ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CONSOLIDATED CASES

OPOSA VS FACTORAN, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)- YSMAEL VS DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 190 SCRA 167
(1990) (no digest)
LAGUA VS CUSI, 160 SCRA 69 (1983)
FACTS: A memorandum was issued preventing the passage of Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with
logs for the Japanese vessel on the national highway loading towards where the vessel was berthed. In
compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the road to the use by
plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented their passage thereof while the
vehicles and trucks of other people were curiously not disturbed and were allowed passess on the same
road. It resulted that the loading of logs on the M/S "Kyofuku Maru" was discontinued. When Plaintiffs
Laguas were already resuming the hauling operations of their logs towards the Japanese Vessel, again
that same road, only the day before ordered by the BFD to be opened for use and passage by plaintiffs,
was closed to them by Defendant Eastcoast's security men upon a radio message order of Defendant
Maglana. Even the vessel M/S "Kyofuku Maruwas" ordered by Defendant Maglana to untie her anchor
contrary to existing laws, rules and regulations of the Bureau of Customs and the Philippine
Coastguard.Given no recourse in the face of the blatant and illegal closure of the road in defiance of BFD
orders to the contrary by the Defendant Eastcoast through the order of Defendant Maglana, Plaintiff
Laguas had to depart postpaste to Mati, Davao Oriental, from Baganga where the shipment and the
road closure were made, to seek the assistance of the PC thereat. The private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss argued that petitioner Daylinda Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not
registered as an "agent" or "dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry.The Court agrees with the
defendants that under the law, the Bureau of Forest Development has the exclusive power to regulate
the use of logging road and to determine whether their use is in violation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Forest Development has the jurisdiction to determine first the
legality of closure of logging roads before the case be directed to the regular courts
HELD: NO. P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in
the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or
illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained.
Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal
closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the
part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should
appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the
Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or
deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development. As we have held in Ateneo de Manila University v.
Court of appeals (145 SCRA 100, 110):
HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, 126 SCRA 69 (1983)
FACTS: There were two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Court of
Appeals which declared the disputed property as forestland, not subject to titling in favor of private
persons, Borre and Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also
filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove
swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the publicdomain.Another oppositor,
Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885containing 117,956 square
meters wasconcerned and prayed that title to said portionbe confirmed and registered in his name.
Issue: Whether or not the lot in question can be subject of registration and confirmation of title in
thename of the private person
HELD: The opposition of the Director of Forestry wasstrengthened by the appellate court's findingthat
timber licenses had to be issued to certainlicensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble
to ask for a license to cuttimber within the area. It was only sometime in1950 that the property was
converted intofishpond but only after a previous warning fromthe District Forester that the same could
not bedone because it was classified as "publicforest.A forested area classified as forest land of
thepublic domain does not lose such classificationsimply because loggers or settlers may havestripped it
of its forest cover. "Forest lands" donot have to be on mountains or in out of theway places. Swampy
areas covered bymangrove trees, nipa palms, and other treesgrowing in brackish or sea water may also
beclassified as forest land. The possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripeninto private
ownership. Therefore, the lot inquestion never ceased to be classified as forestland of public domain.
REPUBLIC VS NAGUIAT, 479 SCRA 598 (1989)

FACTS: Respondent applies for registration of title to 4 parcels of land contending she is the owner of
the said land which she acquired from the LID Corporation which in turn acquired the same from
persons who have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years. The Republic filed in opposition
that said lands belong to the public domain and not subject to private appropriation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the land in dispute as a forest land belonging to public domain may be
appropriated as private property.

Ruling: For a public forest land/reserves to be subject for private appropriation, it requires an express
and positive act of the government that it will become a part of alienable and disposable agricultural
lands of public domain. Occupation in the concept of an owner cannot ripen into private ownership and
be registered to as a title.

G.R. No. 32266. February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL
Facts: The land involved in this case consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in
the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949,
alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty
years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. Both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land.
Issue: Whether or not mangrove swamps, or manglares, are part of our public forest lands.
Held: Yes. Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests
of the Philippines as defined in Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The statutory definition
remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy is accepted and invoked by the executive
department. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of
private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable
agricultural land.
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983
SERAFIN B. YNGSON
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE GONZALES and JOSE M.
LOPEZ
Facts: A number of people, including the petitioner and private respondents, applied for a permit to
utilize 66 hectares of mangrove swamps for fishpond purposes, but were not granted, the area still
being considered to be communal forest. When the area was released for said purpose, the three
private parties in this case had conflicting claims on the same. Initially, the Bureau of Fisheries awarded
the whole area in favor of petitioner. However, the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources later
ordered the division of the area into three portions, one part for each of the petitioner and the private
respondents. Not satisfied with the portion received, petitioner appealed the order.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the whole of the area concerned.
Held: No. It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until
timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the
Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of
utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or
mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or
timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes. All the applications in this case were
premature; therefore not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another. The
interpretation by the Office of the President was held to be an exercise of sound discretion which should
not be disturbed.

G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR.
Facts: Petitioner seeks a declaration that respondent UP does not have the right to supervise and
regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale, measure and seal the
timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from petitioner and/or
impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession, covered by License
Agreement No. 27-A, ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents
be enjoined from committing the acts complained of and prays that respondents be required to pay
petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the suit.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 3990 empowers the respondent UP to scale, measure and seal
the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land referred to in said act, and collect the
corresponding forest charges.
Held: Yes. Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station for the
use of the UP in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved" area
was "ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any existing
concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely removed
it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of
petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto
and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof,
subject only to the existing concession. An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law. The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to
receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its
use. In the instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the
concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded
and transferred to UP until I February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay
the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the
Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the
Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently,
even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to measure the
timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees due thereon.

