Mahesh Govindji Trivedi

MANU/GJ/0773/2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

First Appeal No. 2453 of 2012 with Civil Application No. 5374 of 2013 in First Appeal No. 2453 of
2012 with Civil Application No. 7799 of 2013 in First Appeal No. 2453 of 2012
Decided On: 05.12.2013
Appellants: Mahesh Govindji Trivedi
Vs.
Respondent: Legal Heirs of Bhagvanji Govindji Trivedi & 5 Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.D. Kothari, J.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Mr. S.N. Shelat, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Shivang M. Shah
and Ms. Dhara M. Shah, Advocates
For Respondents/Defendant: Mr. B.N. Limbachia, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2, Mr.
Mahendra U. Vora, Advocate for Respondent No. 1.1.1-1.1.2, 1.2, Mr. M.B. Gandhi with Mr.
Chinmay Gandhi, Advocate for the Respondent No. 3-6 and Rule Served for the Respondents No.
1.1.1-1.1.2, 1.2, 2
Subject: Property
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Bombay Rents, Hotel And Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 [repealed Act] - Section 12(1);
Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act 1948 - Section 32G, Bombay Tenancy And
Agricultural Lands Act 1948 - Section 32P; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 9;
Constitution Of India - Article 227; Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Section 25; Indian Contract
Act, 1872 - Section 201, Indian Contract Act, 1872 - Section 201, Indian Contract Act, 1872 -
Section 202, Indian Contract Act, 1872 - Section 203, Indian Contract Act, 1872 - Section 204,
Indian Contract Act, 1872 - Section 202, Indian Contract Act, 1872 - Section 204; Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 111(g)(2), Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 73; Indian Penal
Code (45 Of 1860) (IPC) - Section 302; Indian Penal Code (45 Of 1860) (IPC) - Section 34;
Indian Penal Code (45 Of 1860) (IPC) - Section 380; Indian Penal Code (45 Of 1860) (IPC) -
Section 392; Indian Penal Code (45 Of 1860) (IPC) - Section 394; Indian Penal Code (45 Of
1860) (IPC) - Section 397; Indian Penal Code (45 Of 1860) (IPC) - Section 457; Indian
Succession Act, 1925 - Section 116, Indian Succession Act, 1925 - Section 213; Punjab
Municipal Act, 1999 - Section 84, Punjab Municipal Act, 1999 - Section 86; Urban Land (ceiling
And Regulation) Act, 1976 [repealed] - Section 21
Citing Reference:

13

3

1

Case Note:
Property - Deed of power of attorney - Ownership of property - Trial Court dismissed
Plaintiff's suit of possession of suit property on ground that Deed of power of attorney
was irrevocable and agreement to sell had taken place in presence of deceased with
Defendant No.2 and thus Defendant No.2 was legal owner of suit property - Hence,
Discussed

Distinguished

Mentioned

2014-07-08 (Page 1 of 16 ) www.manupatra.com sanjay jhanwar
this Appeal - Whether finding of trial Court was justified - Held, it would appear that
donor had executed power of attorney in favour of donee/Defendant no.1 mainly
because donor herself would not remain present for execution of transaction in
respect of her property - In deed, donor had not even remotely expressed intention to
create or transfer any interest in favour of donee - In absence of creation or transfer
of interest in property, it would not be said that donor intended to execute irrevocable
power of attorney - Neither Defendant No.1 nor other brother had applied for probate
in respect of former Will, while probate Application of Plaintiff in respect of later Will
was pending before High Court - Further still, execution of agreement to sell in respect
of suit property as early as on 29th November, 1997 and execution of sale deed as late
as on 18th April, 2007 was not at all explain in evidence by Defendant No.1 - In fact,
Defendant No.1 had not led any evidence before trial Court - In this circumstances of
case, Exh.97 was not irrevocable power of attorney and which was
unenforceable/defective power of attorney deed - Thus no right, title or interest was
passed in favour of Defendant No.2 and consequently nor in favour of Defendant Nos.3
to 6 - Therefore findings of trial Court except finding that suit was bad for not praying
relief of possession, were not only bad in law and illegal, but almost all of them were
perverse - Hence decree passed by trial Court was set aside - Appeal allowed.
Ratio Decidendi:
"I f interest in favour of donee is created in deed of power of attorney, then such deed
becomes irrevocable and even death of donor will have no vitiating effect of deed."
JUDGMENT
R.D. Kothari, J.
1. This is plaintiff's appeal. In this appeal, following main points arise for consideration:--
(a) What makes the deed of power of attorney an irrevocable deed?
(b) Whether the suit filed by legatee, in absence of probate or letters of
administration, as the case may be, is maintainable or not?
(c) Scope of section 213 of the Indian Succession Act.
(d) Is the case on hand falls under section 204 of the Indian Contract Act?
(e) Is it possible to accept as general proposition that stranger to contract cannot
sue? Secondly, in the facts of the present case, is it possible to say that since the
original owner has not challenged the transaction, person who is deriving interest
from the original owner, cannot challenge the same.
1.1 The appeal also raises a question, when the Court can compare the signature under section
73 of the Evidence Act?
2. The facts of the case are fairly simple. The relevant facts are thus:--
2.1 One Ramalaxmiben owned one property at village Mandvi, District : Kutch. It is an
agricultural land bearing survey No. 154. It is a suit land admeasuring 13 acres-24 gunthas. The
said suit property came to be sold by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2 by executing a
registered sale deed dated 18.4.2 007. That had led the plaintiff to institute Special Civil Suit No.
86/2007, challenging the legality of said sale deed and dismissal of said suit has given rise to the
present appeal.
2.2 The defendant No. 1 had executed sale deed in favour of defendant No. 2 on the strength of
power of attorney dated 28.8.1997 said to have been executed by said Ramalaxmiben in favour
of defendant No. 1. Ramalaxmiben died on 3.1.2004. The agreement to sell of the suit property
said to have been executed on 2 9.7.1997. Pending Special Civil Suit No. 86/2007, defendant
No. 2 transferred the suit property in favour of defendant Nos. 3 to 6. Hence, defendant Nos. 3
to 6 came to be joined as party-defendants. The said second sale deed is dated 29.3.2008. It is
the case of the plaintiff that deceased Ramalaxmiben has executed her last Will in favour of the
plaintiff on 31.8.2001. The plaintiff came to know in August 2007 that the suit transaction has
taken place and hence the plaintiff filed the above referred Special Civil Suit. It is the case of the
defendant that the deceased had executed a Will on 25.7.1996 in favour of defendant No. 1 and
other brothers including the plaintiff. The plaintiff had filed an application for obtaining probate
before the Court at Bombay on 22.9.2004. The said application is for obtaining Probate of Will
said to have been executed by the deceased on 31.8.2001 in favour of plaintiff. The said
application for probate was pending at the time of hearing of this appeal.
