments sail these same waters
1
to fuel the
worlds second and third largest economies (China and Japan)
2
who are also
the second
3
and third
4
largest net importers of oil in the world. The SCS and its
surrounding waters have become the future of conflict with the littoral states

1
Australian Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, p. 13.
2
World Bank Development Indicators database, accessed 11 Jun 2014 from:
http://databank.worldbank.org/
3
US Energy Information Administration website, accessed 11 Jun 2014 from:
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=CH
4
US Energy Information Administration website, accessed 11 Jun 2014 from:
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=JA

2
engaged in an arms dynamic as well as territorial disputes over national interests
and the United States finding itself a key actor in the balance of regional power.
China by virtue of its geography and economy is the resident Great Power on the
scene and finds itself in a delicate game of power politics with the existing Great
Power that is the US and the other SCS littoral states including ASEAN countries
and Japan. Of late, tensions in the SCS have flared with Vietnam the latest
antagonist to provoke China
5
; President Obamas strongly worded statements to
reaffirm American support of Japanese
6
and Philippine
7
security during his recent
Asian tour have not helped soothe frayed tempers either. What then, can be
done to ease the situation and prevent these tensions from potentially spiralling
into inter-state conflict that could affect the trade and energy flows that are the
lifeblood of the world economy? Is the recent agreement by China to the Code
for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES) during the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium (WPNS) a positive sign for maritime security and stability?
The following essay will analyse how seapower shapes the national
political goals of states at the grand strategic level, and subsequently how it
affects policies and strategies at the tactical/operational levels of strategy (using
the case of the SCS) and its role in the balance of power politics in the Indo-
Pacific region with particular focus on the PRC as the resident regional

5
BBC report on China-Vietnam confrontation in the South China Sea dated 8 May 2014,
accessed 11 Jun 2014 from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27332723
6
CNN report on President Obamas visit to Japan on 23 Apr 2014, accessed 11 Jun 2014 from:
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/23/world/asia/obama-asia-visit/
7
Reuters report on President Obamas visit to Philippines on 28 Apr 2014, accessed 11 Jun 2014
from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/us-philippines-usa-obama-
idUSBREA3S02T20140429


3
powerhouse and protagonist in the on-going disputes. The thesis of the essay is
that cooperation or conflict management initiatives such as the CUES are
tactical/operational level solutions that have no traction regardless of Chinas
agreement unless they are aligned with national political goals at the grand
strategic level; tactical/operational measures might cure the symptoms that
inflame conflict but without alignment with grand strategy, they will be unable to
permanently address the causal political factors leading to conflict in the first
place and new symptoms that could spur conflict might manifest. That being said,
it is this authors belief that whilst CUES is a solution to calm tensions manifest at
the tactical/operational level, it is also a political signal of intent consistent with
Chinese foreign policy towards a stable and secure Indo-Pacific. There are some
who fail to see the true significance of Chinas endorsement of CUES and
question its necessity
8
through a misperception of Chinese strategic culture. The
essay will conclude by identifying potential areas where political convergence
with China may be possible and propose policy recommendations for
cooperation and/or prevention of conflict between concerned parties in the SCS
disputes.
Framework
This essay will first scope the concept of seapower as it relates to the
national interests of China. It will examine these national interests, analyse how
seapower figures to be used in the grand and tactical/operational level strategies

8
Pedrozo, P., The US-China Incidents at Sea Agreement: A Recipe for Disaster, Journal of
National Security, Law & Policy, Vol.6, Aug 2012, pp. 207-226, accessed 13 Jun 2014 from:
http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/07_Pedrozo-Master.pdf

