Bengzon III vs.

HRET
G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001
CITIZENSHIP, HOW ACQUIRED: (1) by birth and (2) by naturalization
MODES OF REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP: (1) by naturalization; (2) by repatriation and (3) by direct act of
Congress
EFFECT OF REPATRIATION: Recovery of original citizenship
NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN, DEFINED: A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

FACTS:

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27,
1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.

On Nov. 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and, without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the US. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship
for under sec. 1(4) of CA No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, rendering service
to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Then on June 5, 1990, he was naturalized
as a US citizen, in connection with his service in the US Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630.
He ran against petitioner Bengson III for the office of Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 11, 1998elections and was elected for said office. Bengson III then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with HRET, claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House since
he was not a natural-born citizen. HRET dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

HELD:

Petition is without merit.

Citizenship, How Acquired

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship
correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of
his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally
under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the
court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated
himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government
announced policies.

Modes of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law.Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law,
a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of
the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the
Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and
economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.

Repatriation Results in Recovery of Original Nationality

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.

What is a Natural-Born Citizen

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain
his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first
defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and
(2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered
natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-
born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born
because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who
are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized
in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The
reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons
for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.
Asrespondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.
























BENGSON III VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET)
357 SCRA 545
Date of Promulgation: May 7, 2001
Ponente: Kapunan, J.

Keywords: citizenship; natural-born Filipino; naturalized Filipino; repatriation; HRET

QuickGuide: The citizenship of respondent is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a
Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen. As the respondent was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.

Facts:
- Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April
27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.

- On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."

- He was naturalized as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

- On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No.
2630 (An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service
To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States).

- He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He
won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

- Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that respondent Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

- On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz
the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.

- Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari.

- Petitioners arguments:
o Respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when
he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation.
o Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

- Respondents argument:
o He reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article
IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
Issue/s:
- Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-
born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. (YES.)
Ruling:
- The SC ruled in favor of the respondent. The petition is dismissed.

Ratio:
FILIPINO CITIZENS:
- The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
HOW TO ACQUIRE CITIZENSHIP:
- There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.

- These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized
citizen.

- As defined in the 1987 Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."

- Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth
Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No.
2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.



NATURALIZATION:
- Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

- To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification
provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.

- The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the
court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself
to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or
(4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.

- Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

- After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens."

- Noteworthy is the absence of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on
the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.

- As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship,
he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the
House of Representatives.

REPATRIATION:
- Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States
at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

- As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.

- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.

- Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.
HRET:
- The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the House.

- The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.

- There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.


ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 9:25 PM
G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC
that he was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor in
the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special
Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.

RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration
is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his
certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date
he filed his application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10,
2004 elections.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO B.M. No. 1678
RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
*

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.
NACHURA,
REYES and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.


Promulgated:

December 17, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:


This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
[1]
On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume
his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the
Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and
Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the
bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship,
in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the
lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
[2]
It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both
a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.
[3]


Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of
the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment
of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise
of his professional privilege.
[4]


Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.


Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements
and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the
bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines.
[5]
He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
[6]


Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and
other qualifications;
[7]
passing the bar examinations;
[8]
taking the lawyers oath
[9]
and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.
[10]


The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing requirement. This means
continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;
[11]
payment of the annual
professional tax;
[12]
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;
[13]
faithful observance of
the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.
[14]


Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in
cases prescribed by law.
[15]
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the
loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a
privilege denied to foreigners.
[16]


The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of *RA 9225+.
[17]
Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice.
[18]
Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his
law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and
as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his
oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE ALMIE and VERNON
VERSOZA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of prohibitory
and mandatory injunction, to set aside the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), First
Division, on March 22, 2004 disqualifying petitioner Ciceron P. Altarejos from running as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate,
and another resolution of the COMELEC en banc promulgated on May 7, 2004 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national
and local elections.
On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto,
Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of
candidacy that *he+ was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.
Private respondents alleged that based on a letter
[1]
from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was
a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507 issued on November 3, 1997,
and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.
[2]

