February 2012 Supreme Court Decisions on

Political Law
Posted on March 14, 2012 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines
- Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged agrarian reform, citizenship, COMELEC, Commission on
Audit, declaratory relief, double jeopardy, due process, eminent domain, equal protection,
immunity from suit, plebiscite, President, treaty
Here are selected February 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law
Autonomous Region; plebiscite requirement. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides
that the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. The Supreme Court
interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require
ratification through a plebiscite. While it agrees with the petitioners underlying premise that
sovereignty ultimately resides with the people, it disagrees that this legal reality necessitates
compliance with the plebiscite requirement for all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were
to go by the petitioners interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all
amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming
effective, this would lead to impractical and illogical results hampering the ARMMs progress
by impeding Congress from enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise in the
region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government with the costs that unavoidably follow
the holding of a plebiscite. Also, Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 10153 cannot be seen as changing the basic
structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves
the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices of the
ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices to
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs.
Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C.
Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on
Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis
Barok Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
Citizenship; proceeding for declaration of Philippine citizenship. There is no specific statutory or
procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely
allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil
registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the
respondent. The Republic of the Philippines v. Nora Fe Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February 15,
2012.
COMELEC; authority to hold special elections. The Constitution merely empowers the
COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to
another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the
law. Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of Sections 5 and 6, which address
instances when elections have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be
suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud,
terrorism, and other analogous circumstances. In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed
by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local
elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5
or Section 6 of BP 881. More important, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next
ARMM elections and COMELEC has no authority to set a different election date. Datu Michael
Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes,
etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et
al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on
Elections, et al./Luis Barok Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
Commission on Audit; authority to determine if price is excessive; power to conduct post-audit.
The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of funds by an
agency of the national government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose, the Constitution has
provided that the COA shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article,
to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo
Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 07-012; relevance of brand of an equipment as basis
for what is reasonable. The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit
the use of funds by an agency of the national government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose,
the Constitution has provided that the COA shall have exclusive authority, subject to the
limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties. As such, CDAs decisions regarding procurement of equipment for its own use,
including computers and its accessories, is subject to the COAs auditing rules and regulations
for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant
expenditures. Necessarily, CDAs preferences regarding brand of its equipment have to conform
to the criteria set by the COA rules on what is reasonable price for the items purchased.
Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7,
2012.
Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 97-012 (guidelines on evidence to support audit
findings of over-pricing). 3.1 When the price/prices of a transaction under audit is found beyond
the allowable ten percent (10%) above the prices indicated in reference price lists referred to in
pa[r].2.1 as market price indicators, the auditor shall secure additional evidence to firm-up the
initial audit finding to a reliable degree of certainty. 3.2 To firm-up the findings to a reliable
degree of certainty, initial findings of over-pricing based on market price indicators mentioned in
pa[r]. 2.1 above have to be supported with canvass sheets and/or price quotations indicating: a)
the identities/names of the suppliers or sellers; b) the availability of stock sufficient in quantity to
meet the requirements of the procuring agency; c) the specifications of the items which should
match those involved in the finding of over-pricing; and d) the purchase/contract terms and
conditions which should be the same as those of the questioned transaction. Candelario Verzosa
Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 97-012; no retroactive effect. In Arriola v. COA, this
Court ruled that the disallowance made by the COA was not sufficiently supported by evidence,
as it was based on undocumented claims. The documents that were used as basis of the COA
Decision were not shown to petitioners therein despite their repeated demands to see them; they
were denied access to the actual canvass sheets or price quotations from accredited
suppliers. Absent due process and evidence to support COAs disallowance, COAs ruling on
petitioners liability has no basis. We categorically ruled in Nava v. Palattao that
neither Arriola nor the COA Memorandum No. 97-012 can be given any retroactive
effect. Thus, although Arriolawas already promulgated at the time, it is not correct to say that
the COA in this case violated the afore-quoted guidelines which have not yet been issued at the
time the audit was conducted in 1993. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA,
et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Commission on Audit; pre-audit. On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195,
lifting the system of pre-audit of government financial transactions, albeit with certain
exceptions. With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government
operations, the COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, which again lifted the pre-audit of
government transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -
controlled corporations (GOCCs). Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of COA includes
the duty to conduct pre-audit. The Supreme Court found that there is nothing in section 2 of
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all
government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit
requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for
certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal
control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt
measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies. Hence, the
conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that the Supreme Court may compel the COA to
perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA
has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the language
of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can
the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by the Court. Gualberto J. Dela Llana v. The
Chairperson, Commission on Audit, the Executive Secretary and the National Treasurer, G.R.
