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Kevin Lower

Intentionality, Flesh, and Feminine Embodiment in Merleau-Ponty

In his earlier work, Maurice Merleau-Ponty provides a phenomenological account of
consciousness that lends itself to feminist perspectives in philosophy. His emphasis on the
embodiment of consciousness led to various extensions of his philosophy that focus on how the
location of the subject in the body warrants consideration for the sex of that body. Indeed, sexual
differences influence our modes of comportment because the body is the locus of our interactions
with the world. This line of reasoning is clearly applicable to one who wishes to shed light on
womens lived experience. However, Merleau-Pontys later The Visible and the Invisible
distances his project from the phenomenological description of embodiment. The focus of this
work is the rejection of the philosophical assumptions that motivate physicalism and
intellectualism, and he provides the ontological paradigm of the flesh in an attempt to shatter the
subject-object distinction. Given this works distance from his earlier projects, the flesh has been
met with criticism by feminists who found Merleau-Pontys earlier work much more useful and
inclusionary.
1
My aim in this paper will be to reconcile these seemingly opposed stages in
Merleau-Pontys thought and to show how one attempt to expose the benefits of the flesh
ultimately ignores the important problem of intentionality.
1. The Disjunction of Embodiment and Flesh
The purpose of this section will be to motivate the usefulness of Merleau-Pontys
phenomenology of embodiment and its supposed discrepancies with his later ontology of the
flesh. His discussion of embodiment largely comes out of his Phenomenology of Perception. In
the preface, Merleau-Ponty states Everything that I know about the world, even through
science, I know through a perspective that is my own or from an experience of the world without

1
For an example of this view, see Luce Irigarays An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993).
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which scientific symbols would be meaningless.
2
In other words, what is of interest for
Merleau-Ponty is the pre-scientific perspective of the world that is afforded by embodiment.
Thus, instead of treating the body as an object of science, Merleau-Ponty describes the lived
experience of how the body interacts with its surroundings.
One of the most important investigations for the phenomenology of embodiment is the
bodys comportments and use of available space. Since Merleau-Ponty conceives of the body as
a thing-in-the-world, his description of embodiment provides an account of how the body
comports itself toward other objects. Habitual activity is one of the primary modes of bodily
comportment due to the bodys familiarity with the world it inhabits.
3
The way that ones body
makes use of space is contingent upon the nature of ones habitual relationship with the world.
As Iris Young notes in her Throwing Like a Girl, one of these contingencies is sexual
difference. She argues that women make use of less space than is physically available to them,
and they see that space as a space into which one can move but not themselves.
4
These
relationships with the world arise due to the way that the body habitualizes its use of spacea
process that, according to Young, is different between men and women.
For Merleau-Ponty, bodily comportment is inherently intentional or directed toward an
object.
5
Likewise, sexuality itself is an intentional expression of the body that cannot be
transcended.
6
The idea that ones sex influences his or her comportments has been attractive to
various feminist philosophers for characterizing the experience of women. One of the central
features of Iris Youngs account of feminine embodiment is her description of the inhibited
intentionality of feminine subjects. For Merleau-Ponty, the body is the first locus of

2
MP. Preface. Phenomenology of Perception. p. lxxii.
3
MP. The Synthesis of Ones Own Body. Phenomenology of Perception. p. 153.
4
Young. Throwing Like a Girl. pp. 151-152.
5
MP. The Spatiality of Ones Own Body and Motricity. Phenomenology of Perception. p. 139.
6
MP. The Body as a Sexed Being. Phenomenology of Perception. pp. 156-9, 172-8.
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intentionality because it opens the subject to the possibilities of the world. The possibilities that
are opened to the subject depend upon the bodys I can relation to the world, but Young argues
that feminine embodiment relates to the world simultaneously with an I can and I cannot
expression. The intentionality of embodied feminine existence is therefore inhibited because it
does not comport the body with confidencea distinction that establishes the importance of
intentionality for both Merleau-Pontys and Youngs descriptions of bodily comportment.
7
After
understanding the role of embodied subjectivity in this example of feminist phenomenology, the
importance of Merleau-Pontys investigation of embodiment cannot be understated.
Given the applicability of his early philosophy, one might wonder why the later
developments in Merleau-Pontys thought were met with such negative criticism by feminist
philosophers. The central charge against his later work is that he takes a more universalistic
approach to his project rather than pursuing the description of embodiment. The Visible and the
Invisible is primarily concerned with proposing an ontology that breaks out of the methodology
that was created to ward off skepticism.
8
Merleau-Ponty criticizes this approach to philosophy
for being negative in its resistance of skepticism by providing an ontology that abandons this
tendency. The Husserlian foundation of phenomenology largely evolved out of the need to
bracket ones fallible connection to physical phenomena in order to preserve the infallibility of
the phenomena present to consciousness.
9
This led Husserl to adopt the phenomenological
reduction, which preserves the distinction between subject and object by separating the
immanence of consciousness from the physical world.

