G.R. No.

L-30671 November 28, 1973

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR,
FERNANDO, J .:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the
validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch I,
1
declaring a decision final and executory and of an alias writ of
execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently
issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least,
grave abuse of discretion. As thus simply and tersely put, with the facts being undisputed and
the principle of law that calls for application indisputable, the outcome is predictable. The
Republic of the Philippines is entitled to the writs prayed for. Respondent Judge ought not to
have acted thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of execution must be nullified.
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a summary of facts was
set forth thus: "7. On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R
in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of
P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable
Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final
and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to
execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24, 1969, the
corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June 26, 1969, .... 10. On the strength
of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several
Banks, specially on the "monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits
sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution"; the Philippine Veterans
Bank received the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... 11. The funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans
Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian
personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per
Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP Controller,..."
2
. The paragraph immediately
succeeding in such petition then alleged: "12. Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P.
Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment
issued pursuant thereto are null and void."
3
In the answer filed by respondents, through counsel
Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the only
qualification being that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40.
4

The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this certiorari and
prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the
dictates of the Constitution. .
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty
that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is
readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends."
5
Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it
was indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the
Philippines,
6
with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is
not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss
of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are
far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial
remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go
to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law
suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could
very well be imagined."
7

This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised
charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent."
8
A
corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds
cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of
Public Highways v. San Diego,
9
such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of
Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts
ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by
the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law."
10
Such a principle applies even to
an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee. Director of
Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion,
11
speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left
no doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule which has never been seriously questioned, is that money
in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to
the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State,
by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization
by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they
remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although
the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another
reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids
it."
12

In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the Philippines could
rightfully allege a legitimate grievance.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside
both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the
alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on July
12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.
G.R. No. L-30044 December 19, 1973
LORENZO SAYSON, as Highway Auditor, Bureau of Public Highways, Cebu First
Engineering District; CORNELIO FORNIER, as Regional Supervising Auditor, Eastern
Visayas Region; ASTERIO, BUQUERON, ADVENTOR FERNANDEZ, MANUEL S.
LEPATAN, RAMON QUIRANTE, and TEODULFO REGIS, petitioners,
vs.
FELIPE SINGSON, as sole owner and proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.
Teodoro Almase and Casiano U. Laput for respondent.

FERNANDO, J .:
The real party in interest before this Court in this certiorari proceeding to review a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu is the Republic of the Philippines, although the petitioners
are the public officials who were named as respondents
1
in a mandamus suit below. Such is the
contention of the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Felix V. Makasiar,
2
for as he did
point out, what is involved is a money claim against the government, predicated on a contract.
The basic doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent is thus decisive of the
controversy. There is a governing statute that is controlling.
3
Respondent Felipe Singson, the
claimant, for reasons known to him, did not choose to abide by its terms. That was a fatal
misstep. The lower court, however, did not see it that way. We cannot affirm its decision.
As found by the lower court, the facts are the following: "In January, 1967, the Office of the
District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer, ... .
The requisition (RIV No. 67/0331) was signed by the District Engineer, Adventor Fernandez,
and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. ... It was approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It is noted in the approval
of the said requisition that "This is an exception to the telegram dated Feb. 21, 1967 of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications." ... So, a canvass or public bidding was
conducted on May 5, 1967 ... . The committee on award accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor
Service [owned by respondent Felipe Singson] for the sum of P43,530.00. ... Subsequently, it
was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16, 1967 the
Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to
immediately deliver the items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00. ... It would appear
that a purchase order signed by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer and the
Procurement Officer, was addressed to the Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the
Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then made
inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. ... Thus, after finding from the indorsements of
the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of Public Highways that the prices of the various
spare parts are just and reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no less than
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with the verification of V.M. Secarro a
representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment in the
sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. ... His reason for
withholding the 20% equivalent to P8,706.00 was to submit the voucher with the supporting
papers to the Supervising Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher ... was paid on June 9, 1967 in
the amount of P34,824.00 to the petitioner [respondent Singson]. On June 10,1967, Highway
Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic
message of the General Auditing Office which states: "In view of excessive prices charge for
purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by vouchers already submitted this Office direct
all highway auditors refer General Office payment similar nature for appropriate action." ... In
the interim it would appear that when the voucher and the supporting papers reached the GAO,
a canvass was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI
(Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the
Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less
than the price of the Singkier. ... In view of the overpricing the GAO took up the matter with the
Secretary of Public Works in a third indorsement of July 18, 1967. ... The Secretary then
circularized a telegram holding the district engineer responsible for overpricing."
4
What is more,
charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer and the civil engineer involved.
It was the failure of the Highways Auditor, one of the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of
the mandamus suit below, with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor
Service, being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract in question
having been upheld. Hence this appeal by certiorari.
1. To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand taken by the Republic. The lower
court was unmindful of the fundamental doctrine of non-suability. So it was stressed in the
petition of the then Solicitor General Makasiar. Thus: "It is apparent that respondent Singson's
cause of action is a money claim against the government, for the payment of the alleged
balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways. Assuming
momentarily the validity of such claim, although as will be shown hereunder, the claim is void for
the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy, mandamus is not the
remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary action for specific
performance ... . Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to
approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be
entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State ... . In other words, the respondent
should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act
327 ... which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may
be
filed ...."
5
Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided: "In all cases
involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the
Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and
holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons,
office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the
last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by
him."
6
Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final
decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days
from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States,
pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the
President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a
private person or entity."
7

2. With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the appealed
decision defies explanation. It would be to disregard a basic corollary of the cardinal postulate of
non-suability. It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to
prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative
proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be
specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no
ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should
have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. What
transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious then that it does not have the imprint of
validity.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu of September 4, 1968 is
reversed and set aside, and the suit for mandamus filed against petitioners, respondents below,
is dismissed. With costs against respondent Felipe Singson.