GENERAL GARMENTS CORPORATION v. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS and PURITAN SPORTSWEAR CORPORATION, respondents. The GENERAL GARMENTS CORPORATION, organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, is the owner of the trademark "Puritan," under Registration No. 10059 issued on November 15, 1962 by the Philippine Patent Office, for assorted men's wear, such as sweaters, shirts, jackets, undershirts and briefs. On March 9, 1964 the PURITAN SPORTSWEAR CORPORATION, organized and existing in and under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., filed a petition with the Philippine Patent Office for the cancellation of the trademark "Puritan" registered in the name of General Garments Corporation, alleging ownership and prior use in the Philippines of the said trademark on the same kinds of goods, which use it had not abandoned; and alleging further that the registration thereof by General Garments Corporation had been obtained fraudulently and in violation of Section 17(c) of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, in relation to Section 4(d) thereof. On March 30, 1964 General Garments Corporation moved to dismiss the petition on several grounds, all of which may be synthesized in one single issue: whether or not Puritan Sportswear Corporation, which is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business and not doing business in the Philippines, has legal capacity to maintain a suit in the Philippine Patent Office for cancellation of a trademark registered therein. The Director of Patents denied the motion to dismiss on August 6, 1964, and denied likewise the motion for reconsideration on March 5, 1965, whereupon General Garments Corporation, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, filed the instant petition for review. A foreign corporation which has never done ... business in the Philippine Islands and which is unlicensed and unregistered to do business here, but is widely and favorably known in the Islands through the use therein of its products bearing its corporate and trade name has a legal right to maintain an action in the Islands. xxx xxx xxx The purpose of such a suit is to protect its reputation, corporate name and goodwill which has been established, through the natural development of its trade for a long period of years, in the doing of which it does not seek to enforce any legal or contract rights arising from, or growing out of any business which it has transacted in the Philippine Islands. The right to the use of the corporate or trade name is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect in any of the courts of the world even in jurisdictions where it does not transact business just the same as it may protect its tangible property, real or personal against trespass or conversion. Petitioner argues that the ruling in Western Equipment has been superseded by the later decision of this Court inMentholatum Co., Inc. v. Mangaliman (1941), 72 Phil. 524, where it was held that inasmuch as Mentholatum Co., Inc. was a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without the license required by Section 68 of the Corporation Law it could not prosecute an action for infringement of its trademark which was the subject of local registration. The court itself, however, recognized a distinction between the two cases, in that in Western Equipment the foreign corporation was not engaged in business in the Philippines, and observed that if it had been so engaged without first obtaining a license "another and a very different question would be presented." Parenthetically, it may be stated that the ruling in the Mentholatum case was subsequently derogated when Congress, purposely to "counteract the effects" of said case, enacted Republic Act No. 638, inserting Section 21-A in the Trademark Law, which allows a foreign corporation or juristic person to bring an action in Philippine courts for infringement of a mark or trade-name, for unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false description, "whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint." Petitioner's last argument is that under Section 37 of the Trademark Law respondent is not entitled to the benefits of said law because the Philippines is not a signatory to any international treaty or convention relating to marks or tradenames or to the repression of unfair competition. As correctly pointed out by respondents, this provision was incorporated in the law in anticipation of the eventual adherence of the Philippines to any international convention or treaty for the protection of industrial property. It speaks of persons who are nationals of domiciled in, or have a bona fide or effective business or commercial establishment in any foreign country, which is a party to any international convention or treaty relating to industrial property to which the Philippines may be a party. In other words, the provision will be operative only when the Philippines becomes a party to such a convention or treaty. Regardless of Section 37, aliens or foreign corporations are accorded benefits under the law. Thus, under Section 2, for instance, the trademarks, tradenames and service-marks owned by persons, corporations, partnerships or associations domiciled in any foreign country may be registered in the Philippines, provided that the country of which the applicant for registration is a citizen grants bylaw substantially similar privileges to citizens of the Philippines. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, and the resolution of the Director of Patents dated August 6, 1964 is affirmed, with costs.
