G.R. No.

132319 May 12, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:
What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and controlled
by his mind. Law is designed for rational beings as it is based on our inherent sense of
right which is inseparable from reason. Thus, when man's reasoning is so distorted by
disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, he loses
responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are asked to resolve whether or not
the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he
committed.
Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing his wife
LILIA MADARANG in an Information
1
which reads:
That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident premeditation and
treachery, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab LILIA M. MADARANG, his
legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wound 4 1/2 inches by 1 1/2
inch(es) long and 3/16 of an inch wide, located just below the left clavicle 1
3/4 inch(es) lateral to the supra-sternal notch, and plowed along the
interpace slightly coursing upward and posteriorly and stab wound 1 inch in
length, gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep, located at the right arm at its
medial aspect, coursing upwards and medially towards the apex of the right
axilla which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of Lilia M. Madarang.
Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the trial
court entered a "not guilty" plea for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May 5,
1994, the accused's counsel manifested that his client had been observed behaving in an
abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court called the accused to the
stand but he refused to answer any of the questions propounded by the court. Hence, on
the same date, the Court issued an Order
2
directing the transfer of the accused to the
National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his
fitness to stand trial.
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from
a form of psychosis known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital
and was administered medication for his illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two
(2) years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the NCMH and recommitted
to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the charges against him.
3

At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded
to adduce evidence on his claim of insanity at the time he committed the offense.
As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA MIRADOR,
and his daughter LILIFER MADARANG, the following facts were established: The accused
and Lilia Mirador were legally married and their union was blessed with seven (7)
children. The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16) years. He was employed in a
United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a seaman in Germany and stayed
there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta,
Pangasinan, and started a hardware store business. His venture however failed. Worse,
he lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting.
4

In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced
to stay in the house of Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support his
family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with their eight child and was about to
give birth.
5

On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The
accused was jealous of another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of
the fight and in the presence of their children, the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her
untimely demise.
6

AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the accused
shouting and crying inside her house. She called out to them and asked what was
wrong. She received no reply. Her nephew barged into the house and brought out the
children one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While passing by Avelina, her
nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the accused emerge from the
house holding a bolo. She scampered for safety.
7

She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house,
she did not notice anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he
was suffering from any mental illness. Neither did she know of any reason why the
accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any argument while they
were living with her.
8

The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He
could not remember where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts
of his wife. It was only during one of the hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a
picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death. He, however, was not
aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered
from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH for
treatment.
9

DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental Health
(NCMH), declared that the accused was committed to the NCMH on July 4, 1994 upon
order of the court. The NCMH conducted three (3) medical and psychiatric evaluations of
the accused during his confinement therein. Based on the first medical report, dated
August 2, 1994,
10
the accused was found to be suffering from insanity or psychosis,
classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental
abnormality characterized by impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations,
preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-care, insight and judgment, and impaired
cognitive, social and occupational functions. The patient may be incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may become destructive or
have a propensity to attack any one if his hallucinations were violent.
11
A schizophrenic,
however, may have lucid intervals during which he may be able to distinguish right from
wrong.
12
Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental illness may have begun even
prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was already
suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the crime.
1

By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still suffering
from schizophrenia. After one and a half years of confinement, the third psychiatric
evaluation of the accused, dated May 27, 1996,
14
showed that his mental condition
considerably improved due to continuous medication. The accused was recommended to
be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand trial.
15

The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of
sanity at the time he committed the offense. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances of this
case, this Court is of the view that accused Fernando Madarang is of sound
mind at the time of the commission of the offense and that he failed to rebut
by convincing proof the evidence on record against him to exempt him from
criminal liablity. And since the death penalty was suspended or abolished at
the time of the commission of the offense, this Court hereby sentences the
accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
16

Hence this appeal.
The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of
intelligence, making his criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind could
allegedly be deduced from the following:
First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely unaware
of his acts that fateful day and must have committed the crime without the least
discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with
schizophrenia. He cited the testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into
extremes he may be violent and destructive, or very silent and self-focused. The
appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his wife and
Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the sight of him
holding a bolo. He did not seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone
and inflicted further injury. He avers that this is peculiar only to persons who are
mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime would have appeared
remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.
Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high possibility
that he was already suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime on
September 3, 1993.
17
The defense posits that his mental illness may have been caused
by his loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he started through 16 years of
working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent on his mother-
in-law for his family's support and all these may have been beyond his capacity to
handle.
The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a
fight prior to that fateful day should be considered. The marked change in his behavior
when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife on that day and suddenly turned
violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he committed the crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give
birth to their eighth child three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by
something beyond his control, nobody in his right mind would kill his wife who was
carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse.
We find these arguments without merit.
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished
as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal
law. Man is naturally endowed with the faculties of understanding and free will. The
consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or culpable. Hence,
where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An
insane accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No
purpose of criminal law is served by punishing an insane accused because by reason of
his mental state, he would have no control over his behavior and cannot be deterred
from similar behavior in the future.
18

A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American
jurisprudence, the traditional test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843 which states that "to
establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time
of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing,
or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The
M'Naghten rule is a cognitive measure of insanity as the accused is required to know two
things: the nature and quality of the act, and that the act was wrong. This rule has been
criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated whether the word "wrong" referred to moral
or legal wrong. The importance of the distinction was illustrated by Stephen
19
as
follows: A kills B knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but under an insane
delusion that God has commanded him to kill B to obtain the salvation of the human
race. A's act is a crime if the word "wrong" means illegal but it is not a crime if the word
"wrong" means morally wrong. The word "know" was also assailed as it referred solely
to intellectual reason and excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was pointed out
that the accused may know in his mind what he is doing but may have no grasp of the
effect or consequences of his actions.
20
M'Naghten was condemned as based on an
obsolete and misleading concept of the nature of insanity as insanity does not only affect
the intellectual faculties but also affects the whole personality of the patient, including
his will and emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the elements of a
personality and does not solely determine man's conduct.
21

Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" test which means that
"assuming defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and knowledge
that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived
of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent himself from doing the
act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the accused knew that what he was
doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental illness kept
him from controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime. This rule
rests on the assumption that there are mental illnesses that impair volition or self-
control, even while there is cognition or knowledge of what is right and wrong.
22
This
test was likewise criticized on the following grounds: (1) the "impulse" requirement is
too restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts; (2) the "irresistible" requirement is also
restrictive as it requires absolute impairment of the freedom of the will which cases are
very rare; (3) it will not serve the purpose of criminal law to deter criminals as the will
to resist commission of the crime will not be encouraged, and; (4) it is difficult to prove
whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse.
2

Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect."
24

Critics of this test argued that it gave too much protection to the accused. It placed the
prosecution in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity beyond reasonable doubt as
a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was the result of a mental disease
leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact. The case thus becomes
completely dependent on the testimonies of experts.
25

Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law Institute
(ALI) in its Model Penal Code Test, which improved on the M'Naghten and irresistible
impulse tests. The new rule stated that a person is not responsible for his criminal act if,
as a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate
the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
26

Still, this test has been criticized for its use of ambiguous words like "substantial
capacity" and "appreciate" as there would be differences in expert testimonies whether
the accused's degree of awareness was sufficient.
27
Objections were also made to the
exclusion of psychopaths or persons whose abnormalities are manifested only by
repeated criminal conduct. Critics observed that psychopaths cannot be deterred and
thus undeserving of punishment.
28

In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of the M'Naghten style
statutory formulation. It enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which made the
appreciation test the law applicable in all federal courts. The test is similar to M'Naghten
as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused is not required to prove lack of control as
in the ALI test. The appreciation test shifted the burden of proof to the defense, limited
the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of diminished capacity and
provided for commitment of accused found to be insane.
29

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to
be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there
is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability.
30

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not
susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the
mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and
judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion
testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the
accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane
based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as
an expert, such as a psychiatrist.
31
The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity
must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with
which he is charged.
32

In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when
he was committed to the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe
schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish
between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.
Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most common form of psychosis.
3

Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre
behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature
and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed. The interpersonal
perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions and hallucinations. In
the most disorganized form of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes
place and is associated with serious thought disorder and profound habit deterioration in
which the usual social customs are disregarded.
34
During the initial stage, the common
early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness,
hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied and dreamy and may
appear "far away." He does not empathize with the feelings of others and manifests little
concern about the realities of life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of
rejection and an intolerable lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional
involvement with other people to protect himself from painful relationships. There is
shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a loss of spontaneity.
Frequently, he becomes neglectful of personal care and cleanliness.
35
A variety of
subjective experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety and fears
precede the earliest behavioral changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing
tension and confusion and becomes distracted in conversation manifested by his inability
to maintain a train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, this will be noticed as
blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or respond
appropriately to his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may appear to stare,
as he does not regularly blink his eyes in his attempt to hold his attention.
36

None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the
myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous
with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of even a single account of
abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day.
Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was
already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that
schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right
from wrong.
37
Hence the importance of adducing proof to show that the appellant was
not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense. Although the appellant
was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the
evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight
only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to
the commission of the crime. Evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time
preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.
38

In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish
his claim of insanity at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on
record to show that the appellant was completely of unsound mind prior to or
coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by the appellant
to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has
absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that
can be made with facility. The fact that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the
sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife does not, by any stretch of
imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion.
Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed
his wife an indicium of his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental condition
take this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that the appellant and his wife were never
seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the appellant's unstable
mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had been
terminated for the flimsiest reason.
The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and
became totally dependent on his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however,
purely speculative and unsupported by record. To be sure, there was no showing of any
odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his fortune and prior to
his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness. In fact, the
appellant's mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant and
while he lived in her house, she did not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the
appellant's behavior that could have suggested that he was suffering from any mental
illness.
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits
committing the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time
of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found
to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt as
he had already admitted committing the crime.
39
As the appellant, in the case at bar,
failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed his
wife, we are constrained to affirm his conviction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the crime
of parricide is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Case Digest on People v Madarang Gr. No. 132319 May 12,2000
November 27, 2010

Appellant was convicted of parricide for stabbing his wife, causing her death. Appellant
alleges he was in a state of insanity and claims he had no recollection of the stabbing
incident.He insists that he was deprived of intelligence , making his act involuntary.His
psychiatric evaluation revealed he was suffering from schizophrenia but after two years
in the National Center for Mental Health his condition improved thus, he was released.
Held:
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to
be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the act,i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there
is total deprivation of the will.Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability.The issue of insanity is a question of fact.The state or condition of a mans
mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.Establishing ones insanity
requires testimony of an expert witness, such as a psychiatrist.The proof must relate to
the time preceding or coetaneous with the commisssion of the offense with which he is
charged.None of the witnesses declared that he exhibited any of the symptoms
associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing
incident.Also schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of
distinguishing right from wrong.

G.R. No. 166040 April 26, 2006
NIEL F. LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 affirming, with modification, the Decision
2
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 02-1779 convicting
Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.
On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner (then only 12 years old)
with rape was filed with the RTC of Pasay City. The inculpatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, NEIL LLAVE Y FLORES, aka NIEL F. LLAVE, a minor over nine (9) years of age
and under fifteen (15) but acting with discernment, by means of force threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously have carnal knowledge
of the complainant, DEBBIELYN SANTOS y QUITALES, a minor, seven (7) years of age,
against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
3

The Case for the Prosecution
The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of Pasay City.
4
One of their
children, Debbielyn, was born on December 8, 1994.
5
In 2002, she was a Grade II
student at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City
6
and attended classes
from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.
7

Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold quail eggs at a nearby
church.
8
Adjacent to their house was that of Teofisto Bucud, a barbecue vendor who
would usually start selling at 6:30 p.m.
9
Next to Teofistos residence was a vacant
house.
10

Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived home at past 6:00 p.m.
She changed her clothes and proceeded to her mothers store. Marilou asked her
daughter to bring home the container with the unsold quail eggs.
11
Debbielyn did as told
and went on her way. As she neared the vacant house, she saw petitioner, who
suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks which was in front of the vacant
house. There was a little light from the lamp post.
12
She resisted to no avail.
13
Petitioner
ordered her to lie down on the cement. Petrified, she complied. He removed her shorts
and underwear then removed his own. He got on top of her.
14
She felt his penis being
inserted into her vagina. He kissed her.
15
She felt pain and cried.
16
She was sure there
were passersby on the street near the vacant house at the time.
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the girls cries. He rushed to
the place and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the waist down. Teofisto
shouted at petitioner, and the latter fled from the scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to
inform her parents about what happened.
17
She told her father about the incident.
18
Her
parents later reported what happened to the police authorities.
19
Debbielyn told the
police that petitioner was a bad boy because he was a rapist.
20

Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he went out of their
house to get his barbecue grill. He heard someone moaning from within the adjacent
vacant house.
21
He rushed to the place and saw petitioner, naked from waist down, on
top of Debbielyn, making pumping motions on her anus.
22
The girl was crying. He
shouted at petitioner, "Hoy, bakit ginawa mo yan?"
23
Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts
on and fled.
24
Neighbors who had heard Teofisto shouting arrived.
25
Later, Teofisto gave
a written statement to the police investigator regarding the incident.
26

Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he was inside their house.
His daughter, Kimberly Rose, suddenly told him that Debbielyn had been raped near the
vacant house by petitioner.
27
He rushed to the place and found her daughter crying.
When he asked her what happened, she replied that she had been abused. He brought
Debbielyn to their house and then left.
28
He then looked for petitioner and found him at
his grandmothers house. A barangay tanod brought petitioner to the barangay hall.
29

On September 25, 2002, he brought her daughter to the Philippine General Hospital
Child Protection Unit at Taft Avenue, Manila where she was examined by Dr. Mariella S.
Castillo.
Dr. Castillo declared on the witness stand that she was a physician at the Child
Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital. On September 25, 2002, she
interviewed the victim who told her "Masakit ang pepe ko," "Ni-rape ako."
30
Dr. Castillo
also conducted a genital examination on the child, and found no injury on the hymen
and perineum, but found scanty yellowish discharge between the labia minora.
31
There
was also a fresh abrasion of the perineal skin at 1 oclock position near the anal
opening.
32
She declared that the findings support the theory that blunt force or
penetrating trauma (such as an erect penis, finger, or any other foreign body
33
) was
applied to the perineal area
34
not more than six or seven days before.
35
The abrasion
could have been caused on September 24, 2002. She found no spermatozoa in the
vaginal area or injury at the external genitalia;
36
neither did she find any other injury or
abrasion on the other parts of the victims body.
37
She concluded that her findings were
consistent with the victims claim that she was sexually abused by petitioner.
Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez, for his part, testified that on September 24, 2002,
Marilou Santos arrived at the barangay hall and reported that her daughter had been
raped by petitioner who was then in his aunts house at Cadena de Amor Street.
Barangay Captain Greg Florante ordered him and Barangay Tanod Efren Gonzales to
proceed to Cadena de Amor Street and take the boy into custody, and they did as they
were told.
38

The Case for the Accused
Petitioner, through counsel, presented Dr. Castillo as witness. She declared that the
abrasions in the perineal area could have been caused while the offender was on top of
the victim.
39
She explained that the distance between the anus and the genital area is
between 2.5 to 3 centimeters.
40
The abrasion was located at of an inch from the anal
orifice.
Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at the Pasay City South High
School.
41
He had been one of the three outstanding students in grade school and
received awards such as Best in Mathematics.
42
He also finished a computer course and
received a Certificate of Completion from the Philippine Air Force Management
Information Center.
43
He denied having raped the private complainant. He declared that
at 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he was outside of their house to buy rice in the
carinderia
44
and he saw her on his way back.
45
He also met his father, who asked him
what he had done to their neighbor. He was also told that the victims father was so
angry that the latter wanted to kill him.
46
He did not ask his father for the name of the
angry neighbor. He was also told to pass by Cadena de Amor Street in going to his
aunts house. Petitioner also declared that his mother prodded him to go to his aunts
house.
47
Later, Domingo and Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez arrived at his aunts
house and brought him to the barangay hall. He did not know of any reason why
Debbielyn and her parents would charge him with rape.
48

Petitioner also declared that he played cards with Debbielyn.
49
While confined at the
Pasay City Youth Home during trial, he had a crush on "Issa," a young female inmate.
Using a piece of broken glass (bubog) about half-an-inch long, he inscribed her name on
his right thigh, left leg and left arm.
50

Nida Llave testified and identified her sons Certificate of Live Birth, in which it appears
that he was born on March 6, 1990.
51
She declared that at about 6:30 p.m. on
September 24, 2000, Marilou Santos and Marilyn Bucud arrived in their house looking
for her son. According to Marilyn, her son had raped the private complainant. She went
to their house to look for her son and came across Domingo Santos who threatened to
kill her son. She and her husband proceeded to the house of his sister Josefina at
Cadena de Amor Street where petitioner had hidden for a while.
52

At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting Neil of the crime
charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
FROM ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt
of the xxx Niel Llave y Flores beyond reasonable doubt when he forcibly pulled the
complainant towards the vacant lot, laid on top of her and had carnal knowledge with
the [complainant] against her will and consent who is only seven (7) years old (sic).
Moreover, he being a minor, he cannot be meted with the Death penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the CICL [Child in Conflict with the Law] Niel Llave y Flores
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and crediting him with the special mitigating
circumstance of minority, this Court hereby sentences him to prision mayor minimum,
Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).
53

The trial court declared that based on the evidence of the prosecution that petitioner
pushed the victim towards the vacant house and sexually abused her, petitioner acted
with discernment. It also considered petitioners declaration that he had been a
consistent honor student.
54

Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, where he averred the following in his Brief as
appellant therein:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE MATERIAL
INCONSISTENCIES OF THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THAT
OF THE MEDICAL REPORT ON THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION OF BLEEDING.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESS TEOFISTO BUCUD WHO HAS REASON TO
FABRICATE A SCENARIO AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE HE HAS
PERSONAL VENDETTA AGAINST THE LATTERS FAMILY/RELATIVES.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION
OF RAPE BY HAVING CARNAL KNOWLEDGE, BEING CONTRARY TO THE PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE.
55

The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with modification as to the penalty
meted on him.
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is hereby MODIFIED in that the
accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four
(4) months of prision correccional medium as the minimum to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor medium as the maximum. Additionally, the accused-appellant
is ordered to pay the complaining witness the amount of P50,000 by way of moral
damages and P20,000 by way of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
56

Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration,
57
contending that the prosecution failed
to adduce proof that he acted with discernment; hence, he should be acquitted. The
appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution
58
dated November 12, 2004 on the
following finding:
As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant acted with discernment, his
conduct during and after the "crime" betrays the theory that as a minor, the accused-
appellant does not have the mental faculty to grasp the propriety and consequences of
the act he made. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, the fact that forthrightly
upon discovery, the accused-appellant fled the scene and hid in his grandmothers house
intimates that he knew that he did something that merits punishment.
Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that the accused-appellant is a recipient
of several academic awards and is an honor student further reinforces the finding that
he [is] possessed [of] intelligence well beyond his years and is thus poised to
distinguish, better at least than other minors his age could, which conduct is right and
which is morally reprehensible.
59

Petitioner now raises the following issues and arguments in the instant petition before
this Court:
ISSUES
I
WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT PETITIONER
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, WHO WAS A MINOR ABOVE 9 YEARS BUT BELOW
15 YEARS OF AGE AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
ARGUMENTS
I
THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING
WITNESS WITH THE MEDICAL REPORT BELIE THE FINDING OF RAPE.
II
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS.
III
PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT.
IV
THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION IS HEARSAY.
V
THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED.
VI
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
60

The issues raised by the petitioner in this case may be summarized as follows: (1)
whether he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation; (2) whether he had
carnal knowledge of the private complainant, and if in the affirmative, whether he acted
with discernment in perpetrating the crime; (3) whether the penalty imposed by the
appellate court is correct; and (4) whether he is liable to pay moral damages to the
private complainant.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary
investigation before the Information against him was filed.
On the second issue, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of Debbielyn. He insists that her
testimony is inconsistent on material points. He points out that she claimed to have felt
pain in her vagina when petitioner inserted his penis to the point that she cried; this,
however, is negated by Dr. Castillos report stating that there was no evidence of injury
on the victims external genitalia. Petitioner maintains that as against the victims
testimony and that of Dr. Castillos report, the latter should prevail.
According to petitioner, mere touching of the female organ will not suffice as factual
basis of conviction for consummated rape. Moreover, the victims testimony lacks
credibility in view of her admission that, while she was being allegedly ravished by him,
there were passersby along the street. Besides, petitioner avers, an abrasion may be
caused by an invasion of the body through the protective covering of the skin. Petitioner
insists that the prosecution failed to prove the cause of the abrasion.
Petitioner also claims that the victim was tutored or coached by her parents on her
testimony before the trial court. Dr. Castillo testified that when she interviewed
Debbielyn, the latter admitted to her that she did not understand the meaning of the
word "rape" and its Filipino translation, "hinalay," and that the genital examination of
the girl was at the insistence of the latters parents.
Petitioner avers that Teofisto Bucuds testimony has no probative weight because and
had an ill-motive to testify against him. Petitioner stated, on cross-examination, that his
uncle, Boy, had the house rented by Teofisto demolished. Petitioner avers that the
witness persuaded the victims parents to complain against him, as gleaned from the
testimony of Police Investigator Milagros Carroso.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that petitioner was subjected
to an inquest investigation under Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as gleaned from the Certification of the City Prosecutor incorporated in the
Information. It avers that the absence of external injuries does not negate rape; neither
is it necessary that lacerations be found on the hymen of a victim. Rape is consummated
if there is some degree of penetration within the vaginal surface. Corroborative evidence
is not necessary to prove rape. As long as the testimony of the victim is credible, such
testimony will suffice for conviction of consummated rape. When the victim testified that
she was raped, she was, in effect, saying all that is necessary to prove that rape was
consummated. Petitioners evidence to prove ill-motive on the part of Teofisto Bucud in
testifying against him is at best flimsy. Moreover, it is incredible that the victim and her
parents would charge petitioner with rape solely on Teofistos proddings.
The OSG insists that the petitioner acted with discernment before, during, and after the
rape based on the undisputed facts. The submission of the OSG follows:
Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old at the time of the alleged rape
incident, he is presumed to have acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article
12 of the Revised Penal Code. Under said provision, the prosecution has the burden of
proving that he acted with discernment. In the instant case, petitioner insists that there
was no evidence presented by the prosecution to show that he acted with discernment.
Hence, he should be exempt from criminal liability.
Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit.
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code is defined as follows:
"the discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of
a minor under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9), who commits an act prohibited
by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong"
(People v. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 [1939]). For a minor above nine but below fifteen
years of age, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his act
(Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989).
Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law (p. 375, 1998 Ed.), writes
that "discernment is more than the mere understanding between right and wrong.
Rather, it means the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act" (People v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G.
4062]). Hence, in judging whether a minor accused acted with discernment, his mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, which may be known
and should be determined by considering all the circumstances disclosed by the record
of the case, his appearance, his attitude and his behavior and conduct, not only before
and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial should be
taken into consideration (People v. Doquena, supra).
In the instant case, petitioners actuations during and after the rape incident, as well as
his behavior during the trial showed that he acted with discernment.
The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the
prosecutions witness, Teofisto Bucud, petitioner immediately stood up and ran away.
Shortly thereafter, when his parents became aware of the charges against him and that
private complainants father was looking for him, petitioner went into hiding. It was not
until the Barangay Tanod came to arrest him in his grandmothers house that petitioner
came out in the open to face the charges against him. His flight as well as his act of
going into hiding clearly conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the moral depravity
of his act and that he knew he committed something wrong. Otherwise, if he was indeed
innocent or if he was not least aware of the moral consequences of his acts, he would
have immediately confronted private complainant and her parents and denied having
sexually abused their daughter.
During the trial, petitioner submitted documentary evidence to show that he was a
consistent honor student and has, in fact, garnered several academic awards. This
allegation further bolstered that he acted with discernment, with full knowledge and
intelligence. The fact that petitioner was a recipient of several academic awards and was
an honor student further reinforces the finding that he was possessed of intelligence well
beyond his years and thus was able to distinguish, better than other minors of his age
could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible. Hence, although
appellant was still a minor of twelve years of age, he possessed intelligence far beyond
his age. It cannot then be denied that he had the mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. This is important in cases where the accused is
minor. It is worthy to note that the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting
circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent on the part of the accused. In expounding on
intelligence as the second element of dolus, the Supreme Court has stated: "The second
element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality
of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because
the infant has no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability" (Guevarra v.
Aldomovar, 169 SCRA 476 [1989], at page 482).
The foregoing circumstances, from the time the incident up to the time the petitioner
was being held for trial, sufficiently satisfied the trial court that petitioner acted with
discernment before, during and after the rape incident. For a boy wanting in
discernment would simply be gripped with fear or keep mum. In this case, petitioner
was fully aware of the nature and illegality of his wrongful act. He should not, therefore,
be exempted from criminal liability. The prosecution has sufficiently proved that
petitioner acted with discernment.
61

In reply, petitioner asserts that the only abrasion found by Dr. Castillo was on the peri-
anal skin and not in the labia of the hymen. He further insists that there can be no
consummated rape absent a slight penetration on the female organ. It was incumbent
on the prosecution to prove that the accused acted with discernment but failed. The
mere fact that he was an honor student is not enough evidence to prove that he acted
with discernment.
The petition is not meritorious.
On the first issue, petitioners contention that he was deprived of his right to a regular
preliminary investigation is barren of factual and legal basis. The record shows that
petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of
such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing
rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be
filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis
of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his
counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must
be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing,
ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense
as provided for in this Rule.
As gleaned from the Certification
62
of the City Prosecutor which was incorporated in the
Information, petitioner did not execute any waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code before the Information was filed. He was arraigned with the
assistance of counsel on October 10, 2002, and thereafter filed a petition for bail.
63

Petitioners failure to file a motion for a preliminary investigation within five days from
finding out that an Information had been filed against him effectively operates as a
waiver of his right to such preliminary investigation.
64

On the second issue, a careful review of the records shows that the prosecution adduced
evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had carnal knowledge of the
private complainant as charged in the Information. In People v. Morata
65
the Court ruled
that penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere introduction of the male organ into
the labia of the pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge. Hence, even if the penetration
is only slight, the fact that the private complainant felt pains, points to the conclusion
that the rape was consummated.
66

From the victims testimony, it can be logically concluded that petitioners penis touched
the middle part of her vagina and penetrated the labia of the pudendum. She may not
have had knowledge of the extent of the penetration; however, her straightforward
testimony shows that the rape passed the stage of consummation.
67
She testified that
petitioner dragged her behind a pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house and ordered
her to lie down. He then removed her shorts and panty and spread her legs. He then
mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: From what time up to what time?
A: From 12:00 oclock noon up to 6:00 p.m.
Q: September 24, 2002 and going over the calendar, it was Tuesday. Did you go to
school from 12:00 oclock noon up to 6:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, Sir, on the same date I went to school.
Q: At about 6:00 p.m., Sept. 24, 2002, where were you?
A: I went home.
Q: And by whom you are referring to your house at 1-C Carnation St., R. Higgins,
Maricaban, Pasay City?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And what did you do after you went home?
A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of my mother.
Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went?
A: It is near our house, walking distance.
Q: What is your mother selling in that store?
A: She sells quail eggs.
Q: And were you able to immediately go to the store of your mother where she was
selling quail eggs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was past 6:00 p.m. already?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened when you went to the store where your mother is selling quail
eggs past 6:00 p.m.?
A: My mother asked me to bring home something.
Q: What were these things you were asked by your mother to bring home?
A: The things she used in selling.
Q: And did you obey what your mother told you to bring home something?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And what happened to you in going to your house?
A: Totoy pulled me.
Q: Pulled you where?
A: Totoy pulled me towards an uninhabited house.
Q: What happened after Totoy pulled you in an uninhabited house?
A: He told me to lie down on the cement.
Q: What happened after he laid you down on the cement?
A: He removed my shorts and panty. He also removed his shorts.
Q: After Totoy removed your shorts and panty and he also removed his shorts, what
happened next?
A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: What did you feel when Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: It was painful.
Q: Aside from inserting his penis inside your vagina, what else did you do to you?
A: He kissed me on my lips.
Q: After Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your lips, what
did you do?
A: I cried.
Q: What happened when you were crying when he inserted his penis inside your vagina
and kissed you on your lips. What happened next?
A: Somebody heard me crying.
Q: Who heard you crying?
A: Kuya Teofe, Sir.
Q: What happened after you cried and when somebody heard you crying?
A: Totoy ran away.
Q: After Totoy ran away, what happened next?
A: When Totoy ran away, I was left and Kuya Teofe told me to tell the matter to my
parents.
Q: Did you tell your parents what Totoy did to you?
A: Yes, Sir.
68

On cross-examination, the victim was steadfast in her declarations:
ATTY. BALIAD:
Q: Again, in what particular position were you placed by Totoy when he inserted his
penis inside your vagina?
A: I was lying down.
Q: Aside from lying down, how was your body positioned at that time?
A: He placed on top of me.
Q: After he placed on top of you, what else did he do to you, if any?
A: He started to kiss me and then he inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: Did you feel his penis coming in into your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Are you sure that his penis was inserted inside your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
69

When questioned on cross-examination whether she could distinguish a vagina from an
anus, the victim declared that she could and proceeded to demonstrate. She reiterated
that the penis of petitioner penetrated her vagina, thus, consummating the crime
charged:
Atty. Baliad:
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Llave or
"Totoy" inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel that the penis of Neil entered your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where is your "pepe"?
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Where is your anus?
A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case penetrated
only in your vagina and not in your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched
any part of your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.
70

While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any abrasion or laceration in the private
complainants genitalia, such fact does not negate the latters testimony the petitioner
had carnal knowledge of her. The absence of abrasions and lacerations does not
disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a young girl as in this case.
71

According to Dr. Castillo, the hymen is elastic and is capable of stretching and reverting
to its original form.
72
The doctor testified that her report is compatible with the victims
testimony that she was sexually assaulted by petitioner:
Atty. Baliad:
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Llave or
"Totoy" inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel (sic) that the penis of Neil entered your
vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where is your "pepe"?
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Where is your anus?
A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case penetrated
only in your vagina and not in your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched
any part of your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.
x x x x
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: Based on your testimony doctor, and the medico genital examination propounded on
the report that the victim here, Debbielyn Santos is complaining that around 6:00 in the
evening of September 24, 2002, she was sexually abused and that on the following day,
September 25, you interviewed her and stated to you that her genitalia was hurting and
in binocular (sic) "masakit ang pepe ko, ni-rape ako," would your findings as contained
in this Exh. B and C be compatible with the allegation if the minor victim that she was
sexually abused on September 24. 2002 at around 6:00 p.m.?
Atty. Baliad:
Objection, Your Honor. The one who narrated the incident is the mother.
Court:
What is your objection?
Atty. Baliad:
The objection, Your Honor, is the question propounded is that it was the minor who
made the complaint regarding the allegation.
Fiscal Barrera:
The answer were provided..
Court:
The doctor is being asked whether or not her findings is compatible with the complaint
of the minor. Overruled. Answer.
Witness:
A It is compatible with the allegation of the minor.
Fiscal Barrera:
Confronting you again with your two (2) medico-genital documents, the Provincial and
Final Report mark[ed] in evidence as Exhs. B and C, at the lower portion of these two
exhibits there appears to be a signature above the typewritten word, Mariella Castillo,
M.D., whose signature is that doctor?
A Both are my signatures, Sir.
73

Dr. Castillo even testified that the abrasion near the private complainants anal orifice
could have been caused by petitioner while consummating the crime charged:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: With your answer, would it be possible doctor that in the process of the male person
inserting his erect penis inside the vagina, in the process, would it be possible that this
abrasion could have been caused while in the process of inserting the penis into the
vagina touch the portion of the anus where you find the abrasion?
A: It is possible, Sir.
Q: Now, are you aware, in the course of your examination, that the alleged perpetrator
is a 12-year-old minor?
A: I only fount it out, Sir, when I testified.
Q: Do you still recall your answer that a 12-year-old boy could cause an erection of his
penis?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To enlight[en] us doctor, we, not being a physician, at what age could a male person
can have erection?
A: Even infants have an erection.
74

Petitioners contention that the private complainant was coached by her parents into
testifying is barren of merit. It bears stressing that the private complainant testified in a
straightforward and spontaneous manner and remained steadfast despite rigorous and
intensive cross-examination by the indefatigable counsel of the petitioner. She
spontaneously pointed to and identified the petitioner as the perpetrator.
It is inconceivable that the private complainant, then only a seven- year old Grade II
pupil, could have woven an intricate story of defloration unless her plaint was true.
75
The
Presiding Judge of the trial court observed and monitored the private complainant at
close range as she testified and found her testimony credible. Case law is that the
calibration by the trial court of the evidence on record and its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, as well as its findings of facts and the conclusions anchored on
said findings, are accorded conclusive effect by this Court unless facts and
circumstances of substance were overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted, which, if
considered would merit a nullification or reversal of the decision. We have held that
when the offended party is young and immature, from the age of thirteen to sixteen,
courts are inclined to give credence to their account of what transpired, considering not
only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they
would be exposed if the matter to which they testified is not true.
76

Neither do we lend credence to petitioners claim that the charge against him is but a
fabrication and concoction of the private complainants parents. Indeed, petitioner
admitted in no uncertain terms that the spouses had no ill-motive against him. Thus,
Neil testified as follows:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: As you testified earlier that you have played post cards with Debbielyn Santos alias
Lyn-lyn and you have no quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn. Do you know of any
reason why Lyn-lyn complaint (sic) against you for sexual abuse?
A: I dont know of any reason, Sir.
Q: You also testified that you do not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-
lyns parents, spouses Domingo Santos, Jr. and Marilou Santos, do you think of any
reason as to why they would file a complaint against you for molesting their 7-year-old
daughter?
A: I do not know of any reason why they filed a complaint against me, Sir.
Fiscal Barrera:
That would be all, Your Honor.
77

There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached their daughter
before she testified. No mother or father would stoop so low as to subject their daughter
to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic
experience would damage their daughters psyche and mar her life if the charge is not
true.
78

On the other hand, when the parents learned that their daughter had been assaulted by
petitioner, Domingo tried to locate the offender and when he failed, he and his wife
reported the matter to the barangay authorities. This manifested their ardent desire to
have petitioner indicted and punished for his delictual acts.
That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street where residents passed by
does not negate the act of rape committed by petitioner. Rape is not a respecter of time
and place. The crime may be committed by the roadside and even in occupied
premises.
79
The presence of people nearby does not deter rapists from committing the
odious act.
80
In this case, petitioner was so daring that he ravished the private
complainant near the house of Teofisto even as commuters passed by, impervious to the
fact that a crime was being committed in their midst.
Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence that can be
offered to prove the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the offended party. Even
absent a medical certificate, her testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of
conviction if such testimony is credible. Corroborative testimony is not essential to
warrant a conviction of the perpetrator.
81
Thus, even without the testimony of Teofisto
Bucud, the testimonies of the offended party and Dr. Castillo constitute evidence beyond
reasonable doubt warranting the conviction of petitioner.
Teofistos testimony cannot be discredited by petitioner simply because his uncle caused
the demolition of the house where Teofisto and his family were residing. It bears
stressing that Teofisto gave a sworn statement to the police investigator on the very day
that the petitioner raped Debbielyn and narrated how he witnessed the crime being
committed by the petitioner.
82
In the absence of proof of improper motive, the
presumption is that Teofisto had no ill-motive to so testify, hence, his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.
83

The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment when he had
carnal knowledge of the offended party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted for affirming
the trial courts ruling.1wphi1
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years
of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with
discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence
of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential element of a
felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act.
84
On the other hand,
discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment
by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during
the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial.
85
The surrounding
circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was
wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors
cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim
behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would
not be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud
who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon
the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmothers house to avoid
being arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and
took him into custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school student and
even received awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class in his academic
subjects. He represented his class in a quiz bee contest.
86
At his the age of 12, he
finished a computer course.
In People v. Doquea,
87
the Court held that the accused-appellant therein acted with
discernment in raping the victim under the following facts:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doquea committed the
crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the
municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in said
school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time
he was studying therein he always obtain excellent marks, this court is convinced that
the accused, in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was conscious of the
nature and consequences of his act, and so also has this court observed at the time said
accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.
88