2.3 Special Civil Suit No. 86/2007 was mainly contested by defendant No. 2-purchaser.
Defendant No. 2 filed Written Statement at Exh.35. Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 filed their Written
Statement Exh.47 supporting the say of the defendant No. 2. Defendant denies all the assertions
made by the plaintiff. Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 claim that they are bona fide purchasers of the
property.
2.4 The evidence of the plaintiff is recorded at Exh.70. The plaintiff has examined two other
witnesses, namely, Narendrabhai Joshi (at Exh.118) and Jitendra Ratilal (at Exh.129). Former is
the witness to the Will executed in favour of the plaintiff, whereas the latter is employee of
newspaper. The evidence of defendant No. 2 is recorded at Exh.164 and the evidence of
defendant No. 5 is recorded at Exh.168. The parties have filed relevant documentary evidence in
support of their respective case.
3. Upon hearing the learned advocates for the parties and considering the material on record,
the learned trial Court was pleased to dismiss Special Civil Suit No. 86/2007 by judgment and
order dated 86/2007. The findings of the learned trial Court broadly stated are as under:--
(a) that, the defendant No. 1 has not led any evidence. Pending the suit, defendant
No. 1 died and heirs and legal representatives of defendant No. 1 are joined as
party.
(b) that, the plaintiff has not proved that he owns the suit property on the basis of
the Will. The issue of validity of the Will is pending before the Bombay High Court.
Since the original Will is not before the trial Court and it is before the Bombay High
Court, it is not for this Court, i.e. learned trial Court, to decide the validity of the said
Will.
(c) that, the plaintiff otherwise also cannot be declared as owner of the property
because the plaintiff happens to be the accused in the murder case. It is possible to
relate the suit property with the murder case. Section 25 of the Hindu Succession
Act disqualifies the murderer. The intention of Ramalaxmiben cannot be to override
Section 25.
(d) The say of the plaintiff that the deceased cancelled the power of attorney by
issuing a public notice in the newspaper in 1996 is not possible to believe because
deed of power of attorney is of 1997.
(e) Plaintiff cannot be declared as owner of the suit property also because
transaction has taken place during the life time of Ramalaxmiben. That, after
payment of earnest money, remaining amount of consideration is paid within short-
time.
(f) Plaintiff has failed to prove his case of cancelling the sale deed and, therefore, the
deed executed in favour of defendant No. 2 should be considered to be legal.
Therefore, defendant No. 2 would be the bona fide purchase of the property for
value.
(g) Irrevocable power of attorney deed is executed in 1997. As per the say of
defendant No. 2, earnest money is received by defendant No. 1 in presence of
deceased Ramalaxmiben. This assertion is not challenged by the plaintiff in cross-
examination of defendant No. 2. This evidence has gone unchallenged.
(h) "Reverse Presumption" is possible to draw, whereby plaintiff's failure to prove by
documentary evidence, defendant's lack of interest would make way to presume that
agreement to sale and sale-deed executed in favour of defendant No. 2, are for
consideration and they are valid.
(i) That, Ramalaxmiben wanted to sell the suit land. Defendant No. 1 had informed
defendant No. 2 about this and as defendant No. 2 had agreed, transaction had
taken place in presence of Ramalaxmiben and it was finalized as per her wish. In
pursuance of that, defendant No. 1 had executed the agreement to sell.
(j) As deed of power of attorney is executed before the competent authority and
consideration is paid as per the agreement to sell and thereafter possession of suit
property was handed over. Therefore, deed of power of attorney can be considered
to be "coupled with interest and irrevocable".
(k) Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 are bona fide purchasers of the suit property, as
defendant No. 2 clearly says in his evidence that he has not said to defendant Nos. 3
to 6 about pendency of litigation at the time of selling of the suit property. On the
other hand, defendant Nos. 3 to 6 had verified the entries in the revenue record. In
the revenuer record, property was in the name of defendant No. 2. The plaintiff has
unsuccessfully challenged the revenue entries. That, defendant Nos. 3 to 6 are bona
fide purchasers also because they have purchased the suit property by paying
consideration.
(l) No contempt by defendant No. 2, as it is clear say of defendant No. 2 in his
evidence that he was not informed by his advocate about tendering of oral
undertaking as to not to enter into any transaction qua suit property.
(m) Deed of power of attorney is irrevocable, as agreement to sell has taken place in
presence of and during the life time of deceased Ramalaxmiben and thereby interest
has passed on. Hence, power of attorney deed has become irrevocable. That, it is
irrevocable is also stated in the deed itself.
(n) Deed of power of attorney is irrevocable and document executed on the basis of
such deed is valid.
(o) It clearly appears that defendant No. 2 is bona fide purchase and, therefore, it is
proved that he is a full legal owner of the suit property. Legal owner, who is in
possession of property, is free to use and transfer his property. Deed in favour of
defendant Nos. 3 to 6 executed thereafter is therefore, legal.
(p) The plaintiff's suit is not maintainable, as the plaintiff has not prayed for
possession of the suit property.
(q) The Court says that it has studied the case laws cited by the plaintiff and most of
the case laws are on section 202 of the Contract Act. Since the plaintiff has not
obtained Probate or Letters of Administration, the Court says that the case laws do
not support the plaintiff. Further, the facts of the cases cited by the plaintiff were
different, therefore, they do not help the plaintiff. On the other hand, the case-laws
cited by the defendant,-says the Court,- are mainly on section 213 of the Indian
Succession Act and on irrevocable power of attorney. In my discussion,- it says,- in
the judgment I have taken support of this case-laws, as they support the case of the
defendant.
4. It may be stated that before this Court, the appellant sought permission to amend the plaint
by filing Civil Application No. 8021/2013 in First Appeal No. 2453/2012. By way of filing the said
civil application, the appellant-plaintiff had sought permission to add a prayer of possession. The
said civil application was opposed by the respondent-defendant and after hearing the learned
advocates for the parties, the said civil application was allowed by this Court and the appellant-
plaintiff was permitted to amend the plaint on a condition of payment of costs to the respondent-
defendant. Accordingly, the appellant-plaintiff has amended the plaint.
5. Heard learned Senior Advocate Shri S.N. Shelat for the appellant and learned advocate Shri
M.B. Gandhi for the respondents-defendants.
6. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Shelat, after briefly referring the facts of the case, has drawn
attention of the Court to the relevant provisions of Sections 201 to 204 of the Indian Contract
Act. It was submitted that merely by labelling the deed as "irrevocable power of attorney", it
does not become so and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the deed of power
of attorney was revocable. As the deed of power of attorney was not irrevocable, the sale deed
executed by the defendant on the strength of such power of attorney stands vitiated and,
therefore, it is null and void. It was submitted that the learned trial Court has seriously erred in
dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The learned Senior Advocate Shri Shelat has drawn attention of
the Court to the relevant case laws to which reference may be made hereinafter.