7
Young. Throwing Like a Girl. p. 148.
8
This tendency is the philosophical launching point for Descartes, Kant, and Husserl (among others). The first two
chapters of The Visible and the Invisible motivate and critique these methodologies more explicitly.
9
Husserl. Logical Investigations. The Phenomenology Reader. p. 94.
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The philosophies of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty avoid the phenomenological reduction
by locating the subject in the world as an object, but even aspects of these philosophies are
insufficient for breaking out of the subject-object distinction. There seems to be a qualitative
difference between an embodied subject and the thing toward which he or she comports his or
her body. Thus, Merleau-Ponty states, We have to reject the age-old assumptions that put the
body in the world and the seer in the body, or, conversely, the world and the body in the seer as
in a box. [A]s flesh applied to a flesh, the world neither surrounds it nor is surrounded by it.
10

The conception of the subject as embodied thing-in-the-world must be rejected for a different
ontological paradigm. As he states, the world is not a container of things; he rethinks the
relationship between embodied subject and world as one of flesh touching flesh.
Just as the world conceived as flesh is not a container, neither is flesh an ontologically
foundational substance. He writes, Once again, the flesh we are speaking of is not matter. It is
the coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching body[.]
11

Merleau-Pontys motivation for discussing the flesh is to avoid repeating the same metaphysical
dogma that has plagued Western philosophy. To claim that flesh is a container would compare
this ontology to a Hegelian system, and conceiving of flesh as substance would recall problems
with Spinozas substance ontology. Instead, he focuses on the reversibility of flesh as the
defining feature of this paradigm:
[B]etween my movements and what I touch, there must exist some relationship by
principle, some kinship, according to which they are [] the opening upon a
tactile world. This can happen only if my hand, while it is felt from within, is also
accessible from without, itself tangible, for my other hand, for example, if it takes
its place among the things it touches, is in a sense one of them, opens finally upon
a tangible being of which it is also a part.
12



10
MP. The IntertwiningThe Chiasm. The Visible and the Invisible. p. 138.
11
MP. The IntertwiningThe Chiasm. The Visible and the Invisible. p. 146.
12
MP. The IntertwiningThe Chiasm. The Visible and the Invisible. p. 133.
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The hand-over-hand example illustrates the reversibility of flesh that Merleau-Ponty takes to be
the central feature of his ontology. While my left hand touches my right hand, I feel that my left
hand is touching, but I also feel that my right hand is being touched. These are two moments of
the same experience that can be reversed; ones right hand can touch his or her left hand while
ones left hand is touched without changing the position of his or her hands. This feature of the
example is highlighted as the reversibility of flesh that distinguishes it from other ontologies.
However, what is equally radical about Merleau-Pontys notion of reversibility is that
neither moment can be fully completed. As previously stated, one of the goals of this ontology is
to break out of the subject-object distinction. Reversibility alone is not sufficient to achieve that
end. He writes, It is time to emphasize that it is a reversibility always imminent and never
realized in fact. My left hand is always on the verge of touching my right hand touching the
things, but I never reach coincidence.
13
What is important for Merleau-Ponty is the potential for
the hand-over-hand example to be reversed, not its actual reversal. Each hand is at once toucher
and touched. For that to be true, one need not identify the left hand as both touching and being
touched by the right hand. Instead, it is sufficient to identify the potential for reversibility to
occur even though it is never actually realized. The results of this discussion are extended to all
of the senses to avoid establishing a subject-object distinction with other modes of interacting
with the world. Just as ones hand is toucher and touched, the seer must also have the objects of
his or her perception presented to his or her field of view. This dual movement challenges the
subject-object distinction that shapes our understanding of how we interact with the world.
From the conclusion that reversibility is never actualized, one may question the
significance of this concept. While intentionality is still central to a description of embodiment,
Merleau-Ponty is challenging the rigid distinction between the subject that intends and the object