The CA ordered petitioner to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages. There is no factual basis for the award of exemplary damages.
Under Article 2231, of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded if the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, no
aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Information and proved by the People;
hence, the award must be deleted.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that
the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
LLAVE V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del
Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was
indicated as divorced. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole
world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest
of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen.
Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda
on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
HELD:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.
RATIO:
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under
the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the
marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that
the law applies to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. But Article 13 of PD 1083 does
not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
HELD:
The petition is DENIED.
G.R. Nos. 106210-11 January 30, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO "RAMBO" LISING, RODOLFO MANALILI, FELIMON GARCIA, ENRICO
DIZON, and ROBIN MANGA, accused-appellants.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The parents of Cochise and Beebom must have lifted their sorrowful faces
heavenward and blurted out an anguished cry: "Oh God! Why must it be they, so
young, so loving, so beautiful and so promising, to be brutally snatched from our
embrace and never to be seen again?"
Cochise, whose full name was Ernesto Bernabe II, was 26 years old on the fateful
day of April 26, 1990 and Ana Lourdes Castaos, or Beebom to her family friends,
was 22. Cochise had just graduated from the University of the Philippines with a
degree of Bachelor of Laws and was reviewing for the bar examinations, while
Beebom was a graduating student at the College of Mass Communications from
the same university. Both excelled in academic and extra-curricular activities.
The senseless and gruesome killing of the young man and woman, both full of
promise, horrifies us. But what makes this crime more despicable in our eyes is
the involvement of people sworn to uphold the law.
For the crimes for which they were charged and sentenced, appellants now come
to this Court asking us to give their case a second look, insisting on their
innocence.
Sometime in March, 1990, Rodolfo Manalili, a businessman asked Felimon Garcia,
his townmate, if he knew somebody who could allegedly effect the arrest of one
Robert Herrera, the suspect in the killing of his brother, Delfin Manalili.
Felimon Garcia said he knew one and arranged a meeting with him.
On April 21, 1990, Felimon Garcia called up Manalili and informed him that he
already contacted a policeman to help him and said that the policeman wanted to
talk to him. So an appointment was set at 12:00 p.m. of April 22, 1990 at Dau
Exit, North Expressway, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
On said date Manalili, together with his son Richard, arrived at the Dau Exit at
about 12:30 p.m. of April 22, 1990. Felimon Garcia was already there waiting for
Manalili.
They proceeded to the Golden Palace Chinese Restaurant where they would meet
Roberto Lising. They, however, had to change venue because Roberto Lising's live-
in-partner, Ligaya Fausto and other companions were in the restaurant. So they
went instead to a nearby carinderia and instructed Felimon Garcia to follow them
there.
Shortly, Felimon Garcia arrived and introduced Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and
another man armed with a service pistol to Manalili. During the meeting, Manalili
offered to pay them P50,000.00 for the job. Initially, Manalili gave them P2,000.00
and instructed them to go and see Vic Nabua,* his employee who will point them
the person to be arrested.
On April 23-24, Lising's group went to Quezon City and met with Vic Lisboa. They
conducted a surveillance on the Castaos residence in the hope of seeing Herrera.
Failing to do so, the group was asked to come back the next day.
On April 25, the same group arrived at the vicinity of the Castaos residence at
around 5:00 p.m. to resume their surveillance. Two hours later, Lisboa alerted the
group after allegedly spotting Herrera entering the Castaos residence.
Later, the group saw a man and a woman who happened to be Cochise and
Beebom leave to the Castaos residence in a green box type Lancer car. The
group followed the Lancer car with Lising, Dizon and Manga riding in a black car
and Lisboa and Garcia in a motorcycle.
The Lancer car went to Dayrit's Ham and Burger House on Timog Circle, Quezon
City where the couple intended to have dinner. Alighting from the car, they were
accosted by Dizon and Manga who were both carrying firearms. Amidst
protestations, Dizon poked his gun at Cochise, handcuffed him, and shoved him
into the car. Beebom protested loudly at the arrest and was also shoved into the
back of the car.
The young couple's failure to go home that night and the next day alarmed their
parents, so a search was then initiated by close friends and relatives inquiring
from hospitals, restaurants, friends' houses and possible places where the couple
would go.
One group chanced upon Dayrit's Ham and Burger House where they were told
that a couple who fitted their descriptions were taken by three (3) men believed to
be from the military in the evening of April 25, 1990.
The abduction of Cochise and Beebom hit the front pages. Appeals by the parents
to locate them reached the authorities where all possible angles of their
disappearance were explored but there were no significant leads. After about two
(2) months of futile search for their whereabouts, a break came on June 21, 1990
when two (2) security guards working in a Shellane Warehouse in San Fernando,
Pampanga went to see Ms. Rosie Bernabe at her Pasay City Hall office and had
information concerning her son, Cochise. Mrs. Bernabe referred the two guards to
the CAPCOM who interviewed them.
The two guards told the CAPCOM that their friends Raul Morales and Jun Medrano,
both employees of Roberto Lising, informed them that Lising killed a mestisuhin
man and a woman in their warehouse.
On June 23, 1990, Raul Morales was picked up and told his story. In a sworn
statement executed on even date, he stated that he was a pahinante residing in
the warehouse where LPG cylinders are stored, located near Valle Verde Drive-In
Lodge in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned by Ligaya Fausto, common-law wife of
Roberto Lising alias "Rambo." In the main, he said:
21. T: Sa ikaliliwanag ng pagsisiyasat na ito,
maaari bang isalaysay mo ang sinasabi mong hindi
pangkaraniwang pangyayari?
S: Nangyari yan alas 2:00 ng madaling araw ng
26 April 1990 natutulog ako, nang mayron kumatok
sa pinto ng bodega at nagising ako. Tinawag ko si
Aida Morales para buksan ang gate tapos sabi ni Aida
"Ikaw na lang ang magbukas" pagkatapos kinuha ko
yung susi sa kanya para buksan yong gate. Noong
binubuksan ko yong gate sabi sa akin ni Roberto
Lising, "Bakit ang tagal mo" tapos pakabukas ko ng
gate pumasok yong dalawang kotse, una yong itim
pagkatapos yong green na kotse na Lancer, tapos
unang bumaba sa kotse na itim si Rambo, pangalawa
si Felimon bumaba sa kotse na Lancer may dala na
pala. Pagkatapos lumabas ng gate si Felimon may
dala na pala. Si Rambo naman binuksan yong
dalawang pinto ng kotseng itim bumaba yong babae
at saka yong lalaki hinila palabas ni Rambo.
Pagkatapos tinalian niya ng alambre bukod pa sa
pagtali ng alambre pati pa yong mukha tinalian ng
damit. Pagkatapos pagtali ni Rambo, biglang
dumating si Felimon dala pa yong pala pagkatapos
sininyasan si Rambo na ilabas na iyong lalaki. Dinala
ulit ni Rambo ang pala noong palabas na sila noong
lalaki. Pagkatapos ayaw nga lumabas ng lalaki,
itinulak ni Rambo papunta sa labas, sabi naman ng
babae maawa naman po kayo sa amin dahil wala
kaming kasalanan" pagkatapos tinutukan ni Rambo
yong babae at sabi "Putang ina mo, wag kang
maingay, papatayin rin kita". Noong dinala na ni
Rambo, umiiyak na lang yong babae. Mga kalahating
oras bago bumalik si Rambo sa bodega na hindi na
kasama yong lalaki. Nakahubad siya at pinapawisan,
bukod pa yan, naghugas pa ng kamay siya.
Pagkatapos nag-usap-usap silang tatlo, si Rambo, si
Felimon at yong kasama ni Rambo. Pagkatapos
nagsabi si Rambo sa akin na buksan na ang gate at
aalis na sila. Binuksan ko ang gate at nagsakayan
sila sa kotse, si Rambo sa itim at saka yong babae,
sa Lancer naman ang nakasakay yong kasama niya
at si Felimon, at pagkatapos lumabas na sila, tuloy
tuloy na umalis.
1

On June 25, 1990, the body of Cochise was exhumed. An autopsy was conducted
where the finding was: Cause of Death: "Multiple Stab Wounds"
The next day, Beebom's body, which was in an advanced decomposing stage was
exhumed from a shallow grave, two (2) kilometers from where Cochise's body was
found.
After evading arrest the previous days, Roberto Lising was finally apprehended on
June 30, 1990. In a Sworn Statement executed on the same day at Camp Bagong
Diwa, Bicutan, he implicated Felimon Garcia and Rodolfo Manalili. According to
him, this is what happened:
. . . at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening of April 25, 1990, he received a
telephone call from FELIMON GARCIA informing that he and his companions
were at Valle Verde Lodge at San Fernando, Pampanga and that they have a
problem. He immediately went to that place and saw FELIMON GARCIA who
introduced to him RUDY MANALILI who was then accompanied by six (6)
other men; that he saw a yellow Mercedez Benz, a black Torana and a green
Lancer; that on board the Lancer were a man and a woman who were
blindfolded and were introduced to him by RUDY MANALILI as ROBERTO
HERRERA and JOY MANALILI; that they proceeded to one of the rooms of
the motel where MANALILI told him that the two persons should die because
they killed his brother DELFIN MANALILI; that afterwards RUDY MANALILI
paid the chit and they proceeded to the warehouse at Villa Victoria, San
Fernando, Pampanga, owned by LIGAYA FAUSTO where he bound COCHISE
and led him to the back of the warehouse; that MANALILI stabbed COCHISE
and he acted only as a look-out; that FELIMON GARCIA and another person
brought the blindfolded woman to Brgy. San Agustin where she was killed;
that before he, FELIMON GARCIA and RUDY MANALILI parted ways,
MANALILI told him to take care of the Lancer, change its color and later he
will get it and after that he was given P40,000.00 in check which he
encashed at the UCPB Diliman Branch, Quezon City on April 26, 1990; that
he gave P15,000.00 to FELIMON GARCIA and kept the rest; that he had the
Lancer repainted and used it.
2

Thereafter, the manhunt for Felimon Garcia and Rodolfo Manalili began. One by
one, the men responsible for the killing of Cochise and Beebom fell into the hands
of the authorities.
On January 4, 1991, Garcia surrendered and was brought to the NBI. He named
Pat. Enrico Dizon as the companion of Lising when Cochise and Beebom were
kidnapped and brought to Valle Verde Lodge. He refused to make a statement or
give further information until Rodolfo Manalili was arrested.
On January 16, 1991, Enrico Dizon was turned over by his superiors to the NBI.
He named a certain CIC Robin Manga as one of their companions and owner of the
car they used when Cochise and Beebom were kidnapped. Thus, Manga was also
picked up.
Meanwhile, Rodolfo Manalili, who was in Australia at that time was fetched by then
NBI Director Alfredo Lim and Atty. Diego Gutierrez after proper representations
were made with the Australian police.
On January 17, 1991 Felimon Garcia, with the assistance of his counsel, Atty.
Redemberto Villanueva, executed a statement revealing that:
. . . he met RODOLFO MANALILI sometime in April 1987 in his office at No.
71 Mapang-akit Street corner V. Luna, Quezon City while soliciting
contribution for the Barangay fiesta of San Isidro, Minalin. The relationship
continued until he was requested by MANALILI to look for persons who could
help in arresting ROBERTO HERRERA, the suspect in the killing of his brother
DELFIN MANALILI. He contacted ROBERTO LISING alias RAMBO, a policemen
assigned with Pampanga PC Intelligence Unit, thru LIGAYA FAUSTO, his
relative and live-in-partner of LISING, to help in the arrest of HERRERA, and
on April 21, 1990, while in the residence of LISING, he placed a long-
distance call to MANALILI to inform him that LISING is willing to help. They
talked over the phone and agreed to meet the following day in Dao.
He met MANALILI at the Dao-Mabalacat exit and accompanied the latter to
LISING, ENRICO DIZON AND ANOTHER MAN ARMED WITH SERVICE PISTOL
(.45 CALIBER) AND Armalite. MANALILI, during the meeting, said that VIC
NABUA, his employee, will act as pointer of the persons to be arrested and
LISING agreed and asked from MANALILI P50,000.00 for the job to which
MANALILI agreed. Initially MANALILI gave P2,000.00 to LISING as expenses.
He together with LISING, ENRICO DIZON and the driver of a Tamaraw went
to Quezon City on April 23 and 24, 1990, but VIC NABUA failed to spot
HERRERA. On April 25, 1990, LISING and DIZON returned on board a black
car, Colt Galant (sic) driven by ROBIN MANGA and NABUA finally told them
that HERRERA was at a house near the Camelot. After a few minutes of
surveillance NABUA approached them and told them to follow the car driven
by a man with a woman companion. Said car proceeded to Timog Circle and
parked in front of Dayrit Hamburger House, followed by the Colt Galant
which they likewise followed on board a motor and handcuffed the man and
the woman. Then LISING instructed him to contact MANALILI and to follow
them to Pampanga. He, MANALILI and VIC NABUA proceeded to Pampanga
PC where they were instructed by the military on duty to proceed to Valle
Verde Lodge, San Fernando, Pampanga. There they saw LISING and
ERNESTO COCHISE BERNABE and BEEBOM CASTAOS. MANALILI identified
them and instructed him and LISING to release COCHISE and BEEBOM and
assured that whatever MANALILI promised to LISING WILL BE PAID. Lising
AGREED. However, after MANALILI left, LISING told him to bring COCHISE
and BEEBOM to a warehouse owned by LIGAYA FAUSTO where COCHISE
was killed by LISING. Thereafter BEEBOM was forced by ENRICO DIZON and
ROBIN MANGA top board the Galant car which left the warehouse towards
Barangay San Agustin.
He and LISING were left in the warehouse and proceeded to the house of
LIGAYA FAUSTO at MALIGAYA Village in San Fernando. At about 9:00 a.m.
he and LISING went to the warehouse of MANALILI at Xavierville
Subdivision, Quezon City and there a check of P40,000.00 was given to
LISING who encashed it with Fareast Bank and went to Pampanga. He
alighted at Sto. Domingo, Minalin, Pampanga after LISING gave him
P500.00.
3

Rodolfo Manalili, on the other hand, with the assistance of Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez
manifested on January 18, 1991:
that he met LISING through FELIMON GARCIA whom he requested to look
for some police officers who could help in the arrest of ROBERTO HERRERA,
the accused in the killing of his brother DELFIN MANALILI.
He met LISING together with a certain Pat. ENRICO DIZON of the Guagua
police and another police officer in Dau, Pampanga on April 22, 1990, and
gave them a sketch of HERRERA. On April 24, 1990, he told GARCIA to
postpone their plan against HERRERA due to his forthcoming travel to
Germany on April 25. However, at about 10:00 p.m. of April 25, GARCIA
came to his office at No. 71 Mapangakit, Diliman, Quezon City and informed
that they have already arrested HERRERA with a lady companion and that he
was instructed to go to Pampanga, which he did. He was accompanied in his
car by GARCIA and VICTOR LISBOA. They proceeded to Valle Verde Hotel in
San Fernando, Pampanga, and brought him to Room 213 where he saw a
man slumped on the floor with his eyes and mouth covered with tape. The
lady companions sitting on the bed had her eyes also taped. He told LISING
that the man is not HERRERA. He was forced to peek (sic) inside the room
anew, and this time recognized the woman to be BEEBOM CASTAOS. He
pleaded LISING and his companions to release them and would give them
whatever amount he promised them.
After he was told that BEEBOM and COCHISE would be released he
instructed GARCIA to stay behind and see to it that his instructions were
complied with. Then, he returned with VICTOR LISBOA. The following day, at
about 8:00 a.m., LISING and GARCIA came to his house and told him that
the man and BEEBOM were already released and in turn gave them a Far
East Bank check in the amount of P40,000.00.
On April 26, he left for Germany and returned on May 28, 1990. While still in
Germany his wife and househelps have been receiving threatening telephone
calls and on the first week of June he received a call from GARCIA who gave
the telephone to LISING who asked for P60,000.00, otherwise he will kill him
or implicate him in the crime.
On June 21, 1990 he left for Hongkong then to Melbourne for fear of his life
and that of his family.
He claimed that the police officers he saw in Valle Verde Hotel were
Pampanga policemen and not Quezon City policemen.
4

Consequently, two (2) Amended Informations were filed in court against Roberto
"Rambo" Lising, Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon Garcia, Enrico Dizon, Robin Manga, and
Ligaya Fausto.
Criminal Case No. Q-90-15239
For Carnapping (Violation of Republic Act No. 6539)
5

That on or about the 25th day of April 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, P/Pfc.
Roberto Lising y Canlas, Enrico Dizon, Robin Manga y Quimzon, being then
members of the Integrated National Police with Presidential waiver, and
Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon Garcia and Ligaya Fausto, private individuals and
several Does, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
one another, with intent to gain, and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, by means of violence and intimidation against persons,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry
away one G.T. Lancer, with Plate No. PER 942 in an undetermined value and
belonging to Ernesto Bernabe II, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of
the Civil Code.
6

Criminal Case No. Q-90-15240
For: Kidnapping with Double Murder
7

That on or about the 25th day of April, 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, P/Pcf.
Roberto "Rambo" Lising y Canlas, Enrico Dizon, Roberto (sic) Manga y
Quimzon, being then members of the Integrated National Police with
Presidential waiver, and Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon Garcia, both private
individuals, and several Does, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and for the purpose of detaining Ernesto Bernabe II y Blanco @
"Cochise" and Ana Lourdes Castaos y Jis de Ortega @ "Beebom," kidnap or
in any manner deprive them of their liberty and thereafter, pursuant to their
conspiracy, took them to San Fernando, Pampanga, and with intent to kill,
with treachery, evident premeditation and cruelty, did, then and there stab
them several times in the chest and slit open their necks, augmenting their
sufferings which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths and
thereafter burying them to prevent discovery, and Ligaya Fausto, also a
private individual, knowing the criminal intent of the above-named principal
accused cooperated in the execution of the crime by supplying material
and/or moral aid, to the damage and prejudice of the Heirs of said victims in
such amounts as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the New
Civil Code.
8

Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
In building up their case, the prosecution presented two vital witnesses: Froilan
Olimpia, who witnessed the abduction of the young couple at Dayrit's Ham and
Burger House; and Raul Morales, the pahinante who testified on the killing of
Cochise.
On May 27, 1991, Froilan Olimpia testified in court and stated that he was 31
years old and was formerly a security guard of Nationwide Security and
Investigation Agency. He was assigned at the Rotonda Wine Station, the
establishment beside Dayrit's Ham and Burger House along Timog Circle, Quezon
City. His tour of duty on April 25, 1990 was from 12:00 noon to 12:00 midnight.
At about 7:00 to 7:30 in the evening, Olimpia was at his post in front of the Wine
Station. There was a green box type Lancer car which parked in front of the
Dayrit's Ham and Burger House carrying a man and a woman. Then a black car
with no license plate parked behind the green car and two men alighted from it
carrying guns. They announced that they were policemen, one was carrying a .45
caliber firearm in his holster and the other was carrying a long firearm. These men
went towards the green box type Lancer car and handcuffed its driver. He only
heard the man being handcuffed retort "Bakit?" When asked about the female
companion, he said that his attention was more focused on the handcuffing
incident and just later noticed that the woman was already seated at the back of
the car. He did not even see the other man driving the black car.
Olimpia further explained that the security guard of Dayrit's Ham and Burger
House, Anastacio dela Cruz, was not really able to witness the whole incident since
he was busy buying a cigarette stick from a nearby vendor. Just when the latter
was returning to his post, the cars were already backing up ready to leave.
He did not tell anyone about the incident nor bothered to report to the authorities
since he was aware that the perpetrators were policemen. He came to know about
the identities of the man and woman and their disappearance when two female
persons were making inquiries about them on April 27, 1990. The next time,
another group of people asked him about what he witnessed until he was picked
up by the NBI for further questioning about the whole incident.
Raul Morales was presented in court on April 17, 1991. He stated that since March
1988, he had been working for Ligaya Fausto and Roberto Lising as a pahinante or
truck helper of Crown Gas Commercial, a dealer of LPG, located in Valle Victoria
Village, San Fernando, Pampanga. He knew Roberto Lising to be a policeman and
is known by the name "Rambo" Lising. He works as a policeman in the morning
and when he returns home after work, helps in delivering gas. During his
testimony, Morales was given a clean sheet of paper and a pen where he was
asked to make a sketch of his place of work.
At about 2:00 in the morning of April 26, 1990, he was awakened by a knock at
the gate of the warehouse. When he opened the gate, two cars came in: a green
box-type Lancer car driven by Lising, with Felimon Garcia seated in front, a man
and a woman at the back seat of the car; and a black car with Dizon and Manga.
After the two cars entered the premises, he saw Lising go behind their sleeping
quarters and get a wire. Lising and Dizon then brought Cochise to an area in the
middle of the warehouse while Manga led Beebom to another end. After alighting
from the car, Felimon Garcia got a spade from the back compartment of the car
and went out of the warehouse. Lising and Dizon then removed the handcuffs of
Cochise, tied his hands with the wire and blindfolded him with a tape and torn
cloth.
Morales further testified that it was Lising who closed the gate but left it ajar. In a
little while, he noticed another man enter the gate and walked towards Beebom.
He heard the woman plead: "Uncle, maawa po kayo sa amin," while Manga was
tying Beebom's hands with the wire. Garcia, after going inside the warehouse, was
handed a knife by Lising which he used to stab Cochise on the chest. Lising then
retrieved his knife from Garcia and continued to stab Cochise. When Cochise was
already dead, the four men, namely Lising, Garcia, Dizon and Manga carried
Cochise out of the warehouse. They were away for about half an hour and when
they came back, the four men directly went to the well and washed their hands.
The four walked towards Manalili and talked with each other. He could not hear the
conversation but saw that they grouped themselves together.
Before leaving, Lising called on Morales and told him to close the gate and keep
the shoes of Cochise. Lising boarded the green box type Lancer car with Garcia
and the woman. He noticed Rudy Manalili walk out of the gate.
On April 26, 1991, the court conducted an ocular inspection of the scene of the
crime. Witness Morales pointed to the court how the events transpired from where
he was seated.
On the basis of the testimonies of the above witnesses, plus the confessions made
in the extrajudicial statements executed by Roberto Lising, Felimon Garcia, and
Rodolfo Manalili, the prosecution presented their version of the incident as quoted
from the trial court's decision, to wit:
1. The conspiracy to abduct and subsequently kill Ernesto "Cochise" Bernabe
II and Ana Lourdes "Beebom" Castaos was hatched sometime in March
1990 when accused Rodolfo Manalili secured the services of accused Felimon
Garcia to look for men who would be willing to commit the dastardly deed
for a fee. (Exhibits "HH" and "MM")
2. Accused Garcia then set about on his task and contacted accused Roberto
Lising and Enrico Dizon for the "job." (Ibid.)
3. At a meeting arranged by Garcia on 22 April 1990, accused Manalili talked
with Lising and Dizon at Mabalacat, Pampanga about the details of the
conspiracy. (Ibid.)
4. Accused Manalili promised Lising, Dizon and their companions the amount
of P50,000.00 for the "job." (Ibid.)
5. Lising and Dizon readily accepted Manalili's using a total of P10,000.00 as
downpayment, the balance of P40,000.00 payable after the victims have
been kidnapped and killed. (Ibid.)
6. Accused Lising and Dizon then recruited accused Robin Manga to help
implement the orders of Manalili. (Ibid.)
7. On 25 April 1990, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused Lising,
Dizon, Garcia and Manga, on board Manga's black car, went to the vicinity of
the Camelot Hotel at Quezon City. They positioned themselves about 60
meters away from the Castaos residence and waited for the victims.
(Exhibit "MM")
8. At around 6:30 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Cochise and
Beebom went out of the Castaos residence, boarded Cochise's green
colored 1985 Lancer car with plate No. PER 942. (Ibid.) This Lancer car is
owned by, and registered under the name of Cochise's father, Fiscal Ernesto
Bernabe. (Exhibit "DD")
9. Cochise and Beebom then proceeded toward Dayrit's Ham & Burger House
at Timog Avenue, Quezon City. (Ibid.)
10. Accused Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga immediately boarded Manga's
black car and tailed the green Lancer. (Ibid.)
11. Upon reaching Dayrit's Hamburger House, Cochise parked the green
Lancer in front of the restaurant. (T.S.N, 7 May 1991, p. 6)
12. Immediately thereafter, Manga's black car was parked behind the green
Lancer. (Ibid.)
13. Accused Dizon, armed with a .45 caliber pistol, and accused Manga,
carrying a long firearm, alighted from the black car, proceeded towards the
green Lancer and announced that they are policemen. (Id., at 7)
14. While Cochise and Beebom were alighting from the green Lancer, Dizon
approached, pointed the .45 caliber pistol at Cochise and handcuffed
Cochise's hands behind his back. (Id., at 8)
15. Cochise, visibly surprised and confused, asked Dizon, "Bakit?" (Id., at
14)
16. Accused Dizon ignored the question and rudely pushed Cochise into the
back seat of the green Lancer. (Id., at 7-9)
17. Similarly, accused Manga approached Beebom at the other side of the
green Lancer, and pushed her into the other back seat of the green Lancer.
(Ibid.)
18. Accused Dizon and Manga then boarded the front of the green Lancer,
backed the car out of the parking area of Dayrit's Ham & Burger House and
drove away towards EDSA. (Id., at 11)
19. Accused Lising and Garcia, on board Manga's black car, immediately
followed. (Ibid.)
20. After the forcible abduction of Cochise and Beebom, Garcia informed
Manalili of the success of the operation. Garcia further told Manalili to go to a
designated place in San Fernando, Pampanga, where Cochise and Beebom
will be taken. (Exhibit "MM")
21. Manalili then proceeded to San Fernando, Pampanga on board his gray
Mercedes Benz. (Ibid)
22. At around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of 26 April 1990, accused Lising,
Dizon, Garcia and Manga brought Cochise and Beebom to a bodega in San
Fernando, Pampanga owned by accused Ligaya Fausto. (T.S.N., 18 April
1991, p. 6)
23. At this time, Lising was driving the green Lancer with Garcia at the front
seat. At the rear of the car were Cochise and Beebom. (Id., at 8).
24. Manga, on the other hand, was driving the black car, with Dizon beside
him. (Id., at 8).
25. After the green Lancer and the black car were parked inside the bodega,
Cochise, blind-folded, handcuffed and gagged with several strips of masking
tape, was dragged out of the green Lancer by Lising and Dizon towards an
area near the toilet. (Id., at 9-10; T.S.N., 26 April 1991, p. 3).
26. Beebom, on the other hand, was taken by Manga to another area of the
bodega where she could not see Cochise or hear what was being done to
him. (Ibid.)
27. At this point in time, Manalili arrived, parked the car on the road outside
the bodega and walked inside towards Beebom. (T.S.N., 18 April 1991, p.
11).
28. Beebom, seeing Manalili, pleaded, "Uncle, parang awa mo na. Wala
kaming kasalanan." (Ibid)
29. Manalili simply ignored Beebom's plea for mercy. (Ibid)
30. Meanwhile, Garcia went to the back of the green Lancer, got a spade
from the truck compartment, and went out of the bodega (Ibid.). Garcia
walked towards the back of the bodega and there, dug a shallow grave.
(Exhibit "HH")
31. Lising went to the clothesline area of the bodega, got a length of a
laundry wire and some clothes which he tore apart and made into makeshift
ropes. (T.S.N., 18 April 1991, p. 12)
33. Garcia then returned to the bodega with the spade still in his hands and
approached Cochise. (Id., at 14)
34. Lising handed a knife to Garcia, who then stabbed Cochise in the chest.
(Ibid.)
35. Lising, appearing dissatisfied, grabbed the knife from Garcia and stabbed
Cochise several times in the chest and stomach area, as if telling Garcia how
to do it. All this time; Dizon was holding Cochise. (Id., at 14-15)
36. Cochise then fell to the ground, mortally wounded. (Ibid)
37. Thereupon, Dizon motioned to Manga to help carry the body of Cochise.
Manalili then was left to keep watch over Beebom. (Id., at 16)
38. Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga brought to the back of the bodega, into
the shallow grave dug by Garcia. The four then covered Cochise with soil.
(T.S.N., 26 April 1991, p. 6; Exhibit "MM")
39. They then reported to Manalili for final instructions. The order was for all
of them to leave. (T.S.N., 26 April 1991, p.18)
40. Beebom inquired about Cochise, Lising and Dizon answered that they
had released Cochise, and that they would likewise release her. (T.S.N., 18
April 1991, p. 18; Exhibit "MM")
41. Thus, the five accused left the bodega, Dizon and Manga on board the
black car, Manalili in his own car, and Lising, Garcia and Beebom in the
green Lancer. (T.S.N., 18 April 1991, p. 18)
42. Later, upon the instructions of Lising, Dizon and Manga took Beebom
with them on the black car. (Exhibit "MM") This was the last time that
Beebom was seen alive.
43. At around 5:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, Fausto arrived at
her bodega and waited for Lising to arrive. (T.S.N., 18 April 1991, p. 20)
44. About an hour later, Lising arrived on board the Lancer car taken from
Cochise. Lising alighted from the Lancer car, proceeded to one of the huts in
the bodega where Fausto was staying, and informed Fausto about the taking
of the Lancer car. (Id., at 21).
45. After a few minutes, Fausto emerged from the hut and instructed a
certain Jun Medrano, one of Fausto's helpers in the bodega, to drive the
Lancer car to her house in Maligaya Village, San Fernando, Pampanga, and
hide it there. (Id., at 22)
46. Pursuant to Fausto's instruction, Jun Medrano, together with two other
helpers of Fausto, Raul Morales, and a certain Nonoy, drove the Lancer car
to Fausto's house and hid it in the "barbelan" area of the house. (Id., at 23-
24; Exhibit "Y")
47. Meanwhile, satisfied that his orders had been fully implemented, Manalili
paid Lising the P40,000.00 balance of the "contract", by issuing a Far East
Bank check for the said amount to Lising at around 8:00 o'clock in the
morning of 26 April 1990. (Exhibits "K" and "HH")
48. Lising immediately encashed the check and distributed the proceeds
among himself and the other accused, Exhibits "K-2" and "MM")
49. The Lancer car taken from Cochise, on the other hand, remained hidden
for sometime at the residence of Fausto in Maligaya Village where it was
repainted to a light gray color upon the instruction of Fausto. (T.S.N., 18
April 1991, pp. 26-27; Exhibits "CC", "CC-1" to "CC-6")
50. After the Lancer car was repainted to light gray, Fausto's helpers in the
bodega, namely, Jun Medrano, Raul Morales, Rudy, Bebot and Arnold, upon
Fausto's instructions, pushed the Lancer car for about fifteen minutes to
have its engine started. Thereafter, the Lancer car was driven to Fausto's
bodega. (T.S.N., 18 April 1991, pp. 28-29)
51. Lising and Fausto thereafter started using the Lancer car in going to the
bank and other places in San Fernando, Pampanga. (Ibid.)
52. The Lancer car was subsequently recovered by the PC/CAPCOM and
turned over to the custody of Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe. (Exhibits "CC", "CC-1"
to "CC-6" and "EE")
53. On 25 June 1990, after two months of frantic and exhaustive search
made by the Bernabe family, the body of Cochise was found and exhumed
from the grave where Cochise was buried by Lising, Garcia, Dizon and
Manga at the back of Fausto's bodega in San Fernando, Pampanga. It was
determined during an autopsy that Cochise died to multiple stab wounds in
his chest and upper stomach. (T.S.N., 10 April 1991, p. 33; Exhibits "D", "D-
1", "E" and "E-1")
54. The next day, also after two months of frantic and exhaustive search
made by the Castaos family, the body of Beebom was found and exhumed
from a shallow grave about two kilometers from the bodega of Fausto. It
was determined during the autopsy that Beebom died of severe hemorrhage,
secondary to two stab wounds in the chest. (T.S.N., 10 April 1991, p. 40;
Exhibits "1" and "J")
55. Cochise was 26 years old and Beebom was 22 years old when their lives
were untimely ended by the accused. Cochise had just finished his Bachelor
of Laws degree from the University of the Philippines and was then reviewing
for his bar examinations when he was abducted on 25 April 1990. Beebom,
on the other hand, was a graduating Mass Communication student of the
University of the Philippines when she was abducted on 25 April 1990. Both
Cochise and Beebom excelled in academic and extra-curricular activities,
their written works having been published in periodicals and other
publications. Cochise and Beebom were in the best of their youth and health
at the time of their untimely death. (T.S.N., 9 August 1991, pp. 4-7; T.S.N.,
23 July 1991, pp. 24-26; Exhibit "II")
56. The Bernabe family, in their attempt to locate Cochise spent a total of
P380,000.00. In laying Cochise to his final rest, the Bernabe family spent a
total of P632,222.00 for funeral and other expenses. (T.S.N., 9 August 1991,
p. 12; Exhibits "LL", "LL-1 to "LL-3")
57. The Castaos family, on the other hand, spent a total of P350,000.00 for
the funeral services for Beebom. (T.S.N., 23 July 1991, p. 39)
9

In their defense, the accused policemen claimed that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain their conviction. At the same time, each one had an alibi.
Roberto Lising asserted that on April 25, 1990, he took a leave of absence from
the office to be able to celebrate his father's birthday in Arayat, Pampanga and
stayed there for the night. His father was presented to corroborate his assertion.
Enrico Dizon testified that April 25, 1990 was an ordinary working day for him. He
left the office at 5:00 p.m. and headed for home at No. 107 Kamia St., Bgy.
Sindalen, San Fernando, Pampanga. In fact, two of his neighbors recounted in
court the verbal exchange they had when they saw each other in their
neighborhood.
Roberto Manga, meanwhile, averred that it was impossible for him to participate in
the commission of the crime since he was still nursing his gunshot wounds
sustained in an encounter with lawless elements for about a year already.
Garcia and Manalili did not take the witness stand. They opted to rely on their
extrajudicial statements executed the previous days manifesting the absence of
criminal intent.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused RODOLFO
MANALILI, ROBERTO LISING y CANLAS, FELIMON GARCIA, ROBIN MANGA y
QUIMZON and ENRICO DIZON y ESCARIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Double Murder qualified with treachery and aggravated by
evidence premeditation and abuse of public position by Lising, Manga and
Dizon, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer a penalty of double
Reclusion Perpetua with all its accessory penalties provided by law (the
death penalty having been abolished by the 1987 Constitution); to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of Ernesto Bernabe II;
(a) P1,000,000.00 as funeral and other expenses;
(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(c) P500,000.00 as moral damages;
(d) P2,000,000.00 for Cochise's loss of earning capacity;
the heirs of Ana Lourdes Castaos:
(a) P350,000.00 for funeral and other expenses;
(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(c) P500,000.00 as moral damages;
The Court also finds accused Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and Robin Manga
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Illegal Detention
aggravated by use of a motor vehicle and hereby sentences each one of
them to suffer the maximum penalty of Reclusion Temporal with
imprisonment from Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and one (1) day
to Twenty years, and to pay the cost.
Accused LIGAYA FAUSTO who is charged as an accessory after the fact (not
accomplice as alleged by the Prosecution), is hereby acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence.
Accused RODOLFO MANALILI, ROBERTO LISING, ENRICO DIZON, ROBIN
MANGA and FELIMON GARCIA are given full credit of their respective periods
of detention in the service of their respective sentences in this case.
With respect to Criminal Case No. Q-15239 for carnapping, all the accused
are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, it appearing that the use of
the car was done only to facilitate the commission of the crime of Slight
Illegal Detention.
10

In this appeal, the following assignment of errors were made:
Roberto Lising contends that:
I. THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND
CONSIDERING THE STATEMENTS OF RODOLFO MANALILI (EXHS. "HH", "HH-
1" TO HH-25") AND THAT OF FELIMON GARCIA ("MM", "MM-1" TO "MM-14")
ADMISSIBLE AS AGAINST ROBERTO "RAMBO" LISING;
II. THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING RAUL
MORALES AS A CREDIBLE WITNESS, ALSO AS AGAINST ROBERTO "RAMBO"
LISING;
III. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED, LIKEWISE, IN STATING THAT
HEREIN APPELLANT IMMEDIATELY ENCASHED THE CHECK AND
DISTRIBUTED THE PROCEEDS AMONG HIMSELF AND THE OTHER (EXHS. "K-
2" AND "MM");
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE STATEMENT OF THE
HEREIN APPELLANT AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AS AGAINST HIM;
V. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT HEREIN APPELLANT
(LISING IS EQUALLY LIABLE FOR KIDNAPPING THUS, JIVING (SIC) THE
PLACE FOR PURPOSES OF JURISDICTION; AND
VI. THAT THE HON. COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE HEREIN APPELLANT
(ROBERTO LISING) AS ONE OF ALL THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIMES OF
DOUBLE MURDER AND WITH ENRICO DIZON AND ROBIN MANGA FOR
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
11

Enrico Dizon argues that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DROP THE
NAMES OF ROLANDO KHO, ROLANDO FERNANDEZ, NOEMI PANGAN AND
JESUS REMOLACIO FROM THE INFORMATION AND ADMIT AMENDED
INFORMATION IMPLICATING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ENRICO DIZON DESPITE
CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF KHO, FERNANDEZ, PANGAN
AND REMOLACIO;
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE PROSECUTION'S VERSION
OF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MISLEADING
STATEMENTS AS PROVED BY THEIR CONTRADICTIONS TO THE
TRANSCRIPTS OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES, AND AFFIDAVITS PRESENTED;
3. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE FOR IT RELIED IN THE WEAKNESS OF THE
DEFENSE OF ALIBI, WITHOUT REGARDING THE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES RAUL, MORALES AND FROILAN
OLIMPIA;
4. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO
THE AFFIDAVITS EXECUTED BY LISING, MANALILI AND GARCIA DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOT PRESENTED AS WITNESSES BEFORE THE
LOWER COURT;
5. THAT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADJUDGING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMINAL ACTS BASED ON THE
DECLARATION OF FELIMON GARCIA'S EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
WITHOUT ESTABLISHING FIRST THE CONSPIRACY TO WHICH ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DIZON WAS A PART.
12

