Johnston 1

Foucault's Truth: Truth in Modern Society

Dylan Johnston
Dr. Van Vleet, Philosophy 224
Diablo Valley olle!e
Johnston 2
The 'search "or truth' has al#ays been a "unda$ental "eature o" hu$an society and
intellectual endea%or. &et #hat is $eant by 'truth' is o"ten nebulous at best, e%en by those
clai$in! to ''no# #hat truth is.' Philosophers throu!hout history ha%e !rappled #ith the issue
o" de"inin! truth( al$ost all $a)or philosophers touch on truth in one #ay or another.
This essay #ill atte$pt to e*a$ine se%eral di""erent philosophical notions o" truth, #hile
bein! $ind"ul that this is "ar "ro$ a co$plete sur%ey. +n "act, it #ill intentionally e*a$ine t#o
opposin! and relati%ely narro# slices, one in the tradition o" Plato and one in the tradition o"
Prota!oras, in an e""ort to better illu$inate #hat our $odern conception o" truth is. Finally, #e
#ill loo' at the stren!ths and #ea'nesses o" each conception, and hope"ully see #hich is $ore
use"ul and applicable to hu$anity, circa 2,,-.
Plato and .ristotle are perhaps the best/'no#n philosophers in $odern 0estern
i%ili1ation. These t#o $en ha%e had an enor$ous i$pact on our $odern #ay o" li"e, and are
o"ten attributed as responsible "or brin!in! 0estern 'no#led!e and thou!ht a#ay "ro$
$ysticis$ and irrationality, and to#ard science and rationality. They are typically %ie#ed as
opposin! "i!ures( indeed, .ristotle too' e*ception to $any o" his teacher's %ie#s. For e*a$ple,
he called Plato's theory o" a/priori 'no#led!e
2
, 3absurd.4 +n "act, it is in the area o" 'no#led!e
and truth that #e see $any o" the t#o philosophers' disa!ree$ents. Plato's idea o" 3For$s4
"ocused on per"ect "or$s o" thin!s( that is, there is a real$ in #hich per"ect thin!s reside that
are only represented in our #orld. +n Plato's Republic, he touches on this idea:
.nd #e say that the one class o" thin!s is %isible but not
intelli!ible, #hile the "or$s are intelli!ible but not %isible 5...6 in
the case o" all the thin!s that #e then posited as $any, #e re%erse
oursel%es and posit a sin!le "or$ belon!in! to each5...6
2

+n essence, #hat he is sayin! is that, because thin!s li'e $athe$atics e*ist, independent o"
hu$an thou!ht, there $ust be a real$ #ith 'per"ect' $athe$atics. 7b)ects #e percei%e, li'e a
do!, are $erely representations o" the 'per"ect' "or$ o" do!. These eidos, or ideas, are
concei%ed by Plato to be truth.
1 A-priori knowledge, in Plato's context, is the idea that we are born with all the knowledge we will ever have and that
learning is just recollection of it
2 Plato Republic, !ook "#, $%&a
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.ristotle too' e*ception to this idea. 8e belie%ed #hat you see is #hat you !et( in other
#ords, that truth is based in the physical.
the For$s 596are not the causes o" $otion or o" any other chan!e
596.nd they do not in any #ay help either to#ards the 'no#led!e
o" the other thin!s 5...6or to#ards their e*istence 596Moreo%er, all
other thin!s do not co$e to be "ro$ the For$s in any o" the usual
senses o" :"ro$.; .nd to say that the For$s are patterns and that
the other thin!s participate in the$ is to use e$pty #ords and
poetic $etaphors.
2

+t is clear that .ristotle #as critical o" Plato's For$s and !eneral conception o" truth.
This is an accepted analysis a$on!st historians o" Philosophy. &et #hat is less o"ten pointed out
is the si$ilarities bet#een Plato and .ristotle's notions o" truth. They both !enerally belie%e
that truth is so$ethin! 3to be disco%ered4( to the$, truth is 35...6the ense$ble o" truths #hich
are to be disco%ered and accepted5...64
2
, in short, episte$olo!ical absolutis$. +t is easier to
understand .ristotle's and Plato's si$ilarities #hen )u*taposed #ith an episte$olo!ical
absolutist li'e Prota!oras.