No. 180989, February 7, 2012.
Constitutionality; locus standi. Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7 ordering (1) a
moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary
adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite
period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives
of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. The petitioner claims
that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Locus standi or legal
standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court
settle only actual cases or controversies. The Supreme Court was not convinced that the
petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the
case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the
curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as
contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and,
therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO
7. Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioners claim that he is instituting the
present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws
and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed interest
has been branded by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora, as too
general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry. Thus, the
Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case.
Jelbert B. Galicto vs. H.E. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No. 193978,
February 28, 2012.
DAR Administrative Order No. 01; 2003 Rules Governing Issuance of Notice of Coverage and
Acquisition of Agricultural Lands under RA No. 6657; procedure; commencement.
Commencement by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) After determining that a
landholding is coverable under the CARP, and upon accomplishment of the Pre-Ocular
Inspection Report, the MARO shall prepare the NO (CARP Form No. 5-1). Corolarilly,
Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1998, which outlines the steps in the acquisition of lands,
details that in the 3
rd
step, the Department of Agrarian Reform Municipal Office (DARMO)
should conduct a preliminary ocular inspection to determine initially whether or not the
property maybe covered under the CARP, which findings will be contained in CARP Form No.
3.a, or the Preliminary Ocular Inspection Report. Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. Ruben Alcaide
(deceased), substituted by Gloria Alcaide representative of the Farmer-Beneficiaries, G.R. No.
167952, February 1, 2012.
Declaratory relief. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed
of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not
judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect
remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7. Jelbert B.
Galicto vs. H.E. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No. 193978, February 28,
2012.
Double jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65
petition, predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered
with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and where the prosecution had been deprived of due
process. The rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these instances because a Rule 65
petition does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal.
In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine and assess the evidence of the parties
nor weigh the probative value of the evidence. It does not include an inquiry on the correctness
of the evaluation of the evidence. A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether
there has been a validly rendered decision, not the question of whether the decision is legally
correct. In other words, the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per
se void on jurisdictional grounds. Arnold James M. Ysidoro vs. Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo-de
Castro, et al, G.R. No. 171513, February 6, 2012.
Double jeopardy; exceptions. The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal
justice system. It dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical offense. This
principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the civil
law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every
system of jurisprudence. It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the
United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen, viz:
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to
reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under
Rule 45 of the same Rules. The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a)
there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the
defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants express
consent. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such
acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The
finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from
using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a
multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the
State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a
conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant
again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This prohibition, however, is not
absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of
a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due
process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion. Artemio Villareal vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. The
Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa
vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al. G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R.
Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080, February 1, 2012.
Due process; deprivation of the States right to due process. The State, like any other litigant, is
entitled to its day in court; in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for and represents
the State, and carries the burden of diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner
consistent with public interest. The States right to be heard in court rests to a large extent on
whether the public prosecutor properly undertook his duties in pursuing the criminal action for
the punishment of the guilty. The prosecutors role in the administration of justice is to lay
before the court, fairly and fully, every fact and circumstance known to him or her to exist,
without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused and
without regard to any personal conviction or presumption on what the judge may or is disposed
to do. The prosecutor owes the State, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court
the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying
contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that the courts mind
may not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent may not suffer; and that the guilty may not
escape unpunished. In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has ample
discretionary power to control the conduct of the presentation of the prosecution evidence, part
of which is the option to choose what evidence to present or who to call as witness. In this case,
the State was not denied due process in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no
indication that the special prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present available
evidence or that other evidence could be secured. People of the Philippines, v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), et al., G.R. No. 153304-05, February 7, 2012.