Tan vs. Director of Forestry (2009)
Facts: The Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest
land situated in Olangapo, Zambales. One of the bidders is petitioner Tan who was later then awarded
such lot. On April 22, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan,
was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Office of the
Director of Forestry. It was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required
by Order No. 60. And because of this, that Timber license was declared void ab initio and directed to
stop the logging operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan. Petitioner averred that the respondents-
appellees unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license without
just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of his
constitutional right to property without due process of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of
contracts.
Issue: Whether or not the timber license was valid or not.
Held: No. Court fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber license
was signed and released without authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and
is therefore void ab initio. In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963,
the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area
covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner
contained 6,420. In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of
Forestry had no more authority to grant any license. However, granting that the timber license was
valid, still respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license. As pointed out, the rules and
regulations included in the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are
subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to
expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require". A timber license is an instrument by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
People vs. Que (1996)
Facts: The accused, being the owner of an Isuzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with
intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and
custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile) without
any license or authority to do so from the proper authorities causing damage and prejudice to the
government. Thus violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705. However, accused-appellant
denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a
legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of violating Section 68, PD705 for possessing timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Held: Yes, accused was guilty. Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without any
documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705. There are two (2) distinct
and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit: (1) Cutting, gathering, collecting
and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (2) Possession of timber or other
forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or
removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the
second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the
forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents
consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because
E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents as malum prohibitum.
Aquino vs. People
Facts: On behalf of Teachers' Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers'
Camp in Baguio City were to be used for the repairs of Teachers' Camp. Pre-issuance of the permit, a
team composed of members from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect and
Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut. The Executive
Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees under terms and conditions.
However, an information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 was filed against
petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, and without any authority, license or permit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cut trees at Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation of the aforecited law. Petitioner thus averred that he was
sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers' Camp. He allegedly informed his superior, Paul Apilis,
that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of
trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He
claimed that he could not prevent the overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and
Santiago were accompanied by three other men.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
Held: No. Petitioner cannot be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not an
officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection, or
is in possession of the pine trees. There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section
68 of PD 705, to wit: (1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority; and (2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations. The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut,
gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was
charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut,
gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was
not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers' Camp for repairs.
Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-
accused were acquitted of the charges against them.
Merida vs People GR no. 158182 12 June 2008
Facts:
Merida has been charged with the violation of Sec 68 of PD 705 for cutting, gathering and
transporting the lone nara tree inside the property of Tansiongco. Upon confrontation, Merida said that
he cut the tree upon the orders of Vicar Calix who supposedly bought the property from Tansiongco.
Issue:
a. Whether or not Merida can be prosecuted for violation of PD 705 Sec 68 for cutting trees in a private
land
Ruling:
a. Yes, Merida can be prosecuted for violation of PD 705 Sec 68 for cutting trees in a private
land. . Sec 68 of PD 705 has stated that Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx . The law did not distinguish
whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts undep*;r the aforementioned law is the
owner of the property, for what is material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not
the person or entity involved or charged with its violation possesses the required permit, license or
authorization from DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forest products.
ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al. [G.R. No. 152989. September 4, 2002]
Facts:
Madrona is an owner of a parcel of land that is about 60,000 square meters. In 2009, Merida
applied for a Private land transfer permit for him to be able to create a road and a poultry farm in his
property. He was then informed that he can proceed with the cutting of the trees even while his
application was still pending. After 3 weeks, representatives of CENRO raided his property without a
search warrant and the woods were confiscated and were turned over to a baranggay kagawad. After a
few days, CENRo returned with a search warrant and confiscated the logs. Petitioner filed a case against
CENRO, however, he was then prosecuted for finding a probable cause for violation of PD 705 Section
68.
Issue:
Whether or not the owner of a private property can be prosecuted for violating Sec 68 of PD 705
for cutting trees within his own property
Ruling:
Yes, the owner of a private property can be prosecuted for violating Sec 68 of PD 705 for cutting
trees within his own property. Sec 68 of PD 705 has stated that Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx . The
law did not distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts under the
aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is material in determining the culpability of a
person is whether or not the person or entity involved or charged with its violation possesses the
required permit, license or authorization from DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber
or other forest products.
People vs Dator 344 SCRA 222 (2000)
Facts:
On October 29, 1993, Dator feloniously possessed 1,560 board feet of assorted lumber flitches
valued at 23,500 php without any legal document. The lumber was boarded to a Isuzu cargo truck. He
was then charged and pleaded not guilty. The lower court, after trial, found the accused guilty of
violation of Sec 68 of PD 705.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding Dator guilty of violation of the said law beyond
reasonable doubt
Ruling:
No, the lower court did not err in finding Dator guilty of violation of Sec 68 or PD 705. The fact of
possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber, as
well as his subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as
the Revised Forestry Code.[22] Section 68 of the code.
MONGE VS PP
548 SCRA 42 (2008)

FACTS: On 20 July 1994, petitioner and Potencio were found by barangay tanods Serdan and Molina in
possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber in Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga
City. Right there and then, the tanods demanded that they be shown the requisite permit and/or
authority from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) but neither petitioner nor
Potencio was able to produce any. Petitioner fled the scene in that instant whereas Potencio was
brought to the police station for interrogation, and thereafter, to the DENR-Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO). The DENR-CENRO issued a seizure receipt for the three
pieces of lumber indicating that the items, totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had
been seized from Potencio. Later on, petitioner was arrested, but Potencios whereabouts had been
unknown since the time of the seizure until he surfaced on 3 January 1998. An information was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35 charging petitioner and Potencio with violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of
1997.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner violated Sec 68 of PD 705

HELD: Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct and separate
offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing laws and regulations. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993
specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3
thereof materially requires that the transport of lumber be accompanied by a certificate of lumber
origin duly issued by the DENR-CENRO. In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products may be proven by the authorization duly issued
by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering,
collecting and removal of forest products are legal precisely because mere possession of forest products
without the requisite documents consummates the crime.
It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the subject mahogany lumber
and their subsequent failure to produce the requisite legal documents, taken together, has already given
rise to criminal liability under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the second act punished
thereunder. The direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as a state witness on the
circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioners liability. Petitioner cannot
take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber found in his possession nor in his
claim that his help was merely solicited by Potencio to provide the latter assistance in transporting the
said lumber. P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As
such, in prosecutions under its provisions, claims of good faith are by no means reliable as defenses
because the offense is complete and criminal liability attaches once the prohibited acts are committed.
In other words, mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents,
even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. It would therefore make no difference at all whether it
was petitioner himself or Potencio who owned the subject pieces of lumber.

TAOPA VS PP
571 SCRA 610 (2008)

FACTS: The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck
loaded with illegally-cut lumber (113 pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong
species without any authority and/or legal documents as required under existingforest laws and
regulations, prejudicial to the public interest) and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was
covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to Petitioner
Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber. Taopa, Ogalesco and
Cuison were charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree(PD) No. 705 as amended, in the
RTC Virac, Catanduanes. Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on
the merits, RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Only Taopa and Cuison
appealed to CA, Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed. The dispositive portion of
the CA decision read: In this petition, Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him alleging
that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in
the truck when the lumber was seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705

HELD: Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopas alibi because Cuisons testimony
proved Taopas active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the
CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopas house and that Taopa and
Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized.
These facts proved Taopas (and Ogalescos) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in
the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other
forest products without the required legal documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran
away at the mere sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt.
We are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber. Section 68 of PD
705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be
imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft. The
law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license
as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. The actual market value of the
113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630. Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable
penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14
years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the excess of
P47,630. The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty
next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10
years and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.

PAAT vs CA
266 SCRA 167 (1997)

FACTS: The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on
its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product
found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck
and required the owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR
Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugans action for confiscation and ordered
the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal,
private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC
granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents
had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their
motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally
entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.
Whether or not the petitioners contention is correct that the administrative officers of the
DENR allegedly have no power to perform seizure and forfeiture of the truck under the law
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty for violating Sec 68-A of PD 705


HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still
be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of court intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the
factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due
process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained
by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended.
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to
exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court
instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of
the truck.

SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized
Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of
any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances
used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives
are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act
of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it
must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.[33] Statutes should
be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the
benefits intended.
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under
Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that
private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act constituting
a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its
amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the aforementioned
Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:
SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. - Any person
who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a
license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx. (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705
before its amendment by E.O.277 )
SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license. -Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possesstimber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as
amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting,
gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct
offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be
guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code . When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended
court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC. VS CA- MOMONGAN VS OMIPON (NO DIGEST)

G.R. No. 115634 April 27, 2000
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.
FACTS

Petitioners, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR caught two motor vehicles carrying illegally sourced
lumber , where the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus,
the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. DENR filed a criminal
complaint against the two drivers for forcibly taking the vehicles from their custody. Complaint was
dismissed. One of the two vehicles were again seized by DENR loaded with illegal lumbers, but the
drivers were again acquitted. A copy however of the decision was furnished to the Secretary of Justice
for filing of a case of violation of the Revised Forestry Code. The vehicle owner and the driver filled an
action for replevin where the trial court granted the application for replevin. Petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss which was denied by the trial court. Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a
Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting
further proceedings in the civil case for replevin. Court further instructed the petitioners to secure the
confiscated properties, being in custodia legis and referred the case to the appellate court. Court of
Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit, and denied petitioners' claim that private respondents'
complaint for replevin is a suit against the State. Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised
by petitioners based on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody
because they were contradicted by its own findings. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an
application for replevin, is a suit against the State.