On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer
[3]
stating, among others, that he did not commit false representation in
his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of
Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic
Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as
mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private
respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one within the required period.
[4]
Petitioner,
however, filed a Reply Memorandum
[5]
subsequently.
Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of this case, recommended
that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the
May 10, 2004 national and local elections. He found, thus:
x x x
The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials are found in Sections 39
and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provide as follows:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
xxx.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities or
municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
[SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective position:]
xxx.
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
xxx.
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to
avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; xxx
Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an elective local official must be a citizen
of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or
must not have acquired the right to reside abroad.
In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a citizen of the United
States of America. Such fact is proven by his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3 November
1997 and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Alien
Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001
of then Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17
December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic
Act No. 8171 specifically provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of
the above-quoted Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino
citizenship. Respondent has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau
of Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June 2001, Commissioner ANDREA DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still
a holder of visa under Section 13 (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, with an indefinite authorized
stay in the Philippines, implying that respondent did not register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the
Bureau of Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would have already been cancelled. The rule is that in case of doubt
concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the State and against the applicant (Cheng
vs. Republic, L-16999, 22 June 1965).
x x x
Not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship after being naturalized as a citizen of
the United States, it is clear that respondent is not qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate, in the 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections, pursuant to the aforequoted Sections 39 and 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has also committed false representation in his
certificate of candidacy by stating therein that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even
perfected the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Such false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as
it relates to his qualification as a candidate for public office, which could be a valid ground for the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code x x x.
[6]

In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and
recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The dispositive portion of said Resolution stated, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS is hereby disqualified to run as Mayor of San
Jacinto, Masbate. Accordingly, his certificate of candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate is
denied due course and cancelled and his name deleted from the certified list of candidates for the May 10, 2004
elections.
[7]

On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached the following documents to prove that he
had completed all the requirements for repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an elective office, viz:
(1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997;
(2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004;
(3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City, that the Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of
Allegiance of petitioner was received by said office and registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on February 18,
2004;
(4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Bureau on Immigration
and Deportation that it was furnishing said office with the Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation of petitioner
for the cancellation of petitioners registration in said office as an alien, and the issuance to him of the corresponding
Identification Card as Filipino citizen;
(5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Local Registrar of San
Jacinto, Masbate that it was sending petitioners Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation for registration in
their records and for petitioners reacquisition of his former Philippine citizenship.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for
Reconsideration for UTTER LACK OF MERIT and AFFIRMS the Resolution of the First Division.
[8]

The Comelec en banc held, thus:
The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion
for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the
Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective
Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the
respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.
When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First Division) the respondents only evidence
was his Certificate of Repatriation dated 17 December 1977 and marked as Annex 1 of his answer. This piece of
evidence was not enough to controvert the evidence of the petitioners which consist of the letter of the then Bureau of
Immigration Commissioner Andrea Domingo dated 25 June 2001 which stated that as of the even date respondent is a
holder of permanent resident visa (page 15 of the records) and the certification of Josephine C. Camata dated 28
January 2004 certifying, that the name of the respondent could not be found in the records of repatriation. (page 42 of
the records) The questioned resolution, is therefore, in order as the evidence submitted by the respondent were
insufficient to rebut the evidence of the petitioner.
Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to introduce to the record new pieces of evidence,
which introduction is not anymore allowed in a Motion for Reconsideration. These are the following a) Annex 2
Oath of Allegiance; b) Annex 3 Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate; c) Annex 4 Certification of the
City Civil Registrar of Makati City; d) Annex 5 Letter addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate by
Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization; and e) Annex 6 Letter addressed to the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization.
Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more reason should we cancel his certificate of
candidacy for his act of [misrepresenting] himself as a Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy, he has not yet perfected the process of repatriation. He failed to comply with the requirements under
Section 2 of [Republic Act No.] 8171 which provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration.
The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine C. Camata, City Civil Registrar, dated February 18, 2004. This
time, she certifies that Ciceron Perez Altarejos was registered under Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book No. 1, Series of 2004
and paid under OR nos. 88325/8833256 dated February 18, 2004. (page 65 of the records). Obviously, he was able to
register in the proper civil registry only on February 18, 2004.
The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of Immigration only on March 1, 2004 as evidenced by the Bureau
of Immigration Identification Certificate attached to the Motion as Annex 3.
This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First Division) that at the time respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy he is yet to complete the requirement under section two (2) of RA 8171.
As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy.
Such false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate. As
such the certificate of candidacy may be cancelled on such ground. (Ycain vs. Caneja, 18 Phil. 778)
[9]

