Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T.
SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Local Government, NICANOR M.
PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the
Department of Local Government and SALVADOR
CABALUNA JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T.
SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government, respondents.
Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.
Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SARMIENTO, J.:p
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the
President (acting through the Secretary of Local
Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos.
93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of
administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him
by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various
charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression,
grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and
arbitrary detention.
1
The personalities involved are
Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office;
Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza,
Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-
Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales,
Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay
tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in
the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals.
2
We
quote:
xxx xxx xxx
In her verified complaint (Annex A),
Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the
City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged
that due to political reasons, having
supported the rival candidate, Mrs.
Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City
Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency
of the service and the interest of the
public, pulled her out from rightful
office where her qualifications are best
suited and assigned her to a work that
should be the function of a non-career
service employee. To make matters
worse, a utility worker in the office of
the Public Services, whose duties are
alien to the complainant's duties and
functions, has been detailed to take
her place. The petitioner's act are pure
harassments aimed at luring her away
from her permanent position or force
her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza,
she claims that the petitioner
handpicked her to perform task not
befitting her position as Assistant City
Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her
office was padlocked without any
explanation or justification; that her
salary was withheld without cause
since April 1, 1988; that when she filed
her vacation leave, she was given the
run-around treatment in the approval
of her leave in connivance with Dr.
Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the
object of a well-engineered trumped-
up charge in an administrative
complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas
(Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor
is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo
City and complainants Rolando Dabao,
Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry
Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are
members of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their
complaint arose out from the case
where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key
to his office was unceremoniously and
without previous notice, taken by
petitioner. Without an office, Councilor
Ong had to hold office at Plaza
Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the
other complainants sympathized with
him and decided to do the same.
However, the petitioner, together with
its fully-armed security men, forcefully
drove them away from Plaza Libertad.
Councilor Ong denounced the
petitioner's actuations the following
day in the radio station and decided to
hold office at the Freedom Grandstand
at Iloilo City and there were so many
people who gathered to witness the
incident. However, before the group
could reach the area, the petitioner,
together with his security men, led the
firemen using a firetruck in dozing
water to the people and the
bystanders.
Another administrative case was filed
by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod,
appointed by former mayor Rosa O.
Caram. On March 13, 1988, without
the benefit of charges filed against him
and no warrant of arrest was issued,
Erbite was arrested and detained at
the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of
petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly
mauled by other detainees thereby
causing injuries He was released only
the following day.
3

The Mayor thereafter answered
4
and the cases were
shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals
also set forth the succeeding events:
xxx xxx xxx
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and
Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on
June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office
of the Department of Local
Government in Iloilo City. Notices,
through telegrams, were sent to the
parties (Annex L) and the parties
received them, including the
petitioner. The petitioner asked for a
postponement before the scheduled
date of hearing and was represented
by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The
hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral
and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to
come all the way from Manila for the
two-day hearings but was actually held
only on June 20,1988 in view of the
inability and unpreparedness of
petitioner's counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July
25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-
Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner
attempted to delay the proceedings
and moved for a postponement under
the excuse that he had just hired his
counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing
officers denied the motion to
postpone, in view of the fact that the
parties were notified by telegrams of
the scheduled hearings (Annex M).
In the said hearings, petitioner's
counsel cross-examined the
complainants and their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons,
the respondent issued a preventive
suspension order on August 11, 1988
to last until October 11,1988 for a
period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on
September 21, 1988 and the petitioner
again asked for a postponement to
September 26,1988. On September 26,
1988, the complainants and petitioner
were present, together with their
respective counsel. The petitioner
sought for a postponement which was
denied. In these hearings which were
held in Mala the petitioner testified in
Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued
regarding the Malabor case and the
complainants testified including their
witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioner's
counsel, Atty. Original moved for a
postponement of the October 24, 1988
hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988
which was granted. However, the
motion for change of venue as denied
due to lack of funds. At the hearing on
November 7, 1988, the parties and
counsel were present. Petitioner
reiterated his motion to change venue
and moved for postponement anew.
The counsel discussed a proposal to
take the deposition of witnesses in
Iloilo City so the hearing was
indefinitely postponed. However, the
parties failed to come to terms and
after the parties were notified of the
hearing, the investigation was set to
December 13 to 15, 1988.
The petitioner sought for another
postponement on the ground that his
witnesses were sick or cannot attend
the investigation due to lack of
transportation. The motion was denied
and the petitioner was given up to
December 14, 1988 to present his
evidence.
On December 14,1988, petitioner's
counsel insisted on his motion for
postponement and the hearing officers
gave petitioner up to December 15,
1988 to present his evidence. On
December 15, 1988, the petitioner
failed to present evidence and the
cases were considered submitted for
resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie
evidence was found to exist in the
arbitrary detention case filed by
Pancho Erbite so the respondent
ordered the petitioner's second
preventive suspension dated October
11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days.
The petitioner was able to obtain a
restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The
second preventive suspension was not
enforced.
5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon
instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent
Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the
Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in
obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he
instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition,
in the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary
issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor
Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty
months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto
Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon
commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals,
a petition for prohibition,
6
(Malabor it is to be noted, is
one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in
seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5,
1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-
G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990,
it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann
Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent
Secretary, to this Court.
On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining
Order, barring the respondent Secretary from
implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the
enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated
all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we
gave due course thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252),
that the Department of Local Government in hearing the
ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law
and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased,
prejudicial and hostile" towards him
7
arising from his
(Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino party
8
and the running political
rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local
elections;
9
and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in
Iloilo City.
10
He also alleges that he requested the
Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety
days prior to an election (the barangay elections of
November 14, 1988),
11
notwithstanding which, the latter
proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more
suspension orders of the aforementioned cases.
12
He
likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to
Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the
costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his
request.
13
He states that he asked for postponement on
"valid and justifiable"
14
grounds, among them, that he was
suffering from a heart ailment which required
confinement; that his "vital"
15
witness was also
hospitalized
16
but that the latter unduly denied his
request.
17

Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and
95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is
devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and
remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the
petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the
records do not show very clearly in what manner the
Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the
respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary
Luis-Santos were (are) political rivals and that his
"persecution" was politically motivated are pure
speculation and although the latter does not appear to
have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon,
claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would
have under less political circumstances, considering
furthermore that "political feud" has often been a good
excuse in contesting complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-
so's that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to
join the administration party and to operate a lottery in
Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his
allegations, we can not accept them, at face value, much
more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept
them
18
for the same reasons above-stated and
furthermore, because his say so's were never
corroborated by independent testimonies. As a
responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an
official function, is presumed to be performing his duties
regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill
motive can be ascribed to him.
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested
the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account
of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas
Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and
academic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary
from further hearing the complaints against the
petitioners.
19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is
afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we
should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no
convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying
his requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of
discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on
Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that
the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of
discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that
Secretary Santos' actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of
due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the
Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter
ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987
Constitution
20
no longer allows the President, as the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of
suspension and/or removal over local officials. According
to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to
strengthen self-rule by local government units and second,
by deleting the phrase
21
as may be provided by law to
strip the President of the power of control over local
governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds
support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission.
The provision in question reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines
shall exercise general supervision over
local governments. Provinces with
respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to
component barangays shall ensure
that the acts of their component units
are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.
22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935
Constitution, which we quote:
Sec. 10. The President shall have
control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all
Local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be
provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes,
since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law"
and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under
question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in
consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg.
337, the Local Government Code, we quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within
seven days after the complaint is filed,
the Minister of local Government, or
the sanggunian concerned, as the case
may be, shall require the respondent
to submit his verified answer within
seven days from receipt of said
complaint, and commence the hearing
and investigation of the case within
ten days after receipt of such answer
of the respondent. No investigation
shall be held within ninety days
immediately prior to an election, and
no preventive suspension shall be
imposed with the said period. If
preventive suspension has been
imposed prior to the aforesaid period,
the preventive suspension shall be
lifted.
24

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1)
Preventive suspension may be
imposed by the Minister of Local
Government if the respondent is a
provincial or city official, by the
provincial governor if the respondent
is an elective municipal official, or by
the city or municipal mayor if the
respondent is an elective barangay
official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be
imposed at any time after the issues
are joined, when there is reasonable
ground to believe that the respondent
has committed the act or acts
complained of, when the evidence of
culpability is strong, when the gravity
of the offense so warrants, or when
the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence. In all cases, preventive
suspension shall not extend beyond
sixty days after the start of said
suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the
suspended official shall be deemed
reinstated in office without prejudice
to the continuation of the proceedings
against him until its termination.
However ' if the delay in the
proceedings of the case is due to his
fault, neglect or request, the time of
the delay shall not be counted in
computing the time of suspension.
25

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three
questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the
phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the
President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline,
and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution
repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government
Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the
constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that
notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language,
the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its
right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by
existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions
against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of
"as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than
to underscore local governments' autonomy from
congress and to break Congress' "control" over local
government affairs. The Constitution did not, however,
intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-
states out of local government units, as in the federal
governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or
Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared
municipal corporations euphemistically to "small
republics."
26
Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is
subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the
legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the
Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-
is to wean local government units from over-dependence
on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy"
is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other
things, the passage of a local government code,
27
a local
tax law,
28
income distribution legislation,
29
and a national
representation law,
30
and measures
31
designed to realize
autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in
spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the
Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows
Congress to include in the local government code
provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing
Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to
the President. Thus:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities and
resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers
and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating
to the organization and operation of
the local units.
32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be
provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the
objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by
severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by
the Court of Appeals, like the power of local
legislation.
33
The Constitution did nothing more, however,
and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President
(through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed
against local officials administratively, the Constitution
contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the
Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, "supervision" is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has
held,
34
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in the case of Mondano
vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884,
this Court had occasion to discuss the
scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local
government officials in contrast to the
power of control given to him over
executive officials of our government
wherein it was emphasized that the
two terms, control and supervision, are
two different things which differ one
from the other in meaning and extent.
Thus in that case the Court has made
the following digression: "In
administration law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify of
set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter."
But from this pronouncement it cannot
be reasonably inferred that the power
of supervision of the President over
local government officials does not
include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires, as
postulated in Section 64(c) of the
Revised Administrative Code. ...
35

xxx xxx xxx
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for test of the
latter."
36
"Supervision" on the other hand means
"overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties.
37
As we
held,
38
however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with
"overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering".
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's
pronouncements in at least three cases,Lacson v.
Roque,
39
Hebron v. Reyes,
40
and Mondano v.
Silvosa,
41
and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor
General.
42
In Lacson, this Court said that the President
enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may
be provided by law,"
43
a rule we reiterated in Hebron,
and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President
"may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him,
except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding
provincial board."
44
However,
neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically
banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of
disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control
powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise
disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:
The contention that the President has
inherent power to remove or suspend
municipal officers is without doubt not
well taken. Removal and suspension of
public officers are always controlled by
the particular law applicable and its
proper construction subject to
constitutional limitations.
45

In Hebron we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for
the suspension of an officer is specified
by law, the same must be deemed
mandatory and adhered to strictly, in
the absence of express or clear
provision to the contrary-which does
not et with respect to municipal
officers ...
46

In Mondano, the Court held:
... The Congress has expressly and
specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in
the provincial governor who is
authorized to "receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form
of maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of any
crime involving moral turpitude." And
if the charges are serious, "he shall
submit written charges touching the
matter to the provincial board,
furnishing a copy of such charges to
the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such
case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by
the board, if in his opinion the charge
by one affecting the official integrity of
the officer in question." Section 86 of
the Revised Administration Code adds
nothing to the power of supervision to
be exercised by the Department Head
over the administration of ...
municipalities ... . If it be construed
that it does and such additional power
is the same authority as that vested in
the Department Head by section 79(c)
of the Revised Administrative Code,
then such additional power must be
deemed to have been abrogated by
Section 110(l), Article VII of the
Constitution.
47

xxx xxx xxx
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose
disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal
from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative
Code.
48

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President
the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because we did
not think that the President can not exercise it on account
of his limited power, but because the law lodged the
power elsewhere. But in those cases ii which the law gave
him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found
little difficulty in sustaining him.
49

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can
rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional
Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court
believes that the deliberations are by themselves
inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose
Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the
President,
50
Commissioner Blas Ople would not.
51

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new
Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code,
Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are
not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other
notwithstanding the stronger expression of local
autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held
that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337
is still in force and effect.
52

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means
"a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of
decentralization."
53
The Constitution as we observed,
does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments
and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local
governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy,
however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership
and inter-dependence between the central administration
and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a
regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a
radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution,
are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no
other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to
enhance self- government.
As we observed in one case,
54
decentralization means
devolution of national administration but not power to the
local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either
decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration
when the central government
delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and
accountable," and "ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant
communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social
progress." At the same time, it relieves
the central government of the burden
of managing local affairs and enables it
to concentrate on national concerns.
The President exercises "general
supervision" over them, but only to
"ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has
no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments
with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the
other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be
autonomous, In that case, the
autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to
a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to
"self-immolation," since in that event,
the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.
55

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor
Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers
the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact
that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges,
the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of
suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima
faciefindings. The Court is not of course tolerating
misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon
is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question
to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is
effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held:
56

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal
mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His
term of office does not expire until
1986. Were it not for this information
and the suspension decreed by the
Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he
would have been all this while in the
full discharge of his functions as such
municipal mayor. He was elected
precisely to do so. As of October 26,
1983, he has been unable to. it is a
basic assumption of the electoral
process implicit in the right of suffrage
that the people are entitled to the
services of elective officials of their
choice. For misfeasance or
malfeasance, any of them could, of
course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, Ms
culpability must be established.
Moreover, if there be a criminal action,
he is entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence. A
preventive suspension may be
justified. Its continuance, however, for
an unreasonable length of time raises
a due process question. For even if
thereafter he were acquitted, in the
meanwhile his right to hold office had
been nullified. Clearly, there would be
in such a case an injustice suffered by
him. Nor is he the only victim. There is
injustice inflicted likewise on the
people of Lianga They were deprived
of the services of the man they had
elected to serve as mayor. In that
sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo,
the protracted continuance of this
preventive suspension had outrun the
bounds of reason and resulted in sheer
oppression. A denial of due process is
thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such
an unconstitutional application that
the order of suspension should be
lifted.
57

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with
suspensions, for the above reasons,
58
and so also, because
it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local
government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we
have held,
59
is simply "to prevent the accused from
hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his
influence and authority over possible witnesses"
60
or to
keep him off "the records and other evidence.
61

It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming
up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the
Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty
days,
62
which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty
days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and
which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors
have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive
imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his
presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless
and until found guilty.
Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local
Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no
more than sixty days. As we held,
63
a longer suspension is
unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less
than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension
which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all
intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his
term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes, his suspension permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the
fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse,
any absolution will be for naught because needless to say,
the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is
reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts
of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done in
Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor
Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the
respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the
necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor
without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is
that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so
to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him
down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent
Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President,
through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal
power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of
Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and
needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under
questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact
premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon
has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension
and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around
the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local
Government Code which brings to light a pattern of
suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his
natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what
appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to
perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer
the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the
purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued.
Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we
are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the
finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the
same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of
appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if
warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the
Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on
those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings
of prima facie evidence.
In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a
mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in
which local officials remain accountable to the central
government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to
the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative
control over local governments; it did not exempt the
latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is
consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the
national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the
manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action
against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent
terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the
President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the
suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be
suspended for the offenses he was charged originally;
provided:
a) that delays in
the investigation of
those charges "due
to his fault, neglect
or request, (the
time of the delay)
shall not be
counted in
computing the
time of suspension.
[Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or
after the expiration
of, his preventive
suspension, the
petitioner commits
another or other
crimes and abuses
for which proper
charges are filed
against him by the
aggrieved party or
parties, his
previous
suspension shall
not be a bar to his
being preventively
suspended again, if
warranted under
subpar. (2), Section
63 of the Local
Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are
DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is
LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED,
provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may
not be made to serve future suspensions on account of
any of the remaining administrative charges pending
against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988.
The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all
such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann
Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 82217 January 29, 1990
LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their
spouses, BRAULIO D. YARANON and DEMETRIO D.
BAUTISTA, JR., respectively; JAMES BRETT and SINAI C.
HAMADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO
MACARAIG, Executive Secretary, HON. VICENTE JAYME,
Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE,
Secretary of Budget and Management, and HON.
ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer,
respondents.

CORTES, J.:
In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15, 1987, which
created the (Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed
on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment
of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the
approval of the act through a plebiscite.
Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the
constitution, in Article X, provides:
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Sec. 15. There shall be created
autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well
as territorial integrity of the Republic
of the Philippines.
SEC. 16. The President shall exercise
general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and
responsibilities not granted
Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in
the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an
organic act for each autonomous
region with the assistance and
participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the
President from a list of nominees
from multi-sectoral bodies. The
organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the
region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts
with personal, family and property
law jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of this Constitution and
national laws.
The creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities,
and geographic areas voting favorably
in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region.
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected
under this Constitution shall, within
eighteen months from the time of
organization of both Houses, pass the
organic acts for the autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural
resources;
(4) Personal, family and property
relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning
development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism
development ;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of
the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be
authorized by law for the promotion
of the general welfare of the people
of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and
order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police
agencies which shall be organized,
maintained, supervised, and utilized
in accordance with applicable laws.
The defense and security of the
regions shall be the responsibility of
the National Government.
A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete Without
reference to its historical background.
In April 1986, just after the EDSA
Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg,
S.V.D., broke off on ideological
grounds from the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and its military
arm the New People's Army. (NPA).
After President Aquino was installed
into office by People Power, she
advocated a policy of national
reconciliation. She called on all
revolutionary forces to a peace
dialogue. The CPLA heeded this call of
the President. After the preliminary
negotiations, President Aquino and
some members of her Cabinet flew to
Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on
September 13, 1986 and signed with
Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As
Commander of the CPLA and Ama
Mario Yag-ao (as President of
Cordillera Bodong Administration, the
civil government of the CPLA a
ceasefire agreement that signified the
cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No.
7, E.O. 220).
The parties arrived at an agreement in
principle: the Cordillera people shall
not undertake their demands through
armed and violent struggle but by
peaceful means, such as political
negotiations. The negotiations shall
be a continuing process until the
demands of the Cordillera people
shall have been substantially granted.
On March 27, 1987, Ambassador
Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of
the government], in pursuance of the
September 13, 1986 agreement, flew
to the Mansion House, Baguio City,
and signed with Fr. Balweg (as
Chairman of the Cordillera panel) a
joint agreement, paragraphs 2 and 3
of which state:
Par. 2- Work together in drafting an
Executive Order to create a
preparatory body that could perform
policy-making and administrative
functions and undertake consultations
and studies leading to a draft organic
act for the Cordilleras.
Par. 3- Have representatives from the
Cordillera panel join the study group
of the R.P. Panel in drafting the
Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint
agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a
panel of the Philippine government
and of the representatives of the
Cordillera people.
On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C.
Aquino signed the joint draft into law,
known now as E.O. 220. [Rejoinder
G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3].
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the
exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6
of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) , which covers the provinces
of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was
created to accelerate economic and social growth in the
region and to prepare for the establishment of the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main
function is to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the region,
particularly, to coordinate with the local government
units as well as with the executive departments of the
National Government in the supervision of field offices
and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting
projects and activities in the region [sec. 5]. It shall also
monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and
local government projects in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR
shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-
formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an
implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the
Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time
as the autonomous regional government is established
and organized [sec. 17].
Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220,
its last "Whereas" clause provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of
the first Congress and the enactment
of the organic act for a Cordillera
autonomous region, there is an urgent
need, in the interest of national
security and public order, for the
President to reorganize immediately
the existing administrative structure
in the Cordilleras to suit it to the
existing political realities therein and
the Government's legitimate concerns
in the areas, without attempting to
pre-empt the constitutional duty of
the first Congress to undertake the
creation of an autonomous region on
a permanent basis.
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766
entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed
into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and
agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory
nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit:
SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board,
the Cordillera Region Assembly as
well as all offices and agencies
created under Execute Order No. 220
shall cease to exist immediately upon
the ratification of this Organic Act.
All funds, properties and assets of the
Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly shall
automatically be transferred to the
Cordillera Autonomous Government.
I
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the
inherent and stated powers and prerogatives of the law-
making body, as well as faithful adherence to the
principle of separation of powers, require that its
enactment be accorded the presumption of
constitutionality. Thus, in any challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute, the burden of clearly and
unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality always rests
upon the challenger. Conversely, failure to so prove will
necessarily defeat the challenge.
We shall be guided by these principles in considering
these consolidated petitions.
In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by
issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her
legislative powers prior to the convening of the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-
empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an
organic act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. We have carefully studied the Constitution
and E.O. No. 220 and we have come to the conclusion
that petitioners' assertions are unfounded. Events
subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220 also bear out
this conclusion.
1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it
actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination
of the delivery of services of line departments and
agencies of the National Government in the areas
covered by the administrative region as a step
preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras.
It does not create the autonomous region contemplated
in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic
act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it
prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not
necessarily conflict with the provisions of the
Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show
later.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the
creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. A
regional consultative commission shall first be created.
The President shall then appoint the members of a
regional consultative commission from a list of nominees
from multi-sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist
the Congress in preparing the organic act for the
autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed by
the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within
eighteen months from the time of its organization and
enacted into law. Thereafter there shall be held a
plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec.
18]. Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall
the autonomous region be created.
Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in
1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first
Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for
some measures to address the urgent needs of the
Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not
yet been passed and the autonomous region created.
These measures we find in E.O. No. 220. The steps taken
by the President are obviously perceived by petitioners,
particularly petitioner Yaranon who views E.O. No. 220 as
capitulation to the Cordillera People's Liberation Army
(CPLA) of Balweg, as unsound, but the Court cannot
inquire into the wisdom of the measures taken by the
President, We can only inquire into whether or not the
measures violate the Constitution. But as we have seen
earlier, they do not.
2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not
necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad
Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the
Cordilleras" [Petition, G.R. No. 79956, p. 25].
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of
government in the autonomous region composed of an
elective executive and legislature and special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec.
18]. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did
not establish an autonomous regional government. It
created a region, covering a specified area, for
administrative purposes with the main objective of
coordinating the planning and implementation of
programs and services [secs. 2 and 5]. To determine
policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene
yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with,
among others, identifying priority projects and
development programs [sec. 9]. To serve as an
implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive
Board composed of the Mayor of Baguio City, provincial
governors and representatives of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and non-
governmental organizations as regular members and all
regional directors of the line departments of the National
Government as ex-officio members and headed by an
Executive Director [secs. 10 and 11]. The bodies created
by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local
governmental structure, nor are they autonomous
government agencies. They merely constitute the
mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the
existing local governments, the agencies of the National
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and
non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to
spur development in the Cordilleras.
The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative
coordination is underscored by the mandate of E.O. No.
220 for the President and appropriate national
departments and agencies to make available sources of
funds for priority development programs and projects
recommended by the CAR [sec. 21] and the power given
to the President to call upon the appropriate executive
departments and agencies of the National Government
to assist the CAR [sec. 24].
3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the
Congress, after it was convened, enacted Republic Act
No. 6658 which created the Cordillera Regional
Consultative Commission. The President then appointed
its members. The commission prepared a draft organic
act which became the basis for the deliberations of the
Senate and the House of Representatives. The result was
Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera
autonomous region, which was signed into law on
October 23, 1989. A plebiscite for the approval of the
organic act, to be conducted shortly, shall complete the
process outlined in the Constitution.
In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and
effect for more than two years and we find that, despite
E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the Cordilleras is
still to be created, showing the lack of basis of
petitioners' assertion. Events have shown that
petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for
the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
was totally unfounded.
Clearly, petitioners' principal challenge has failed.
II
A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the
CAR: whether or not it is a territorial and political
subdivision. The Constitution provides in Article X:
Section 1. The territorial and political
subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras
as hereinafter provided.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. No province, city,
municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras contemplated by the
Constitution, Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion
that E. 0. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by
creating a new territorial and political subdivision.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220,
we find that it did not create a new territorial and
political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger
subdivision.
1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a
territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a
separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and
municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that
are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the
power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose
of property, the power to create its own sources of
revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created
primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation
of programs and services in the covered areas.
The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of
expediting the delivery of services is nothing new. The
Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made
as part of the law of the land by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 1, established eleven (11) regions, later
increased to twelve (12), with definite regional centers
and required departments and agencies of the Executive
Branch of the National Government to set up field offices
therein. The functions of the regional offices to be
established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1)
to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and
regulations of the department or agency in the regional
areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective
service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with
regional offices of other departments, bureaus and
agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local
government units in the area; and (5) to perform such
other functions as may be provided by law. [See Part II,
chap. III, art. 1, of the Reorganization Plan].
We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as
the administrative regions created under the
Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the
operation of the CAR requires the participation not only
of the line departments and agencies of the National
Government but also the local governments, ethno-
linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in
bringing about the desired objectives and the
appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.
2. Then, considering the control and supervision
exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices
created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the
indispensable participation of the line departments of
the National Government, the CAR may be considered
more than anything else as a regional coordinating
agency of the National Government, similar to the
regional development councils which the President may
create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These
councils are "composed of local government officials,
regional heads of departments and other government
offices, and representatives from non-governmental
organizations within the region for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the
autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the
economic and social growth and development of the
units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be
considered as a more sophisticated version of the
regional development council.
III
Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of
the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the
local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio
City) which compose the CAR.
We find first a need to clear up petitioners' apparent
misconception of the concept of local autonomy.
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of
local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers
to the administrative autonomy of local government
units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority [Villegas v.
Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1].
Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it
being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art.
II, sec. 10]. And while there was no express guarantee
under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the
Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the
Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the
irreversible march towards further enlargement of local
autonomy in the country [Villegas v. Subido, supra.]
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is
peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant
of political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision in the
Constitution for an autonomous regional government
with a basic structure consisting of an executive
department and a legislative assembly and special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in
each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory
coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for
political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the
resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of
adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already
enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an
autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
Anent petitioners' objection, we note the obvious failure
to show how the creation of the CAR has actually
diminished the local autonomy of the covered provinces
and city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure
speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient
to cause the invalidation of E.O. No. 220.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner, vs. Hon.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN in
her capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, respondents.
ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution vests the President with the power
of supervision, not control, over local government units
(LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs and
their officials execute their tasks in accordance with
law. While he may issue advisories and seek their
cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot
prevent them from performing their tasks and using
available resources to achieve their goals. He may not
withhold or alter any authority or power given them by
the law. Thus, the withholding of a portion of internal
revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by
administrative fiat.
The Case

Before us is an original Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition seeking (1) to annul Section 1 of Administrative
Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government
units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their
authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing
Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their
internal revenue allotments.
On November 17, 1998, Roberto Pagdanganan,
through Counsel Alberto C. Agra, filed a Motion for
Intervention/Motion to Admit Petition for
Intervention,
[1]
attaching thereto his Petition in
Intervention
[2]
joining petitioner in the reliefs sought. At
the time, intervenor was the provincial governor of
Bulacan, national president of the League of Provinces of
the Philippines and chairman of the League of Leagues of
Local Governments. In a Resolution dated December 15,
1998, the Court noted said Motion and Petition.
The Facts and the Arguments

On December 27, 1997, the President of the
Philippines issued AO 372. Its full text, with emphasis on
the assailed provisions, is as follows:
"ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372
ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT
FOR FY 1998
WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about
by the peso depreciation requires continued prudence in
government fiscal management to maintain economic
stability and sustain the country's growth momentum;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies
adopt cash management measures to match expenditures
with available resources;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and direct:
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies,
including state universities and colleges, government-
owned and controlled corporations and local
governments units will identify and implement measures
in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year
by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for
non-personal services items, along the following
suggested areas:
1. Continued implementation of the
streamlining policy on organization and
staffing by deferring action on the
following:
a. Operationalization of new agencies;
b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of
positions;
c. Filling of positions; and
d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual
and casual personnel, regardless of funding source.
2. Suspension of the following activities:
a. Implementation of new
capital/infrastructure projects, except
those which have already been
contracted out;
b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor
vehicles;
c. All foreign travels of government
personnel, except those associated
with scholarships and trainings funded
by grants;
d. Attendance in conferences abroad where
the cost is charged to the government
except those clearly essential to
Philippine commitments in the
international field as may be
determined by the Cabinet;
e. Conduct of
trainings/workshops/seminars, except
those conducted by government
training institutions and agencies in
the performance of their regular
functions and those that are funded by
grants;
f. Conduct of cultural and social
celebrations and sports activities,
except those associated with the
Philippine Centennial celebration and
those involving regular
competitions/events;
g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases
where it constitutes the only source of
compensation from government
received by the person concerned;
h. Publications, media advertisements and
related items, except those required
by law or those already being
undertaken on a regular basis;
i. Grant of new/additional benefits to
employees, except those expressly and
specifically authorized by law; and
j. Donations, contributions, grants and
gifts, except those given by institutions
to victims of calamities.
3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies
to all GOCCs and LGUs
4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of
fuel, water, office supplies, electricity and
other utilities
5. Deferment of projects that are
encountering significant implementation
problems
6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and
the use of savings and reserves
SECTION 2. Agencies are given the flexibility to identify
the specific sources of cost-savings, provided the 25%
minimum savings under Section 1 is complied with.
SECTION 3. A report on the estimated savings generated
from these measures shall be submitted to the Office of
the President, through the Department of Budget and
Management, on a quarterly basis using the attached
format.
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and
evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging
fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to
10% of the internal revenue allotment to
local government units shall be withheld.
SECTION 5. The Development Budget
Coordination Committee shall conduct a
monthly review of the fiscal position of the
National Government and if necessary,
shall recommend to the President the
imposition of additional reserves or the
lifting of previously imposed reserves.
SECTION 6. This Administrative Order shall
take effect January 1, 1998 and shall
remain valid for the entire year unless
otherwise lifted.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 27
th
day of December, in
the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-seven."
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President
Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO
372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of
internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the
LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO
372, was in effect exercising the power of control over
LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however,
only the power of generalsupervision over LGUs,
consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner
further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent
(10%) of their IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of the
Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each
of these units its share in the national internal revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents,
claims on the other hand that AO 372 was issued to
alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the
peso devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of
the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It
allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it
merely directs local governments to identify measures that
will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal
services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding
of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the
statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or
holdback on their revenue shares, because such
withholding is "temporary in nature pending the
assessment and evaluation by the Development
Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."
The Issues