4
and how these strategies incorporate cooperation and/or conflict prevention to
achieve security and stability. It will make comparisons with similar initiatives in
other instances of seapower competition and conclude that any policies or
strategies that are adopted to blunt the inflammatory edges of such competition
need to be vertically aligned across the grand strategic and tactical/operational
levels of strategy in order to achieve long-term stability. Policy recommendations
will be mooted in areas where there is the prospect of such vertical alignment.
Seapower: The Concept
He who rules on the sea will shortly rule on the land also.
Ottoman Admiral Khaireddin Pasha (better known as Barbarossa)
Whoever commands the sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands the
trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world
itself
British aristocrat, soldier and explorer Sir Walter Raleigh.
These quotes encapsulate the essence of seapower as a key component
of grand strategy formulation underlining the nexus between the mercantilist and
military aspects of seapower that was the bedrock of Mahanian theory. Several
facts underpin this: two thirds of the globe is covered by the sea, and of the
remaining one third that is inhabited, 70% of its population live within 100 miles of
a coastline
9
; over 90% of international trade (by volume and weight) travels by

9
BR 1806, The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (London: HMSO, 1995).

5
water
10
; it thus follows that a nations ability to exploit the sea and protect this
source of commerce has a significant bearing on its prosperity. Without
trivialising the advocates of landpower such as Mackinders Heartland Theory
11

in favour of seapower theorists like Mahan
12
, both schools of thought share a
commonality in the securing of resources and their flows to support national
interests, they diverge on the subject of the means (medium of land or sea)
rather than the ends. In any case, the geography of the Indo-Pacific and the facts
of global resource flows point to the maritime domain as the medium of
importance in the 21
st
century.
Seapower is a not so much a definition or term as it is a concept made up
of multiple facets spanning different levels of strategy from political grand
strategy to tactical/operational military strategy. Till offers a succinct foundation
through his four attributes of the sea as: a resource, a medium of transportation,
a medium of information and a medium for dominion
13
. Building on this
foundation, the ability to exploit the seas resources, transport goods and
materials to conduct commerce, spread ideas and establish outposts form the
bedrocks of a states national interests and drive its grand strategy. At the
tactical/operational level, the discourse revolves around the ability to secure this
exploitation of the sea and possibly do so at the expense of other states.

10
US Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Maritime Challenges 1997, p. 24.
11
Mackinder, H.J., The Geographical Pivot of History, Geographical Journal 23, No.4 (April
1904), pp. 421-37.
12
Mahan, A.T., The Influence of Seapower Upon History: 1660-1783, 12
th
edition, (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1918), pp. 25-88.
13
Till, G., Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 3
rd
edition, (London: Routledge,
2013), pp. 6-23.

6
At this tactical/operational level, two main strands of thought exist: Mahan
and his dictum of seeking dominance of the sea by removing the threat of the
enemys forces altogether be it by decisive battle or blockade
14
; and Corbetts
approach to gain control of the maritime domain at a time and place conducive to
its usage in support of strategic interests
15
. It is important to be cognizant of the
contexts that influenced both men; Mahan based his theory on the case studies
of maritime powers like the British who used the Royal Navy to achieve the
dominance that Pax Britannica came to symbolise while Corbetts works
examined conflicts such as World War I, that epitomised the difficulty of being
able to muster the level of dominance called for by Mahan and perhaps
advocated a more cost-effective and limited concept of command of the sea.
The grand strategy formulation of states with regard to the military
dimension is thus concerned with the security of these arteries of resource flows
through which the lifeblood of trade and energy course to the beat of the nations
commercial heart.
Seapower & Grand Strategy
An overview of the security environment that states plan to secure is a
pre-requisite to any meaningful discourse on the grand strategies of the SCS and
the concerned states because it will bring into focus the threats that jeopardise
the safety of these arteries of commerce and make it easier to key in on
practicable solutions.