7ne o" Prota!oras' $ost "a$ous <uotes is, 3Man is the $easure o" all thin!s.4
=
This
state$ent is "ar "ro$ de"initi%e, and The +nternet >ncyclopedia o" Philosophy uses the "ollo#in!
e*a$ple to clari"y #hat is $eant by it:
The test case nor$ally used is te$perature. +" Ms. ?. says 3it is
hot,4 then the state$ent 5unless she is lyin!6 is true "or her.
.nother person, Ms. &, $ay si$ultaneously clai$ 3it is cold.4 This
state$ent could also be true "or her. +" Ms. ? nor$ally li%es in
.las'a and Ms. & in Florida, the sa$e te$perature 5e. !. 2@
elsius6 $ay see$ hot to one and cool to the other. The $easure
o" hotness or coldness is "airly ob%iously the indi%idual person. 7ne
cannot le!iti$ately tell Ms. ? she does not "eel hot A she is the
only person #ho can accurately report her o#n perceptions or
sensations.
4

This can be ta'en "urther, to say that, "or e*a$ple, beauty is 3in the eye o" the beholder.4
Morals, or truth can be said to be the sa$e. +ndeed, .thenians o" the ti$e reco!ni1ed this and
thus opposed $oralBepiste$olo!ical relati%is$, on the !rounds that it #ould brea' do#n
1 Aristotle Metaphysics !ook #, (hapter )
2 *oucault +,ruth and Power- Power/Knowledge p 1'2
' Plato Theaetetus, 1$2a
. Poster, (arol +Protagoras- ,he #nternet /nc0clopedia of Philosoph0
http122wwwieput3edu2protagor2
Johnston .
society. +n "act, Plato #as stron!ly opposed to episte$olo!ical relati%ists li'e Prota!oras, and
so$e obser%ers note that Plato $ay ha%e created his "or$s in part to re"ute Prota!oras'
relati%ist ideas.
2
.nother "a$ous <uote "ro$ Prota!oras is, 3Mi!ht $a'es ri!ht.4 This state$ent, too, is
open to interpretation, but $uch less so than 3Man is the $easure o" all thin!s.4 0hat he
see$s to ha%e $eant by this state$ent is that #hile one $ay ha%e the ob)ecti%ely 3ri!ht4
ans#er to so$ethin!, i" they do not ha%e po#er, they ha%e little or no #ay o" disse$inatin! it.
Thus, those in po#er create 'truth', #hether or not it corresponds to the real #orld. 0e can see
that this is true throu!hout history. The reli!ion and culture o" >uropean settlers o" the 3Ce#
0orld4 led the$ to belie%e that they had a 3Mani"est Destiny4 to ta'e o%er Corth .$erica.
Decause they belie%ed they #ere superior to other races, and because they #ere $ore
po#er"ul in $any respects
2
, they succeeded in con<uerin! the indi!enous people o" Corth and
South .$erica. +t is hi!hly unli'ely that Cati%e .$ericans considered >uropean superiority and
Mani"est Destiny to be true. &et due to their respecti%e po#er positions, >uropeans' notion
beca$e 3true.4 +ndeed, only until %ery recently ha%e ES history classes be!un teachin! that #e
essentially co$$itted !enocide and stole the .$erica's "ro$ her indi!enous people. >%en the
notion o" the 3Ce# 0orld4 #as a truth only true because the people #ho belie%ed it had po#er.
Cati%e .$ericans did not thin' it #as the 3Ce# 0orld.4 They thou!ht it #as ho$e.
There are stren!ths and #ea'nesses to both the relati%ist notion o" truth and the
absolutist notion o" truth. 0e can easily see the shortco$in!s o" the absolutist position in the
abo%e e*a$ple( and #hile it can be ar!ued that there is an 3ob)ecti%e4 truth, #ould the $ere
e*istence o" a 5hypothetical6 ob)ecti%e truth helped the Cati%e .$ericansF Co. +t #as #hat
>uropeans belie%ed to be the truth that !uided their actions. +t #as the only truth that
$attered.