HELD
Yes, since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance
with law, the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. The seizure of the vehicles and their
load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd
to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the
circumstances Property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit,
for it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and
not otherwise.
NO, State may not be sued without its consent, and a suit against a public officer for his official
acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. In the present
case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature, there was no malice
nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against
the State. It cannot prosper without the State's consent.
G.R. No. 93540 December 13, 1999
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, VICENTE
A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW, as, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents.
FACTS
Two police officers of the Marikina intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with narra lumber along the Marcos
Highway. They apprehended the truck and brought its cargo to the Personnel Investigation
Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City.
Discovering the discrepancies in the documentation of the nara lumber, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a
temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the narra
lumber and the six- wheeler truck. Having no action from the private respondent, the confiscated narra
lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government. Private respondents filed for
the issuance of writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the
recovery of the confiscated lumber and six-wheeler truck, and to enjoin the planned auction sale of the
subject narra lumber. Trial court issued an Order directing petitioners to desist from proceeding with the
planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Private respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents
(Replevin). Trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply and filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the Orders of the trial
court but was dismissed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision.
However, that motion was denied by the Court of Appeals , hence this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondents can validly be restored possession of their trucks and lumber based on the
writ of replevin.

HELD
No, in order for replevin to prosper, the wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought
in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is
offered, the writ should not be issued. In the case at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck
were confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended by
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in
custodia legis. When a thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his
execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it. Otherwise, there would be interference with
the possession before the function of law had been performed as to the process under which the
property was taken. Sec. 80 of P. D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within
6 hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary
investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to administrative
confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628 November 20, 2009
APEX MINING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., the mines adjudication board, provincial mining
regulatory board (PMRB-DAVAO), MONKAYO INTEGRATED SMALL SCALE MINERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
ROSENDO VILLAFLOR, BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE, DAVAO UNITED MINERS
COOPERATIVE, ANTONIO DACUDAO, PUTING-BATO GOLD MINERS COOPERATIVE, ROMEO ALTAMERA,
THELMA CATAPANG, LUIS GALANG, RENATO BASMILLO, FRANCISCO YOBIDO, EDUARDO GLORIA, EDWIN
ASION, MACARIO HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO CARUBIO, ROBERTO BUNIALES, RUDY ESPORTONO, ROMEO
CASTILLO, JOSE REA, GIL GANADO, PRIMITIVA LICAYAN, LETICIA ALQUEZA and JOEL BRILLANTES
Management Mining Corporation, Respondents.

FACTS
Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) was granted an Exploration Permit(EP 133) by the Bureau of
Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG) which assigned all its rights to EP 133 to the respondent, Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation which is alleged to be a 100%-owned
subsidiary of MMC. Subsequently, BMG registered SEMs Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA)application and the Deed of Assignment. Several oppositions were filed. The Courts Assailed
Decision held that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the
conditions stipulated in the permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of
Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized agents. Since SEM did not claim or submit
evidence that it was a designated agent of MMC, the latter cannot be considered as an agent of the
former that can use EP 133 and benefit from it. It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated
Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a mining right be made with the
prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Moreover, the Assailed Decision pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-renewal since it was not
renewed before or after its expiration.
SEM also filed a Motion for Referral of Case to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments. Apex, for its
part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision. Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion
for reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them.

ISSUES
Whether or not the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC to SEM was
validly made without violating any of the terms and conditions set forth in Presidential Decree No. 463
and EP 133 itself.
Whether or not the DENR Secretary has authority to issue DAO 66 declaring 729 hectares of the
areas covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and open to small-scale
mining purposes.

HELD
No, it was invalid. One of the terms and conditions of EP 133 is: That this permit shall be for the
exclusive use and benefit of the permittee or his duly authorized agents and shall be used for mineral
exploration purposes only and for no other purpose. While it may be true that SEM is a100% subsidiary
corporation of MMC, there is no showing that the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter. As
such, the assignment is null and void as it directly contravenes the terms and conditions of the grant of
EP 133. Also, PD 463 (Mineral ResourcesDevelopment Decree), which is the governing law when the
assignment was executed, explicitly requires that the transfer or assignment of mining rights, including
the right to explore a mining area, must be with the prior approval of the Secretary of DENR. Such is not
present in this case. Although EP 133 was extended for 12 months until July 6,1994, MMC never
renewed its permit prior and after its expiration.With the expiration of EP 133 on July 6, 1994, MMC lost
any right to the Diwalwal Gold RushArea. SEM, on the other hand, has not acquired any right to the said
area because the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is invalid. Hence, both MMC and SEM have not acquired
any vested rightover the area covered by EP 133

NO. The DENR Secretary has no power to convert forest reserves into non-forest reserves. Such
power is vested with the President. The DENR Secretary may only recommend to the President which
forest reservations are to be withdrawn from the coverage thereof. Thus, DAO No. 66 is null and void for
having been issued in excess of the DENR Secretarys authority.


Miners Association of the Philippines vs. Factoran
January 16, 1995
Facts:
Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her
legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-
venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which
declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitutionshall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the
effectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit
Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand
and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the
Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders,
to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the two Department Administrative Orders valid.

Ruling:
Yes, AO Nos. 57 and 82 are both constitutional and valid. This is due to the fact that EO279, in effect,
gave the Secretary of Natural Resources the authority to conclude jointventure, co-production, or
production sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources.
Furthermore, the constitutionality of these administrative orders goes to show that the utilization of
inalienable lands of public domain is not merely done through license, concession or lease since the
options are now also open to the State through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production,
joint venture, or production sharing agreements. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police
power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of
contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-
extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital
public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211
provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution.

ALVAREZ VS PICOP RESOURCES- APEX MINING CO, INC. VS SMGMC (NO DIGEST)

PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. VENERACION
Facts:
Respondent applied with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Development Services, DENR, Region IX,
Zamboanga City for a Declaration of Location (DOL) over Block 159 of the Malangas Coal Reservation,
situated at Barangays Payongan and Kauswagan, Alicia,Zamboanga del Sur. On 18 May 1989, the Office
of the Regional Executive Director (RED) of the DENR informed the respondent that his DOL cannot be
registered since Block 159 was part of the Malangas Coal Reservation, as provided under Proclamation
No. 284, issued by the President on19 July 1938. With the endorsement of the Office of Energy Affairs
(OEA) and the DENR Secretary, the respondent petitioned the Office of the President for the withdrawal
of Block 159 from the coal reservation and its conversion into a mineral reservation. The petitioner
applied for a mineral prospecting permit over Block 159 with the OEA, which the latter granted on 4
September 1989. On 18 October 1991, petitioner submitted to the DENR an application/proposal for a
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) over Blocks120, 159 and 160 of the Malangas Coal
Reservation. On 21 February 1992, the Officer-In-Charge Regional Technical Director Dario R. Mioza of
the Mines and Geo-Sciences Developmental Service (MGDS) advised the petitioner to amend its
application for MPSA by excluding Block 159 as the same is covered by the application of the
respondent. Nevertheless, the petitioner did not exclude Block 159 from its MPSA. Records also show
that it had not applied for nor was it able to obtain an Exploration Permit from the BMGS over Block
159.On 13 April 1992, Presidential Proclamation No.890 was issued, which effectively excluded Block159
from the operation of Proclamation No. 284,and declared Block No. 159 as government mineral
reservation open for disposition to qualified mining applicants, pursuant to Executive Order No. 279.
Respondent immediately filed, on 28 May 1992, a protest to the petitioners inclusion of Block 159 in its
application for MPSA before the RED of the DENR Office in Zamboanga City. After the parties were
heard, the RED, in an Order, dated 12 April 1993, ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered the
petitioner to amend its MPSA by excluding there from Block 159.On 30 July 1993, petitioner filed an
appeal with the DENR Secretary questioning the Orders issued by the RED. While the case was pending,
respondent applied for a MPSA. On 31 July 1992, he paid the processing fee for a MPSA covering Block
159 and was able to comply with all other requirements of the MPSA application. The MAB ruled that
the petitioner filed its appeal beyond the five-day prescriptive period provided under Presidential
Decree No.463, which was then the governing law on the matter. The MAB also decreed that the
respondent had preferential mining rights over Block 159. It ruled that the proper procedure with
respect to the mining rights application over Block 159 when it was still part of the Malangas Coal
Reservation required the following: (1) application for prospecting permit with the OEA or other office
having jurisdiction over said reservation; (2)application for exploration permit; (3) application for
exclusion of the land from such reservation;(4) Presidential Declaration on exclusion as recommended
by the Secretary; and (5)application for Lease thereof with priority given to holder of exploration Permit.
The MAB noted that petitioner did not file for an exploration permit nor applied for the exclusion of
Block 159. Moreover, petitioner filed a MPSA on18 October 1991, or almost six (6) months prior to the
issuance of Proclamation No. 890 excluding Block 159 from the Malangas Coal Reservation and allowing
its disposition. Thus, the application for a MPSA over Block 159, while it was still part of a government
reservation other than a mineral reservation, was erroneous and improper and could not have been
legally accepted. And, since the records show that only one MPSA was filed after the issuance of
Proclamation 890 that of the respondents, the preferential right over Block 159 was acquired by the
respondent.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner acquired preferential right on mining rights over Block 159.

Held:

No, in the instant case, petitioner failed to state any compelling reason for not filing its appeal within the
mandated period. Instead, the records show that after failing to comply with the period within which to
file their motion for reconsideration on time, they again failed to file their appeal before the Office of
the DENR Secretary within the time provided by law. Natural resources, mines: as a general rule,
prospecting and
exploration of minerals in a government reservation is prohibited under Sec.13 of PD 463 -
However, the same rule provides an exception involving instances when the government agency
concerned allows it. Section13. Areas Closed to Mining Location. No prospecting and exploration shall
be allowed: (a)In military, and other Government reservations except when authorized by the proper
Government agency concerned. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 463 reiterates the rule and clarifies
it further by stating that prospecting, exploration and exploitation of minerals on reserved lands other
than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the proper government agency. As an exception to this
rule, qualified persons may undertake the said prospecting, exploration and exploitation when the said
agencies cannot undertake them.


Atlas Consolidated Mining vs. CA (1990)
Facts:
ATLAS entered into an operating agreement with the heirs of Manuel Cuenco and Jose P. Velez
(collectively referred to herein as CUENCO-VELEZ) the former was granted the right to explore, develop
and operate twelve) mining claims belonging to the latter located at Toledo City, Cebu. ATLAS entered
into a similar agreement with the Biga Copper Mines Exploration Company (BIGA COPPER), a
partnership composed of Pablo B. Gorosin, Francisco B. Gorosin, Pedro B. Gorosin and Vicente T.
Garaygay (collectively referred to herein as the BIGA PARTNERS). Subject of this Operating Agreement
are thirty-one (31) mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu. It appears,
however, that of the total mining claims "leased" by ATLAS from both the CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA
COPPER, nine (9) mining claims overlap. These nine (9) overlapping mining claims became the subject of
Mines Administrative Cases Nos. V-727 and V-750 whereby under date of February 12, 1974, the
Director of Mines resolved the same in favor of CUENCO-VELEZ. BIGA COPPER appealed this decision to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who, in a decision affirmed the decision of the
Director of Mines. This later decision was appealed to the Office of the President under O.P. Case No.
0435. During the pendency of this appeal in the Office of the President, the parties, namely, CUENCO-
VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compromise agreement. This compromise agreement enabled
BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the nine (9) overlapping mining claims. Earlier, ATLAS alleged
that when it started the operation of its Carmen Project, which includes some of the mining claims
subject of the aforestated Operating Agreements with BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ ATLAS received
numerous letters from third- parties claiming that they were assignees of BIGA COPPER and the BIGA
PARTNERS over the mining claims. ATLAS allegedly conducted a verification of the said demands and
later on confirmed that before the registration of the Articles of Partnership of BIGA COPPER, the BIGA
PARTNERS sold and/or assigned some of their respective shares, rights, interests and participations over
the mining claims to third parties and that BIGA COPPER, acting separately from the BIGA PARTNERS,
likewise sold and/or assigned its undivided shares, interests and participations over the mining claims to
third parties. On the other hand, a certain Alejandro T. Escano wrote ATLAS informing the latter that he
is an assignee of CUENCO-VELEZ with respect to the three (3) mining claims which CUENCO-VELEZ
retained under the compromise agreement with BIGA COPPER. Escano, alleged that CUENCO-VELEZ had
assigned to him fifty percent (50%) of their rights, interests and participations in the said mining claims.
In turn, CUENCO-VELEZ advised ATLAS that their assignment to Alejandro T. Escano was already revoked
or rescinded for failure of the said assignee to fulfill the conditions contained in their deed of
assignment. In the light of the foregoing situation, ATLAS instituted a petition for declaratory relief with
the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 8, and which was docketed as Civil Case No. 16669-R.
Cited as respondents therein were BIGA COPPER, BIGA PARTNERS, CUENCO-VELEZ and some thirty-one
(31) assignees.

Issue:
Whether or not a person who is not a party to a contract can file a petition for declaratory relief and
seek a judicial interpretation of such contract.

Held:
No, the contention of Atlas that it has interest is without legal ground. ATLAS cannot be considered as
an interested party under the deeds of assignment and, therefore, has no standing to institute the
declaratory action. It cannot be disputed that ATLAS, being one of the parties to the operating
agreements, has an interest therein. A review of the record, in fact, reveals that ATLAS purports to be
seeking a judicial interpretation of its operating agreements with BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ But
after evaluating the lengthy arguments it presented to justify the declaratory action this Court arrives at
one logical conclusionthe ambiguity is not in the operating agreements themselves but in the validity
of the assignments of mining rights made by BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ to third parties.