14
Ibid, pp. 57-59.
15
Ibid, pp. 64-67.

7
The literature on the subject of Maritime Security (MARSEC) generally
identifies four threats to the security of resource flows: natural disasters, maritime
terrorism, piracy and inter-state conflict as a result of resource competition or
territorial disputes
16
. The first three do not usually involve threats emanating from
state actors; as such it is easy to find common ground between states in
collaborating to deal with them and these frequently serve as avenues for
advancing political concord through cooperative arrangements (a key tenet of the
proposals for easing inter-state tensions that will be covered later in the essay). It
is the thorny subject of territorial disputes with its attendant issues of energy,
environment and food security as well as sovereignty that have generated
headlines on the issue of regional stability.
Taking a Realist view of the world, a fundamental priority of a state is to
secure itself through the raising of a credible military force that can either be
called upon or used in coercion to protect its national interests. This force needs
to be able to first and foremost protect its sovereign rights within its geographical
territory (including sea, land and air). This protection does not only entail the
ability to influence the physical geographical territory, but also extends to the
approaches or surroundings of this territory since events or parties within these
approaches or surroundings may be able to exert some level of influence on the
states territory. In fact the states protection umbrella also needs to extend to

16
Cole, B.D., Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters, (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 2013), pp. 1-2; Ho, J., The Shifting of Maritime Power and the Implications for Maritime
Security in East Asia, IDSS Working Paper No. 68, (Singapore: Nanyang Technological
University, 2004), pp. 13-19; Sjaastad, A.C., Southeast Asian SLOCs and Security Options in
Maritime Security in South East Asia, Kwa, C.G. & Skogan, J.K. (eds), (London: Routledge,
2007), pp. 4-6.

8
cover those areas that concern its key industries and economy, which in the case
of the SCS states, entails the global sea lines of communications (SLOC) that
their energy needs and trade goods traverse. However, the sheer size of the sea
space these areas cover, and the myriad of tasks and relatively limited size of
most navies (as a function of fiscal considerations) these days mean they face a
Herculean task even with the advance of technology. This was the impetus for
then-USN Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Mullens call for a
thousand-ship navy to ensure the security of the global maritime commons
17
and
a key consideration driving coalitions such as the Combined Maritime Forces
(CMF) in the Arabian Sea.
The antagonists of piracy, maritime terrorism and natural disasters are
non-state actors and make little distinction between the national identities of their
victims. It is thus such common causes that nations band together against to
ensure the safety of the global maritime commons that encompass a large
proportion of global SLOCs. Even where these threats encroach upon territorial
seas, nations have been able to agree at the political and tactical/operational
level on collaborative frameworks to address the threats. A current example is
the trilateral Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) to combat piracy between Singapore,
Malaysia and Indonesia as well as its aeronautical extension: the Eyes in the Sky
(EiS) maritime air patrols that also include Thailand. The MSP has contributed to
the removal of war risk insurance premiums by Lloyds on maritime traffic
transiting the Malacca Straits. Another example is the 30-member CMF coalition

17
Adm Michael G. Mullen, USN, remarks delivered at the 17
th
International Seapower
Symposium, Newport, Rhode Island, 21 Sep 2005.

9
conducting anti-terrorism and anti-piracy missions in the Arabian Sea. Although
there are existing rivalries amongst the MSP nations and the CMF member-
states, the non-state nature of the threats that they collaborate against make
these cooperation arrangements possible and attractive at the political level,
even attracting informal cooperation arrangements with non-CMF members like
China. This paves the way for the tactical/operational implementation (in the form
of Operation MALSINDO in the Malacca Straits and the various CTF missions in
the Arabian Sea) to enjoy continued success. The subject of defining territorial
seas and securing Command of them (in the Corbettian sense) is where the SCS
states diverge politically.
Gaining political concord with China certainly goes a long way towards
advancing a more lasting solution on the disputes in the SCS and calming the
tensions that have flared up of late considering that China is involved in nearly
every territorial dispute in the SCS as well as its long-standing concern of re-
unification with Taiwan. In order to do so, one needs to first understand Chinese
interests, its accompanying grand strategy and Chinas strategic culture.
Chinese Maritime Interests
Returning to the Realist need to secure the states territory and its
approaches/surroundings, the SCS constitutes both a large swathe of Chinas
territorial seas (in accordance with UNCLOS definitions), and the alternative
approach to the PRC mainland other than the continental route. The decline of
the USSR coupled with Chinas quantum growth since the end of the Cold War