On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, petitioner filed this petition praying that: (1) The petition be given due course
and a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the respondents
and all persons acting on their behalf, from fully implementing the questioned COMELEC Resolutions promulgated
on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004; (2) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering the COMELEC
and all persons acting on its behalf to allow petitioner to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004
elections, and to count and canvass the votes cast in his favor and to proclaim him as the winning mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate; and (3) after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered declaring null and void and setting aside the
COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004 and other related Orders of the COMELEC or its
representatives which have the effect of illegally preventing petitioner from running as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
In its Comment,
[10]
the Office of the Solicitor General stated that, based on the information relayed to it by the
COMELEC, petitioners name, as a mayoralty candidate in San Jacinto, Masbate, was retained in the list of candidates
voted upon by the electorate in the said municipality. Hence, the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy
was never implemented. The COMELEC also informed the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners opponent, Dr.
Emilio Aris V. Espinosa, was already proclaimed duly elected Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said supervening event has rendered the instant petition moot and
academic, and it prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
In his Reply,
[11]
petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He claims that the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying
him from running as a mayoralty candidate adversely affected his candidacy, since his supporters were made to believe
that his votes would not be counted. Moreover, he stated that said COMELEC resolutions cast a doubt on his Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 17, 1997. In
view thereof, he ran and was even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if
there was delay in the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the proper
civil registry, the same was brought about by the inaction on the part of said offices since the records of the Special
Committee on Naturalization show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance have long been
transmitted to said offices.
Petitioner also asserts that the subsequent registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration
and with the Civil Registry of Makati City prior to the May 10, 2004 elections has the effect of curing the defect, if any, in
the reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship as his repatriation retroacted to the date of his application for repatriation as
held in Frivaldo v. Comelec.
The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation; and (2) whether or not the
COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the
Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.
[12]
Nonetheless, courts
will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
[13]

First Issue: Is the registration of petitioners repatriation
with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?
The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171,
[14]
thus:
SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon
cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the
repatriated citizen.
The law is clear that repatriation is effected by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper
civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was
registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of
Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed
his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections.
When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply?
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,
[15]
the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be construed as
applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. The Court, through Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus:
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election
day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one years residency immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation,
shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge
his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-
assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials)
beganhe was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon.
This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the
purpose for which such law was enacted. x x x Paraphrasing this Courts ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap &
Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected
official and at the start of his term.
[16]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application. In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No.
725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldos repatriation to the date of filing
of his application was justified by the Court, thus:
x x x
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should
apply to past eventsi.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into beingin order to benefit
the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally
guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there
is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and
transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should be
made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or
would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or
prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither
has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or
breach of some constitutional guaranty.
x x x
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were
not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of
applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving
already renounced his American citizenshipwas, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not
be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended
right and justice to prevail.
[17]

Republic Act No. 8171
[18]
has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No. 725. They cover the same subject matter:
Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of
natural-born Filipinos. The Courts ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of
filing of ones application for repatriation subsists for the same reasons quoted above.
Accordingly, petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore,
qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC
was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of
San Jacinto, Masbate.
Second Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc
gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division?
The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First Division, considering that
petitioner failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner
submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion
for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. As the COMELEC en
banc correctly stated:
The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion
for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the
Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective
Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the
respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.
[19]

It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with
sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc of May 7, 2004, affirming
the Resolution of its First Division dated March 22, 2004, is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.



















Labo, Jr. vs COMELEC, [176 SCRA 1; GR 86564, August 1, 1989]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Municipal Corporation, Qualification, 2
nd
Highest Number of Votes)
Facts: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for the office of the Mayor of Baguio City during Elections. Having
garnered the highest number of votes, Petitioner was elected and proclaimed winner while Respondent garnered the
second highest number of votes. Subsequently Respondent filed a petition for quo warranto contesting the election of
the Petitioner on the ground that the latter is a naturalized Australian citizen and was divested of his Philippine
citizenship having sworn allegiance to the Queen of Australia. Petitioner opposes to the contrary.
Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides for the qualifications that an elective official must be a citizen of the
Philippines.
From the evidence adduced, it was found out that citizenship requirements were not possessed by the petitioner during
elections. He was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
Issue: WON private respondent, having garnered the 2
nd
highest number of votes, can replace the petitioner as mayor.
Held: No. The simple reason is that he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.
Note:
1. Dual citizenship is not a bar in running for elections, dual allegiance is.
2. Mere repatriation is not enough to run for elections.
3. A written certification of an oath of allegiance to the Philippines must be attached together with the COC.