1 Poster, (arol +Protagoras- ,he #nternet /nc0clopedia of Philosoph0
+4istoricall0, it was in response to Protagoras and his fellow sophists that Plato began the search for transcendent
for3s or knowledge which could so3ehow anchor 3oral judg3ent-
2 ,his is an over-generali5ation 6et it re3ains1 the end result was that the /uropeans coloni5ed, and the 7atives lost
Johnston $
&et the #ea'nesses o" relati%ist truth can be easily de$onstrated also. This is
so$eti$es called the 3sub)ecti%ist "allacy,4 #hich Jacob Van Vleet describes:
Today it is <uite co$$on to hear the phrase, 3That $ay be true "or
you, but it is not true "or $e.4 This is the <uintessential
sub)ecti%ist "allacy. This "allacy is called the sub)ecti%ist "allacy
because $any #ho use this erroneous type o" ar!u$ent $ista'enly
belie%e that all truth ulti$ately depends on the sub)ect or the
indi%idual 596 For e*a$ple, i" a person belie%es that 2G2HI, then
heBshe belie%es a "alsehood, not a truth.
2

8ere #e see the #ea'nesses o" episte$olo!ical relati%is$( there are so$e thin!s, li'e
$athe$atical truths, that are 'true' #hether or not a particular person belie%es it to be true or
not. >piste$olo!ical relati%is$, #ielded clu$sily, can be used to clai$ anythin! as true. +t can
be used to deny that there is any sort o" ob)ecti%e truth.
0hat, then, can #e say truth isF .nd #hat is the $odern %ie# o" truthF +n the past t#o
centuries, scienti"ic 'no#led!e has beco$e the absolute $easure o" truth. The idea that
science tells us #hat is true and #hat is not is an idea that $ost people accept #ithout
<uali"ication. >%en those, #ho accept reli!ious truth o%er scienti"ic truth belie%e in de"inite truth
that can be 3pointed at4: the #ord o" Jod. Thus, our $odern conception o" truth, or at least the
%ast $a)ority o" people's conception o" truth, is one %ery close or identical to .ristotle's( that is,
there are truths in the uni%erse, and they are to be disco%ered Kby scienceL or #e already 'no#
the$ Kthrou!h scriptures, the re%ealed #ord o" JodL. Further$ore, truth is seen as #hat
corresponds #ith and represents real thin!s in our uni%erse.
Michel Foucault o""ers a radically di""erent %ie# o" truth, and it is one that shares $any
o" the "eatures #ith the Prota!orean conception. Foucault's notion o" truth is best su$$ed up
in his essay, 3Truth and Po#er4:
596 by truth + do not $ean 'the ense$ble o" truths #hich are to be
disco%ered and accepted', but rather 'the ense$ble o" rules
accordin! to #hich the true and "alse are separated and speci"ic
e""ects o" po#er attached to the true 596 'Truth' is lin'ed in a
circular relation #ith syste$s o" po#er #hich produce and sustain
it, and to e""ects o" po#er #hich it induces and #hich e*tend it. .
're!i$e' o" truth.
2
1 "an "leet, Jacob Informal Logical Fallacies ! "rief #uide$ p.8
2 *oucault +,ruth and Power- Power/Knowledge p 1'2
Johnston 9

Foucault's notion o" truth is indeed si$ilar to Prota!oras'. 0hat he is essentially sayin! is that
po#er controls truth, #hich sounds %ery $uch li'e 3Mi!ht $a'es ri!ht4. &et it is i$portant to
distin!uish bet#een the t#o. Prota!oras %ery #ell $ay ha%e $eant literally 'he #ith the po#er
$a'es truth', and $eant it in a positi%e #ay. Foucault, on the other hand, has a $uch $ore
sophisticated approach, and "urther$ore one that is criticizing the "eatures it describes.
Foucault is !rapplin! #ith #hat truth is in $odern, technolo!ical, scienti"ic societies.