Robin Manga asserts that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT ON THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF CO-ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI AND
FELIMON GARCIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO DID NOT TAKE THE
WITNESS STAND NOR THEIR STATEMENTS OFFERED IN EVIDENCE;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
STATEMENTS OF RODOLFO MANALILI AND FELIMON GARCIA "AFFIRMED
CONSPIRACY" AMONG THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE ITS UTTER
LACK OF EVIDENTIARY VALUE;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT ON
THE TESTIMONIES OF RAUL MORALES AND FROILAN OLIMPIA DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE STATEMENTS OF THE TWO ARE REPLETE WITH
INCONSISTENCIES, SELF-CONTRADICTIONS AND ARE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT FELIMON GARCIA'S
NARRATION OF THE ABDUCTION WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE TESTIMONY
OF FROILAN OLIMPIA WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTICIPATION OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ROBIN MANGA DESPITE STATEMENTS BY OLIMPIA THAT HE
SAW QUEZON CITY POLICEMEN ROLANDO KHO AND ROLANDO FERNANDEZ
AS THE PERSONS WHO ABDUCTED "COCHISE" AND "BEEBOM" IN THE
EARLY EVENING OF APRIL 25, 1990 AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF FELIMON GARCIA WAS NOT EVEN
IDENTIFIED BY THE LATTER DURING THE TRIAL OF THESE CASES;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE MATTERS
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANGA;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PHYSICAL
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANGA BEING INVOLVED IN THE
OFFENSES CHARGED;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
MANGA.
13

Rodolfo Manalili avers that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING TOTAL CREDIBILITY TO
RAUL MORALES AND IN NOT FINDING THAT RAUL MORALES WAS A
REHEARSED AND PERJURED WITNESS INSOFAR AS IMPLICATING ACCUSED
RODOLFO MANALILI IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF DOUBLE
MURDER IS CONCERNED;
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED
RODOLFO MANALILI DID NOT HAVE ANY CRIMINAL INTENT OF DOING AWAY
WITH THE LIVES OF ERNESTO BERNABE II AND ANA LOURDES CASTAOS
AND THAT HE LIKEWISE DID NOT HAVE ANY MOTIVE WHATSOEVER IN
CONSPIRING TO DO SO;
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT
ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI NEVER ENTERED INTO A CONSPIRACY TO
COMMIT THE CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER NOR DID HE COMMIT ANY ACT/S
ON THE BASIS OF WHICH IT CAN BE INFERRED THAT HE ENTERED INTO
SUCH A CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT THE CRIME IMPUTED TO HIM;
IV. SINCE THERE WAS IN EFFECT SEPARATE TRIAL OF THE SEVERAL
ACCUSED WHO WERE EACH REPRESENTED BY SEPARATE LAWYERS AND
CONSIDERING THAT CONSPIRACY BETWEEN MANALILI AND HIS CO-
ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN BY ANY ACT OR DECLARATION DURING
ITS EXISTENCE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THE SWORN STATEMENT OF ROBERTO LISING AS EVIDENCE
AGAINST RODOLFO MANALILI TO THE EXTENT THAT IT PURPORTS TO
ATTEST TO MANALILI'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRIME;
V. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE ON THE BASIS OF WHICH IT CAN BE
INFERRED THAT ANOTHER PARTY WHO WOULD BE MOST BENEFITED BY
DOING AWAY WITH THE LIVES OF THE VICTIMS, WAS BEHIND THE
COMMISSION OF DOUBLE MURDER;
VI. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE WELL-
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE IN CRIMINAL LAW THAT WHEN THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO TWO REASONABLE
INTERPRETATIONS: ONE REASONABLE INTERPRETATION LEADING TO A
DECISION OF CONVICTION, AND, THE OTHER REASONABLE
INTERPRETATION LEADING TO A FINDING OF ACQUITTAL, THEN THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT FULFILLED THE STRINGENT
REQUIREMENT OF THE LAW OF PROVING THE GUILT OF ACCUSED RODOLFO
MANALILI BEYOND DOUBT AND THEREFORE SAID ACCUSED MANALILI IS
ENTITLED TO AN ACQUITTAL; AND
VII. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING INFLATED,
UNSUBSTANTIATED, AND SPECULATIVE DAMAGES WHICH ARE NOT
RECOVERABLE UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
14

Felimon Garcia contends that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RAUL
MORALES WAS A REHEARSED AND PERJURED WITNESS TO MAKE FALSE
ASSERTIONS IMPLICATING APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER;
II. SINCE THERE WAS IN EFFECT SEPARATE TRIALS OF THE SEVERAL
ACCUSED WHO WERE EACH REPRESENTED BY SEPARATE LAWYERS AND
CONSIDERING THAT CONSPIRACY BETWEEN APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA
AND HIS CO-ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN BY ANY ACT OR
DECLARATION DURING ITS EXPERIENCE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SWORN STATEMENT OF ROBERTO
LISING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA;
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT APPELLANT
FELIMON GARCIA DID NOT HAVE ANY CRIMINAL INTENT NOR MOTIVE
WHATSOEVER TO CONSPIRE WITH APPELLANT LISING ET AL TO KILL
ERNESTO BERNABE II AND ANA LOURDES CASTAOS BOTH OF WHOM
APPELLANT GARCIA HAS NEVER KNOWN OR MET BEFORE APRIL 25, 1990;
IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT
APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA PERFORMED THE ACTS ADMITTED BY HIM
UNDER THE COMPULSION OF AN IRRESISTIBLE FORCE AND/OR UNDER THE
IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY
AND THEREFORE EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY; AND
V. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA IS NOT
EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY, THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT FINDING HIM GUILTY MERELY AS AN ACCOMPLICE OF THE CRIME OF
DOUBLE MURDER AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO A LOWER PENALTY IN
VIEW OF THE PRESENCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER, OBFUSCATION, AND
LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG, AS MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES.
15

Basically the present appeal is anchored on three issues: (a) the admissibility of
the extrajudicial statements of appellants Manalili, Garcia and Lising; (b) the
credibility of prosecution witnesses Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales and the (c)
finding of conspiracy among the appellants.
Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective
declarants, pursuant to the rule that the act, declaration or omission of a party as
to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This is based upon the
presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such
declarations were true. A man's act, conduct and declarations wherever made,
provided they be voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is
fair to presume that they correspond with the truth and it is his fault if they are
not.
16

There is no question that their respective extrajudicial statement of Manalili and
Garcia were executed voluntarily. They were assisted by their counsel and properly
sworn to before a duly authorized officer. They merely relied on their extra-judicial
statements and did not take the witness stand during the trial.
Lising, on the other hand, claims that he was coerced and tortured into executing
the extrajudicial statement but nothing appears on record that such extrajudicial
statement was made under compulsion, duress or violence on his person. Lising
did not present himself for physical examination, nor did he file administrative
charges against his alleged tormentors which would necessarily buttress the claim
of torture in the absence of such evidence. There are in fact indicia of
voluntariness in the execution of his extra-judicial statements, to wit: (a) it
contains many details and facts which the investigating officer could not have
known and could not have supplied, without the knowledge and information given
by Lising himself; (b) it bears corrections duly initialed by him; (c) it tends to
explain or justify his conduct and shift the blame to his co-accused Manalili.
Moreover, the claim that Lising was not assisted by counsel is belied by the fact
that the signature of his counsel Atty. Yabut appears in all the pages of his
extrajudicial statements.
The rule that an extrajudicial statement is evidence only against the person
making it, also recognizes various exceptions. One such exception worth noting is
the rule that where several extrajudicial statements had been made by several
persons charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion with
reference to said several confessions, the facts that the statements are in all
material respects identical, is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants
and is admissible against other persons implicated therein.
17
They are also
admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to
show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the
crime and may likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other
facts and circumstances that other persons had participated in the perpetration of
the crime charged and proved.
18
These are known as "interlocking confessions."
No doubt that the statements were independently executed and rather identical
with each other in their material details. There are also distinct similarities in the
narration of events leading to the killings of Cochise and Beebom.
Manalili and Garcia's statements reveal that Manalili wanted to effect the arrest of
Robert Herrera; that he asked help from Garcia if the latter knew of policemen
who could do the job; that Garcia arranged the meeting with Lising who
volunteered to take the job for the promised consideration of P50,000.00; that a
downpayment of P2,000.00 was made; that Manalili was informed that Robert
Herrera and Joy Ortega were arrested; that Manalili together with Garcia and
Nabua proceeded to the PC-INP Headquarters in Pampanga where they were told
to proceed to Valle Verde Motel; that they were met by Dizon and Manga at the
motel and were told that Herrera was inside the room; that upon discovery that
Lising's group had taken the wrong person and recognized Beebom's voice,
Manalili pleaded to the group that the victim be released, assuring Lising that the
balance P40,000.00 would still be paid; that Lising and his group refused but
relented upon Manalili's persistence; that Manalili left for Manila but instructed
Garcia to stay behind and ensure the release of the victims; and that the next day
Lising went to his office and claimed the balance to which Manalili issued the
corresponding check.
Garcia added that after Manalili had left, Lising told him to bring Cochise and
Beebom to the warehouse owned by Ligaya where Cochise was killed. Thereafter,
they forcibly took Beebom into the car and proceeded to Brgy. San Agustin.
Likewise, we find Lising's statement as corroborative evidence against the others.
Except as to that portion where he exculpates himself from any liability stating
that it was Manalili and Garcia who actually stabbed Cochise in the warehouse and
that he was merely a lookout, Lising's statement is identical as to the other
material facts, namely, that Cochise and Beebom were brought to the Valle Verde
Motel, blindfolded where he met Manalili and Garcia; that they were brought to the
warehouse on board a green box type Lancer car, where Cochise was killed; that
Beebom was brought to Brgy. San Agustin where she was eventually killed; that
he should take care of the green box type Lancer car and was given P40,000.00 in
check.
Nonetheless, the trial court's decision, in convicting all the accused was based not
on the aforesaid extrajudicial statements of the accused alone but mainly on the
eyewitness account of the two witnesses, Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales, which
the trial court gave weight and credence as bearing the "chime of truth and
honesty." Well-established is the rule that the trial court's evaluation of the credit-
worthiness of the testimony given before it by witnesses should be accorded great
respect.
19
Froilan Olimpia, a security guard of the Rotonda Wine Station, an
establishment adjacent to the Dayrit's Ham and Burger House witnessed the
abduction of Cochise and Beebom in front of the said restaurant.
He testified that he saw three men in a black car without a license plate drive to
Dayrit's Ham and Burger House and park behind the green Lancer car. When the
two men alighted from the car, they introduced themselves as policemen to the
by-standers, one carrying a .45 caliber firearm in his holster and the other
carrying a long firearm. The two men approached the green Lancer car and
handcuffed its driver. Olimpia only heard the man say: "Bakit"? He later noticed
that the woman was already seated at the back of the car. These two men drove
the green Lancer car which was followed by the black car When asked to identify
the three me, Olimpia unhesitatingly identified Dizon and Manga.
Q Mr. Witness, on April 25, 1990, where were you employed?
A Security Guard of Nationwide Security & Investigation Agency.
Q You said you were employed with Nationwide Security &
Investigation Agency, as Security Guard on said date where,
were you assigned as security guard?
A At Rotonda Wine Station, sir.
Q Where is this Rotonda Wine Station located?
A At Timog Ave., sir.
Q What city?
A Quezon City, sir.
Q You said you were employed as security guard of Rotonda
Wine Station, Timog Ave., Quezon City, do you have proof to
show that you were a security guard of said Rotonda Wine
Station on April 25, 1990?
A I have, sir, but it is filed with the agency.
Q This Rotonda Wine Station, what establishments are beside
this establishment, and let us talk first on the left and then
right?
A The left side of Rotonda Wine Station is the Dayrit Hamburger
house and the right is a drugstore.
Q What was your tour of duty on April 25, 1990?
A 12:00 noon to 12:00 midnight, sir:
Q And did you report for duty on said date?
A Yes, sir.
Q On or about 7:00 to 7:30 o'clock in the evening of April 25,
1990, what particular portion or Rotonda Wine Station were you
posted?
A I was at the door, sir.
Q Door of what, front or back?
A Front door of the Rotonda Wine Station, sir.
Q When you said you were at the front door, inside the building
or outside?
A Outside of the door, sir.
Q You mentioned a while ago that on the left side of the Rotonda
Wine Station where were posted is the Dayrit Hamburger House,
was there a security guard there?
A Yes, sir.
Q And do you know him?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is his name?
A Anastacio dela Cruz, sir.
Q You stated that at 7:00 to 7:30 in the evening of April 25,
1990, you positioned yourself in front or outside the door of
Rotonda Wine Station, did you notice anything unusual while you
were posting there?
A Yes, sir, there was.
Q What was that unusual incident that took place, if any?
A There was a vehicle parking in front of Dayrit Hamburger
house.
Q What kind of a vehicle parked there?
A Green Lancer, car, box type.
Q Where was it parked particularly?
A In front of Dayrit Hamburger house, at the side of the street.
Q Did you notice the passenger of that green Lancer car?
A No, I did not know them, sir.
Q But did you have the occasion to look and see them?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many were they?
A Two, sir.
Q Were they male and female?
A Yes, sir, one man and one woman.
Q You said you noticed the car with two persons boarding it,
what happened after the vehicle parked on the side of the street
in front of the Dayrit Hamburger house?
A After they had parked their vehicle, I noticed that another car
parked behind that green Lancer car without any plate number.
Q Did you notice what kind of a car was that which parked
behind the seen Lancer car?
A I noticed it was a black car without plate number but I did not
notice the make.
Q What happened after the black car parked behind the green
Lancer car?
A Two men from the black car alighted.
Q What did the two men do after they alighted?
A After they alighted they announced and introduced themselves
that they were policemen and they went towards the green
Lancer car.
Q You said they introduced themselves as policemen, to whom?
A To the people around the vicinity, to the by-standers.
Q When the two men who introduced themselves as policemen,
did you notice if they were armed?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please tell us what arm or weapon did they carry?
A The other one was carrying a 45 firearm on his holster and the
other one was carrying a long firearm, I do not know what kind
of firearm that long firearm was.
Q This person carrying 45 firearm, could you still recall him or
his figure or feature?
A If I see him again, I could recognize him.
Q But can you describe him before this Court?
A Yes, sir, he is tall, a little bit dark complexion and with a little
mustache.
Q You said that if you see that person again, you can recognize
him. Will you please look around the courtroom and point to him
if he is now inside?
A Yes, he is here, sir.
Q If he is here, will you please point to him?
A Yes, I can point to him.
Q Will you please go down from the witness stand, go to him and
tap him on his shoulder?
A (Witness went down from the witness stand, went to the
person and tap the shoulder, who when asked of his name
answered as ENRICO DIZON).
Q Go back to the witness stand.
ATTY. CRESCINI:
May we make it of record, Your Honor, that at the time the
witness was asked to identify Enrico Dizon, there are many
people, at least one hundred in number, standing inside the
courtroom closely to each other.
FISCAL:
I would like to adopt the same manifestation, Your Honor.
Q You have identified the person with 45 caliber firearm, the
person who was carrying a long firearm, can you still recognize
him or can you remember his feature?
A If I could see him again, I can recognize him.
Q You said that you can see that person with long firearm again,
you can recognize him, will you look around the courtroom and
tell us if that person you are referring to is here?
A Yes, he is here.
Q Will you please point to him?
A (Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom who when
asked of his name answered as ROBIN MANGA).
Q Now, that you identified the two armed men who alighted from
the black car and introduced themselves as policemen, what did
these two men do after that?
A They went towards the parked green Lancer car.
Q And what did they do when they went towards the green
Lancer car?
A They immediately handcuffed the man driving the green
Lancer car.
Q This person who was handcuffed, were you able to look and
see him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you still recognize him if you see him again?
A Yes, sir, I can recognize him if I see him again.
Q What about a picture, if you are shown a picture of that man
who was handcuffed, could you still be able to identify him?
A Yes, sir, I can.
Q I am showing to you a picture marked as Exh. "X-4" please
look at this picture and tell us if you could recognize this picture?
A Yes, sir, I know this person.
Q Who is this person?
A He is Ernesto Bernabe II, sir.
Q What relation has this person in this picture and the person
who was handcuffed in the evening of April 25, 1990 at the time
you saw him?
A I know, sir, this person in the picture and the one who was
handcuffed refer to one and the same person.
Q You said that Ernesto Bernabe was handcuffed, you know
where was his companion at the time, who was a woman?
A I noticed she was already inside the car.
Q What car are you referring, the green Lancer car or the black
car without plate number?
A The green Lancer car, sir.
Q You said you saw the woman, were you able to look and see
her that evening?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would you still be able to identify her if you see her again?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to Exh. "X-4" will you look at this picture, and
tell us what relation has this person in this picture to the one
who was together with the man who was handcuffed?
A She is the woman I am referring to, sir, whom I saw inside the
green Lancer, they are one and the same.
Q You said you saw the man whom you identified as Ernesto
Bernabe being handcuffed by the two policeman, how far were
you from them?
A Five armslength (sic), sir.
Q By the way, this front of Dayrit Hamburger house and this
Rotonda Wine Store, are they lighted at night?
A Yes, sir.
Q What kind of light illuminates the area?
A Mercury lamp, sir.
Q How many lights are there?
A Many, sir.
Q You said there were lights, in the area during nighttime, can
you describe to us from your point of comparison in daytime
whether it is bright or not more particularly at the time of the
incident in question?
A It was bright just like daytime, sir.
20