Asaphil Construction vs Tuason Jr. 488 SCRA 126 (2006)
Fatcs:
In 1975, Respondent Tuason entered into a Contract for sale and Purchase of Perlite ore with Induplex
wherein the latter agreed to buy all the perlite ore that may be found and mined in Respondents mining
claim, then Induplex will assist Respondent in securing and perfecting his right over the mining claim.
Respondent then, executed in 1976 an agreement in favor of the Petitioner Asaphil. In 1990,
Respondent filed with the Bureau of Mines of DENR a complaint against Petitioner and Induplex for
declaration of Nullity of the two contracts for Sale and Purchase of Perlite ore. Respondent alleged that
the stockholders of Induplex formed and organized Ibalon who in fact been mining, extracting and
utilizing the perlite ore in Ibalons mining claim, that such is a violation of the condition imposed by
Board of Investments. Also, that Induplex acquired majority stocks of Asaphil and majority of Ibalons
share were transferred to Romero who is also a stockholder of Asaphil and Ibalon. Respondent claim
that said acts adversely affected his interests and the government as well.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR has jurisdiction over Respondents claim, namely the Annulment of the Contract
for sale and Purchase of perlite ore?
Ruling:
The Court upholds the findings of the DENR Regional Executive Director (RED) that the DENR does not
have jurisdiction over the Respondents claim. At the time (1990) of the filing of the complaint, the
jurisdiction of the DENR over mining disputes and controversies is governed by P.D no.1281, particularly
vesting the Bureau of Mines (now Mines and Geosciences Bureau) of the DENR with jurisdictional
supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or applicants for and or grantees of mining
licenses, permits, leases and/or operators thereof, including mining service contracts as their mining
activities are concerned.
La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association vs Ramos 445 SCRA 1 (2004)
Facts:
In 1987, President Aquino issued E.O 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and
evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization
of minerals, which upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary the President may execute with
the foreign proponent. In 1995, Pres. Ramos approved RA 7942 which defines the modes of mineral
agreements for mining operations outlines the procedure for their filing and approval , assignment,
transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms .Similar provisions govern financial or technical
assistance agreements. While in 1997, counsels for Petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary
demanding to stop the implementation of R.A 7942 and DAO (no.96-40), giving DENR fifteen days from
receipt to act thereon. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted with or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A 7942 valid?
Ruling:
The Court finds the provisions of R.A 7942 to be violative of Sec.2 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution
namely the Regalian and Filipinization of Natural Resources . When the parts of the statute re so
mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for
each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that it all could not
be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
Unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected must not fall
with them. Petition is granted.
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation vs Balite Portal Mining Cooperative 380 SCRA 145 (2002)
Facts:
Case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve known as
the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area, the land has been embroiled in controversy since the mid 80s due to its
gold deposits. From then, thousands of people flocked, to stake their respective claims. In 1988,
Marcopper was granted Exploration Permit (E.P No.133) which included the hotly contested area.
In 1991, Congress enacted R.A 7076 establishing a Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program to be
implemented by Secretary of DENR and also to authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale
mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to small-scale miners
under certain conditions. Then, Sec,Factoran issued Dept.Administrative Order (No.60) declaring
hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining.
Subsequently, a petition for cancellation of E.P (no.133) and the admission of a Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) proposal was filed before the DENR Executive Director docketed as Mining
Case (no.8-8-94) Marcopper while case is pending assigned E.P (no.133) to Petitioner SEM which in turn
applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit. Mines and Geosciences Bureau
registered the application.
Several entities including respondent Balite Communal Portal Mining Corporation filed their oppositions.
In 1997, Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao passed a Resolution (no.26) authorizing the
issuance of Ore Transport Permits (OTPs) to small-scale miners operating in the Diwalwal area. Then,
petitioner filed a complaint for damage before RTC alleging the illegal issuance of OTPs allowed the
extraction and hauling of gold per truck load from SEMs mining claim. RPA dismissed petitioners claim.
In 1997, Petitioner file before the CA against PMRB Davao, DENR Secretary and Balite which represent
all OTP grantees. It prayed for the Nullification of Memorandum Order 97-03 on the ground that the
direct state utilization espoused therein would impair its vested right under E.P (no.133).
Issue:
Whether or not the Memorandum Order adopt the direct utilization scheme in resolving the dispute
over the area?
Ruling:
No. The challenged Memorandum Order (97-03) did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as a
policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the Memorandum clearly indicate that what was
directed there under was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioners
contention, it did not grant any management/operating or by profit-sharing agreement to small-scale
miners or to any party, for that matter, has simply instructed the DENR Officials concerned to undertake
studies to determine its feasibility.
Consequently, the petition was premature, the said M.O did not impose any obligation on the claimants
or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties to the dispute. At this stage,
petitioner can show no more than a mere apprehension that the State through the DENR, would directly
take over the mines after the studies point to its viability. But until the DENR actually does so and
Petitioners fear turn into reality, no valid objection can be entertained against M.O 97-03 on grounds
which are purely speculative and anticipatory.
DIDIPIO EARTH- SAVER'S MULTI-PURPOSE ASSOC. VS GOZUN- TATAD VS SECRETEARY OF DoE (NO
DIGEST)

G.R. No. 159149 June 26, 2006
The HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Energy, Petitioner,
vs.
LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent

FACTS
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 33 as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration,
underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated
petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. The said law imposes a
penalty that is monetary for violators. The respondent association asked the DOE to set aside the
circular for being contrary to law. However, the said department denied the request for lack of merit.
The respondent then filed before the trial court a petition and the trial court nullified the said circular on
the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Circular issued by DOE is valid
RULING
Yes, For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1)
the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and
(2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.
The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading,
adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. These specific acts and
omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious
practices of some petroleum merchants.
As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as
amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a
minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty
for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers,
marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetary penalty. This mere silence,
nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere
fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law
since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum
products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular
merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers,
marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.
G.R. No. 161113 June 15, 2004
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, ANA MARIA NEMENZO, as President of FREEDOM FROM DEBT
COALITION, MA. TERESA I. DIOKNO-PASCUAL, REP. LORETTA ANN ROSALES (Party-List Akbayan), REP.
JOSE VIRGILIO BAUTISTA (Party-List Sanlakas), REP. RENATO MAGTUBO (Party-List Partido
Manggagawa),petitioners,
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondents.

