ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CONSOLIDATED CASES

OPOSA VS FACTORAN, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)- YSMAEL VS DEPUTY EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY, 190 SCRA 167 (1990) (no digest)
LAGUA VS CUSI, 160 SCRA 69 (1983)
FACTS: A memorandum was issued preventing the passage of Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks
loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel on the national highway loading towards where the
vessel was berthed. In compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant Eastcoast
closed the road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented
their passage thereof while the vehicles and trucks of other people were curiously not disturbed
and were allowed passess on the same road. It resulted that the loading of logs on the M/S
"Kyofuku Maru" was discontinued. When Plaintiffs Laguas were already resuming the hauling
operations of their logs towards the Japanese Vessel, again that same road, only the day before
ordered by the BFD to be opened for use and passage by plaintiffs, was closed to them by
Defendant Eastcoast's security men upon a radio message order of Defendant Maglana. Even
the vessel M/S "Kyofuku Maruwas" ordered by Defendant Maglana to untie her anchor contrary
to existing laws, rules and regulations of the Bureau of Customs and the Philippine
Coastguard.Given no recourse in the face of the blatant and illegal closure of the road in
defiance of BFD orders to the contrary by the Defendant Eastcoast through the order of
Defendant Maglana, Plaintiff Laguas had to depart postpaste to Mati, Davao Oriental, from
Baganga where the shipment and the road closure were made, to seek the assistance of the PC
thereat. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss argued that petitioner Daylinda
Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered as an "agent" or "dealer" of logs
in the Bureau of Forestry.The Court agrees with the defendants that under the law, the Bureau
of Forest Development has the exclusive power to regulate the use of logging road and to
determine whether their use is in violation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Forest Development has the jurisdiction to determine first
the legality of closure of logging roads before the case be directed to the regular courts
HELD: NO. P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any
power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging
road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for
damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for
damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure
was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be
disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial
proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to
determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of
damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development. As we have held in Ateneo de Manila
University v. Court of appeals (145 SCRA 100, 110):
HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, 126 SCRA 69 (1983)
FACTS: There were two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Court of
Appeals which declared the disputed property as forestland, not subject to titling in favor of
private persons, Borre and Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal
of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land
was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the
publicdomain.Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot
No. 885containing 117,956 square meters wasconcerned and prayed that title to said portionbe
confirmed and registered in his name.
Issue: Whether or not the lot in question can be subject of registration and confirmation of title in
thename of the private person
HELD: The opposition of the Director of Forestry wasstrengthened by the appellate court's
findingthat timber licenses had to be issued to certainlicensees and even Jose Amunategui
himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cuttimber within the area. It was only sometime
in1950 that the property was converted intofishpond but only after a previous warning fromthe
District Forester that the same could not bedone because it was classified as "publicforest.A
forested area classified as forest land of thepublic domain does not lose such
classificationsimply because loggers or settlers may havestripped it of its forest cover. "Forest
lands" donot have to be on mountains or in out of theway places. Swampy areas covered
bymangrove trees, nipa palms, and other treesgrowing in brackish or sea water may also
beclassified as forest land. The possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripeninto
private ownership. Therefore, the lot inquestion never ceased to be classified as forestland of
public domain.
REPUBLIC VS NAGUIAT, 479 SCRA 598 (1989)

FACTS: Respondent applies for registration of title to 4 parcels of land contending she is the
owner of the said land which she acquired from the LID Corporation which in turn acquired the
same from persons who have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years. The Republic
filed in opposition that said lands belong to the public domain and not subject to private
appropriation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the land in dispute as a forest land belonging to public domain may be
appropriated as private property.

Ruling: For a public forest land/reserves to be subject for private appropriation, it requires an
express and positive act of the government that it will become a part of alienable and disposable
agricultural lands of public domain. Occupation in the concept of an owner cannot ripen into
private ownership and be registered to as a title.

G.R. No. 32266. February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL
Facts: The land involved in this case consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps
located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on
January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the
Court of First Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the
land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. Both the petitioner
and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land.
Issue: Whether or not mangrove swamps, or manglares, are part of our public forest lands.
Held: Yes. Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the
public forests of the Philippines as defined in Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917.
The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy is accepted and
invoked by the executive department. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and
may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest
land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983
SERAFIN B. YNGSON
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE
GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ
Facts: A number of people, including the petitioner and private respondents, applied for a permit
to utilize 66 hectares of mangrove swamps for fishpond purposes, but were not granted, the
area still being considered to be communal forest. When the area was released for said
purpose, the three private parties in this case had conflicting claims on the same. Initially, the
Bureau of Fisheries awarded the whole area in favor of petitioner. However, the Sec. of
Agriculture and Natural Resources later ordered the division of the area into three portions,
one part for each of the petitioner and the private respondents. Not satisfied with the portion
received, petitioner appealed the order.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the whole of the area concerned.
Held: No. It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that
until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of
Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of
these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond
leases, and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer
and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other
purposes. All the applications in this case were premature; therefore not one of the applicants
can claim to have a preferential right over another. The interpretation by the Office of the
President was held to be an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.

G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR.
Facts: Petitioner seeks a declaration that respondent UP does not have the right to supervise
and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale, measure and
seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from
petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its
concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A, ceded in full ownership to the UP by
Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained
of and prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as
damages and costs of the suit.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 3990 empowers the respondent UP to scale, measure
and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land referred to in said act, and collect
the corresponding forest charges.
Held: Yes. Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station
for the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the
College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the
above "reserved" area was "ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the
Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely
removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the
timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of
its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the
latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. An owner has the right
to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. The right
to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the
jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use. In the instant case, that exception is
made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the
license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until I
February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or
royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The
charges should not be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of
Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even
the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to measure the
timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees due thereon.

