Quimiguing v Icao

Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by parents, sued Felix Icao. The two were neighbors in Dapitan City
where they had close and confidential relations. Icao, being a married man had carnal
intercourse with quimiguing several times by force or intimidation without her consent. Carmen
became pregnant despite the drugs supplied by Felix. This in effect forced Carmen to stop
studying. She is now claiming for support at P120.00 per month. Icao moved to dismiss the
petition for lack of cause of action. He claims that Carmen did not allege that the child had been
born. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Carmen they had a baby girl born. She now tries to
allege that the baby was born but the court said that there can no longer be any amendments to
the original complaint.
Issue: Can Carmen Quimiguing demand support from Felix Icao?
Held:
Yes, the court held that the conceived child although unborn is given by law a provisional
personality for all purposes favorable to it provided by Art. 40 of the Civil Code. Carmen may
demand support from the progenitors of the baby. Under Art. 742 the unborn child may also
receive donations. The Supreme Court said that the lower courts theory of Art. 291 violates Art.
40. Carmen may also claim damages under Art. 21. This is supported by Art. 2219. Independent
of the support of the child, she may claim for damages for the forced carnal knowledge done
which is under the original terms of complaint.

Geluz v CA
Facts: Nita Villanueva knew Antonio Geluz in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she
became pregnant before she and Oscar Lazo, the petitioner, was married. Acting on the advice of
the aunt and wanted to conceal it, she had an abortion through Geluz. After the marriage she
was again pregnant but was now employed in COMELEC and the pregnancy proved to be an
inconvenience to her so she decided to have an abortion again through Geluz. In less than two
years she was again pregnant and on February 21, 1955 along with her sister and her daughter
had an abortion once again. Lazo was in Cagayan during this time, campaigning and did not know
nor gave consent to the abortion. Lazo filed an action for the abortion of the third baby. The trial
court gave an award of P3,000 upon the provision of Art 2206.
Issue: Did the trial court err in awarding Lazo under the provision of Art. 2206?
Held: Yes, the filing of the award does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed
with personality, it being incapable of having rights and obligations. Art. 40 expressly limits such
provisional personality. Damages that can be claimed by parents are those inflicted directly upon
them which are moral damages on account of the distress and anguish attendant to its loss and
the disappointment of their parental expectations. However, the court did not award moral
damages to Lazo because of the indifference to the previous abortions. He took no steps to
investigate and secure the punishment of Geluz. Instead of filing for an administrative or criminal
case he rather took the opportunity and filed a civil case to get a large amount of money.


Republic Act No. 6809 December 13, 1989
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN
YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO
HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless
otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and
property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of
civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or
responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one
years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants,
insurance policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions favorable
to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 13, 1989

De Jesus v. Syquia
Facts: Cesar Syquia, 23, scion to a prominent family in manila, had a brother-in-law who owns a
barber shop in tondo where he was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. This is where he
met Antonia Loanco, 20, who works as a cashier in the said barber shop. The two had an
amorous relationship which resulted to a child which was born on June 17, 1931. Syquia
constantly visited the home of Antonia in the early months of the pregnancy. Syguia even wrote
and placed in her hands a note directed to the Rev. Father claiming that the baby is his and
would like his name to be given to the baby. He also occasionally writes to Antonia showing
paternal interest in the situation that had developed with her and cautioned her to keep in good
condition in order that Junior might be strong. Upon the delivery of the baby he employed his
friend, Dr. Talavera to attend to the baby. When she left the hospital, Syquia took her with her
mother and the baby to a house at camarines street and lived there for almost a year. All the
expenses were charged to Syquia. In time, Syquias ardor abated and when Antonia showed signs
of her second pregnancy the defendant decamped and now married to another woman. The
court also noted that during the christening of the child, where the Cesar did all the preparation
caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of the name Cesar Syquia Jr.
Issue:
1) Does the note to the Padre, in connection to the letters to Antonia proves an
acknowledgement of paternity?
2) Is the acknowledgement in subsection 1 of Art 135 must be made in a single?
Held:
1) Yes, even though the name given is Ismal Loanco and not Cesar Syquia Jr. its identity as the
child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear.
2) No, there is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed in one. The
provision only states that the writing has to be indubitable. The law fixes no period during which
a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child. Period was enough
to convince the fathers resolution to concede the status. Breach of promise to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advance for such
promise.