The Petition
[3]
submits the following issues for the
Court's resolution:
"A. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse
of discretion [in] ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost
reduction program in violation of the LGU[']S fiscal
autonomy
"B. Whether or not the president committed grave
abuse of discretion in ordering the withholding of 10% of
the LGU[']S IRA"
In sum, the main issue is whether (a) Section 1 of AO
372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their
expenditures by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same
issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal
revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's
power of general supervision over local governments.
Additionally, the Court deliberated on the question
whether petitioner had the locus standi to bring this suit,
despite respondents' failure to raise the issue.
[4]
However,
the intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan has rendered
academic any further discussion on this matter.
The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.
Main Issue:

Validity of AO 372

Insofar as LGUs Are Concerned

Before resolving the main issue, we deem it
important and appropriate to define certain crucial
concepts: (1) the scope of the President's power of
general supervision over local governments and (2) the
extent of the local governments' autonomy.
Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs

Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the
President's power over local governments to one of
general supervision. It reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. x x x"
This provision has been interpreted to exclude the
power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,
[5]
the Court
contrasted the President's power of supervision over local
government officials with that of his power of control over
executive officials of the national government. It was
emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -
- differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished
them as follows:
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail
or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter."
[6]

In Taule v. Santos,
[7]
we further stated that the Chief
Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking
whether local governments or their officials were
performing their duties as provided by the fundamental
law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as they act within the scope of their
authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior
body; it does not include any restraining authority over
such body,"
[8]
we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,
[9]
the difference
between control and supervision was further
delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the
performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules
are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the
act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide
to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does
not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see
to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do
not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they
may order the work done or redone, but only to conform
to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner
of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
Under our present system of government, executive
power is vested in the President.
[10]
The members of the
Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter
egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of
the President, at whose will and behest they can be
removed from office; or their actions and decisions
changed, suspended or reversed.
[11]
In contrast, the heads
of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their
sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom
they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they
are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control,
so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of
their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President
may not withhold or alter any authority or power given
them by the Constitution and the law.
Extent of Local Autonomy

Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the
President's power over local governments is the state
policy of ensuring local autonomy.
[12]

In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,
[13]
we said that local
autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to
"break up the monopoly of the national government over
the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end
the relation of partnership and interdependence between
the central administration and local government units x x
x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to
regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing
self-government.
[14]

Decentralization simply means the devolution of
national administration, not power, to local
governments. Local officials remain accountable to the
central government as the law may provide.
[15]
The
difference between decentralization of administration and
that of power was explained in detail in Limbona v.
Mangelin
[16]
as follows:
"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments
'more responsive and accountable,'
[17]
and 'ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress.'
[18]
At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises 'general
supervision'
[19]
over them, but only to 'ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law.'
[20]
He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
[21]

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local
government units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-
immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency."
[22]

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the
national government has not completely relinquished all
its powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly responsive
and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic,
political and social development at the smaller political
units are expected to propel social and economic growth
and development. But to enable the country to develop as
a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must
be integrated and coordinated towards a common
national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country
still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated
in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal
governments are still agents of the national
government.
[23]

The Nature of AO 372

Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudential
precepts, let us now look into the nature of AO 372. As its
preambular clauses declare, the Order was a "cash
management measure" adopted by the government "to
match expenditures with available resources," which were
presumably depleted at the time due to "economic
difficulties brought about by the peso
depreciation." Because of a looming financial crisis, the
President deemed it necessary to "direct all government
agencies, state universities and colleges, government-
owned and controlled corporations as well as local
governments to reduce their total expenditures by at least
25 percent along suggested areas mentioned in AO 372.
Under existing law, local government units, in
addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise
of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal
autonomy means that local governments have the power
to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their
equitable share in the national taxes released by the
national government, as well as the power to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities. It
extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local
officials in turn have to work within the constraints
thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and
imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant
to local needs and resources or not. Hence, the necessity
of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of
proposals from both local and national officials,
[24]
who in
any case are partners in the attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any
manner of national government intervention by way of
supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal
and otherwise, are consistent with national
goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is
the head of the economic and planning agency of the
government,
[25]
primarily responsible for formulating and
implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated
social and economic policies, plans and programs
[26]
for
the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the
formulation and the implementation of such policies and
programs are subject to "consultations with the
appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and
local government units." The President cannot do so
unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code
provides:
[27]

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an
unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the
Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary
of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of
Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with
the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments
in the internal revenue allotment of local government
units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national internal
revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current
fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the
President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an
unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers
of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government,
and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than
thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal
revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current
one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to
comply with these requisites before the issuance and the
implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not
even try to show that the national government was
suffering from an unmanageable public sector
deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted
consultations with the different leagues of local
governments. Without these requisites, the President has
no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally
the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is
merely directory and has been issued by the President
consistent with his power of supervision over local
governments. It is intended only to advise all government
agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-
reduction measures that will help maintain economic
stability in the country, which is facing economic
difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in
case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory,
therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of
the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the
directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the
power of control.
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a
rather commanding tone, and while we agree with
petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the
Local Government Code have not been satisfied, we are
prepared to accept the solicitor general's
assurance that the directive to "identify and implement
measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x
x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is
merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a
mandatory or binding order that interferes with local
autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does
not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a
subaltern.
Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail
upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal
restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all
concerned would do well to heed the President's call to
unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the
crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction
may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not
follow such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the
solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1.
Withholding a Part of LGUs' IRA

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A
basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
[28]
The Local Government Code
[29]
specifies
further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU
concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the
year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that
may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose."
[30]
As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of
command that must be given a compulsory
meaning.
[31]
The provision is, therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the
withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of
the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by
the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding
clearly contravenes the Constitution and the
law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback,
which means "something held back or withheld, often
temporarily."
[32]
Hence, the "temporary" nature of the
retention by the national government does not
matter. Any retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as
an advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4
thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision
effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local
governments. Concededly, the President was well-
intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs IRA,
but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions
must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must
be carried out by legal methods.
Refutation of Justice Kapunan's Dissent

Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents from our
Decision on the grounds that, allegedly, (1) the Petition is
premature; (2) AO 372 falls within the powers of the
President as chief fiscal officer; and (3) the withholding of
the LGUs IRA is implied in the President's authority to
adjust it in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit.
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent,
when "the conduct has not yet occurred and the
challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the
agency charged with administering the administrative
order, the determination of the scope and
constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its
immediate adverse effect involves too remote and
abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial
function."
This is a rather novel theory -- that people should
await the implementing evil to befall on them before they
can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it
remembered that the real issue here is whether the
Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of
AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts
implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Taada v.
Angara,
[33]
this Court held that when an act of the
legislative department is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy
becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of
the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:
"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition
no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. 'The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that
the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.'
[34]
Once a
'controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x , it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide.'
[35]

x x x x x x x x x
"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in
many cases,
[36]
it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its
sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in
matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought
before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer,
agency, instrumentality or department of the
government."
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v.
Secretary of the Department of Energy:
[37]

"x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the
courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution,
have the inherent authority to determine whether a
statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute
violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the
duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional
and void."
By the same token, when an act of the President,
who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress,
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and
the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
Besides, the issue that the Petition is premature has
not been raised by the parties; hence it is deemed
waived. Considerations of due process really prevents its
use against a party that has not been given sufficient
notice of its presentation, and thus has not been given the
opportunity to refute it.
[38]

Second, on the President's power as chief fiscal
officer of the country. Justice Kapunan posits that Section
4 of AO 372 conforms with the President's role as chief
fiscal officer, who allegedly "is clothed by law with certain
powers to ensure the observance of safeguards and
auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites in
the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the
constitutional and statutory mandates."
[39]
He cites
instances when the President may lawfully intervene in
the fiscal affairs of LGUs.
Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent
have specifically been authorized by law and have not
been challenged as violative of the Constitution. On the
other hand, Section 4 of AO 372, as explained earlier,
contravenes explicit provisions of the Local Government
Code (LGC) and the Constitution. In other words, the acts
alluded to in the Dissent are indeed authorized by law;
but, quite the opposite, Section 4 of AO 372 is bereft of
any legal or constitutional basis.
Third, on the President's authority to adjust the IRA
of LGUs in case of an unmanageable public sector
deficit. It must be emphasized that in striking down
Section 4 of AO 372, this Court is not ruling out any form
of reduction in the IRAs of LGUs. Indeed, as the President
may make necessary adjustments in case of an
unmanageable public sector deficit, as stated in the main
part of this Decision, and in line with Section 284 of the
LGC, which Justice Kapunan cites. He, however, merely
glances over a specific requirement in the same provision -
- that such reduction is subject to consultation with the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and, more
importantly, with the presidents of the leagues of local
governments.
Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need for
"interaction between the national government and the
LGUs at the planning level," in order to ensure that "local
development plans x x x hew to national policies and
standards." The problem is that no such interaction or
consultation was ever held prior to the issuance of AO
372. This is why the petitioner and the intervenor (who
was a provincial governor and at the same time president
of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and chairman
of the League of Leagues of Local Governments) have
protested and instituted this action. Significantly,
respondents do not deny the lack of consultation.
In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section 287
[40]
of
the LGC as impliedly authorizing the President to withhold
the IRA of an LGU, pending its compliance with certain
requirements. Even a cursory reading of the provision
reveals that it is totally inapplicable to the issue at bar. It
directs LGUs to appropriate in their annual budgets 20
percent of their respective IRAs for development
projects. It speaks of no positive power granted the
President to priorly withhold any amount. Not at all.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents
and their successors are hereby
permanently PROHIBITED from implementing
Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43, respectively dated
December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998, insofar as
local government units are concerned.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 195770 - July 17, 2012]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., SERGIO TADEO and NELSON
ALCANTARA, Petitioners, v.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA and SECRETARY CORAZON JULIANO-
SOLIMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and
DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Case
For the Court s consideration in this Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition is the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 10147 or the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2011
1
which provides
a P21 Billion budget allocation for the Conditional Cash
Transfer Program (CCTP) headed by the Department of
Social Welfare & Development (DSWD). Petitioners seek to
enjoin respondents Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa
and DSWD Secretary Corazon Juliano-Soliman from
implementing the said program on the ground that it
amounts to a "recentralization" of government functions
that have already been devolved from the national
government to the local government units.
The Facts
In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction
strategy with the poorest of the poor as target
beneficiaries.
2
Dubbed "Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino," it was
pre-pilot tested in the municipalities of Sibagat and
Esperanza in Agusan del Sur; the municipalities of Lopez
Jaena and Bonifacio in Misamis Occidental, the Caraga
Region; and the cities of Pasay and Caloocan
3
upon the
release of the amount of P50 Million Pesos under a Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO) issued by the Department
of Budget and Management.
4
rll
On July 16, 2008, the DSWD issued Administrative Order
No. 16, series of 2008 (A.O. No. 16, s. 2008),
5
setting the
implementing guidelines for the project renamed
"Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program" (4Ps), upon the
following stated objectives, to wit:rbl
r l l lbrr
1. To improve preventive health care of pregnant women
and young children
2. To increase enrollment/attendance of children at
elementary level
3. To reduce incidence of child labor
4. To raise consumption of poor households on nutrient
dense foods
5. To encourage parents to invest in their children's (and
their own) future
6. To encourage parent's participation in the growth and
development of young children, as well as involvement in
the community.
6
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chanrobles virtual law library
This government intervention scheme, also conveniently
referred to as CCTP, "provides cash grant to extreme poor
households to allow the members of the families to meet
certain human development goals."
7
rll
Eligible households that are selected from priority target
areas consisting of the poorest provinces classified by the
National Statistical Coordination Board (NCSB)
8
are
granted a health assistance of P500.00/month, or
P6,000.00/year, and an educational assistance of
P300.00/month for 10 months, or a total of
P3,000.00/year, for each child but up to a maximum of
three children per family.
9
Thus, after an assessment on
the appropriate assistance package, a household
beneficiary could receive from the government an annual
subsidy for its basic needs up to an amount of P15,000.00,
under the following conditionalities:rbl
r l l lbrr
a) Pregnant women must get pre natal care starting from
the 1st trimester, child birth is attended by skilled/trained
professional, get post natal care thereafter
b) Parents/guardians must attend family planning
sessions/mother's class, Parent Effectiveness Service and
others
c) Children 0-5 years of age get regular preventive health
check-ups and vaccines
d) Children 3-5 years old must attend day care
program/pre-school
e) Children 6-14 years of age are enrolled in schools and
attend at least 85% of the time
10
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chanrobles virtual law library
Under A.O. No. 16, s. 2008, the DSWD also
institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network
among the Department of Education (DepEd), Department
of Health (DOH), Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), the National Anti-Poverty Commission
(NAPC) and the local government units (LGUs), identifying
specific roles and functions in order to ensure effective
and efficient implementation of the CCTP. As the DSWD
takes on the role of lead implementing agency that must
"oversee and coordinate the implementation, monitoring
and evaluation of the program," the concerned LGU as
partner agency is particularly tasked to rbl
r l l lbrr
A. Ensure availability of the supply side on health and
education in the target areas.
b. Provide necessary technical assistance for Program
implementation
c. Coordinate the implementation/operationalization of
sectoral activities at the City/Municipal level to better
execute Program objectives and functions
d. Coordinate with various concerned government
agencies at the local level, sectoral representatives and
NGO to ensure effective Program implementation
e. Prepare reports on issues and concerns regarding
Program implementation and submit to the Regional
Advisory Committee, and
f. Hold monthly committee meetings
11
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chanrobles virtual law library
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
12
executed by the
DSWD with each participating LGU outlines in detail the
obligation of both parties during the intended five-year
implementation of the CCTP.
Congress, for its part, sought to ensure the success of the
CCTP by providing it with funding under the GAA of 2008
in the amount of Two Hundred Ninety-Eight Million Five
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P298,550,000.00). This
budget allocation increased tremendously to P5 Billion
Pesos in 2009, with the amount doubling to P10 Billion
Pesos in 2010. But the biggest allotment given to the CCTP
was in the GAA of 2011 at Twenty One Billion One
Hundred Ninety-Four Million One Hundred Seventeen
Thousand Pesos (P21,194,117,000.00).
13
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Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a former Senator, joined
by Sergio Tadeo, incumbent President of the Association of
Barangay Captains of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, and
Nelson Alcantara, incumbent Barangay Captain of
Barangay Sta. Monica, Quezon City, challenges before the
Court the disbursement of public funds and the
implementation of the CCTP which are alleged to have
encroached into the local autonomy of the LGUs.
The Issue
THE P21 BILLION CCTP BUDGET ALLOCATION UNDER THE
DSWD IN THE GAA FY 2011 VIOLATES ART. II, SEC. 25 &
ART. X, SEC. 3 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN RELATION
TO SEC. 17 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 BY
PROVIDING FOR THE RECENTRALIZATION OF THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF BASIC
SERVICES ALREADY DEVOLVED TO THE LGUS.
Petitioners admit that the wisdom of adopting the CCTP as
a poverty reduction strategy for the Philippines is with the
legislature. They take exception, however, to the manner
by which it is being implemented, that is, primarily
through a national agency like DSWD instead of the LGUs
to which the responsibility and functions of delivering
social welfare, agriculture and health care services have
been devolved pursuant to Section 17 of Republic Act No.
7160, also known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
in relation to Section 25, Article II & Section 3, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners assert that giving the DSWD full control over
the identification of beneficiaries and the manner by
which services are to be delivered or conditionalities are to
be complied with, instead of allocating the P21 Billion
CCTP Budget directly to the LGUs that would have
enhanced its delivery of basic services, results in the
"recentralization" of basic government functions, which is
contrary to the precepts of local autonomy and the
avowed policy of decentralization.
Our Ruling
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure
the autonomy of local governments
14
and even devotes a
full article on the subject of local governance
15
which
includes the following pertinent provisions:rl
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
x x x
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional
development councils or other similar bodies composed of
local government officials, regional heads of departments
and other government offices, and representatives from
non-governmental organizations within the regions for
purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen
the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the
economic and social growth and development of the units
in the region. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and
meaningful autonomy that would develop them into self-
reliant communities and effective partners in the
attainment of national goals,
16
Section 17 of the Local
Government Code vested upon the LGUs the duties and
functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and
facilities, as follows:rl
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.rbl
r l l lbrr
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant
and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging
the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They
shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant
to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise
such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental
to efficient and effective provision of the basic services
and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not
limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to
take on the functions and responsibilities that have
already been devolved upon them from the national
agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and
facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of
the same provision provides a categorical exception of
cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services, thus:rl
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b)
hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other
facilities, programs and services funded by the National
Government under the annual General Appropriations Act,
other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those
wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not
covered under this Section, except in those cases where
the local government unit concerned is duly designated as
the implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
programs and services. (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The essence of this express reservation of power by the
national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by
the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
The Court held in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals
17
that while
it is through a system of decentralization that the State
shall promote a more responsive and accountable local
government structure, the concept of local autonomy does
not imply the conversion of local government units into
"mini-states."
18
We explained that, with local autonomy,
the Constitution did nothing more than "to break up the
monopoly of the national government over the affairs of
the local government" and, thus, did not intend to sever
"the relation of partnership and interdependence between
the central administration and local government
units."
19
In Pimentel v. Aguirre,
20
the Court defined the
extent of the local government's autonomy in terms of its
partnership with the national government in the pursuit of
common national goals, referring to such key concepts as
integration and coordination. Thus:rl
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the
national government has not completely relinquished all
its powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly responsive
and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political
and social development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and
development. But to enable the country to develop as a
whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be
integrated and coordinated towards a common national
goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in
the President and Congress.
Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance to the
local government unit as to preclude any and all
involvement by the national government in programs
implemented in the local level would be to shift the tide of
monopolistic power to the other extreme, which would
amount to a decentralization of power explicated in
Limbona v. Mangelin
21
as beyond our constitutional
concept of autonomy, thus:rl
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments more
responsive and accountable and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress. At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises general
supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs
are administered according to law. He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the [sic] favor of local
governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts
to self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.
22
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Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government
powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code
itself weighs against it. The national government is, thus,
not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation
and implementation of national development programs
especially where it is implemented locally in coordination
with the LGUs concerned.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
a doubtful and argumentative one.
23
Petitioners have failed
to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of the
provisions under the GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21
billion budget for an intervention program formulated by
the national government itself but implemented in
partnership with the local government units to achieve the
common national goal development and social progress
can by no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy
of local governments.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,
vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI,
PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY
TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO
PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO
SINSUAT, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for
petitioner petitioner.
Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are
assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as
follows:
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner
Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was
appointed as a member of the
Sangguniang Pampook, Regional
Autonomous Government, Region XII,
representing Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was
elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of
eighteen (18) members. Two of said
members, respondents Acmad
Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on
March 23, 1987 with the Commission
on Elections their respective
certificates of candidacy in the May 11,
1987 congressional elections for the
district of Lanao del Sur but they later
withdrew from the aforesaid election
and thereafter resumed again their
positions as members of the Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman
Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of
the Committee on Muslim Affairs of
the House of Representatives, invited
Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of
Region XI, Zamboanga City and the
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of
the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter
which reads:
The Committee on
Muslim Affairs well
undertake
consultations and
dialogues with
local government
officials, civic,
religious
organizations and
traditional leaders
on the recent and
present political
developments and
other issues
affecting Regions IX
and XII.
The result of the
conference,
consultations and
dialogues would
hopefully chart the
autonomous
governments of
the two regions as
envisioned and
may prod the
President to
constitute
immediately the
Regional
Consultative
Commission as
mandated by the
Commission.
You are requested
to invite some
members of the
Pampook Assembly
of your respective
assembly on
November 1 to 15,
1987, with venue
at the Congress of
the Philippines.
Your presence,
unstinted support
and cooperation is
(sic) indispensable.
5. Consistent with the said invitation,
petitioner sent a telegram to Acting
Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the
Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that
there shall be no session in November
as "our presence in the house
committee hearing of Congress take
(sic) precedence over any pending
business in batasang pampook ... ."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid
instruction of the petitioner, Acting
Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the
members of the Assembly the
following telegram:
TRANSMITTING
FOR YOUR
INFORMATION
AND GUIDANCE
TELEGRAM
RECEIVED FROM
SPEAKER LIMBONA
QUOTE
CONGRESSMAN
JIMMY MATALAM
CHAIRMAN OF THE
HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON
MUSLIM AFFAIRS
REQUESTED ME TO
ASSIST SAID
COMMITTEE IN
THE DISCUSSION
OF THE PROPOSED
AUTONOMY
ORGANIC NOV. 1ST
TO 15. HENCE
WERE ALL
ASSEMBLYMEN
THAT THERE SHALL
BE NO SESSION IN
NOVEMBER AS
OUR PRESENCE IN
THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE
HEARING OF
CONGRESS TAKE
PRECEDENCE OVER
ANY PENDING
BUSINESS IN
BATASANG
PAMPOOK OF
MATALAM
FOLLOWS
UNQUOTE
REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly
held session in defiance of petitioner's
advice, with the following
assemblymen present:
1. Sali, Salic
2. Conding,
Pilipinas (sic)
3. Dagalangit, Rakil
4. Dela Fuente,
Antonio
5. Mangelen, Conte
6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares,
Diego
8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
After declaring the presence of a
quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was
authorized to preside in the session.
On Motion to declare the seat of the
Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in
attendance voted in the affirmative,
hence, the chair declared said seat of
the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5,
1987, the session of the Assembly
resumed with the following
Assemblymen present:
1. Mangelen
Conte-Presiding
Officer
2. Ali Salic
3. Ali Salindatu
4. Aratuc, Malik
5. Cajelo, Rene
6. Conding,
Pilipinas (sic)
7. Dagalangit, Rakil
8. Dela Fuente,
Antonio
9. Ortiz, Jesus
10 Palomares,
Diego
11. Quijano, Jesus
12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
13. Tomawis,
Acmad
14. Tomawis, Jerry
An excerpt from the debates and
proceeding of said session reads:
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker,
Honorable Members of the House,
with the presence of our colleagues
who have come to attend the session
today, I move to call the names of the
new comers in order for them to cast
their votes on the previous motion to
declare the position of the Speaker
vacant. But before doing so, I move
also that the designation of
the Speaker Pro Tempore as the
Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny
Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the
session last November 2, 1987 be
reconfirmed in today's session.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or
objections on the two motions
presented? Me chair hears none and
the said motions are approved. ...
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of
the motion to declare the seat of the
Speaker vacant; one abstained and
none voted against.
1

Accordingly, the petitioner prays for
judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully
prays that-
(a) This Petition be given due course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction be
issued enjoining respondents from
proceeding with their session to be
held on November 5, 1987, and on any
day thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be
rendered declaring the proceedings
held by respondents of their session on
November 2, 1987 as null and void;
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as
Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or
Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on
March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting,
and
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other
relief as may be just and equitable.
2

Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19,
1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang
Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK
AUTONOMOUS REGION XII,"
3
on the grounds, among
other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be
prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and
emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned
after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for
the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11,
elections. . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will
show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was
ever made . . ."
4
and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in
paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without
authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation
of the power of the Assembly,"
5
that the petitioner "had
recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash
from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the
salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic],"
6
and
that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against
some members of the Assembly on question which should
have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly,"
7
for which the respondents now submit that
the petition had become "moot and academic".
8

The first question, evidently, is whether or not the
expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made
the case moot and academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot
and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution
so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done
purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and
to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process
alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force
and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the
Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether
or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense,
assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise
given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what
appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at
least, the respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to
this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the
Sangguniang Pampook."
9
"To be sure, the private
respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a
conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato
City,"
10
but that was "so that their differences could be
threshed out and settled."
11
Certainly, that avowed
wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how
conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice
and hearing contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known
in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice
and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be
heard,
12
it does not appear herein that the petitioner had,
to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood
charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It
cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any
opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then,
the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that
cannot warrant expulsion.
In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be
a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against
the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be
abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the
resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the
petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question
which should have been resolved within the confines of
the Assemblyman act which some members claimed
unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and
character as representative of the people"
13
an act that
cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial
remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution,
14
and, unless
the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one
may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that
should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his
removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so
minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line
with the most elementary requirements of due process.
And while it is within the discretion of the members of the
Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are
nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court
in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave
abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the
Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts
may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less
strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second
issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of
Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is
the extent of self-government given to the two
autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were
organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No.
1618
15
promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things,
the Decree established "internal autonomy"
16
in the two
regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines and its Constitution,"
17
with legislative and
executive machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities
18
specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to
"undertake all internal administrative matters for the
respective regions,"
19
except to "act on matters which are
within the jurisdiction and competence of the National
Government,"
20
"which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign
exchange, banking and quasi-banking,
and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration,
development, exploitation or
utilization of all natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and
telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and
educational planning; and
(12) General auditing.
21

In relation to the central government, it provides that
"[t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions
..."
22

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments
"more responsive and accountable,"
23
"and ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress."
24
At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision"
25
over them, but only to "ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law."
26
He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
27

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declare to be autonomous . In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-
immolation," since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.
28

But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy
Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves,
truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere
administration is a question foreign to this petition, since
what is involved herein is a local government unit
constituted prior to the ratification of the present
Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that
controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact
exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the
proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy
autonomy in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political
subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. Here
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
29

Sec. 2. The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.
30

xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created
autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines.
31

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the
latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject
alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the
President (and the Department of Local Government).
32
If
the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably
beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the
Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were
never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
that is, in which the central government commits an act of
self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first
place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power
of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions."
33
In the second place, the Sangguniang
Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge
chiefly administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang
Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook
shall exercise local legislative powers
over regional affairs within the
framework of national development
plans, policies and goals, in the
following areas:
(1) Organization of regional
administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural
development of the Autonomous
Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and
industrial programs for the
Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the
Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the
Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising
measures as provided for in this
Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and
administration of schools established
by the Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and
maintenance of health, welfare and
other social services, programs and
facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of
customs, traditions, languages and
culture indigenous to the Autonomous
Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be
authorized by law,including the
enactment of such measures as may
be necessary for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people in the
Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such
powers as may be necessary to assure
that enactment and acts of the
Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in
compliance with this Decree, national
legislation, policies, plans and
programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall
maintain liaison with the Batasang
Pambansa.
34

Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an
inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with
more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as
Speaker.
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as
Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in
convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole
purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did
so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook
since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming
that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless
for lack of quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2
and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions
shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of
the Sangguniang Pampook,"
35
but it provides likewise that
"the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess
of "short intervals."
36
Of course, there is disagreement
between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess
called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15,
1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the
petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that,
to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and
that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess
when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a
debate can talk things out informally and obviate
dissenssion [sic] and disunity.
37
The Court agrees with the
respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak
of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees
that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess
since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1,
the date session opens under the same Rules.
38
Hence,
there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly
interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord
with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called
the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he
could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered
by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives provided a plausible reason for the
intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess
could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions
themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground
of good faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had
resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the
Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not
apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced
that the invitation was what precipitated it.
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not
to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said,
a recess can not be validly declared without a session
having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner
herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order
recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or
otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the
Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful
prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In
the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive
moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough
coercive remedies to thwart them.
39