Tan vs. Director of Forestry (2009)
Facts: The Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain tract of
public forest land situated in Olangapo, Zambales. One of the bidders is petitioner Tan who was
later then awarded such lot. On April 22, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64, in the name
of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal
without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6,
1964, the license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry. It was not signed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by Order No. 60. And because of
this, that Timber license was declared void ab initio and directed to stop the logging operations
of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan. Petitioner averred that the respondents-appellees unlawfully,
illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction,
and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license without just
cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of
his constitutional right to property without due process of law, and in effect, by impairing the
obligation of contracts.
Issue: Whether or not the timber license was valid or not.
Held: No. Court fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber
license was signed and released without authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal
of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. In the first place, in general memorandum order No.
46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber
license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of
public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420. In the second place, at the time it was
released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any
license. However, granting that the timber license was valid, still respondents-appellees can
validly revoke his timber license. As pointed out, the rules and regulations included in the
ordinary timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at
the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an
earlier date, when public interests so require". A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest
or public welfare as in this case.
People vs. Que (1996)
Facts: The accused, being the owner of an Isuzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No.
PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn
lumber (Species of Tanguile) without any license or authority to do so from the proper
authorities causing damage and prejudice to the government. Thus violating Section 68 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705. However, accused-appellant denied the charge against
him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal
source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of violating Section 68, PD705 for possessing
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations.
Held: Yes, accused was guilty. Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without
any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705. There are two
(2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit: (1) Cutting,
gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (2)
Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by
the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering,
collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from
a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other
forest products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
Aquino vs. People
Facts: On behalf of Teachers' Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within
the Teachers' Camp in Baguio City were to be used for the repairs of Teachers' Camp. Pre-
issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Forest
Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted
an inspection of the trees to be cut. The Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit
allowing the cutting of 14 trees under terms and conditions. However, an information for
violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 was filed against petitioner, Cuteng,
Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, and
without any authority, license or permit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cut trees at Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation of the aforecited law. Petitioner thus
averred that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers' Camp. He allegedly
informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit.
However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map
used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the
overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied
by three other men.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
Held: No. Petitioner cannot be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is
not an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or
collection, or is in possession of the pine trees. There are two distinct and separate offenses
punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit: (1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority; and (2) Possession of timber or other
forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.
The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise
the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed
the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of
the cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers' Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not
likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused were
acquitted of the charges against them.
Merida vs People GR no. 158182 12 June 2008
Facts:
Merida has been charged with the violation of Sec 68 of PD 705 for cutting, gathering
and transporting the lone nara tree inside the property of Tansiongco. Upon confrontation,
Merida said that he cut the tree upon the orders of Vicar Calix who supposedly bought the
property from Tansiongco.
Issue:
a. Whether or not Merida can be prosecuted for violation of PD 705 Sec 68 for
cutting trees in a private land
Ruling:
a. Yes, Merida can be prosecuted for violation of PD 705 Sec 68 for cutting trees in a
private land. . Sec 68 of PD 705 has stated that Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx . The law did
not distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts undep[;r
the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is material in
determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or entity involved
or charged with its violation possesses the required permit, license or authorization
from DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forest
products.
ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al. [G.R. No. 152989. September 4, 2002]
Facts:
Madrona is an owner of a parcel of land that is about 60,000 square meters. In 2009,
Merida applied for a Private land transfer permit for him to be able to create a road and a poultry
farm in his property. He was then informed that he can proceed with the cutting of the trees
even while his application was still pending. After 3 weeks, representatives of CENRO raided
his property without a search warrant and the woods were confiscated and were turned over to
a baranggay kagawad. After a few days, CENRo returned with a search warrant and
confiscated the logs. Petitioner filed a case against CENRO, however, he was then prosecuted
for finding a probable cause for violation of PD 705 Section 68.
Issue:
Whether or not the owner of a private property can be prosecuted for violating Sec
68 of PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property
Ruling:
Yes, the owner of a private property can be prosecuted for violating Sec 68 of PD
705 for cutting trees within his own property. Sec 68 of PD 705 has stated that Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
xxx . The law did not distinguish whether or not the person who commits the
punishable acts under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what
is material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or
entity involved or charged with its violation possesses the required permit, license or
authorization from DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or other
forest products.
People vs Dator 344 SCRA 222 (2000)
Facts:
On October 29, 1993, Dator feloniously possessed 1,560 board feet of assorted lumber
flitches valued at 23,500 php without any legal document. The lumber was boarded to a Isuzu
cargo truck. He was then charged and pleaded not guilty. The lower court, after trial, found the
accused guilty of violation of Sec 68 of PD 705.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding Dator guilty of violation of the said law
beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
No, the lower court did not err in finding Dator guilty of violation of Sec 68 or PD 705.
The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo
and Dita lumber, as well as his subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[22] Section 68 of the code.
MONGE VS PP
548 SCRA 42 (2008)

FACTS: On 20 July 1994, petitioner and Potencio were found by barangay tanods Serdan and
Molina in possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber in Barangay
Santo Domingo, Iriga City. Right there and then, the tanods demanded that they be shown the
requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce any. Petitioner fled the scene in
that instant whereas Potencio was brought to the police station for interrogation, and thereafter,
to the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO). The
DENR-CENRO issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces of lumber indicating that the items,
totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been seized from Potencio. Later
on, petitioner was arrested, but Potencios whereabouts had been unknown since the time of
the seizure until he surfaced on 3 January 1998. An information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Iriga City, Branch 35 charging petitioner and Potencio with violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of
1997.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner violated Sec 68 of PD 705

HELD: Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct
and separate offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber
or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land without any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents required under existing laws and regulations. DENR
Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the
transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 thereof materially requires that the
transport of lumber be accompanied by a certificate of lumber origin duly issued by the DENR-
CENRO. In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing
timber or other forest products may be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. In
the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting
and removal of forest products are legal precisely because mere possession of forest products
without the requisite documents consummates the crime.
It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the subject mahogany
lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the requisite legal documents, taken together,
has already given rise to criminal liability under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the
second act punished thereunder. The direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as
a state witness on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioners
liability. Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber
found in his possession nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited by Potencio to
provide the latter assistance in transporting the said lumber. P.D. No. 705 is a special penal
statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As such, in prosecutions under its
provisions, claims of good faith are by no means reliable as defenses because the offense is
complete and criminal liability attaches once the prohibited acts are committed. In other words,
mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even
absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. It would therefore make no difference at all whether it
was petitioner himself or Potencio who owned the subject pieces of lumber.

TAOPA VS PP
571 SCRA 610 (2008)

FACTS: The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes
seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber (113 pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany
Group and Apitong species without any authority and/or legal documents as required under
existingforest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest) and arrested its driver,
Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On
investigation, Cuison pointed to Petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the
owners of the seized lumber. Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were charged with violating Section
68 of Presidential Decree(PD) No. 705 as amended, in the RTC Virac, Catanduanes. Taopa,
Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, RTC found
them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Only Taopa and Cuison appealed to CA,
Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision read: In this petition, Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him alleging
that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he
was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705

HELD: Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopas alibi because Cuisons
testimony proved Taopas active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular,
the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopas house
and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the
truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopas (and Ogalescos) exercise of
dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-
accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the
required legal documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere
sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt.
We are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended, is punished as qualified theft. The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and
possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized
lumber was P67,630. Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty
should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14
years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the
excess of P47,630. The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposable on Taopa shall
be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be
anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

PAAT vs CA
266 SCRA 167 (1997)

FACTS: The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR
personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required
documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,
CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private
respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director
Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugans action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the
truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private
respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan.
RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private
respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial
court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the
trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.
Whether or not the petitioners contention is correct that the administrative officers of the
DENR allegedly have no power to perform seizure and forfeiture of the truck under the
law
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty for violating Sec 68-A of PD 705


HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of court intervention is fatal to ones
cause of action.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and
uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded
(1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative
agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9)
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken
and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections
68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in
view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have
been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over
the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly
Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or
other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water
or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances
utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to
dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in
favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it
must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the
statute.
[33]
Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the
evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will
advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable
under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July
12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private
respondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. We
disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by
E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the aforementioned
Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:
SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without
license. - Any person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or
from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or
permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx. (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before its
amendment by E.O.277 )
SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without
license. -Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or possesstimber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705
as amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the
act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without
authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that
provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from
the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty
of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . When the statute is clear and
explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the
law.