Elections; synchronization of ARMM elections with local elections. The Court was unanimous
in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local
elections, the intention can be inferred from Sections 1, 2 and 5 of the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed
their objective more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials
from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing
to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective,
highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. That the ARMM elections were not
expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot
be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of
synchronization. It is to be considered that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been
officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping
in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but
is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate
sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing
instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future.
Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of
its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great
length of time, to be progressive and not static. Article X of the Constitution, entitled Local
Government, clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to classify autonomous regions,
such as the ARMM, as local governments. The inclusion of autonomous regions in the
enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading Local Government
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the
forms of local governments. That the Constitution mentions only the national government and
the local governments, and does not make a distinction between the local government and
the regional government, is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of
government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than other
local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous
regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions
are also considered as local elections. Datu Michael Abas Kida, et. al v. Senate of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
Eminent domain; just compensation. When the State exercises its inherent power of eminent
domain, the Constitution imposes the corresponding obligation to compensate the landowner for
the expropriated property. When the State exercises the power of eminent domain in the
implementation of its agrarian reform program, the constitutional provision which governs is
Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution. Notably, this provision also imposes upon the State
the obligation of paying the landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the
governments agrarian reform purposes. That the compensation mentioned here pertains to the
fair and full price of the taken property is evident from the exchange between the members of the
Constitutional Commission during the discussion on the governments agrarian reform program.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, G.R. No. 169903, February 29,
2012.
Equal protection clause. The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not
violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be reasonable, it must be
shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same
class. Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. It was not seen how the
quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came
from. Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic v. Hypermix
Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012.
Executive agreement; requisites. An executive agreement is similar to a treaty, except that the
former (a) does not require legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals with
a narrower range of subject matters. Despite these differences, to be considered an executive
agreement, the following three requisites provided under the Vienna Convention must
nevertheless concur: (a) the agreement must be between states; (b) it must be written; and (c) it
must governed by international law. China National machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon.
Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012.
Executive Power; power to classify or reclassify lands. The power to classify or reclassify lands
is essentially an executive prerogative, albeit local government units, thru zoning ordinances,
may, subject to certain conditions, very well effect reclassification of land use within their
respective territorial jurisdiction. Reclassification decrees issued by the executive department,
through its appropriate agencies, carry the same force and effect as any statute. As it were, PD
27 and Proclamation 1637 are both presidential issuances, each forming, by virtue of Sec. 3(2),
Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, a part of the law of the land. Land Bank of the Philippines
vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado
Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al.
vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Irrepealable law. The supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA
No. 9054 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable
laws. The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these
laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws,
the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of
Congress. Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a
mere majority vote, provided there is quorum. In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054
to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress,
which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which the Supreme Court sought
to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie
the hands of, future legislatures. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc.,
et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et
al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis Barok Biraogo, G.R.
No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
President; judicial courtesy. Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of
courts and applies only to lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary
injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court to suspend its
proceedings for practical and ethical considerations. In other words, the principle of judicial
courtesy applies where there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would
be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower
court or court of origin. Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the President, who
represents a co-equal branch of government. To suggest otherwise would be to disregard the
principle of separation of powers, on which our whole system of government is founded upon.
Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does not, and
cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless of how
close the voting is, so long as there is concurrence of the majority of the members of the en
banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the case, a decision garnering only 8 votes out
of 15 members is still a decision of the Supreme Court en banc and must be respected as such.
The petitioners are, therefore, not in any position to speculate that, based on the voting, the
probability exists that their motion for reconsideration may be granted. Datu Michael Abas
Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc.,
et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs.