10
has seen it resolve land border issues with both Russia and India. The maritime
approach however is less secure with the USN and regional navies combining to
pose a formidable counter-balance to the PLA-N. The heightened sensitivity of
the maritime domain is also a historical by-product of the hundred years of
humiliation when China was invaded by foreign powers from the sea.
The potential and current resources that the SCS contains in fish stocks
and minerals affect the food security, energy security as well as environmental
security of the concerned states. China is easily the worlds dominant fish
producer
18
and the Chinese fishing industry forms a sizable chunk of the
agricultural GDP
19
. Considering the implications for employment and food
security, ceding some of the fishery resources to other states by virtue of
capitulating in its territorial claims does not seem politically attractive. The huge
energy potential in the SCS
20
as well as Chinas reliance on imported energy to
fuel its economy provides another compelling political reason for it not to back
down from its current stance in the SCS territorial disputes.

Chinese Maritime Strategy

18
Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations statistics on global aquaculture
production, accessed 12 Jun 2014 from: http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/global-aquaculture-
production/en
19
European parliament Study by Blomeyer, R., Goulding, I., Pauly, D., Sanz, A., Stobberup, K.,
The Role of China in World Fisheries, accessed 12 Jun 2014 from:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/pech/dv/chi/china.pdf; Zhang, H.
Chinas Evolving Fishing Industry: Implications for Regional and Global Maritime Security, RSIS
Working Paper No. 246, (Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 2012), p. 3.
20
US Energy Information Administration analysis of the South China Sea energy deposits,
accessed 13 Jun 2014 from: http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs

11
Chinas strategy to secure this maritime space seems to follow two central
themes: the strengthening of its navy and paramilitary forces to acquire an anti-
access area denial and enforcement capability at the military tactical/operational
level, and at the political grand strategic level, the occupation and/or
consolidation of disputed islands and features in the SCS with a view to using
them to lay legitimate claim subsequently to the surrounding resources in these
areas.
Chinas military strategy is part of its shifting doctrine towards an active
offshore defence
21
that calls for it to be able to influence engagements with any
adversaries up to the peripheries of its territory. In the case of the SCS that
constitutes the maritime approach to China, this involves the deployment of its
navy and paramilitary assets for the conduct of maritime naval presence patrols,
naval exercises and law enforcement operations. Politically, China is currently
employing a delaying strategy
22
in order to strengthen its own claims by the
exercise of jurisdiction and guarding against exclusion from any development
activities in the disputed areas so that if or when it eventually decides to start
further negotiations, it can do so from a stronger position.

Conflict Prevention, Collaboration & Constraints

21
Cole, B.D., The Great Wall at Sea, (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 173; Le Mire,
C., The Spectre of an Asian Arms Race, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Vol. 56, No.1, p.
148; Shambaugh, D., Chinas Military in Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement, and
Power Projection, The China Quarterly, No. 146, Special Issue: Chinas Military in Transition
(Jun 1996), pp. 279-280.
22
Fravel, M.T., Chinas Strategy in the South China Sea, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.
33, No.3, Dec 2011, p. 299.

12
It is during these Chinese naval deployments that provocations with other
states naval and paramilitary forces have taken place. A code of conduct
CUES in a similar vein to the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement between
the USN and Soviet Navy in 1972 to prevent such provocative incidents from
accidentally spiralling into serious inter-state conflict was recently signed by the
naval chiefs of the WPNS of which China and the SCS littoral states are
members. This signalled an underscoring of the political impetus generated by
the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) to
alleviate an earlier round of tensions. The inclusion of the PLA-N in large-scale
multi-lateral exercises such as the US-hosted Rim of The Pacific (RIMPAC) has
also allowed the navies of the concerned states to build better rapport and lessen
misunderstandings.
The flaw in the CUES is that it concerns naval vessels whereas
paramilitary vessels instead of naval forces have been involved in the recent
skirmishes. Although some might view the use of paramilitary vessels as less
provocative than naval warships, the tendency to engage in more extreme
behaviour such as ramming could have an opposite effect and heighten tensions
even more. Furthermore, despite the alignment of the CUES (a code applicable
to military vessels) with the (political) aims of the DOC, within the Chinese
bureaucracy, it is difficult to coordinate the actions of the numerous agencies
involved in maritime affairs
23
with the result that the tactical actions of coastguard