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC. VS CA- MOMONGAN VS OMIPON (NO DIGEST)

G.R. No. 115634 April 27, 2000
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA,
respondents.
FACTS

Petitioners, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR caught two motor vehicles carrying
illegally sourced lumber , where the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents
and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load
of lumber. DENR filed a criminal complaint against the two drivers for forcibly taking the vehicles
from their custody. Complaint was dismissed. One of the two vehicles were again seized by
DENR loaded with illegal lumbers, but the drivers were again acquitted. A copy however of the
decision was furnished to the Secretary of Justice for filing of a case of violation of the Revised
Forestry Code. The vehicle owner and the driver filled an action for replevin where the trial
court granted the application for replevin. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied
by the trial court. Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary
Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting
further proceedings in the civil case for replevin. Court further instructed the petitioners to
secure the confiscated properties, being in custodia legis and referred the case to the appellate
court. Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit, and denied petitioners' claim that
private respondents' complaint for replevin is a suit against the State. Respondent court
brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the subject vehicles
were validly seized and held in custody because they were contradicted by its own findings.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia
legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an
application for replevin, is a suit against the State.

HELD
Yes, since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in
accordance with law, the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. The
seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of
the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice
and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances Property that
is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit, for it is
property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the
law, and not otherwise.
NO, State may not be sued without its consent, and a suit against a public officer for his
official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State
ultimately liable. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to
account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in
question are clearly official in nature, there was no malice nor bad faith on their part.
Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State.
It cannot prosper without the State's consent.
G.R. No. 93540 December 13, 1999
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW, as, Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents.
FACTS
Two police officers of the Marikina intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with narra lumber along the
Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck and brought its cargo to the Personnel
Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR
Office in Quezon City. Discovering the discrepancies in the documentation of the nara lumber,
petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra
lumber and the six-wheeler truck.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the
narra lumber and the six- wheeler truck. Having no action from the private respondent, the
confiscated narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government.
Private respondents filed for the issuance of writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated lumber and six-wheeler truck,
and to enjoin the planned auction sale of the subject narra lumber. Trial court issued an Order
directing petitioners to desist from proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the
hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Private respondents filed an Ex-
Parte Motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin). Trial court issued a
writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply and filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the Orders of the trial court but
was dismissed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision.
However, that motion was denied by the Court of Appeals , hence this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondents can validly be restored possession of their trucks and lumber
based on the writ of replevin.

HELD
No, in order for replevin to prosper, the wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties
sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic
averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued. In the case at bar, the subject narra
lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A
of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277. Property lawfully taken by
virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. When a thing is in official custody of a
judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to
recover it. Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of law
had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken. Sec. 80 of P. D. No.
705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within 6 hours from the time of the
seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations
applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to administrative
confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628 November 20, 2009
APEX MINING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., the mines adjudication board, provincial
mining regulatory board (PMRB-DAVAO), MONKAYO INTEGRATED SMALL SCALE MINERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., ROSENDO VILLAFLOR, BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING
COOPERATIVE, DAVAO UNITED MINERS COOPERATIVE, ANTONIO DACUDAO, PUTING-
BATO GOLD MINERS COOPERATIVE, ROMEO ALTAMERA, THELMA CATAPANG, LUIS
GALANG, RENATO BASMILLO, FRANCISCO YOBIDO, EDUARDO GLORIA, EDWIN ASION,
MACARIO HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO CARUBIO, ROBERTO BUNIALES, RUDY
ESPORTONO, ROMEO CASTILLO, JOSE REA, GIL GANADO, PRIMITIVA LICAYAN,
LETICIA ALQUEZA and JOEL BRILLANTES Management Mining Corporation, Respondents.

FACTS
Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) was granted an Exploration Permit(EP 133) by the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG) which assigned all its rights to EP 133 to the
respondent, Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation which
is alleged to be a 100%-owned subsidiary of MMC. Subsequently, BMG registered SEMs
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)application and the Deed of Assignment.
Several oppositions were filed. The Courts Assailed Decision held that the assignment of
Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the
permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of Marcopper Mining
Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized agents. Since SEM did not claim or submit evidence
that it was a designated agent of MMC, the latter cannot be considered as an agent of the
former that can use EP 133 and benefit from it. It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated
Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a mining right be made with
the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). Moreover, the Assailed Decision pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-renewal since
it was not renewed before or after its expiration.
SEM also filed a Motion for Referral of Case to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments.
Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision. Camilo Banad, et al.,
likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to
them.

ISSUES
Whether or not the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC to
SEM was validly made without violating any of the terms and conditions set forth in
Presidential Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself.
Whether or not the DENR Secretary has authority to issue DAO 66 declaring 729
hectares of the areas covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-
forest lands and open to small-scale mining purposes.

HELD
No, it was invalid. One of the terms and conditions of EP 133 is: That this permit shall
be for the exclusive use and benefit of the permittee or his duly authorized agents and
shall be used for mineral exploration purposes only and for no other purpose. While it
may be true that SEM is a100% subsidiary corporation of MMC, there is no showing that
the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter. As such, the assignment is null and
void as it directly contravenes the terms and conditions of the grant of EP 133. Also, PD
463 (Mineral ResourcesDevelopment Decree), which is the governing law when the
assignment was executed, explicitly requires that the transfer or assignment of mining
rights, including the right to explore a mining area, must be with the prior approval of the
Secretary of DENR. Such is not present in this case. Although EP 133 was extended for
12 months until July 6,1994, MMC never renewed its permit prior and after its
expiration.With the expiration of EP 133 on July 6, 1994, MMC lost any right to the
Diwalwal Gold RushArea. SEM, on the other hand, has not acquired any right to the said
area because the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is invalid. Hence, both MMC and SEM
have not acquired any vested rightover the area covered by EP 133
NO. The DENR Secretary has no power to convert forest reserves into non-forest
reserves. Such power is vested with the President. The DENR Secretary may only
recommend to the President which forest reservations are to be withdrawn from the
coverage thereof. Thus, DAO No. 66 is null and void for having been issued in excess of
the DENR Secretarys authority.


Miners Association of the Philippines vs. Factoran
January 16, 1995
Facts:
Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of
her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and
approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to
negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the
exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57
which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be converted into production-sharing agreements
within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 82
which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing
Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57
shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their
respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an
organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the
instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the two Department Administrative Orders valid.

Ruling:
Yes, AO Nos. 57 and 82 are both constitutional and valid. This is due to the fact that
EO279, in effect, gave the Secretary of Natural Resources the authority to conclude
jointventure, co-production, or production sharing agreements for the exploration, development
and utilization of mineral resources. Furthermore, the constitutionality of these administrative
orders goes to show that the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain is not merely done
through license, concession or lease since the options are now also open to the State through
direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing
agreements. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be
precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying
and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the
necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs.
The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided
legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution.