7. On the other hand, learned advocate Shri Gandhi has supported the' judgment under appeal.
Shri Gandhi, in view of the submissions advanced by him at the time of hearing, has submitted
that the plaintiff has no right to file suit. In addition to it and in the alternative, it was submitted
that the suit was not maintainable. The principal submissions of learned advocate Shri Gandhi
are as under:--
(a) that, the plaintiff has no right to file the suit because the plaintiff claims right
under the Will and that such a right can be effective and meaningful only when the
plaintiff obtains probate or letter of administration, as the case may be. That, until
the probate is granted by the competent Court, such a right would be in the area of
contingent right or a right in the nature of inchoate right and that being so, no
person can base his or her claim on the basis of such a nature of right.
(b) that, in view of section 213 of the Indian Succession Act read with Section 9 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, plaintiff's suit is barred.
(c) that, the plaintiff is not party to the contract. The agreements that are under
challenge are executed by the defendants inter se. A person, who is not a party to
the contract and who is a stranger to the contract, cannot bring the action
challenging the contract.
(d) that, the original owner of the property has not challenged the transaction during
her life time. So, the person deriving right of interest from the original owner cannot
challenge the transaction.
(e) that, relying on Section 204 of the Contract Act, it was urged that as the agent
has partly exercised authority, now it cannot be revoked.
(f) that, the first Will executed is a registered Will and the second Will on which the
plaintiff places reliance is not a registered Will. Therefore, the former should be
preferred to the latter. Further, in view of the ratio laid down in Minaxiben
Shashikantbhai Patel v. Dist. Collector, 2007(1) GLR 277, in respect of former Will,
no probate is required to be obtained. That, being so, a person's right under the first
Will will be crystallized and ripened on execution of Will itself. Further, still, under
the former Will, all the four brothers, including the plaintiff herein, have acquired
right and interest over the suit property. In absence of challenge by the other
brothers to the suit transaction read with receiving of full consideration and handing
over of possession of the property, plaintiff's challenge to the suit transaction ought
not to be accepted.
(g) Relying on Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, a submission was made to
compare the signatures appearing on page 17 versus page 38 of the paper-book and
also page 19 versus page 38 of the paper-book. In this regard, the learned counsel
has urged to read page 36 of the paper-book with Exh.117. It was submitted that
dissimilarity in the signatures would be apparent.
(h) that, at the time of execution of the alleged second Will, Ramalaxmiben was
undergoing treatment and she was hospitalized at Bombay. Hence, execution of
second Will is unreliable. It was also submitted that the fact that prayer for
possession claimed only at the appellate stage ought to be considered while
considering the plaintiff's claim on merits. The submission in this regard is two fold;
firstly, as otherwise the plaintiff has no right or interest in the property, prayer for
possession cannot improve, in any way, the case of the plaintiff, and secondly, relief
of possession is in the nature of discretionary relief and in the circumstances of the
present case, when the right and interest is transferred in favour of a third party,
prayer for decree of possession ought not to be passed on at this belated stage.
8. In order to appreciate the challenge to the suit transaction and the above referred to
submissions made by the learned advocate for the respondent, brief reference to the other
relevant facts as emerges from the record may be made:--
(1) It is the say of the plaintiff-appellant that notwithstanding the alleged former Will
in favour of defendant No. 1 and other brothers, defendant No. 1 has just within 13
days of the death of Ramalaxmiben filed civil suit before the Civil Court at Mandvi
claiming share in the property. That suit was transferred to the Court which has tried
the present suit, i.e. Special Civil Suit No. 86/2007. The said suit is said to be
pending.
(2) It is not in dispute that defendant No. 2- purchaser of the property is none-else,
but the father of junior advocate Mr. Fufal, who is said to be working with advocate
Mr. A.J. Thakker, who is advocate for defendant No. 2.
(3) Defendant No. 5 in his evidence admits that he along with defendant No. 2 has
purchased many properties. He further says that Mr. A.J. Thakker is their advocate
in many cases. He denies the suggestion put to him that they used to purchase
disputed properties. He also denies the suggestion that more than couple of
litigations of their disputed properties are pending.
(4) One Ravishanker is husband of deceased Ramalaxmiben. Ravishanker had two
wives, namely, (i) Labhkuvarben and (ii) Ramalaxmiben. Labhkuvarben was
murdered for which the present appellant-plaintiff along with others were
prosecuted. In fact, Sessions Court had convicted the present appellant-plaintiff. This
appears to have weighed to some extent with the trial Court, as the trial Court has
observed that under the Hindu Succession Act, a person, who has committed
murder, cannot inherit or acquire property. The appellant has produced a copy of the
judgment of the appellate Court wherein the appellant-plaintiff is acquitted by the
appellate Court. By filing Civil Application No. 7799/2013 the appellant has sought
permission to place on record judgment of the appellate Court. This civil application
was heard along with the main appeal. The learned advocate for the respondents has
seriously opposed this application. Bearing in mind that the applicant seeks
permission to produce judgment delivered by the appellate Court, the objection
raised by the learned advocate for the respondents cannot be accepted. Hence, the
civil application is allowed. The judgment of the appellate Court is taken on record.
9. I may consider the case of parties on merits.
9.1 The nature of power of attorney is determinative of the fate of the case. Of course, fate of
case also depends upon the different pleas of maintainability of suit raised by the respondent.
First about deed of power of attorney. It is at Exh.97. It is dated 28.7.1997. It is said to have
been executed by deceased Ramalaxmiben in favour of Bhagwanji Govindji Trivedi (i.e.
defendant No. 1). It would appear from Exh.97 that deceased Ramalaxmiben was also a trustee
of one Trust named "Ravishanker Gangubai Charitable Trust". The said Trust owns property at
Bombay. In Exh.97, Ramalaxmiben refers the property of the said Trust and also the property
owned by her, which situate at Mandvi. In Exh.97, though there is no reference to survey No.
154, i.e. suit property, it is not in dispute between the parties that deed of power of attorney
pertains to the suit property also. In the said deed, the executant, i.e. Ramalaxmiben, has
conferred all rights upon the power of attorney holder to deal with the property including power
to purchase and dispose of the property. It is stated that it is irrevocable power of attorney.
10. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Shelat for the appellant has drawn attention of the Court to
Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act, which reads thus:--
201. Termination of agency.--An agency is terminated by the principal revoking his
authority, or by the agent renouncing the business of the agency; or by the business
of the agency being completed; or by either the principal or agent dying or becoming
of unsound mind; or by the principal being adjudicated an insolvent under the
provisions of any Act for the time being in force for the relief of insolvent debtors.
11. A bare reading of Section 201 would show that the agreement stands terminated on the
death of either the principal or the agent. In the present case, Ramalaxmiben has died on
3.1.2004 and the deed of power of attorney was executed on 28.8.1997 and on the strength of
deed of power of attorney, agreement to sell was executed on 29.11.1997. Thereafter, after the
death of Ramalaxmiben, sale deed was executed by the defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant
No. 2 on 18.4.2007. On the basis of this admitted fact, it cannot be denied that deed of power of
attorney stands revoked on the death of Ramalaxmiben, unless it becomes irrevocable under
section 202 or it is a case under section 204 of the Contract Act.
12. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Shelat has drawn attention of the Court to the case of Prahlad
and others v. Laddevi and Ors., MANU/RH/0011/2007 : AIR 2007 (Raj.) 166. The learned Single
Judge in that case has held thus:--
A power of attorney granted by the donor to the donee is operative and effective
only during the lifetime of the donor. The donor and donee stand in relationship of
'master and agent'. Since the actions done by donee are deemed to be the actions
done on the part of the donor, naturally such a power of attorney cannot be
operative or be effective after the demise of the donor. Therefore, the power of
attorney granted by Mr. Jain on 28.5.1997 came to an end on 20.10.1997 upon his
demise"
The case of Prahlad and others (supra) supports the case of the appellant.
13. But, it is the case of the defendant that deed of power of attorney is irrevocable and in the
alternative, as the authority under the deed of power of attorney is partly exercised, therefore,
in view of section 204, deed cannot be revoked.
13.1 Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 reads thus:
202. Termination of agency, where agent has an interest in subject matter:- Where
the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject matter of
the agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of an express contract, be terminated
to the prejudice of such interest.
Section 202 gives illustrations. They read thus:
(a) A gives authority to B to sell A's land, and to pay himself, out of the proceeds,
the debts due to him from A. A cannot revoke this authority, nor can it be
terminated by his insanity or death.
(b) A consigns 1000 bales of cotton to B, who has made advances to him on such
cotton, and desires B to sell the cotton, and to repay himself out of the price the
amount of his own advances. A cannot revoke this authority, nor is it terminated by
his insanity or death.
14. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Shelat has drawn attention of the Court to the case of H.H.
Maharani Shantidevi P. Gaikwad v. Savjibhai Haribhai Patel & Ors, MANU/SC/0213/2001 : AIR
2001 SC 1462. The main question arose for consideration in that case was interpretation of
some provisions of ULC Act, 1976, particularly Section 21 of the said Act. Section 21 deals with
the cases in which excess land would not be treated as excess land. An agreement was entered
into between the plaintiff--Mr. Patel and defendant No. 1 Shri Gaikwad. Under the said
agreement, the plaintiff had evolved a scheme for construction of dwelling units for the weaker
section of the society as envisaged under the Act. The said units were to be constructed on
defendant No. 1's land. The total land covered under the agreement was 707 Acres. The
defendant No. 1 had also executed a power of attorney in favour of the plaintiff. In the said
deed, the deed was referred to as irrevocable. The plaintiff had instituted a suit praying for
cancellation of the agreement entered into between the parties and also for cancellation of the
power of attorney. Construing the terms of the agreement, High Court had found that the power
conferred under the deed upon the attorney along with the interest would attract section 202 of
the Indian Contract Act. The Supreme Court disagreed with this. The holding of the Supreme
Court, so far relevant for the present discussion, is as under:--
50. We are unable to agree with the approach of the High Court and find substance
in the contention of Mr. Nariman. Clause (17) is in the nature of express stipulation
that before delivery of possession, the contract could be unilaterally terminated.
When there is no ambiguity in the clause, the question of intendment is immaterial.
The fact that the clause is couched in a negative form is of no consequence. The
intention is clear from the plain language of clause (17) of the agreement. In the
case in hand, Section 202 has no applicability. It is not a case of agency coupled
with interest. No interest can be said to have been created on account of plaintiff
being permitted to prepare the scheme and take ancillary steps. Plaintiff could not
get possession before declaration under Section 21 of the ULC Act. Mr. Dhanuka also
contended that the agreement is not determinable is clear from the conduct of
original defendant No. 1 and also what he stated in the affidavit-cum-declaration
dated 10th February, 1978 about agreement not being terminable. The contention of
learned counsel is that what original defendant No. 1 has said in the said document
is his interpreting statement which is admissible in law and this interpreting
statement and also his conduct, clearly shows that agreement was not terminable by
original defendant No. 1. Strong reliance has been placed on Godhra Electricity Co.
Ltd. & Anr. v. The State of Gujarat & Anr. [MANU/SC/0282/1974 : (1975) 2 SCR 42]
in particular to the following passage (at p. 36 of AIR)....
15. Shri Shelat has also invited attention of the Court to the case of R. Sandhyarani, W/o. T.A.M.
Mylarappa, S/o. Late Mylappa, MANU/KA/7313/2007 : 2008 (1) Kar LJ 524. In that case also, in
an appeal before the High Court, applicability of section 202 was considered. In para-9, the High
Court has held, "...From the plain reading of the above Section, it is clear that there is no such
wordings as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Therefore, as soon as the
person, who executed the power of attorney, dies the right given to the power of attorney holder
also comes to an end. Therefore, any registered sale deed executed by the respondent, without
any valid title over the property, becomes void...."
16. Shri Shelat has also drawn attention to the case of Manubhai Prabhudas Patel and others v.
Jayantilal Vadilal Shah and Ors. MANU/GJ/1491/2011 : 2012 (1) GLH 565. The defendant's
application for amendment of pleadings for incorporating the challenge pertaining to section 202
of the Contract Act came to be rejected by the trial Court. Being aggrieved by the said rejection,
defendant had filed petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. This Court while allowing the
petition has held that assignment of interest in the subject matter to the agent must be
simultaneous with creation of power in him in order to make the deed as irrevocable power of
attorney. In the said case, this Court has held as under:--
18. Thus, mere use of the word `irrevocable' in a Power of Attorney will not make
the Power of Attorney irrevocable unless the terms thereof, disclose that it created
or recognized an agency coupled with interest in favour of the Agent. For example, a
power of attorney simpliciter, which merely authorizes an Agent, to do certain acts,
in the name of or on behalf of the executant can be revoked or cancelled by the
executant at any time, in spit of the instrument stating that the Power of Attorney is
irrevocable. On the other hand, a Power of Attorney executed in favour of an Agent,
recording or recognizing an interest of the Agent/Attorney, in the property which is
the subject matter of the Agency, cannot be revoked or terminated, even if the
instrument does not state specifically that it is irrevocable, as then, it would be a
power coupled with an interest (Section 202 of the Contract, 1872).
17. Shri Shelat has also invited attention of the Court to the law laid down in Bowstead and
Reynolds on Agency, Seventeenth Edition by F.M.B. Reynolds The relevant part of the said
decision is quoted hereunder:--
Irrevocability at common law. The dominant assumption in the cases is that a grant
of authority is of its nature revocable. The mere fact that a power is declared in the
instrument granting it to be irrevocable does not make it so, even if that instrument
is a deed. Authority can be irrevocable; but this is only where the notion of agency is
employed as a legal device for a different purpose from that of normal agency, to
confer as security or other interest on the "agent"
The circumstances in which authority is thus irrevocable a common law are,
however, difficult to define. The history of this part of the law remains obscure.