+t $ust "urther$ore be stated that Foucault #as not atte$ptin! to say e%ery piece o"
'no#led!eBtruth is relati%e. +n the pre%iously stated e*a$ple o" di""erent people e*periencin!
the sa$e te$perature di""erently, he #ould li'ely a!ree that an ob)ecti%e ans#er can be "ound
#ith a ther$o$eter. Foucault's #or' "ocused on the 'truths' about hu$ans( that is, ho#
institutions co$e to describe people in certain #ays, and then ho# po#er is assi!ned to one
!roup and e*cluded "ro$ the rest. 7r, in his o#n #ords, 3596 + #as studyin! 596 the political
status o" science and the ideolo!ical "unctions #hich it could ser%e.4
2
8is intent see$s not to
ha%e been to <uestion so$ethin! li'e Jeneral Melati%ity:
596 i", concernin! a science li'e theoretical physics or or!anic
che$istry, one poses the proble$ o" its relations #ith the political
and econo$ic structures o" society, isn't one posin! an e*cessi%ely
co$plicated <uestionF Doesn't this set the threshold o" possible
e*planations i$possibly hi!hF Dut on the other hand, i" one ta'es a
"or$ o" 'no#led!e li'e psychiatry, #on't the <uestion be $uch
easier to resol%e, since 596 psychiatric practice is lin'ed #ith a
#hole ran!e o" institutions, econo$ic re<uire$ents and political
issues o" social re!ulationF ouldn't the inter#ea%in! o" e""ects o"
po#er and 'no#led!e be !rasped #ith !reater certainty in the case
o" a science as 'dubious' as psychiatryF

0hat Foucault is sayin! is that the relation bet#een po#er and truth can be de$onstrated "ar
$ore clearly #hen one loo's at the 'hu$an' sciences, because there is a direct path bet#een
the conclusions o" such sciences and their i$pact on cultures, societies and indi%iduals.
1 *oucault +,ruth and Power- Power/Knowledge p 1%)
Johnston &
Foucault's "ocus #as scienti"ic 'no#led!e o" hu$ans, their bodies N $inds, and ho# these
truths are used by $odern !o%ern$ents to re!ulate and control us.
7ne o" the $ost i$portant "eatures o" Foucault's hypothesis is the distinction bet#een
#hat he calls the 'Eni%ersal' intellectual o" the past, and the 'Speci"ic' intellectual o" $odern
ti$es. To spea' in concrete ter$s, the uni%ersal intellectual is a Oeonardo Da Vinci, a 3)ac' o"
all trades4, #hereas the speci"ic intellectual #ould be an .lbert >instein or a harles Dar#in.
Foucault sees this transition as tanta$ount to understandin! truth in $odern scienti"ic
societies. The $odern intellectual is
596 no lon!er he #ho bears the %alues o" all, opposes the un)ust
so%erei!n or his $inisters and $a'es his cry resound beyond the
!ra%e. +t is rather he #ho, alon! #ith a hand"ul o" others, has at his
disposal, #hether in ser%ice o" the state or a!ainst it, po#ers #hich
can either bene"it or irre%ocably destroy li"e.
2

Foucault's assertion is that the $odern intellectual is no lon!er one #ho en!enders particular
philosophies or ideolo!ies( rather, they are beholden to the interests o" those po#er structures
that already e*ist and thus to their correspondin! ideolo!ies. Foucault ar!ues that this
trans"or$ation o" the intellectual "ro$ uni%ersal to speci"ic brin!s particular dan!ers #ith it:
The dan!er o" re$ainin! at the le%el o" con)ectural stru!!les,
pressin! de$ands restricted to particular sectors. The ris' o" lettin!
