Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No.

202242, July 17, 2012

Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC
as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the
JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of
Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests
the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative
each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that
petitioner has no real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current
composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review
have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the
1987 Constitution.
Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present,
especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in
issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official
nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition
for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the
Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the
nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all
over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very
process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The
claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose,
that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408
FACTS: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51 % of the issued
and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding, only two bidders
participated. Petitioner Manila Prince, a Filipino Corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC at P41.58 per share and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian Firm, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder,
petitioner matches the bid price of P44.00 per share by Renong Berhad. Subsequently, petitioner
sent a manager's check as bid security to match the bid of Renong Berhad which respondent
GSIS refuse to accept. Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid
and that the sale may be consummated which Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be preferred after it has match the bid offered of
Malaysian firm under Section 10, second paragraph of Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration
of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates. Since the constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation,
it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Article 12, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1987
Constitution provides that "in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." It means
just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. When the Constitution speaks of "national
patrimony", it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark- a living testimonial of Philippine
Heritage. While it was restrictively an American Hotel when it first opened, it immediately
evolved to be truly Filipino. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. Respondents further argue that the Constitutional provision is addressed to the State,
not to GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of a person distinct from the government are considered "state action"
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
Without doubt, the transaction entered into by the GSIS is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command. Therefore, the GSIS is directed to accept the
matching bid of petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR
GENERAL
JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS AND ELIZABETH DIMAANO

The resulting government [from the EDSA Revolution] was a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations excep
t treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the
Philippines, assumed under international law. The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was
not operative during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipi
no people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights
found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government did not r
epudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (the PCGG), through the AFP Anti-
Graft Board (the Board), investigated reports of unexplained wealth involving Major General
Josephus Ramas (Ramas), the Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the time of
former President Ferdinand Marcos. Pursuant to said investigation, the Constabulary r
aiding team served a search and seizure warrant on the premises of Ramas alleged mistress
Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the military equipment stated in the warrant, items not included
in the warrant, particularly, communications equipment, land titles, jewelry, and several
thousands of cash in pesos and US dollars, were also seized.
In its Resolution, the AFP Board reported that (1) Dimaano could not have used the said
equipment without Ramas consent; and (2) Dimaano could not be the owner of the money
because she has no visible source of income. The Board then concluded with a recommendation
that Ramas be prosecuted for violation of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, otherwise known as the Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property. Accordingly, Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic or Petitioner) filed a Complaint again
st Ramas and Dimaano. On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint on
the grounds that (1) the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate the private respondents and (2)
the search and seizure conducted was illegal.

ISSUES: Whether or not the properties confiscated in Dimaanos house were illegally seized and
therefore inadmissible in evidence.

HELD: Thus, during the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives
and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the
authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not
have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it.
The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and
seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles confiscated. The raiding team had no legal
basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless
search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and
they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However,
we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and
seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor.
We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

Javellana vs. Executive Secretary
Facts:

The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, as amended
byResolution No. 4, calling for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments to thePhilippine
Constitution. Said Resolution was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, for theelection of
delegates of the said Convention. Hence, the 1971 Constitutional Convention beganto perform its
functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the
President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.On
November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines
issuedPresidential Decree No. 73, which is an order for setting and appropriating of funds for
aplebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution as drafted by the
1971Constitutional Convention.On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on
Elections, theTreasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said respondents or
their agentsfrom implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, on the grounds that the President
does not havethe legislative authority to call a plebiscite and the appropriation of public funds for
the purposeare lodged exclusively by the Constitution in Congress and there is no proper
submission to thepeople of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no
freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people
of thecontents thereof.On December 23, 1972, the President announced the postponement of the
plebiscite for theratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. The Court deemed it fit to
refrain, for thetime being, from deciding the aforementioned case.In the afternoon of January 12, 1973,
the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgentmotion," praying that said case be decided "as
soon as possible, preferably not later thanJanuary 15, 1973." The next day, January 13, 1973, the Court
issued a resolution requiring therespondents to comment and file an answer to the said "urgent motion" not
later than Tuesday

noon, January 16, 1973." When the case was being heard, the Secretary of Justice called onand
said that, upon instructions of the President, he is delivering a copy of Proclamation No.1102,
which had just been signed by the President earlier that morning.Proclamation No. 1102,
declares that Citizen Assemblies referendum was conducted, and thatthe result shows that more
than 95% of the members of the Citizens Assemblies are in favor of the new Constitution and
majority also answered that there was no need for a plebiscite andthat the vote of the Citizens
Assemblies should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite. The thenPresident of the Philippines,
Marcos, hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposedby the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of the
Citizens Assemblies throughout the Philippines, and hasthereby come into effect.