Authority is only irrevocable where it accompanies a security or proprietary interest,
or is a part of it or a means of achieving it, or, apparently, where it secures an
obligation owed by principal to agent. The fact that the agent subsequently acquires
an interest in the property is irrelevant: to be irrevocable the authority must be
conferred as part of, or as, protection of the agent's interest.
18. It would appear from the above that if the interest in favour of the donee is created in the
deed of power of attorney or if such interest is passed on in favour of donee, then such deed
becomes irrevocable and even the death of donor would have no vitiating effect or consequence
on the deed. It may also be noted that creation of such interest need not necessarily be in the
deed of power of attorney itself and expression of such creation of interest or recognition of
interest by the donor may be in the form of separate deed in this regard. In the other words,
donor may have expressed his/her intention of conferring or creating interest upon the donee by
executing separate simultaneous deed. What is important and determinative is the intention of
the donor, and secondly expression of such intention should be either in the deed of power of
attorney itself or in another deed executed simultaneously. It is for the party who asserts the
deed to be irrevocable to show and establish that it is not revocable in its nature. The burden
would be heavier on the party to explain when such interest is not transferred or created
specifically in the said deed and/or when it is not simultaneously conferred or created. In the
present case, it would appear that the donor had executed power of attorney in favour of donee
(deft. No. 1) mainly because the donor herself cannot remain present for execution of
transaction in respect of her property and Trust's property. In the deed (Exh.97), the donor has
not even remotely expressed an intention to create or transfer any interest in favour of the
donee. In absence of creation or transfer of interest in the property, it cannot be said that donor
intended to execute irrevocable power of attorney. Although the deed in the heading is referred
as "irrevocable power of attorney", mere referring and labeling as "irrevocable" would not make
the deed irrevocable. Reading of the deed (Exh.97) leaves no doubt that it is not irrevocable.
19. It is also to be borne in mind that Ramalaxmiben had said to have executed Will in favour of
defendant No. 1 and other brothers of the said defendant on 25.7.1996. Much emphasis was
placed by the learned advocate for the respondent on this former Will, which is a registered Will.
Bequeathing the property in favour of defendant No. 1 makes rooms for defendant No. 1 to urge
that the donor has created interest in favour of donee by executing Will. Apart from the fact that
execution of Will is not simultaneous with the execution of Exh.97,- which alone is sufficient to
reject such submission,-odds in the form of circumstances are heavily against the donee (deft.
No. 1). Later execution of another Will in 2001 in favour of the plaintiff considerably weakens
such plea of defendant No. 1. In this regard, it would appear from the evidence that neither
defendant No. 1 nor other brother had applied for probate in respect of the former Will, while
probate application of the plaintiff in respect of the later Will is pending before Bombay High
Court. Further still, execution of agreement to sell in respect of suit property as early as on
29.11.1997 and execution of sale deed as late as on 18.4.2007 is not at all explain in the
evidence by defendant No. 1. In fact, defendant No. 1 has not led any evidence before the trial
Court. In this regard, it may also be noted that Ramalaxmiben has died as late as in January,
2004. If Ramalaxmiben had intended to create or transfer interest in favour of defendant No. 1,
happening of events in that case would have been in different order and different sequence and
perhaps, this proceeding will not have arisen. In the circumstances of the case, Exh.97 is not
irrevocable power of attorney.
19.1 Finding of learned trial Court on deed becoming irrevocable has no substance and it is
bordering on perverse finding. General reference to it may be made at the end.
20. In view of the above, Jalaram Developer's case reported in MANU/GJ/0997/2009 : 2010 (1)
GLH 354 cannot be of any help to the respondent. In Jalaram Developer's case (supra), granting
of interim relief below Exh.5 by the trial Court was challenged before this Court. This Court had
vacated the interim relief, as the plaintiff had been silent about huge investment made by the
other side and creation of third party interest in it. Thus, the main question was propriety of
granting of injunction by the Court. It is true that in that case, there was reference to
irrevocable power of attorney. However, the Court has proceeded to consider the case on the
footing that deed of power of attorney was irrevocable. Whether, deed is irrevocable or not was
not a issue in that case. Following Head Note would show that the said case turns on different
point.
...Sale by irrevocable power of attorney--Agreement to sell was executed in favour
of the appellant by M and after his death his irrevocable power of attorney holder
executed the registered sale deed--Challenge to the said sale made by the legal
heirs of M on the ground that after the death of M sale deed cannot be executed by a
power of attorney holder and further that they have an undivided share in the
property and so also the sale is bad in law--The Trial Court allowed the Exh.5
application and directed the parties to maintain status-quo--Setting aside the said
order, held, the appellant is believed to have possession of the suit property--
Substantial construction has already been carried out and third parties rights are
created--The appellant has made huge investments on the suit property--The
plaintiff has challenge the registered sale deed but remained silent about the
development agreement--On the aforesaid facts it is further held that legal heirs
would not be entitled to challenge the sale as the possession had already been
transferred and their party rights had been created and, therefore, an agency would
not be terminate even after the death of person who has authorized, more
particularly when the same was irrevocable.
21. Now, the submissions of learned advocate Shri Gandhi for the respondent may be
considered.
21.1 As referred to above, Shri Gandhi has tried to strike at the root, in the sense that if the
submissions, viz. the plaintiff's right to file suit and maintainability of the suit is/are found
acceptable, then the nature of power of attorney becomes immaterial and irrelevant. If the
submission of Shri Gandhi found acceptance, suit must fail. Shri Gandhi has submitted that the
plaintiff could enforce his right meaningfully only when the plaintiff is granted probate by the
competent Court. It is submitted that the plaintiff's right till the probate is granted to him would
be in the nature of contingent right or inchoate right and the same would be crystallized and
would become enforceable only when the probate is granted to the plaintiff by the competent
Court.
21.2 In the present case, the plaintiff has filed the suit without obtaining probate. That being so,
the plaintiff cannot successfully enforce such contingent interest. It was submitted that the
plaintiff's suit would be impliedly barred under section 9 of CPC. Shri Gandhi has drawn attention
of the Court to head Note (a) of the case of Mrs. Hem Nolini Judah v. Mrs. Isolyne Sarojbashini
Bose and Ors., MANU/SC/0399/1962 : AIR 1962 (2) SC 1471. It reads thus:--
(a) Succession Act (1925), S. 213 -Property claimed as belonging to testator as
legatee under a Will--Alleged will neither probated nor letters of administration
obtained in regard to it--Claim is barred by section.