23
Freise, C., By Invitation, Mostly: the International Politics of the US Security Presence, China
and the South China Sea, RSIS Working Paper No.247, (Singapore Nanyang Technological
University, 2012), pp. 20-21; Li, M., Chinese Debates of South China Sea Policy: Implications for

13
or fisheries vessels might not always be aligned with the political position. In any
case, present regulations applicable to all vessels that ply the seas (Rules of the
Road) exist, prompting Pedrozo and Roughead to question the utility of a more
comprehensive code to include non-naval vessels
24
.
China recognizes the logic that collaboration (especially in resource
exploitation) is likely to reap synergies, which could benefit it rather than engage
in petty conflicts that benefit no one since resources continue to go untapped or
fish stocks continue to be exhausted and efforts cannot be directed toward
efficient preservation of the marine environment for fish stocks to thrive. The
Sino-Vietnamese cooperation arrangement to resolve territorial disputes, develop
and secure the Gulf of Tonkin is an example of successful Chinese collaboration
with a concerned SCS state.
A key impediment that complicates Chinas tactical/operational actions
and its political rhetoric is nationalism
25
. As much as its actions might be
perceived as belligerent by the most pessimistic non-Chinese observer, Chinese
actions taken in the context of its strategic culture are in fact fairly consistent with
a non-provocative stance. The numerous policy statements that China has made
to commit to peaceful non-violent resolutions of disputes and its endorsement of
the DOC and CUES are consistent with its New Security Policy (NSC)
announced at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996 that are based on the
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence first enunciated by Zhou Enlai in 1955

Future Developments, RSIS Working Paper No.239, (Singapore Nanyang Technological
University, 2012), p. 25.
24
Pedrozo, pp. 208-09.
25
Freise, p. 7.

14
of: respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-
interference in the internal affairs of other countries, equality and mutual benefit,
and peaceful co-existence
26
. The fact that China is using water cannons from
paramilitary vessels to exchange fire with Vietnamese vessels instead of
sending warships to engage in more serious exchange of ordnance is in a way,
some form of restraint also.
Opportunities for Collaboration
Some initiatives and platforms currently exist in the Indo-Pacific that
promote multi-lateral collaboration and involves China and several concerned
SCS states. As mentioned earlier, these address non-state threats of piracy,
maritime terrorism and humanitarian disaster relief.
At the tactical/operational level, China along with most of the ASEAN
countries and Japan are contracting parties to the Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP), an information-sharing network and capacity building facility to
combat piracy and armed robbery at sea. China also maintains a permanent task
group on-station in the Gulf of Aden to conduct escorts of merchant shipping in
collaboration with CMF task forces against the threats of piracy and maritime
terrorism, and conduct humanitarian (medical assistance) missions in Somalia. In
the wake of the MH370 incident, Singapore has mooted the establishment of a

26
Shambaugh, D., China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order, International Security.,
Vol.29, No.3, Winter, 2004, p. 69; Nan, L., The Evolving Chinese Conception of Security and
Security Approaches In Tan, S..S., Acharya, A., (eds) Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation (New
York, M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 61.