The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on
Elections, et al./Luis Barok Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
President; power to appoint officer in charge. The power to appoint has traditionally been
recognized as executive in nature. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad
strokes the extent of this power. The main distinction between the provision in the 1987
Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence construction; while in
the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make are enumerated in a
single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is
empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is
significant; in providing for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to
make a distinction between the first group of presidential appointments and the second group of
presidential appointments. he first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments. The second group of officials the President can appoint are all other officers
of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint. The second sentence acts as the catch-all provision
for the Presidents appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature. The wide latitude given to the President to appoint is further
demonstrated by the recognition of the Presidents power to appoint officials whose
appointments are not even provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which
have to be filled, but the law does not provide the process for filling them, the Constitution
recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by appointment. There is no
incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and
autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA
No. 10153, to appoint OICs. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et
al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et
al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis Barok Biraogo, G.R.
No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
State immunity; doctrine of state immunity. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to
private acts or acts jure gestionis. Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory,

it is
crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved whether the entity claiming immunity
performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. A thorough examination of the
basic facts of the case would show that CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary activity. Piecing
together the content and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding
dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wangs letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan Agreement
would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely
commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its business. Even
assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions, such claim does not
automatically vest it with immunity. It is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity
from suit, even if it contends that it performs governmental functions. Its designation as the
Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term implementing
agency has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from
suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce
evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Courts
ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be
presumed to be a government-owned and -controlled corporation without an original charter. As
a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code. China
National machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No. 185572,
February 7, 2012.
State immunity; waiver by submission to arbitration. In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 provides for a waiver by implication of state immunity. In the said law,
the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration in a foreign country is construed as an implicit
waiver of immunity from suit. Although there is no similar law in the Philippines, there is reason
to apply the legal reasoning behind the waiver in this case. Under the provisions of The
Conditions of Contract which is an integral part of the Contract Agreement,, if any dispute arises
between Northrail and CNMEG, both parties are bound to submit the matter to the HKIAC for
arbitration. In case the HKIAC makes an arbitral award in favor of Northrail, its enforcement in
the Philippines would be subject to the Special Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special
Rules). Rule 13 thereof provides for the Recognition and Enforcement of a Foreign Arbitral
Award. Under Rules 13.2 and 13.3 of the Special Rules, the party to arbitration wishing to have
an arbitral award recognized and enforced in the Philippines must petition the proper regional
trial court (a) where the assets to be attached or levied upon is located; (b) where the acts to be
enjoined are being performed; (c) in the principal place of business in the Philippines of any of
the parties; (d) if any of the parties is an individual, where any of those individuals resides; or (e)
in the National Capital Judicial Region. From all the foregoing, it is clear that CNMEG has
agreed that it will not be afforded immunity from suit. Thus, the courts have the competence and
jurisdiction to ascertain the validity of the Contract Agreement. China National machinery &
Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012.
Supreme Court; respect to factual findings of administrative agencies. It is the general policy of
the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is
constitutionally-created, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for
their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined
to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence, and the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. Candelario Verzosa
Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Taxpayers suit; standing. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional
issue when it is established that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution. Gualberto J. Dela Llana v. The Chairperson,
Commission on Audit, the Executive Secretary and the National Treasurer, G.R. No. 180989,
February 7, 2012.
Administrative Law
Administrative Rule; due process; publication, when required. The Commissioner of Customs
issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified
according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of
discharge. The regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge,
commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be
classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was
3%, for feed grade, 7%.CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or
Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Considering that the regulation
would affect the substantive rights of respondent, it therefore follows that petitioners should have
applied Sections 3 and 9 of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code. When an
administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than
its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for
the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to
those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law. Because petitioners failed to follow the
requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be
struck down. Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic v.
Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012.
Void government contract; payment for services. Parties who do not come to court with clean
hands cannot be allowed to profit from their own wrongdoing. The action (or inaction) of the
party seeking equity must be free from fault, and he must have done nothing to lull his
adversary into repose, thereby obstructing and preventing vigilance on the part of the latter.