hi$sel" be $anipulated by the political parties or trade union
apparatuses #hich control these local stru!!les. .bo%e all, the ris'
o" bein! unable to de%elop these stru!!les "or lac' o" a !lobal
strate!y or outside support 596
2

+n essence, because the $odern intellectual no lon!er has his o#n ideolo!ical !oals and
o%erarchin! belie"s, but rather speci"ic 'no#led!e in a particular area, it is political and
econo$ic po#er that direct these 'local stru!!les' to#ard their o#n end. +n addition, Foucault
points out that due to the nature o" speci"ic intellectualis$, the Eni%ersity has beco$e an echo
cha$ber o" sorts:
1 *oucault +,ruth and Power- Power/Knowledge p 12)
2 #bid p 1'%
Johnston 8
596 the uni%ersity Khas e$er!edL 596 as 'e*chan!ers', pri%ile!ed
points o" intersection. 596 .nd #hat is called the crisis o" the
uni%ersities should not be interpreted as a loss o" po#er, but on the
contrary as a $ultiplication and re/en"orce$ent o" their po#er/
e""ects as centres KsicL in a poly$orphous ense$ble o" intellectuals
#ho %irtually all pass throu!h and relate the$sel%es to the
acade$ic syste$.
2


Due to this, not only does con%entional #isdo$ tend to be rein"orced, but so do the types o"
discourse that help distin!uish #hat is 3true4 and #hat is "alse. This is #hat truly $a'es
Foulcault's ideas $odern and co$ple*, as opposed to a Prota!orean conception o" truth.
0hereas Prota!oras #as sayin! 'he #ith the bi! stic' !ets heard,' Foucault does not re<uire
so$eone '#ieldin! a stic''. Mather, it is the %ery thin!s that #e already consider 'true' and
those $ethods #e use to "ind 'truth' that shape our %ie#s and sel"/rein"orce. This is #hat he
$eant by sayin! the uni%ersity's po#er/e""ects ha%e been $ultiplied, in an a!e #here the
intellectual is speci"ic. Decause one can no lon!er be a 3Oeonardi Da Vinci4, #e $ust pass
throu!h the uni%ersity syste$ to !ain speci"ic 'no#led!e in a !i%en area. 0ithout so$e sort o"
de!ree pro%in! one's 'no#led!e in a speci"ic area, one is )ust rantin! 5no# re"erred to as
blo!!in!6. 0hile this trend has a""ected hu$an 'no#led!e in substantially positi%e #ays 5no
sin!le intellectual could possibly deal #ith the shear %olu$e o" 'no#led!e in all o" $odern
science6, it has led to, as Foucault su!!ests, a "or$ o" 'truth/he!e$ony'. Decause intellectuals
!ain their 3base4 'no#led!e in essentially the sa$e #ays, in%ol%in! already/accepted,
con%entional #isdo$, their "uture disco%eries are necessarily chained to #hat they learned
throu!h the uni%ersity.
The opposite %ie#, shared by .ristotle, and one #hich li'ely is the !eneral public's %ie#,
is that science hu$an reason are unbiased tools "or disco%erin! #hat is. The i$a!ery brou!ht
"orth by the sub/title o" arl Sa!an's The Demon-Haunted World is a per"ect su$$ation o" this
%ie#: Science as a Candle in the Dark.
.s is typical, another's #ords do the $ost )ustice in e*plainin! the essential di""erence
bet#een these t#o notions:
1 *oucault, :ichel +,ruth and Power- Power/Knowledge p 1'%
Johnston )
+n the traditional, 3archaeolo!ical4 %ie# o" science, it #as nature,
throu!h "acts collected by obser%ation and e*peri$ent, that
%alidated scienti"ic theories. 7n the constructionist %ie#, scienti"ic
theories are produced by pro"essional thou!ht collecti%es #hose
$e$bers e$ploy a shared set o" assu$ptions, principles,
$ethodolo!ies, practices, and %alues to construct interpretations
acceptable to the$ o" intrinsically e<ui%ocal e$pirical data.
2
The idea that all truth is de"inite see$s an attracti%e proposition. Further$ore it is
probably a $ain reason $any people hold this %ie# today. The "ounder o" onser%apedia
2
,
.ndre# Schla"ly, in an inter%ie# #ith Stephen olbert, said o" truth: 3+t's li'e the de%elop$ent
o" $ath. &ou don't %ote to decide #hether 2 G 2 H 4. +t beco$es clear o%er ti$e 596 the truth
rises to the top4
=
. +ndeed, the site's o#n description o" onser%apedia is 3a clean and concise
resource "or those see'in! the truth.4
4
&et in a !larin! e*a$ple o" co!niti%e dissonance, the site
clai$s it presents a #orld %ie# 3"ree o" corruption by liberal untruths4
@
. 'Oiberal' is de"ined by
the site as:
596 so$eone #ho re)ects lo!ical and biblical standards, o"ten "or
sel"/centered reasons. There are no coherent liberal standards(
o"ten a liberal is $erely so$eone #ho cra%es attention, and #ho
uses $any #ords to say nothin!.