In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of
quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is
ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member,
Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him
as Speaker thereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN
DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,respondents.
Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced
the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic
organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious
elements echoed the objection and so did the women's
groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the
mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the
protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare
of the city.
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous
success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its
operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents,
renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it
enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND
CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS
PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR
THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE
USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION
THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF
CASINO.
BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de
Oro, in session assembled that:
Sec. 1. That pursuant to the policy
of the city banning the operation of
casino within its territorial jurisdiction,
no business permit shall be issued to
any person, partnership or corporation
for the operation of casino within the
city limits.
Sec. 2. That it shall be a violation of
existing business permit by any
persons, partnership or corporation to
use its business establishment or
portion thereof, or allow the use
thereof by others for casino operation
and other gambling activities.
Sec. 3. PENALTIES. Any violation
of such existing business permit as
defined in the preceding section shall
suffer the following penalties, to wit:
a
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Sec. 4. This Ordinance shall take
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Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner
Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
OPERATION OF CASINO AND
PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
THEREFOR.
WHEREAS, the City Council established
a policy as early as 1990 against
CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the
City Council passed another Resolution
No. 2673, reiterating its policy against
the establishment of CASINO;
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it
likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of Business
Permit and to cancel existing Business
Permit to any establishment for the
using and allowing to be used its
premises or portion thereof for the
operation of CASINO;
WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458,
No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act
7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4),
Paragraph VI of the implementing rules
of the Local Government Code, the
City Council as the Legislative Body
shall enact measure to suppress any
activity inimical to public morals and
general welfare of the people and/or
regulate or prohibit such activity
pertaining to amusement or
entertainment in order to protect
social and moral welfare of the
community;
NOW THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in
session duly assembled that:
Sec. 1. The operation of gambling
CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro
is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 2. Any violation of this
Ordinance shall be subject to the
following penalties:
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00
shall be imposed against the
proprietor, partnership or corporation
undertaking the operation, conduct,
maintenance of gambling CASINO in
the City and closure thereof;
b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6)
months nor more than one (1) year or
a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or
both at the discretion of the court
against the manager, supervisor,
and/or any person responsible in the
establishment, conduct and
maintenance of gambling CASINO.
Sec. 3. This Ordinance shall take
effect ten (10) days after its
publication in a local newspaper of
general circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals,
where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On
March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the
ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to
prohibit their enforcement.
1
Reconsideration of this
decision was denied on July 13, 1993.
2

Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in
this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
3
They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in holding that:
1. Under existing laws, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Cagayan de Oro does not have the
power and authority to prohibit the
establishment and operation of a
PAGCOR gambling casino within the
City's territorial limits.
2. The phrase "gambling and other
prohibited games of chance" found in
Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) (v) of
R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal
gambling."
3. The questioned Ordinances in effect
annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore
invalid on that point.
4. The questioned Ordinances are
discriminatory to casino and partial to
cockfighting and are therefore invalid
on that point.
5. The questioned Ordinances are not
reasonable, not consonant with the
general powers and purposes of the
instrumentality concerned and
inconsistent with the laws or policy of
the State.
6. It had no option but to follow the
ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v.
PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14,
1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the
issues presented in this present case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to
help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including
casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and
Gaming Corporation,
4
this Court sustained the
constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits
of the entity to the national economy as the third highest
revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR
and the Bureau of Customs.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions,
is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes
indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly
vested with the police power under what is known as the
General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as
follows:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every
local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific
and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically
declares that:
Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions
and Compensation. (a) The
Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code
and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass
resolutions necessary for an efficient
and effective city government, and in
this connection, shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(
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regulate properties and businesses within their territorial
limits in the interest of the general welfare.
5

The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of
casinos because they involve games of chance, which are
detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by
general law and even by the Constitution itself. The
legislative power conferred upon local government units
may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only
over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously
argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been
permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de
Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its
territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the
Local Government Code.
It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with
the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II,
Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as
various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the
character of the nation. In giving the local government
units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and
other social problems, the Local Government Code has
recognized the competence of such communities to
determine and adopt the measures best expected to
promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line
with the policies of the State.
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly
authorized the local government units to prevent and
suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance,
like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it
meant allforms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.
6
Otherwise,
it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their
power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by
special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did
not do so simply means that the local government units
are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their
territories, including the operation of casinos.
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed
out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the
PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D.
1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies
between them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR
under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code
insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and
provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause
reading as follows:
(f) All general and special laws, acts,
city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or
parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code
are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt
regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D.
1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the
petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code
calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local
government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically
provides:
Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In
the interpretation of the provisions of
this Code, the following rules shall
apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local
government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of
powers and of the lower local
government unit. Any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence
of the power shall be interpreted in
favor of the local government unit
concerned;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The general welfare provisions in
this Code shall be liberally interpreted
to give more powers to local
government units in accelerating
economic development and upgrading
the quality of life for the people in the
community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically
harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and
several decisions of this Court expressive of the general
and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the
State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of
the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the
old case of U.S. v. Salaveria,
7
which sustained a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The
petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also
impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as
"a martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR and
authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."
This is the opportune time to stress an important point.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is
nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it
at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it
sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the
legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of
gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may
consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices,
Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court
has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it
been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
conflicting theories.
8
That is the prerogative of the
political departments. It is settled that questions regarding
the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not
addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the
legislative and executive departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government. That
function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches
decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience
and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts,
and not to the courts of justice.
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition
is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No.
3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the
criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions
on the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long
line of decisions
9
has held that to be valid, an ordinance
must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the
constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or
discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may
regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent
with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local
Government Code, local government units are authorized
to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this
provision excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The
petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code
could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In
fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or
phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the
same meaning of, words with which it is associated.
Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling"
is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance,"
the word should be read as referring to only illegal
gambling which, like the other prohibited games of
chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the
problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous
efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of
Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their
advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that
they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied
therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising
the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan
de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to
this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that
have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly
cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the
change has been made by the Local Government Code
itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking
authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really
repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in
the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over
the objection of the local government unit concerned. This
modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is
permissible because one law can change or repeal another
law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words.
While insisting that the decree has only been "modifiedpro
tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead,
repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because
the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and
regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now
be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in
fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary
but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word
"shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning.
Local government units have now no choice but to prevent
and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view
includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this
construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance
to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by
the local government units pursuant to the mandatory
duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation,
PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a
toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be
able to exercise its powers as a prime source of
government revenue through the operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f)
of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of
the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific
laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified)
by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A
reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced
below, will disclose the omission:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known
as the "Local Government Code,"
Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and
Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are
hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191,
1508 and such other decrees, orders,
instructions, memoranda and
issuances related to or concerning the
barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and
4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding
hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2)
of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the
Special Education Fund; Presidential
Decree No. 144 as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741;
Presidential Decree No. 231 as
amended; Presidential Decree No. 436
as amended by Presidential Decree No.
558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381,
436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136
are hereby repealed and rendered of
no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is
hereby repealed insofar as it governs
locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby
repealed or amended insofar as they
are inconsistent with the provisions of
this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections
12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as
amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68,
69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended; and Section 16 of
Presidential Decree No. 972, as
amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts,
city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or
parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code
are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are
not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co.
v. Apostol,
10
this Court explained:
The cases relating to the subject of
repeal by implication all proceed on
the assumption that if the act of later
date clearly reveals an intention on the
part of the lawmaking power to
abrogate the prior law, this intention
must be given effect; but there must
always be a sufficient revelation of this
intention, and it has become an
unbending rule of statutory
construction that the intention to
repeal a former law will not be
imputed to the Legislature when it
appears that the two statutes, or
provisions, with reference to which the
question arises bear to each other the
relation of general to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of
P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent
points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding
in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309,
creating a Board of Claims under the Department of
Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or
detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for
measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR
revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would
show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by
the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved
as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal
problems of the government.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting
one statute against another in an inevitably destructive
confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile
them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming
respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the
government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D.
1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one
and annul the other but to give effect to both by
harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case
before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is
to hold that under the Local Government Code, local
government units may (and indeed must) prevent and
suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories
except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The
exception reserved in such laws must be read into the
Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally
effective and mutually complementary.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two
kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized
by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is
probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so.
The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them
to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the
distinction between these two forms of gambling without
a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature.
Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could,
by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as
authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at
the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and
R.A. 983.
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of
arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners
that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary,
we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has
the character and force of a statute, as well as the public
policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of
certain games of chance despite the prohibition of
gambling in general.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances
should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can
undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived
their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their
origin to, and derive their powers and
rights wholly from the legislature. It
breathes into them the breath of life,
without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so it may destroy. As it may
destroy, it may abridge and control.
Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature
might, by a single act, and if we can
suppose it capable of so great a folly
and so great a wrong, sweep from
existence all of the municipal
corporations in the State, and the
corporation could not prevent it. We
know of no limitation on the right so
far as to the corporation themselves
are concerned. They are, so to phrase
it, the mere tenants at will of the
legislature.
11

This basic relationship between the national legislature
and the local government units has not been enfeebled by
the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the
policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract
from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains
control of the local government units although in
significantly reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power
to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable
innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment
on the local government units of the power to tax,
12
which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large,
however, the national legislature is still the principal of the
local government units, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it.
The Court understands and admires the concern of the
petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their
apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will
be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the
view that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained
without special effort, turns the head of the
workman"
13
and that "habitual gambling is a cause of
laziness and ruin."
14
In People v. Gorostiza,
15
we declared:
"The social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The
laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit."
George Washington called gambling "the child of avarice,
the brother of iniquity and the father of mischief."
Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the
legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain
forms of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly
affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can
be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the
Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do
not find such contravention here.
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and
regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and
sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines,
remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by
the Local Government Code, which empowers the local
government units to prevent or suppress only those forms
of gambling prohibited by law.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree
has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not
competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de
Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use
of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance
No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all
their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary
to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and
are therefore ultra vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 129093 August 30, 2001
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN
OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONY
CALVENTO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated February 10,
1997 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 93, enjoining petitioners from implementing or
enforcing Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and its
subsequent Order 2 dated April 21, 1997 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was
appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation
of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San
Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto
outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated
February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was
issued on September 18, 1995. The ordinance reads:
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA
"ILLEGAL GAMBLING" LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA
LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng
Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng
masasamang impluwensiya lalo't higit sa mga
kabataan;
KUNG KAYA'T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina
Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala A.
Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C.
Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng
lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit
na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito
sa lalawigan ng Laguna lalo't higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay
hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng Philippine
National Police (PNP) Col. [illegible] na mahigpit
na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat ng uri ng
illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng Laguna lalo
na ang "Jueteng".
3

As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent
Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent
Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro
Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or
enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order
requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R Cataquiz to issue
a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and
(3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco
Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the
petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution
or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. The dispositive portion
of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants,
their agents and representatives are hereby
enjoined from implementing or enforcing
resolution or kapasiyahan blg. 508, T. 1995 of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Laguna
prohibiting the operation of the lotto in the
province of Laguna.
SO ORDERED.
4

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was
subsequently denied in an Order dated April 21, 1997,
which reads:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by defendants Jose D. Lina, Jr. and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, thru
counsel, with the opposition filed by plaintiff's
counsel and the comment thereto filed by
counsel for the defendants which were duly
noted, the Court hereby denies the motion for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
5

On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging
that the following errors were committed by the
respondent trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE
PETITIONERS FROM IMPLEMENTING
KAPASIYAHAN BLG. 508, T. 1995 OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA
PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF THE LOTTO IN
THE PROVINCE OF LAGUNA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
ARGUMENT POSITED BY THE PETITIONERS THAT
BEFORE ANY GOVERNMENT PROJECT OR
PROGRAM MAY BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE
NATIONAL AGENCIES OR OFFICES, PRIOR
CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL BY THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS CONCERNED AND OTHER
CONCERNED SECTORS IS REQUIRED.
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid
policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna
of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all
forms of gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the
provincial government's police power under the General
Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991.
6
They also maintain
that respondent's lotto operation is illegal because no
prior consultations and approval by the local government
were sought before it was implemented contrary to the
express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160.
7

For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the
questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the
power of the state since in this case the national
legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and
permitted its operations around the country.
8
As for the
allegation that no prior consultations and approval were
sought from the sangguniang panlalawigan of Laguna,
respondent Calvento contends this is not mandatory since
such a requirement is merely stated as a declaration of
policy and not a self-executing provision of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
9
He also states that his
operation of the lotto system is legal because of the
authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn had
been granted a franchise to operate the lotto by
Congress.
10

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State,
contends that the Provincial Government of Laguna has no
power to prohibit a form of gambling which has been
authorized by the national government.
11
He argues that
this is based on the principle that ordinances should not
contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely
agents of the national government. The local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers which have
been conferred on them by Congress. This being the case,
these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter. The OSG also adds that the question of whether
gambling should be permitted is for Congress to
determine, taking into account national and local interests.
Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries
which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its
legislative grant of authority, the province's Sangguniang
Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority
by preventing something already allowed by Congress.
The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1)
whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayor's permit
based thereon are valid; and (2) whether prior
consultations and approval by the
concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system
can be operated in a given local government unit.
The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of
Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor's permit for the
operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private respondent.
According to the mayor, he based his decision on an
existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the
province of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely
states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is
but a mere policy statement on the part of the local
council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a
valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system
in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit as much
when they stated in their petition that:
5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity
thereof are express and clear. The Resolution is a
policy declaration of the Provincial Government
of Laguna of its vehement opposition and/or
objection to the operation of and/or all forms of
gambling including the Lotto operation in the
Province of Laguna.
12

As a policy statement expressing the local government's
objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part
of the local government's autonomy to air its views which
may be contrary to that of the national government's.
However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not
mean that local governments may actually enact
ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.
Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case
could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by
the national government through an Act of Congress.
Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg.
42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and
allows it to operate the lotteries. The pertinent provision
reads:
SECTION 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall
be the principal government agency for raising
and providing for funds for health programs,
medical assistance and services and charities of
national character, and as such shall have the
general powers conferred in section thirteen of
Act Numbered One thousand four hundred fifty-
nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes
races, lotteries, and other similar activities, in
such frequency and manner, as shall be
determined, and subject to such rules and
regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board
of Directors.
This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a
game of chance, the national government deems it wise
and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot
issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to
prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national
legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a
provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or
resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local
government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from
Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,
13
ordinances should
not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.
The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated inMagtajas v.
Pryce Properties Corp.
14

Municipal governments are only agents of the
national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred
upon them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to
suggest that the local government units can
undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate
by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and
derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of
life, without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it
may abridge and control. Unless there is some
constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature might, by a single act, and if we can
suppose it capable of so great a folly and so
great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the
municipal corporations in the state, and the
corporation could not prevent it. We know of no
limitation on the right so far as the corporation
themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the
legislature (citing Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids, etc.
Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing
local autonomy dictates a different conclusion.
The basic relationship between the national
legislature and the local government units has
not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy. Without meaning to detract from
that policy, we here confirm that Congress
retains control of the local government units
although in significantly reduced degree now
than under our previous Constitutions. The
power to create still includes the power to
destroy. The power to grant still includes the
power to withhold or recall. True, there are
certain notable innovations in the Constitution,
like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax (citing Art.
X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which cannot now be
withdrawn by mere statute. By and large,
however, the national legislature is still the
principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
15

Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal
state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local
governments will necessarily be limited and confined
within the extent allowed by the central authority.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state or an
"imperium in imperio".
16

To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent
mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang
508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as
justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said
resolution is nothing but an expression of the local
legislative unit concerned. The Board's enactment, like
spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the
national legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in
declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around
the country. These provisions state:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. . . .
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require
all national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and
people's organizations, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions.
SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. No
project or program shall be implemented by
government authorities unless the consultations
mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26 hereof are
complied with, and prior approval of the
sanggunian concerned is obtained; Provided,
that occupants in areas where such projects are
to be implemented shall not be evicted unless,
appropriate relocation sites have been provided,
in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that
these apply only to national programs and/or projects
which are to be implemented in a particular local
community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the
national government, but of a charitable institution, the
PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is
far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation
of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with
Section 26 thereof.
17
Section 26 reads:
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government
Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological
Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national
agency or government-owned or controlled
corporation authorizing or involved in the
planning and implementation of any project or
program that may cause pollution, climatic
change, depletion of non-renewable resources,
loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover, and
extinction of animal or plant species, to consult
with the local government units,
nongovernmental organizations, and other
sectors concerned and explain the goals and
objectives of the project or program, its impact
upon the people and the community in terms of
environmental or ecological balance, and the
measures that will be undertaken to prevent or
minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27
should be interpreted to mean projects and programs
whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26
and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may
bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion
of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop
land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain
animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6)
other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of
a particular group of people residing in the locality where
these will be implemented. Obviously, none of these
effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the
province of Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation
raised by petitioners is clearly an afterthought on their
part. There is no indication in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz
that this was one of the reasons for his refusal to issue a
permit. That refusal was predicated solely but erroneously
on the provisions of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna.
In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision
enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or implementing
the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna. That resolution expresses merely
a policy statement of the Laguna provincial board. It
possesses no binding legal force nor requires any act of
implementation. It provides no sufficient legal basis for
respondent mayor's refusal to issue the permit sought by
private respondent in connection with a legitimate
business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna
enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing
Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the
Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991
REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CECILIA ALMAJOSE,respondents.
Legal Services Division for petitioner.
Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano Law Offices for
private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
In this petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 7, Article
IX (A) of the present Constitution, the petitioner Governor
of the Province of Rizal, prays for the nullification of
Resolution No. 89-868 of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) dated November 21, 1989 and its Resolution No. 90-
150 dated February 9, 1990.
The dispositive portion of the questioned Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, the Commission resolved
to dismiss, as it hereby dismisses the
appeal of Governor Reynaldo San Juan
of Rizal. Accordingly, the approved
appointment of Ms. Cecilia Almajose as
Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal, is
upheld. (Rollo, p. 32)
The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150 reiterates CSC's
position upholding the private respondent's appointment
by denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget
Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal was left vacant by its
former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario.
In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed
Director Reynaldo Abella of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos
assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988
pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the petitioner who
further requested Director Abella to endorse the
appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the
contested position of PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was
then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she
discharged the functions of acting PBO.
In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the
DBM Secretary, then Director Abella of Region IV
recommended the appointment of the private respondent
as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all
Municipal Budget Officers of the said province which
included three nominees of the petitioner. According to
Abella, the private respondent was the most qualified
since she was the only Certified Public Accountant among
the contenders.
On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S.
Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment papers of the private
respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the aforestated
recommendation of Abella.
In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary
Carague, the petitioner reiterated his request for the
appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested position
unaware of the earlier appointment made by
Undersecretary Cabuquit.
On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G.
Galvez wrote the petitioner that Dalisay Santos and his
other recommendees did not meet the minimum
requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the
position of a local budget officer. Director Galvez whether
or not through oversight further required the petitioner to
submit at least three other qualified nominees who are
qualified for the position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and
processing.
On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been
informed of the private respondent's appointment wrote
Secretary Carague protesting against the said appointment
on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is
not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that the private
respondent lacks the required three years work
experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31;
and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial
Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman,
who has the power to recommend nominees for the
position of PBO.
On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director
of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio
A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the
petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious considering
that public respondent DBM validly exercised its
prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none
of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed
requirements.
On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the BLLA ruling.
On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public
respondent CSC protesting against the appointment of the
private respondent and reiterating his position regarding
the matter.
Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the
questioned resolutions which prompted the petitioner to
submit before us the following assignment of errors:
A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
APPOINTMENT BY DBM ASSISTANT
SECRETARY CABUQUIT OF CECILIA
ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF RIZAL.
B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
CECILIA ALMA JOSE POSSESSES ALL
THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS.
C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE NOT
QUALIFIED TO THE SUBJECT POSITION.
D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY
ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN NOT
ALLOWING PETITIONER TO SUBMIT
NEW NOMINEES WHO COULD MEET
THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATION
(Petition, pp. 7-8, Rollo, pp. 15-16)
All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or
not the private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge
the functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to the appointment
made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon
the recommendation of then Director Abella of DBM
Region IV.
The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he
has the sole right and privilege to recommend the
nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee
should come only from his nominees. In support thereof,
he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 which
provides that:
Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces,
cities and municipalities shall be
appointed henceforth by the Minister
of Budget and Management upon
recommendation of the local chief
executive concerned, subject to civil
service law, rules and regulations, and
they shall be placed under the
administrative control and technical
supervision of the Ministry of Budget
and Management.
The petitioner maintains that the appointment
of the private respondent to the contested
position was made in derogation of the provision
so that both the public respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion in upholding
Almajose's appointment.
There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 112 the petitioner's power to recommend is
subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for
the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the
recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the
required standards, the appointing authority, the Minister
(now Secretary) of public respondent DBM is expected to
reject the same.
In the event that the Governor recommends an
unqualified person, is the Department Head free to
appoint anyone he fancies ? This is the issue before us.
Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on
December 24, 1986, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code vested upon the
Governor, subject to civil service rules and regulations, the
power to appoint the PBO (Sec. 216, subparagraph (1), BP
337). The Code further enumerated the qualifications for
the position of PBO. Thus, Section 216, subparagraph (2)
of the same code states that:
(2) No person shall be appointed
provincial budget officer unless he is a
citizen of the Philippines, of good
moral character, a holder of a degree
preferably in law, commerce, public
administration or any related course
from a recognized college or
university, a first grade civil service
eligibility or its equivalent, and has
acquired at least five years experience
in budgeting or in any related field.
The petitioner contends that since the appointing
authority with respect to the Provincial Budget Officer of
Rizal was vested in him before, then, the real intent
behind Executive Order No. 112 in empowering him to
recommend nominees to the position of Provincial Budget
Officer is to make his recommendation part and parcel of
the appointment process. He states that the phrase "upon
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned"
must be given mandatory application in consonance with
the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the
1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2
thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend
cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative
issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the
right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's
nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as
embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget
Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
The questioned ruling is justified by the public respondent
CSC as follows:
As required by said E.O. No. 112, the
DBM Secretary may choose from
among the recommendees of the
Provincial Governor who are thus
qualified and eligible for appointment
to the position of the PBO of Rizal.
Notwithstanding, the recommendation
of the local chief executive is merely
directory and not a condition sine qua
non to the exercise by the Secretary of
DBM of his appointing prerogative. To
rule otherwise would in effect give the
law or E.O. No. 112 a different
interpretation or construction not
intended therein, taking into
consideration that said officer has
been nationalized and is directly under
the control and supervision of the
DBM Secretary or through his duly
authorized representative. It cannot be
gainsaid that said national officer has a
similar role in the local government
unit, only on another area or concern,
to that of a Commission on Audit
resident auditor. Hence, to preserve
and maintain the independence of said
officer from the local government unit,
he must be primarily the choice of the
national appointing official, and the
exercise thereof must not be unduly
hampered or interfered with, provided
the appointee finally selected meets
the requirements for the position in
accordance with prescribed Civil
Service Law, Rules and Regulations. In
other words, the appointing official is
not restricted or circumscribed to the
list submitted or recommended by the
local chief executive in the final
selection of an appointee for the
position. He may consider other
nominees for the position vis a vis the
nominees of the local chief executive.
(CSC Resolution No. 89-868, p. 2;Rollo,
p. 31)
The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of
the appointment of one Provincial Budget Officer. The tug
of war between the Secretary of Budget and Management
and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a
seemingly innocuous position involves the application of a
most important constitutional policy and principle, that of
local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on
local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in
Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy,
the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The exercise by local governments of meaningful power
has been a national goal since the turn of the century. And
yet, inspite of constitutional provisions and, as in this case,
legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials,
national officers cannot seem to let go of centralized
powers. They deny or water down what little grants of
autonomy have so far been given to municipal
corporations.
President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7, 1900 to
the Second Philippine Commission ordered the new
Government "to devote their attention in the first instance
to the establishment of municipal governments in which
natives of the Islands, both in the cities and rural
communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage
their own local officers to the fullest extent of which they
are capable and subject to the least degree of supervision
and control which a careful study of their capacities and
observation of the workings of native control show to be
consistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.
In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the
Commission which combined both executive and
legislative powers was directed to give top priority to
making local autonomy effective.
The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local
autonomy. However, in distinguishing between
presidential control and supervision as follows:
The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11,
Article VII, 1935 Constitution)
the Constitution clearly limited the executive
power over local governments to "general
supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The
President controls the executive departments.
He has no such power over local governments.
He has only supervision and that supervision is
both general and circumscribed by statute.
In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court
stated:
. . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175
[1958]) with the then Justice, now
Chief Justice, Concepcion as
the ponente, clarified matters. As was
pointed out, the presidential
competence is not even supervision in
general, but general supervision as
may be provided by law. He could not
thus go beyond the applicable
statutory provisions, which bind and
fetter his discretion on the matter.
Moreover, as had been earlier ruled in
an opinion penned by Justice Padilla in
Mondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143
[1955]) referred to by the present
Chief Justice in his opinion in the
Hebron case, supervision goes no
further than "overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties."
(Ibid, pp. 147-148) Control, on the
other hand, "means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate had done
in the performance of their duties and
to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter." It would
follow then, according to the present
Chief Justice, to go back to the Hebron
opinion, that the President had to
abide by the then provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code on
suspension and removal of municipal
officials, there being no power of
control that he could rightfully
exercise, the law clearly specifying the
procedure by which such disciplinary
action would be taken.
Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution,
legislation implementing local autonomy was enacted. In
1959, Republic Act No. 2264, "An Act Amending the Law
Governing Local Governments by Increasing Their
Autonomy and Reorganizing Local Governments" was
passed. It was followed in 1967 when Republic Act No.
5185, the Decentralization Law was enacted, giving
"further autonomous powers to local governments
governments."
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country
further, at least insofar as legal provisions are concerned,
towards greater autonomy. It provided under Article II as a
basic principle of government:
Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and
promote the autonomy of local
government units, especially the
barangay to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant
communities.
An entire article on Local Government was incorporated
into the Constitution. It called for a local government code
defining more responsive and accountable local
government structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or
substantial boundary alteration cannot be done except in
accordance with the local government code and upon
approval by a plebiscite. The power to create sources of
revenue and to levy taxes was specifically settled upon
local governments.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more
marked in the present Constitution.
Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments
The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only
reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the
provisions making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus,
Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:
Sec. 2. The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers
and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating
to the organization and operation of
the local units.
When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the
recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely
directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM
Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary
powers and ignores the right of local governments to
develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of
their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is
frustrated and set back.
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which
states:
Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right
to fill up any existing vacancy where
none of the nominees of the local chief
executive meet the prescribed
requirements.
is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The
DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified
recommendees nominated by the Governor. If
none is qualified, he must return the list of
nominees to the Governor explaining why no
one meets the legal requirements and ask for
new recommendees who have the necessary
eligibilities and qualifications.
The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM.
More important, however, is the proper administration of
fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and municipal
budgets are prepared at the local level and after
completion are forwarded to the national officials for
review. They are prepared by the local officials who must
work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not
formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM
and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or
not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for
this reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a
balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals
from both the local and national officials. It is for this
reason that the nomination and appointment process
involves a sharing of power between the two levels of
government.
It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the
procedure followed in the appointments of Justices and
Judges. Under Article VIII of the Constitution, nominations
for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar
Council. The President makes the appointments from the
list of nominees submitted to her by the Council. She
cannot apply the DBM procedure, reject all the Council
nominees, and appoint another person whom she feels is
better qualified. There can be no reservation of the right
to fill up a position with a person of the appointing
power's personal choice.
The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is
aggravated by the fact that Director Galvez required the
Provincial Governor to submit at least three other names
of nominees better qualified than his earlier
recommendation. It was a meaningless exercise. The
appointment of the private respondent was formalized
before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being
informed that his nominee had been rejected. The
complete disregard of the local government's prerogative
and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom,
authority, and discretion are manifest.
In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente
G. Sinco stated that the value of local governments as
institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of
autonomy that they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated
that "local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of
free nations. . . . A people may establish a system of free
government but without the spirit of municipal
institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty." (Sinco,
Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706).
Our national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should
also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these
provisions are based.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
questioned resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are
SET ASIDE. The appointment of respondent Cecilia
Almajose is nullified. The Department of Budget and
Management is ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget
Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees submitted
by the Provincial Governor.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and
CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN
and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES,
INC. represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO;
MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or
MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A.
MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD
VENTURES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION;
MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO
M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING
CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT
CORPORATION and TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY
OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B.
PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and
ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-
JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA
VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC.,
represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT;
MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO
M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.;
EASTERN LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING
CORP.; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR
ISIDRO B. PACIS,respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump
created by affluence and profligate consumption and
extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of
the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or making a clearing in
the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to
understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more
important than protecting him and keeping his family
alive.
How do we strike a balance between environmental
protection, on the one hand, and the individual personal
interests of people, on the other?
Towards environmental protection and ecology,
navigational safety, and sustainable development,
Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake
Development Authority." This Government Agency is
supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid
declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly
named, within the context of the national and regional
plans and policies for social and economic development.
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic Act No.
4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of
Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns
of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective
uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply,
irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of
the Government and the general public over: the
environment impact of development on the water quality
and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the
inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial,
domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas
around the lake; the increasing urbanization which
induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality
studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if
steps are not taken to check the same; and the floods in
Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which
will influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since
any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily
involve the lake and its river systems, likewise gave
impetus to the creation of the Authority.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read
as follows:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is
hereby declared to be the national
policy to promote, and accelerate the
development and balanced growth of
the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces, cities and
towns hereinafter referred to as the
region, within the context of the
national and regional plans and
policies for social and economic
development and to carry out the
development of the Laguna Lake
region with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation
of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention
of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution.
1

Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in
this case, include:
Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is
hereby further amended by adding
thereto seven new paragraphs to be
known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m),
(n), (o), and (p) which shall read as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) The provisions
of existing laws to
the contrary
notwithstanding,
to engage in fish
production and
other aqua-culture
projects in Laguna
de Bay and other
bodies of water
within its
jurisdiction and in
pursuance thereof
to conduct studies
and make
experiments,
whenever
necessary, with the
collaboration and
assistance of the
Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic
Resources, with
the end in view of
improving present
techniques and
practices. Provided,
that until modified,
altered or
amended by the
procedure
provided in the
following sub-
paragraph, the
present laws, rules
and permits or
authorizations
remain in force;
(k) For the purpose
of effectively
regulating and
monitoring
activities in Laguna
de Bay,the
Authority shall
have exclusive
jurisdiction to issue
new permit for the
use of the lake
waters for any
projects or
activities in or
affecting the said
lake including
navigation,
construction, and
operation of
fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish
corrals and the like,
and to impose
necessary
safeguards for lake
quality control and
management and
to collect necessary
fees for said
activities and
projects: Provided,
That the fees
collected for
fisheries may be
shared between
the Authority and
other government
agencies and
political sub-
divisions in such
proportion as may
be determined by
the President of
the Philippines
upon
recommendation
of the Authority's
Board: Provided,
further, That the
Authority's Board
may determine
new areas of
fishery
development or
activities which it
may place under
the supervision of
the Bureau of
Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources
taking into account
the overall
development plans
and programs for
Laguna de Bay and
related bodies of
water: Provided,
finally, That the
Authority shall
subject to the
approval of the
President of the
Philippines
promulgate such
rules and
regulations which
shall govern
fisheries
development
activities in Laguna
de Bay which shall
take into
consideration
among others the
following: socio-
economic
amelioration of
bonafide resident
fishermen whether
individually or
collectively in the
form of
cooperatives,
lakeshore town
development, a
master plan for
fishpen
construction and
operation,
communal fishing
ground for lake
shore town
residents, and
preference to lake
shore town
residents in hiring
laborer for fishery
projects;
(l) To require the
cities and
municipalities
embraced within
the region to pass
appropriate zoning
ordinances and
other regulatory
measures
necessary to carry
out the objectives
of the Authority
and enforce the
same with the
assistance of the
Authority;
(m) The provisions
of existing laws to
the contrary
notwithstanding,
to exercise water
rights over public
waters within the
Laguna de Bay
region whenever
necessary to carry
out the Authority's
projects;
(n) To act in
coordination with
existing
governmental
agencies in
establishing water
quality standards
for industrial,
agricultural and
municipal waste
discharges into the
lake and to
cooperate with
said existing
agencies of the
government of the
Philippines in
enforcing such
standards, or to
separately pursue
enforcement and
penalty actions as
provided for in
Section 4 (d) and
Section 39-A of this
Act: Provided, That
in case of conflict
on the appropriate
water quality
standard to be
enforced such
conflict shall be
resolved thru the
NEDA Board.
2

To more effectively perform the role of the Authority
under Republic Act No. 4850, as though Presidential
Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely
effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land and
waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural
resources requiring judicious management to their optimal
utilization to insure renewability and to preserve the
ecological balance, the competing options for the use of
such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over such uses
having created undue constraints on the institutional
capabilities of the Authority in the light of the limited
powers vested in it by its charter, Executive Order No. 927
further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of
the Authority and named and enumerated the towns,
cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de
Bay Region".
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following
provisions of Executive Order No. 927 which include in
particular the sharing of fees:
Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de
Bay and Other Bodies of Water within
the Lake Region: To effectively
regulate and monitor activities in the
Laguna de Bay region, the Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permit for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said region including
navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures,
fish corrals and the like.
For the purpose of this Executive
Order, the term "Laguna de Bay
Region" shall refer to the Provinces of
Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San
Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon,
Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of
Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in
Batangas Province; the towns of Silang
and Carmona in Cavite Province; the
town of Lucban in Quezon Province;
and the towns of Marikina, Pasig,
Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in
Metro Manila.
Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority
is hereby empowered to collect fees
for the use of the lake water and its
tributaries for all beneficial purposes
including but not limited to fisheries,
recreation, municipal, industrial,
agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and
waste disposal purpose; Provided, that
the rates of the fees to be collected,
and the sharing with other government
agencies and political subdivisions, if
necessary, shall be subject to the
approval of the President of the
Philippines upon recommendation of
the Authority's Board, except fishpen
fee, which will be shared in the
following manner; 20 percent of the
fee shall go to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent shall go to the
Project Development Fund which shall
be administered by a Council and the
remaining 75 percent shall constitute
the share of LLDA. However, after the
implementation within the three-year
period of the Laguna Lake Fishery
Zoning and Management Plan, the
sharing will be modified as follows: 35
percent of the fishpen fee goes to the
lakeshore local governments, 5 percent
goes to the Project Development Fund
and the remaining 60 percent shall be
retained by LLDA; Provided, however,
that the share of LLDA shall form part
of its corporate funds and shall not be
remitted to the National Treasury as an
exception to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1234.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential
Decree No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this
manner:
Sec 41. Definition of Terms.
(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever
Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act,
the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay
which is that area covered by the lake
water when it is at the average annual
maximum lake level of elevation 12.50
meters, as referred to a datum 10.00
meters below mean lower low water
(M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below
such elevation are public lands which
form part of the bed of said lake.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake
Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that
the newly passed law gave municipal governments the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their
municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides:
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and
Charges.
(a) Municipalities shall have the
exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges in the municipal waters and
impose rental fees or charges therefor
in accordance with the provisions of
this Section.
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:
(1) Grant fishing
privileges to erect
fish corrals, oyster,
mussel or other
aquatic beds or
bangus fry areas,
within a definite
zone of the
municipal waters,
as determined by
it; . . . .
(2) Grant privilege
to gather, take or
catch bangus fry,
prawn fry
or kawag-kawag or
fry of other species
and fish from the
municipal waters
by nets, traps or
other fishing gears
to marginal
fishermen free
from any rental
fee, charges or any
other imposition
whatsoever.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(XI) Subject to the
provisions of Book
II of this Code,
grant exclusive
privileges of
constructing fish
corrals or fishpens,
or the taking or
catching of bangus
fry, prawn fry
orkawag-kawag or
fry of any species
or fish within the
municipal waters.
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority
to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen
operators took advantage of the occasion to establish
fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the
Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July,
1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water
surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from
7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995.
The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages
were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by
the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake
carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore
municipalities of separate independent policies in the
operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed
territorial municipal waters in the lake and their
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already
saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating
the current environmental problems and ecological stress
of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority
served notice to the general public that:
In compliance with the instructions of
His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V.
RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at Pila,
Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850
as amended by Presidential Decree
813 and Executive Order 927 series of
1983 and in line with the policies and
programs of the Presidential Task
Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal
Fishing, the general public is hereby
notified that:
1. All fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures in the Laguna
de Bay Region, which were not
registered or to which no application
for registration and/or permit has been
filed with Laguna Lake Development
Authority as of March 31, 1993 are
hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures so declared as
illegal shall be subject to demolition
which shall be undertaken by the
Presidential Task Force for Illegal
Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures declared
as illegal shall, without prejudice to
demolition of their structures be
criminally charged in accordance with
Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as
amended by P.D. 813 for violation of
the same laws. Violations of these laws
carries a penalty of imprisonment of
not exceeding 3 years or a fine not
exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both
at the discretion of the court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures declared
as illegal in accordance with the
foregoing Notice shall have one (1)
month on or before 27 October 1993
to show cause before the LLDA why
their said fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures should not be
demolished/dismantled.
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the
concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them
to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days
from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be
effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed
injunction cases against the Authority before various
regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for
Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development,
Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for
Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by
IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR
Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case No. 566,
for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila Marine Life Business
Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil
Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by
AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for
Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris
Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-,
for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch
79, Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial
Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case
No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern
Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation.
The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it
on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were
invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining
order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were
issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the
Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar
structures in question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the
Authority with this court. Impleaded as parties-
respondents are concerned regional trial courts and
respective private parties, and the municipalities and/or
respective Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala,
who issued permits for the construction and operation of
fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The Authority sought the
following reliefs,viz.:
(A) Nullification of the temporary
restraining order/writs of preliminary
injunction issued in Civil Cases Nos.
64125, 759 and 566;
(B) Permanent prohibition against the
regional trial courts from exercising
jurisdiction over cases involving the
Authority which is a co-equal body;
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A.
7610 (Local Government Code of 1991)
did not repeal, alter or modify the
provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended,
empowering the Authority to issue
permits for fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures in
Laguna de Bay and that, the Authority
the government agency vested with
exclusive authority to issue said
permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's
consolidated petitions were referred to the Court of
Appeals.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court
of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those
quasi-judicial agencies of government whose decision or
order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the
LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions
insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the
LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay
are concerned had been repealed by the Local
Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid
repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to and is now
vested with their respective local government units
concerned.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the
Authority has returned to this Court charging the following
errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED AN
ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL
AGENCY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS
AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927
SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED
BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID
RULING IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED
PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO
ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE
BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO
CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS.
We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the
main and only issue posed is: Which agency of the
Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or
the towns and municipalities comprising the region
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of
Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide
that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all
surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting
the said region, including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the
like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan
may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster,
mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a
definite zone of the municipal waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do
not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating
the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the
latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the
lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any
express provision which categorically expressly repeal the
charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there
was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of
laws should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic
Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a
general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the
enactment of a later legislation which is a general law
cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a
well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute,
provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not
repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms,
provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or
alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are
broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special
law."
3

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a
special statute, the special statute should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general
statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to
the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied
repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect
must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A
special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication.
4

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the
Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code
of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the
Authority, which are environmental protection,
navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is
every indication that the legislative intent is for the
Authority to proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner
Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay,
like any other single body of water has its own unique
natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the
eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller
rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km basin or
watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and
Rizal provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of
Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute one
integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be
protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be
serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development.
This is an exhaustible natural resource a very limited
one which requires judicious management and optimal
utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its
ecological integrity and balance."
"Managing the lake resources would mean the
implementation of a national policy geared towards the
protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable
development of the region with due regard to the inter-
generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this
part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have
foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the
special law designed to govern the management of our
Laguna de Bay lake resources."
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to
fragmented concepts of management policies where
lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive
dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The
garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake,
abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens
by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific
portion but the entire 900 km of lake water. The
implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water
resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to
conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de
Bay."
5

The power of the local government units to issue fishing
privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is
evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local
Government Code empowering local governments to issue
fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of
Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific
Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising
Power Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant
permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section
2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control
and management.
6
It does partake of the nature of police
power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and
the most demanding of all State powers including the
power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the
Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power
should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on
matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna
de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides
for the proper sharing of fees collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a
quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that,
considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake
Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA
304, 306, which we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
As a general rule, the adjudication of
pollution cases generally pertains to
the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB),
except in cases where the special law
provides for another forum. It must be
recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative
agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws to carry out and
make effective the declared national
policy of promoting and accelerating
the development and balanced growth
of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and
Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan
with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation
of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention
of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution. Under
such a broad grant of power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its
special charter, obviously has the
responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region
from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas. In carrying out the
aforementioned declared policy, the
LLDA is mandated, among others, to
pass upon and approve or disapprove
all plans, programs, and projects
proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region,
public corporations, and private
persons or enterprises where such
plans, programs and/or projects are
related to those of the LLDA for the
development of the region.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that
an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it
by law, it is likewise a settled rule that
an administrative agency has also such
powers as are necessarily implied in
the exercise of its express powers. In
the exercise, therefore, of its express
powers under its charter, as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with
respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region, the authority of
the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist
order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise,
it may well be reduced to a "toothless"
paper agency.
there is no question that the Authority has
express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial
body in respect to pollution cases with authority
to issue a "cease and desist order" and on
matters affecting the construction of illegal
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's
pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the
Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against
it may only be instituted before the Court of
Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions
necessitating the resolution of legal questions
affecting the powers of the Authority as
provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial
Courts have jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149
of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the
provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the
Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the
exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the
authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter
vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing
authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region.
Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would
render useless its reason for being and will in effect
denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development
Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had
never intended to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and
injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the
authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to
grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.
The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by
Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal;
Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal;
and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig, Metro
Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered set
aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are
hereby prohibited from issuing permits to construct and
operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures within the Laguna Lake Region, their previous
issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing
permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of
Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and
Walfredo M. de la Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala,
specifically, are likewise declared null and void and
ordered cancelled.
The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
put up by operators by virtue of permits issued by
Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region,
specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development, Inc. and
Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources,
Inc., represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco;
Greenfield Ventures Industrial Development Corporation
and R.J. Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing
And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation, BDR
Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue
Lagoon Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers,
Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its President
Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon
Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing Corporation,
are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition
by the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 152774. May 27, 2004]
THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, represented by its
Governor, HERMILANDO I.
MANDANAS, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, Executive Secretary and Chairman of
the Oversight Committee on Devolution; HON.
EMILIA BONCODIN, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. JOSE D. LINA,
JR., Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Province of Batangas, represented by its
Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed the present
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to declare as
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the
General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and
2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each
corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos
(P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund
(LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Named as respondents are Executive Secretary
Alberto G. Romulo, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Oversight Committee on Devolution, Secretary Emilia
Boncodin of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) and Secretary Jose Lina of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG).
Background
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48
entitled ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION
ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION. The program was
established to facilitate the process of enhancing the
capacities of local government units (LGUs) in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them
by the National Government Agencies concerned pursuant
to the Local Government Code.
[1]
The Oversight
Committee (referred to as the Devolution Committee in
E.O. No. 48) constituted under Section 533(b) of Republic
Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991) has
been tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate rules
and regulations necessary for its effective
implementation.
[2]
Further, to address the funding
shortfalls of functions and services devolved to the LGUs
and other funding requirements of the program, the
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was
created.
[3]
For 1998, the DBM was directed to set aside an
amount to be determined by the Oversight Committee
based on the devolution status appraisal surveys
undertaken by the DILG.
[4]
The initial fund was to be
sourced from the available savings of the national
government for CY 1998.
[5]
For 1999 and the succeeding
years, the corresponding amount required to sustain the
program was to be incorporated in the annual GAA.
[6]
The
Oversight Committee has been authorized to issue the
implementing rules and regulations governing the
equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to the
LGUs.
[7]

The LGSEF in the GAA of 1999
In Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the
GAA of 1999, the program was renamed as the LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND
(LGSEF). Under said appropriations law, the amount
of P96,780,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs
in the internal revenue taxes. Item No. 1, Special
Provisions, Title XXXVI A. Internal Revenue Allotment of
Rep. Act No. 8745 contained the following proviso:
... PROVIDED, That the amount of FIVE BILLION PESOS
(P5,000,000,000) shall be earmarked for the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund for the funding
requirements of projects and activities arising from the full
and efficient implementation of devolved functions and
services of local government units pursuant to R.A. No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That such amount shall be
released to the local government units subject to the
implementing rules and regulations, including such
mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations
and distribution of said fund among local government
units subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by
the Oversight Committee on Devolution as constituted
pursuant to Book IV, Title III, Section 533(b) of R.A. No.
7160. The Internal Revenue Allotment shall be released
directly by the Department of Budget and Management to
the Local Government Units concerned.
On July 28, 1999, the Oversight Committee (with
then Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora as Chairman)
passed Resolution Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005 and
OCD-99-006 entitled as follows:
OCD-99-005
RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION
SCHEME FOR THE PhP5 BILLION CY 1999
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF) AND
REQUESTING HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA TO APPROVE
SAID ALLOCATION SCHEME.
OCD-99-006
RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION
SCHEME FOR THE PhP4.0 BILLION OF THE
1999 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
EQUALIZATION FUND AND ITS
CONCOMITANT GENERAL FRAMEWORK,
IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND
MECHANICS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION
AND RELEASE, AS PROMULGATED BY THE
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON DEVOLUTION.
OCD-99-003
RESOLUTION REQUESTING HIS
EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA TO APPROVE THE REQUEST OF
THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON
DEVOLUTION TO SET ASIDE TWENTY
PERCENT (20%) OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION
FUND (LGSEF) FOR LOCAL AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROJECTS AND OTHER PRIORITY
INITIATIVES FOR LGUs INSTITUTIONAL AND
CAPABILITY BUILDING IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES
AND MECHANICS AS PROMULGATED BY
THE COMMITTEE.
These OCD resolutions were approved by then
President Estrada on October 6, 1999.
Under the allocation scheme adopted pursuant to
Resolution No. OCD-99-005, the five billion pesos LGSEF
was to be allocated as follows:
1. The PhP4 Billion of the LGSEF shall be
allocated in accordance with the allocation
scheme and implementing guidelines and
mechanics promulgated and adopted by
the OCD. To wit:
a. The first PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be
allocated in accordance with the codal
formula sharing scheme as prescribed
under the 1991 Local Government
Code;
b. The second PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall
be allocated in accordance with a
modified 1992 cost of devolution fund
(CODEF) sharing scheme, as
recommended by the respective
leagues of provinces, cities and
municipalities to the OCD. The
modified CODEF sharing formula is as
follows:
Province : 40%
Cities : 20%
Municipalities : 40%
This is applied to the P2 Billion after the
approved amounts granted to individual
provinces, cities and municipalities as
assistance to cover decrease in 1999 IRA
share due to reduction in land area have
been taken out.
2. The remaining PhP1 Billion of the LGSEF
shall be earmarked to support local
affirmative action projects and other
priority initiatives submitted by LGUs to
the Oversight Committee on Devolution
for approval in accordance with its
prescribed guidelines as promulgated and
adopted by the OCD.
In Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the Oversight
Committee set aside the one billion pesos or 20% of the
LGSEF to support Local Affirmative Action Projects (LAAPs)
of LGUs. This remaining amount was intended to respond
to the urgent need for additional funds assistance,
otherwise not available within the parameters of other
existing fund sources. For LGUs to be eligible for funding
under the one-billion-peso portion of the LGSEF, the OCD
promulgated the following:
III. CRITERIA FOR ELIGIBILITY:
1. LGUs (province, city, municipality, or
barangay), individually or by group or
multi-LGUs or leagues of LGUs,
especially those belonging to the
5
th
and 6
th
class, may access the fund
to support any projects or activities
that satisfy any of the aforecited
purposes. A barangay may also access
this fund directly or through their
respective municipality or city.
2. The proposed project/activity should be
need-based, a local priority, with high
development impact and are
congruent with the socio-cultural,
economic and development agenda of
the Estrada Administration, such as
food security, poverty alleviation,
electrification, and peace and order,
among others.
3. Eligible for funding under this fund are
projects arising from, but not limited
to, the following areas of concern:
a. delivery of local health and
sanitation services, hospital
services and other tertiary
services;
b. delivery of social welfare services;
c. provision of socio-cultural services
and facilities for youth and
community development;
d. provision of agricultural and on-site
related research;
e. improvement of community-based
forestry projects and other
local projects on
environment and natural
resources protection and
conservation;
f. improvement of tourism facilities
and promotion of tourism;
g. peace and order and public safety;
h. construction, repair and
maintenance of public works
and infrastructure, including
public buildings and facilities
for public use, especially
those destroyed or damaged
by man-made or natural
calamities and disaster as
well as facilities for water
supply, flood control and
river dikes;
i. provision of local electrification
facilities;
j. livelihood and food production
services, facilities and
equipment;
k. other projects that may be
authorized by the OCD
consistent with the
aforementioned objectives
and guidelines;
4. Except on extremely meritorious cases, as
may be determined by the Oversight
Committee on Devolution, this portion
of the LGSEF shall not be used in
expenditures for personal costs or
benefits under existing laws applicable
to governments. Generally, this fund
shall cover the following objects of
expenditures for programs, projects
and activities arising from the
implementation of devolved and
regular functions and services:
a. acquisition/procurement of supplies
and materials critical to the
full and effective
implementation of devolved
programs, projects and
activities;
b. repair and/or improvement of
facilities;
c. repair and/or upgrading of
equipment;
d. acquisition of basic equipment;
e. construction of additional or new
facilities;
f. counterpart contribution to joint
arrangements or collective
projects among groups of
municipalities, cities and/or
provinces related to
devolution and delivery of
basic services.
5. To be eligible for funding, an LGU or group
of LGU shall submit to the Oversight
Committee on Devolution through the
Department of Interior and Local
Governments, within the prescribed
schedule and timeframe, a Letter
Request for Funding Support from the
Affirmative Action Program under the
LGSEF, duly signed by the concerned
LGU(s) and endorsed by cooperators
and/or beneficiaries, as well as the
duly signed Resolution of
Endorsement by the respective
Sanggunian(s) of the LGUs concerned.
The LGU-proponent shall also be
required to submit the Project Request
(PR), using OCD Project Request Form
No. 99-02, that details the following:
(a) general description or brief of the project;
(b) objectives and justifications for
undertaking the project,
which should highlight the
benefits to the locality and
the expected impact to the
local program/project arising
from the full and efficient
implementation of social
services and facilities, at the
local levels;
(c) target outputs or key result areas;
(d) schedule of activities and details of
requirements;
(e) total cost requirement of the
project;
(f) proponents counterpart funding
share, if any, and identified
source(s) of counterpart
funds for the full
implementation of the
project;
(g) requested amount of project cost
to be covered by the LGSEF.
Further, under the guidelines formulated by the
Oversight Committee as contained in Attachment -
Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the LGUs were required to
identify the projects eligible for funding under the one-
billion-peso portion of the LGSEF and submit the project
proposals thereof and other documentary requirements to
the DILG for appraisal. The project proposals that passed
the DILGs appraisal would then be submitted to the
Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and
approval. Upon its approval, the Oversight Committee
would then serve notice to the DBM for the preparation of
the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and Notice of
Cash Allocation (NCA) to effect the release of funds to the
said LGUs.
The LGSEF in the GAA of 2000
Under Rep. Act No. 8760, otherwise known as the
GAA of 2000, the amount of P111,778,000,000 was
allotted as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue
taxes. As in the GAA of 1999, the GAA of 2000 contained a
proviso earmarking five billion pesos of the IRA for the
LGSEF. This proviso, found in Item No. 1, Special
Provisions, Title XXXVII A. Internal Revenue Allotment,
was similarly worded as that contained in the GAA of 1999.
The Oversight Committee, in its Resolution No. OCD-
2000-023 dated June 22, 2000, adopted the following
allocation scheme governing the five billion pesos LGSEF
for 2000:
1. The PhP3.5 Billion of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall
be allocated to and shared by the four
levels of LGUs, i.e., provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays, using
the following percentage-sharing
formula agreed upon and jointly
endorsed by the various Leagues of
LGUs:
For
Provinces 26
% or P 910,000,000
For Cities 23% or
805,000,000
For Municipalities 35%
or 1,225,000,000
For Barangays 16%
or 560,000,000
Provided that the respective Leagues
representing the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays shall
draw up and adopt the horizontal
distribution/sharing schemes among
the member LGUs whereby the
Leagues concerned may opt to adopt
direct financial assistance or project-
based arrangement, such that the
LGSEF allocation for individual LGU
shall be released directly to the LGU
concerned;
Provided further that the individual
LGSEF shares to LGUs are used in
accordance with the general purposes
and guidelines promulgated by the
OCD for the implementation of the
LGSEF at the local levels pursuant to
Res. No. OCD-99-006 dated October 7,
1999 and pursuant to the Leagues
guidelines and mechanism as approved
by the OCD;
Provided further that each of the
Leagues shall submit to the OCD for its
approval their respective allocation
scheme, the list of LGUs with the
corresponding LGSEF shares and the
corresponding project categories if
project-based;
Provided further that upon approval by
the OCD, the lists of LGUs shall be
endorsed to the DBM as the basis for
the preparation of the corresponding
NCAs, SAROs, and related
budget/release documents.
2. The remaining P1,500,000,000 of the CY
2000 LGSEF shall be earmarked to
support the following initiatives and
local affirmative action projects, to be
endorsed to and approved by the
Oversight Committee on Devolution
in accordance with the OCD
agreements, guidelines, procedures
and documentary requirements:
On July 5, 2000, then President Estrada issued a
Memorandum authorizing then Executive Secretary
Zamora and the DBM to implement and release the 2.5
billion pesos LGSEF for 2000 in accordance with Resolution
No. OCD-2000-023.
Thereafter, the Oversight Committee, now under the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
promulgated Resolution No. OCD-2001-29 entitled
ADOPTING RESOLUTION NO. OCD-2000-023 IN THE
ALLOCATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEASE OF THE
REMAINING P2.5 BILLION LGSEF FOR CY 2000. Under this
resolution, the amount of one billion pesos of the LGSEF
was to be released in accordance with paragraph 1 of
Resolution No. OCD-2000-23, to complete the 3.5 billion
pesos allocated to the LGUs, while the amount of 1.5
billion pesos was allocated for the LAAP. However, out of
the latter amount, P400,000,000 was to be allocated and
released as follows: P50,000,000 as financial assistance to
the LAAPs of LGUs;P275,360,227 as financial assistance to
cover the decrease in the IRA of LGUs concerned due to
reduction in land area; and P74,639,773 for the LGSEF
Capability-Building Fund.
The LGSEF in the GAA of 2001
In view of the failure of Congress to enact the
general appropriations law for 2001, the GAA of 2000 was
deemed re-enacted, together with the IRA of the LGUs
therein and the proviso earmarking five billion pesos
thereof for the LGSEF.
On January 9, 2002, the Oversight Committee
adopted Resolution No. OCD-2002-001 allocating the five
billion pesos LGSEF for 2001 as follows:
Modified Codal Formula P 3.000 billion
Priority Projects 1.900 billion
Capability Building Fund .100 billion
P 5.000 billion
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P3.0 B of the CY 2001 LGSEF
which is to be allocated according to the modified codal
formula shall be released to the four levels of LGUs, i.e.,
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, as follows:
LGUs Percentage Amount
Provinces 25 P 0.750 billion
Cities 25 0.750
Municipalities 35 1.050
Barangays 15 0.450
100 P 3.000
billion
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P1.9 B earmarked for
priority projects shall be distributed according to the
following criteria:
1.0 For projects of the 4
th
, 5
th
and 6
th
class LGUs; or
2.0 Projects in consonance with the Presidents
State of the Nation Address
(SONA)/summit commitments.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the remaining P100 million
LGSEF capability building fund shall be distributed in
accordance with the recommendation of the Leagues of
Provinces, Cities, Municipalities and Barangays, and
approved by the OCD.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov.
Mandanas wrote to the individual members of the
Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of
Resolution No. OCD-2002-001. He also wrote to Pres.
Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said resolution
as it violates the Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1991.
On January 25, 2002, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo
approved Resolution No. OCD-2002-001.
The Petitioners Case
The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as
unconstitutional and void the provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. Similarly
assailed are the Oversight Committees Resolutions Nos.
OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023,
OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001 issued pursuant
thereto. The petitioner submits that the assailed provisos
in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar as they
earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of
the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and
imposed conditions for the release thereof, violate the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as
it mandates that the just share of the LGUs shall be
automatically released to them. Sections 18 and 286 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, which enjoin that the
just share of the LGUs shall be automatically and
directly released to them without need of further
action are, likewise, cited.
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution
and release of the five-billion-peso portion of the IRA,
classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with
the implementing rules and regulations, including the
mechanisms and guidelines prescribed by the Oversight
Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the
Constitution that the LGUs share in the national taxes
shall be automatically released to them. The petitioner
maintains that the use of the word shall must be given a
compulsory meaning.
To further buttress this argument, the petitioner
contends that to vest the Oversight Committee with the
authority to determine the distribution and release of the
LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an
anathema to the principle of local autonomy as embodied
in the Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991. The petitioner cites as an example the experience in
2001 when the release of the LGSEF was long delayed
because the Oversight Committee was not able to convene
that year and no guidelines were issued therefor. Further,
the possible disapproval by the Oversight Committee of
the project proposals of the LGUs would result in the
diminution of the latters share in the IRA.
Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by
the assailed OCD resolutions is the improper amendment
to Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 on
the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs. Said
provision allocates the IRA as follows: Provinces 23%;
Cities 23%; Municipalities 34%; and Barangays
20%.
[8]
This formula has been improperly amended or
modified, with respect to the five-billion-peso portion of
the IRA allotted for the LGSEF, by the assailed OCD
resolutions as they invariably provided for a different
sharing scheme.
The modifications allegedly constitute an illegal
amendment by the executive branch of a substantive
law. Moreover, the petitioner mentions that in the Letter
dated December 5, 2001 of respondent Executive
Secretary Romulo addressed to respondent Secretary
Boncodin, the former endorsed to the latter the release of
funds to certain LGUs from the LGSEF in accordance with
the handwritten instructions of President Arroyo. Thus,
the LGUs are at a loss as to how a portion of the LGSEF is
actually allocated. Further, there are still portions of the
LGSEF that, to date, have not been received by the
petitioner; hence, resulting in damage and injury to the
petitioner.
The petitioner prays that the Court declare as
unconstitutional and void the assailed provisos relating to
the LGSEF in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the
assailed OCD resolutions (Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003,
OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029
and OCD-2002-001) issued by the Oversight Committee
pursuant thereto. The petitioner, likewise, prays that the
Court direct the respondents to rectify the unlawful and
illegal distribution and releases of the LGSEF for the
aforementioned years and release the same in accordance
with the sharing formula under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. Finally, the petitioner urges
the Court to declare that the entire IRA should be released
automatically without further action by the LGUs as
required by the Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1991.
The Respondents Arguments
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, urge the Court to dismiss the petition on
procedural and substantive grounds. On the latter, the
respondents contend that the assailed provisos in the
GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the assailed resolutions
issued by the Oversight Committee are not constitutionally
infirm. The respondents advance the view that Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution does not specify that the just
share of the LGUs shall be determined solely by the Local
Government Code of 1991. Moreover, the phrase as
determined by law in the same constitutional provision
means that there exists no limitation on the power of
Congress to determine what is the just share of the LGUs
in the national taxes. In other words, Congress is the
arbiter of what should be the just share of the LGUs in
the national taxes.
The respondents further theorize that Section 285 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides for
the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs, was
not intended to be a fixed determination of their just
share in the national taxes. Congress may enact other
laws, including appropriations laws such as the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001, providing for a different sharing
formula. Section 285 of the Local Government Code of
1991 was merely intended to be the default share of the
LGUs to do away with the need to determine annually by
law their just share. However, the LGUs have no vested
right in a permanent or fixed percentage as Congress may
increase or decrease the just share of the LGUs in
accordance with what it believes is appropriate for their
operation. There is nothing in the Constitution which
prohibits Congress from making such determination
through the appropriations laws. If the provisions of a
particular statute, the GAA in this case, are within the
constitutional power of the legislature to enact, they
should be sustained whether the courts agree or not in the
wisdom of their enactment.
On procedural grounds, the respondents urge the
Court to dismiss the petition outright as the same is
defective. The petition allegedly raises factual issues
which should be properly threshed out in the lower courts,
not this Court, not being a trier of facts. Specifically, the
petitioners allegation that there are portions of the LGSEF
that it has not, to date, received, thereby causing it (the
petitioner) injury and damage, is subject to proof and must
be substantiated in the proper venue, i.e., the lower
courts.
Further, according to the respondents, the petition
has already been rendered moot and academic as it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy. The IRAs for the
years 1999, 2000 and 2001, have already been released
and the government is now operating under the 2003
budget. In support of this, the respondents submitted
certifications issued by officers of the DBM attesting to the
release of the allocation or shares of the petitioner in the
LGSEF for 1999, 2000 and 2001. There is, therefore,
nothing more to prohibit.
Finally, the petitioner allegedly has no legal standing
to bring the suit because it has not suffered any injury. In
fact, the petitioners just share has even
increased. Pursuant to Section 285 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the share of the provinces is
23%. OCD Nos. 99-005, 99-006 and 99-003 gave the
provinces 40% of P2 billion of the LGSEF. OCD Nos. 2000-
023 and 2001-029 apportioned 26% of P3.5 billion to the
provinces. On the other hand, OCD No. 2001-001
allocated 25% of P3 billion to the provinces. Thus, the
petitioner has not suffered any injury in the
implementation of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions.
The Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues
Before resolving the petition on its merits, the Court
shall first rule on the following procedural issues raised by
the respondents: (1) whether the petitioner has legal
standing or locus standi to file the present suit; (2)
whether the petition involves factual questions that are
properly cognizable by the lower courts; and (3) whether
the issue had been rendered moot and academic.
The petitioner has locus standi
to maintain the present suit
The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
[9]
Accordingly, it has been held
that the interest of a party assailing the constitutionality of
a statute must be direct and personal. Such party must be
able to show, not only that the law or any government act
is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some right
or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.
[10]