22. The submission that the plaintiff's interest is in the nature of contingent interest is too
spacious submission to be accepted. Law in this regard is well settled. If the plaintiff has
otherwise right over the property, in absence of probate, such right is unenforceable in absence
of Probate. However, it does not bar initiation of any legal proceedings. Such bar is not possible
to read under section 9 of CPC nor such bar is possible to infer on the ground that the nature of
the plaintiff's right in such a situation is contingent. This submission has no substance. It may be
stated that in Mrs. Hem Nolini's case (supra), one Dr. Miss Mitter's house was in issue. It was
suit property. She had died in 1925. She had left behind her three sisters and her mother. The
plaintiff had filed a suit seeking declaration that she is the owner of the house. The say of the
plaintiff was that Dr. Miss Mitter had made a Will in favour of one of the sisters, i.e. Momin, in
1921 and Momin had made gift of the said property to the plaintiff. As against that, it was the
case of the defendant-appellant that said Dr. Miss Mitter had made Will in favour of her mother
in 1925 and the mother, in turn, had made Will in 1930 in favour of defendant. Now, the
defendant-appellant had obtained letters of administration of the Will of the mother, i.e. 1930
Will. However, it was not in dispute that no probate or letters of administration was ever
obtained by the mother of the appellant in respect of 1925 Will. It is non-obtaining of probate or
letters of administration of Will, that is said to have been in favour of mother of the defendant,
that came in the way of the defendant-appellant. The basis of the appellant's claim was Will
made in favour of her by her mother. Since the said later Will was unprobated Will, law as
referred to in head note (a) came to be laid down. Bar under section 213 hits to both- to the
plaintiff and to the defendant. This would show that Miss Hem Nolini's case (supra) cannot help
the respondent.
23. Shri Gandhi has also submitted that stranger to the contract cannot sue. Drawing attention
to pages 23 & 24 of the paper-book, i.e. agreement to sell, and pages 25 & 26 (additional deed),
it was submitted that in the former deed it is clearly stated that possession is handed over and
in the latter deed, it is clarified that possession is received by the purchaser and full
consideration is paid. In view of such deeds on record, a person who is stranger to the contract,
cannot successfully challenge the suit transaction. This submission is totally misplaced and has
no substance. A stranger to the contract, if he is the real owner of the said property, can
certainly challenge the transaction of the property of which he claims to be the owner. Generally
speaking, any transaction in respect of any immovable property, executed to the exclusion of
real owner cannot affect, in any way, the right of the real owner to question the transaction. The
submission that stranger to the contract cannot sue has no substance.
24. Shri Gandhi has drawn attention to Gandabhai Ranchhodbhai's case, 1993 (2) GLH 463,
therein purchaser of property, who had purchased the property from the legatees to whom
original owner had bequeathed the property, had instituted suit for eviction against tenant on
the ground, inter alia, of denial of title by tenant. Head Note of this case would show that it does
not help to the submissions of the learned advocate for the respondent.
(B) Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 - S. 12(1) -
Disclaimer or denial of little of landlord - Transfer of Property Act, 1972 - S. 111(g)
(2) - Indian Evidence Act, 1972 - S. 116 - Indian Succession Act, 1925 - S. 213 -
Denial by tenant of title of the landlord - Plaintiff claiming to have purchased the
property by sale deed executed by legatees who were bequeathed the suit property
by the original landlord - Notice of attornment served on the tenant by plaintiff
claiming to be landlord- Tenant in reply asking for copy of Will, Probate, etc. and
also showing willingness to pay rent on plaintiff establishing derivative title - Copies
asked for not supplied to the tenant - In such circumstances, in the absence of
plaintiff's establishing title, they were not entitled to decree for possession on the
ground of denial of title by tenant.
25. Relying on the case of Somabhai Bholidas Patel (Decd.)) through Legal Heirs Kalpeshbhai
Natwarlal Patel & Ors v. State of Gujarat & Anr., MANU/GJ/0971/2009 : 2009 (3) GLR 2645, it
was vehemently urged that when the original owner, i.e. Ramalaxmiben, has not challenged the
transaction during her lifetime, any one who claims to derive the right or interest through
Ramalaxmiben cannot challenge the transaction. Somabhai Patel's case (supra) is the case
under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Sections 32G & 32P came up for
consideration of this Court. In that case, the petitioners were legal representatives of deceased
Somabhai Patel. The petitioners were litigating through power of attorney holder. Deceased
Somabhai was cultivating the land bearing survey No. 1270 situated at village Pethapur,
District : Gandhinagar since 1956. The revenue authority had passed some orders in respect of
the said land in 1963 and 1969. These orders came in the way of the petitioner in transferring
the land to the third party. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court has
observed that orders of 1963 and 1969 were not challenged even by Somabhai during his
lifetime. This Court has observed in para-8 as under:--
8. The petition does not merit acceptance for the reasons that follow hereinafter. It
is an accepted position that both the orders made on 5.4.1963 and 31.1.1969
respectively, under sections 32G and 32P of the Act, were made against deceased
Somabhai and though the exact date of death of the said gentleman] is not
available, the said orders were never challenged by deceased Somabhai during his
life-time. Apparently, when the petitioners wanted to part with the property they
realized that the orders made in 1963 and 1969 respectively, would not permit them
to transfer the property in favour of third party, the rights of deceased Somabhai
having been held to be limited, after the land had been resumed by the Authority by
passing an order in 1963.
The Court found that the order of the year 1969 under challenge by the revenue authority does
not suffer from any legal infirmity and does not call for any interference (para-17). The Court
has concluded thus:
18. To summarise: Proceedings under Section 32G of the Act dated 5.4.1963 having
attained finality, in absence of challenge within the period of limitation,
consequential proceedings under Sec. 32P of the Act cannot be successfully
challenged, and that too without explaining the gross delay which has occurred in
challenging both the sets of proceedings, and a finding being recorded by the
Appellate Authority first condoning the delay.
26. Reliance sought to be placed by analogy on Somabhai Patel's case (supra) is also totally
misplaced. It is defendant No. 1 to explain why the sale deed was not executed till the death of
Ramalaxmiben (i.e. 2004) when the agreement to sell was executed as early as in 1997.
Further, sale deed, in fact, came to be executed as late as in 2 007, i.e. after the death of
Ramalaxmiben. The submission that the original owner has not challenged the transaction and,
therefore, the person deriving interest through original owner cannot challenge the transaction,
has even no factual basis. This submission has no substance, nor the case of Somabhai Patel
(supra) has any applicability to the facts of the present case.
27. Relying on Section 204 of the Indian Contract Act, Shri Gandhi has contended that when the
agent has partly exercised the authority in pursuant to the deed of power of attorney, even the
principal cannot revoke the authority. It was submitted that since the agreement to sell was
executed during the lifetime of Ramalaxmiben and part of consideration was received by her,
remaining act done by the agent, i.e. execution of the sale deed, cannot be questioned even by
the principal, i.e. donor, much less by the plaintiff.
28. Section 204 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 reads thus:
204: Revocation where authority has been partly exercised.--The principal cannot
revoke the authority given to his agent after the authority has been partly exercised,
so far as regards such acts and obligations as arise from acts already done in the
agency.