Here, even with the respondents supposed failure to ascertain the validity of the contract and the
authority of the public official involved in the construction agreements, there is no such
confusion as to the matter of the contracts validity and the equivalent compensation. As found
by the court a quo, petitioner had assured the contractors that they would be paid for the work
that they would do, as even DPWH Undersecretary Teodoro T. Encarnacion had told them to
fast-track the project. Hence, respondents cannot by any stretch of logic, be deprived of
compensation for their services when despite their ostensible omissions they only heeded the
assurance of DPWH and proceeded to work on the urgent project. DPWH v. Ronaldo Quiwa, et.
al, G.R. No. 183444, February 8, 2012.
Agrarian Reform
Agrarian Reform Law; agricultural lands. The primary governing agrarian law with regard to
agricultural lands, be they of private or public ownership and regardless of tenurial arrangement
and crops produced, is now RA 6657. Section 3(c) of RA 6657 defines agricultural lands as
lands devoted to agricultural activity as defined in the Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado
Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran,
Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado
Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Agrarian Reform Law; applicability of PD 27, RA 6657, and Proclamation 1637. From the
standpoint of agrarian reform, PD 27, being in context the earliest issuance, governed at the start
the disposition of the rice-and-corn land portions of the Doronilla property. And true enough,
the DAR began processing land transfers through the OLT program under PD 27 and thereafter
issued the corresponding CLTs. However, when Proclamation 1637 went into effect, DAR
discontinued with the OLT processing. The tenants of Doronilla during that time desisted from
questioning the halt in the issuance of the CLTs. It is fairly evident that DAR noted the effect of
the issuance of Proclamation 1637 on the subject land and decided not to pursue its original
operation, recognizing the change of classification of the property from agricultural to
residential. When it took effect on June 15, 1988, RA 6657 became the prevailing agrarian
reform law. This is not to say, however, that its coming into effect necessarily impeded the
operation of PD 27, which, to repeat, covers only rice and corn land. Far from it, for RA 6657,
which identifies rice and corn land under PD 27 as among the properties the DAR shall acquire
and distribute to the landless, no less provides that PD 27 shall be of suppletory application.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform
vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by
Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796; 161830 &
190456, February 8, 2012.
Agrarian Reform Law; certificates of title; merely an evidence of recognition by the government;
inchoate right. While the PD 27 tenant-farmers are considered the owners by virtue of that
decree, they cannot yet exercise all the attributes inherent in ownership, such as selling the lot,
because, with respect to the government represented by DAR and LBP, they have in the
meantime only inchoate rights in the lotthe being amortizing owners. This is because they
must still pay all the amortizations over the lot to Land Bank before an EP is issued to them.
Then and only then do they acquire, in the phraseology ofVinzons-Magana, the vested right of
absolute ownership in the landholding. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado
Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran,
Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado
Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796; 161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Agrarian Reform Law; private rights; just compensation. As payment the farmer-beneficiaries
who were given the 75 CLTs prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1283, as amended by
Proclamation 1637, are deemed full owners of the lots covered by 75 CLTs vis--vis the real
registered owner. The farmer-beneficiaries have private rights over said lots as they were
deemed owners prior to the establishment of the LS Townsite reservation or at least are
subrogated to the rights of the registered lot owner. Those farmer-beneficiaries who were issued
CLTs or EPs after June 21, 1974 when Proclamation 1283, as amended, became effective do not
acquire rights over the lots they were claiming under PD 27 or RA 6657, because the lots have
already been reclassified as residential and are beyond the compulsory coverage for agrarian
reform under RA 6657. Perforce, the said CLTs or EPs issued after June 21, 1974 have to be
annulled and invalidated for want of legal basis, since the lots in question are no longer subject to
agrarian reform due to the reclassification of the erstwhile Doronilla estate to non-agricultural
purposes. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian
Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased)
represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830
& 190456, February 8, 2012.
Agricultural tenancy relationship; de jure tenant; grounds for ejection provided by law.
Respondent, as landowner/agricultural lessor, has the burden to prove the existence of a lawful
cause for the ejectment of petitioner, the tenant/agricultural lessee. This rule proceeds from the
principle that a tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure.