As to the killing of the two victims, Raul Morales' testimony about what transpired
in the warehouse in the morning of April 26, 1990 satisfied the trial court beyond
reasonable doubt, as being consistent and credible, sufficient to convict all the
accused for the crime of murder. He testified positively, that on that fateful
morning, two cars entered the warehouse after he opened the gate. Lising and
Garcia alighted from the green Lancer car and brought out from the backseat
Cochise and Beebom. The other black car carried Dizon and Manga. Soon after,
Manalili entered the gate which was left open by Lising, and stood beside Beebom.
Cochise, whose hands were tied with a wire was brought to an area far from
Beebom's view. He was stabbed by Garcia, and then by Lising. After killing
Cochise, the four men carried him out of the warehouse while Manalili stayed with
Beebom.
The trial court was even more convinced about the witnesses' credibility after
conducting an ocular inspection of the scene of the crime.
ATTY. LLORENTE:
Q Now, Mr. Morales, from yesterday's hearing, you mentioned
that at about 2:090, April 26, you were awakened by a sound of
a motor vehicle and somebody was knocking. Do you recall
having stated that yesterday?
A Yes, I remember that, sir.
Q Now, apart from the sound of the motor vehicle and the knock
at the door, what else do you recall?
A Somebody called for Aida, Sir.
Q What else?
A I heard somebody said "Aida you open the door" and she told
me "just open the door, Sir.
Q And what did you do?
A I opened the door, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After the gate was opened, what happened?
A Two (2) cars got inside, Sir.
Q Can you describe the first car that entered the gate.
A The first one that got inside was colored green, Sir.
Q Do you know the make model or kind of vehicle that is colored
green?
A It was a Lancer car, Sir.
Q Did you notice also who was driving?
A Yes, I saw, Sir.
Q Who?
A It was Roberto Lising, Sir.
Q Was there anybody else inside the car?
A There was, Sir.
Q Who were inside that car?
A One was in front and two were at the back seat, Sir.
Q The one in front, do you know who was that?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Who?
A Felimon Garcia, Sir.
Q Was that the first time that you met this person?
A Felimon Garcia?
ATTY. LLORENTE:
Yes.
A That was the third time, Sir.
Q Why do you know Felimon Garcia?
A Because he is a cousin of Ligaya Fausto, Sir.
Q Can you please look around the Courtroom and tell us if you
can point to this Felimon Garcia and if you can, please do.
That man, Sir.
(Witness pointing to a man in white t-shirt who when asked
answered by the name of Felimon Garcia).
Q What about the two (2) passengers at the back of the Lancer
car, who were they?
A There was one woman and one man but I don't know their
names, Sir.
Q Let's go to the man. Did you see his condition? Physical
condition, his appearance?
A Tall, medium built, good-looking and hairy on the arms. He
was wearing white t-shirt and was in shorts, Sir.
Q What about the condition under which this person was seated
at the back of the car, can you describe that?
A I was not able to observe how he was seated, all I know is that
I saw him when he went out of the car, Sir.
Q What about the other passengers, the woman passenger. Can
you describe her.
A She was medium built, she was beautiful and fair-
complexioned "puti".
Q Now, let's go to the second car. Did you notice the driver of
the second car?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did you recognize this person?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Would you be able to identify, him?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you please look around if this person driving the second
car is in this Courtroom and if so, please point to him.
(witness pointing to a man in white shirt who when asked
answered by the name of Robin Manga).
Q Was there anybody else inside the second car aside from the
driver?
A There was, Sir.
Q Would you be able to identify that person?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you again look around the Courtroom and tell us if that
person is present and if so, please point to him.
A (witness pointing to a man in stripe shirt who when asked
answered by the name of Enrico Dizon).
Q Now, the two (2) cars having entered the premises, could you
please tell us what happened with these two (2) cars after
entering the premises?
A I saw Roberto Lising went behind the place of our sleeping
quarters and got a wire, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How did that woman reach that portion of the Lancer car? Can
you describe that?
A She was brought to that portion by the companion of Rambo,
Sir.
Q Who in particular?
A That man, Sir, (witness pointing to accused Robin Manga).
Q What about the man, how was he brought to that portion
which you have identified from the Lancer car?
A It was Roberto Lising who brought him there, Sir.
Q All by himself?
A They were two (2), Sir.
Q Who's the second aside from Mr. Lising?
A (witness pointing to accused Enrico Dizon).
Q After the man and the woman were placed in that position as
you described, what happened?
A Felimon Garcia came out and he was bringing with him a
spade (pala), Sir.
Q Did you notice where Felimon Garcia got that spade or pala?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where?
A They got it from the Lancer car, Sir.
Q In what particular portion of the Lancer car?
A At the back compartment of the car, Sir.
Q Incidentally, Mr. Morales, what happened to the gate?
Who closed the gate?
A It was they who closed the gate, Sir.
Q Did anybody else arrive?
A Yes, there were, Sir.
Q Who?
(witness pointing to accused Rodolfo Manalili) witness pointed to
a man in eyeglasses who when asked answered by the name of
Rodolfo Manalili.
Q Now, this person that you said arrived, how did he arrive?
A When he arrive, he went direct to the woman and talked with
the woman, Sir.
Q Did you hear any conversation between that man as you
identified as accused Manalili to the woman that you pointed to
here in the sketch?
A I only heard "Don't harm us. We have done no wrong".
COURT:
Who said that?
A It was the woman, Your Honor.
Q Did you hear how the woman address this man that you have
identified as accused Manalili?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How?
A Uncle, please pity us. We have done no wrong.
ATTY. LLORENTE:
Your Honor please, we heard the witness stating this time in
tagalog and could be corrected by the counsels for the accused.
May we respectfully request, Your Honor, that that particular
portion stated by the witness in tagalog be placed on record also
in tagalog.
COURT: Place that on record.
A Uncle, parang awa mo naman, wala naman kaming kasalanan.
Q Did you hear Mr. Manalili say anything when you heard this
plea by the woman?
A I heard nothing, Sir.
Q At that time when this plea was being made, what happened
to the person beside the woman? I am referring to the accused
that you have identified as Manga. What happened to him?
A He was tying her with a wire, Sir.
Q Now, let's go back to the man. What happened to him?
A Also, he was tied with a wire, Sir.
Q Let's talk about accused Lising. Before, this man that you have
identified was being tied with the wire, what did Mr. Lising do?
A He got wire, Sir.
Q Where?
A From here, Sir.
ATTY. LLORENTE:
For the record, Your Honor, witness pointed to the clothesline
wire that he previously drew that were attached to hut no. 1.
Q What else did Mr. Lising do apart from getting . . . securing
those laundry wires?
A They got the handcuff and then tied them with the wire, Sir.
Q From this area where Mr. Lising got these laundry wires,
where did he go?
A He went towards the man, Sir.
Q And when he was beside the man, what did he do?
A He took off the handcuff of the man and tied the man with the
wire, Sir.
Q Did he remove the handcuff, tied the man with the wire all by
himself?
A They were two (2), Sir.
Q Who is the other person helping Lising?
A (witness pointed to Enrico Dizon)
Q Could you demonstrate to us how were the hands of this man
tied with the laundry wire?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Please show us, Mr. Morales.
(witness placing his two arms behind his waist with crossed
wrists)
Q Mr. Morales, for clarification. In the event that you know
subsequently, much, much later, did you ever come to know
who was that man tied with his hands at the back that you have
just demonstrated? Did you ever come to know his name later?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Who?
A Cochise and Beebom, Sir.
Q What about Beebom? You mentioned Beebom. Who is this
Beebom? Who is that Beebom in relation to the person that you
have described in that area present at that time?
A They were sweethearts, Sir.
Q Let me just refer you to the woman that was brought out of
the green car, Lancer car. Did you ever come to know his name
later on?
A When I read it from the newspaper, Sir.
Q And what was the name that you were able to read from the
paper that made you identified that woman from the Lancer car?
A Beebom, Sir.
Q What is the complete name?
A Beebom Castaos, Sir.
Q What about the man. Did you also get her complete name?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What is his complete name?
A Cochise Bernabe, Sir.
Q Now, after this man that you have just identified as Cochise
Bernabe, after his hands were tied at the back, what else did Mr.
Lising and Mr. Dizon do with this man?
A Felimon went inside the bodega, Sir.
Q And what did Felimon do?
A After that, he went towards Lising, Sir.
Q And when Felimon approached Lising, what happened?
A Felimon was given a knife, Sir. (witness in the vernacular said
"kutsilyo").
Q What did Felimon do with the knife?
A They went towards the man, Sir.
Q And what happened?
A Then he stabbed the man once, Sir.
Q How? Can you demonstrate?
A Yes, Sir.
ATTY. LLORENTE:
Please do.
(witness demonstrating by placing his left hand on the height of
his shoulder and making a thrust by his left hand forward).
Q What else happened after what you had demonstrated
happened?
A Rambo grabbed and took the knife from Felimon, Sir.
Q And what did Rambo do with the knife?
A He also stabbed the man, Sir.
ATTY. LLORENTE:
Can you demonstrate to us how did he do this?
A Yes, Sir. (witness demonstrating by putting his left hand
forward at the height of his shoulder and making a forward
thrust by his right hand several times).
Q Did you notice what portion of Cochise was stabbed when
Lising was doing this?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where?
A Inside the bodega, Sir. "Sa may bodega".
xxx xxx xxx
21

The defense, however, would discredit the testimony of Raul Morales alleging that
he was not a credible witness considering that there were inconsistencies and
improbabilities in his testimony. To them, he was a rehearsed witness, since he
was taken from the NBI to the residence of Governor Remulla's son, a good friend
of Cochise, as sanctuary during the trial of this case.
Some of the inconsistencies pointed out are as follows: (1) in the sworn
statement, Morales claimed that the black car driven by Lising entered the
compound ahead followed by the green Lancer car driven by Garcia while he
stated in his testimony in court that the green Lancer car was first to enter, driven
by Lising with Garcia in the passenger seat followed by the black car with Manga
and Dizon on board; (2) in his statement, Morales indicated that he did not see
the actual killing of Cochise since the victim was brought out, while he testified in
court that Garcia and Lising stabbed the victim inside the compound; (3) Morales
made mention of a total of five persons, including the two victims, in the early
morning of April 26, while in court, he identified the five accused seen with the two
victims.
It has been held that inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony referring
to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not impair the
witnesses' credibility.
22
These inconsistencies even tend to strengthen, rather
than weaken, the credibility of witnesses as they negate any suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony.
23

The defense finds it also improbable for Morales to have witnessed the events at
such a vantage point from the steps of the hut, since the perpetrators of a crime
would not unnecessarily expose themselves in committing the act to prevent
possible identification.
Obviously, it never occurred to Lising at the time that Morales, who was under his
control and who was afraid of him, would ever testify against him.
Manalili makes capital of the fact that Morales did not mention him at all in his
prior sworn statement as being present at the scene of the crime. For Manalili, the
omission of his name was a significant development as it appeared improbable
that a vital witness will miss out an alleged perpetrator if indeed he was present at
the scene of the crime.
Raul Morales himself admitted later on that there were omissions in his sworn
statement made before the CAPCOM because he was afraid of his employer Lising
and his companions. Understandably, he was reluctant to volunteer all the
information about the killing for fear that he would suffer the same fate of Cochise
and Beebom. The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a
criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in the criminal investigation is
of common knowledge and has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect
credibility.
24
Besides, at that time, Raul Morales was merely concerned with
bringing out his story without really paying particular attention to the details. He
related the his employer Lising and companions brought a man and a woman to
their warehouse and killed them both. He saw Cochise's face on the papers and
recognized him to be the man whom Lising's group killed. Morales only mentioned
Lising and Garcia's names in his sworn statement because they were the only ones
known to him. Such omission and discrepancies should not be taken against him.
It bears emphasis that a sworn statement or an affidavit does not purport to be a
complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant.
25
It is a
matter of judicial experience that a sworn statement being taken ex parte is
almost always incomplete and often inaccurate. Thus, discrepancies between the
statements of the affiant in his sworn statement and those made on the witness
stand do not necessarily discredit him.
26
There is no rule of evidence to the effect
that omission of certain particulars in an affidavit or sworn statement would estop
an affiant in making an elaboration thereof during the trial.
27
Whenever there is
an inconsistency between the affidavit and testimony of the witness, the latter
commands greater weight.
28

Roberto Lising discredits Raul Morales as having a motive in implicating him to the
crime since "he quelled a rally staged by Morales who was the most arrogant and
stubborn of Fausto's employees, seeking an increase in pay". As pahinante in their
LPG business, Morales, according to Lising, was oftentimes reprimanded for not
doing his job well and held responsible for lost gas tanks.
The motive imputed to Morales is as far-fetched as it is unsubstantiated. It is
highly unlikely that Morales, a mere pahinante, if he were arrogant and stubborn,
would be tolerated by Lising, the live-in partner of Fausto.
By and large, the defenses raised by the accused do not persuade us. When it
comes to the issue of credibility of the witnesses, appellate courts give much
weight and respect to the findings of the trial court since the trial court is in the
better position to examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor of the
witnesses.
29
With the eyewitnesses' account of Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales,
the culpability of the accused for the crimes charged have been established.
This brings us to the third issue of whether or not there was conspiracy.
Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime.
30

Where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it then conspiracy exists. While direct evidence is
not necessary, conspiracy may be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused
themselves when during and after said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.
31

Undoubtedly, the trial court did not err in finding the existence of conspiracy in
this case. With the interlocking confessions of Manalili, Garcia and Lising, the
group came to an agreement to effect the arrest of Robert Herrera for a
considerable sum of P50,000.00. The stake-out at the Castaos residence, the
tailing of the car, the abduction at Dayrit's Ham and Burger Restaurant and the
detention in the Valle Verde Motel and the subsequent killing of the two victims all
show that all the accused acted in unison and cooperated with each other towards
the accomplishment of a common criminal design. Where conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all.
Garcia, for his part, prays that his liability be mitigated on grounds of lack of intent
or motive, acts made under the compulsion of an irresistible force, and voluntary
surrender, which if considered would make him merely an accomplice to the crime.
Unfortunately, these defenses are unavailing.
To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him
to a mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his will.
32
That
compulsion must be of some character as to leave the accused no opportunity for
self-defense in equal combat or for escape.
33

Garcia's participation and presence from the time the abduction was hatched, up
to the killing of the victims is undisputed. He was very well aware of Manalili's
plans. He was instrumental in introducing Lising to Manalili. Likewise, Lising's
intentions to silence both Cochise and Beebom at the end upon realizing an
alleged mistake was known to him. He did not do anything to deter the
commission or to report the crimes immediately thereafter. In fact, he stated that
he and Lising saw each other after the incident but never mentioned anything
about it, which only goes to show their intention of concealing the crime. Only
after several months of being hunted, did he send feelers for his surrender.
Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent of participation of
each individual conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of
all.
34
The degree of actual participation in the commission of crime is immaterial.
In People v. Degoma, the Court explained:
. . . One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the
criminal designs of his co-conspirators; he merges his will into the common
felonious intent. A person who embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly
held to have cast his lot with his fellow conspirators and to have taken his
chances that things may go awry and that the offended party may resist or
third persons may get killed in the course of implementing the basic criminal
design. To free himself from such criminal liability, the law requires some
overt act on the part of the conspirator, to seek to prevent commission of
the second or related felony or to abandon or dissociate himself from the
conspiracy to commit the initial felony. (People v. Salvador, 163 SCRA 574,
580-582 [1988]; People vs. Bazar, 162 SCRA 609, 617 [1988]; People v.
Escober, 157 SCRA 541, 567 [1988]; People v. Pelagio, 20 SCRA 153, 159-
160 [1967] (Emphasis supplied).
35

For the same reasons, Manalili can not likewise be exonerated from the crime. We
have examined carefully the arguments of the Solicitor General in urging Manalili's
acquittal, but the facts and circumstances surrounding the case do not support his
stand.
We find it difficult to accept Manalili's contention that he had contracted the
services of policemen to effect the "legal arrest" of Robert Herrera, the main
suspect in the killing of his brother, Delfin Manalili. Equally preposterous is his
assertion that upon arriving at the Valle Verde Hotel in San Fernando, Pampanga,
he realized there was a mistake in the identities of the persons arrested, so he
insisted that they be released. Neither is there factual basis to his claim that he
had every reason to protect the life of Beebom, in particular, since the latter is a
principal witness against Robert Herrera, the suspect in the shooting of his
brother.
In the first place, why did he take it upon himself to employ persons unknown to
him to effect the "arrest" of Herrera? The warrant of arrest of Herrera, if one was
really issued, was never presented in evidence. In the second place, the
surreptitious meeting of Manalili with Lising arranged by Garcia, the surveillance or
stake out of the Castaos' residence, the manner of abduction where the victims
were blindfolded, handcuffed and gagged at Valle Verde Motel, cannot certainly be
considered as acts in the regular performance of their duties as policemen. Thirdly,
if it was true that Manalili just wanted the arrest of Robert Herrera, why did he
have to seek the assistance of Pampanga policemen? It would have been more
logical and expedient to have utilized the NBI or Quezon City Police especially
when the alleged warrant of arrest was issued by a Quezon City court. After all, it
was not difficult to locate Robert Herrera as he was reportedly frequenting the
Castaos' residence in Quezon City. Fourthly, it does not stand to reason why the
victims were taken to Pampanga after allegedly being arrested in Quezon City. It
would have been more cogent for the appellants to have delivered the victims to
the nearest station of the Quezon City Police Department considering that the
warrant of arrest was allegedly issued by a Quezon City court. If arrest was really
in the minds of the accused, why did they hole-up with the victims in a motel
when they arrived in Pampanga? Finally, if they were bent on legally arresting one
Roberto Herrera, it was not necessary for them to also take into custody the
woman companion of the person they mistook as Herrera.
All these only show that Manalili has premeditated in his mind a more sinister plot
than merely effecting a "legal arrest."
It is an unmitigated absurdity for Manalili to pretend that upon his realization of
the mistake in their "arrest," he insisted upon the release of the victims since he
had every reason to keep Beebom alive. If he had just a bit of concern for
Beebom's safety, why did Manalili leave for Manila without bringing her and
Cochise with him to make sure that no harm would befall them, knowing fully well
of Lising's resolve just revealed to him to silence both victims? What should be
nearer the truth is that Beebom and Cochise became aware of Manalili's presence
at the motel together with the other accused and this was the added reason why
the two had to be eliminated, to do away with having to explain why he was at the
scene. His pretension that he wanted to keep Beebom from harm's way because
she was to have testified in the prosecution of his brother rings hollow. It cannot
be assumed that had she lived she would have testified in court and pointed to
Robert Herrera as the killer of Manalili's brother.
In any case, assuming the remote possibility, the mistake in the identity of the
victims does not exonerate Manalili pursuant to the rule that one who performs a
criminal act should be held liable for the act and for all its consequences although
the victim was not the person whom the fellow intended to injure.
36

We are reminded of the rule that the conviction must not rest on the weakness of
the defense but on the strength of the prosecution's evidence. In the instant case,
apart from its interlocking sworn statements of appellants, Raul Morales' positive
testimony that he saw Manalili enter the bodega, and stand beside Beebom, while
Cochise was being killed, convinces us with moral certainty that Manalili is equally
guilty of the crimes charged. His presence in the warehouse clearly belies his claim
that from the motel, he left for Manila already. As against the positive testimony
and identification, mere denials of the accused cannot prevail to overcome
conviction by the court.
37
The inaction of Manalili where he could have prevented
the killings only reveal his complicity to the crime. Manalili is certainly part of a
complete whole without whom there would be no Cochise-Beebom double murder
case.
Furthermore, the decision of the trial court exonerating Manalili and Garcia for the
crime of Kidnapping and finding the rest of the accused guilty for the crime of
Slight Illegal Detention only does not escape us. There being conspiracy, all the
accused should be equally guilty for the crimes as charged. Unfortunately, we can
no longer convict Manalili and Garcia for Kidnapping in consonance with the
constitutional right against double jeopardy. Nonetheless, they stand to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the double murder. The crime of Slight Illegal
Detention should be qualified to Serious Illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code considering that a female victim was involved.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. The decision of the lower court finding accused Rodolfo Manalili, Roberto
"Rambo" Lising, Felimon Garcia, Robin Q. Manga and Enrico Dizon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder, including their civil liability is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto, and
2. The decision of the lower court finding accused Roberto "Rambo" Lising, Enrico
Dizon, and Robin Manga guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention aggravated
by the use of motor vehicle is hereby MODIFIED, in that the said accused are
hereby declared guilty of the crime of Kidnapping under Article 267(4) of the
Revised Penal Code, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST ON PEOPLE v. LISING [285 SCRA 595 (1998)]

November 10, 2010


Facts: In March 1990, Rodolfo Manalili, a businessman, asked Felimon Garcia, his
townmate, if he knew somebody who could allegedly affect the arrest of Robert Herrera,
the suspect in the killing of his brother, Delfin Manalili. On April 21, 1990, Garcia called
up Manalili and informed him that he already contracted a policeman to help him. On
April 22, Garcia introduced Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and another man to Manalili.
During the meeting, Manalili offered to pay them P50K for the job. On April 23-24,
Lisings group met with Vic Lisboa and conducted a surveillance on the Castaos
residence in the hope of seeing Herrera. Failing to do so, the group was asked to return
the next day.