La Chemise Lacoste vs. Fernandez GR 63796-97, 21 May 1984; First Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J)
Facts: La chemise Lacoste is a French corporation and the actual owner of the trademarks Lacoste, Chemise Lacoste, Crocodile Device and a composite mark consisting of the word Lacoste and a representation of a crocodile/alligator, used on clothings and other goods sold in many parts of the world and which has been marketed in the Philippines (notably by Rustans) since 1964.
In 1975 and 1977, Hemandas Q. Co. was issued certificate of registration for the trademark Chemise Lacoste and Q Crocodile Device both in the supplemental and Principal Registry. In 1980, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed for the registration of the Crocodile device and Lacoste. Games and Garments (Gobindram Hemandas, assignee of Hemandas Q.Co.) opposed the registration of Lacoste. In 1983, La Chemise Lacoste filed with the NBI a letter-complaint alleging acts of unfair competition committed by Hemandas and requesting the agencys assistance. A search warrant was issued by the trial court. Various goods and articles were seized upon the execution of the warrants. Hemandas filed motion to quash the warrants, which the court granted. The search warrants were recalled, and the goods ordered to be returned. La Chemise Lacoste filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the proceedings before the patent office is a prejudicial question that need to be resolved before the criminal action for unfair competition may be pursued.
Held: No. The proceedings pending before the Patent Office do not partake of the nature of a prejudicial question that must first be definitely resolved. The case, which suspends the criminal action, must be a civil case, not a mere administrative case, which is determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused. The issue whether a trademark used is different from anothers trademark is a matter of defense and will be better resolved in the criminal proceedings before a court of justice instead of raising it as a preliminary matter in an administrative proceeding.
Inasmuch as the goodwill and reputation of La Chemise Lacoste products date back even before 1964, Hemandas cannot be allowed to continue the trademark Lacoste for the reason that he was the first registrant in the Supplemental Register of a trademark used in international commerce. Registration in the Supplemental Register cannot be given a posture as if the registration is in the Principal Register. It must be noted that one may be declared an unfair competitor even if his competing trademark is registered. La Chemise Lacoste is world-renowned mark, and by virtue of the 20 November 1980 Memorandum of the Minister of Trade to the director of patents in compliance with the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property, effectively cancels the registration of contrary claimants to the enumerated marks, which include Lacoste.
Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. lAC GR 75420, 15 November 1991; Second Division, Gutierrez Jr., (J)
Facts: Kabushi Kaisha Isetan is a Japanese corporation, and owner of the trademark Isetan and the Young leave design. Isetann Department Store, on the other hand, is a domestic corporation, and owner fo the trademark Isetann and clover design. In 1980, Kabushi Kaisha Isetan field petitions for the cancellation of the supplemental registration of Isetann with the Philippine Patent Office. It also filed for the cancellation of the mark Isetan from the corporate name of Isetann Department Store with the SEC. Both the SEC and the Director of Patents, eventually, ruled against Kabushi Kaisha Isetan. It appealed to the intermediate Appellate Court, which denied the petition for being filed out of time.
Issue: Whether Kabushi Kaisha Isetan has the right to seek for the cancellation of the word Isetan from the corporate name of Isetann Department Store.
Held: No. A Fundamental principle in Trademark Law is that the actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a tradename. Kabushi Kaisha Isetan has never conducted any business in the Philippines. It has never promoted its trademark or tradename in the Philippines. It has absolutely no business goodwill in the Philippines. It is unknown to Filipinos except the very few who may have noticed it while traveling abroad. It has never paid a single centavo of tax to the Philippine Government. Under the law, it has no right to the remedy it seeks. Isetann Department Store is entitled to use its trademark in the Philippines.
PHILIP MORRIS ET AL V CA
Facts: Petitioners Philip Morris et al are US companies not doing business in the Philippines. As registered owners "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK" petitioners asserted that private respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark "MARK" in contravention of Section 22 of the Trademark Law, and should be precluded during the pendency of the case from performing the acts complained of via a preliminary injunction. Respondent admitted petitioners registration subject to the affirmative and special defense on misjoinder of party plaintiffs. Respondent further alleged that it has been authorized by the BIR to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademark MARK and that it is a common word which cannot be exclusively appropriated.
Issue: WON the treaty obligation under Article 2 of the Paris Convention (of which the Philippines is a signatory and ratified by Senate) is sufficient basis for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.
Held: No. Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments.
* Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market. NOTE: infringement issue not discussed extensively issue focused on lifting of writ- mere interlocutory order.
Philip Morris vs. Court of Appeals [GRN 91332 July 16, 1993.] MELO, J.:
Facts: Petitioners Philip Morris, Inc., Benson and Hedges (Canada), Inc., and Fabriques of Tabac Reunies, S.A., are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, herein private respondent, from manufacturing and selling "MARK" cigarettes in the local market. Banking on the thesis that petitioners' respective symbols "MARK VII", 'MARK TEN", and "MARK", also for cigarettes, must be protected against unauthorized appropriation, Philip Morris, Incorporated is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Virginia, United States of America, and does business at 100 Park Avenue, New York, New York, United States of America. The two other plaintiff foreign corporations, which are wholly- owned subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc., are similarly not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction. Plaintiffs-petitioners asserted that defendant Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark' Plaintiffs admit in the complaint that "xxx they are not doing business in the Philippines and are suing on an isolated transaction xxx'. This simply means that they are not engaged in the sale, manufacture, importation, expor[tation and advertisement of their cigarette products in the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not there has been an invasion o plaintiffs' right of property to such trademark or trade name. Whether of not there is a violation of the International Agreement on protection of trademarks. Held: There is no proof whatsoever that any of plaintiffs products which they seek to protect from any adverse effect of the trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and available for commercial purposes anywhere in the Philippines. To sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringement, petitioners, as foreign corporations not engaged in local commerce, rely on Section 21-A of the Trademark Law reading as follows: SECTION 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or trade-name has been registered or assigned under this act may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false description, whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fiftynine, as amended, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint: Provided, That the country of which the said foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines. (As inserted by Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 638.) to drive home the point that they are not precluded from initiating a cause of action in the Philippines on account of the principal perception that another entity is pirating their symbol without any lawful authority to do so. A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a tradename. Adoption alone of a trade, ark would not give exclusive right thereto. Such right grows out of their actual use. Adoption is not use. One may make advertisements, issue circulars, give out price lists on certain goods; but these alone would not give exclusive right of use. For trademark is a creation of use. The records show that the petitioner has never conducted business in the Philippines. It has never promoted its tradename of trademark in the Philippines. It is unknown to Filipinos except the very few who may have noticed it while travelling abroad. It has paid a single centavo of tax to the Philippine government. Under the law, it has no right to the remedy it seeks. In other words, petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question of whether they have an exclusive right over the'symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous on petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their "right" to be protected. Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal (Mortensen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of Judiciary of Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions 93; Paras, International Law and World Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20). Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, Fourth ed., 1974, p. 16).
Bata Industries v CA Digest
G.R. No. L-53672, May 31, 1982
Facts: The respondent New Olympian Rubber Products sought to register the mark "BATA" for casual rubber shoe products, alleging it had used the said mark since the 1970s. The petitioner, a Canadian corporation opposed with its allegations that it owns and has not abandoned said trademark. The petitioner has no license to do business in the Philippines and the trademark has never been registered in the Philippines by any foreign entity. Bata Industries does not sell footwear under the said trademark in the Philippines nor does it have any licensing agreement with any local entity to sell its product.
Evidence show that earlier, even before the World War II, Bata shoes made by Gerbec and Hrdina (Czech company) were already sold in the country. Some shoes made by the petitioner may have been sold in the Philippines ntil 1948. On the other hand, respondent spent money and effort to popularize the trademark "BATA" since the 70's. Moreover, it also secures 3 copyright registrations for the word "BATA". The Philippine Patent Office (PPO) dismissed the opposition by the petitioner while the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed said decision. However, a 2nd resolution by the CA affirmed the PPO decision.
Issue: Does the petitioner have the right to protect its goodwill alleged to be threatened with the registration of the mark?
NO. Bata Industries has no Philippine goodwill that would be damaged by the registration of the mark. Any slight goodwill obtained by the product before World War II was completely abandoned and lost in the more than 35 years that passed since Manila's liberation from Japan. The petitioner never used the trademark either before or after the war. It is also not the successor-in-interest of Gerbec & Hrdina and there there was no privity of interest between them, Furthermore, the Czech trademark has long been abandoned in Czechoslovakia.