REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., respondents. DECISION BERSAMIN, J p: By law, accretion the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person. Antecedents Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Paraaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. 1 On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter's co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. 2aICHEc The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. 3 Ruling of the RTC On May 10, 2000, 4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Paraaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Paraaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical description, to wit: xxx xxx xxx Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of the Decree be issued. SO ORDERED. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed. THIAaD Ruling of the CA In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC, 5 to wit: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEE'S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE. III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS. On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC. 6 The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October 20, 2003. 7 HAICET Issues Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that: 8 I RESPONDENTS' CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE. II ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE PARAAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE. III THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION. IV THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE. HSDIaC To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree). Ruling The appeal is meritorious. I. The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents' benefit Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters." In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows: On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which was previously a part of the Paraaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that: "Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." 9 AaSTIH The CA upheld the RTC's pronouncement, holding: It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the Paraaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo). 10 The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents' evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Paraaque River. The Republic's submission is correct. Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition to it. 11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. 12 The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b)made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. 13 Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land registration. DAcaIE However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the Paraaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the Paraaque River . . . (and) became an orchard after it dried up." Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mother's name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Paraaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Paraaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B. The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years the span of time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents' witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Paraaque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.'s own testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the Paraaque River that had dried up and become an orchard. AaITCH We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.'s own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the Paraaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed." 14 That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast." 15 The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became respondents' property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. 16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law. 17 The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. 18 It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person. 19 aSAHCE II Acquisitive prescription was not applicable in favor of respondents The RTC favored respondents' application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also because they had taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the following ratiocination, viz.: 20 In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd- 00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC- Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application. Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness. TEcCHD In fine, the application is GRANTED. As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC. Both lower courts erred. The relevant legal provision is Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which pertinently states: Section 14.Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1)Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation ofalienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. xxx xxx xxx Under Section 14 (1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. 21 The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years." 22 ICTacD Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on the Court, 23 the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 24 Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the findings. In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC declared: In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application. The RTC apparently reckoned respondents' period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty years" from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had performed showing their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payor's ownership of the land the taxes were paid for, 25 the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership; 26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession. The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest 27 has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents' predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998- B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B. On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 1999 28 signified that their alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their application for land registration on March 7, 1997. SIaHTD Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion. Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion. Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a question that the Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero, 29 a case involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried- up portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court held: As for petitioner's claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail. Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character. IcAaEH xxx xxx xxx Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their value. And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when "[r]iver beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held: The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems.Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners. The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. . . . (Emphasis supplied) SEAHcT Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases supplied) Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 30 No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. 31Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. 32 Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property through prescription. Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit: 33 aSIHcT NOTE ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996. This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev't. on Jan. 3, 1968. Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299 Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paraaque Cadastre. Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the property's nature as alienable and disposable public land? To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, we said in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap 34 that: cCaATD The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied) In Menguito v. Republic, 35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento, 36 we specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit: To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227). This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. . . . ." For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable. HISAET In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied) In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the following manner, viz.: . . . it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. xxx xxx xxx The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Emphasis supplied) ECSaAc These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev't" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being part of the dried-up bed of the Paraaque River. Respondents shall pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur. ||| (Republic v. Santos III, G.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012)
EN BANC [G.R. No. L-13250. May 30, 1962.] THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. ANT ONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent. Solicitor General for petitioner. Ramirez & Ortigas for respondent. R E S O L U T I O N PAREDES, J p: Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, (Maria Cerdeira, for short), died in Tangier, (North Africa), on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise, she was married to a Spanish Citizen and a permanent resident of Tangier from 1931 up to her death, on January 2, 1955. She left properties in Tangier as well as in the Philippines. Among the properties in the Philippines are several parcels of land and many shares of stock, accounts receivable and other intangible personal properties. The real estate situated in the Philippines had a market value of P1,109,483.50 and her personal properties also in the Philippines had a value of P396,308.90. On the real estate the respondent AntonioCampos Rueda, as administrator of her estate, paid the sum of P111,582.00 as estate tax and the sum of P151,791.48 as inheritance tax, on the transfer of her real properties in the Philippines, but refused to pay the corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due on the transfer of her intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to Section 122 of the Tax Code. The Collector of Internal Revenue in a decision assessed the estate of the deceased, as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, the sum of P161,874.95 including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties of Maria Cerdeira. On appeal the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the decision of the Collector, without costs, who elevated the case to Us for review, alleging that the Court of Tax Appeals erred in holding that (1)The testate estate of Maria Cerdeira is not liable for