On April 25, the group saw a man and a woman who happened to be Cochise Bernabe,
26 years old and a new graduate of the UP College of Law, and Beebom Castaos, 22 -
years old and a graduating student of the UP College of Mass Communication, leave the
Castaos residence in a green box type Lancer car. The group followed the Lancer car
with Lising, Dizon and Manga riding in a black car and Lisboa and Garcia in a motorcycle.
The Lancer car stopped at Dayrits Ham and Burger House on Timog Circle. Alighting
from the car, they were accosted by Dizon and Manga.

On June 21, two security guards told the CAPCOM that their friends Raul Morales and
Jun Medrano, both employees of Roberto Lising, informed them that Lising killed a man
and a woman in their warehouse. On June 23, Raul Morales was picked up and told his
story. On June 25, the body of Cochise was exhumed. The cause of his death was
multiple stab wounds. The next day, Beeboms body was exhumed from a shallow grave,
2 kilometers from where Cochises body was found.

One by one, the men responsible for the killing of Cochise & Beebom fell into the hands
of the authorities. Lising, Garcia & Manalili executed extrajudicial statements. Upon
arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented 2 vital
witnesses: Froilan Olimpia, who witnessed the abduction of the young couple at Dayrits
Ham and Burger House; & Raul Morales, the pahinante who testified on the killing of
Cochise. In their defense, the accused policemen allege that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain their conviction. Each one also presented an alibi.

On July 1, 1992, the Court held Manalili, Lising, Garcia, Manga and Dizon guilty of the
crime of double murder qualified with treachery and aggravated by premeditation and
abuse of public position by Lising, Manga and Dizon. The Court also held Lising, Dizon
and Manga guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention aggravated by use of a motor
vehicle. The accused were acquitted of the crime of kidnapping, since the use of the car
was done only to facilitate the commission of the crime of slight illegal detention

Issues, Held and Ratio:

1. WON the extrajudicial statements of appellants Manalili, Garcia and Lising were
admissible.

Yes. Extrajudicial statements are, as a rule, admissible as against their respective
declarants, pursuant to the rule that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

? Based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against
himself, unless such declarations were true.

? The respective extrajudicial statement of Manalili and Garcia were executed
voluntarily. They were assisted by a counsel and properly sworn to before a duly
authorized officer. They merely relied on their extrajudicial statements and did not take
the witness stand.

? Lising claims that he was coerced and tortured into executing the extrajudicial
statement. However, he did not present himself for physical examination, nor did he file
administrative charges against his alleged tormentors.

? The following are indicators of the voluntariness in the execution of Lisings
extrajudicial statement:

- It contains many details and facts which the investigating officer could not have
known without the information given by Lising.

- It bears corrections duly initialed by Lising.

- It tends to explain or justify his conduct and shift the blame to his co-accused
Manalili.

Extrajudicial statements can also be used as evidence against several persons charged
with the same offense when the statements are in all material respects identical and
there could have been no collusion among the parties.

? interlocking confessions

? In this case, the statements were independently executed and rather identical
with each other in their material details.

The trial courts decision in convicting all the accused was based not merely on the
extrajudicial statements of the accused alone but mainly on the eyewitness account of
the two witnesses, which the trial court gave weight and credence as true.

2. WON the prosecution witnesses Froilan, Olimpia and Raul Morales were credible.

Yes. The testimony of Raul Morales satisfied the trial court beyond reasonable doubt, as
being consistent and credible, sufficient to convict all the accused for the crime of
murder.

? He testified positively.

? The ocular inspection conducted by the trial court supported Morales narration
of the events.

The inconsistencies & discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not
upon the basic aspect of the crime do not impair the witness credibility. These
consistencies even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, the credibility of the
witnesses as they negate any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.

The initial reluctance of the witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and
their unwillingness to be involved in the criminal investigation is of common knowledge
and has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect credibility.

A sworn statement or an affidavit doesnt indicate the complete details of the event. It is
a matter of judicial experience that a sworn statement being taken ex parte is almost
always incomplete & often inaccurate. Discrepancies between the sworn statement & the
testimony do not necessarily discredit the witness. In case of discrepancy, the latter
prevails over the former.

When it comes to the issue of credibility of the witnesses, the appellate courts give much
weight to the findings of the trial court since the latter had the capacity to examine and
observe the witnesses.

3. WON the finding of conspiracy among the appellants was sufficiently proven.

Yes. Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime.
Conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. While direct evidence is not necessary,
conspiracy may be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused when during and
after said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest

TC didnt err in finding the existence of conspiracy in this case given the interlocking
confessions of Manalili, Garcia & Lising.

Where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all. The precise modality or
extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary. The degree of
actual participation in the commission of crime is immaterial.

4. WON Garcias liability is mitigated by (1) his lack of intent or motive, (2) his acts
were made under the compulsion of an irresistible force, & (3) his voluntary surrender,
w/c would make him merely an accomplice to the crime

No. To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a
mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his will. Such compulsion
must be of some character as to leave the accused no opportunity for self-defense in
equal combat or for escape. Garcias participation and presence from the time the
abduction was hatched, up to the killing of the victims is undisputed.
G.R. No. L-32265 May 16, 1983
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO RAMOS y ANTONIO, ELADIO CALUYA y BINUYA, SIXTO GABORNE y
LLUADER and EDUARDO SUBLECHERO y GABUAT, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Amado Sison for E. Sublechero.
Ernesto C S. Sibal for E. Ramos, defendants-appellants.

RELOVA, J.:
Automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XIV at
Caloocan City, for robbery with homicide, sentencing Ernesto Ramos, Eladio Caluya,
Eduardo Sublechero, and Sixto Gaborne "to suffer the supreme penalty of death by
electrocution, and to indemnify the heirs of Dr. Mariano Gana jointly and severally the
sum of P12,200.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs."
With respect to the accused Sixto Gaborne who, upon arraignment, pleaded guilty to the
charge and was sentenced accordingly, this Court on July 25, 1974 set aside the
decision of the lower court of March 5, 1970 and granted him a new trial "to enable him
to be afforded the opportunity to be heard in accordance with the guidelines set forth by
this Court from Apduhan and the subsequent cases." Thus, this appeal concerns the
accused Ernesto Ramos y Antonio, Eladio Caluya y Binuya and Eduardo Sublechero y
Gabuat only.
Evidence shows that about nine o'clock in the evening of December 8, 1967, Vilma Pitelo
and Milagros Bural, housemaids of Dr. and Mrs. Mariano Gana whose residence is at 139
Tirad Pass, Balintawak, Caloocan City were in the kitchen of the said Gana residence.
Vilma was scrubbing the kitchen floor while Milagros was putting water in bottles near
the kitchen sink. Suddenly, appellant Ernesto Ramos came from behind Milagros Bural,
held her left shoulder and tied a handkerchief over her mouth. A companion of Ernesto
Ramos helped in tying her hands behind her back, following which Vilma Pitelo was also
tied, her mouth with a twisted shirt and her hands and feet tied with a rope. Upon
hearing the footsteps from the other side of the kitchen, Milagros Bural, and Vilma Pitelo
saw Ernesto Ramos and the other appellants who had entered the kitchen door, hide
behind the door near the refrigerator. Dr. Gana entered the kitchen and got a bottle of
water inside the refrigerator. He then went back to the sala and listened to the radio.
Appellants entered the sala, except Ernesto Ramos who stayed and stood guard in the
kitchen. Suddenly, Mrs. Rosario Bella-Gana who at the time was resting in her bedroom
at the ground floor of their residence heard a groan and thinking that her husband, Dr.
Gana, might be suffering from "bangungot", shouted: "Manoy, Manoy, may sakit ka ba?
Ano ang nangyari?" and immediately rushed to leave her room to give her husband a
glass of water. As she opened the door, she met appellants Caluya, Sublechero, Gaborne
and another one she described as tag and thin. These four men led her back to her room
and demanded money. Mrs. Gana told them they can get every thing and pleaded not to
hurt her. Appellant Sublechero asked for the key to the aparador while the tan one took
the money which is a little over P200.00.
Thereafter, the four men led Mrs. Gana to the kitchen where they tied her hands behind
her back with a rope. She was made to join her two maids who were tied to the rice
sack near the cupboard. The five men including Ernesto Ramos fled from the house.
Mrs. Gana managed to go up to the second floor of the house where she called her
daughter-in-law, Sarah Florentino Gana, who untied her. They went down the ground
floor where they saw Dr. Gana slumped at the foot of the stairs, soaked with blood.
Sarah went to the kitchen and untied the maids, following which, they returned to the
sala and found Dr. Gana already dead.
The matter was reported to the police who came to investigate and ordered the
members of the household not to touch anything. Vilma then and there told the police
that she knew one of the five men, Eduardo Sublechero, because the latter used to play
basketball in their yard.
After the statements of the other witnesses had been taken, appellants Ernesto Ramos,
Eladio Caluya and Eduardo Sublechero were investigated by the police of Caloocan City
before whom they gave their respective statements which were subscribed and sworn to
before the inquest fiscal. Sixto Gaborne refused to give a statement.
Dr. Plaridel Vidal of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted the examination on
the body of the deceased Dr. Mariano Gana. Necropsy report shows that the victim died
of "[h]emorrhage, meningeal, subdural, subarachnoidal extensive and generalized,
traumatic." (Exhibit "F")
In his defense, Ernesto Ramos professed innocence of the crime charged due to the
exempting circumstance of irresistible force and uncontrollable fear. His evidence tends
to show that:
[O]n December 8, 1967, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, accused
appellant Ernesto Ramos was fetched from his house at 109 G. de Jesus,
Caloocan City by co-accused Eduardo Sublechero and brought to the house
of the latter at General Tirona, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City to fill out
application forms for overseas employment. While thus preparing their
application forms, two other co-accused, Sixto Gaborne and Boy Andy came
and invited them to eat in a restaurant for they won in gambling, (t.s.n., p.
3, March 19, 1969). Thereafter, they proceeded to a store at Bagong Barrio
where Boy Andy bought a rope. Upon seeing the rope, accused-appellant
Ernesto Ramos became curious and asked Boy Andy what he will do with the
rope and he was told to keep quiet but after about two minutes Ernesto
Ramos insisted in knowing what the rope was for. Finally Boy Andy told
them if they really want to have money, Ernesto Ramos protested and said
what they were thinking was not good and that he wanted to go home. Boy
Andy prevented him from leaving for he had already known of their evil
scheme and was afraid he might tell the police. When Ernesto Ramos
refused to join them, and was insisting to go home. Boy Andy held him by
the collar of his shirt at the same time pulling out a dagger which he pointed
to Ramos and told him if Ramos will not go with him he will kill him. For
fear, Ramos went with them to Samson Road where they waited for Jojo.
From there, they proceeded to the house of Dr. Mariano Gana. After cutting
the wire fence, Boy Andy pushed Eduardo Sublechero inside. When they
were all inside, Ramos was forced by Andy to go inside too. Ramos' knees
were trembling, (t.s.n. p. 4, March 19, 1969) Ramos saw the two
housemaids hogtied but he could not see clearly who hogtied them for it was
dark inside-the lights were off. Boy Andy ordered Ramos to stand guard and
threatened him not to leave or he will kill him. After a while he heard
banging noises inside and then saw all the others running towards the
kitchen so all of them ran outside of the house and proceeded to Boy Andy's
house where the loot of P200.00 was divided. At first Ramos refused to
accept his share of P40.00 by saying they could keep it and he will just go
home. When Boy Andy suspected that Ramos might tell the police of the
incident, the latter got nervous and afraid so for fear of his life, he accepted
the money and went home. The following day, they were arrested by the
police and investigated at the police headquarters. (pp. 3 & 4, Appellant
Ernesto Ramos' Brief)
The defense of Eduardo Sublechero is as follows: On December 8,1967, he and Ernesto
Ramos were preparing their applications for overseas employment. Boy Andy arrived
and invited them to go to Bagong Barrio. On the way, and in front of the house of Dr.
Mariano Gana, Boy Andy held Sublechero by the collar of his shirt, poked a three-bladed
instrument at him and ordered him to enter the residence of Dr. Mariano Gana. While
inside the residence of the victim, Sublechero did riot have the chance to go out of the
house because Boy Andy was always beside him. In short, this appellant claims
exemption from any criminal liability because his acts and/or participation in the criminal
design of Boy Andy, who up to then remains at large, was under compulsion of an
irresistible force and under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury.
Likewise, Eladio Caluya claims that on December 8,1967, at about 8:00 in the evening
he was on his way to his residence at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, from work at the
Asiatic Shoe Factory and met Boy Andy, Gaborne, Sublechero and Ramos waiting for
him at Samson Road. He claimed no conversation took place among them and they
walked towards Bagong Barrio until they reached the residence of Dr. Mariano Gana.
They stopped in front of said house and he claimed he was surprised when Boy Andy
told them that they would enter the said house to rob. He remonstrated but Boy Andy
threatened to kill him if he would not join. His testimony follows.
Q When he told you would rob said house, what did you do, you
particularly?
A I told him that I would not go with him.
Q When you told him you would not go with him, what
happened?
A He threatened me if I would not go with them, he would kill
me.
Q When he threatened you, did he have any weapon with him
then?
A He had.
Q What was with him?
A A knife this long (Witness demonstrating a foot long).
ATTY. BALGONA:
Q Did he threatened you with that knife?
A Yes, sir, by poking the same at my side.
Q Did you finally enter the premises of the house of Doctor
Gana?
A Yes, sir." (tsn. p. 2 1, March 19, 1969 hearing)
He claimed, however, that he did not do anything while inside
the house of Dr. Gana.
Q What did you do when you were already at the premises of the
house of Doctor Gana?
A None, sir. (tsn. p. 21, March 19, 1969 hearing)
On December 9, 1967, at about 3:00 in the morning, he was apprehended at his
residence by policemen and brought to the Caloocan City Police Headquarters for
investigation.
The trial court, with valid reason, refused to accept the alleged threat employed by Boy
Andy to kill them if they would not join him and considered the same as flimsy and
inadequate so as to strike fear in their hearts and compel them to obey and commit the
heinous crime. "Even if Boy Andy was armed with a knife, he was alone and the three
accused could manage to overpower him if not escape from the scene of the crime. It is
evident that accused Ramos, Sublechero and Caluya were willing participants in the
pursuit of their criminal design to rob and kill. The excuses of the defendants cannot
prevail over the clear, conclusive and positive evidence of the prosecution. Moreover,
the crime committed was proven independently of the extra-judicial confessions of the
accuse thru the testimonies of the pro petition witnesses beyond reasonable doubt. It is
proceedings. observed by the Court that the evidence on record offers sufficient and
ample ground to conclude that the accused committed the crime of robbery with
homicide pursuant to a conspiracy. The circumstance of their meeting together one night
in one place from which they proceeded to the scene of the crime; the taking along with
them a newly bought rope; their separate, individual and assigned tasks in the
commission of the crime; the almost militant dispatch and precision in the perpetration
of the crime; and their departure together from the scene of the crime and meeting in
one place to divide the loot- all these facts and circumstances taken together clearly
manifest a pre-conceived, well-planned and concerted action on the part of the accused
in pursuance of their common and evil design to rob and kill. (Decision, pp. 27-28)
We find no reason to differ from the conclusions reached by the trial court in finding
herein appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The defense
invoked by the appellants that they acted in view of the irresistible force and
uncontrollable fear of Boy Andy in the unfortunate incident which resulted in the death
of Dr. Mariano Gana is devoid of merit. Basis of these two exempting circumstances is
the complete absence of freedom. In the case at bar, appellants Ramos, Sublechero and
Caluya failed to show that they resisted the threats of Boy Andy and that in spite of their
resistance they were still forced to act in accordance with his wishes. Their fear of Boy
Andy was merely speculative and there was complete absence of real or reasonable fear
for one's life. Had appellants wanted to, they would have easily overpowered Boy Andy
who was alone.
On the other hand, the manner in which the crime was executed shows that appellants
had community of design and that they cooperated and helped each other in the
commission thereof. They met in Samson Road, Caloocan City and from there proceeded
to the scene of the crime. In the presence of the appellants, Boy Andy bought a rope
from a store. Upon entering the house, each one performed his assigned task and after
the commission of the crime, they left the scene of the crime and met in the place of
Boy Andy to get their respective shares.
By and large, the people's evidence is sufficient to sustain the judgment appealed from.
However, in the absence of the necessary votes, We have to impose the penalty lower
than death which is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, as modified in the sense that the penalty imposed on herein appellants
Ernesto Ramos y Antonio, Eladio Caluya y Binuya and Eduardo Sublechero y Gabuat is
reduced to reclusion perpetua, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST ON PEOPLE v. RAMOS [296 SCRA 589 (1998)]

November 10, 2010


Nature: Automatic Review of a decision of the RTC of Pangasinan

? October 16, 1995 Elizabeth T. Ramos filed a criminal complaint for rape
against Feliciano M. Ramos. It was alleged that the appellant was able to perpetrate the
felony against the minor through the use of force and intimidation in its execution

? Elizabeth Ramos, a minor of 14 years old, was raped by her father while her
brothers and sisters were sleeping nearby. She was warned not to report the matter to
anyone or else he would kill her. The rape was discovered only when she suffered an
abortion of the fetus that she was carrying in her womb.