13
MP. The IntertwiningThe Chiasm. The Visible and the Invisible. pp. 147-8.
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of that intention. With this new ontology, intentionality has become a two-sided movement. The
subject intends toward an object, and the object also intends toward the subject; the seer is only a
seer insofar as he or she is seen by what he or she sees.
14
This removes the traditional privileging
of the subject over the object from the relationship, but Merleau-Ponty has thrown aspects of his
earlier work into questionaspects that benefit feminist phenomenologists by giving them the
tools with which to describe womens experience. Intentionality, a concept with great
significance for feminist extensions of his thought, has become radically reconceived to break
out of the subject-object distinction. Such a shift in Merleau-Pontys philosophy was met with
hostility by a group that found his early work useful, but this tension is not as radical as one
might think.
2. Reconciling the Flesh with Feminine Embodiment
One author who has attempted to reconcile Merleau-Pontys later ontology with feminist
philosophy is Linda Alcoff in her Merleau-Ponty and Feminist Theory on Experience. She
explains that the purpose of his later project is to provide a new vocabulary for philosophy to
avoid the dualistic presuppositions that influenced phenomenology.
15
She identifies features of
the ontology of the flesh that are useful for feminist philosophy, and all of these features involve
the disruption of the subject-object distinction. Her first point is that the world opens itself to the
subject when one experiences oneself as an object. This distances phenomenology from
conceiving of perception as a mastery of its object, which can be helpful for philosophers who
wish to characterize the experience of women. Second, she notes that Merleau-Ponty avoids the
privileged vantage point of the absolute subject in epistemology.
16
Such a privileged position
was required by the Cartesian cogito, but Merleau-Ponty removes this need for perception. This

14
MP. Eye and Mind. Section 3. Art and Its Significance. 3
rd
ed. p. 288.
15
Alcoff. Merleau-Ponty and Feminist Theory on Experience. Chiasms. p. 263.
16
Alcoff. Merleau-Ponty and Feminist Theory on Experience. Chiasms. p. 264.
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provides feminist philosophers with a backdoor through which to construct an epistemology that
subverts the privileging of the masculine subject.
Having abandoned this privileged vantage point, Merleau-Pontys notion of the flesh
provides feminist philosophy with an ontological foundation for gender equality. Alcoff writes,
we cannot objectify the other any more successfully than we can objectify the visible world, the
world that sees us in our seeing of it.
17
Objectification has been transformed into a dual
movement between subject and object; insofar as one objectifies, he or she is also objectified. As
in the hand-over-hand example, the distinction between subject and object dissolves with regard
to objectification. This results in a stronger relation of intersubjectivity and solves some concerns
with the problem of the Otherboth of which are useful for dissolving gender disparity.
18
As a
result, Alcoff concludes that Merleau-Pontys notion of the flesh benefits feminist perspectives,
but she concedes that there are significant limitations in his thought for feminist philosophy.
While Alcoff does well to note the benefits of Merleau-Pontys late ontology for feminist
philosophy, she does not target the central tension between his early and late work. Certain
aspects of Merleau-Pontys ontology of the flesh seem attractive to feminist perspectives, and
Alcoff rightly identifies the important ways in which Merleau-Ponty avoids the subject-object
distinction. However, this development in his thought may render his previous
phenomenological description of embodiment problematic to those attempting to reconcile his
early and later work. Both Merleau-Ponty and philosophers such as Young use a vocabulary that

17
Alcoff. Merleau-Ponty and Feminist Theory on Experience. Chiasms. p. 264.
18
Objectification itself comes under question since it cannot properly take place without the splitting of the subject
from an object. The gaze of the Other, which is often discussed in the context of gender disparity, does not have the
same descriptive power when one accepts the ontology of the flesh. Merleau-Ponty himself discusses the gaze of the
Other in the context of the philosophy of negativity, and this section of the work is instructive for understanding
which assumptions lead to this problem. See pp. 83-84 of The Visible and the Invisible.
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is riddled with problematic assumptions
19
that The Visible and the Invisible avoids through
constructing a new ontology. If Merleau-Ponty has abandoned the vocabulary of his early work,
then this also throws the feminist extensions of his work into question. Thus, not only has
Merleau-Ponty provided a more universalistic approach that removes itself from the important
discussion of embodiment, but he has also abandoned the aspects of his philosophy that were
useful to feminist perspectives.
It is worth remembering that The Visible and the Invisible exists as an unfinished
manuscript. In its current state, it introduces a radical ontology that shakes itself from
questionable philosophical paradigms. Merleau-Pontys early work is itself filled with
problematic assumptions due to the vocabulary with which he described embodiment. Despite
the differences in vocabulary, Merleau-Pontys project largely remains the same. His later
ontology evolves out of his criticism of the philosophies of reflection and negativity just as his
phenomenology of embodiment arose between intellectualist and physicalist explanations of
consciousness.
20
The ontology of the flesh is a supplement to his previous project that unearths
the problematic assumptions of his early phenomenology. While embodiment is still the locus of
our interactions with the world, we now have an ontology that more clearly reflects that
relationship without condemning the world beneath the gaze of the privileged subject. This does
not require one to abandon the conclusions reached in Merleau-Pontys early work. If developed
further, the manuscript may have applied this ontology to a phenomenological description of
embodiment. Nevertheless, these phases in Merleau-Pontys thought remain compatible.