ALVAREZ VS PICOP RESOURCES- APEX MINING CO, INC. VS SMGMC (NO
DIGEST)

PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. VENERACION
Facts:
Respondent applied with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Development Services, DENR,
Region IX, Zamboanga City for a Declaration of Location (DOL) over Block 159 of the Malangas
Coal Reservation, situated at Barangays Payongan and Kauswagan, Alicia,Zamboanga del Sur.
On 18 May 1989, the Office of the Regional Executive Director (RED) of the DENR informed the
respondent that his DOL cannot be registered since Block 159 was part of the Malangas Coal
Reservation, as provided under Proclamation No. 284, issued by the President on19 July 1938.
With the endorsement of the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA) and the DENR Secretary, the
respondent petitioned the Office of the President for the withdrawal of Block 159 from the coal
reservation and its conversion into a mineral reservation. The petitioner applied for a mineral
prospecting permit over Block 159 with the OEA, which the latter granted on 4 September 1989.
On 18 October 1991, petitioner submitted to the DENR an application/proposal for a Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) over Blocks120, 159 and 160 of the Malangas Coal
Reservation. On 21 February 1992, the Officer-In-Charge Regional Technical Director Dario R.
Mioza of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Developmental Service (MGDS) advised the petitioner
to amend its application for MPSA by excluding Block 159 as the same is covered by the
application of the respondent. Nevertheless, the petitioner did not exclude Block 159 from its
MPSA. Records also show that it had not applied for nor was it able to obtain an Exploration
Permit from the BMGS over Block 159.On 13 April 1992, Presidential Proclamation No.890 was
issued, which effectively excluded Block159 from the operation of Proclamation No. 284,and
declared Block No. 159 as government mineral reservation open for disposition to qualified
mining applicants, pursuant to Executive Order No. 279. Respondent immediately filed, on 28
May 1992, a protest to the petitioners inclusion of Block 159 in its application for MPSA before
the RED of the DENR Office in Zamboanga City. After the parties were heard, the RED, in an
Order, dated 12 April 1993, ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered the petitioner to amend
its MPSA by excluding there from Block 159.On 30 July 1993, petitioner filed an appeal with the
DENR Secretary questioning the Orders issued by the RED. While the case was pending,
respondent applied for a MPSA. On 31 July 1992, he paid the processing fee for a MPSA
covering Block 159 and was able to comply with all other requirements of the MPSA application.
The MAB ruled that the petitioner filed its appeal beyond the five-day prescriptive period
provided under Presidential Decree No.463, which was then the governing law on the matter.
The MAB also decreed that the respondent had preferential mining rights over Block 159. It
ruled that the proper procedure with respect to the mining rights application over Block 159
when it was still part of the Malangas Coal Reservation required the following: (1) application for
prospecting permit with the OEA or other office having jurisdiction over said reservation;
(2)application for exploration permit; (3) application for exclusion of the land from such
reservation;(4) Presidential Declaration on exclusion as recommended by the Secretary; and
(5)application for Lease thereof with priority given to holder of exploration Permit. The MAB
noted that petitioner did not file for an exploration permit nor applied for the exclusion of Block
159. Moreover, petitioner filed a MPSA on18 October 1991, or almost six (6) months prior to the
issuance of Proclamation No. 890 excluding Block 159 from the Malangas Coal Reservation
and allowing its disposition. Thus, the application for a MPSA over Block 159, while it was still
part of a government reservation other than a mineral reservation, was erroneous and improper
and could not have been legally accepted. And, since the records show that only one MPSA
was filed after the issuance of Proclamation 890 that of the respondents, the preferential right
over Block 159 was acquired by the respondent.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner acquired preferential right on mining rights over Block 159.

Held:

No, in the instant case, petitioner failed to state any compelling reason for not filing its
appeal within the mandated period. Instead, the records show that after failing to comply with
the period within which to file their motion for reconsideration on time, they again failed to file
their appeal before the Office of the DENR Secretary within the time provided by law. Natural
resources, mines: as a general rule, prospecting and
exploration of minerals in a government reservation is prohibited under Sec.13 of PD 463 -
However, the same rule provides an exception involving instances when the government
agency concerned allows it. Section13. Areas Closed to Mining Location. No prospecting and
exploration shall be allowed: (a)In military, and other Government reservations except when
authorized by the proper Government agency concerned. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
463 reiterates the rule and clarifies it further by stating that prospecting, exploration and
exploitation of minerals on reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be undertaken
by the proper government agency. As an exception to this rule, qualified persons may undertake
the said prospecting, exploration and exploitation when the said agencies cannot undertake
them.


Atlas Consolidated Mining vs. CA (1990)
Facts:
ATLAS entered into an operating agreement with the heirs of Manuel Cuenco and Jose
P. Velez (collectively referred to herein as CUENCO-VELEZ) the former was granted the right to
explore, develop and operate twelve) mining claims belonging to the latter located at Toledo
City, Cebu. ATLAS entered into a similar agreement with the Biga Copper Mines Exploration
Company (BIGA COPPER), a partnership composed of Pablo B. Gorosin, Francisco B. Gorosin,
Pedro B. Gorosin and Vicente T. Garaygay (collectively referred to herein as the BIGA
PARTNERS). Subject of this Operating Agreement are thirty-one (31) mining claims of BIGA-
COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu. It appears, however, that of the total mining
claims "leased" by ATLAS from both the CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, nine (9) mining
claims overlap. These nine (9) overlapping mining claims became the subject of Mines
Administrative Cases Nos. V-727 and V-750 whereby under date of February 12, 1974, the
Director of Mines resolved the same in favor of CUENCO-VELEZ. BIGA COPPER appealed this
decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who, in a decision affirmed the
decision of the Director of Mines. This later decision was appealed to the Office of the President
under O.P. Case No. 0435. During the pendency of this appeal in the Office of the President,
the parties, namely, CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compromise
agreement. This compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over
the nine (9) overlapping mining claims. Earlier, ATLAS alleged that when it started the operation
of its Carmen Project, which includes some of the mining claims subject of the aforestated
Operating Agreements with BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ ATLAS received numerous
letters from third- parties claiming that they were assignees of BIGA COPPER and the BIGA
PARTNERS over the mining claims. ATLAS allegedly conducted a verification of the said
demands and later on confirmed that before the registration of the Articles of Partnership of
BIGA COPPER, the BIGA PARTNERS sold and/or assigned some of their respective shares,
rights, interests and participations over the mining claims to third parties

and that BIGA
COPPER, acting separately from the BIGA PARTNERS, likewise sold and/or assigned its
undivided shares, interests and participations over the mining claims to third parties. On the
other hand, a certain Alejandro T. Escano wrote ATLAS informing the latter that he is an
assignee of CUENCO-VELEZ with respect to the three (3) mining claims which CUENCO-
VELEZ retained under the compromise agreement with BIGA COPPER. Escano, alleged that
CUENCO-VELEZ had assigned to him fifty percent (50%) of their rights, interests and
participations in the said mining claims. In turn, CUENCO-VELEZ advised ATLAS that their
assignment to Alejandro T. Escano was already revoked or rescinded for failure of the said
assignee to fulfill the conditions contained in their deed of assignment. In the light of the
foregoing situation, ATLAS instituted a petition for declaratory relief with the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch 8, and which was docketed as Civil Case No. 16669-R. Cited as
respondents therein were BIGA COPPER, BIGA PARTNERS, CUENCO-VELEZ and some
thirty-one (31) assignees.

Issue:
Whether or not a person who is not a party to a contract can file a petition for declaratory
relief and seek a judicial interpretation of such contract.

Held:
No, the contention of Atlas that it has interest is without legal ground. ATLAS cannot be
considered as an interested party under the deeds of assignment and, therefore, has no
standing to institute the declaratory action. It cannot be disputed that ATLAS, being one of the
parties to the operating agreements, has an interest therein. A review of the record, in fact,
reveals that ATLAS purports to be seeking a judicial interpretation of its operating agreements
with BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ But after evaluating the lengthy arguments it
presented to justify the declaratory action this Court arrives at one logical conclusionthe
ambiguity is not in the operating agreements themselves but in the validity of the assignments of
mining rights made by BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ to third parties.