? Upon filing of the charges in the RTC Feliciano changed his residence to Tuai,
Cagayan and an alias warrant of arrest was issued. March 26, 1996 Feliciano was
arrested in Tuao, Cagayan while he was feeding the ducks.

? After the prosecution has presented their evidence Feliciano wanted to change
his plea to guilty and he was allowed by the court to do so. Feliciano Ramos was
sentenced to death by the RTC of Pangasinan.

Issues:

1. WON he can claim the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

? NO. There was no voluntary surrender because he arrested by police Aban.
According to Aban Feliciano went with him when he showed the warrant of arrest. The
execution of warrant of arrest against Feliciano entailed expenses of about P2,500

? Surrender is voluntary when it is done by an accused spontaneously and made
in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to
the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.

? Feliciano tried to evade arrest by changing his residence. The appellant was
arrested and he was actually taken and held in custody under the authority of the law.

2. WON his plea of guilty can be taken as a mitigating circumstance

? NO. His plea of guilty was made after the evidence against him was presented.
It was made out of fear of conviction & not based on his conscience. A plea of guilty
must be made at the first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused.

? A plea of guilty made after the arraignment and after the trial had begun does
not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance

3. WON the 7 new attendant circumstances instituted by RA 7659 can be
considered as aggravating circumstance

? NO. RA 7659 in A335 in the RPC provided for the 7 new attendant
circumstances. People vs. Garcia attendant circumstance partake the nature of
qualifying circumstances and not merely aggravating circumstance, since they increase
the penalties by the degrees. Aggravating circumstance affect only the period of the
penalty and does not increase it to a higher degree.

? People vs. Bayot qualifying circumstance or an inherent aggravating
circumstance should not be mistaken for a generic aggravating circumstance in the
crime of robbery. Generic aggravating circumstance, not offset by mitigating
circumstance, increases the penalty which should be imposed upon the accused to the
maximum period, but without exceeding the limit prescribed by law. A qualifying
circumstance gives the crime its proper and exclusive name but also imposes on the
author thereof no other penalty but that specially prescribed by law for said crimes.

? Rape with the concurrence of minority of the victim and her relationship with the
aggressor gives a different character of rape which raised the imposable penalty from
reclusion perpertua to the higher and supreme penalty of death. Result: minority of the
offended party and relationship to the offender ? special qualifying circumstance.

4. WON the accused can be convicted for qualified rape

? NO. Cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he wasnt properly informed
that he is being accused of qualified rape

? Every element which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint
or information.

? Person cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that which he is charged in
the complaint or information on which he is tried.

? In Garcia it was held that it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is
charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death
although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital
punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned

? The general principles of criminal law provide that aggravating circumstances,
even if not alleged in the information, may be proven during the trial over objection of
the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the sentence. Such evidence merely
forms part of the proof of the actual commission of the offense and its consideration by
the courts do not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina
Bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr.
Nepomuceno that she had thrown away her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing
her to reclusion perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's
neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house,
apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the
place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from
the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering
and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and,
having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to
her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her
to her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very
dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar
called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take
bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom
had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a
path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before.
Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's
house. Upon being asked whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers
or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to
the appellant's house and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her
house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon
said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house
and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it
for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had
theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of another man with
whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his conclusions, he
testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he
went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno
whose testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the
very witnesses for the prosecution and by the appellant, as will be stated later, they
were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the appellant was an
infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree with both. On the contrary,
he maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under
subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted
in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in
question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of
the child were not caused by the hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually
roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully
or consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or
omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the
person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of
his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held
liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in
one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or
imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her
affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took
place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol she considers him her
husband as he considers her his wife began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial,
he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming
such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her
womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of
the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to
Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and
Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to
the appellant's house after the appellant had left the place, staggering, without strength
to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact she was
helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the
truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact
that the appellant denied having made any admission to said physician and that from
the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness and her extreme
debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had
upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being then
only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the
inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her
lover Luis Kirol a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day is
uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or learned from books what
experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware
of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her
debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute
the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child
from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and
exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket,
according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had
fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of
giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of
imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and
extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere
accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances
(art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting
that the appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she
later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes
entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged errors attributed to
the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such
circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her
favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and convicted, with
costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is
ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.
People vs. Bandian, 63 Phil 530 (1936)
FACTS: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a
thicket apparently to respond to the call of nature. Few minutes later, Bandian emerged
from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back,
staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. Rushing to her
aid, he brought her to her house and placed her on the bed. He called on Adriano
Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining
the thicket where the appellant had gone a few
moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno declared that the
appellant gave birth in her own house and three her child into the thicket to kill it. The
trial court gave credit to this opinion.

Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide

Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be
committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary,
conscious and free act or omission. The evidence does not show that the appellant, in
causing her childs death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so
willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it
to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second
lover, Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirolshe
considers him her husband as he considers him his wifebegan a year ago; as he so
testified at the trial, he knew of the pregnancy and that it was his and that theyve been
eagerly awaiting the birth of the child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed
of her pregnancy to Kirol.

Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or
she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful
or insuperable
to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance, to take hernchild from the thicket
where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger
of losing its life. If by going into the thicket to pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving
birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence
or any other reason than that she
was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she could not be blamed
because it all happened by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law
exempts from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances
(Art. 12(4), RPC). Thus, having the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her
favor, she is acquitted of the crime that she had been accused of.
G.R. No. 173485 November 23, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NENITA LEGASPI y LUCAS, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Challenged in this appeal is the January 16, 2006 Decision
1
promulgated by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01209, which affirmed in toto the Judgment
2
of
conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 rendered by the
Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 164, in Criminal Case No. 12351-D.
On April 23, 2003, accused-appellant Nenita Legaspi y Lucas (Legaspi), also known as
"Nita," was charged before the RTC for violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Nenita Legaspi y
Lucas a.k.a. "Nita" with the crime of violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165,
committed as follows:
On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to sell, possess or otherwise use any
dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and
give away to Police Officer Arturo San Andres, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance weighing sixteen
(16) decigrams (0.16 grams), which was found positive to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of said law.
3

Upon arraignment
4
on July 14, 2003, Legaspi pleaded not guilty to the charge against
her. After the pre-trial conference
5
held on the same day, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution evidence, upon which the RTC anchored its finding of guilt, consisted of
the testimonies of two of the operatives involved in the buy-bust operation, Police
Officer (PO) 2 Arturo San Andres and PO1 Janet A. Sabo.
6
Their version of the incident
leading to Legaspis arrest is summarized as follows:
San Andres and Sabo were assigned to the Mayor Special Action Team (MSAT), Pasig
City Police Station. On April 22, 2003, at around 4:00 p.m., a certain informant, whose
identity remained confidential, approached San Andres to report about the rampant
incidence of drug abuse at Centennial Village, Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City and about the
drug pusher who was identified as Legaspi. After gathering all the necessary details, San
Andres immediately informed his superior, Police Inspector Villaruel, who instructed him,
Sabo, PO1 Aldrin Mariano, and PO1 Roland Panis to conduct a buy-bust operation.
Villaruel designated San Andres to act as the poseur-buyer and gave him two pieces of
one hundred-peso (P 100.00) bills to be used as buy-bust money. Mariano was tasked to
be the team leader, and he, along with the rest of the team, served as San Andress
backup. At around 5:15 p.m., the team reached Centennial Village, where after a
briefing on their operations, San Andres, together with the informant, proceeded to
Legaspis house, while the others strategically placed themselves in the entrapment
area, keeping San Andres within their view. Upon seeing Legaspi, who was just outside
her house, the informant introduced San Andres to her as a "scorer."
7
Legaspi asked
them how much they wanted to "score," to which San Andres replied "P 200.00
panggamit lang."
8
After San Andres gave Legaspi the buy-bust money, which he had
previously marked with his initials "ABS," Legaspi reached into her pocket and gave him
one heat-sealed plastic sachet containing the suspected shabu. As soon as San Andres
got the sachet, he scratched his head, to signal to his team that the transaction was
over. He thereafter introduced himself as a police officer, informed Legaspi of her rights,
and marked the sachet he had received from her with his initials. The team then brought
Legaspi to Rizal Medical Center for a check-up, and then to the police station wherein
they filed the appropriate charges against her. Meanwhile, San Andres sent the sachet to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and requested for an examination
to determine the nature of its contents.
9

Annalee R. Forro, a PNP forensic chemist at the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory,
examined the "heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings EXH A ABS
04/22/03 containing 0.16 gram white crystalline substance"
10
on the same day. In her
Chemistry Report No. D-727-03E, she stated the following:
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result
to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
x x x x
CONCLUSION:
Specimen A contains Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
11

This report, along with the plastic sachet with white crystalline substance bought from
Legaspi, and the two P 100.00 bills used as marked money,
12
were presented in court.
After the prosecution had rested its case, Legaspi was called to the witness stand to
relay her version of the events. Legaspi primarily denied the charges against her. She
testified that on April 22, 2003, while she was inside her house taking care of her
grandson, San Andres and Mariano peeked through her window and asked her if she was
"Nita." Legaspi alleged that after she answered in the affirmative, the two police officers
pushed the door open and told her to go with them. She claimed that because of the
shock the events had caused her, she was not able to ask the police officers why they
were taking her with them. Legaspi said that she was brought to the police precinct in
Pasig City where she was asked about her shabu source. Legaspi averred that she told
the police officers that she did not know what they were talking about. She asseverated
that she had never been arrested before and that she had never been involved in any
illegal drugs case.
13

On December 12, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused NENITA LEGASPI Y LUCAS a.k.a. "Nita" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and hereby
imposes upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand
pesos (P 500,000.00), with the accessory penalties provided under Section 35 thereof.
Moreover, the heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.16 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (Exhibit "E-1") is hereby confiscated in favor
of the government and turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for
destruction in accordance with law.
With Costs.
14

In convicting Legaspi, the RTC stated that it was more convinced with the version of the
prosecution. The RTC held that the positive testimonies of the two police officers were
stronger than Legaspis negative testimony. The RTC added that aside from the
presumption that the two police officers performed their duties in a regular manner,
there was no showing that they had any ill motive in arresting Legaspi.
Aggrieved, Legaspi appealed
15
her case to this Court. However, conformably with this
Courts Decision in People v. Mateo,
16
which modified certain rules on direct appeals
from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, Legaspis case was transferred to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
17

Legaspi anchored her appeal on the lone error as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE POLICE INSTIGATED THE ALLEGED BUY-
BUST TRANSACTION.
18

On January 16, 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, affirming the RTCs
judgment of conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 12, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 164 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is AFFIRMED en toto.
19

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals explained the difference between instigation, which
is deemed contrary to public policy, and entrapment, a valid means of arresting violators
of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It then held that the buy-bust operation that led to
Legaspis arrest was an entrapment, and that Legaspi miserably failed to substantiate
her allegation of instigation, which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court of Appeals also said that contrary to Legaspis assertions, neither prior
surveillance nor the presentation of the informant in court was an indispensable
requirement to the successful prosecution of a drug case.
20

Undaunted, Legaspi is once again before this Court, assigning the same error she
assigned before the Court of Appeals.
21

The Ruling of this Court
Legaspi was charged and convicted for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride, more
popularly known as shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or
the Dangerous Drugs Law, which provides:
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P 500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P 10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P 500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential
chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation
of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires
within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed in every case.
For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners,
couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed in every case.
If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a
dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any
offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person
who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed
in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment
and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P 500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a
"protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
Defense of Instigation
Legaspi contends that she was instigated to commit the crime, as she was not the one
who sought out San Andres to sell him shabu. She avers that San Andress own
testimony clearly shows that he had suggested the commission of the crime by offering
her P 200.00 for the purchase of shabu. Legaspi claims that this is supported by her
testimony wherein she denied selling shabu to San Andres or to anyone for that matter.
This, she says, is confirmed by the fact that she has no police or criminal record.
22

Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, we shall first distinguish between entrapment
and instigation. Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate method of
apprehending criminals. Its purpose is to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution
of their criminal plan. Instigation, on the other hand, involves the inducement of the
would-be accused into the commission of the offense. In such a case, the instigators
become co-principals themselves.
23

Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigating person and the
accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him,
there is instigation and no conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal intent
originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, even after a
person acted as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an
opportunity for the commission of the offense, or the accused was aided in the
commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him,
there is no instigation and the accused must be convicted. The law in fact tolerates the
use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.
24

The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very relevant in
anti-narcotics operations. It has become common practice for law enforcement officers
and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in
apprehending drug offenders.
25
This Court, elaborating on the concept of a buy-bust
operation within the context of entrapment and instigation, has said:
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted
as a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly
employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act
of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates
from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Its
opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the accused
into committing the offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to
public policy and considered an absolutory cause. x x x.
26

Instigation is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an accused. To use this
as a defense, however, the accused must prove with sufficient evidence that the
government induced him to commit the offense.
27
Legaspi claims that she was induced
into committing the crime as charged, as she was the one approached by San Andres,
who was then looking to buy shabu.
We find, however, that Legaspis defense of instigation must fail. It is an established rule
that when an accused is charged with the sale of illicit drugs, the following defenses
cannot be set up:
(1) that facilities for the commission of the crime were intentionally placed in his
way; or
(2) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-buyer
seeking to expose his criminal act; or
(3) that police authorities feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisted in its commission.
28

The foregoing are especially true in that class of cases where the offense is the kind that
is habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnished evidence of a course of
conduct. Mere deception by the police officer will not shield the perpetrator, if the
offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the police
officer.
29

In the case at bar, the police officers, after receiving a report of drug trafficking from
their confidential informant, immediately set-up a buy-bust operation to test the veracity
of the report and to arrest the malefactor if the report proved to be true. The
prosecution evidence positively showed that Legaspi agreed to sell P 200.00 worth of
shabu to San Andres, who was then posing as a buyer. Legaspi was never forced,
coerced, or induced to source the prohibited drug for San Andres. In fact, San Andres
did not even have to ask her if she could sell him shabu. Legaspi was merely informed
that he was also a "scorer"; and as soon as she learned that he was looking to buy, she
immediately asked him how much he needed. Under the circumstances, the police
officers were not only authorized but were under an obligation to arrest Legaspi even
without an arrest warrant as the crime was committed in their presence.
30

The RTC was correct in upholding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in
applying the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by the police officers,
especially since Legaspi failed to impute on them any motive to falsely testify against
her.
31
Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust
operation team were inspired by improper motive or did not properly perform their duty,
their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.
32

Furthermore, when Legaspi testified in court, her defense was one of denial and not
instigation.1awp++i1 While instigation is a positive defense, it partakes of the nature of
a confession and avoidance.
33
In instigation, the crime is actually performed by the
accused, except that the intent originates from the mind of the inducer.
34
Thus, it is
incompatible with the defense of denial, where the theory is that the accused did not
commit the offense at all. Instigation and denial, therefore, cannot be present
concurrently. Besides, this Court has consistently held that:
[B]are denials are weak forms of defenses, especially in this case where the accused-
appellants testimony was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The
uncorroborated denial by the accused-appellant cannot prevail over the testimonies of
the arresting officer and the poseur-buyer, who both testified on affirmative matters.
Furthermore, there is no indication that the arresting team and the other prosecution
witnesses were actuated by improper motives, prevaricating just to cause damnation to
him. Thus, their affirmative statements proving accused-appellants culpability must be
respected and must perforce prevail.
35

No Prior Surveillance
Legaspi also argues that the veracity of the buy-bust operation is suspect as it was
conducted without prior surveillance.
36

This Court has many times discussed the dispensability of prior surveillance in buy-bust
operations, as it is not a pre-requisite for the validity of an entrapment or such buy-bust
operation. In People v. Eugenio,
37
we held that the conduct of surveillance prior to a
buy-bust operation is not required especially when the police officers are accompanied to
the scene by their civilian informant. This is so because there is no rigid or textbook
method in conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work, and
the need for prior surveillance may be dispensed with when time is of the essence.
38
In
People v. Gonzales,
39
we said:
The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means
to apprehend drug dealers. Thus, we have refused to establish on a priori basis what
detailed acts the police authorities might credibly undertake in their entrapment
operations.
40

Non-presentation of Informant
Legaspi further contends that the failure to present the informant as a witness in court is
very material and relevant in the case at bar, inasmuch as she had denied having sold
shabu to anyone. She also claims that since the identity of the informant was known to
her from the beginning, there was no reason for the prosecution to not present him in
court as a witness, especially since he is in the best position to establish that she had
indeed been engaged in the sale of shabu prior to the buy-bust operation against her.
41

We do not agree. The presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the successful
prosecution of drug cases. Informants are almost always never presented in court
because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.
42
In People v. Ho
Chua,
43
we held:
[P]olice authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they
surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over the
moment they are presented in court. Moreover, drug dealers do not look kindly upon
squealers and informants. It is understandable why, as much as permitted, their
identities are kept secret. In any event, the testimony of the informant would be merely
corroborative.
44

Legaspi argues that it was the civilian informant who reported on her alleged drug-
pushing; hence, only he had personal knowledge of such activities, subject of this case.
Contrary to Legaspis claims, the subject matter of this case is her sale of shabu to San
Andres on April 22, 2003. She was not charged and convicted for her activities prior to
such sale. Since San Andres, who was the poseur-buyer himself, already testified to the
events, which he had personal knowledge of, the testimony of the informant would be
merely corroborative, and can thus be dispensed with.
45

Only two elements are to be proven for the prosecution of illegal sale of regulated or
prohibited drugs:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
The prosecution had presented evidence that established both elements by the required
quantum of proof, i.e., guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
46

Legaspi was positively identified by the prosecutions eyewitnesses as the person who
sold to the poseur-buyer a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance. Her identity as the culprit cannot be doubted, having been caught in
flagrante delicto in an entrapment operation conducted by the MSAT of Pasig City. Such
positive identification prevails over Legaspis uncorroborated and weak defense of denial,
and unsubstantiated and contradictory defense of instigation.
47

The prosecution also succeeded in establishing with certainty and conclusiveness the
corpus delicti of the crime. After Legaspi received the P 200.00 from San Andres, the
poseur-buyer, she reached into her pocket and handed him one heat-sealed plastic
sachet containing shabu. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the
receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust
transaction between the entrapping officers and Legaspi.
48

As the prosecution ably established Legaspis guilt beyond reasonable doubt, both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in convicting her for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January 16, 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01209.
SO ORDERED.