the payment of deficiency estate and inheritance taxes in the sum of P161,874.95; (2)The international zone of Tangier, even if it is not recognized by the Philippine Government as a state, could avail of the reciprocal provisions of our Tax Code; (3)The term "foreign country" in Section 122 of the Tax Code, refers to a foreign government competent to levy taxes without any consideration for theinternational status of said government; (4)There exists reciprocity between Tangier and Philippine Laws on the matter of death taxes on intangible personal property; (5)The certification Exhibits, D-1, G-1, Q-1, and T, considered together, are sufficient proof on the non-liability of movable property located in Tangier for inheritance tax properties. The pertinent portion of Section 122, of the Tax Code, as amended by Section 6, Rep. Act. No. 83, recites as follows: "SEC. 122.Definitions. . . . Provided, however, That in the case of a resident, the transmission or transfer of any intangible personal property, regardless of its location, is subject to the taxes prescribed in this Title; And provided, further, That no tax shall be collected under This Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible personal property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in the foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country. xxx xxx xxx" In order to show the status of the law on the subject, in force or existing in Tangier at the time of Maria Cerdeira's death in 1955, the respondent submitted certificates, the contents of which are quoted hereunder "Que las transmissiones hereditarias de bienes muebles situados en Tanger, no estan sujetas a ningun impuesto sucesorio conforme al Dahir del 15 de Mayo de 1925 y Ley del 30 de Enero de 1932, vigentes en la Zona Internacional de Tanger, sea cualquiera la nacionalidad de los intersesados en la sucesion (Exh. 'd-1')". "Que conforme la ley del 30 de Enero de 1932, en relacion con el Dahir de 15 de Mayo de 1925, al preceptuarse, que 'quedan sujetos al pago del impuesto de derechos reales, establecido para las donaciones entre vivos, las transmisiones de inmuebles por causa de muerte acontecida a partir del 10 de Enero de 1932' deja como actos no sujetos a ningun impuesto sucesorio, las transmisiones hereditarias de bienes muebles radicantes en Tanger, sea cualquiera la nacionalidad de los interesados en la sucesion (Exh. 'G-1')". "Praise be to God, The undersigned do hereby certify that neither Moroccan nor foreign legatees at Tangier and its province, in the Sherifian State, are subject to any tax on movables, with exception of real estate which is liable to inheritance tax by virtue of the law of January 10, 1932, published in Official Bulletin No. 72 (Exh. 'Q- 1')". "The law of January 30, 1932 modifying the Dahir of May 15, 1925 subjecting the transfer of real estate through deaths to the payment of registration taxes, as ofJanuary 1, 1932, subjects to no inheritance tax the successional transfers of movable property, whatever may be the nationality of those interested in the succession (Exh. 'I')". Exhibit D-1 is certified by the Register of Properties and Chief of the Bureau of Taxes at Tangier; Exh. Q-1 by the Acting Administrator and Lands Registrar at Tangier; Exhibit Q-1 by the Judge of the International Court at Tangier and Exhibit T, by the Governor at the Province of Tangier. While Section 122 of the Philippine Tax Code aforequoted speaks of "intangible personal property" in both subdivisions (a) and (b); the alleged laws of Tangier refer to "bienes muebles situados en Tanger", "bienes muebles radicantes en Tanger" "movables" and "movable property". In order that this court may be able to determine whether the alleged laws of Tangier grant the reciprocal tax exemptions required by Section 122 of the Tax Code, and without, for the time being, going into the merits of the issues raised by the petitioner-appellant, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals for the reception of evidence or proofs on whether or not the words "bienes muebles", "movables" and "movable property" as used in the Tangier laws, include or embrace "intangible personal property", as used in the Tax Code. No costs. Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ ., concur. Bengzon, C . J ., on leave, took no part. ||| (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Rueda, G.R. No. L-13250, May 30, 1962)
THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 143377. February 20, 2001.] SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS [Special Former Twelfth Division], HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La Union) & The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Laogan Baeza & Llantino Law Offices for petitioner. Solicitor General for respondents. SYNOPSIS Lots No. 1 and 4, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-381 in the name of Rafael Galvez, were sold by the latter to Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat. On August 16, 1960, Mamaril, et al. sold the same lots to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company and the latter in turn conveyed the property to ShipsideIncorporated, herein petitioner, on October 28, 1963, resulting in the issuance of new Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-57 10. Unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, OCT No. 0-381 was already declared null and void and was ordered cancelled by the then Court of First Instance of La Union, in its order dated February 1, 1963. The decision of the CFI became final and executory on October 23, 1973. On April 21, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General, after being notified that the aforesaid order remained unexecuted despite the writ of execution issued by the trial court, filed a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles before the Regional Trial Courtof San Fernando, La Union. Petitioner Shipside, Inc. moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging, among others that the respondent Republic was not the real party-in-interest and that the cause of action was already barred by prescription. The trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and its motion for reconsideration was likewise turned down. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through petition for certiorari and prohibition. The appeal court denied the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition. The Supreme Court granted the petition. An action for revival of judgment must be brought within ten years from the time said judgment becomes final. In the present case, the action for revival of judgment was instituted only in 1999, or more than twenty-five (25) years after the judgment had become final. Hence, the action is barred by extinctive prescription. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it was no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez's title was ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds true today. Section 2 of Proclamation No. 216, issued on July 27, 1993 provided for the transfer of all areas covered by Wallace Air Station to the BCDA. With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a right or interest to protect. Consequently, the Republic was not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest. Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it was the BCDA, not the Government, which stood to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the name ofpetitioner was cancelled. SYLLABUS 1.COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION CODE; CORPORATE POWERS; POWER TO SUE AND BE SUED IS LODGED WITH THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS; PHYSICAL ACT OFCORPORATION MAY BE PERFORMED BY DULY AUTHORIZED NATURAL PERSONS. A corporation, such as petitioner, has no power except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and /or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, it has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers (Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. CA, 264 SCRA 11 [1996]). In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors. 2.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT DOES NOT RENDER PLEADING FATALLY DEFECTIVE. The Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional (Uy v. Land Bank, G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000). Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, noncompliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF CERTIFICATION AGAINST NON-FORUM SHOPPING NOT CURABLE BY SUBMISSION THEREOF AFTER FILING OF PETITION; A CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING SIGNED BY A PERSON ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY PROOF THAT THE SIGNATORY IS AUTHORIZED TO FILE THE PETITION. The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATION AGAINST NON-FORUM SHOPPING; NON- COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT, WHEN MAY BE EXCUSED; CASE AT BAR. In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et. al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Courtconsidered the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court ofAppeals, et. al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. Land Bank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy's petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping. In the instant case, the merits of petitioner's case should be considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of nonforum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretary's certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT IS MANDATORY BUT MUST NOT BE USED TO DEFEAT ITS PURPOSE; TECHNICAL RULES SHOULD BE USED TO PROMOTE JUSTICE. It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum shopping (Bernardo v. NLRC, 255 SCRA 108 [19961). Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal. 6.ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; ACTION FOR REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT; PERSPECTIVE PERIOD. The action instituted by the Solicitor General in the trial court is one for revival ofjudgment which is governed by Article 11.44(3) of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Article 1144(3) provides that an action upon a judgment "must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues." On the other hand, Section 6, Rule 39 provides that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, but that after the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. Taking these two provisions into consideration, it is plain that an action for revival of judgment must be brought within ten years from the time said judgment becomes final. 7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ALREADY BARRED BY EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION IN CASE AT BAR. From the records of this case, it is clear that the judgment sought to be revived became final on October 23, 1973. On the other hand, the action for revival of judgment was instituted only in 1999, or more than twenty- five (25) years after the judgment had become final. Hence, the action is barred by extinctive prescription considering that such an action can be instituted only within ten (10) years from the time the cause ofaction accrues.