The tenant can only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law, in
this case Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844. SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural
lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that: (1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate
family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably
located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural
purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections 25 and
except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is not more than five hectares,
in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advance
notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against
him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years
or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the
tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to
demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossession; (2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and
conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by
fortuitous event orforce majeure; (3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the
landholding for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon; (4) The agricultural
lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section 29; (5)
The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or
destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural
lessee; (6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That
if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per
centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession,
although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished;
or (7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph
2 of Section 27. Juan Galope v. Cresencia Bugarin, G.R. No. 185669, February 1, 2012.
Agricultural tenancy relationship; requisites; may be established through written or oral contract.
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee. Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as
the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist
upon an oral agreement. Juan Galope v. Cresencia Bugarin, G.R. No. 185669, February 1, 2012.
Jurisdiction of DAR; DARAB. The DARAB has been created and designed to exercise the
DARs adjudicating functions. And just like any quasi-judicial body, DARAB derives its
jurisdiction from law, specifically RA 6657, which invested it with adjudicatory powers over
agrarian reform disputes and matters related to the implementation of CARL. The Supreme
Court need not belabor that DARABs jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Doronilla
property, cannot be conferred by the main parties, let alone the intervening farmer-beneficiaries
claiming to have vested rights under PD 27. As earlier discussed, the process of land reform
covering the 1,266 hectares of the Araneta estate was not completed prior to the issuance of
Proclamation 1637. So the intervenors, with the exception of the 79 tenant-beneficiaries who
were granted CLTs, failed to acquire private rights of ownership under PD 27 before the
effective conversion of the Doronilla property to non-agricultural uses. Hence, the Doronilla
property, being outside of CARP coverage, is also beyond DARABs jurisdiction. Land Bank of
the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J.
Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos,
Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8,
2012.
Social justice; laches. There can be little quibble about Duran, et al. being guilty of laches. They
failed and neglected to keep track of their case with their lawyer for 14 long years. As discussed
above, Atty. Lara died even prior to the promulgation of the DARAB Decision. Even then, they
failed to notify the DARAB and the other parties of the case regarding the demise of Atty. Lara
and even a change of counsel. It certainly strains credulity to think that literally no one, among
those constituting the petitioning-intervenors, had the characteristic good sense of following up
the case with their legal counsel. Only now, 14 years after, did some think of fighting for the
right they slept on. Thus, as to them, the CA Decision is deemed final and executory based on
the principle of laches. Agrarian reform finds context in social justice in tandem with the police
power of the State. But social justice itself is not merely granted to the marginalized and the
underprivileged. But while the concept of social justice is intended to favor those who have less
in life, it should never be taken as a toll to justify let alone commit an injustice. Land Bank of
the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J.
Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos,
Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8,
2012.
Public Land
Public Land Act; alienable and disposable land. Public Land Act requires that the applicant for
registration must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land; and (b) that the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land must have been either
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. Certifications of the
DENR are not sufficient to prove the foregoing. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18
dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR.
Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status
for areas below 50 hectares. Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to
do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the
land is alienable and disposable. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of
the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The
CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring
the land alienable and disposable. Republic of the Philippines v. Lucia Gomez, G.R. No. 189021,
February 22, 2012.
Public Land Act; confirmation of of imperfect titles. It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the
possession and occupation required to acquire an imperfect title over an alienable and disposable
public land must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious in character. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Alconaba, the Supreme Court explained that the intent behind the use of
possession in conjunction with occupation is to emphasize the need for actual and not just
constructive or fictional possession. The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit
the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property. On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the
required nature of possession and occupation, thus, requiring a reference to the relevant
provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118 thereof, possession for
purposes of prescription must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down
by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and
not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous
that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The
party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential
elements of acquisitive prescription. Republic of the Philippines v. East Silverlane Realty
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 186961, February 20, 2012.