The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the
requisite standing to maintain the present suit. The
petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to
protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other
LGUs. This interest pertains to the LGUs share in the
national taxes or the IRA. The petitioners constitutional
claim is, in substance, that the assailed provisos in the
GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions
contravene Section 6, Article X of the Constitution,
mandating the automatic release to the LGUs of their
share in the national taxes. Further, the injury that the
petitioner claims to suffer is the diminution of its share in
the IRA, as provided under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the
implementation of the assailed measures. These
allegations are sufficient to grant the petitioner standing
to question the validity of the assailed provisos in the
GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions as
the petitioner clearly has a plain, direct and adequate
interest in the manner and distribution of the IRA among
the LGUs.
The petition involves a significant
legal issue
The crux of the instant controversy is whether the
assailed provisos contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution
and the Local Government Code of 1991. This is
undoubtedly a legal question. On the other hand, the
following facts are not disputed:
1. The earmarking of five billion pesos of the
IRA for the LGSEF in the assailed provisos
in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and re-enacted
budget for 2001;
2. The promulgation of the assailed OCD
resolutions providing for the allocation
schemes covering the said five billion
pesos and the implementing rules and
regulations therefor; and
3. The release of the LGSEF to the LGUs only
upon their compliance with the
implementing rules and regulations,
including the guidelines and mechanisms,
prescribed by the Oversight Committee.
Considering that these facts, which are necessary to
resolve the legal question now before this Court, are no
longer in issue, the same need not be determined by a trial
court.
[11]
In any case, the rule on hierarchy of courts will
not prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over the
petition. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise
of this Courts primary jurisdiction.
[12]

The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of
this Court entails the proper legal interpretation of
constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the
transcendental importance of the case, as it necessarily
involves the application of the constitutional principle on
local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The nature of the
present controversy, therefore, warrants the relaxation by
this Court of procedural rules in order to resolve the case
forthwith.
The substantive issue needs to be resolved
notwithstanding the supervening events
Granting arguendo that, as contended by the
respondents, the resolution of the case had already been
overtaken by supervening events as the IRA, including the
LGSEF, for 1999, 2000 and 2001, had already been
released and the government is now operating under a
new appropriations law, still, there is compelling reason
for this Court to resolve the substantive issue raised by the
instant petition. Supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a
decision if there is a grave violation of the
Constitution.
[13]
Even in cases where supervening events
had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to
resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar
and public.
[14]

Another reason justifying the resolution by this
Court of the substantive issue now before it is the rule that
courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.
[15]
For the GAAs in the coming years may contain
provisos similar to those now being sought to be
invalidated, and yet, the question may not be decided
before another GAA is enacted. It, thus, behooves this
Court to make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue
now.
Substantive Issue
As earlier intimated, the resolution of the
substantive legal issue in this case calls for the application
of a most important constitutional policy and principle,
that of local autonomy.
[16]
In Article II of the Constitution,
the State has expressly adopted as a policy that:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has
been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the
autonomy of LGUs. Section 2 thereof reiterates the State
policy in this wise:
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall
enjoy local autonomy.
Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the
Constitution confines the Presidents power over the LGUs
to one of general supervision.
[17]
This provision has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control. The
distinction between the two powers was enunciated
in Drilon v. Lim:
[18]

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an
act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion,
order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he
may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent
merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have
the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but
only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules
are followed.
[19]

The Local Government Code of 1991
[20]
was enacted
to flesh out the mandate of the Constitution.
[21]
The State
policy on local autonomy is amplified in Section 2 thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby
local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National
Government to the local government units.
Guided by these precepts, the Court shall now
determine whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001, earmarking for each corresponding
year the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA for the
LGSEF and the OCD resolutions promulgated pursuant
thereto, transgress the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001 and the OCD resolutions violate the
constitutional precept on local autonomy
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share,
as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall
be automatically released to them.
When parsed, it would be readily seen that this
provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a just
share in the national taxes; (2) the just share shall be
determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be
automatically released to the LGUs.
The Local Government Code of 1991, among its
salient provisions, underscores the automatic release of
the LGUs just share in this wise:
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. Local
government units shall have the power and authority to
establish an organization that shall be responsible for the
efficient and effective implementation of their
development plans, program objectives and priorities; to
create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes,
fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively for their
use and disposition and which shall be retained by
them; to have a just share in national taxes which shall be
automatically and directly released to them without need
of further action;
...
Sec. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of
each local government unit shall be released, without
need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a
quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each
quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose.
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish
the share of local government units under existing laws.
Websters Third New International Dictionary
defines automatic as involuntary either wholly or to a
major extent so that any activity of the will is largely
negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical;
like or suggestive of an automaton. Further, the word
automatically is defined as in an automatic manner:
without thought or conscious intention. Being
automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory. As such, the LGUs are not
required to perform any act to receive the just share
accruing to them from the national coffers. As
emphasized by the Local Government Code of 1991, the
just share of the LGUs shall be released to them
without need of further action. Construing Section 286
of the LGC, we held inPimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,
[22]
viz:
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic
feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of
the shares of LGUs in the National internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local
Government Code specifies further that the release shall
be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days
after every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to
any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose. As a rule, the term
SHALL is a word of command that must be given a
compulsory meaning. The provision is,
therefore,IMPERATIVE.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding,
effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA
pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation in the country. Such withholding
clearly contravenes the Constitution and the
law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback,
which means something held back or withheld, often
temporarily. Hence, the temporary nature of the
retention by the national government does not
matter. Any retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an
advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4
thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision
effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local
governments. Concededly, the President was well-
intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs IRA,
but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions
must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must
be carried out by legal methods.
[23]

The just share of the LGUs is incorporated as the
IRA in the appropriations law or GAA enacted by Congress
annually. Under the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
2000 and 2001, a portion of the IRA in the amount of five
billion pesos was earmarked for the LGSEF, and these
provisos imposed the condition that such amount shall be
released to the local government units subject to the
implementing rules and regulations, including such
mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations
and distribution of said fund among local government
units subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by
the Oversight Committee on Devolution. Pursuant
thereto, the Oversight Committee, through the assailed
OCD resolutions, apportioned the five billion pesos LGSEF
such that:
For 1999
P2 billion - allocated according to Sec. 285 LGC
P2 billion - Modified Sharing
Formula (Provinces 40%;
Cities 20%; Municipalities 40%)
P1 billion projects (LAAP) approved by OCD.
[24]

For 2000
P3.5 billion Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 26%;
Cities 23%; Municipalities 35%;
Barangays 16%);
P1.5 billion projects (LAAP) approved by the OCD.
[25]

For 2001
P3 billion Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 25%;
Cities 25%; Municipalities 35%;
Barangays 15%)
P1.9 billion priority projects
P100 million capability building fund.
[26]

Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the
LGUs without the Oversight Committees prior
approval. Further, with respect to the portion of the
LGSEF allocated for various projects of the LGUs (P1 billion
for 1999; P1.5 billion for 2000 and P2 billion for 2001), the
Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD
resolutions, laid down guidelines and mechanisms that the
LGUs had to comply with before they could avail of funds
from this portion of the LGSEF. The guidelines required (a)
the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding based
on the criteria laid down by the Oversight Committee; (b)
the LGUs to submit their project proposals to the DILG for
appraisal; (c) the project proposals that passed the
appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to the Oversight
Committee for review, evaluation and approval. It was
only upon approval thereof that the Oversight Committee
would direct the DBM to release the funds for the
projects.
To the Courts mind, the entire process involving the
distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share
of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its
distribution and release to the vagaries of the
implementing rules and regulations, including the
guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the
Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by
the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001
and the OCD resolutions, makes the
release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the
constitutional and statutory mandate that the just share
of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. The
LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight
Committee.
Where the law, the Constitution in this case, is clear
and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what
it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the
mandate is obeyed.
[27]
Moreover, as correctly posited by
the petitioner, the use of the word shall connotes a
mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion.
[28]

Indeed, the Oversight Committee exercising
discretion, even control, over the distribution and release
of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an anathema to and
subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied
in the Constitution. Moreover, it finds no statutory basis at
all as the Oversight Committee was created merely to
formulate the rules and regulations for the efficient and
effective implementation of the Local Government Code of
1991 to ensure compliance with the principles of local
autonomy as defined under the Constitution.
[29]
In fact,
its creation was placed under the title of Transitory
Provisions, signifying its ad hoc character. According to
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the principal author and
sponsor of the bill that eventually became Rep. Act No.
7160, the Committees work was supposed to be done a
year from the approval of the Code, or on October 10,
1992.
[30]
The Oversight Committees authority is
undoubtedly limited to the implementation of the Local
Government Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert the
same. Neither can it exercise control over the IRA, or even
a portion thereof, of the LGUs.
That the automatic release of the IRA was precisely
intended to guarantee and promote local autonomy can
be gleaned from the discussion below between Messrs.
Jose N. Nolledo and Regalado M. Maambong, then
members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:
MR. MAAMBONG. Unfortunately, under Section 198 of the
Local Government Code, the existence of subprovinces is
still acknowledged by the law, but the statement of the
Gentleman on this point will have to be taken up probably
by the Committee on Legislation. A second point, Mr.
Presiding Officer, is that under Article 2, Section 10 of the
1973 Constitution, we have a provision which states:
The State shall guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government units,
especially the barrio, to insure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities.
This provision no longer appears in the present
configuration; does this mean that the
concept of giving local autonomy to local
governments is no longer adopted as far as
this Article is concerned?
MR. NOLLEDO. No. In the report of the Committee on
Preamble, National Territory, and Declaration of Principles,
that concept is included and widened upon the initiative of
Commissioner Bennagen.
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you for that.
With regard to Section 6, sources of revenue, the creation
of sources as provided by previous law was subject to
limitations as may be provided by law, but now, we are
using the term subject to such guidelines as may be fixed
by law. In Section 7, mention is made about the unique,
distinct and exclusive charges and contributions, and in
Section 8, we talk about exclusivity of local taxes and the
share in the national wealth. Incidentally, I was one of the
authors of this provision, and I am very thankful. Does this
indicate local autonomy, or was the wording of the law
changed to give more autonomy to the local government
units?
[31]

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes. In effect, those words indicate also
decentralization because local political units can collect
taxes, fees and charges subject merely to guidelines, as
recommended by the league of governors and city mayors,
with whom I had a dialogue for almost two hours. They
told me that limitations may be questionable in the sense
that Congress may limit and in effect deny the right later
on.
MR. MAAMBONG. Also, this provision on automatic
release of national tax share points to more local
autonomy. Is this the intention?
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, the Commissioner is perfectly right.
[32]

The concept of local autonomy was explained
in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals
[33]
in this wise:
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means
a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization.
The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than
to break up the monopoly of the national government
over the affairs of local governments and as put by
political adherents, to liberate the local governments
from the imperialism of Manila. Autonomy, however, is
not meant to end the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and
local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime
of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical
step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are
subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other
purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance
self-government.
As we observed in one case, decentralization means
devolution of national administration but not power to
the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments
more responsive and accountable and ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress. At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises general
supervision over them, but only to ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law. He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the [sic] favor of local
governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts
to self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.
[34]

Local autonomy includes both administrative and
fiscal autonomy. The fairly recent case of Pimentel v.
Aguirre
[35]
is particularly instructive. The Court declared
therein that local fiscal autonomy includes the power of
the LGUs to, inter alia, allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities:
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to
having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their
functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy
means that local governments have the power to create
their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable
share in the national taxes released by the national
government, as well as the power to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities. It
extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local
officials in turn have to work within the constraints
thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and
imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant
to local needs and resources or not ...
[36]

Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the constitutionally mandated automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.
[37]

Following this ratiocination, the Court
in Pimentel struck down as unconstitutional Section 4 of
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 372 which ordered the
withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of ten percent of
the LGUs IRA pending the assessment and evaluation by
the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation.
In like manner, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a
withholding of a portion of the IRA. They put on hold
the distribution and release of the five billion pesos LGSEF
and subject the same to the implementing rules and
regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms
prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to
time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372, the assailed provisos in
the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions
effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by
the LGUs and must be struck down. They cannot,
therefore, be upheld.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001 and the OCD resolutions cannot amend
Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991
Section 284
[38]
of the Local Government Code
provides that, beginning the third year of its effectivity,
the LGUs share in the national internal revenue taxes shall
be 40%. This percentage is fixed and may not be reduced
except in the event the national government incurs an
unmanageable public sector deficit" and only upon
compliance with stringent requirements set forth in the
same section:
Sec. 284. ...
Provided, That in the event that the national government
incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit, the
President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon
recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of
Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget
and Management, and subject to consultation with the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments
in the internal revenue allotment of local government
units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of the national internal
revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current
fiscal year; Provided, further That in the first year of the
effectivity of this Code, the local government units shall, in
addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal revenue
allotment which shall include the cost of devolved
functions for essential public services, be entitled to
receive the amount equivalent to the cost of devolved
personnel services.
Thus, from the above provision, the only possible
exception to the mandatory automatic release of the
LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for
the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the
collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case
what should be automatically released shall be a
proportionate amount of the collections for the current
fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a
quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of
national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the
current fiscal year. In the instant case, however, there is
no allegation that the national internal revenue tax
collections for the fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001 have
fallen compared to the preceding three fiscal years.
Section 285 then specifies how the IRA shall be
allocated among the LGUs:
Sec. 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. The
share of local government units in the internal revenue
allotment shall be allocated in the following manner:
(a) Provinces Twenty-three (23%)
(b) Cities Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities Thirty-four (34%); and
(d) Barangays Twenty percent (20%).
However, this percentage sharing is not followed
with respect to the five billion pesos LGSEF as the assailed
OCD resolutions, implementing the assailed provisos in the
GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, provided for a different
sharing scheme. For example, for 1999, P2 billion of the
LGSEF was allocated as follows: Provinces 40%; Cities
20%; Municipalities 40%.
[39]
For 2000, P3.5 billion of the
LGSEF was allocated in this manner: Provinces 26%;
Cities 23%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays
26%.
[40]
For 2001, P3 billion of the LGSEF was allocated,
thus: Provinces 25%; Cities 25%; Municipalities 35%;
Barangays 15%.
[41]

The respondents argue that this modification is
allowed since the Constitution does not specify that the
just share of the LGUs shall only be determined by the
Local Government Code of 1991. That it is within the
power of Congress to enact other laws, including the
GAAs, to increase or decrease the just share of the
LGUs. This contention is untenable. The Local
Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while
it is conceded that Congress may amend any of the
provisions therein, it may not do so through
appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local
Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate
law, not in the appropriations law, because Congress
cannot include in a general appropriation bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in a separate
legislation.
[42]

A general appropriations bill is a special type of
legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of
money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal
unit.
[43]
Any provision therein which is intended to amend
another law is considered an inappropriate provision.
The category of inappropriate provisions includes
unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are
intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kinds
of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.
[44]

Increasing or decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or
modifying their percentage sharing therein, which are
fixed in the Local Government Code of 1991, are matters
of general and substantive law. To permit Congress to
undertake these amendments through the GAAs, as the
respondents contend, would be to give Congress the
unbridled authority to unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy
of the LGUs, and thus put the same in jeopardy every
year. This, the Court cannot sanction.
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that, unlike
those of 1999, 2000 and 2001, the GAAs of 2002 and 2003
do not contain provisos similar to the herein assailed
provisos. In other words, the GAAs of 2002 and 2003 have
not earmarked any amount of the IRA for the
LGSEF. Congress had perhaps seen fit to discontinue the
practice as it recognizes its infirmity. Nonetheless, as
earlier mentioned, this Court has deemed it necessary to
make a definitive ruling on the matter in order to prevent
its recurrence in future appropriations laws and that the
principles enunciated herein would serve to guide the
bench, bar and public.
Conclusion
In closing, it is well to note that the principle of local
autonomy, while concededly expounded in greater detail
in the present Constitution, dates back to the turn of the
century when President William McKinley, in his
Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission dated
April 7, 1900, ordered the new Government to devote
their attention in the first instance to the establishment of
municipal governments in which the natives of the Islands,
both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall be
afforded the opportunity to manage their own affairs to
the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to
the least degree of supervision and control in which a
careful study of their capacities and observation of the
workings of native control show to be consistent with the
maintenance of law, order and loyalty.
[45]
While the 1935
Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy,
nonetheless, it limited the executive power over local
governments to general supervision ... as may be
provided by law.
[46]
Subsequently, the 1973 Constitution
explicitly stated that *t+he State shall guarantee and
promote the autonomy of local government units,
especially the barangay to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities.
[47]
An entire
article on Local Government was incorporated
therein. The present Constitution, as earlier opined, has
broadened the principle of local autonomy. The 14
sections in Article X thereof markedly increased the
powers of the local governments in order to accomplish
the goal of a more meaningful local autonomy.
Indeed, the value of local governments as
institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of
autonomy that they enjoy.
[48]
As eloquently put by M. De
Tocqueville, a distinguished French political writer, *l+ocal
assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free
nations. Township meetings are to liberty what primary
schools are to science; they bring it within the peoples
reach; they teach men how to use and enjoy it. A nation
may establish a system of free governments but without
the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit
of liberty.
[49]

Our national officials should not only comply with
the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should
also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these
provisions are based.
[50]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000
and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997]
ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO,
ROMUALDO TANO, TEOCENES MIDELLO, ANGEL
DE MESA, EULOGIO TREMOCHA, FELIPE
ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN, ROBERT LIM,
VIRGINIA LIM, FELIMON DE MESA, GENEROSO
ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE, ROMULO DEL
ROSARIO, CHOLITO ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO,
ANDRES OLIVA, VITTORIO SALVADOR,
LEOPOLDO ARAGON, RAFAEL RIBA, ALEJANDRO
LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO, RAMIRO MANAEG,
RUBEN MARGATE, ROBERTO REYES, DANILO
PANGARUTAN, NOE GOLPAN,ESTANISLAO
ROMERO, NICANOR DOMINGO, ROLDAN
TABANG, PANGANIBAN, ADRIANO TABANG,
FREDDIE SACAMAY, MIGUEL TRIMOCHA,
PACENCIO LABABIT, PABLO H. OMPAD,
CELESTINO A. ABANO, ALLAN ALMODAL, BILLY
D. BARTOLAY, ALBINO D. LIQUE, MELCHOR J.
LAYSON, MELANI AMANTE, CLARO E. YATOC,
MERGELDO B. BALDEO, EDGAR M. ALMASET A.,
JOSELITO MANAEG, LIBERATO ANDRADA, JR.,
ROBERTO BERRY, RONALD VILLANUEVA,
EDUARDO VALMORIA, WILDREDO MENDOZA,
NAPOLEON BABANGA, ROBERTO TADEPA,
RUBEN ASINGUA, SILVERIO GABO, JERRY
ROMERO, DAVID PANGAGARUTAN, DANIEL
PANGGARUTAN, ROMEO AGAWIN, FERNANDO
EQUIZ, DITO LEQUIZ, RONILO ODERABLE,
BENEDICTO TORRES, ROSITO A. VALDEZ,
CRESENCIO A. SAYANG, NICOMEDES S. ACOSTA,
ERENEO A. SEGARINO, JR., WILDREDO A.
RAUTO, DIOSDADO A. ACOSTA, BONIFACIO G.
SISMO, TACIO ALUBA, DANIEL B. BATERZAL,
ELISEO YBAEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC, EDDIE
ESCALICAS, ELEAZAR
B. BATERZAL, DOMINADOR HALICHIC,
ROOSEVELT RISMO-AN, ROBERT C. MERCADER,
TIRSO ARESGADO, DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO
CHAVEZ, VICTOR VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C.
YABANEZ, ARMANDO T. SANTILLAN, RUDY S.
SANTILLAN, JODJEN ILUSTRISIMO, NESTOR
SALANGRON, ALBERTO SALANGRON, ROGER L.
ROXAS, FRANCISCO T. ANTICANO, PASTOR
SALANGRON, BIENVENIDO SANTILLAN,
GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL BENJAMIN JOVELITO
BELGANO, HONEY PARIOL, ANTONIO
SALANGRON, NICASIO SALANGRON, & AIRLINE
SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION OF
PALAWAN, petitioners, vs. GOV. SALVADOR P.
SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIAN
PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN, namely, VICE-
GOVERNOR JOEL T. REYES, JOSE D. ZABALA,
ROSALINO R. ACOSTA, JOSELITO A. CADLAON,
ANDRES R. BAACO, NELSON P. PENEYRA,
CIPRIANO C. BARROMA, CLARO E. ORDINARIO,
ERNESTO A. LLACUN, RODOLFO C. FLORDELIZA,
GILBERT S. BAACO, WINSTON G. ARZAGA,
NAPOLEON F. ORDONEZ and GIL P. ACOSTA,
CITY MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN, MEMBERS
OF SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG PUERTO
PRINCESA, ALL MEMBERS OF BANTAY DAGAT,
MEMBERS OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE OF
PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL AND CITY
PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN and PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY, and ALL JUDGES OF PALAWAN,
REGIONAL, MUNICIPAL AND
METROPOLITAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioners caption their petition as one for
Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional:
(a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office
Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993,
issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto
Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) enjoin the
enforcement thereof; and (3) restrain respondents
Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City and Judges of Regional Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts
[1]
and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and
hearing cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances
and of the Office Order.
More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be
treated as, a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition.
The following is petitioners summary of the factual
antecedents giving rise to the petition:
1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92
which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN
ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH
AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM
JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING
EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF, the full text of which reads as follows:
Section 1. Title of the Ordinance. - This Ordinance is
entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL
LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY
FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND
PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES THEREOF.
Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. - To effectively
free our City Sea Waters from Cyanide and other
Obnoxious substance, and shall cover all persons and/or
entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto
Princesa who is are [sic] directly or indirectly in the
business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the
City.
Section 3. Definition of terms. - For purpose of this
Ordinance the following are hereby defined:
A. SEA BASS - A kind of fish under the family of
Centropomidae, better known as APAHAP;
B. CATFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Plotosidae,
better known as HITO-HITO;
C. MUDFISH - A kind of fish under the family of
Orphicaphalisae better known as DALAG
D. ALL LIVE FISH - All alive, breathing not necessarily
moving of all specie[s] use for food and for aquarium
purposes.
E. LIVE LOBSTER - Several relatively, large marine
crustaceans of the genus Homarus that are alive and
breathing not necessarily moving.
Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any
business enterprise or company to ship out from Puerto
Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft
or seacraft of any live fish and lobster except SEA BASS,
CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES.
Section 5. Penalty Clause. - Any person/s and or business
entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a
fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not
more than twelve (12) months, cancellation of their permit
to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa or all of the
herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court.
Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the
establishment found vilating the provisions of this
ordinance is a corporation or a partnership, the penalty
prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon its
president and/or General Manager or Managing Partner
and/or Manager, as the case maybe [sic].
Section 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any
ordinance inconsistent to [sic] this ordinance is deemed
repealed.
Section 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1,
1993.
SO ORDAINED.
xxx
2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City
Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series
of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:
In the interest of public service and for purposes of City
Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN
ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR
INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE,
OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS
POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT
IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS
PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE
BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER
OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993
TO JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and
directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on
cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out
from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf
or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any
point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft.
The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the
shipper possessed the required Mayors Permit issued by
this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or
clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with
all other existing rules and regulations on the matter.
Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the
required documents as stated herein must be held for
proper disposition.
In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to
coordinate with the PAL Manager, the PPA Manager, the
local PNP Station and other offices concerned for the
needed support and cooperation. Further, that the usual
courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times in
the conduct of the inspection.
Please be guided accordingly.
xxx
3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted
Resolution No. 33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING
THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING,
SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL
DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT:
FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS
FASCIATUS(SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR
SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND
SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA
MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT
CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER
PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS
SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND
FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A
PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN
WATERS, the full text of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches *sic+ and
studies disclose that only five (5) percent of the corals of
our province remain to be in excellent condition as [a]
habitat of marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms;
WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and
devastation of the corals of our province were principally
due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing,
sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances
and other related activities;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to
protect and preserve the existence of the remaining
excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to
reinvigorate and regenerate themselves into vitality within
the span of five (5) years;
WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A.
7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991 empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect
the environment and impose appropriate penalties [upon]
acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among
others.
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P.
Peneyra and upon unanimous decision of all the members
present;
Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve
Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance No. 2 for the
purpose, to wit:
ORDINANCE NO. 2
Series of 1993
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN
IN SESSION ASSEMBLED:
Section 1. TITLE - This Ordinance shall be known as an
Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing,
buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng),
2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3. Cromileptes altivelis
(Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and
spawning), 4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada
Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and
other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder
size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green
Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (Topical Aquarium
Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming from
Palawan Waters.
Section II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the
policy of the state that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for [a]
more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization
whereby local government units shall be given more
powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.
2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a]
local Government Unit shall be liberaly interpreted in its
favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower
government units. Any fair and reasonable doubts as to
the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of
the Local Government Unit concerned.
3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in
this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the
people in the community.
4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare. - Every local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance; and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Section III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. - It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the Province of Palawan to
protect and conserve the marine resources of Palawan not
only for the greatest good of the majority of the present
generation but with [the] proper perspective and
consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this
end, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan henceforth declares
that is [sic] shall be unlawful for any person or any
business entity to engage in catching, gathering,
possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms as enumerated in Section
1 hereof in and coming out of Palawan Waters for a period
of five (5) years;
Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. - Any person and/or
business entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized
with a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, and/or imprisonment of
six (6) months to twelve (12) months and confiscation and
forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in favor of
the government at the discretion of the Court;
Section V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. - If for any reason, a
Section or provision of this Ordinance shall be held as
unconditional [sic] or invalid, it shall not affect the other
provisions hereof.
Section VI. REPEALING CLAUSE. - Any existing Ordinance
or a provision of any ordinance inconsistent herewith is
deemed modified, amended or repealed.
Section VII. EFFECTIVITY. - This Ordinance shall take effect
ten (10) days after its publication.
SO ORDAINED.
xxx
4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances,
Annexes A and C hereof thereby depriving all the
fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City
of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and
the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and
other marine merchants from performing their lawful
occupation and trade;
5. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes
Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, and Felipe
Ongonion, Jr. were even charged criminally under criminal
case no. 93-05-C in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay, an original carbon copy of the
criminal complaint dated April 12, 1993 is hereto attached
as Annex D; while xerox copies are attached as Annex
D to the copies of the petition;
6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other
hand, were charged by the respondent PNP with the
respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City, a
xerox copy of the complaint is hereto attached as Annex
E;
Without seeking redress from the concerned local
government units, prosecutors office and courts,
petitioners directly invoked our original jurisdiction by
filing this petition on 4 June 1993. In sum, petitioners
contend that:
First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process
of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from
the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article
XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation
nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be
granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the
absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue
permit.
Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan
altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession,
buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling
organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught
or gathered through lawful fishing method, the
Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to
earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as
petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are
concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing
their vocation and entering into contracts which are
proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business
endeavors to a successful conclusion.
Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based
thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to
be dismissed.
In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required
respondents to comment on the petition, and furnished
the Office of the Solicitor General with a copy thereof.
In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public
respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the
validity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a valid
exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the
general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]), and its
specific power to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section
458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. They
claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the Province
of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that
the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its
territory remain healthy for the future generation. The
Ordinance, they further asserted, covered only live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated
in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine
aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the
prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect and
preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to
regenerate.
Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained
that there was no violation of due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the former,
public hearings were conducted before the enactment of
the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose
and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a
substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who
catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a
fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of
selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium cyanide while
the latter does not. Further, the Ordinance applied
equally to all those belonging to one class.
On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea
for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order claiming that despite the pendency of this case,
Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent
on proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against
petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha,
Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Andres Lemihan and
Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said
plea, we issued on 11 November 1993 a temporary
restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court
to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment
and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 11223.
On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the
Solicitor General from filing a comment, considering that
as claimed by said office in its Manifestation of 28 June
1994, respondents were already represented by counsel.
The rest of the respondents did not file any
comment on the petition.
In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved
to consider the comment on the petition as the Answer,
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.
[2]