Asaphil Construction vs Tuason Jr. 488 SCRA 126 (2006)
Fatcs:
In 1975, Respondent Tuason entered into a Contract for sale and Purchase of Perlite ore with
Induplex wherein the latter agreed to buy all the perlite ore that may be found and mined in
Respondents mining claim, then Induplex will assist Respondent in securing and perfecting his
right over the mining claim.
Respondent then, executed in 1976 an agreement in favor of the Petitioner Asaphil. In 1990,
Respondent filed with the Bureau of Mines of DENR a complaint against Petitioner and Induplex
for declaration of Nullity of the two contracts for Sale and Purchase of Perlite ore. Respondent
alleged that the stockholders of Induplex formed and organized Ibalon who in fact been mining,
extracting and utilizing the perlite ore in Ibalons mining claim, that such is a violation of the
condition imposed by Board of Investments. Also, that Induplex acquired majority stocks of
Asaphil and majority of Ibalons share were transferred to Romero who is also a stockholder of
Asaphil and Ibalon. Respondent claim that said acts adversely affected his interests and the
government as well.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR has jurisdiction over Respondents claim, namely the Annulment of the
Contract for sale and Purchase of perlite ore?
Ruling:
The Court upholds the findings of the DENR Regional Executive Director (RED) that the DENR
does not have jurisdiction over the Respondents claim. At the time (1990) of the filing of the
complaint, the jurisdiction of the DENR over mining disputes and controversies is governed by
P.D no.1281, particularly vesting the Bureau of Mines (now Mines and Geosciences Bureau) of
the DENR with jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or
applicants for and or grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases and/or operators thereof,
including mining service contracts as their mining activities are concerned.
La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association vs Ramos 445 SCRA 1 (2004)
Facts:
In 1987, President Aquino issued E.O 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept,
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which upon appropriate recommendation
of the Secretary the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In 1995, Pres. Ramos
approved RA 7942 which defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations
outlines the procedure for their filing and approval , assignment, transfer and withdrawal, and
fixes their terms .Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements. While
in 1997, counsels for Petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding to stop the
implementation of R.A 7942 and DAO (no.96-40), giving DENR fifteen days from receipt to act
thereon. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted with or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A 7942 valid?
Ruling:
The Court finds the provisions of R.A 7942 to be violative of Sec.2 Art XII of the 1987
Constitution namely the Regalian and Filipinization of Natural Resources . When the parts of the
statute re so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, and that it all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are Unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus
dependent, conditional, or connected must not fall with them. Petition is granted.
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation vs Balite Portal Mining Cooperative 380 SCRA
145 (2002)
Facts:
Case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve
known as the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area, the land has been embroiled in controversy since the
mid 80s due to its gold deposits. From then, thousands of people flocked, to stake their
respective claims. In 1988, Marcopper was granted Exploration Permit (E.P No.133) which
included the hotly contested area.
In 1991, Congress enacted R.A 7076 establishing a Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program to be
implemented by Secretary of DENR and also to authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside
small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts
to small-scale miners under certain conditions. Then, Sec,Factoran issued Dept.Administrative
Order (No.60) declaring hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale
mining.
Subsequently, a petition for cancellation of E.P (no.133) and the admission of a Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) proposal was filed before the DENR Executive Director
docketed as Mining Case (no.8-8-94) Marcopper while case is pending assigned E.P (no.133)
to Petitioner SEM which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the
permit. Mines and Geosciences Bureau registered the application.
Several entities including respondent Balite Communal Portal Mining Corporation filed their
oppositions. In 1997, Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao passed a Resolution (no.26)
authorizing the issuance of Ore Transport Permits (OTPs) to small-scale miners operating in
the Diwalwal area. Then, petitioner filed a complaint for damage before RTC alleging the illegal
issuance of OTPs allowed the extraction and hauling of gold per truck load from SEMs mining
claim. RPA dismissed petitioners claim.
In 1997, Petitioner file before the CA against PMRB Davao, DENR Secretary and Balite which
represent all OTP grantees. It prayed for the Nullification of Memorandum Order 97-03 on the
ground that the direct state utilization espoused therein would impair its vested right under E.P
(no.133).
Issue:
Whether or not the Memorandum Order adopt the direct utilization scheme in resolving the
dispute over the area?
Ruling:
No. The challenged Memorandum Order (97-03) did not conclusively adopt direct state
utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the Memorandum clearly
indicate that what was directed there under was merely a study of this option and nothing else.
Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any management/operating or by profit-
sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, has simply instructed
the DENR Officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility.
Consequently, the petition was premature, the said M.O did not impose any obligation on the
claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties to the dispute. At
this stage, petitioner can show no more than a mere apprehension that the State through the
DENR, would directly take over the mines after the studies point to its viability. But until the
DENR actually does so and Petitioners fear turn into reality, no valid objection can be
entertained against M.O 97-03 on grounds which are purely speculative and anticipatory.
DIDIPIO EARTH- SAVER'S MULTI-PURPOSE ASSOC. VS GOZUN- TATAD VS
SECRETEARY OF DoE (NO DIGEST)

G.R. No. 159149 June 26, 2006
The HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Energy, Petitioner,
vs.
LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent

FACTS
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 33 as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,
adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for
trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
cylinders. The said law imposes a penalty that is monetary for violators. The respondent
association asked the DOE to set aside the circular for being contrary to law. However, the said
department denied the request for lack of merit. The respondent then filed before the trial court
a petition and the trial court nullified the said circular on the ground that it introduced new
offenses not included in the law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Circular issued by DOE is valid
RULING
Yes, For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of
penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute
itself.
The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal
trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. These
specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to
curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.
As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P.
Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts
aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular,
the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed
by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any
maximum monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the
aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on
a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes
are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving
petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding
penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum
pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the
law.
G.R. No. 161113 June 15, 2004
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, ANA MARIA NEMENZO, as President of FREEDOM
FROM DEBT COALITION, MA. TERESA I. DIOKNO-PASCUAL, REP. LORETTA ANN
ROSALES (Party-List Akbayan), REP. JOSE VIRGILIO BAUTISTA (Party-List Sanlakas), REP.
RENATO MAGTUBO (Party-List Partido Manggagawa),petitioners,
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
(MERALCO), respondents.