15
Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC) leveraging on the infrastructure at
its Command and Control (C2) Centre, which hosts the Information Fusion
Centre (IFC)
27
an information sharing agency amongst militaries. The RHCC
aims to provide a platform for efficient coordination of multi-national HADR efforts
following the massive effort required to effectively coordinate the multitude of
assets from various nations across the large expanse of ocean in the search for
the missing aircraft.
At the political level, forums such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, ARF,
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and Expanded ASEAN
Maritime Forum (EAMF) offer a dialogue platform for politicians. Although the
ADMM+ has its working groups on specific issues such as MARSEC, it is not
clear if the groups composition includes the myriad of civilian law enforcement
agencies that constitute MARSEC practitioners in addition to the traditional
military personnel. Since one of the key problems affecting the alignment of
political and tactical/operational strategies highlighted when dealing with China is
its difficulty of internal bureaucratic coordination, a platform that brings all its
maritime agencies together to discuss MARSEC issues might be a practical
solution. It could potentially be organised along the lines of the Regional
MARSEC Practitioners Course (RMPC) currently conducted by the Republic of
Singapore Navy (RSN). The RMPC brings together personnel from MARSEC
agencies in the Asia Pacific region including coastguards, customs and

27
Wong, K., Shangri-La Dialogue: Singapore continues push for regional HADR centre, Janes
Defence Weekly article, accessed 13 Jun 2014 from:
https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+++17132
67&Pubabbrev=JDW

16
authorities as well as other maritime agencies to discuss and share perspectives
on MARSEC as well as establish relationships. The establishment of closer
relationships and understandings of one anothers modus operandi would sow
the seeds for subsequent cooperation to materialize over resource sharing and
joint development efforts.
China should continue to maintain its participation in the Gulf of Aden and
ReCAAP as these serve to reinforce its commitment to protection of its interests
by securing the SLOCs that contribute to its resource flows. At the same time,
they provide a platform for cooperation and relationship building with other states
at the political level. The RHCC is another good opportunity in this respect and
China should capitalise on it should the initiative eventuate.
With respect to the recommendation of an expanded MARSEC
practitioners course that includes Chinese maritime agencies, Singapore is best
placed to drive this initiative as it already conducts the RMPC and Shangri-La
Dialogue and both could be synergized to enable both cooperation at the political
and the tactical/operational levels. Politically, Singapore has both a credible
reputation as an interlocutor for other countries and it would be feasible, as it is
not involved in any disputes with China in the SCS.

Conclusion
There is no doubt that China is a centrepiece in any collaborative venture
to ensure maritime security and stability in the Indo-Pacific by virtue of its

17
economy and geography. This essay has framed the issue as an interaction
between the military tactical/operational and political grand strategic levels of
strategy. It has used the concept of seapower to derive a link with Chinese
national interests and its strategies to secure these interests; it has also provided
an alternative (conciliatory) interpretation of Chinese strategies to the Western
perception using the lens of Chinese strategic culture. In doing so, it aims to
reinforce the point that any strategy for collaboration with China needs to fit into
its domestic political rhetoric (at the grand strategic level) and achieve buy-in
across all its bureaucratic maritime agencies (at the tactical/operational level of
implementation). The policy recommendations this essay proposed address the
political and tactical/operational considerations and offer potential avenues to
serve as a springboard to deepen collaboration with China to achieve safe and
secure seas in the Indo-Pacific for all.


18
References
1. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, remarks delivered at the 17
th
International
Seapower Symposium, Newport, Rhode Island, 21 Sep 2005.
2. Australian Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013.
3. BBC report on China-Vietnam confrontation in the South China Sea dated 8
May 2014, accessed 11 Jun 2014 from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
27332723
4. BR 1806, The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (London: HMSO,
1995).
5. CNN report on President Obamas visit to Japan on 23 Apr 2014, accessed
11 Jun 2014 from: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/23/world/asia/obama-asia-
visit/
6. Cole, B.D., The Great Wall at Sea, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001).
7. Cole, B.D., Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters,
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013).
8. European parliament Study by Blomeyer, R., Goulding, I., Pauly, D., Sanz, A.,
Stobberup, K., The Role of China in World Fisheries, accessed 12 Jun 2014
from:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/pech/dv/chi/
china.pdf
9. Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations statistics on global
aquaculture production, accessed 12 Jun 2014 from:
http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/global-aquaculture-production/en

19
10. Fravel, M.T., Chinas Strategy in the South China Sea, Contemporary
Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No.3, Dec 2011, pp. 292-319.
11. Freise, C., By Invitation, Mostly: the International Politics of the US Security
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