On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party
respondents the Department of Agriculture and the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required
the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on their
behalf. But in light of the latters motion of 9 July 1997 for
an extension of time to file the comment which would only
result in further delay, we dispensed with said comment.
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we
resolved to dismiss this petition for want of merit, on 22
July 1997, and assigned it to the ponente for the writing of
the opinion of the Court.
I
There are actually two sets of petitioners in this
case. The first is composed of Alfredo Tano, Baldomero
Tano, Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano, Teocenes Midello,
Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr.,
Andres Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally
charged with violating Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal
Case No. 93-05-C of the 1
st
Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Palawan;
[3]
and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim who
were charged with violating City Ordinance No. 15-92 of
Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993,
of the Province of Palawan before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa.
[4]
All of them, with the
exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr.,
Felimon de Mesa, Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are likewise
the accused in Criminal Case No. 11223 for the violation of
Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan, pending before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan.
[5]

The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest
of the petitioners numbering seventy-seven (77), all of
whom, except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan
-- an alleged private association of several marine
merchants -- are natural persons who claim to be
fishermen.
The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is,
of course, to prevent the prosecution, trial and
determination of the criminal cases until the
constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they
allegedly violated shall have been resolved. The second set
of petitioners merely claim that they being fishermen or
marine merchants, they would be adversely affected by
the ordinances.
As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil
for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity
amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no showing
that the said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal
cases, have filed motions to quash the informations
therein and that the same were denied. The ground
available for such motions is that the facts charged therein
do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in
question are unconstitutional.
[6]
It cannot then be said that
the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It must
further be stressed that even if the petitioners did file
motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith
give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is
denied, the remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the
party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if,
after trial on the merits of adverse decision is rendered, to
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
[7]
And ,
even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial
may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari, a
motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow
the court concerned an opportunity to correct its errors,
unless such motion may be dispensed with because of
existing exceptional circumstances.
[8]
Finally, even if a
motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the
remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any
showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1
thereof.
[9]
For obvious reasons, the petition at bar does
not, and could not have , alleged any of such grounds.
As to the second set of petitioners, the instant
petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for
a declaration that the Ordinances in question are a nullity
... for being unconstitutional.
[10]
As such, their petition
must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved,
[11]
it being settled that the
Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such
petitions.
[12]

II
Even granting arguendo that the first set of
petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear
disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and
important reason or exceptional or compelling
circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us
should be allowed. While we have concurrent jurisdiction
with Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence
gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma:
[13]

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
(inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial
Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-
crowding of the Courts docket.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this
time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of
what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of
litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-
called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their
appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and
immediately by the highest tribunal of the land.
In Santiago v. Vasquez,
[14]
this Court forcefully
expressed that the propensity of litigants and lawyers to
disregard the hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not
only because of the imposition upon the precious time of
this Court, but also because of the inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the
case which often has to be remanded or referred to the
lower court, the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
since this Court is not a trier of facts. We reiterated the
judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of [its] primary
jurisdiction.
III
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles
against the first set of petitioners, we opt to resolve this
case on its merits considering that the lifetime of the
challenged Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance No. 15-
92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1
January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of
Palawan, enacted on 19 February 1993, is effective for
only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were
undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under the
new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the
environment and are thus novel and of paramount
importance. No further delay then may be allowed in the
resolution of the issues raised.
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances
enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption
of constitutionality.
[15]
To overthrow this presumption,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.
[16]
Where doubt
exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.
[17]

After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and
the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to
have been violated, we find petitioners contentions
baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from
any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable
laws.
Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII
and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as
having been transgressed by the Ordinances.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII
reads:
SEC. 2. x x x
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:
Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on
freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
xxx
SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence
fishermen, especially of local communities, to the
preferential use of the communal marine and fishing
resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide
support to such fishermen through appropriate technology
and research, adequate financial, production, and
marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall
also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The
protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign
intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their
labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the
petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal
fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan is described as a private
association composed of Marine Merchants; petitioners
Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as merchants; while the rest
of the petitioners claim to be fishermen, without any
qualification, however, as to their status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a
definition of the terms subsistence or marginal
fishermen,
[18]
they should be construed in their general
and ordinary sense. Amarginal fisherman is an individual
engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his
harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is
barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of
gathering the fish,
[19]
while a subsistence fisherman is one
whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his
livelihood.
[20]
Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160)
defines amarginal farmer or fisherman as an individual
engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be
limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or
marine products produced by himself and his immediate
family. It bears repeating that nothing in the record
supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these
definitions.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay
stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations
marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is
that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming,
with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in
rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Our survey of the statute
books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks
of the preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section
149 of the LGC of 1991 which pertinently provides:
SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x
(b) The sangguniang bayan may:
(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster,
mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a
definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by
it: Provided, however, That duly registered organizations
and cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall have
preferential right to such fishery privileges ....
In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3, dated 25 April 1996,
the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government prescribed the guidelines on the preferential
treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right
mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not
involve such fishery right.
Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of
the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but of
their protection, development, and conservation. As
hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant
precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to
the end that their enjoyment by the people may be
guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also
for the generations to come.
The so-called preferential right of subsistence or
marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not
at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine,
marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the
first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
their exploration, development and utilization ... shall be
under the full control and supervision of the
State. Moreover, their mandated protection,
development, and conservation as necessarily recognized
by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain
restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be
in favor of anyone. Thus, as to the curtailment of the
preferential treatment of marginal fisherman, the
following exchange between Commissioner Francisco
Rodrigo and Commissioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., took
place at the plenary session of the Constitutional
Commission:
MR. RODRIGO:
Let us discuss the implementation of this
because I would not raise the hopes of our
people, and afterwards fail in the
implementation. How will this be
implemented? Will there be a licensing or
giving of permits so that government officials
will know that one is really a marginal
fisherman? Or if policeman say that a person
is not a marginal fisherman, he can show his
permit, to prove that indeed he is one.
MR. BENGZON:
Certainly, there will be some mode of
licensing insofar as this is concerned and this
particular question could be tackled when we
discuss the Article on Local Governments --
whether we will leave to the local
governments or to Congress on how these
things will be implemented. But certainly, I
think our Congressmen and our local officials
will not be bereft of ideas on how to
implement this mandate.
x x x
MR. RODRIGO:
So, once one is licensed as a marginal
fisherman, he can go anywhere in the
Philippines and fish in any fishing grounds.
MR. BENGZON:
Subject to whatever rules and regulations and
local laws that may be passed, may be existing
or will be passed.
[21]
(underscoring supplied
for emphasis).
What must likewise be borne in mind is the state
policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of
the State to protect and advance the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
[22]
On this score, in
Oposa v. Factoran,
[23]
this Court declared:
While the right to balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles the State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is
less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation -
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners - the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear
of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting
their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second , the day would not be too far when
all else would be lost not only for the present generation,
but also for those to come - generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with
it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment ...
The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents
merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the
General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:
SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).
Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that
the general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to the local government
units in accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people of the
community.
The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant
fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose
rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by
appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or
poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other
deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any
violation of the provisions of applicable fishery
laws.
[24]
Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang
panlungsod and the sangguniang
panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants,
which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that *p+rotect
the environment and impose appropriate penalties for
acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ... and such
other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of
eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological
imbalance.
[25]

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of
decentralization
[26]
as expressly mandated by the
Constitution.
[27]
Indispensable thereto is devolution and
the LGC expressly provides that *a+ny provision on a
power of a local government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers
and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the local government unit
concerned,
[28]
Devolution refers to the act by which the
National Government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific
functions and responsibilities.
[29]

One of the devolved powers enumerated in the
section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of
fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation
of mangroves.
[30]
This necessarily includes enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within
the municipal waters.
The term municipal waters, in turn, include not
only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the
municipality, not being the subject of private ownership
and not comprised within the national parks, public forest,
timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also
marine waters included between two lines drawn
perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where
the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea
at low tide and a third line parallel with the general
coastline and fifteen kilometers from it.
[31]
Under P.D. No.
704, the marine waters included in municipal waters is
limited to three nautical miles from the general coastline
using the above perpendicular lines and a third parallel
line.
These fishery laws which local government units
may enforce under Section 17(b), (2), (i) in municipal
waters include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015
which, inter alia, authorizes the establishment of a closed
season in any Philippine water if necessary for
conservation or ecological purposes; (3) P.D. No. 1219
which provides for the exploration, exploitation,
utilization, and conservation of coral resources; (4) R.A.
No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg. 58, which makes it
unlawful for any person, association, or corporation to
catch or cause to be caught, sell, offer to sell, purchase, or
have in possession any of the fish specie called gobiidae or
ipon during closed season; and (5) R.A. No. 6451 which
prohibits and punishes electrofishing, as well as various
issuances of the BFAR.
To those specifically devolved insofar as the control
and regulation of fishing in municipal waters and the
protection of its marine environment are concerned, must
be added the following:
1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages
within municipal waters;
2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium
fishes within municipal waters;
3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells
within municipal waters;
4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture
shelled mollusks within municipal waters;
5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed
farms within municipal waters;
6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture
pearls within municipal waters;
7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport
fish and fishery products; and
8. Establishment of closed season in
municipal waters.
These functions are covered in the Memorandum of
Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local
Government.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted
to local government units under Section 16 (the General
Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi),
458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably
involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the
questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
Parenthetically, we wish to add that these
Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611,
otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP)
for Palawan Act, approved on 19 July 1992. This statute
adopts a comprehensive framework for the sustainable
development of Palawan compatible with protecting and
enhancing the natural resources and endangered
environment of the province, which shall serve to guide
the local government of Palawan and the government
agencies concerned in the formulation and
implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting
said province.
[32]

At this time then, it would be appropriate to
determine the relation between the assailed Ordinances
and the aforesaid powers of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan
to protect the environment. To begin, we ascertain the
purpose of the Ordinances as set forth in the statement of
purposes or declaration of policies quoted earlier.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have
two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a
closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals
covered therein for a period of five years, and (2) to
protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of
Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further
destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well
within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in
municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the
establishment of closed seasons. The devolution of such
power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum
of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local
Government.
The realization of the second objective falls within
both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express
mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment.
[33]

The destruction of the coral reefs results in serious,
if not irreparable, ecological imbalance, for coral reefs are
among the natures life-support systems.
[34]
They collect,
retain, and recycle nutrients for adjacent nearshore areas
such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef flats; provide
food for marine plants and animals; and serve as a
protective shelter for aquatic organisms.
[35]
It is said that
*e+cologically, the reefs are to the oceans what forests
are to continents: they are shelter and breeding grounds
for fish and plant species that will disappear without
them.
[36]

The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in
part, from the modern phenomenon of live-fish trade
which entails the catching of so-called exotic tropical
species of fish not only for aquarium use in the West, but
also for the market for live banquet fish *which+ is
virtually insatiable in ever more affluent Asia.
[37]
These
exotic species are coral-dwellers, and fishermen catch
them by diving in shallow water with corraline habitats
and squirting sodium cyanide poison at passing fish
directly or onto coral crevices; once affected the fish are
immobilized [merely stunned] and then scooped by
hand.
[38]
The diver then surfaces and dumps his catch into
a submerged net attached to the skiff . Twenty minutes
later, the fish can swim normally. Back on shore, they are
placed in holding pens, and within a few weeks, they expel
the cyanide from their system and are ready to be
hauled. Then they are placed in saltwater tanks or
packaged in plastic bags filled with seawater for shipment
by air freight to major markets for live food fish.
[39]
While
the fish are meant to survive, the opposite holds true for
their former home as *a+fter the fisherman squirts the
cyanide, the first thing to perish is the reef algae, on which
fish feed. Days later, the living coral starts to expire. Soon
the reef loses its function as habitat for the fish, which eat
both the algae and invertebrates that cling to the
coral. The reef becomes an underwater graveyard, its
skeletal remains brittle, bleached of all color and
vulnerable to erosion from the pounding of the
waves.
[40]
It has been found that cyanide fishing kills most
hard and soft corals within three months of repeated
application.
[41]

The nexus then between the activities barred by
Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa and the
prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand, and the use
of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In
sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the
Ordinances may not then be controverted.
As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by
Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto
Princesa, we find nothing therein violative of any
constitutional or statutory provision. The Order refers to
the implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not
the Mayors Permit.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the part of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact
Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1992, on the theory that the
subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility
of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)
under P.D. No. 704, otherwise known as the Fisheries
Decree of 1975; and that, in any event, the Ordinance is
unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), likewise in
accordance with P.D. No. 704.
The majority is unable to accommodate this view.
The jurisdiction and responsibility of the BFAR under P. D.
no. 704, over the management, conservation,
development, protection, utilization and disposition of all
fishery and aquatic resources of the country is not all-
encompassing. First, Section 4 thereof excludes from such
jurisdiction and responsibility municipal waters, which
shall be under the municipal or city government
concerned, except insofar as fishpens and seaweed culture
in municipal in municipal centers are concerned. This
section provides, however, that all municipal or city
ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries
and any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the
Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources for
appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only
upon his approval.
[42]

Second, it must at once be pointed out that the
BFAR is no longer under the Department of Natural
Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural
Resources). Executive Order No. 967 of 30 June 1984
transferred the BFAR from the control and supervision of
the Minister (formerly Secretary) of Natural Resources to
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) and converted
it into a mere staff agency thereof, integrating its functions
with the regional offices of the MAF.
In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987,
which reorganized the MAF, the BFAR was retained as an
attached agency of the MAF. And under the Administrative
Code of 1987,
[43]
the BFAR is placed under the Title
concerning the Department of Agriculture.
[44]

Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged
Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or
unenforceable because it was not approved by the
Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be
sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department
of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances
affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has been
dispensed with in view of the following reasons:
(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC
expressly repeals or amends Section 16 and 29 of P.D. No.
704
[45]
insofar that they are inconsistent with the
provisions of the LGC.
(2) As discussed earlier, under the general
welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the
power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right
of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically
vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or
charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances,
the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances,
electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of
fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to
prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable
fishing laws.
[46]
Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang
bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang
panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to *p+rotect
the environment and impose appropriate penalties for
acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such
other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of
eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological
imbalance.
[47]

In closing, we commend the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa
and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan
for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently
needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine
environment, thereby sharing in the herculean task of
arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that
other local government units shall now be roused from
their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle
against the decimation of our legacy to future generations.
At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their
response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued
on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 175368 April 11, 2013
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL
RESOURCES and HON. ANGELO T. REYES, in his capacity
as Secretary of DENR, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus,
1
praying that this Court order the following: (
1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The
Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the
People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and
bar respondents from exercising control over provinces;
and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the
Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR)
nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale
Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of
Bulacan.
The Facts are as follows:
On March 28, 1996, Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration
Corporation (Golden Falcon) filed with the DENR Mines
and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. III (MGB R-III)
an Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) covering an area of 61,136 hectares
situated in the Municipalities of San Miguel, San Ildefonso,
Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
2

On April 29, 1998, the MGB R-III issued an Order denying
Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement for failure to secure area clearances
from the Forest Management Sector and Lands
Management Sector of the DENR Regional Office No. III.
3

On November 11, 1998, Golden Falcon filed an appeal with
the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau Central Office
(MGB-Central Office), and sought reconsideration of the
Order dated April 29, 1998.
4

On February 10, 2004, while Golden Falcon's appeal was
pending, Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo
R. Cruz and Liberato Sembrano filed with the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of
Bulacan their respective Applications for Quarry Permit
(AQP), which covered the same area subject of Golden
Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement.
5

On July 16, 2004, the MGB-Central Office issued an Order
denying Golden Falcon's appeal and affirming the MGB R-
III's Order dated April 29, 1998.
On September 13, 2004, Atlantic Mines and Trading
Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an
Application for Exploration Permit (AEP) covering 5,281
hectares of the area covered by Golden Falcon's
Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement.
6

On October 19, 2004, DENR-MGB Director Horacio C.
Ramos, in response to MGB R-III Director Arnulfo V.
Cabantog's memorandum query dated September 8, 2004,
categorically stated that the MGB-Central Office's Order
dated July 16, 2004 became final on August 11, 2004,
fifteen (15) days after Golden Falcon received the said
Order, per the Certification dated October 8, 2004 issued
by the Postmaster II of the Philippine Postal Corporation of
Cainta, Rizal.
7

Through letters dated May 5 and May 10, 2005, AMTC
notified the PENRO of Bulacan and the MGB R-III Director,
respectively, that the subject Applications for Quarry
Permit fell within its (AMTC's) existing valid and prior
Application for Exploration Permit, and the the former
area of Golden Falcon was open to mining location only on
August 11, 2004 per the Memorandum dated October 19,
2004 of the MGB Director, Central Office.
8

On June 24, 2005, Ricardo Medina, Jr., PENRO of Bulacan,
indorsed AMTC's letter to the Provincial Legal Officer, Atty.
Eugenio F. Resurreccion, for his legal opinion on which
date of denial of Golden Falcon's application/appeal
April 29, 1998 or July 16, 2004 is to be considered in the
deliberation of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board
(PMRB) for the purpose of determining when the land
subject of the Applications for Quarry Permit could be
considered open for application.
On June 28, 2005, Provincial Legal Officer Eugenio
Resurreccion issued a legal opinion stating that the Order
dated July 16, 2004 of the MGB-Central Office was a mere
reaffirmation of the Order dated April 29, 1998 of the
MGB R-III; hence, the Order dated April 29, 1998 should be
the reckoning period of the denial of the application of
Golden Falcon.
On July 22, 2005, AMTC filed with the PMRB of Bulacan a
formal protest against the aforesaid Applications for
Quarry Permit on the ground that the subject area was
already covered by its Application for Exploration Permit.
9

On August 8, 2005, MGB R-III Director Cabantog, who was
the concurrent Chairman of the PMRB, endorsed to the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan, Governor Josefina M. dela
Cruz, the aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit that had
apparently been converted to Applications for Small-Scale
Mining Permit of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz,
Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez (formerly Liberato
Sembrano).
10

On August 9, 2005, the PENRO of Bulacan issued four
memoranda recommending to Governor Dela Cruz the
approval of the aforesaid Applications for Small-Scale
Mining Permit.
11

On August 10, 2005, Governor Dela Cruz issued the
corresponding Small-Scale Mining Permits in favor of
Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz
and Lucila S. Valdez.
12

Subsequently, AMTC appealed to respondent DENR
Secretary the grant of the aforesaid Small-Scale Mining
Permits, arguing that: (1) The PMRB of Bulacan erred in
giving due course to the Applications for Small-Scale
Mining Permit without first resolving its formal protest; (2)
The areas covered by the Small-Scale Mining Permits fall
within the area covered by AMTC's valid prior Application
for Exploration Permit; (3) The Applications for Quarry
Permit were illegally converted to Applications for Small-
Scale Mining Permit; (4) DENR-MGB Director Horacio C.
Ramos' ruling that the subject areas became open for
mining location only on August 11, 2004 was controlling;
(5) The Small-Scale Mining Permits were null and void
because they covered areas that were never declared
People's Small-Scale Mining Program sites as mandated by
Section 4 of the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991;
and (6) Iron ore is not considered as one of the quarry
resources, as defined by Section 43 of the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995, which could be subjects of an
Application for Quarry Permit.
13

On August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary rendered a
Decision
14
in favor of AMTC. The DENR Secretary agreed
with MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos that the area was
open to mining location only on August 11, 2004, fifteen
(15) days after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27,
2004 of a copy of the MGB-Central Office's Order dated
July 16, 2004, which Order denied Golden Falcon's appeal.
According to the DENR Secretary, the filing by Golden
Falcon of the letter-appeal suspended the finality of the
Order of denial issued on April 29, 1998 by the Regional
Director until the resolution of the appeal on July 16, 2004
by the MGB-Central Office. He stated that the Applications
for Quarry Permit were filed on February 10, 2004 when
the area was still closed to mining location; hence, the
Small-Scale Mining Permits granted by the PMRB and the
Governor were null and void. On the other hand, the DENR
Secretary declared that AMTC filed its Application for
Exploration Permit when the area was already open to
other mining applicants; thus, AMTCs Application for
Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the DENR
Secretary held that the questioned Small-Scale Mining
Permits were issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No.
7076 and beyond the authority of the Provincial Governor
pursuant to Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942, because the area
was never proclaimed to be under the People's Small-Scale
Mining Program. Further, the DENR Secretary stated that
iron ore mineral is not considered among the quarry
resources.
The dispositive portion of the DENR Secretarys Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-
III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines and Trading Corp. is declared
valid and may now be given due course. The Small-Scale
Mining Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-
003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B-004-05 of
Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez
are declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the said
permits are hereby CANCELLED.
15

Hence, petitioner League of Provinces filed this petition.
Petitioner is a duly organized league of local governments
incorporated under R.A. No. 7160. Petitioner declares that
it is composed of 81 provincial governments, including the
Province of Bulacan. It states that this is not an action of
one province alone, but the collective action of all
provinces through the League, as a favorable ruling will
not only benefit one province, but all provinces and all
local governments.
Petitioner raises these issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 17(B)(3)(III) OF THE, 1991
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND SECTION 24 OF THE
PEOPLE'S SMALL-SCALE MINING ACT OF 1991 ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR PROVIDING FOR EXECUTIVE
CONTROL AND INFRINGING UPON THE LOCAL AUTONOMY
OF PROVINCES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT [DENR] IN
NULLIFYING, VOIDING AND CANCELLING THE SMALL-SCALE
MINING PERMITS AMOUNTS TO EXECUTIVE CONTROL,
NOT MERELY SUPERVISION AND USURPS THE DEVOLVED
POWERS OF ALL PROVINCES.
16

To start, the Court finds that petitioner has legal standing
to file this petition because it is tasked under Section 504
of the Local Government Code of 1991 to promote local
autonomy at the provincial level;
17
adopt measures for the
promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials
and employees;
18
and exercise such other powers and
perform such other duties and functions as the league may
prescribe for the welfare of the provinces.
19

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-
equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears
emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-
honored principle that a statute is presumed to be
valid.
20
This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of the Government a becoming
courtesy for each other's acts.
21
This Court, however, may
declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where
a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution,
22
leaving no doubt or hesitation in the
mind of the Court.
23

In this case, petitioner admits that respondent DENR
Secretary had the authority to nullify the Small-Scale
Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of
Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control over the
PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining
Program is subject to control by respondent DENR.
Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale
mining in the provinces is granted by three statutes: (1)
R.A. No. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2)
R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small Scale Mining Act of
1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
24
The pertinent provisions
of law sought to be declared as unconstitutional by
petitioner are as follows:
R.A. No. 7061 (The Local Government Code of 1991)
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local
government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and
shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the
duties and functions currently vested upon them. They
shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant
to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise
such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental
to efficient and effective provision of the basic services
and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not
limited to, the following:
x x x x
(3) For a Province:c
x x x x
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to
supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement
of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry
projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and
other laws on the protection of the environment; and
mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes; x x x
25

R.A. No. 7076 (People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991)
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. - There is
hereby created under the direct supervision and control of
the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board,
herein called the Board, which shall be the implementing
agency of the Department, and shall exercise the following
powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush
areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas
for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and
regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over
conflicting claims within a peoples small-scale
mining area, an area that is declared a small-
mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be
necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of
this Act.
26

Petitioner contends that the aforecited laws and DENR
Administrative Order No. 9640 (the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995) did
not explicitly confer upon respondents DENR and the
DENR Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify,
void, or cancel the permits issued by the Provincial
Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by
the PMRB. The statutes are also silent as to the power of
respondent DENR Secretary to substitute his own
judgment over that of the Provincial Governor and the
PMRB.
Moreover, petitioner contends that Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A.
No. 7076, which confer upon respondents DENR and the
DENR Secretary the power of control are unconstitutional,
as the Constitution states that the President (and
Executive Departments and her alter-egos) has the power
of supervision only, not control, over acts of the local
government units, and grants the local government units
autonomy, thus:
The 1987 Constitution:
Article X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to
component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.
27

Petitioner contends that the policy in the above-cited
constitutional provision is mirrored in the Local
Government Code, which states:
SEC. 25. National Supervision over Local Government
Units. - (a) Consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision
over local government units to ensure that their acts are
within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly
over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent
component cities; through the province with respect to
component cities and municipalities; and through the city
and municipality with respect to barangays.
28

Petitioner contends that the foregoing provisions of the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991
show that the relationship between the President and the
Provinces or respondent DENR, as the alter ego of the
President, and the Province of Bulacan is one of executive
supervision, not one of executive control. The term
"control" has been defined as the power of an officer to
alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his/her duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while
the term "supervision" is the power of a superior officer to
see to it that lower officers perform their function in
accordance with law.
29

Petitioner argues that respondent DENR Secretary went
beyond mere executive supervision and exercised control
when he nullified the small-scale mining permits granted
by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the former
substituted the judgment of the latter.
Petitioner asserts that what is involved here is a devolved
power.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to
regulate small-scale mining has been devolved to all
provinces. In the exercise of devolved powers,
departmental approval is not necessary.
30