The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed case against the Executive Secretary and
theSecretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and
their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution
notfound in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935.Javellana alleged that the
President had announced "the immediate implementation of the NewConstitution, thru his
Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "thatthe President,
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is withoutauthority to create the
Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve theproposed Constitution ...";
"that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by theFilipino people of the
proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposedConstitution was not a
free election, hence null and void."

Issue:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 involves a justiciable
or political question.
2. Whether or not the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified to said Art. XV of
the1935 Constitution.

3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution aforementioned been approved by a majority of
thepeople in Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held throughout the Philippines.
4. Whether or not the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution.
5. Whether or not the parties are entitled to any relief.

Ruling:
The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when thecrucial
question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court(Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss thepetition.
Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant therelief being
sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.

First Issue
On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro,Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of
thevalidity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question.
JusticesMakalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in
their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch asit is claimed
there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not
there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Courtshould keep hands-off
out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court maydetermine from both factual
and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitutionbeen complied with."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Courthold that the issue is
political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."

Second Issue
On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,Fernando,
Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that theConstitution proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified inaccordance with Article XV,
section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an
election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in onlyby qualified and duly
registered voters.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special
national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice
President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create
the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of
the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular
elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing)
the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is
proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his
proclamation.

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional
provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the
Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any
suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have
not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and
honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding
of the elections

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are
less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining
order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the
questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents
office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled
election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the
way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a
new mandate or to elect a new president.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she
and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country;

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

In Re: Saturnino Bermudez (G.R. No. 76180 )
I mmunity from Suits
Facts:
This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by the petitioner Bermudez seeking for the
clarification of Sec. 5, Art. 18 of the proposed 1986 Constitution, as quoted:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall
be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Petitioner sought the aid of the Court to determine as to whom between the incumbent
Pres. Aquino and VP Laurel and elected Pres. Marcos and VP Tolentino the said provision refers
to.
Issue: Whether the Court should entertain the petition for declaratory relief?
Held:
It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
relief.(Note: ROC provides that the jurisdiction for petitions for declaratory relief is with the
RTC )
More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of
the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure.
It being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the
Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-
President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their
term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of election.

In Re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno

Facts:
Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter
dated Nov. 14, 1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking
in the CA. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of
the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was reorganized
and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "An
Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." He was
then appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of
Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization
of the entire government including the judiciary. A Screening Committee was created. When
Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an exercise of her legislative power, the
Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the
NEW CA. However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He
alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued
order of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's request. A motion for
consideration was later filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of
ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he
had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.

Issue:
Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that
would negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33.

Held:
The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was
created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of
Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow
of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it
as as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence. A government as a result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it
is already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany,
Japan, and others. In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct
exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of
Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

De Leon vs Esguerra 153 scra 602
Facts:
Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen of barangay
dolores, taytay, rizal. On february 9, 1987, de leon received memo antedated december 1, 1986
signed by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, february 8, 1987, designating
Florentino Magno, as new captain by authority of minister of local government and similar
memo signed february 8, 1987, designated new councilmen.

Issue:
Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Held:
No, memoranda has no legal effect.
1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So, February 8,
1987 and not December 1, 1986.

2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer
in efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article
XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were suspended.

3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect.
Petitioners now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has
been fixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with constitution.
Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest
Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had
the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their
petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art
7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form
of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA
6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to
the Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of
the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders
the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision,
it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before
complying with RA 6735

Defensor Santiago vs. Comelec
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a
Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples
Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of
said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of
general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of
the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time
and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the
conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid
exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law
because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is
adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .
HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means
that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No.
6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution are declared void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the
matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC,
sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of
such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election
Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature
stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions
or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap
of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on
12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

Aquino vs. Enrile
FACTS: Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and
ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any
charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce
Enrile. Enriles answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is
valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial
Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the
case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is
a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the
Presidents order.