FACTS
MERALCO filed with the ERC an Application for an increase in rates. MERALCO also prayed ex parte for
the grant of a provisional authority to implement the increase according to the schedule attached to its
Application. The National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms, Inc. (NASECORE), in a Letter
addressed to then ERC Chairman Manuel R. Sanchez (Sanchez), informed him of its intention to file an
Opposition to MERALCOs Application. Petitioner Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) also expressed its
intention to file an opposition to MERALCOs Application. However, the ERC, without first resolving the
Motions for Production of Documents of NASECORE and FDC and apparently without considering
Lualhatis Opposition, issued an Order provisionally approving MERALCOs ex parte application for rate
increase. FDC argues that the Order of the ERC is void for having been issued without legal or statutory
authority. It also contends that Rule 3, Section 4(e) of the Implementing Rules of the EPIRA is
unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power. FDC further asserts that the said
Order is void for having been issued by the ERC with grave abuse of discretion and manifest bias. In
support of its prayer for the issuance of injunctive relief, FDC claims that the implementation by
MERALCO of the provisional rate increase will result in irreparable prejudice to FDC and others similarly
situated unless the Court restrains such implementation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate adjustments.
RULING
Yes, The OSG contends that ERC has statutory authority to issue provisional orders, including provisional
rate increases. It points out that the EPIRA expressly states that the powers of the Energy Regulatory
Board (ERB) under E.O. No. 172 shall be exercised by the ERC. ERC authority is found in Secs. 44 and 80
of the EPIRA.
The ERC is endowed with the statutory authority to approve provisional rate adjustments under the
aegis of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. The sections read, thus:
SEC. 44. Transfer of Powers and Functions. The powers and functions of the Energy Regulatory Board
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby transferred to the ERC. The foregoing transfer
of powers and functions shall include all applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment,
property and personnel as may be necessary.
Sec. 80. Applicability and Repealing Clause. The applicability provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
146, as amended, otherwise known as the "Public Services Act;" Republic Act 6395, as amended,
revising the charter of NPC; Presidential Decree 269, as amended, referred to as the National
Electrification Decree; Republic Act 7638, otherwise known as the "Department of Energy Act of 1992;"
Executive Order 172, as amended, creating the ERB; Republic 7832 otherwise known as the "Anti-
Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994;" shall continue to have full
force and effect except insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act.
The provisions with respect to electric power of Section 11(c) of Republic Act 7916, as amended, and
Section5(f) of Republic Act 7227 are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
[G.R. No. 141314. April 9, 2003] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ENERGY REGULATORY
BOARD, petitioner, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondent.
FACTS
MERALCO filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for revised rates, with an average
increase. Then, he ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition that in the event the ERB
determines that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected by
MERALCO shall be refunded to its customers or credited in their favor. The Commission on Audit (COA)
conducted an examination of the books of accounts and records of MERALCO and thereafter
recommended, among others, that: (1) income taxes paid by MERALCO should not be included as part of
MERALCOs operating expenses and (2) the net average investment method or the number of
months use method should be applied in determining the proportionate value of the properties used
by MERALCO during the test year. COA submitted its "COA Report" which contained, among others, the
recommendation not to include income taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its operating expenses for
purposes of rate determination and the use of the net average investment method for the computation
of the proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year for the
determination of the rate base. Subsequently, the ERB rendered its decision adopting the above
recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment. The ERB held that income
tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be borne by the stockholders who are
recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of their business.
ISSUE
Whether in ruling that income tax paid by MERALCO should be treated as part of its operating expenses
and thus considered in determining the amount of increase in rates imposed by MERALCO
RULING
No. American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are
persuasive for no court holds a patent on correct decisions. Our laws must be construed in accordance
with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each
law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed
to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be
stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others.
Rate regulation calls for a careful consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances material to
each application for an upward rate revision. Rate regulators should strain to strike a balance between
the clashing interests of the public utility and the consuming public and the balance must assure a
reasonable rate of return to public utilities without being unreasonable to the consuming public. What
is reasonable or unreasonable depends on a calculus of changing circumstances that ebb and flow with
time. Yesterday cannot govern today, no more than today can determine tomorrow.
Prescinding from these premises, we reject MERALCOs insistence that the non-inclusion of income tax
payments as a legitimate operating expense will deny public utilities a fair return of their investment.
This stubborn stance is belied by the report submitted by the COA on the audit conducted on
MERALCOs books of accounts and the findings of the ERB.
Republic vs. Medina 41 SCRA 643 (1971)
FACTS:
Manila Electric Company (hereinafter termed MERALCO) filed an application with the Public
Service Commission seeking approval of revised rate schedules, with increased charges, claiming that
the floating exchange rate and economic conditions resulting there from increased its operating and
maintenance expenses by more than 40%, and likewise increased the peso cost of servicing its foreign
debts, causing it to incur an operational deficit and net loss of over one million pesos a month. The
proposed new rates, applicant contended, would give it a reasonable return of below 12% of the
present value of its properties devoted to the public service, and implicated no additional burden to
small consumers (of 100 KWH or less per month) constituting around 52% of petitioner's customers.
The Republic and other oppositors filed an opposition to respondent MERALCO's main application for
increase in rate charges on the ground that the floating rate of exchange notwithstanding, the
applicant's sound financial condition is still capable of maintaining efficient service and meeting due
payments on its obligations, with a reasonable rate of return on its investment; that the applicant's cash
reserves accumulated and realized from its huge net annual profits over the past years is capable of
sustaining itself without resorting to borrowings, despite the alleged increase in operating expenses;
that the proper basis of rate fixing is the fair value of its property useful and being used in the service of
the public, without regard to encumbrance or indebtedness; that the increase in rate sought is excessive
and unreasonable and will bring about greater hardship to the people, as well as directly cause increase
in the cost of production which will have to be unduly borne by the consuming public; and that the rate
of increase prayed for cannot be supported by the evidence to be presented in justification thereof,
apart from other grounds that may become apparent in the course of the proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order on May 20 170, authorizing the provisional rates is valid.
HELD/RULING:
No. It having been agreed that the evidence submitted in connection with, or in support of, the
provisional rates should be taken as evidence submitted on the merits of the petition, and a decision on
the merits having been rendered by the Commission, after consideration of all the evidence submitted
by the parties, the review of the Public Service Commission order of 20 May 1970 (authorizing the
provisional rates) would serve no practical purpose, since the decision on the merits superseded said
order, and the moneys collected there under by Meralco would have to be returned or credited to
customers in so far as they exceeded the rates authorized by the ultimate decision. Anyway, the brief of
petitioner Gonzalez in the Case L-32464 discusses the propriety of the authorization of provisional rates.
It is contended by petitioner Gonzalez, however, that the provisional rate proceedings were void for
want of jurisdiction, because the notice of hearing was first published in two newspapers of general
circulation beginning 9 May 1970, and continued for 10 consecutive days until 19 May 1970; that the
hearings on the provisional rates actually started 14 May, and said rates were approved on 20 May
1970.
Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative vs. ERB, 632 SCRA 96 (2010)
FACTS:
On February 8, 1996, the Association of Mindanao Rural Electric Cooperatives, as representative
of SURNECO and of the other 33 rural electric cooperatives in Mindanao, filed a petition before the then
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) for the approval of the formula for automatic cost adjustment and
adoption of the National Power Corporation (NPC)restructured rate adjustment to comply with Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7832.4 The case was docketed as ERB Case No. 96-49, and later consolidated with
identical petitions of other associations of electric cooperatives in the Philippines. In an Order dated
February 19, 1997, the ERB granted SURNECO and other rural electric cooperatives provisional authority
to use and implement the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) formula pursuant to the mandatory
provisions of R.A. No. 7832 and its IRR, with a directive to submit relevant and pertinent documents for
the Boards review, verification, and confirmation. While the passage of R.A. No. 91366 led to the
creation of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), replacing and succeeding the ERB. All pending
cases before the ERB were transferred to the ERC. ERB Case No. 96-49 was re-docketed as ERC Case No.
2001-343.In the Order dated June 17, 2003, the ERC clarified ERBs earlier policy regarding the PPA
formula to be used by the electric cooperatives, viz. After a careful evaluation of the records, the
Commission noted that the PPA formula which was approved by the ERB was silent on whether the
calculation of the cost of electricity purchased and generated in the formula should be "gross" or "net"
of the discounts. To attain uniformity in the implementation of the PPA formula, the Commission has
resolved that: 1. In the confirmation of past PPAs, the power cost shall still be based on "gross," and2. In
the confirmation of future PPAs, the power cost shall be based on "net."The electric cooperatives filed
their respective motions for clarification and/or reconsideration. Hence, the ERC issued anOrder7 dated
January 14, 2005, stating that the PPA was a cost-recovery mechanism, not a revenue-generating
scheme, so that the distribution utilities or the electric cooperatives must recover from their customers
only the actual cost of purchased power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SURNECO disallow its use of the multiplier scheme to compute its system loss.
HELD/RULING:

No. SURNECO cannot insist on using the multiplier scheme even after the imposition of the system loss
caps under Section10 of R.A. No. 7832. Indeed, under National Electrification Administration
Memorandum No. 1-A, the use of the multiplier scheme allows the recovery of system losses even
beyond the caps mandated in R.A. No. 7832, which is intended to gradually phase out pilferage losses as
a component of the recoverable system losses by the distributing utilities such as SURNECO. However, it
is totally repugnant to and incompatible with the system loss caps established in R.A. No. 7832, and is
repealed by Section 16 of the law. As between NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, a mere administrative
issuance, and R.A. No. 7832, a legislative enactment, the latter must prevail. Additionally, the PPA
formula provided in the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 was only a model to be used as a guide by the electric
cooperatives in proposing their own PPA formula for approval by the then Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB).Sections 4 and 5, Rule IX of the IRR directed the electric cooperatives to apply for approval of such
formula with the ERB so that the system loss caps under the law would be incorporated in their
computation of power cost adjustments.

The IRR did not provide for a specific formula; therefore, there was nothing in the IRR that was
amended or could have been amended relative to the PPA formula. The IRR left to the ERB, now the
Energy Regulatory Commission, the authority to approve and oversee the implementation of the electric
cooperatives PPA formula in the exercise of its rate-making power over them. Surigao del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) vs. Energy Regulatory Commission. The regulation of rates to be charged
by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the
control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is use for a
public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject
to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be
withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same
is subject to public regulation.


Tatad vs. Secretary of DOE, 281 SCRA 330 (1997)

FACTS:

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has
always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these
innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA
8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and
petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject
only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He
claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported
refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff
differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors
in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined
petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined
crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.

HELD/RULING:
No. The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the
Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free
competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in
the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell
and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works
to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts
deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players
that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own
will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will
suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an
uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective
players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and
they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to
the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players
insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by
requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

GARCIA vs. CORONA G.R No. 132451, December 17, 1999 (321 SCRA 218)

FACTS:
On November 5, 1997, this Court in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy and Lagman,
et al., v. Hon.Ruben Torres, et al., declared Republic Act No. 8180, entitled "An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes", unconstitutional, and its implementing Executive
Order No. 392 void.
As a result of the Tatad decision, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8479, a new deregulation
law without the offending provisions of the earlier law. Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, a member of
Congress, has now brought this petition seeking to declare Section 19 thereof, which sets the time of full
deregulation, unconstitutional. After failing in his attempts to have Congress incorporate in the law the
economic theory he espouses, petitioner now asks us, in the name of upholding the Constitution, to
undo a violation which he claims Congress has committed.
Petitioner contends that Section 19 of R.A. 8479, which prescribes the period for the removal of
price control on gasoline and other finished products and for the full deregulation of the local
downstream oil industry, is patently contrary to public interest and therefore unconstitutional because
within the short span of five months, the market is still dominated and controlled by an oligopoly of the
three (3) private respondents, namely, Shell, Caltex and Petron.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 19 of R.A No. 8479 is glaringly pro-oligopoly, anti-competition and anti-
people, being patently unconstitutional and violative of the laws

RULING:
A calculus of fear and pessimism, however, does not justify the remedy petitioner seeks: that we
now overturn a law enacted by Congress and approved by the Chief Executive. The Court must act on
valid legal reasons that will explain why we should interfere with vital legislation. To strike down a
provision of law we need a clear showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute has allowed
to be done. Since there is no clear showing that Section 19 of R.A. 8479 has violated the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade, I vote that the present petition
be DISMISSED.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals G.R.No. 120865-71
(251 SCRA 42) 1995
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to
execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and
towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that
the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same. EO 927 further defined and
enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed
exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149
thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the
municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore Big fishpen operators took advantage
of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with
fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture
structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal
shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3)
owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures
otherwise demolition shall be effected.

ISSUES:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for
fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
RULING:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927,
specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all
surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160
has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal waters.
The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter
water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since
it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other
hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures
is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for
lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive,
least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the
charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991
on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with
authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal
fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not
repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the
exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its
charter vested on it.
Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92 banning the
shipment of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the same light,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits the catching,
gathering, buying, selling and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms
for a period of 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitiones Airline Shippers Association of Palawan
together with marine merchants were charged for violating the above ordinance and resolution by the
city and provincial governments. The petitioners now allege that they have the preferential rights as
marginal fishermen granted with privileges provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code,
invoking the invalidity of the above-stated enactments as violative of their preferential rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the local government units violative
of the preferential rights of the marginal fishermen?
RULING:
No, the enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were not violative of their preferential
rights. The enactment of these laws was a valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to protect public
interests and the public right to a balanced and healthier ecology. The rights and privileges invoked by
the petitioners are not absolute. The general welfare clause of the local government code mandates for
the liberal interpretation in giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic development and to
upgrade the life of the people in the community. The LGUs are endowed with the power to enact fishery
laws in its municipal waters which necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances in order to
effectively carry out the enforcement of fishery laws in their local community.
HIZON VS CA- ALEXANDRA CONDO CORP. VS LLDA (NO DIGEST)
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP VS. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, [G.R. NO. 191427, MAY 30,
2011]
Facts:
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, found that Universal Robina Corp. failed to
complywith government standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. After conducting hearings, the
LLDA resolved that respondent is found to be discharging polluted wastewater. Petitioner moved to
reconsider however the LLDA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order to
pay the penalties. Petitioner challenged by certiorari the orders before the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court went on to chidepetitioners petition for certiorari as premature since the law provides
for an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President,
a remedy which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial intervention.

Issue:
Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as
grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Held:
No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The
thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The
rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution
of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed. Petitioner had thus available administrative
remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR
Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best,
speculative and presumptuous. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to
be heard before the case against him is decided.

MMDA VS JANCOM- HENARES V LTFRB ( NO DIGEST)


G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979 ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Plaintiff (formerly known as "Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia") is a limited partnership and defendant Feati Bank
and Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the
Highway Hills Subdivision. The plaintiff as vendor and the vendee entered into separate agreements of
sale on installments over two parcels of land. The said vendees transferred their rights and interests
over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase
price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the
agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions. The
petitioner acquired and issued in its name, respectively and the building restrictions were also
annotated therein. However, the respondent bought directly to Emma Chavez the said parcel of land.
Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and
industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong,
Rizal. It alleges that plaintiff-appellant 'completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said
subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos Avenue" and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it
"only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years after the area had been declared a commercial and
industrial zone.
ISSUE
Whether or not the said resolution is valid exercise of police power.
RULING
The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as an exercise of
police power is without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said resolution was never questioned
before it. The rule is that the question of law or of fact which may be included in the appellant's
assignment of errors must be those which have been raised in the court below, and are within the issues
framed by the parties.
the validity of the resolution was admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts below. when
plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. The only controversy then as stated by the trial court was
whether or not the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong ... which declared lots Nos. 4
and 5 among others, as a part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, prevails over
the restrictions constituting as encumbrances on the lots in question. Having admitted the validity of the
subject resolution below, even if impliedly, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position on appeal.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act," empowers a Municipal
Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations";for the municipality. Clearly, the law
does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution
No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the
word "regulation" under the provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power
exists "(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... "
An examination of Section 12 of the same law which prescribes the rules for its interpretation likewise
reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be "liberally construed in its favor" and that
"(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the
local government and it shall be presumed to exist." The same section further mandates that the
general welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to local
governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the people
in the community. The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a
contract between "a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other," in which
case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not
apply in the case at bar.
Technology Developers, Inc. vs. CA, 193 SCRA 147 (1991)
FACTS:
Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal briquette. On
February 16, 1989, they received a letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full
cessation of the operation of the petitioners plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also requested the
company to show to the office of the mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayors
permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. Since the
company failed to comply in bringing the required documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without
notice, caused the padlock of companys plant premises, effectively causing stoppage of its operation.
Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary
injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.
The lower court ruled against the company. The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the mayor has authority to order the closure of the plant.

Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of discretion.

HELD/RULING:
1. Yes. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether
there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a
business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of
Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to
protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for
a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to
control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the
operation of the business.

2. No. The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the
fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health
of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders
and it was required to bring the following: a. Building permit; b. Mayor's permit; and c. Region III-
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit. This action of the Acting
Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
directed to the Provincial Governor through channels. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued
only after an investigation was made. It found that the fume emitted by the plant of petitioner goes
directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.

AC ENTERPRISES, INC. VS FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORP. MMDA VS CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA
BAY (NO DIGEST)
Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary
477 SCRA 436 (2005)

FACTS: This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various
concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying, for lack of
cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 635.

At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President [President Ramos], through
Proclamation No. 635, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications.

The petioners opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of dump site under the
territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their constutents. Moreso, the the dump site is
to be constructed in Watershed reservation.
Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal and Municipality of
San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of President Estrada in 2003, the
dumpsite was re-opened.

A temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not raised the question that
the project was not consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take it into
consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump sites permanent closure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality of San
Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project

HELD: The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."

Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No.
635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code,
which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.

Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all national agencies
and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local government units, non-governmental
and people's organization, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires prior
consultations before a program shall be implemented by government authorities ans the prior approval
of the Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Pao, Section 2 (c), requiring
consultations with the appropriate local government units, should apply to national government
projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular community implementing
the project.

Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining order,
Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the Court of
Appeals that they had conducted the required consultations. However, the ambivalence of his reply was
brought to the fore when at the height of the protest rally and barricade made by the residents of
petitioners to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal
openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any
further attempt to dump garbage in their province.

Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the municipality,
grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section
16 of th(e) Code. These include:

(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of
endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; [Section 447
(1)(vi)]

(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the
municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land within the
jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning
ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws,
rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating
the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with
the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]

(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and
facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities,
providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal forests and
watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects .and,
subject to existing laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an
efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source of the water
supply; regulating the construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and
reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this
purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of
said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct,
pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the
consumption, use or wastage of water.*Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)+

Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.

Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.

GR NO 172835 Air Philippines Corporation vs Pennwsell Inc

FACTS

Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air
transportation services while respondent Pennswell, Inc. was engaged in the manufacturing and selling
of industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants. Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner
sundry goods in trade but petitioner failed to fully pay their obligation, thus respondent filed a
complaint. Petitioner alleged that it was defrauded by respondent for its previous sale of four items.
Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely altered the names and labels of
such goods. The petitioner also stated that a conference was held between petitioner and respondent ,
whereby the parties agreed that respondent would return to petitioner the amount it previously paid.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical
components of the following products. The RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioners motion.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to
disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. The RTC reversed its
decision, hence a petition for certiorari was filed at the appellate court, which denied the Petition as
well as the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner brought the instant Petition before SC.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it
upheld the ruling of the trial court that the chemical components or ingredients of respondents
products are trade secrets or industrial secrets that are not subject to compulsory disclosure

HELD
No. The products are covered by the exception of trade secrets being divulged in compulsory disclosure.
Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private character of trade secrets. There is a privilege
not to disclose ones trade secrets. The Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and banking
transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as
embodied in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 77of Republic Act
7394, or the Consumer Act of the Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical
components of its products. . While it is true that all consumer products domestically sold, whether
manufactured locally or imported, shall indicate their general make or active
ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to respondent. Respondents
specialized lubricants are not consumer products. Its products are not intended for personal, family,
household or agricultural purposes. Rather, they are for industrial use, specifically for the use of aircraft
propellers and engines. The revelation of respondents trade secrets serves no better purpose to the
disposition of the main case pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can
be gleaned from the facts, petitioner received respondents goods in trade in the normal course of
business. To be sure, there are defenses under the laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner.
On the other hand, the greater interest of justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade
secrets. Weighing the conflicting interests between the parties, SC rules in favor of the greater interest
of respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive
economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.
SHELL PHIL. EXPLORATION VS JALOS- LLDA VS CA (NO DIGEST)

Merida vs People GR no. 158182 12 June 2008
Facts:
Merida has been charged with the violation of Sec 68 of PD 705 for cutting, gathering and
transporting the lone nara tree inside the property of Tansiongco. Upon confrontation, Merida said that
he cut the tree upon the orders of Vicar Calix who supposedly bought the property from Tansiongco.
Issue:
a. Whether or not Merida can be prosecuted for violation of PD 705 Sec 68 for cutting trees in a private
land
Ruling:
a. Yes, Merida can be prosecuted for violation of PD 705 Sec 68 for cutting trees in a private
land. . Sec 68 of PD 705 has stated that Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx . The law did not distinguish
whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts under the aforementioned law is the
owner of the property, for what is material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not
the person or entity involved or charged with its violation possesses the required permit, license or
authorization from DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forest products.
ROLDAN VS ARCA (NO DIGEST)

G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006
Eduardo Hernandez, et al.
vs.
NAPOCOR

Facts: NAPOCOR began the construction of steel towers to support overhead high tension cables in
connection with its 230 kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project, which passes
through petitioners homes. This alarmed the petitioners for their research showed that said steel
towers could expose them to electromagnetic fields, which could cause illnesses like cancer or leukemia.
When negotiations between the parties failed, petitioners filed a complaint for damages and TRO or writ
of preliminary injunction against NAPOCOR, but the latter sought for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction,
citing PD 1818, which provides that no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction toissue any
restraining order or injunction in any case, dispute, orcontroversy involving government infrastructure
project. The trial court was of the view that PD 1818 is not applicable in the present case due to the
health risks involved.
Issue: Should PD 1818 be applied?
Held: No. The prohibition of any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects
extends only to the issuance ofinjunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this
dimension and involvingquestions of law, courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to
restrain or prohibit administrative acts. In the case at bar, petitioners sought issuance of preliminary
injunction on the ground that NAPOCOR impinged on their right to health as enshrined in Art. II, Sec.15
of the Constitution. Respondent also failed to conduct a prior consultation with petitioners, as the
affected community, a requirement embodied in Sec. 27 of the Local Government Code. These
questions of law thus divest the case from the protective mantle of PD 1818. In the present case, the
far-reaching irreversible effects to human safety should be the primordial concerns over presumed
economic benefits as alleged by the NAPOCOR. For what use will modernization serve if it proves to be a
scourge on an individuals fundamental right, not just to health and safety, but, ostensibly, to life
preservation itself, in all of its desired quality?