Petitioner contends that if the provisions in Section 24 of
R.A. No. 7076 and Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 granting the power of control
to the DENR/DENR Secretary are not nullified, nothing
would stop the DENR Secretary from nullifying, voiding
and canceling the small-scale mining permits that have
been issued by a Provincial Governor.
Petitioner submits that the statutory grant of power of
control to respondents is unconstitutional, as the
Constitution only allows supervision over local
governments and proscribes control by the executive
departments.
In its Comment, respondents, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, stated that contrary to the assertion
of petitioner, the power to implement the small-scale
mining law is expressly limited in Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of
the Local Government Code, which provides that it must
be carried out "pursuant to national policies and subject to
supervision, control and review of the DENR." Moreover,
the fact that the power to implement the small-scale
mining law has not been fully devolved to provinces is
further amplified by Section 4 of the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991, which provides, among others, that
the People's Small-Scale Mining Program shall be
implemented by the DENR Secretary.
The petition lacks merit.
Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII (National Economy and
Patrimony) of the Constitution
31
provides that "the
exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State."
Moreover, paragraph 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution provides that "the Congress may, by law,
allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens x x x."
Pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, R.A.
No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991,
was enacted, establishing under Section 4 thereof a
People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented
by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other
concerned government agencies.
The People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 defines
"small-scale mining" as "refer[ring] to mining activities,
which rely heavily on manual labor using simple
implement and methods and do not use explosives or
heavy mining equipment."
32

It should be pointed out that the Administrative Code of
198733 provides that the DENR is, subject to law and
higher authority, in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate, under Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of the country's
natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale
mining law in the provinces is made subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR under the
Local Government Code of 1991, while the Peoples Small-
Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the Peoples Small-
Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by the DENR
Secretary in coordination with other concerned local
government agencies.
Indeed, Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the
Constitution states that "[t]he President of the Philippines
shall exercise general supervision over local governments,"
and Section 25 of the Local Government Code reiterates
the same. General supervision by the President means no
more than seeing to it that laws are faithfully executed or
that subordinate officers act within the law.
34

The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of
local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to
the administrative autonomy of local government units or,
cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority.
35
It does not make local
governments sovereign within the State.
36
Administrative
autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject
to limitations like following national policies or
standards,
37
and those provided by the Local Government
Code, as the structuring of local governments and the
allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources
among the different local government units and local
officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands
of Congress
38
under Section 3, Article X of the
Constitution.
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress
to "enact a local government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local
units."
In connection with the enforcement of the small-scale
mining law in the province, Section 17 of the Local
Government Code provides:
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local
government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and
shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the
duties and functions currently vested upon them. They
shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant
to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise
such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental
to efficient and effective provision of the basic services
and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not
limited to, the following:
x x x x
(3) For a Province:c
x x x x
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to
supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement
of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry
projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and
other laws on the protection of the environment; and
mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes;
39

Clearly, the Local Government Code did not fully devolve
the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the
provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in
charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out
the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources.
40

Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991
is in harmony with R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-
Scale Mining Act of 1991,
41
which established a People's
Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the
Secretary of the DENR, thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared of the
State to promote, develop, protect and rationalize viable
small-scale mining activities in order to generate more
employment opportunities and provide an equitable
sharing of the nation's wealth and natural resources,
giving due regard to existing rights as herein provided.
x x x x
Sec. 4. People's Small-Scale Mining Program. - For the
purpose of carrying out the declared policy provided in
Section 2 hereof, there is hereby established a People's
Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, hereinafter called the Department, in
coordination with other concerned government agencies,
designed to achieve an orderly, systematic and rational
scheme for the small-scale development and utilization of
mineral resources in certain mineral areas in order to
address the social, economic, technical, and
environmental problems connected with small-scale
mining activities.
x x x x
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. There is
hereby created under the direct supervision and control of
the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board,
herein called the Board, which shall be the implementing
agency of the Department, and shall exercise the following
powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush
areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas
for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and
regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over
conflicting claims within a peoples small-scale
mining area, an area that is declared a small-
mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be
necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of
this Act.
42

DENR Administrative Order No. 34, series of 1992,
containing the Rules and Regulations to implement R.A.
No. 7076, provides:
SEC. 21. Administrative Supervision over the People's
Small-Scale Mining Program. The following DENR officials
shall exercise the following supervisory functions in the
implementation of the Program:
21.1 DENR Secretrary direct supervision and
control over the program and activities of the
small-scale miners within the people's small-
scale mining area;
21.2 Director the Director shall:
a. Recommend the depth or length of
the tunnel or adit taking into account
the: (1) size of membership and
capitalization of the cooperative; (2)
size of mineralized areas; (3) quantity
of mineral deposits; (4) safety of
miners; and (5) environmental impact
and other considerations;
b. Determine the right of small-scale
miners to existing facilities in
consultation with the operator,
claimowner, landowner or lessor of an
affected area upon declaration of a
small-scale mining area;
c. Recommend to the Secretary the
withdrawal of the status of the
people's small-scale mining area when
it can no longer be feasibly operated
on a small-scale basis; and
d. See to it that the small-scale mining
contractors abide by small-scale mines
safety rules and regulations.
x x x x
SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. The
Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board created under
R.A. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and
functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
22.1 Declares and segregates existing gold rush
area for small-scale mining;
22.2 Reserves for the future, mineralized
areas/mineral lands for people's small-scale
mining;
22.3 Awards contracts to small-scale miners
cooperative;
22.4 Formulates and implements rules and
regulations related to R.A. 7076;
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over
conflicting claims within ninety (90) days upon
filing of protests or complaints; Provided, That
any aggrieved party may appeal within five (5)
days from the Board's decision to the Secretary
for final resolution otherwise the same is
considered final and executory; and
22.6 Performs such other functions as may be
necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of
R.A. 7076.
SEC. 6. Declaration of People's Small-Scale Mining Areas.
The Board created under R.A. 7076 shall have the
authority to declare and set aside People's Small-Scale
Mining Areas in sites onshore suitable for small-scale
mining operations subject to review by the DENR Secretary
thru the Director.
43

DENR Administrative Order No. 23, otherwise known as
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942,
otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
adopted on August 15, 1995, provides under Section
123
44
thereof that small-scale mining applications should
be filed with the PMRB
45
and the corresponding permits
shall be issued by the Provincial Governor, except small-
scale mining applications within the mineral reservations.
Thereafter, DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40,
otherwise known as the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, adopted on December 19,
1996, provides that applications for Small-Scale Mining
Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City
Mayor through the concerned Provincial/City Mining
Regulatory Board for areas outside the Mineral
Reservations and with the Director though the Bureau for
areas within the Mineral Reservations.
46
Moreover, it
provides that Local Government Units shall, in
coordination with the Bureau/ Regional Offices and
subject to valid and existing mining rights, "approve
applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel,
quarry x x x and gravel permits not exceeding five (5)
hectares."
47

Petitioner contends that the Local Government Code of
1991, R.A. No. 7076, DENR Administrative Orders Nos. 95-
23 and 96-40 granted the DENR Secretary the broad
statutory power of control, but did not confer upon the
respondents DENR and DENR Secretary the power to
reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued
by the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts
entered into by the Board.
The contention does not persuade.
The settlement of disputes over conflicting claims in small-
scale mining is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076,
thus:
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. There is
hereby created under the direct supervision and control of
the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board,
herein called the Board, which shall be the implementing
agency of the Department, and shall exercise the following
powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
x x x x
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting
claims within a people's small-scale mining area, an area
that is declared a small mining area; x x x
Section 24, paragraph (e) of R.A. No. 7076 cited above is
reflected in Section 22, paragraph 22.5 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7076, to
wit:
SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. The
Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board created under
R.A. No. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and
functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
x x x x
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over
conflicting claims within ninety (90) days upon filing of
protests or complaints; Provided, That any aggrieved party
may appeal within five (5) days from the Board's decision
to the Secretary for final resolution otherwise the same is
considered final and executory; x x x
In this case, in accordance with Section 22, paragraph 22.5
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
7076, the AMTC filed on July 22, 2005 with the PMRB of
Bulacan a formal protest against the Applications for
Quarry Permits of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz,
Liberato Sembrano (replaced by Lucila Valdez) and
Gerardo Cruz on the ground that the subject area was
already covered by its Application for Exploration
Permit.
48
However, on August 8, 2005, the PMRB issued
Resolution Nos. 05-8, 05-9, 05-10 and 05-11, resolving to
submit to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan the
Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo
Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz
for the granting/issuance of the said permits.
49
On August
10, 2005, the Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the
Small-Scale Mining Permits to Eduardo Mercado,
Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz based on
the legal opinion of the Provincial Legal Officer and the
Resolutions of the PMRB of Bulacan.
Hence, AMTC filed an appeal with respondent DENR
Secretary, appealing from Letter-Resolution No. 05-1317
and Resolution Nos. 05-08, 05-09, 05-10 and 05-11, all
dated August 8, 2005, of the PMRB of Bulacan, which
resolutions gave due course and granted, on August 10,
2005, Small-Scale Mining Permits to Eduardo D. Mercado,
Benedicto S. Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz
involving parcels of mineral land situated at Camachin,
Doa Remedios Trinidad, Bulacan.
The PMRB of Bulacan filed its Answer, stating that it is an
administrative body, created under R.A. No. 7076, which
cannot be equated with the court wherein a full-blown
hearing could be conducted, but it is enough that the
parties were given the opportunity to present evidence. It
asserted that the questioned resolutions it issued were in
accordance with the mining laws and that the Small-Scale
Mining Permits granted were registered ahead of AMTC's
Application for Exploration Permit. Further, the Board
stated that the Governor of Bulacan had the power to
approve the Small-Scale Mining Permits under R.A. No.
7160.
The DENR Secretary found the appeal meritorious, and
resolved these pivotal issues: (1) when is the subject
mining area open for mining location by other applicants;
and (2) who among the applicants have valid
applications.1wphi1 The pertinent portion of the decision
of the DENR Secretary reads:
We agree with the ruling of the MGB Director that the
area is open only to mining location on August 11, 2004,
fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July
27, 2004 of a copy of the subject Order of July 16,
2004.1wphi1 The filing by Golden Falcon of the letter-
appeal suspended the finality of the Order of Denial issued
on April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director until the
Resolution thereof on July 16, 2004.
Although the subject AQPs/SSMPs were processed in
accordance with the procedures of the PMRB, however,
the AQPs were filed on February 10, 2004 when the area is
still closed to mining location. Consequently, the SSMPs
granted by the PMRB and the Governor are null and void
making thereby AEP No. III-02-04 of the AMTC valid, it
having been filed when the area is already open to other
mining applicants.
Records also show that the AQPs were converted into
SSMPs. These are two (2) different applications. The
questioned SSMPs were issued in violation of Section 4 of
RA 7076 and beyond the authority of the Provincial
Governor pursuant to Section 43 of RA 7942 because the
area was never proclaimed as "People's Small-Scale Mining
Program." Moreover, iron ore mineral is not considered
among the quarry resources.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-
III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines and Trading Corp. is declared
valid and may now be given due course. The Small-Scale
Mining Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-
003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B-004-05 of
Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez
are declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the said
permits are hereby CANCELLED.
50

The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary
was rendered in accordance with the power of review
granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of
disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No.
707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
52
It is noted that although AMTC filed a
protest with the PMRB regarding its superior and prior
Application for Exploration Permit over the Applications
for Quarry Permit, which were converted to Small-Scale
Mining Permits, the PMRB did not resolve the same, but
issued Resolution Nos. 05-08 to 05-11 on August 8, 2005,
resolving to submit to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan
the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo
Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz
for the granting of the said permits. After the Provincial
Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale Mining Permits
on August 10, 2005, AMTC appealed the Resolutions of the
PMRB giving due course to the granting of the Small-Scale
Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor.
Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that
the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid
and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-
Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor,
emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR
Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review
and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the
validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits
by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB,
is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the
determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights
of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter
in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts
obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.
53
The
DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A.
No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to
the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or
litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial
function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated
with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor
in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over
the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a
determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting
claims based on the law.
In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076
are unconstitutional, the Court has been guided by Beltran
v. The Secretary of Health,
54
which held:
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court
to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must
clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition
must fail.
55

In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by
petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Section 17
(b )(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
Section 24 'of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the
constitutionality of the said provisions of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for
themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES,
INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro &
Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas,
Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S.
Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista &
Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina
Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C.
Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C.
Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo
Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco,
Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon
Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses
Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and
on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor,
Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C.
Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari
Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho &
Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael
Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho,
Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel
Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor
children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas,
Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws &
Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning
Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE
COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE
HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its
President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso
Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Donato
Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and
VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by
Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his
personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC.,
represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member
of the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA,
LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL
ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management;
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health;
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE
APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR
SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX),
herein represented by its National President, Atty.
Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A.
Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio
Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan,
Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana,
Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and
Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National
Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H.
LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D.,
CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-
LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life,
and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA,
CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE
NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO
collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C.
TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity,
and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the
Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by
Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her
personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z.
CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA,
CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY,
WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L.
POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON
PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY
VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-
GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN
CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A.
RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M.
KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health,
and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that
it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good."
1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the
nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our
people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and
unemployment. While governmental policies have been
geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the
bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a
problem that concerns not only the poor, but every
member of society. The government continues to tread on
a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is,
the general welfare of the Filipino people and the
development of the country as a whole. The legislative
branch, as the main facet of a representative government,
endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy
looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to
fully implement these measures and bring concrete and
substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz.
Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes
regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts
its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called
upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into
action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn
duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and
enduring principle that holds Philippine society together -
the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years
than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society,
diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their
perceived consequences freely circulate in various media.
From television debates
2
to sticker campaigns,
3
from
rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings
organized by members of the clergy
4
- the clash between
the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep
division in every level of the society. Despite calls to
withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the
said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield
the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision
may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as
presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-
in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
5
filed
by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely
Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as
citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of
their minor children; and the Magnificat Child
Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-
owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,
6
filed by the Alliance
for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc.,
through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S.
Noche
7
and several others
8
in their personal
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the
generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,
9
filed by the Task Force
for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S.
Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
10
filed
by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City,
Inc.,
11
Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,
12
a domestic,
privately-owned educational institution, and
several others,
13
in their capacities as citizens
(Serve Life);
(5) Petition,
14
filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in
his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
15
filed
by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace
Apostolate of the Philippines,
16
in their
capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
17
filed
by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians
Inc.,
18
and several others
19
in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,
20
filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D.
and several others,
21
in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
22
filed
by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad
and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as
citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet
unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in
his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
23
filed
by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.
24
and
several others,
25
in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates
who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,
26
filed by
Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,
27
Attys.
Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella
Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their
capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of
the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
28
filed
by John Walter B. Juat and several others,
29
in
their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
30
filed
by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and
several others,
31
in their capacities as citizens
(CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition
32
filed by Almarim
Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,
33
filed by Atty.
Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen
and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,
34
filed by Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited
political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on
the following GROUNDS:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the
unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against
abortion, the implementation of the RH Law
would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.
35

The RH Law violates the right to health and the
right to protection against hazardous products.
The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides
universal access to contraceptives which are
hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer
and other health problems.
36

The RH Law violates the right to religious
freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH
Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of
public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of
public funds for purposes that are believed to be
contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious
freedom.
37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens
conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who
seek advice on reproductive health programs to other
doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on
reproductive health programs and service, although it is
against their religious beliefs and convictions.
38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),
39
provides that
skilled health professionals who are public officers such as,
but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health
physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or
rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with
the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered
as conscientious objectors.
40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the
formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should
not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of
religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH
Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and
the "compelling state interest test" to justify the
regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the
right to free speech.
42

The RH Law violates the constitutional
provision on involuntary servitude. According to
the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because,
to be accredited under the PhilHealth program,
they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bona services for indigent women,
under threat of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment.
43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients
are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render reproductive health
services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would
mean that the majority of the public would no longer be
able to avail of the practitioners services.
44

The RH Law violates the right to equal
protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH
Law discriminates against the poor as it makes
them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use. The
petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
seeks to introduce contraceptives that would
effectively reduce the number of the poor.
45

The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution. In
imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or
fine for "any violation," it is vague because it
does not define the type of conduct to be
treated as "violation" of the RH Law.
46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH
Law violates the right to due process by removing from
them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs
and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and
what kind of services they shall offer."
47
It ignores the
management prerogative inherent in corporations for
employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their
own discretion and judgment.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
To compel a person to explain a full range of
family planning methods is plainly to curtail his
right to expound only his own preferred way of
family planning. The petitioners note that
although exemption is granted to institutions
owned and operated by religious groups, they
are still forced to refer their patients to another
healthcare facility willing to perform the service
or procedure.
48

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of
one's family protected by the Constitution. It is
contended that the RH Law providing for
mandatory reproductive health education
intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise
their children in accordance with their beliefs.
49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the
person who will undergo reproductive health procedure,
the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the
spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually
decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of
their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the
parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their
child should use contraceptives.
50

The RH Law violates the constitutional
principle of non-delegation of legislative
authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power
to determine whether a product is non-
abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).
51

The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill
rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of
the Constitution.
52

The RH Law violates Natural Law.
53

The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy
of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
{ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law,
providing for reproductive health measures at
the local government level and the ARMM,
infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and
the ARMM under the Local Government Code
and R.A . No. 9054.
54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file
their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of
the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the
petitions in behalf of the respondents,
55
Congressman
Edcel C. Lagman,
56
former officials of the Department of
Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr.
Alberto G. Romualdez,
57
the Filipino Catholic Voices for
Reproductive Health (C4RH),
58
Ana Theresa "Risa"
Hontiveros,
59
and Atty. Joan De Venecia
60
also filed their
respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with
several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S.
Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.
61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive
arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual
case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet
ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack
standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the
enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and
arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante
Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of
the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and
twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference
with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or
identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the
sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in
the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August
6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral
argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered
extended until further orders of the Court.
63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the
same time posed several questions for their clarification
on some contentions of the parties.
64

The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has
allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18,
1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act
to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive
drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation
and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner."
65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,
66
approved on June 21, 1969,
contained provisions relative to "dispensing of
abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and
devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that
"no drug or chemical product or device capable of
provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified
by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or
sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly
licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the
UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal
element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal
ligation to mitigate population growth.
67
Among these
measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16,
1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on
Population, Creating the Commission on Population and
for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family
planning will be made part of a broad educational
program; safe and effective means will be provided to
couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and
morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President
Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No.
79,
68
dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made
"family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
provided "family planning services as a part of over-all
health care," and made "available all acceptable methods
of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens
desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and
family planning methods evolved from being a component
of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive
health.
69
Under that policy, the country gave priority to
one's right to freely choose the method of family planning
to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the
commitments made in the International Conference on
Population and Development.
70
Thus, on August 14, 2009,
the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta
for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to
provide for comprehensive health services and programs
for women, including family planning and sex education.
71

The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population
of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace.
From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in
1960, the population of the country reached over 76
million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.
72
The
executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures
were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH
Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, access and information to the full
range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure
that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to
reproductive health be achieved. To make it more
effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of
modem family planning methods, supplies and services,
and for schools to provide reproductive health education.
To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of
refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure
to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law
be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular,
argues that the government sponsored contraception
program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right
to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the
State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI
prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the
passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."
73
It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception
and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act
No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless
dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician.
What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under
the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the
entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to
the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country
- is made to play in the implementation of the
contraception program to the fullest extent possible using
taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and
provider of all forms of family planning methods and the
implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread
dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of
family planning methods, devices and supplies.
74

ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions
of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them
to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power
of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free
Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic
Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and
its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve
some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial
hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the
legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect
the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it
being "a product of a majoritarian democratic
process"
75
and "characterized by an inordinate amount of
transparency."
76
The OSG posits that the authority of the
Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by
certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the
discretion to implement the constitutional policies and
positive norms with the political departments, in
particular, with Congress.
77
It further asserts that in view
of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-
Terrorism Council,
78
the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to
assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.
79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied
challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed
law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners,
and that the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims
that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is
not a speech-regulating measure.
80

In many cases involving the determination of the
constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the
Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its
exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the
wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle
of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of
powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government, which obtains not through express provision
but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department
of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere.
81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;
82
(b) the executive power shall be vested in
the President of the Philippines;
83
and (c) the judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
84
The
Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three
branches of government.
85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary
recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which
imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the
nature of their functions and of their respect for the other
branches of government, in striking down the acts of the
Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the
policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.
86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of
social disquietude or political instability, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated.
87
In order to address
this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect
the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its
sphere of competence and authority, but at the same
time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a
very limited and specific point - to determine whether the
acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion.
88
Thus, while the Court may not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law,
it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or
grave abuse of discretion results.
89
The Court must
demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those
cherished rights and principles embodied in the
Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of
judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution
makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may
be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes
back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive
branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review,
the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort,
then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions
under review.
90
This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,
91
the Court has
unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in
Macalintal v. COMELEC,
92
Aldaba v. COMELEC,
93
Magallona
v. Ermita,
94
and countless others. In Tanada, the Court
wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition
no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
"The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a
"controversy as to the application or interpretation of
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in
the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court
is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis
supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for
the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of
powers and the balancing of powers among the three
great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and
control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief,
indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument
of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing
operation.
95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the
Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just
any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of
judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz :
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.
96

Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect
petitions do not present any actual case or controversy
because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.
97
They
claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet
concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been
charged with violating any of its provisions and that there
is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been
adversely affected by its operation.
98
In short, it is
contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion.
99
The rule is
that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. The controversy must be
justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other
words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real,
tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue.
There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in
nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness.
101
A question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of the act complained of
102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of
the Republic of the Philippines,
103
where the
constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in
question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to
pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete
act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners'
and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court
ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not
yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts
under a law are not necessary to render the controversy
ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already
been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.
104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so
because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law
for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.
They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge
lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH
Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech
regulating measure.
105

The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge,
also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not
only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.
106
These include religious freedom, freedom
of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
107
After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are
but component rights of the right to one's freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are
externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating
from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal
statues,
108
it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not
only regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
109
The
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For
unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental
Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
110
Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty
to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions
have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights
to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of
these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can
indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no
actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a
reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment
of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the
petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends
that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners
cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced
and applied against them,
111
and the government has yet
to distribute reproductive health devices that are
abortive.
112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as
citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act.
113
It requires a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge"
embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation
of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging
the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation
of the rights of third persons not before the court. This
rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.
115

Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the
rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."
116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,
117
the
Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases,
118
ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders although they had only an indirect and
general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law
may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still,
the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s
tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with
material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one
occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional
plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may
not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act. As held in Jaworski v.
PAGCOR:
119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be
properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this
case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and
take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of
this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and
just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules
of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
(Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench
and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the
guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the
constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the
freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that
the issues of contraception and reproductive health have
already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of
society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions
raise issues of transcendental importance warranting
immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the
unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait
for a life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial
restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so,
when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake,
would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.
120
Suffice it to state that
most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and
so the Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
121

One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the
RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of
the Constitution,
122
prescribing the one subject-one title
rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health
with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation
violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent - to act as a population control
measure.
123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the
RH Law is not a birth or population control measure,
124
and
that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.
125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive
health law, the Court sees it as principally a population
control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared
towards the reduction of the country's population. While it
claims to save lives and keep our women and children
healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products.
As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
with access to information on the full range of modem
family planning products and methods. These family
planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly
geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the
RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide
pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of
the law, however, covers the dissemination of information
and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality
reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention
that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire
RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH
Law.
126
Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to
contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its
very foundation.
127
As earlier explained, "the other
positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance,
maternal care including pre-and post-natal services,
prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in
the Magna Carta for Women."
128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one
subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G
Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does
not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to
cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of
the law shows that both "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to
the overriding objective to control the population growth.
As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and
guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to
health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that
the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act."
129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive
health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human
development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the
right to life and health of the unborn child under Section
12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation
allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively
sanctions abortion.
130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms
prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb as an
abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take
effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary
to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford
protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only
"non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies,
medical research shows that contraceptives use results in
abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which
already has life.
131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental
human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction
of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an
affront to the dignity of man.
132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law
requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify
that the product or supply is not to be used as an
abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms
that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering
that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise
or administer the use of these products and supplies to
prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make
a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient
purposes.
133

Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply
the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law
does not violate the Constitution since the said law
emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive
health care services, methods, devices products and
supplies shall be made accessible to the public.
134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative
determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients
by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with
due consideration to various studies and consultations
with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other
experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court
afford deference and respect to such a determination and
pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is
later on determined as an abortive.
135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the
constitutional protection of one's right to life is not
violated considering that various studies of the WHO show
that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized
ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is
constitutional since the law specifically provides that only
contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the
fertilized ovum are allowed.
136

The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human
being enjoys the right to life.
137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being
grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a
creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom,
or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the
laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than
ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family
planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent
vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled
"An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June
18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and
devices which prevent fertilization,
138
to the promotion of
male vasectomy and tubal ligation,
139
and the ratification
of numerous international agreements, the country has
long recognized the need to promote population control
through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-
term economic development. Through the years, however,
the use of contraceptives and other family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public
health, particularly, reproductive health.
140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures
promoting women's rights and health and the overall
promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A.
No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the
"The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated.
Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine
national population program has always been grounded
two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and
the "principle of non-coercion."
141
As will be discussed
later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the
constitutional protection expressly provided to afford
protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position
that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence. During the
deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the
individual members of the Court could express their own
views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life
begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus
should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12
which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the
unborn from conception. This is undisputable because
before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said
reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to
any proscription prior to conception or when life begins.
The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are
quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific
fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They
are waving the view that life begins at implantation.
Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that
conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the
female ovum by the male sperm.
142
On the other side of
the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers
to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus.
143

Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and
ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v.
Judicial Bar Council:
144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory
construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It
is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction
that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have
in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they
say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First,
because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it
should ever be present as an important condition for the
rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional
meaning of the word "conception" which, as described
and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means
that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it
as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable
zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable
of developing into a being like its parents.
145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term
"conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by
the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of
survival and maturation under normal conditions.
146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal
personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan
S. Montano,
147
it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even
a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,
148
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing
for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect
for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a
legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and
promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus
was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.
149

Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light
on the intention of the Framers regarding the term
"conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to
the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the
following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which
reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is
when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is
human life. x x x.
150

xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as
such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological
manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is
the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says
yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living
organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself.
It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes
in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it
multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous
process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs
of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the
fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an
equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception,
the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this
happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with
23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46
chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only -
and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized
ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively,
we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive
and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human
life. Its nature is human.
151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment
of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization"
was not because of doubt when human life begins, but
rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of
conception" was described by us here before with the
scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the
comprehension of some people; we want to use the
simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."
152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given
ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is
sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution,
without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view
because according to the Commissioner's own admission,
he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins.
So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very,
dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins
from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt
about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress,
too.
153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a
question on that point. Actually, that is one of the
questions I was going to raise during the period of
interpellations but it has been expressed already. The
provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does
this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the
right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we
know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact
that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the
rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has
already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized
ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What
happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the
opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus.
Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these
so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then
that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would
be unconstitutional and should be banned under this
provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up
to Congress to state whether or not these certain
contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based
on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already
considered abortifacient.
154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that
the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State
shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the
unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is,
upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of
the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it determine when life
begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional
provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an
abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to
the courts to decide on based on established evidence.
155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive
and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US
bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only
to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the
millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-
free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and
pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life
of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised
some of these implications this afternoon when I
interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner
Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a
categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of
the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also
actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain
contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this
point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it
disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because
contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn
yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking
more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine
device which actually stops the egg which has already
been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say
"from the moment of conception," what really occurs is
that some of these contraceptives will have to be
unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the
fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the
1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during
the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal
ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients.
157

Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is
no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms
sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that
effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12,
Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your
Honor.
158

Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of
medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied
Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of
pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon
enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."
159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female
gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo
develops."
160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological
Obstetrics),
161
used by medical schools in the Philippines,
also concludes that human life (human person) begins at
the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and
the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual,
with a unique genetic composition that dictates all
developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also
reveals that: "Human development begins after the union
of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process
known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a
sequence of events that begins with the contact of a
sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum)
and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid
nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their
chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum,
known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the
beginning, or primordium, of a human being."
162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology
163
mirror
the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a
continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark
because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically
distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The
combination of 23 chromosomes present in each
pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus
the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome
is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical
Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive
Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein
concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at
the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that
fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that
conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are
sacred from the moment of conception, and that
destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what
the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology
and human embryology, a human being begins
immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no
point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis
where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any
philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape
this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well defined
"moment of conception." This conclusion is objective,
consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of
any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of
human life or of human embryos.
164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or
understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is
a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of
conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the
theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.
165
According to him, "fertilization and
conception are two distinct and successive stages in the
reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous."
166
Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
"medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the
fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it
is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected."
167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is
devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not
pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the
fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate
object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and
46 chromosomes.
168
Implantation has been conceptualized
only for convenience by those who had population control
in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not
only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this
position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly
legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would
prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It
would be provocative and further aggravate religious-
based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes -
abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the
1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a
measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the
Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the
Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the
protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no
pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-
abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.
169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with
this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the
Court has opted not to make any determination, at this
stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself
clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio,
the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the
policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that
it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for
implantation.
170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime
under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized
ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this
Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full
range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that
contribute to reproductive health and well-being by
addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also
includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the
enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements
of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion
complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of
individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly
whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and
timing of their children; to make other decisions
concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion
and violence; to have the information and means to do so;
and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and
reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive
health rights do not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws
against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance,
executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order,
rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392,
otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent
in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of
the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection
must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By
using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs
or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that
induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is
any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the
Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already
has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect
it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first,
prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first
kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to
that which induces the killing or the destruction of the
fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH
Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins
only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does
not declare either that protection will only be given upon
implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it
recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the
fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the
fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes
existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the
mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and
afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum
implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device
from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it
affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does
not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position
that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its
viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is
not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as
defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces
abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum
or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso
under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply
included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is
made available on the condition that it is not to be used as
an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all
its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will
not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot
be present in every instance when the contraceptive
product or supply will be used.
171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to
safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however,
the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded,
should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL
must have a certification from the FDA that said product
and supply is made available on the condition that it
cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is
consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of
the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not
purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will
be used for such purpose and their other forms or
equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the
authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when
they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law
defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act,
the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines
"abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall
be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily
induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
[Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is
redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and
scientifically proven modern family planning method,
device, or health product, whether natural or artificial,
that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a
fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being
implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved
indication as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows
"contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only
those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of
a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb.
172

This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice
Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the
insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of
the RH-IRR
173
must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should,
therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the
insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for
the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy
the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With
such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate
that a contraceptive will only be considered as an
"abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as
pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the
fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive"
would permit the approval of contraceptives which are
actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe
mechanism.
174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the
certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot
act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of
an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its
declared policy against abortion, the undeniable
conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the
PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives
that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do
not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy
prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that
laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each other in
prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To
uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR
and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the
primary effect of being an abortive would effectively
"open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution."
175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no
abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life
must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to
health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family
products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and
the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of
essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals.
176
Citing various studies on the matter, the
petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and
cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral
contraceptives as compared to women who never use
them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the
use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is
contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive
pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic
stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial
infarction.
177
Given the definition of "reproductive health"
and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)
178
and (w)
179
of
the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed
legislation only seeks to ensure that women have
pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.
180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of
the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere
statement of the administration's principle and policy.
Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical
authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a
danger to the health of women.
181

The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right
to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the
States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which
shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all the people at affordable
cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical
care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an
effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and
research, responsive to the country's health needs and
problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for
disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development,
and self-reliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade
malpractices and from substandard or hazardous
products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these
provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly
express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executory. There is no need for
legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions.
182
In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,
183
it was
stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative
act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is,
as it has always been, that
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered
self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless
the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the
petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se.
184
In fact, ALFI
prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A.
No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are
not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription
of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.
185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in
this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No.
4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is
still a good law and its requirements are still in to be
complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the
observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of
the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation
of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and
dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still
require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A.
No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to
ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe
are made available to the public. As aptly explained by
respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of
contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used
without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale,
Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs
and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act
Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards
of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for
Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the
provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH
Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation
of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly
governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership,
or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute
whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive
drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug,
chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for
the purpose of preventing fertilization of the
female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument,
device, material, or agent introduced into the
female reproductive system for the primary
purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating
the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of
not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of
not less than six months or more than one year or both in
the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section
25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and
devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever
nature and kind or device shall be compounded,
dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available
to the consuming public except through a prescription
drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for
in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension
of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether
harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless.
186
[Emphases in the Original. Underlining
supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection
with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning
Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and
monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the
whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all
appropriate local government bodies to plan and
implement this procurement and distribution program.
The supply and budget allotments shall be based on,
among others, the current levels and projections of the
following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and
couples who want to space or limit their
children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of
method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement,
distribution and monitoring program consistent with the
overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the
DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs
and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No.
4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive
drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The
public health must be protected by all possible means. As
pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility
and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting
from or incidental to their use.
187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single
contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant
to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its
determination which drugs or devices are declared by the
FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food
and medicines available to the public are safe for public
consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this
point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is
premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives
must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick
as expounded herein, to be determined as the case
presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress
cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-
uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first
sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only
after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by
the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to
determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or
intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The
provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular
family planning supply from the EDL supports this
construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not
mandatory. There must first be a determination by the
FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies. There can
be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of
contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and
tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional
proscription, there are those who, because of their
religious education and background, sincerely believe that
contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil.
Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially
claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of
contraceptives but also the willing participation and
cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use.
Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely
opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of
the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of
the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign
rule of God in the transmission of Human life."
188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the
guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives
contravene their religious beliefs.
189

2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law
attempts to address religious sentiments by making
provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional
guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also
imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer
the patient seeking reproductive health services to
another medical practitioner who would be able to
provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this
amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to
cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without
violating his/her religious beliefs.
190

They further argue that even if the conscientious
objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is
unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious
objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient
seeking reproductive health services and information - no
escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23
(a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive
health procedures. They claim that the right of other
individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those
working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7;
b) public officers involved in the implementation of the
law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public
schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also
not recognize.
191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners
meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the
matter to another health care service provider is still
considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare
service providers. They add that compelling them to do
the act against their will violates the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law
are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of
Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with
abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory
pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents
encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom
they are required.
192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a
conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider
infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the
objector to become an unwilling participant in the
commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings.
While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by
the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive
acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the
public.
193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show
compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious
freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat
that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the
rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of
rights, sustainable human development, health, education,
information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the
demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened
or are not being met as to justify the impairment of
religious freedom.
194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH
Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning
and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a
certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision
forces individuals to participate in the implementation of
the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious
beliefs.
195
As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty
of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance
with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law
forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and
information to contraception against their beliefs must be
struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH
Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither
imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.
196
They point
out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest
by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive
health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line
with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice
health guarantees of the Constitution,
197
and that what
the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which
deprive others of their right to reproductive
health.
198
They assert that the assailed law only seeks to
guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no
one will be compelled to violate his religion against his
free will.
199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural
family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are
effectively going against the constitutional right to
religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail
the constitutionality of the RH Law.
200
In other words, by
seeking the declaration that the RH Law is
unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court
recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural
family planning methods and impose this on the entire
citizenry.
201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist
that the same does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully
balanced compromise between the interests of the
religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep
silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who
needs access to information and who has the right to
expect that the health care professional in front of her will
act professionally. For the respondents, the concession
given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient
accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's
religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of
others.
202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious
freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in
duration, location and impact.
203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under
Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable
regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples
to have access to information regarding parenthood,
family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is
argued that those who object to any information received
on account of their attendance in the required seminars
are not compelled to accept information given to them.
They are completely free to reject any information they do
not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without intervention of the State.
204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the
notion that natural family planning is the only method
acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing
various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight
the changing stand of the Catholic Church on
contraception throughout the years and note the general
acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its
followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a
heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse
ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds.
History has shown us that our government, in law and in
practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural,
social and racial groups to thrive in a single society
together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant
towards all - the religious people of different sects and the
non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people
generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him
to be, and to whom they call for guidance and
enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the
preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of
Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society,
and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals
and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and
promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God "
manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and
historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble,
it means that the State recognizes with respect the
influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the
purest principles of morality.
205
Moreover, in recognition
of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973
and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and
accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax
exemption of church property, salary of religious officers
in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong
barrier so that the State would not encroach into the
affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of
separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in
Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is
based on mutual respect.1wphi1 Generally, the State
cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much
less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It
cannot favor one religion and discriminate against
another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its
beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the
citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for
the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion
should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in
the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its
generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an
iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically
symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church"
means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need
to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the
pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down
the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article
VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall
be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom
provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State
from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as
against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in
affairs among religious groups."
206
Essentially, it prohibits
the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is
the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.
207
Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering
with the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith.
208
Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the
Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union
209
wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation
for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of
worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of
the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153),
but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of
religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said
that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good. Any legislation whose effect or
purpose is to impede the observance of one or all
religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the
state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a
general law which has for its purpose and effect to
advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid
despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless
the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing
such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d.
563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not
designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a
single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious
beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious
beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice,
while the establishment clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs
and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses
were intended to deny government the power to use
either the carrot or the stick to influence individual
religious beliefs and practices.
210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion
is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the
freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:
211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless
bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the
freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and
without bounds. One may believe in most anything,
however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the
scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between
the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there
is quite a stretch of road to travel.
212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the
awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with
proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare."
213

Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause
and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the
Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)
214
where it was
stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation,
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and
framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."
215
In
the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with
respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of
religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The
purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."
216
"What is sought under the theory of
accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality
of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the
legislature or the courts."
217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious
freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.
218
Underlying the compelling state interest test is
the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and
that laws burdening it should be subject to strict
scrutiny.
219
In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to
determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the
Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court
mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not
employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in
subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case
then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious
freedom is whether it violates the established institutions
of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the
"immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine
that a law of general applicability may burden religious
exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to
accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After
Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule.
Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate
danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly
recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and
present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible
Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the
"clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate
danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious
speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of
expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German
cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail
over established institutions of society and law. Gerona,
however, which was the authority cited by German has
been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave
and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case
that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as
explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate
to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican
Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the
"clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate
danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily
discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German
doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not
congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus
not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano,
the present case involves purely conduct arising from
religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is
proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of
human conduct has different effects on the state's
interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term
while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would
protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is
therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the
state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious
freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most
inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of
Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The
entire constitutional order of limited government is
premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher
sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty
God in order to build a just and humane society and
establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit
this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests
which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is
therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling
interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right
to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a
heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise
would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less
powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining
which shall prevail between the state's interest and
religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering
religious liberty while at the same time affording
protection to the paramount interests of the state. This
was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.
refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling
state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests
of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without
which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in
the original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the
Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or
one's participation in the support of modem reproductive
health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or
whether the same is right or wrong according to one's
dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside
the province of the civil courts."
220
The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at
bench should be understood only in this realm where it
has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands
without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to
determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee
of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and
respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to
violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law
respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights
of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable
human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions
for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family which in turn
is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the
State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and
access, without bias, to all methods of family planning,
including effective natural and modern methods which
have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-
based medical research standards such as those registered
and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as
identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That
the State shall also provide funding support to promote
modern natural methods of family planning, especially the
Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of
acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e),
Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable
individuals and couples to have the number of children
they desire with due consideration to the health,
particularly of women, and the resources available and
affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws,
public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and
choice of family planning methods that are in accordance
with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking
into consideration the State's obligations under various
human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society,
faith-based organizations, the religious sector and
communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health
and population and development policies, plans, and
programs will address the priority needs of women, the
poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of
a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the
family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility
between parents to determine and achieve the desired
number of children, spacing and timing of their children
according to their own family life aspirations, taking into
account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their
religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were
enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some
medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the
principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be
respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts
what the government can do with religion, it also limits
what religious sects can or cannot do with the
government. They can neither cause the government to
adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor
can they not cause the government to restrict other
groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a
state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their
supposition that the State cannot enhance its population
control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their
religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One
cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud
his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and
State demands that one render unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are
God's.
221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote
reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious
beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the
same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to
Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions
commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health
care and services under the law to another accessible
healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections
based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is
allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice,
the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's
espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in
Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an
exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling
state interest in the accomplishment of an important
secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious
objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less
than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a
conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has
been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an
intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One
side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the
abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other
entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of
penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament
of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are
incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to
perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner
Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at
the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.
222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-
out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it
makes pro-life health providers complicit in the
performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or
offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what
they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but
he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect
participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is
necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it
being an externalization of one's thought and conscience.
This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the
protection that should be afforded to individuals in
communicating their beliefs to others as well as the
protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights
guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in
his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind.
223
While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of
choice through informed consent, freedom of choice
guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and
prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether
direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.
224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral
convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of
the State, on the other, to provide access and information
on reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to determine the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children, the
Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector
should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of
the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to
his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of
"the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of
the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and
Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health
Board,
225
that the midwives claiming to be conscientious
objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act
of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or
support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions.
226
The Inner House stated "that if 'participation'
were defined according to whether the person was taking
part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more
complexity and uncertainty."
227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the
applicable principle was the same - they could not be
forced to assist abortions if it would be against their
conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers.
Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such
institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their
duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the
Court deems that it must be struck down for being
violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to
Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24,
considering that in the dissemination of information
regarding programs and services and in the performance
of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom
of health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines,
Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary
228
it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that
it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good."
10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties
provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without
set consequences for either an active violation or mere
inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual.
Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected
right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval.
The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who
declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a
patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court
cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as
provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of
hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the
RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection
clause. The conscientious objection clause should be
equally protective of the religious belief of public health
officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they
should not be considered exempt from the mandates of
the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious
objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners
without distinction whether they belong to the public or
private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic
in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees
its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires
employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a
place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values.
The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in
the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its
beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus,
seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in
more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept
then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the
press, assembly and petition, and freedom of
association.
229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no
such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also
because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the
Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any
conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must
prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-
Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete
with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and
respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this
with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you
have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long
IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the
provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I
cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " ....
skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or
municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of
their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you
agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the
private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors,
skilled health professionals cannot be considered
conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not
against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and
the law, the law must prevail.
230

Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on
whether the respondents, in defense of the subject
provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more
compelling state interest to restrain conscientious
objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2]
discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory
character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve
the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents'
submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously
silent in the establishment of a more compelling state
interest that would rationalize the curbing of a
conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action
contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral
arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and
evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes
disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to
refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad.
What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty
to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so
because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this
burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the
standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary
health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free
speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a
regulation by the State of the relationship between
medical doctors and their patients.
231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest
which would limit the free exercise clause of the
conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails
to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat,
State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to
believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act
according to what one believes. And this freedom is
violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief
or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.
233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger
to the life or health of an individual in the perceived
scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who
plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their
children refers to a future event that is contingent on
whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or
whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On
the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object
to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment
a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health
matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to
justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's
religious freedom, the respondents have failed to
demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests" which could limit or override a person's
fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the
respondents have not presented any government effort
exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its
legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.
234
Other than the assertion that the act of referring
would only be momentary, considering that the act of
referral by a conscientious objector is the very action
being contested as violative of religious freedom, it
behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other
means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its
objective without violating the rights of the conscientious
objector. The health concerns of women may still be
addressed by other practitioners who may perform
reproductive health-related procedures with open
willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who
is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves
the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of
constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by
the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is
protected. Considering other legislations as they stand
now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No.
6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A.
No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of
Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation
to health services and programs. The pertinent provision
of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and
programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive
Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive
health services and programs covering all stages of a
woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes
of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the
provision for comprehensive health services, due respect
shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the
rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible
parenthood, and the right of women to protection from
hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and
post-natal services to address
pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and
effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in
youth sexuality education and health
services without prejudice to the
primary right and duty of parents to
educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections, including
sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and
AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of
reproductive tract cancers like breast
and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and
management of pregnancy-related
complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women
and children, women and children
victims and survivors shall be provided
with comprehensive health services
that include psychosocial, therapeutic,
medical, and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing, recovery,
and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of
infertility and sexual dysfunction
pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond
their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and
intervention of mental health
problems of women and girls. In
addition, healthy lifestyle activities are
encouraged and promoted through
programs and projects as strategies in
the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. -
The State shall provide women in all sectors with
appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information
and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's
health in government education and training programs,
with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth and the development of moral
character and the right of children to
be brought up in an atmosphere of
morality and rectitude for the
enrichment and strengthening of
character;
(2) The formation of a person's
sexuality that affirms human dignity;
and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective
family planning methods including
fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay
eventually replied that the compelling state interest was
"Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands
of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."
235
He,
however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts
and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health
Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality
rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to
2008,
236
although there was still no RH Law at that time.
Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that
such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling
state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the
delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women,
they could not be solved by a measure that puts an
unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in
exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a
valid exception set forth in the law. While generally
healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would
contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be
made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these
situations, the right to life of the mother should be given
preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting
to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave
danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban,
representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause
that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom
of religion does not contemplate an emergency."
237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and
the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to
try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the
resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty.
Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the
principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein
intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the
child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a
conflict situation between the life of the child and the life
of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try
to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not
necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to
save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the
other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the
child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be
guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted
against the child because both their lives are equally
valuable.
238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother,
procedures endangering the life of the child may be
resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of
the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever
burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case
would have been more than justified considering the life
he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15
239
as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court
finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power
by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed
provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for
would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood,
family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does
not even mandate the type of family planning methods to
be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or
artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive
any information during their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept the information
given to them, are completely free to reject the
information they find unacceptable, and retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2)
(i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by
intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that
it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family
rather than promote its solidarity and total
development.
240

The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions
strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution.
In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the
family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care
and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate
in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to
control population growth, contains provisions which tend
to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the
husband and/or the father from participating in the
decision making process regarding their common future
progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority
over their minor daughter simply because she is already a
parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or
private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive
health procedures on any person of legal age on the
ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following
persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided,
That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one
undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis
supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health
procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by
their very nature, should require mutual consent and
decision between the husband and the wife as they affect
issues intimately related to the founding of a family.
Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the
State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a
family." One person cannot found a family. The right,
therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section
3, their right "to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them
" is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this
mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to
the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring
the other spouse from participating in the decision would
drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly
result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and
the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This
would be a marked departure from the policy of the State
to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.
241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure
is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just
one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect
their future as a family because the size of the family or
the number of their children significantly matters. The
decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs
exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one
cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a
constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it
prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling
interest, the State should see to it that they chart their
destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19(
c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta
for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights
in all matters relating to marriage and family relations,
including the joint decision on the number and spacing of
their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section
3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility
between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should
not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one
spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to
undergo reproductive health procedure.
242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within
the protected zone of marital privacy and such state
intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal
privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction,
the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v.
Mutuc,
243
where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification
with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection."
244
Marje adopted the ruling of the US
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,
245
where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights
-older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in
our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute
which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense
on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional
invasion of the right to privacy of married persons.
Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully
enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote
that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees
create zones of privacy."
246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the
courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in
cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a
procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to
family planning services, whether natural or artificial:
Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to
modern methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision
except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision
making process of the minor with regard to family
planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental
authority is already cut off just because there is a need to
tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs
the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own
parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and
father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort.
To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly
anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the
constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government."
247
In this regard,
Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to
modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that
the right of parents is superior to that of the
State.
248
[Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents
to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the
right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which
very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in
the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It
would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held
Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and
violative of the recognition that the State affords couples
entering into the special contract of marriage to as one
unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take
over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor
child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can
justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the
exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7
or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section
23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about
family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family
planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as
access to information is concerned, the Court finds no
constitutional objection to the acquisition of information
by the minor referred to under the exception in the
second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to
take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn
child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother
as that of the unborn child. Considering that information
to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential
in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access
to such information with respect to reproductive health
must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents
might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded
because they are not prohibited to exercise parental
guidance and control over their minor child and assist her
in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception
must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the
life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage
and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk
simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no
person should be denied the appropriate medical care
urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is,
the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section
23(a)(2)(ii)
249
should be struck down. By effectively limiting
the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective
surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved are
"non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions
discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as
provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the
parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right
of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be
an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to
Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education
under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the
principle of academic freedom . According to the
petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational
institutions to teach reproductive health education even if
they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to
their students.
250
Citing various studies conducted in the
United States and statistical data gathered in the country,
the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives
has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce
and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion
and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of
society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.
251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the
validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet
to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education. One can only speculate on the content,
manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict
the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of
this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the
1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing
the youth to become productive members of society.
Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents
in the development of their children by recognizing that
said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of
parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the
State.
252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens
patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the
youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the
importance of developing the youth and their important
role in nation building.
253
Considering that Section 14
provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive
health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection
against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against
women and children and other forms of gender based
violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and
children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender
and development; and responsible parenthood, and that
Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the
RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible
teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and
emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds
that the legal mandate provided under the assailed
provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights
and duties of the parents in the moral development of
their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the
mandatory reproductive health education program shall
be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-
community associations, school officials and other interest
groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a
condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners'
contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1)
of the Constitution is without merit.
254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the
reproductive health education program provided under
Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same
violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from
vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions
a "private health service provider" among those who may
be held punishable but does not define who is a "private
health care service provider." They argue that confusion
further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a
"private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed
legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups
from rendering reproductive health service and modern
family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these
institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive
health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from
rendering reproductive health procedures under Section
23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the
withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect
information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect
information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
255
Moreover, in determining whether the words
used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken
in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in
relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment.
256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the
definition of "private health care service provider,"
reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public
health care institution, which is duly licensed and
accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and
operation of facilities for health promotion, disease
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals
suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or
deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and
nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a
doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health
worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or
(4) barangay health worker who has undergone training
programs under any accredited government and NGO and
who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in
the community after having been accredited to function as
such by the local health board in accordance with the
guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health
(DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care
institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private
health care service provider," should not be a cause of
confusion for the obvious reason that they are used
synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right
to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive
health service and modem family planning methods,
includes exemption from being obligated to give
reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the
qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right
to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive
health service and modem family planning methods,
necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to
give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and
"methods" are broad enough to include the providing of
information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that
the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect
information regarding reproductive health programs and
services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is
hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are
prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or
private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the
dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide
incorrect information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health including the right to informed choice
and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes
failing to agree with a copy or model or with established
rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the
requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to
coincide with the truth.
257
On the other hand, the word
"knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that
is intentional.
258
Used together in relation to Section
23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and
effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
Public health and safety demand that health care service
providers give their honest and correct medical
information in accordance with what is acceptable in
medical practice. While health care service providers are
not barred from expressing their own personal opinions
regarding the programs and services on reproductive
health, their right must be tempered with the need to
provide public health and safety. The public deserves no
less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the
equal protection clause under the Constitution as it
discriminates against the poor because it makes them the
primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce
the number of the poor. Their bases are the various
provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially
those mentioned in the guiding principles
259
and definition
of terms
260
of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational
institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program imposed by the RH Law renders it
unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,
261
the Court
had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal
protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied
in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been
embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a
more specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness
in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of
an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and
inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a state's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms
of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state
to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state
actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions
cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all
actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What
it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons
who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will
be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the
classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the
sense that the members of the class should possess the
same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity
will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those
covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The
mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs
from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of
such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter
be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise
fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied;
citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government's reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution
which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the
needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be
given priority in addressing the health development of the
people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which
shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all the people at affordable
cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical
care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes
poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is,
therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only
seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the
RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as
elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the
population growth rate is incidental to the advancement
of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children.
While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks
to charge couples with the duty to have children only if
they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper
look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to
do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the
implementation of government programs to promote
basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational
institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program under Section 14, suffice it to state
that the mere fact that the children of those who are less
fortunate attend public educational institutions does not
amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the
assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
distinction rests between public educational institutions
and private educational institutions, particularly because
there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is
constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that
Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and
non-government health care service providers to render
forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health
services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude
because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts
against their will.
262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services
envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as
forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health
care service providers have the discretion as to the
manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover,
the OSG points out that the imposition is within the
powers of the government, the accreditation of medical
practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a
right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine
is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the
legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but
a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly
involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power
includes the power of Congress
263
to prescribe the
qualifications for the practice of professions or trades
which affect the public welfare, the public health, the
public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or
control such professions or trades, even to the point of
revoking such right altogether.
264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of
involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force,
threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion
and compulsion.
265
A reading of the assailed provision,
however, reveals that it only encourages private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers to
render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation
with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose
to do otherwise. Private and non-government
reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the
liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to
provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to
provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or
threat is made upon them to render pro bono service
against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the
Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable
burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by
Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state
interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed,
however, it should be emphasized that conscientious
objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their
religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to
render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether
or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential
Drugs List (EDL).
266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The
FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services
and methods. It is the only government entity empowered
to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It
should be understood that health services and methods
fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended
by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is
hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH).
Said Administration shall be under the Office of the
Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers
and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation
of this Act and of the rules and regulations
issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the
collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in
connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis
for the preparation of health products standards,
and to recommend standards of identity, purity,
safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with
technical requirements to serve as basis for the
issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-
check for compliance with regulations regarding
operation of manufacturers, importers,
exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug
outlets, and other establishments and facilities
of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all
applicable health products prior to the issuance
of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety,
efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders,
distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers,
retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of
health products to report to the FDA any
incident that reasonably indicates that said
product has caused or contributed to the death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a
patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio
or upon verified complaint for health products,
whether or not registered with the FDA
Provided, That for registered health products,
the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30)
days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days
only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall,
and/or withdrawal of any health product found
to have caused death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be
imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or
grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned
to implement the risk management plan which is
a requirement for the issuance of the
appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers
and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to
carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's
premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food
and medicines available to the public, the FDA was
equipped with the necessary powers and functions to
make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure
public health and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods."
From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that
Congress intended that the public be given only those
medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific
and evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained
in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,
267
as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the
government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To
many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous
Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners
claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved
to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the
Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the
LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of
basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be
self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units
shall likewise exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or
incidental to efficient and effective provision of
the basic services and facilities enumerated
herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but
are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the
LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved
upon them from the national agencies on the
aspect of providing for basic services and
facilities in their respective jurisdictions,
paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a
categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs
and services.
268
Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection
(b) hereof, public works and infrastructure
projects and other facilities, programs and
services funded by the National Government
under the annual General Appropriations Act,
other special laws, pertinent executive orders,
and those wholly or partially funded from
foreign sources, are not covered under this
Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as
the implementing agency for such projects,
facilities, programs and services. [Emphases
supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the
national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by
the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the
LGU.
269
A complete relinquishment of central government
powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code
itself weighs against it.
270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that
whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,
271
the hiring of skilled health professionals,
272
or
the training of barangay health workers,
273
it will be the
national government that will provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to
national priority programs which the local government is
called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us
are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is
nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed
as making the availability of these services mandatory for
the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH
Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy
of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM.
The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.
Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No.
9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by
petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation
of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the
policy statements for the guidance of the regional
government. These provisions relied upon by the
petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be
exercised by the regional government, which can, in no
manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of
its power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy
granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of
imperium et imperio in the relationship between the
national and the regional governments.
274
Except for the
express and implied limitations imposed on it by the
Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its
inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects
which extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest.
275

11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates
natural law,
276
suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a
law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every
law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as
natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute,
executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To
begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and
notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists,
philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the
philosophical school are interested in the law as an
abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present.
277
Unless, a natural right has been transformed
into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down
a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
278
the very case cited
by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not
duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it
conforms with both the Constitution and natural law.
Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most
peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man
where no law is applicable.
279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not
sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion
in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the
population control program of the government by
providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public,
especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as
unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services,
methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out,
however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society
cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes
to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to
religious freedom is a recognition that man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church
and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to
impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine
modem society leaves enough room for diversity and
pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-
minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign
as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the
idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to
address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause
of these perennial issues is not the large population but
the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population
growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the
country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for
the country in the long run. The European and Asian
countries, which embarked on such a program generations
ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The
number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse
effects on their economy. These young workers represent
a significant human capital which could have helped them
invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These
countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but
they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with
incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by
remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is
because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied
workers. What would happen if the country would be
weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer
younger generation would not be able to support them?
This would be the situation when our total fertility rate
would go down below the replacement level of two (2)
children per woman.
280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population
problem, but the State should not use coercive measures
(like the penal provisions of the RH Law against
conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the
policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a
law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature
has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted
by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying
what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a
given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the
judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to
question the policies adopted by the legislative branch.
Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every
unjust situation that may arise from the application of a
particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial
legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But
as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the
Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting
the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation
and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function
is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to
the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by
the lawmaking body.
281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a
mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with
coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law
as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the
Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A.
No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The
Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive
provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the
principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the
adoption of any family planning method should be
maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his
or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer
a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who
refuses to support reproductive health programs
or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n
in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as
they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-
IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void
for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March
19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is
hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354
which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.