In the facts of the present case, section 204 cannot help the respondent. Apart from the fact
that section 204 protects the acts done by the agent on behalf of the principal, prior to
cancellation or revocation of his authority, respondent cannot defend the present execution of
sale deed by invoking section 204 of the Contract Act. In this context, it may be stated that in
the present case, earlier Ramalaxmiben had issued a public notice in the newspaper wherein she
has stated that no transaction be entered into without her express consent. This public notice
was issued in the newspaper on 28.7.1996 and 8.8.1996. The learned trial Court has not
properly appreciated this, inasmuch as it has discarded this public notice by observing that it
was prior to the execution of deed of power of attorney. It is true that Exh.97 is said to have
been executed in 1997. When it comes to examine the legality and validity of the sale deed
executed as late as in 2007, other circumstances of the case assumes some importance. In this
context, public notice issued in the newspaper and the latter Will said to have been executed in
2001 play some role in appreciating the deed of power of attorney. Further, when issuance of
public notice by Ramalaxmiben is not in dispute, it is just, natural and logical that Ramalaxmiben
would have made some reference to this in deed while conferring power upon defendant No. 1.
Section 204 cannot help the respondent. To say the least, section 204 is not intended to protect
the act of the agent, such as in the case on hand, as it is sought to be urged by defending the
execution of sale deed.
29. Shri Gandhi relying on the cases of (1) Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Municipal Committee,
Chheharta, MANU/SC/0392/1979 : AIR 1979 SC 1250, and (2) State of Gujarat v. Mer Prabhat
Ramji, AIR 1991 Guj 195, has urged that the present suit is not maintainable.
In Mer Prabhat Ramji's case (supra), civil suit came to be filed challenging the order of
confiscation of goods passed by the Collector in exercise of powers under the Essential
Commodities Act, 1955. This Court in that case has held that jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred.
Similarly, in Munshi Ram's case (supra), assessment of professional tax on individual partner
was sought to be challenged by filing civil suit. Special remedy is provided under sections 84 &
86 of the Punjab Municipal Act. That being so, it was held that availability of special remedy
excludes the jurisdiction of civil Court. Reliance placed on this case law is also totally misplaced.
The suit of the plaintiff in the present case, considering the relief claimed by the plaintiff, cannot
be held to be barred, either because special remedy is provided under the Indian Succession Act
or because it is impliedly barred under section 9 of CPC.
30. Shri Gandhi has vehemently urged that in view of section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, if
this Court compares the signature appearing on page 17 of the paper-book versus signature on
page 38 and also the signature appearing on page 19 versus page 38, it would appear that
signature of the deceased is got up one. Learned advocate Shri Gandhi has also invited attention
of the Court to page 64 of the paper-book read with Exh.117. It was submitted that if the Court
compares this signature, even prima facie it would appear that signature does not tally. In
support of this reliance placed on Section 73, learned advocate has drawn attention to the cases
of (1) Murarilal v. State of M.P. MANU/SC/0189/1979 : AIR 1980 SC 531, and (2) Lalit Popli v.
Canara Bank & Ors, MANU/SC/0144/2003 : AIR 2003 SC 1796. In the latter case, the bank's
employee was dismissed from service on the allegation of misconduct. The allegation was that
the employee was responsible for unauthorized withdrawal from customer's account. The
employee had accepted that there was some lapse on his part, however, he had pleaded that
there was no criminal intent on his part. It is in this context it was observed that, "Even to naked
eye mistakes in spelling of `signature' were visible and should not have escaped eyes of bank
employee who is supposed to be trained and equipped to notice such glaring mistakes. Nature of
work of bank employee demands vigilance with inbuilt requirement to act carefully...."
Then, in Murarilal's case(supra) observations on Section 73 of the Evidence Act came to be made
in a case wherein appellant was convicted for the offence under section 302 IPC and also for the
offences under section 460 read with sections 34, 457, 380, 392, 394 & 397 IPC. The
observations made on Section 73 in the above case cannot help the respondent. The submission
based on Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act has no substance and it is not possible to enter
into exercise of comparison of signature, as submitted by learned advocate Shri Gandhi. It is
unsafe. It may be stated that in the given case, Court may invoke Section 73 of the Indian
Evidence Act to do complete justice. However, it cannot be pressed into service to relieve the
party to the proceedings from discharging the onus or burden that lies upon it to establish the
facts. In other words, onus or burden of proof that lies upon the party has to be discharged by
the said party, or in a given situation, Court may compare the signature appearing on record.
Then, once attempt is made by party to discharge the burden and thereby relevant material is
brought on record, then considering circumstances of the case, if it is so required to dispel the
doubt, the Court may compare the signature. Thus, it is power conferred upon the Court and not
right bestowed upon the party. Exceptional circumstances or peculiar facts of the case do not
make rule. Speaking of case on hand, submission of the learned advocate Mr. Gandhi is to read
two Wills i.e. of 1996 and of 2001 together and compare the signature of the deceased. It is
enough to say that two signatures are not apparently incomparable in appearance. To draw the
conclusion, merely by comparing signatures as suggested by the learned advocate.
31. Strong reliance was also placed on the case of Minaxiben Shashikantbhai Patel (supra). In
that case, this Court has held that probate is not compulsorily required of the Will executed by
Hindus qua the properties situated outside the territories of the original civil jurisdiction of the
High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Mumbai, for establishing right pursuant to it. It was
submitted that in view of the law laid down in Minaxiben's case (supra), defendant No. 1 was not
required to obtain any probate. Further, in contrast to the second Will, former Will is a registered
Will. Therefore, on execution of the Will itself, defendant No. 1 acquires right and in exercise of
his right, defendant has entered into the sale transaction. Developing the submission on this
line, it was submitted that under the former Will, all the four brothers have acquired interest and
transaction is challenged only by the plaintiff whose action is not supported by the other
brothers. Therefore, the action of the plaintiff should be appreciated bearing in mind the said
fact. Secondly, supporting the findings of the learned trial Court, it was submitted that upon
acquiring of right under the Will, defendant No. 1 has duly executed sale deed in favour of other
defendants. It is not merely execution of the sale deed, but full consideration is received by the
`seller' and possession is handed over to the purchaser. Thus, interest has duly passed on in
favour of third party and, therefore, challenge to the suit transaction should be appreciated
bearing this material aspect in mind.
32. This submission has also no substance. In Minaxiben Patel's case (supra), a question came
up before this Court for consideration, as the District Collector had refused entering of the name
of the petitioner in the revenue record on the ground that the petitioner had not obtained
probate of the Will. It may be stated that in the revenue proceeding legal heirs of the deceased
had given consent for mutation of entry in favour of the petitioner. This Court upon considering
section 213 of the Indian Succession Act and the principles laid down in Clarence Pais and others
v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0122/2001 : AIR 2001 SC 1151, has held that probate is not
required. Reliance placed on the case of Minaxiben Patel (supra) is misplaced mainly because the
law laid down in that case is mixed up by the respondent with several other points. It is one
thing to say that in respect of former Will executed by Ramalaxmiben, defendant No. 1 is not
required to obtain probate, however, it is quite different thing to say that sale deeds executed by
defendant No. 1, which are under challenge, are legal and valid in view of law down in
Minaxiben's case (supra). Question mark on the validity of suit transaction and on competency of
defendant No. 1 to execute said deed is placed by plaintiff not on the ground that defendant No.