Public Officers
Public officer; preventive suspension. The Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Ysidoro for
90 days in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. Clearly, by well-established
jurisprudence, the provision of Section 13, Republic Act 3019 makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend, for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, any public officer who
has been validly charged with a violation of Republic Act 3019, as amended or Title 7, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code or any offense involving fraud upon government of public funds or
property. Arnold James M. Ysidoro vs. Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, et al. G.R. No.
171513, February 6, 2012.
Public officers; liability for overpricing; personal and solidary liability; reimbursement. The
Court upholds the COAs ruling that petitioner is personally and solidarily liable for the
overpricing in the computers purchased by CDA. The directive for the payment of the amount of
disallowance finally determined by the COA did not change the nature of the obligation as
solidary because the demand thus made upon petitioner did not foreclose his right as solidary
debtor to proceed against his co-debtors/obligors, in this case the members of the PBAC charged
under Notice of Disallowance No. 93-0016-101, for their share in the total amount of
disallowance. Petitioner is therefore liable to restitute the P881,819.00 to the Government
without prejudice, however, to his right to recover it from persons who were solidarily liable
with him. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838,
February 7, 2012.
Public officials; holdover. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the
period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. The Supreme Court has
already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by
the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the
Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity.
Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit
by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local
officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has, in the past, recognized the validity of
holdover provisions in various laws. One significant difference between the present case and
these past cases is that while these past cases all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the
present case refers to local elective officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor,
and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year
term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Even assuming that a holdover is
constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article
VII of RA No. 9054),

the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no
express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D.
Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc.,
et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B.
Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis Barok Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271,
February 28, 2012.
Signing bonus; legality. There is no dispute that the grant of a signing bonus had been previously
disallowed by the express mandate of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Arroyo). On July 22, 2002, this Court declared in SSS v. COA that Social Services Commissions
authority to fix the compensation of its employees under its charter, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
1161 as amended, is subject to the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, which provides for the
consolidation of allowances and compensation in the prescribed standardized salary rates. While
there are exceptions provided under Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. No. 6758 in observance of the
policy on non-diminution of pay, the signing bonus is not one of the benefits contemplated. This
Court also ruled that the signing bonus is not a truly reasonable compensation since conduct of
peaceful collective negotiations should not come with a price tag. hat MIAAs Board of
Directors did not make a mistake and their real intention was to reward the successful conclusion
of collective negotiations by some pecuniary means is belied by simultaneous approval of the
grant and the CNA between SMPP and MIAA betrays their real intention. Moreover, prior to the
issuance of AOM No. JPA 03-35 declaring the subject benefit illegal, there was no effort on the
part of its Board of Directors to rectify the alleged mistake in nomenclature. It was only after
then Corporate Auditor Manalo and Director Nacion called MIAAs attention as to the illegality
of a signing bonus that MIAA alleged that the subject benefit is a CNA Incentive. Easily, such is
a mere afterthought.Manila International Airport Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
194710, February 14, 2012.
Signing bonus; return of illegal bonus. Good faith is anchored on an honest belief that one is
legally entitled to the benefit. In this case, the MIAA employees who had no participation in the
approval and release of the disallowed benefit accepted the same on the assumption that
Resolution No. 2003-067 was issued in the valid exercise of the power vested in the Board of
Directors under the MIAA charter. As they were not privy as to reason and motivation of the
Board of Directors, they can properly rely on the presumption that the former acted regularly in
the performance of their official duties in accepting the subject benefit. Furthermore, their
acceptance of the disallowed grant, in the absence of any competent proof of bad faith on their
part, will not suffice to render liable for a refund. The same is not true as far as the Board of
Directors. Their authority under Section 8 of the MIAA charter is not absolute as their exercise
thereof is subject to existing laws, rules and regulations and they cannot deny knowledge
of SSS v. COA and the various issuances of the Executive Department prohibiting the grant of the
signing bonus. In fact, they are duty-bound to understand and know the law that they are tasked
to implement and their unexplained failure to do so barred them from claiming that they were
acting in good faith in the performance of their duty. The presumptions of good faith or
regular performance of official duty are disputable and may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence. Manila International Airport Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
194710, February 14, 2012.