FACTS
MERALCO filed with the ERC an Application for an increase in rates. MERALCO also prayed ex
parte for the grant of a provisional authority to implement the increase according to the schedule
attached to its Application. The National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms, Inc.
(NASECORE), in a Letter addressed to then ERC Chairman Manuel R. Sanchez (Sanchez),
informed him of its intention to file an Opposition to MERALCOs Application. Petitioner
Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) also expressed its intention to file an opposition to
MERALCOs Application. However, the ERC, without first resolving the Motions for Production
of Documents of NASECORE and FDC and apparently without considering
Lualhatis Opposition, issued an Order provisionally approving MERALCOs ex parte application
for rate increase. FDC argues that the Order of the ERC is void for having been issued without
legal or statutory authority. It also contends that Rule 3, Section 4(e) of the Implementing Rules
of the EPIRA is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power. FDC further
asserts that the said Order is void for having been issued by the ERC with grave abuse of
discretion and manifest bias. In support of its prayer for the issuance of injunctive relief, FDC
claims that the implementation by MERALCO of the provisional rate increase will result in
irreparable prejudice to FDC and others similarly situated unless the Court restrains such
implementation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate adjustments.
RULING
Yes, The OSG contends that ERC has statutory authority to issue provisional orders, including
provisional rate increases. It points out that the EPIRA expressly states that the powers of the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) under E.O. No. 172 shall be exercised by the ERC. ERC
authority is found in Secs. 44 and 80 of the EPIRA.
The ERC is endowed with the statutory authority to approve provisional rate adjustments under
the aegis of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. The sections read, thus:
SEC. 44. Transfer of Powers and Functions. The powers and functions of the Energy
Regulatory Board not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby transferred
to the ERC. The foregoing transfer of powers and functions shall include all applicable
funds and appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel as may be
necessary.
Sec. 80. Applicability and Repealing Clause. The applicability provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the "Public Services
Act;" Republic Act 6395, as amended, revising the charter of NPC; Presidential Decree
269, as amended, referred to as the National Electrification Decree; Republic Act 7638,
otherwise known as the "Department of Energy Act of 1992;" Executive Order 172, as
amended, creating the ERB; Republic 7832 otherwise known as the "Anti-Electricity and
Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994;" shall continue to have full
force and effect except insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act.
The provisions with respect to electric power of Section 11(c) of Republic Act 7916, as
amended, and Section5(f) of Republic Act 7227 are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
[G.R. No. 141314. April 9, 2003] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, petitioner, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondent.
FACTS
MERALCO filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for revised rates, with
an average increase. Then, he ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition that
in the event the ERB determines that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all
excess amounts collected by MERALCO shall be refunded to its customers or credited in their
favor. The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination of the books of accounts and
records of MERALCO and thereafter recommended, among others, that: (1) income taxes paid
by MERALCO should not be included as part of MERALCOs operating expenses and (2) the
net average investment method or the number of months use method should be applied in
determining the proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year.
COA submitted its "COA Report" which contained, among others, the recommendation not to
include income taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its operating expenses for purposes of rate
determination and the use of the net average investment method for the computation of the
proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year for the
determination of the rate base. Subsequently, the ERB rendered its decision adopting the above
recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment. The ERB held
that income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be borne by the
stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of their
business.
ISSUE
Whether in ruling that income tax paid by MERALCO should be treated as part of its operating
expenses and thus considered in determining the amount of increase in rates imposed by
MERALCO
RULING
No. American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At
best, they are persuasive for no court holds a patent on correct decisions. Our laws must be
construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be
deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto.
More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all
and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and
different from others.
Rate regulation calls for a careful consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances
material to each application for an upward rate revision. Rate regulators should strain to strike a
balance between the clashing interests of the public utility and the consuming public and the
balance must assure a reasonable rate of return to public utilities without being unreasonable to
the consuming public. What is reasonable or unreasonable depends on a calculus of changing
circumstances that ebb and flow with time. Yesterday cannot govern today, no more than today
can determine tomorrow.
Prescinding from these premises, we reject MERALCOs insistence that the non-inclusion
of income tax payments as a legitimate operating expense will deny public utilities a fair return
of their investment. This stubborn stance is belied by the report submitted by the COA on the
audit conducted on MERALCOs books of accounts and the findings of the ERB.
Republic vs. Medina 41 SCRA 643 (1971)
FACTS:
Manila Electric Company (hereinafter termed MERALCO) filed an application with the
Public Service Commission seeking approval of revised rate schedules, with increased charges,
claiming that the floating exchange rate and economic conditions resulting there from increased
its operating and maintenance expenses by more than 40%, and likewise increased the peso
cost of servicing its foreign debts, causing it to incur an operational deficit and net loss of over
one million pesos a month. The proposed new rates, applicant contended, would give it a
reasonable return of below 12% of the present value of its properties devoted to the public
service, and implicated no additional burden to small consumers (of 100 KWH or less per
month) constituting around 52% of petitioner's customers.
The Republic and other oppositors filed an opposition to respondent MERALCO's main
application for increase in rate charges on the ground that the floating rate of exchange
notwithstanding, the applicant's sound financial condition is still capable of maintaining efficient
service and meeting due payments on its obligations, with a reasonable rate of return on its
investment; that the applicant's cash reserves accumulated and realized from its huge net
annual profits over the past years is capable of sustaining itself without resorting to borrowings,
despite the alleged increase in operating expenses; that the proper basis of rate fixing is the fair
value of its property useful and being used in the service of the public, without regard to
encumbrance or indebtedness; that the increase in rate sought is excessive and unreasonable
and will bring about greater hardship to the people, as well as directly cause increase in the cost
of production which will have to be unduly borne by the consuming public; and that the rate of
increase prayed for cannot be supported by the evidence to be presented in justification thereof,
apart from other grounds that may become apparent in the course of the proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order on May 20 170, authorizing the provisional rates is valid.
HELD/RULING:
No. It having been agreed that the evidence submitted in connection with, or in support
of, the provisional rates should be taken as evidence submitted on the merits of the petition, and
a decision on the merits having been rendered by the Commission, after consideration of all the
evidence submitted by the parties, the review of the Public Service Commission order of 20 May
1970 (authorizing the provisional rates) would serve no practical purpose, since the decision on
the merits superseded said order, and the moneys collected there under by Meralco would have
to be returned or credited to customers in so far as they exceeded the rates authorized by the
ultimate decision. Anyway, the brief of petitioner Gonzalez in the Case L-32464 discusses the
propriety of the authorization of provisional rates. It is contended by petitioner Gonzalez,
however, that the provisional rate proceedings were void for want of jurisdiction, because the
notice of hearing was first published in two newspapers of general circulation beginning 9 May
1970, and continued for 10 consecutive days until 19 May 1970; that the hearings on the
provisional rates actually started 14 May, and said rates were approved on 20 May 1970.
Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative vs. ERB, 632 SCRA 96 (2010)
FACTS:
On February 8, 1996, the Association of Mindanao Rural Electric Cooperatives, as
representative of SURNECO and of the other 33 rural electric cooperatives in Mindanao, filed a
petition before the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) for the approval of the formula
for automatic cost adjustment and adoption of the National Power Corporation
(NPC)restructured rate adjustment to comply with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7832.4 The case
was docketed as ERB Case No. 96-49, and later consolidated with identical petitions of other
associations of electric cooperatives in the Philippines. In an Order dated February 19, 1997,
the ERB granted SURNECO and other rural electric cooperatives provisional authority to use
and implement the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) formula pursuant to the mandatory
provisions of R.A. No. 7832 and its IRR, with a directive to submit relevant and pertinent
documents for the Boards review, verification, and confirmation. While the passage of R.A. No.
91366 led to the creation of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), replacing and
succeeding the ERB. All pending cases before the ERB were transferred to the ERC. ERB Case
No. 96-49 was re-docketed as ERC Case No. 2001-343.In the Order dated June 17, 2003, the
ERC clarified ERBs earlier policy regarding the PPA formula to be used by the electric
cooperatives, viz. After a careful evaluation of the records, the Commission noted that the
PPA formula which was approved by the ERB was silent on whether the calculation of the cost
of electricity purchased and generated in the formula should be "gross" or "net" of the discounts.
To attain uniformity in the implementation of the PPA formula, the Commission has resolved
that: 1. In the confirmation of past PPAs, the power cost shall still be based on "gross," and2. In
the confirmation of future PPAs, the power cost shall be based on "net."The electric
cooperatives filed their respective motions for clarification and/or reconsideration. Hence, the
ERC issued anOrder7 dated January 14, 2005, stating that the PPA was a cost-recovery
mechanism, not a revenue-generating scheme, so that the distribution utilities or the electric
cooperatives must recover from their customers only the actual cost of purchased power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SURNECO disallow its use of the multiplier scheme to compute its
system loss.
HELD/RULING:

No. SURNECO cannot insist on using the multiplier scheme even after the imposition of
the system loss caps under Section10 of R.A. No. 7832. Indeed, under National Electrification
Administration Memorandum No. 1-A, the use of the multiplier scheme allows the recovery of
system losses even beyond the caps mandated in R.A. No. 7832, which is intended to gradually
phase out pilferage losses as a component of the recoverable system losses by the distributing
utilities such as SURNECO. However, it is totally repugnant to and incompatible with the system
loss caps established in R.A. No. 7832, and is repealed by Section 16 of the law. As between
NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, a mere administrative issuance, and R.A. No. 7832, a legislative
enactment, the latter must prevail. Additionally, the PPA formula provided in the IRR of R.A. No.
7832 was only a model to be used as a guide by the electric cooperatives in proposing their own
PPA formula for approval by the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).Sections 4 and 5, Rule IX
of the IRR directed the electric cooperatives to apply for approval of such formula with the ERB
so that the system loss caps under the law would be incorporated in their computation of power
cost adjustments.

The IRR did not provide for a specific formula; therefore, there was nothing in the IRR
that was amended or could have been amended relative to the PPA formula. The IRR left to the
ERB, now the Energy Regulatory Commission, the authority to approve and oversee the
implementation of the electric cooperatives PPA formula in the exercise of its rate-making
power over them. Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) vs. Energy
Regulatory Commission. The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon
the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of
public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is use for a public purpose and
is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to
regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be
withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued,
the same is subject to public regulation.


Tatad vs. Secretary of DOE, 281 SCRA 330 (1997)

FACTS:

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government
has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws
accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or
purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source,
lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude
oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of
Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the
imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products
violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly
favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the
downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined
petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on
refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.

HELD/RULING:
No. The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art
12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is
contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated
and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the
only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As
the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities.
The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge
of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It
erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market
power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of
pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field.
The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective
players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new
players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new
players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil
industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new
players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil
companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

GARCIA vs. CORONA G.R No. 132451, December 17, 1999 (321 SCRA 218)

FACTS:
On November 5, 1997, this Court in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy and
Lagman, et al., v. Hon.Ruben Torres, et al., declared Republic Act No. 8180, entitled "An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes", unconstitutional, and its
implementing Executive Order No. 392 void.
As a result of the Tatad decision, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8479, a new
deregulation law without the offending provisions of the earlier law. Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia,
a member of Congress, has now brought this petition seeking to declare Section 19 thereof,
which sets the time of full deregulation, unconstitutional. After failing in his attempts to have
Congress incorporate in the law the economic theory he espouses, petitioner now asks us, in
the name of upholding the Constitution, to undo a violation which he claims Congress has
committed.
Petitioner contends that Section 19 of R.A. 8479, which prescribes the period for the
removal of price control on gasoline and other finished products and for the full deregulation of
the local downstream oil industry, is patently contrary to public interest and therefore
unconstitutional because within the short span of five months, the market is still dominated and
controlled by an oligopoly of the three (3) private respondents, namely, Shell, Caltex and
Petron.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 19 of R.A No. 8479 is glaringly pro-oligopoly, anti-competition
and anti-people, being patently unconstitutional and violative of the laws

RULING:
A calculus of fear and pessimism, however, does not justify the remedy petitioner seeks:
that we now overturn a law enacted by Congress and approved by the Chief Executive. The
Court must act on valid legal reasons that will explain why we should interfere with vital
legislation. To strike down a provision of law we need a clear showing that what the Constitution
prohibits, the statute has allowed to be done. Since there is no clear showing that Section 19 of
R.A. 8479 has violated the constitutional prohibition against monopolies and combinations in
restraint of trade, I vote that the present petition be DISMISSED.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals G.R.No. 120865-71
(251 SCRA 42) 1995
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to
execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the
lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same. EO 927 further defined and enlarged
the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by
the term Laguna de Bay Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed
exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149
thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal
waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore Big fishpen operators took advantage of the
occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with
fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture
structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal
shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3)
owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures
otherwise demolition shall be effected.

ISSUES:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for
fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
RULING:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927,
specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted
to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal waters. The provisions
of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights
authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied
repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand,
the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the
purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control
and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and
most demanding of all state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA
which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting
Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with
authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens,
fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the
provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction
to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities
situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92 banning the
shipment of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the same light, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering,
buying, selling and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of
5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitiones Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with
marine merchants were charged for violating the above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial
governments. The petitioners now allege that they have the preferential rights as marginal fishermen
granted with privileges provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code, invoking the invalidity of the
above-stated enactments as violative of their preferential rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the local government units violative of the
preferential rights of the marginal fishermen?
RULING:
No, the enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were not violative of their preferential rights.
The enactment of these laws was a valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to protect public interests
and the public right to a balanced and healthier ecology. The rights and privileges invoked by the
petitioners are not absolute. The general welfare clause of the local government code mandates for the
liberal interpretation in giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic development and to upgrade
the life of the people in the community. The LGUs are endowed with the power to enact fishery laws in its
municipal waters which necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances in order to effectively carry out
the enforcement of fishery laws in their local community.
HIZON VS CA- ALEXANDRA CONDO CORP. VS LLDA (NO DIGEST)
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP VS. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, [G.R. NO.
191427, MAY 30, 2011]
Facts:
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, found that Universal Robina
Corp. failed to
complywith government standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Res
ources (DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. After conducting
hearings, the LLDA resolved that respondent is found to be discharging polluted wastewater.
Petitioner moved to reconsider however the LLDA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
and reiterated its order to pay the penalties.
Petitioner challenged by certiorari the orders before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court w
ent on to chidepetitioners petition for certiorari as premature since the law provides for an
appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the
President, a remedy which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial
intervention.

Issue:
Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

Held:
No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial
system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out
their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides
for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice
to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.
Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its
contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in
futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous.
The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be
heard before the case against him is decided.

MMDA VS JANCOM- HENARES V LTFRB ( NO DIGEST)