1 has entered into transaction without obtaining probate.
33. In Clarence Pais's case (supra), on which this Court has placed reliance in Minaxiben's case
(supra), analyzing section 213 of the Indian Succession Act, the Supreme Court has laid down as
under:--
(1) it prohibits recognition of rights as an executor or legatee under a will without
production of a probate;
(2) it sets down a rule of evidence and forms really a part of procedural requirement
of the law of forum;
(3) the bar that is imposed by this section is only in respect of the establishment of
the right as an executor or legatee and not in respect of establishment of the right in
any other capacity;
(4) the section does not prohibit the Will being looked into for purposes other than
those mentioned in the section;
(5) the bar to the establishment of the right is only for its establishment in a Court of
justice and not its being referred to in other proceedings before administrative or
other Tribunal; and
(6) the section is a bar to everyone claiming under a will, whether as a plaintiff or a
defendant, if no probate or Letters of Administration is granted.
34. Will, in order to be valid and effective, has to be last Will. In the present case,
Ramalaxmiben has said to have executed another Will in 2001. In view of the fact that the
deceased has executed subsequent Will, decision in the case of Minaxiben Patel (supra) cannot
help much to the respondent. Further, it is also possible to distinguish said decision on the
ground that bar that executor or legatee would face either in enforcing or defending the right in
absence of probate is only before the Court. Bar under section 213 has no application before
revenue authority.
35. The present appeal succeeds,
(1) as defendant No. 1 has sought to transfer the suit property through deed of
power of attorney, which is not irrevocable and which is unenforceable/defective
power of attorney deed, hence, in the circumstances of the case, no right, title or
interest is passed in favour of defendant No. 2 and consequently nor in favour of
defendant Nos. 3 to 6.
(2) as defendant Nos. 3 to 6 are not bona fide purchasers for value without notice.
Almost all material circumstances are against defendant Nos. 3 to 6. Filing of
application by plaintiff claiming breach of undertaking by defendant No. 2, then, the
fact that son of defendant No. 2 is an advocate practicing along with and under the
advocate for defendant No. 2. Then the say of defendant No. 5 in his evidence, all
these are possible to read in favour of the plaintiff.
(3) as the findings of the learned trial Court,-except the finding that the suit is bad
for not praying relief of possession,- are not only bad in law and illegal, but almost
all of them are perverse.
36. The learned trial Court has laboured hard to draw the conclusion that transaction under
challenge had taken place in presence of deceased Ramalaxmiben. The overwhelming
circumstances of the case that points towards different direction, ignored or not properly
appreciated by the trial Court, while no evidence is led on behalf of defendant No. 1,
appreciation of other evidence is grossly erroneous. Hence, its finding is perverse. Fine attempt
made by the learned advocate Shri Gandhi to support the finding of the trial Court by covering
and connecting this finding with legal submission fails, as facts and circumstances of the case do
not help the learned advocate.
37. In view of the above discussion, the appeal succeeds. The judgment and decree passed by
the learned trial Court in Special Civil Suit No. 86/2007 is hereby quashed and set aside.
38. The submission made by the learned advocate for the respondent that since the prayer for
possession was made by the appellant-plaintiff only at the appellate stage, therefore, even if the
appellant-plaintiff succeeds on merits, prayer for possession ought not to be considered, as the
prayer is made by the appellant at a belated stage, has no substance. A submission was also
made that discretion in favour of the appellant ought not to be exercised. This submission of the
learned advocate for the respondent is also not possible to accept. It may be stated that earlier
the suit land was said to be in possession of one Ishwarlal, who claimed to be tenant. Said
Ishwarlal had litigated upto the High Court and had lost before this Court. It is the say of the
appellant-plaintiff that in view of pendency of litigation initiated by Ishwarlal, the appellant-
plaintiff had not prayed for relief for possession. As observed above, before this Court an
application for amendment of plaint was moved and this Court has allowed the said application.
The said order of allowing the application has become final. Once the said application is allowed
by passing a suitable order of awarding costs to the respondent, it cannot be said that prayer for
possession should not be taken into consideration by this Court even if this Court is of the view
that appeal is to be allowed, nor there are circumstances in favour of the respondent to refuse
relief in favour of the appellant. Hence, the appeal succeeds. The judgment and decree passed
by the learned trial Court is hereby quashed and set aside. The Appeal is allowed with costs.
39. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Shelat has drawn attention of the Court to the case of
Binapani Kar Chowdhury v. Satyabrata Basu & Anr., MANU/SC/2832/2006 : AIR 2006 SC 2263,
wherein, in an identical situation, it was held thus:
8. Therefore, with a view to do complete justice between the parties, it is
appropriate to direct the trial court (Civil Judge, Senior Division, Alipore) where T.S.
No. 10/1995 is pending to proceed to hear arguments and deliver judgment in the
suit. Nothing further will be required, if the suit is to be dismissed. But if the suit is
to be decreed, the trial Court should make it clear that the judgment and decree will
come into effect only on the first respondent obtaining and producing the probate of
the Will, and till then the decree should be considered only as provisional and not to
be given effect. We disposed of this appeal accordingly making it clear that nothing
stated above is an expression of any opinion on merits of the case.
In view of the above, the view of the learned Single Judge in Raichand Dhanji v. Jivraj Bhavanji
& Ors, MANU/MH/0233/1930 : AIR 1932 Bom 13, cannot be of much assistance to the
respondent. Emphasis was placed on the following holding;-
The practice under which the Court passes a decree in a suit by the executor or the
legatee but gives a direction that the decree is not to be sealed until probate is
granted, is not correct.
It may also be stated that the learned Single Judge of this Court in Gandabhai's case (supra),
MANU/GJ/0123/1994 : 1993 (1) GLR 238 referred above has taken identical view on this.
Identical to Binapani's case (supra).
40. In view of the above, the judgment and decree passed in favour of the appellant-plaintiff
would come into operation and effect only if probate for which the appellant-plaintiff has applied,
is granted by the probate Court. Till the probate is granted to the appellant-plaintiff, the decree
passed herein should be considered only provisional and would not be given effect to.
41. Since the main appeal is disposed of, Civil Application No. 5374/2013 does not survive and
stands disposed of accordingly.
Civil Application No. 7799/2013 stands allowed.
At this stage, learned advocate Mr. Gandhi for the respondent prays for stay of operation of the
judgment for eight weeks. The judgment passed by this Court, as stated above, is in sense
provisional. All the same, operation of the judgment is stayed for a period of six weeks from
today.
Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

Mahesh Govindji Trivedi

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Mahesh Govindji Trivedi

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

MANU/GJ/0773/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

Potrebbero piacerti anche