Dumlao v. Quality Plastics
Facts:
On Feb 28, 1962, the court of first instance of Pangasinan rendered a judgment ordering
defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana
Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics, inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest
from November 1958. The lower court said that incase the defendants failed to pay the said
amount before the decision is final, Quality Plastic Products is authorized to foreclose the bond
which consists of the obligations and certain Real properties which were used as security for the
undertaking. When the defendants failed to pay the amount after the decision has become final
the lower court ordered the foreclosure of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the
land of Pedro Oria. The land was levied and sold which was confirmed by the lower court on
November 20,1962. However, unknown to Quality Plastic Products that Pedro Oria died on April
23, 1959 long before the action was filed nor were they aware that the same property was
pending in the same tayug court for the testate estate of pedro oria. The heirs of Oria, Dionisio,
Fausta, Amado, and Benjamin Dumlao, and everyone who was in the probated will of Oria sued
Quality Plastic Products for the annulment of the judgement against oria and the execution
against his land on the ground that there was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
Oria. Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator of Orias testate estate. Quality
Plastics now allege that Orias heirs were aware of the suit and that they were estopped to
question the courts jurisdiction over Oria. After the hearing in the lower court it held that it had
acquired jurisdiction over soliven and the other defendants by reason of their voluntary
appearance. Since they had acquired jurisdiction over the person of oria and that the judgement
was valid as to him as well.
Issue: Is the judgment of the lower court valid against the deceased pedro oria?
Held:
No, the court held that since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgement against him is
a patent nullity. As far as Oria is concerned the judgement against him is void for lack of
jurisdiction over the person. He could not have been validly served with summons since he had
no more civil personality. His juridical capacity was lost through death. The lower court erred in
ruling that since solivens counsel also appeared as Orias counsel there was now voluntary
appearance. Solivens counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel
has no application. Judgment in civil case no. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of
jurisdiction.

Frivaldo v. Comelec
Facts:
Juan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988
and assumed office in due time. Salvador Estuye filed a petition with COMELEC for the
annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino Citizen because he was
naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. Frivaldo in his answer admitted that he was
naturalized in the United States but contends that he only did so to protect himself against
President Marcos thus he pleaded for a special and affirmative defense. He says that he was
merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the
Martial law Dictators agent abroad. He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the
EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his
title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed
within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not
sue under the said section. Frivaldo subsequently moved for a preliminary hearing on his
affirmative defenses but COMELEC set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for
reconsideration was denied. He now seeks a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask the the
said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. A temporary order was issued against the hearing on the merits by COMELEC and
required comments from respondents. Private respondents reiterate that Frivaldo was a
naturalized American citizen who had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of election
thus was not qualified to run for governor. They also assert that the petition was not a quo
warranto. Their purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor his candidacy being
null and void ab initio. Had it been a quo warranto they could not have filed it within ten days
because they received the proof on September 1988. Also, although the league may not be a
proper party, Estuye is suing in his personal capacity. SG supports the contention that frivaldo
was not a Filipino citizen thus he is disqualified from public office. His election could not cure this
defect. Frivaldo contends that his naturalization as an American was not impressed with
voluntariness and could not repatriate himself because the special committee on naturalization
had not yet been organized. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born
citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation and that his active participation in the 1987
congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US thus
restoring his Philippine citizenship.
Issue: Is Juan G. Frivaldo a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18,
1988 as provincial governor of Sorsogon?
Held:
No, the court held that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and there disqualified from
serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Under Article XI, section 9, of the constitution
all public officials and employees owe the state and the constitution Allegiance at all times and
the specific requirement in section 42 of the LGC that a candidate for local elective office must be
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the OEC provides that a qualified voter must be a citizen of the
Philippines as provided by Article V, section 1 of the constitution. Frivaldos contention that he
was forced to be naturalized as a US citizen by means of protection from the prosecution of the
Marcos government through his agents in the US cannot be acceptable and must be rejected
outright. Many Filipinos in the US similarly situated as Frivaldo, some even at higher risk, did not
find it necessary to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. The case of Nottebohm could not
be applied to this case because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states
as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the US is not
actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. If petitioner really wanted to disavow his American
citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship the petitioner should have done so through
naturalization or by repatriation. Since neither was invoked and claims he reacquired citizenship
by participating in the elections in this country which forfeits his American citizenship under US
laws is untenable because such laws do not concern us here. It does not automatically restore his
citizenship. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of the appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonally
changed.