8.ID.; ID.; ACTIONS; PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN AGAINST THE STATE; RULE MAY NOT BE INVOKED WHERE GOVERNMENT IS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez's title was ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds true today. 9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO ARTIFICIAL BODIES CREATED BY THE STATE FOR SPECIAL PURPOSE; CLAIM OF IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY CANNOT BE RAISED BY BCDA IN CASE AT BAR. The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes, it being said that when the title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category as ordinary persons (Kingston v. LeHigh Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa 469). By raising the claim of imprescriptibility, a claim which cannot be raised by the BCDA, the Government not only assists the BCDA, as it did in E. B. Marcha, it even supplants the latter, a course of action proscribed by said case. Moreover, to recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in this case would set a bad precedent as it would allow the Republic to prosecute, on behalf of government- owned or controlled corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest against whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been created merely as agents for the realization of government programs. 10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY MAY BE RAISED BY THE GOVERNMENT ONLY IN CASES WHERE IT IS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, EXPLAINED. With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a right or interest to protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. "To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to enforced (Pioneer Insurance v. CA, 175 SCRA 668 [1989]). A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest (Ibonilla v. Province of Cebu, 210 SCRA 526 [1992]). Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, not the Government, which stands to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the name of petitioner is cancelled. 11.ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTIES; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; JURISDICTION OF THE COURT MAY NOT BE INVOKED BY A PARTY WHO HAS NO INTEREST TO PROTECT; BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IN CASE AT BAR. Having the capacity to sue or be sued, it should thus be the BCDA which may file an action to cancel petitioner's title, not the Republic, the former being the real party in interest. One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action (Ralla v. Ralla, 199 SCRA 495 [1991]). A suit may be dismissed if the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest. If the suit is not brought in the name of the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed, as was done by petitioner in this case, on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action (Tanpingco v. IAC, 207 SCRA 652 [1992]). 12.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES; BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; NOT A MERE AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT. We, however, must not lose sight of the fact that the BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate and distinct from the government. It may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. While public benefit and public welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic and social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country's goal for enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations have been created by government to act as its agents for the realizationof its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA and the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these entities, although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not government-function corporations invested with governmental attributes. It may thus be said that the BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. D E C I S I O N MELO, J p: Before the Court is a petition for certiorari filed by Shipside Incorporated under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure against the resolutions of the Court of Appealspromulgated on November 4, 1999 and May 23, 2000, which respectively, dismissed a petition for certiorari and prohibition and thereafter denied a motion for reconsideration. The antecedent facts are undisputed: On October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-381 was issued in favor of Rafael Galvez, over four parcels of land Lot 1 with 6, 571 square meters; Lot 2, with 16,777 square meters; Lot 3 with 1,583 square meters; and Lot 4, with 508 square meters. On April 11, 1960, Lots No. 1 and 4 were conveyed by Rafael Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat in a deed of sale which was inscribed as Entry No. 9115 OCT No. 0-381 on August 10, 1960. Consequently, Transfer Certificate No. T-4304 was issued in favor of the buyers covering Lots No. 1 and 4. Lot No. 1 is described as: SCETHa A parcel of land (Lot 1, Plan PSU-159621, L.R. Case No. N-361; L.R.C. Record No. N-14012, situated in the Barrio of Poro, Municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union, bounded on the NE, by the Foreshore; on the SE, by Public Land and property of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company; on the SW, by properties ofRafael Galvez (US Military Reservation Camp Wallace) and Policarpio Munar; and on the NW, by an old Barrio Road. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S. 74 deg. 11'W., 2670.36 from B.L.L.M. 1, San Fernando, thence S. 66 deg. 19'E., 134.95 m. to point 2; S. 14 deg. 57'W., 11.79 m. to point 3; S. 12 deg. 45'W., 27.00 m. to point 4; S. 12 deg. 45'W, 6.90 m. to point 5; N. 69 deg., 32'W., 106.00 m. to point 6; N. 52 deg., 21'W., 36.85 m. to point 7; N. 21 deg. 31'E., 42.01 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-ONE (6,571) SQUARE METERS, more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan; and marked on the ground; bearings true, date of survey, February 4-21, 1957. Lot No. 4 has the following technical description: A parcel of land (Lot 4, Plan PSU-159621, L.R. Case No. N-361 L.R.C. Record No. N-14012), situated in the Barrio of Poro, Municipality of San Fernando, La Union. Bounded on the SE by the property of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company; on the S. by property of Pelagia Carino; and on the NW by the property of Rafael Galvez (US Military Reservation, Camp Wallace). Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S. deg. 24'W. 2591.69 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, San Fernando, thence S. 12 deg. 45'W., 73.03 m. to point 2; N. 79 deg. 59'W., 13.92 m. to point 3; N. 23 deg. 26'E., 75.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHT (508) SQUARE METERS, more or less. All points referred to are indicated in the plan and marked on the ground; bearings true, date of survey, February 4-21, 1957. On August 16, 1960, Mamaril, et al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. The deed of sale covering the aforesaid property was inscribed as Entry No. 9173 on TCT No. T-4304. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate No. T-4314 was issued in the name of Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company as owner of Lots No. 1 and 4. On February 1, 1963, unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, issued an Order in Land Registration Case No. N-361 (LRC Record No. N-14012) entitled "Rafael Galvez, Applicant, Eliza Bustos, et al., Parties-In-Interest; Republic of the Philippines, Movant" declaring OCT No. 0-381 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of La Union issued in the name of Rafael Galvez, null and void, and ordered the cancellation thereof. The Order pertinently provided: Accordingly, with the foregoing, and without prejudice on the rights of incidental parties concerned herein to institute their respective appropriate actions compatible with whatever cause they may have, it is hereby declared and this court so holds that both proceedings in Land Registration Case No. N-361 and Original Certificate No. 0-381 of the Registry of Deeds for the province of La Union issued in virtue thereof and registered in the name of Rafael Galvez, are null and void; the Register of Deeds for the Province of La Union is hereby ordered to cancel the said original certificate and/or such other certificates of title issued subsequent thereto having reference to the same parcels of land; without pronouncement as to costs.