P
This sea$less trans"er "ro$ episte$olo!ical absolutis$ to episte$olo!ical relati%is$, that is,
"ro$ sayin! there is an ob)ecti%e truth and "urther$ore sayin! 3+ ha%e it4 to statin! so$ethin!
that is not "actual and ob%iously based in opinion, is the $ost dan!erous trend and threat to
truth as one can i$a!ine. 0hile #e can say there are truths, li'e 2G2H4, that are absolute, it
is e*tre$ely dan!erous to say all truth is absolute. +t is particularly dan!erous #hen one's
3truth4 is based on the Dible and a speci"ic ideolo!y. onser%ati%es in .$erica ha%e been usin!
this practice "or the past =, years to ad%ance their econo$ic and political ideolo!ies. +t leads
Schla"ly, later in the sa$e inter%ie#, to state as "act:
1 ;old3an, <teven = %<cientific >nowledge as <ocial (onstruct- &cience 'ars$ Part #, =ecture 2%
2 (onservapedia
?http122wwwconservapediaco32:ain@PageA
' The (olbert Report$ /pisode B%$1$9, Cece3ber 8, 2%%)
. (onservapedia +About-
?http122wwwconservapediaco32(onservapedia1AboutA
$ #bid
9 (onservapedia +=iberal-
?http122wwwconservapediaco32=iberalA
Johnston 1%
Most o" Jesus' parables #ere 596 "ree $ar'et parables. 8e !a%e
one $an @ talents, he !a%e another $an 2 talents, he !a%e another
$an 2 talent. The $an #ho had @ $ade "i%e $ore Q he #as
re#arded, he #as co$$ended... the $an #ho had one didn't $a'e
any $ore, and he #as sent to hell.
2
The conclusion, #e are to assu$e, is that "ree/$ar'et principles are the hi!hest $oral, and
"urther$ore, 3correct.4 Thus, #ith a #a%e o" the hand, conser%ati%es ta'e reli!ion, so$ethin!
$any already belie%e to be the re%elation o" absolute truth, and i$pose on top o" it 'lessons'
that support their #orld%ie#s and ideolo!ies. 0e can be certain that they are ideolo!ies o"
e*istin! po#er.
This is #hy Foucault's thesis is so i$portant and rele%ant. 8is toolbo* allo#s us to see
that $any 'truths' are really $erely di""erent e*pressions o" institutional and episte$olo!ical
he!e$ony, $eanin! that e*istin! ideas and po#er structures naturally sel"/rein"orce and create
#hat #e o"ten thin' o" as truth. Jeor!e Oa'o"" points out the pressin! nature o" understandin!
truth: 3There is an i$$ediate co$pellin! reason. 7ur de$ocracy is in dan!er. 596 The political
di%ide in .$erica is not )ust a $aterial di%ide, as in the 't#o .$ericas.' 596 The di%ide is
located in our brains Q in the #ays .$ericans understand the #orld.3
2
.t the sa$e ti$e, Foucault's thesis can be ta'en too "ar. 8e hi$sel" "lushes this out in a
2-I2 debate #ith Coa$ ho$s'y
=
re!ardin! 'true' hu$an nature and the possibility o" a "uture
society #hich does not alienate it:
.nd i" one ad$its 596 that a certain hu$an nature e*ists, that this
hu$an nature has not been !i%en in actual society the ri!hts and
the possibilities #hich allo# it to reali1e itsel" 5...6, doesn't one ris'
de"inin! this hu$an nature #hich is at the sa$e ti$e ideal and
real, and has been hidden and repressed until no# / in ter$s
borro#ed "ro$ our society, "ro$ our ci%ili1ation, "ro$ our cultureF
4
1 The (olbert Report$ /pisode B%$1$9, Cece3ber 8, 2%%)
2 =akoff, ;eorge The Political Mind
' Ja3es :iller, in The passion of Michel Foucault, writes of the debate1 +DE unbeknownst to (ho3sk0, *oucault had
received, in partial pa03ent for his appearance, a large chunk of hashish, which for 3onths afterwards, *oucault and
his Parisian friends would jokingl0 refer to as the '(ho3sk0 hash'-
. (ho3sk0, /lders, and *oucault +4u3an 7ature-
Johnston 11
Foucault's point is that #e cannot use ideas 'borro#ed' "ro$ current structures o" thou!ht to
ascertain true hu$an nature, and thus cannot articulate a theoretical society
2
that #ould not
e*ploit, oppress and alienate this nature.