G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979 ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Plaintiff (formerly known as "Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia") is a limited partnership and defendant
Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to
the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision. The plaintiff as vendor and the vendee
entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land. The said
vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma
Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the
corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on
installment) and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions. The petitioner
acquired and issued in its name, respectively and the building restrictions were also annotated
therein. However, the respondent bought directly to Emma Chavez the said parcel of land.
Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared
a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. It alleges that plaintiff-appellant 'completely sold and
transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue" and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it "only on July 23, 1962 or more than
two (2) years after the area had been declared a commercial and industrial zone.
ISSUE
Whether or not the said resolution is valid exercise of police power.
RULING
The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as an
exercise of police power is without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said resolution was
never questioned before it. The rule is that the question of law or of fact which may be included
in the appellant's assignment of errors must be those which have been raised in the court
below, and are within the issues framed by the parties.
the validity of the resolution was admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts below.
when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. The only controversy then as stated by the
trial court was whether or not the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong ... which
declared lots Nos. 4 and 5 among others, as a part of the commercial and industrial zone of the
municipality, prevails over the restrictions constituting as encumbrances on the lots in question.
Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution below, even if impliedly, plaintiff-appellant
cannot now change its position on appeal.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act," empowers a
Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations";for the
municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance.
Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory
measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision. As a
matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding ... "
An examination of Section 12 of the same law which prescribes the rules for its interpretation
likewise reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be "liberally construed in its
favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be
interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist." The same section
further mandates that the general welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as
to give more power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare
and material progress of the people in the community. The only exceptions under Section 12
are existing vested rights arising out of a contract between "a province, city or municipality on
one hand and a third party on the other," in which case the original terms and provisions of the
contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case at bar.
Technology Developers, Inc. vs. CA, 193 SCRA 147 (1991)
FACTS:
Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal
briquette. On February 16, 1989, they received a letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo
Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioners plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
The letter also requested the company to show to the office of the mayor some documents,
including the Building permit, mayors permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environmental and
Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. Since the company failed to comply in bringing the
required documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without notice, caused the padlock of companys
plant premises, effectively causing stoppage of its operation. Technology Developers then
instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injuction against
respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower
court ruled against the company. The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the mayor has authority to order the closure of the plant.

Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of discretion.

HELD/RULING:
1. Yes. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition
of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control
Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor
of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his
police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close
the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of
the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business.

2. No. The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution
emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but
also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its
operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following: a. Building permit; b.
Mayor's permit; and c. Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-
Pollution permit. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the
residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through
channels. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was
made. It found that the fume emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding
houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.

AC ENTERPRISES, INC. VS FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORP. MMDA VS CONCERNED
RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY (NO DIGEST)
Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary
477 SCRA 436 (2005)

FACTS: This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and
various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality
and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.

At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President [President
Ramos], through Proclamation No. 635, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal
applications.

The petioners opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of dump site
under the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their constutents. Moreso, the
the dump site is to be constructed in Watershed reservation.
Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal and
Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of President
Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened.

A temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not raised the question
that the project was not consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take
it into consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump sites permanent closure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality
of San Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project

HELD: The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."

Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents,
Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the
Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.

Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local government units,
non-governmental and people's organization, and other concerned sectors of the community
before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section
27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government
authorities ans the prior approval of the Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr.
v. Pao, Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government units,
should apply to national government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance
of the particular community implementing the project.

Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining
order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the
Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required consultations. However, the
ambivalence of his reply was brought to the fore when at the height of the protest rally and
barricade made by the residents of petitioners to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the
municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and
notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their
province.

Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the
municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code. These include:

(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural
resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and
such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes,
or of ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]

(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of
the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land
within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting
integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in
populous centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said
fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]

(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic
services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said
services and facilities, providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and
conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and
other similar forest development projects .and, subject to existing laws, establishing and
providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply
water for the inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the
construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs;
protecting the purity and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose,
extending the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of
said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal,
aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and
regulating the consumption, use or wastage of water.[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]

Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can
be implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.

Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.

GR NO 172835 Air Philippines Corporation vs Pennwsell Inc

FACTS

Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air
transportation services while respondent Pennswell, Inc. was engaged in the manufacturing and
selling of industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants. Respondent delivered and sold
to petitioner sundry goods in trade but petitioner failed to fully pay their obligation, thus
respondent filed a complaint. Petitioner alleged that it was defrauded by respondent for its
previous sale of four items. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely
altered the names and labels of such goods. The petitioner also stated that a conference was
held between petitioner and respondent , whereby the parties agreed that respondent would
return to petitioner the amount it previously paid.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and
chemical components of the following products. The RTC rendered an Order granting the
petitioners motion. Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that
it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is
confidential. The RTC reversed its decision, hence a petition for certiorari was filed at the
appellate court, which denied the Petition as well as the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
brought the instant Petition before SC.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence
when it upheld the ruling of the trial court that the chemical components or ingredients of
respondents products are trade secrets or industrial secrets that are not subject to compulsory
disclosure

HELD
No. The products are covered by the exception of trade secrets being divulged in compulsory
disclosure. Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private character of trade secrets.
There is a privilege not to disclose ones trade secrets. The Supreme Court has declared that
trade secrets and banking transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the
people to information as embodied in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely
on Section 77of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the Philippines, in order to compel
respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. . While it is true that all consumer
products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall indicate their
general make or active
ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to respondent.
Respondents specialized lubricants are not consumer products. Its products are not intended
for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes. Rather, they are for industrial use,
specifically for the use of aircraft propellers and engines. The revelation of respondents trade
secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the main case pending with the RTC,
which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner
received respondents goods in trade in the normal course of business. To be sure, there are
defenses under the laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner. On the other hand, the
greater interest of justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade secrets. Weighing the
conflicting interests between the parties, SC rules in favor of the greater interest of
respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they
derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the
public.
SHELL PHIL. EXPLORATION VS JALOS- LLDA VS CA (NO DIGEST)

Merida vs People GR no. 158182 12 June 2008
Facts:
Merida has been charged with the violation of Sec 68 of PD 705 for cutting, gathering
and transporting the lone nara tree inside the property of Tansiongco. Upon confrontation,
Merida said that he cut the tree upon the orders of Vicar Calix who supposedly bought the
property from Tansiongco.
Issue:
a. Whether or not Merida can be prosecuted for violation of PD 705 Sec 68 for
cutting trees in a private land
Ruling:
a. Yes, Merida can be prosecuted for violation of PD 705 Sec 68 for cutting trees in a
private land. . Sec 68 of PD 705 has stated that Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx . The law did
not distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts under the
aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is material in determining
the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or entity involved or charged
with its violation possesses the required permit, license or authorization from DENR
at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forest products.
ROLDAN VS ARCA (NO DIGEST)

G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006
Eduardo Hernandez, et al.
vs.
NAPOCOR

Facts: NAPOCOR began the construction of steel towers to support overhead high tension
cables in connection with its 230 kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project,
which passes through petitioners homes. This alarmed the petitioners for their research
showed that said steel towers could expose them to electromagnetic fields, which could cause
illnesses like cancer or leukemia. When negotiations between the parties failed, petitioners filed
a complaint for damages and TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against NAPOCOR, but the
latter sought for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, citing PD 1818, which provides that no court
in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction
toissue any restraining order or injunction in any case, dispute, orcontroversy involving
government infrastructure project. The trial court was of the view that PD 1818 is not applicable
in the present case due to the health risks involved.
Issue: Should PD 1818 be applied?
Held: No. The prohibition of any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure
projects extends only to the issuance
ofinjunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or
the exercise of discretion in technical
cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involvingquestions of law, courts could
not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. In the
case at bar, petitioners sought issuance of preliminary injunction on the ground that NAPOCOR
impinged on their right to health as enshrined in Art. II, Sec.15 of the Constitution. Respondent
also failed to conduct a prior consultation with petitioners, as the affected community, a
requirement embodied in Sec. 27 of the Local Government Code. These questions of law thus
divest the case from the protective mantle of PD 1818. In the present case, the far-reaching
irreversible effects to human safety should be the primordial concerns over presumed economic
benefits as alleged by the NAPOCOR. For what use will modernization serve if it proves to be a
scourge on an individuals fundamental right, not just to health and safety, but, ostensibly, to life
preservation itself, in all of its desired quality?