Sei sulla pagina 1di 3

Level crossings risk reduction in CP5

Level crossings risk reduction


in CP5
Supporting document










Document Ref: SBPT229 Version 1.0
Network Rail 1
Level crossings risk reduction in CP5
We will continue to reduce the safety risks in CP5
The safety of our workforce, passengers and the public is of paramount importance. We also believe that a safer railway is also a better
performing railway. As a responsible business, we will not trade-off safety with other operational issues and will deliver our safety strategy to
ensure everyone goes home safe every day.

Level crossing contribution to total system risk from SRM
Level crossings account for an estimated 9 per cent of the total rail system safety risk.
Over 95 per cent of this risk is derived from user behaviour.
The development of technology and risk controls has increased expectations of safety by the
public, customers and stakeholders. Our safety strategy sets an ambitious agenda involving
elimination and engineering solutions where possible. So we have to prioritise requirements to
mitigate risk at level crossings.
Safety risk model Road Rail interface contribution to total system risk at start of CP4


Train accident risk
Overall, train accident risk has fallen by two-thirds during the last ten years, driven by a large
reduction in the risk from Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs) owing to TPWS installation.
Currently the largest risk from the Precursor Indicator Model is public behaviour at level
crossings. The lower coloured section in the graph below shows the risk from road-rail
interface activities. This is dominated by the risk from public behaviour at level crossings, but it
also includes small contributions from failures, irregular working and non-rail vehicles on the
line at other locations that lead to derailments. Those other precursors are more important in
passenger risk.


Level crossings risk reduction in CP5
Level crossings risk
Collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings are classified as train accidents.
Collisions at level crossings account for around 42 per cent of all of the Precursor Indicator
Models train accident risk to passengers, members of the public and workers.
The graph illustrates the lack of any significant reduction in level crossing risk over the previous
eleven years to 2009 with regard to train accident risk (and whole system risk). This has meant
that the proportion of train accident risk attributable to level crossings has grown substantially.
As a result of this a policy decision was taken to adopt a more interventionist approach in order
to reduce risks at level crossing in CP4 and CP5.
Progress to date
We commenced our first tranche of work to reduce risks at level crossings in 2010. Since then
the following has been achieved:
19.6 per cent reduction in risk to date
600 crossings closed saving 158 million in whole life operational costs
Lowest ever recorded level of train accident risk from level crossings
50 per cent reduction in the number of fatalities
2012 is the first year with no regulatory enforcement notices for level crossings
Up to 50 per cent reduction in the cost of new innovation, saving 20 million on footbridges
We continue to learn from the work we have already completed to identify the most beneficial
interventions and priorities for CP5. This prioritisation takes account of the value of the safety
risk reduction, broader business risk, the cost benefit analysis and expert judgement.
Ring fenced funding in the HLOSs
Ring-fenced funding of 67 million was specifically provided in the HLOS for England and
Wales to reduce the risk of accidents at levels crossings. In Scotland ring fenced funding of
10 million was included in the HLOS specifically for the closure of level crossings. We believe,
however, that closure will not always give the biggest safety benefit and propose that the
funding in Scotland also be used to reduce the risk of accidents as in England and Wales.


We will implement the five point process, as agreed with the ORR, to arrive at a risk-based
enhancement programme. We believe this will give the optimum level of risk reduction for the
resource provided and which may include actions such as:
The closure of high risk level crossings
The introduction of red light safety equipment
The introduction of new technology to replace whistleboards
The introduction of new equipment to alert users to the proximity of a train
The case for additional investment
We will continue to explore the opportunities to invest to reduce risks at level crossings on a
self-financing basis and also promote the business case for additional funding in this area.
We continue to examine the cost and benefits of a wider programme of works including those
crossings that have greater risks and are more difficult to close. We expect to prioritise closing
user worked crossings (UWC) and footpath crossings on high speed lines and fitting miniature
warning lights (MWL) where closure is not possible.















Network Rail 2

Potrebbero piacerti anche