Foucault $ay indeed be correct. &et shall #e not stri%e to#ards a 'bri!hter "uture'( should #e
si$ply 'thro# up our hands'F This is precisely #hat ho$s'y ta'es issue #ith:
0ell, si$ilarly in the intellectual do$ain, one is "aced #ith the
uncertainties that you correctly pose. 7ur concept o" hu$an nature
is certainly li$ited( it's partially socially conditioned, constrained by
our o#n character de"ects and the li$itations o" the intellectual
culture in #hich #e e*ist. &et at the sa$e ti$e it is o" critical
i$portance that #e 'no# #hat i$possible !oals #e're tryin! to
achie%e, i" #e hope to achie%e so$e o" the possible !oals. .nd that
$eans that #e ha%e to be bold enou!h to speculate and create
social theories on the basis o" partial 'no#led!e, #hile re$ainin!
%ery open to the stron! possibility, and in "act o%er#hel$in!
probability, that at least in so$e respects #e're %ery "ar o"" the
$ar'.
2
+t is i$portant to 'eep in $ind that Foucault's thesis, ta'en too "ar, can lea%e us 'stuc'
in the $ud', &et it see$s prudent, !i%en our current political and ideolo!ical state, and our
orthodo* understandin! o" truth, that Foucault be ta'en %ery seriously. +n "act, his %ie#s are
indispensable in understandin! $odern reality and our place in it( "urther$ore, understandin!
Foucault's theory o" truthBpo#er relation is necessary "or hu$anity to $o%e "or#ard, to#ard a
bri!hter "uture that truly does )ustice to hu$an nature. 0e $ay not !et there easily( #e $ay
be "eelin! blindly in the dar'. &et on#ard #e $ust !o, "or 3the choice, as 8. J. 0ells once said
in a di""erent conte*t, is clearly the uni%erse or nothin!.4
=
1 ,his was a refutation of (ho3sk0, who had just described his anarcho-s0ndicalis3, a theoretical societal
organi5ation he considered the best alternative to what we currentl0 have
2 (ho3sk0, /lders, and *oucault +4u3an 7ature-
' <agan, (arl (osmos Public !roadcasting <ervice, 1)8%
Johnston 12
Works Cited
.ristotle. etaphysics. osi$o, +nc., 2,,P.
>lders, F., ho$s'y, C., and Foucault, M. 38u$an Cature: Justice %ersus Po#er. Coa$
ho$s'y debates #ith Michel Foucault4 +nternational Philosophers' Pro)ect, 2-I2.
Foucault, Michel. !o"er#$no"ledge KSelected +nter%ie#s N 7ther 0ritin!s 2-I2/2-IIL.
Pantheon Doo's, 2-R,.
Jold$an, Ste%en O. Science Wars% What Scientists $no" and Ho" They $no" &t. The Teachin!
o$pany, 2,,P.
Oa'o"", Jeor!e. The !olitical ind. Pen!uin Doo's, 2,,R.
Plato. Republic. 8ac'ett Publishin! o$pany, +nc., 2,,4. Translated "ro$ the Ce# Standard
Jree' Te*t by .D. Mee%e.
Plato. Theaetetus. For!otten Doo's, 2,,R. Translated by Den)a$in Jo#ett.
Van Vleet, Jacob >. &n'ormal (ogical )allacies% * +rie' ,uide. +ndependent Scholar's Press,
2,,-.