19
These assumptions include (but are not limited to) the perpetuation of the subject-object distinction through a
Husserlian understanding of intentionality.
20
An early expression of Merleau-Pontys project can be found in the first pages of The Structure of Behavior
(2002) and applied in The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology from The Phenomenology of Perception.
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The concept that receives the most radical treatment in Merleau-Pontys late ontology is
intentionality. The usefulness of intentionality for feminist descriptions of embodiment has
already been discussed, and it is especially problematic for Merleau-Ponty to conceive of
intentionality in a different manner. However, the implications of his late ontology are still useful
for describing embodiment. Youngs description of inhibited intentionality focuses on the added
struggles of feminine bodily comportment. In addition, she discusses the relationship of the
feminine body with the space it inhabits, and she uses terms such as confined to characterize
this relationship. Given Merleau-Pontys notion of reversibility, Young now has a new
vocabulary to describe womens spatial experience. When she comports her body to complete an
action, the object
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of that action resists the intention of her body. The womans comportment no
longer maintains the expressed of I can and I cannot alone; the object itself reflects this
contradiction and refuses to present itself to the comportment as something with which the
intended action can be completed. This gives new meaning to Youngs claim that womans
intentionality is overlaid with bodily immanence: she cannot transcend her body because the
object denies her comportment and reverses her intention inward.
Further, reversibility has important implications for intersubjectivity and sexual
expression. Sexual expression is typically characterized as an intentional act by both early
Merleau-Ponty and feminist phenomenologists such as Sara Heinmaa.
22
With the earlier
description of intentionality as a directed act from a subject to an object, the social influence of
sexual expression is largely omitted. The notion of a gender performance that is informed by
ones understanding of social norms is incompatible with such a rigid intentionality between

21
Note that object throughout these next paragraphs should be read within the context of reversibility. The
distinction between subject and object is never one realized in fact. I use subject and object merely to emphasize
how reversibility affects the phenomenology of feminine bodily comportment.
22
Heinmaas Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference (2003) is especially helpful for understanding the
importance of sexual expression for a phenomenology of embodiment.
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subject and object.
23
When considering the reversibility of intentionality, ones gender
performance not only presents itself to others, but it receives feedback by other gender
performances, social customs, and responses to ones own performance. Thus, sexual expression
is an intentional act that is molded by the social context of the performance, not an expression
that takes place in a vacuum. This distinction motivates constructive theories of gender that aid
feminist phenomenology in describing embodiment by acknowledging external influences on
gender identity.
Conclusion
Although Merleau-Pontys ontology of the flesh radically reconceives concepts that were
indispensable for feminist extensions of his early thought, it is clear that these phases are chiefly
compatible. The projects of feminist philosophers such as Iris Young can be aided by adopting
the ontology of The Visible and the Invisible, despite the contradiction between their
vocabularies. Further, while Alcoff provides an interesting analysis of the relationship between
Merleau-Pontys ontology of the flesh and feminist philosophy, she avoids discussing the
implications of that ontology on intentionality. Given the central role of intentionality in feminist
descriptions of embodiment, Alcoff did not target one of the most important phenomenological
concepts in her analysis. The purpose of this paper was to show that intentionality is one of the
fundamental disagreements between Merleau-Pontys earlier and later work, but these phases
need not be opposed to one another. One might worry that Merleau-Pontys later work robs
feminist philosophies of their descriptive power due to the importance of intentionality for
feminist descriptions of embodiment. On the contrary, the ontology of the flesh fortifies these
projects against problematic assumptions that result in undesired implications for feminist
phenomenology.

23
Gender performance is most clearly described by Judith Butler in Gender Trouble (1990).
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