On October 28, 1963, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company sold to herein petitioner Lots No. 1 and 4, with the deed being entered in TCT NO. 4314 as entry No. 12381. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5710 was thus issued in favor of the petitioner which starting since then exercised proprietary rights over Lots No. 1 and 4. In the meantime, Rafael Galvez filed his motion for reconsideration against the order issued by the trial court declaring OCT No. 0-381 null and void. The motion was denied on January 25, 1965. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines in a Resolution promulgated on August 14, 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 36061-R. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued an Entry of Judgment, certifying that its decision dated August 14, 1973 became final and executory on October 23, 1973. On April 22, 1974, the trial court in L.R.C. Case No. N-361 issued a writ of execution of the judgment which was served on the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union on April 29, 1974. Twenty four long years thereafter, on January 14, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter dated January 11, 1999 from Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, stating that the aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court in L.R.C. No. N-361 have not been executed by the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union despite receipt of the writ of execution. On April 21, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles before the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region (Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union) docketed therein as Civil Case No. 6346 entitled, "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Heirs of Rafael Galvez, represented by Teresita Tan, Reynaldo Mamaril, Elisa Bustos, Erlinda Balatbat, Regina Bustos, Shipside Incorporated and the Register of Deeds of La Union, Defendants." The evidence shows that the impleaded defendants (except the Register of Deeds of the province of La Union) are the successors-in- interest of Rafael Galvez (not Reynaldo Galvez as alleged by the Solicitor General) over the property covered by OCT No. 0-381, namely: (a) Shipside Inc. which is presently the registered owner in fee simple of Lots No. 1 and 4 covered by TCT No. T-5710, with a total area of 7,079 square meters; (b) Elisa Bustos, Jesusito Galvez, and Teresita Tan who are the registered owners of Lot No. 2of OCT No. 0-381; and (c) Elisa Bustos, Filipina Mamaril, Regina Bustos and Erlinda Balatbat who are the registered owners of Lot No. 3 of OCT No. 0-381, now covered by TCT No. T-4916, with an area of 1,583 square meters. In its complaint in Civil Case No. 6346, the Solicitor General argued that since the trial court in LRC Case No. 361 had ruled and declared OCT No. 0-381 to be null and void, which ruling was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the defendants-successors-in-interest of Rafael Galvez have no valid title over the property covered by OCT No. 0-381, and the subsequent Torrens titles issued in their names should be consequently cancelled. On July 22, 1999, petitioner Shipside, Inc. filed its Motion to Dismiss, based on the following grounds: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action because only final and executory judgments may be subject of an action for revival of judgment; (2) the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest because the real property covered by the Torrens titles sought to be cancelled, allegedly part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station), were under the ownership and administration of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) under Republic Act No. 7227; (3) plaintiff's cause of action is barred by prescription; (4) twenty-five years having lapsed since the issuance of the writ ofexecution, no action for revival of judgment may be instituted because under Paragraph 3 of Article 1144 of the Civil Code, such action may be brought only within ten (10) years from the time the judgment had been rendered. An opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by the Solicitor General on August 23, 1999, alleging among others, that: (1) the real party-in-interest is the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) prescription does not run against the State. On August 31, 1999, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and on October 14, 1999, its motion for reconsideration was likewise turned down. On October 21, 1999, petitioner instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 55535, on the ground that the orders of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss and its subsequent motion for reconsideration were issued in excess of jurisdiction. On November 4, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 55535 on the ground that the verification and certification in the petition, under the signature of Lorenzo Balbin, Jr., was made without authority, there being no proof therein that Balbin was authorized to institute the petition for and in behalf and of petitioner.cATDIH On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (1) a complaint filed on behalf of a corporation can be made only if authorized by its Board of Directors, and in the absence thereof, the petition cannot prosper and be granted due course; and (2) petitioner was unable to show that it had substantially complied with the rule requiring proof of authority to institute an action or proceeding. Hence, the instant petition. In support of its petition, Shipside, Inc. asseverates that: 1.The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition when it made a conclusive legal presumption that Mr. Balbin had no authority to sign the petition despite the clarity of laws, jurisprudence and Secretary's certificate to the contrary; 2.The Honorable Court of Appeals abused its discretion when it dismissed the petition, in effect affirming the grave abuse of discretion committed by the lowercourt when it refused to dismiss the 1999 Complaint for Revival of a 1973 judgment, in violation of clear laws and jurisprudence. Petitioner likewise adopted the arguments it raised in the petition and comment/reply it filed with the Court of Appeals, attached to its petition as Exhibit "L" and "N", respectively. In his Comment, the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the instant petition based on the following considerations: (1) Lorenzo Balbin, who signed for and in behalf ofpetitioner in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping portion of the petition, failed to show proof of his authorization to institute the petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, thus the latter court acted correctly in dismissing the same; (2) the real party-in- interest in the case at bar being the Republic of the Philippines, its claims are imprescriptible. In order to preserve the rights of herein parties, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on June 26, 2000 enjoining the trial court from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 6346. The issues posited in this case are: (1) whether or not an authorization from petitioner's Board of Directors is still required in order for its resident manager to institute or commence a legal action for and in behalf of the corporation; and (2) whether or not the Republic of the Philippines can maintain the action for revival of judgment herein. We find for petitioner. Anent the first issue: The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that Lorenzo Balbin, the resident manager for petitioner, who was the signatory in the verification and certification on non-forum shopping, failed to show proof that he was authorized by petitioner's board of directors to file such a petition. A corporation, such as petitioner, has no power except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, it has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers (Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. CA, 264 SCRA 11 [1996]). In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors. It is undisputed that on October 21, 1999, the time petitioner's Resident Manager Balbin filed the petition, there was no proof attached thereto that Balbin was authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certification therein, as a consequence of which the petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However, subsequent to such dismissal, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching to said motion a certificate issued by its board secretary stating that on October 11, 1999, or ten days prior to the filing of the petition, Balbin had been authorized by petitioner's board of directors to file said petition. The Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional (Uy v. LandBank, G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000). Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation. In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et. al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), theCourt considered the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Courtof Appeals, et. al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy's petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping. In the instant case, the merits of petitioner's case should be considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretary's certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight. It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non- forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping (Bernardo v. NLRC, 255 SCRA 108 [1996]). Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal. Now to the second issue: The action instituted by the Solicitor General in the trial court is one for revival of judgment which is governed by Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Article 1144(3) provides that an action upon a judgment "must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues." On the other hand, Section 6, Rule 39 provides that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, but that after the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. Taking these two provisions into consideration, it is plain that an action for revival of judgment must be brought within ten years from the time said judgment becomes final. From the records of this case, it is clear that the judgment sought to be revived became final on October 23, 1973. On the other hand, the action for revival of judgment was instituted only in 1999, or more than twenty-five (25) years after the judgment had become final. Hence, the action is barred by extinctive prescription considering that such an action can be instituted only within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues. The Solicitor General, nonetheless, argues that the State's cause of action in the cancellation of the land title issued to petitioner's predecessor-in-interest is imprescriptible because it is included in Camp Wallace, which belongs to the government. The argument is misleading. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez's title was ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds true today. Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority. Section 4 pertinently provides: SECTION 4. Purposes of the Conversion Authority. The Conversion Authority shall have the following purposes: (a)To own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station, O'Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station, Mt. Sta. Rita Station (Hermosa, Bataan) and those portions of Metro Manila military camps which may be transferred to it by the President; Section 2 of Proclamation No. 216, issued on July 27, 1993, also provides: SECTION 2. Transfer of Wallace Air Station Areas to the Bases Conversion and Development Authority. All areas covered by the Wallace Air Station as embraced and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended, excluding those covered by Presidential Proclamations and some 25-hectare area for the radar and communication station of the Philippine Air Force, are hereby transferred to the Bases Conversion Development Authority . . . With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a right or interest to protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest.Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to enforced (Pioneer Insurance v. CA, 175 SCRA 668 [1989]). A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest (Ibonilla v.Province of Cebu, 210 SCRA 526 [1992]). Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, not the Government, which stands to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the name of petitioner is cancelled. Nonetheless, it has been posited that the transfer of military reservations and their extensions to the BCDA is basically for the purpose of accelerating the sound and balanced conversion of these military reservations into alternative productive uses and to enhance the benefits to be derived from such property as a measure ofpromoting the economic and social development, particularly of Central Luzon and, in general, the country's goal for enhancement (Section 2, Republic Act No. 7227). It is contended that the transfer of these military reservations to the Conversion Authority does not amount to an abdication on the part of the Republic of its interests, but simply a recognition of the need to create a body corporate which will act as its agent for the realization of its program. It is consequently asserted that the Republic remains to be the real party in interest and the Conversion Authority merely its agent. We, however, must not lose sight of the fact that the BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate and distinct from the government. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7227 reads: SECTION 3. Creation of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority. There is hereby created a body corporate to be known as the Conversion Authority which shall have the attribute of perpetual succession and shall be vested with the powers of a corporation. It may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. While public benefit and public welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic and social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country's goal for enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations have been created by government to act as its agents for the realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA and the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these entities, although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not government-function corporations invested with governmental attributes. It may thus be said that the BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Moreover, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7227 provides: SECTION 5. Powers of the Conversion Authority. To carry out its objectives under this Act, the Conversion Authority is hereby vested with the following powers:
(a)To succeed in its corporate name, to sue and be sued in such corporate name and to adopt, alter and use a corporate seal which shall be judicially noticed; EASCDH Having the capacity to sue or be sued, it should thus be the BCDA which may file an action to cancel petitioner's title, not the Republic, the former being the real party in interest. One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action (Ralla v. Ralla, 199 SCRA 495 [1991]). A suit may be dismissed if the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest. If the suit is not brought in the name of the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed, as was done by petitioner in this case, on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action (Tanpingco v. IAC, 207 SCRA 652 [1992]). However, E.B. Marcha Transport Co., Inc. v. IAC (147 SCRA 276 [1987]) is cited as authority that the Republic is the proper party to sue for the recovery of possession ofproperty which at the time of the institution of the suit was no longer held by the national government but by the Philippine Ports Authority. In E.B. Marcha, the Court ruled: It can be said that in suing for the recovery of the rentals, the Republic of the Philippines, acted as principal of the Philippine Ports Authority, directly exercising the commission it had earlier conferred on the latter as its agent. We may presume that, by doing so, the Republic of the Philippines did not intend to retain the said rentals for its own use, considering that by its voluntary act it had transferred the land in question to the Philippine Ports Authority effective July 11, 1974. The Republic of the Philippines had simply sought to assist, not supplant, the Philippine Ports Authority, whose title to the disputed property it continues to recognize. We may expect then that the said rentals, once collected by the Republic of the Philippines, shall be turned over by it to the Philippine Ports Authority conformably to the purposes of P.D. No. 857. E.B. Marcha is, however, not on all fours with the case at bar. In the former, the Court considered the Republic a proper party to sue since the claims of the Republic and the Philippine Ports Authority against the petitioner therein were the same. To dismiss the complaint in E.B. Marcha would have brought needless delay in the settlement of the matter since the PPA would have to refile the case on the same claim already litigated upon. Such is not the case here since to allow the government to sue herein enables it to raise the issue of imprescriptibility, a claim which is not available to the BCDA. The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes, it being said that when the title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category as ordinary persons (Kingston v. LeHigh Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa 469). By raising the claim of imprescriptibility, a claim which cannot be raised by the BCDA, the Government not only assists the BCDA, as it did in E.B. Marcha, it even supplants the latter, a course of action proscribed by said case. Moreover, to recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in this case would set a bad precedent as it would allow the Republic to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest against whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been created merely as agents for the realization of government programs. Parenthetically, petitioner was not a party to the original suit for cancellation of title commenced by the Republic twenty-seven years for which it is now being made to answer, nay, being made to suffer financial losses. It should also be noted that petitioner is unquestionably a buyer in good faith and for value, having acquired the property in 1963, or 5 years after the issuance of the original certificate of title, as a third transferee. If only not to do violence and to give some measure of respect to the Torrens System, petitioner must be afforded some measure ofprotection. One more point. Since the portion in dispute now forms part of the property owned and administered by the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, it is alienable and registerable real property. We find it unnecessary to rule on the other matters raised by the herein parties. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the orders dated August 31, 1999 and October 4, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of the First National Judicial Region (Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union) in Civil Case No. 6346 entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Heirs of Rafael Galvez, et. al., Defendants" as well as the resolutions promulgated on November 4, 1999 and May 23, 2000 by the Court of Appeals (Twelfth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 55535 entitled "Shipside, Inc., Petitioner versus Hon. Alfredo Cajigal, as Judge, RTC, San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26, and the Republic of the Philippines, Respondents" are hereby reversed and set aside. The complaint in Civil Case No. 6346, Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando City, La Union entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Heirs of Rafael Galvez, et al." is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action by the Bases Development and Conversion Authority. SO ORDERED. cHECAS Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions VITUG, J .: I find no doctrinal difficulty in adhering to the draft ponencia written by our esteemed Chairman, Mr. Justice JARM, insofar as it declares that an action for revival of judgment is barred by extinctive prescription, if not brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues, pursuant to Article 1144(3) of the New Civil Code. It appears that the judgment in the instant case has become final on 23 October 1973 or well more than two decades prior to the action for its revival instituted only in 1999. With due respect, however, I still am unable to subscribe to the idea that prescription may not be invoked by the government in this case upon the thesis that the transfer ofCamp Wallace to the Bases Conversion Development Authority renders the Republic with no right or interest to protect and thus unqualified under the rules of procedure to be the real party-in-interest. While it is true that Republic Act 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, authorizes the transfer of the military reservations and their extensions to the Conversion Authority, the same, however, is basically for the purpose of accelerating the sound and balanced conversion ofthese military reservations into alternative productive uses and to enhance the benefits to be derived from such property as a measure of promoting the economic and social development, particularly, of Central Luzon and, in general, the country's goal for enhancement. 1 The transfer of these military reservations to the Conversion Authority does not amount to an abdication on the part of the Republic of its interests but simply a recognition of the need to create a body corporate which will act as its agent for the realization of its program specified in the Act. It ought to follow that the Republic remains to be the real party-in-interest and the Conversion Authority being merely its agent. In E.B. Marcha Transport Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 2 the Court succinctly resolved the issue of whether or not the Republic of the Philippines would be a proper party to sue for the recovery of possession of property which at the time of the institution of the suit was no longer being held by the national government but by the Philippine Ports Authority. The Court ruled: "More importantly, as we see it, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines is not the proper party would result in needless delay in the settlement of this matter and also in derogation of the policy against multiplicity of suits. Such a decision would require the Philippine Ports Authority to refile the very same complaint already proved by the Republic of the Philippines and bring back the parties as it were to square one. "It can be said that in suing for the recovery of the rentals, the Republic of the Philippines, acted as principal of the Philippine Ports Authority, directly exercising the commission it had earlier conferred on the latter as its agent. We may presume that, by doing so, the Republic of the Philippines did not intend to retain the said rentals for its own use, considering that by its voluntary act it had transferred the land in question to the Philippine Ports Authority effective July 11, 1974. The Republic of the Philippines had simply sought to assist, not supplant, the Philippine Ports Authority, whose title to the disputed property it continues to recognize. We may expect then that the said rentals, once collected by the Republic of the Philippines, shall be turned over by it to the Philippine Ports Authority conformably to the purposes of P.D. No. 857." There would seem to be no cogent reason for ignoring that rationale specially when taken in light of the fact that the original suit for cancellation of title of petitioner's predecessor-in-interest was commenced by the Republic itself, and it was only in 1992 that the subject military camp was transferred to the Conversion Authority. TSIEAD ||| (Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001)
SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. L-25843. July 25, 1974.] MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant. Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee. Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant. D E C I S I O N FERNANDO, J p: The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision are the mother and the uncle of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased father. The dispute centers as to who of them should be entitled to act as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the appropriate Civil Code provisions decided in favor of the mother, the plaintiff in this case. Defendant uncle appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it did following the specific mandate of the law. In addition, it must have taken into account the principle that in cages of this nature the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. It is not an unreasonable assumption that between a mother and an uncle, the former is likely to lavish more care on and pay greater attention to her. This is all the more likely considering that the child is with the mother. There are no circumstances then that did militate against what conforms to the natural order of things, even if the language of the law were not as clear. It is not to be lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State as parens patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity under the present Constitution, did weigh in the balance the opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the welfare of the child called for the mother to be entrusted with such responsibility. We have to affirm. The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the facts." 1 The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. 2 After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." 3 The latter states: "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives; . . ." 4 Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the appealed decision: "The insurance proceeds belong to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor under the custody and parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives with plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property by lucrative title. Said property, therefore, belongs to the minor child in ownership, and in usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the usufructuary is entitled to possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00." 5 It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the applicability of the two cited Civil Code provisions can be disputed, the decision must stand. There is no ambiguity in the language employed. The words are rather clear. Their meaning is unequivocal. Time and time again, this Court has left no doubt that where codal or statutory norms are cast in categorical language, the task before it is not one of interpretation but of application. 6 So it must be in this case. So it was in the appealed decision. 1.It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the defendant-appellant 7 to blunt the force of legal commands that speak so plainly and so unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question of policy, the conclusion will remain unaltered. What is paramount, as mentioned at the outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in consonance with such primordial end that Articles 320 and 321 have been worded. There is recognition in the law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the event that there is less than full measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is supplied by the bond required. With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle. Manresa, commenting on Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain, the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus "El derecho y la obligacion de administrar el patrimonio de los hijos es una consecuencia natural y logica de la patria potestad y de la presuncion de que nadie cuidar de los bienes de acqullos con mas cario y solicitud que los padres. En nuestro Derecho antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida de una manera indirecta aquella doctrina, y as! se desprende de la sentencia cia del Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se refiere a la ley 24, tit. XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia suerte aceptan en general dicho principio los Codigos extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de que trataremos m s adelante." 8 2.The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting asparens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. It could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea. In a recent case, 9 there is this quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against defendant-appellant. Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. Barredo, J., did not take part. ||| (Cabanas v. Pilapil, G.R. No. L-25843, July 25, 1974)
EN BANC [G.R. No. L-409. January 30, 1947.] ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs. ERIBERTO MISA, respondent. Pedro M. Recto and Que Tube C. Makalintal, for petitioner. First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent. SYLLABUS 1.INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ALLEGIANCE OF CITIZEN OR SUBJECT TO SOVEREIGN; NATURE OF. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF ENEMY OCCUPATION. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; SOVEREIGNTY, EFFECT ON, OF ENEMY OCCUPATION. The subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during a war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times." 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; "TEMPORARY ALLEGIANCE" SIMILAR TO ALLEGIANCE OF FOREIGNER TO GOVERNMENT OF HIS RESIDENCE. The words "temporary allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them, may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TREASON IN FOREIGN COUNTRY AND IN TERRITORY UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION. Just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort. 6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 114 OF REVISED PENAL CODE, APPLICABILITY OF. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation. 7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF MILITARY OCCUPANT TO CHANGE LAWS OR MAKE NEW ONES. Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. 8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MILITARY OCCUPANT CANNOT REPEAL OR SUSPEND OPERATION OF LAW OF TREASON. Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason. 9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE, EFFECT OF THEORY OF, ADOPTED. Adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide. 10.ID., SOVEREIGNTY, IN WHOM DOES IT RESIDE. Sovereignty resides in the people of the Philippines. 11.ID.; ID.; COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT. The Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution. 12.ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY, POLITICAL. The question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officer, citizens and subjects of the country." 13.ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC, RIGHT OF, TO PROSECUTE TREASON COMMITTED DURING JAPANESE OCCUPATION. Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that: "The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." R E S O L U T I O N "In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic: "(1)Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which of foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. United States, 21 Law. ed., 42g; Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526); "Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham v~. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, 'although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them' is one of the 'rules of international law of our times'; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpach ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
"Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United States was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons,supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty, or on the old theory that such occupation transfers the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word 'sovereignty' used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present case; "Considering that even adopting the words 'temporary allegiance,' repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand,ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has to obey, with certain exceptions, the laws of that country which enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own; "Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage, inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta 1.S. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also ill operative as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation; "Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience ( Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants; "Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor; "Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party i n the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide; "(2)Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935 , a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that all laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution;' Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that 'Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them' (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, 'As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood' (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is 'a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.'
"Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States 'All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States', was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these limitations do not do away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that 'The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines'; "This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. Justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion." Separate Opinions PERFECTO, J ., concurring: Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started. As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and self-preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its enforcement will only be consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their country out to the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be the case if the law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension. Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation is advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical with obedience to law, during the enemy occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to which was also suspended. Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to his government or his sovereign in return for the protection which he receives. "'Allegiance,' as the term is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U. S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208. "'Allegiance' was said by Mr. Justice Story to be 'nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is.' United States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 456, 461; 169 U. S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890. "Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty binding on him who enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government. It is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen. Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501. "By 'allegiance' is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for the protection which he receives. It may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of another government or sovereign, and an alien while domiciled in a country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his residence. Carlisle vs. United States, 83 U. S.(16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426. "'Allegiance,' as defined by Blackstone, 'is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the King, in return for that protection which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being per actual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their birth they are under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for this reason, evidently founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject upon an implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other will demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights which they acquire by being born within the King's allegiance, which can never be forfeited but by their own misbehavior; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to the King, which would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences.' Indians w ithin the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance to the government of a state, for they receive protection from the government and are subject to its laws. They are born in allegiance to the government of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911." (3 Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., pp. 226-227.) "Allegiance. Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding on him who enjoys the protection of the commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government or to the sovereign under which he lives in return for the protection he receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen. "Classification. Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance that which arises by nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance that arising through some circumstance or act other than birth, namely, by denotation or naturalization; (3) local allegiance the arising from residence simply within the country, for however short a time; and (4) legal allegiance that arising from oath, taken usually at the town or reed, for, by the common law, the oath of allegiance might be tendered to every one upon attaining the age of twelve years." (3 C. J. S., 'p. 885.) "Allegiance. The obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives. 15 R. C. L., 140." (Ballentine, Law Dictionary, p. 68.) "'Allegiance,' as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to his state the obligation of obedience and support which he owes to it. The state is the political person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this allegiance. The machinery through which it operates is its government. The persons who operate this machinery constitute its magistency. The rules of conduct which the state utters or enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its sovereignty." (W. W. Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International Law, 1 American Journal of International Law, p. 915.) "The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in character. This principle had been aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion in the case of Luria vs. United States: "Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other." (3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed., p. 6.) "Allegiance. The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection which the government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to the sovereign, correlative with the protection received. "It is a comparatively modern corruption of allegiance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege (ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and unqualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47. xxx xxx xxx
"Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the former to his government or sovereign, until by some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a temporary and local allegiance continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United States, 16 Wall. [U. S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 42G." (1 Rouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 179.) The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view of the revolutionary insertion in our Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.' (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities above quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that sovereignty resides somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people themselves. Although it is possible that they had already discovered that the people and only the people are the true sovereign, their minds were not yet free from the shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty have been exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules whose ideology was best expressed in the famous words of one of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the government, as an entity different and in opposition to the people themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece, and modern democracies function on the assumption that sovereignty resides in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our people. To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there may be some plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy occupation, with the consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended, because our government stopped to function in the country. But the idea cannot have any place under our Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic philosophy of Philippine democracy, it could not have been suspended during the enemy occupation. Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended life." There is no possible middle situation between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality and existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of "suspended personality" or "suspended existence" of a people? In no time during enemy occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be what they are. The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution. There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her husband. Because some external and insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising his marital powers, functions, and duties, and the wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity? Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is unacceptable. We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p. 752, ante) that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth. The advent of independence had the effect of changing the name of our Government and the withdrawal by the United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts did not change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty, following our constitutional philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized by the United States of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By such act, President Roosevetl, as spokeman of the American people, accepted and recognized the principle that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the Filipino people. The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation f independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific war, President Quezon had been sitting as representative of a sovereign people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the same Filipino people took part outstanding and brilliant, it may be added in the drafting and adoption of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forunner of the future democratic constitution of the would government envisioned by all those who adhere to the principle of unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously desired all who want to be spared the sufferings, misery and disaster of another war. Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in Congress. Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the power granted by the Election to the President to suspend the election in certain districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a public calamity, but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme Court has the power to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it has no power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any valid law, such as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be included among the laws of ther Commonwealth which, by, his theory of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during the Japanese occupation. Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead going from Corregidor to Australia, and later to Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory. "The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative in time of war and when the country is invaded by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The framers of the Constitution surely did not entertain even for a moment the absurdity that when the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is more needed in the defense of the survival of the state, the same should be suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required to render personal, military or civil service may claim exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their country in distress. Petitioner advances the theory that protection is the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the citizens, the latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition is untenable. Allegiance to the sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the result of the social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that organized society would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens are entitled to the protection of their government, but whether or not that government fulfills that duty, is immaterial to the need of maintaining the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the same way that the physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should continue, irrespective of the ability or inability of his mind to choose the most effective measures of personal protection. After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes lad during and under the Japanese regime, whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the puppet government they had set up, are null and void, as we have done in our opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285), and in several other cases where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently accept petitioner's theory. If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we cannot imagine the existence of organized society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino people, without laws governing, it, necessarily we have to conclude that the laws of the Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and the only ones that could claim obedience from our citizens. Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to the enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we accept that our allegiance to our legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall by its own weight, because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and fidelity, is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect, veneration, gratitude, amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some foe feelings that bind us to our own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The enemy only provokes repelling and repulsive feelings hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt, spitefulness. The natural incompatibility of political social and ethical ideologies, between our people and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any feeling of attraction between them, aside from the initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality of the Nippon soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the most inoffensive of our citizens.
Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be further slapped, may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary to change human nature. Political actions, legal rules, and judicial decisions deal with human relations, taking man as he is, not as he should be. To love the enemy is not natural. As long as human psychology remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance based on hatred? The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of international law, could not have established in our country any government that can be legally recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry and ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance even a temporary one from a decent people. One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case of invasion, are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will notice immediately that the result will be the doom of small nations and peoples, by whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic practices. In the imminence of invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of the smaller will readily throw away their arms to rally behind palladium of the invaders. Two foot he three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory since September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act, creating the People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime against national security "committed between December 8, 1941 and September 2, 1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive have jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including the time of Japanese occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security, including article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had reminded in full effect an should be enforced. That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said and that no one, at the time the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of Representatives, ever dared to expose the useless of creating a People's Court to try crimes which, as claimed by petitioner, could not have been committed as the laws punishing them have been suspended, is a historical fact of which the Supreme Court may the take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous agreement of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and that the theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to help quash the pending treason cases at any cost. Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based n generally accepted principles of international law, although this argument becomes futile by petitioner's admission that the theory is advantageous to strong powers but harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that the latter cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the theories, urged by petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generally accepted principles of international law. As the latter forms part of our laws by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that there is no alternative but to accept the theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws, especially those political in nature. There is no law more political in nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an inverted reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under petitioner's theory, the offspring devours its parent. Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment? There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy determining agency of government, even since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the idea that our laws should be suspended during enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing by Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the Second National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into effect on December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we started from the premise that all our laws shall continue in effect during the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing the President "to continue in fore laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy," (section 2 ), that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give more emphasis to the intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines small otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress may not meet as scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then convinced that we did not have available the necessary means of repelling effectively the enemy invasion. Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment for treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be dismissed without the opportunity for them to re vindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal technicality which appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminately classify them with the other accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience revolts against the idea of allowing the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma of having betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to show through the due process of law that they are free from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as such during the critical period of test. HILADO, J ., concurring: I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-called Japanese occupation of the Philippines (which was nothing more than the occupation of Manila and certain other specific regions of the Islands which constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of this country to their legitimate government and to the United States was not suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period there was no change of sovereignty here; but my reasons are different and I proceed, to set them forth: I.SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE (a)Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than a hundred-fold in World War II, the nations had evolved certain rules and principles which came to be known as International Law, governing their conduct with each other and toward their respective citizens and inhabitants, in the armed forces or in civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war. During the ages which preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had no realization of the potential excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up to that time war was, at least under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently justified, and the nations had not on that account, proscribed nor renounced it as an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling international disputes. It is not for us now to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical fact. Suffice it to recognize its existence in history. But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was, employed for entirely different reasons and from entirely different motives, compared to previous wars, and the instruments and methods of warfare had been so materially changed as not only to involve the contending armed forces on well defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but to spread death and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their properties, not only in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones, no less than 61 civilized nations and governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and solemnly subscribe to the now famous Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the United States in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report to President Truman of June 7, 1945: "International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions in international law are brought about by the action of governments designed to meet a change in circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached from time to time in adopting settled principles to new situations. xxx xxx xxx "After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law took place. By the time the Nazis came to power it was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war or the institution of war by treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no longer available to those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on the juridical principle that aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal.
"The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps. One of the most significant is the Briand- Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which Germany, Italy, and Japan, in common with the United States and practically all the nations of the world, renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies. "Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry I,. Stimson, as United States Secretary of State, gave voice to the American concept of its effect. He said, 'war between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has become illegal throughout practically the entire world It is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing . . .. By that very act we have made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of re-examining many of its Codes and treaties.' "This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind that justifiable war is a crime. "Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-eight governments, which declared that 'a war of aggression constitutes . . . an international crime.' "The Eighth Assembly of the league of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of the representatives of forty-eight member- nations, including Germany, declared that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, the twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that 'war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species.' xxx xxx xxx "We therefore propose to charge that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern international law has abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it are engaged in legitimate business. Thus may the forces of the law be mobilized on the side of Peace." (U. S. A. An American Review," published by the United States Office of War Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.) When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law" and "the re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war," he has in mind no other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of international law, that there is a distinction between the just and the unjust war the war of defense and the war of aggression" to which he alludes in an earlier paragraph of the same report. In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned Justice Jackson says that "international law as taught in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century generally declared that war-making was not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one of the paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report, the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as other reversals of the same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; and the 6th Pan-American Conference of 1928, which unanimously adopted a resolution stating that war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species: which enumeration, he says, is not an attempt at an exhaustive catalogue. It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United States, and later, in rapid succession, against other allied nations, was a war of aggression and utterly unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its attack; against the Philippines and its consequent invasion and occupation of certain areas thereof. Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for petitioner herein in support of his theory of suspended allegiance, have been evolved and accepted during those periods of the history of nations when all war was considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson, and the others have reference to military occupation in the course of really justifiable war. Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive war which threw the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from the last month of 1941 to the first week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and bound herself to seek the settlement of her disputes with other nations only by pacific means. Thus she expressly gave her consent to that modification of the then existing rules and principles of international law governing the matter. With that modification, all the signatories to the pact necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide by all its implications, among them the outlawing, proscription and renunciation of military occupation of another nation's territory in the course of a war thus outlawed, proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of saying that the rules and principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of military occupation were automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future cases of war coming under the ban and condemnation of the pact. If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if such a war is an international crime against the human species: a nation which occupies a foreign territory in the course of such a war cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or positive law, acquire or possess any legitimate power or right growing out or incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan in criminally invading the Philippines and occupying certain portions of its territory during the Pacific war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense and only in this sense should we speak here with respect this country and its citizens, any more than could a burglar breaking through a man's house pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or right within that house with respect either to the person of the owner or to his property. To recognize in the first instance any legal power or right on the part of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on the part of the burglar, the same as in case of a military occupant in the course of a justifiable war, would be nothing short of legalizing the crime itself. It would be the most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to prosecute, condemn and hang the appropriately called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at the same time recognize any lawfulness in their occupation of territories they have so barbarously and feloniously invaded. And let it not be forgotten that the Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have instituted and conducted the so-called war crimes trials. Neither should we lose sight of the further fact that this government has a representative in the international commission currently trying the Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. These facts leave no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord with the other United Nations in considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this country had six years before the outbreak of the Pacific war already renounced war as an instrument of national policy ( Constitution, Article II, section 2), thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this Court to apply to the occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines during that war the rules and principles of international law which might be applicable to a military occupation occurring in the course of a justifiable war. How can this Court recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when our own government has sent a representative to said international commission in Tokyo trying the Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against humanity and peace" committed by them during World War II of which said occupation was but part and parcel? In such circumstances how could such occupation produce no less an effect than the suspension of the allegiance of our people to their country and government? (b)But even in the hypothesis and not more than a mere hypothesis that when Japan occupied the City of Manila and certain other areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a justifiable war, still the theory of suspended allegiance would not hold good. The continuance of the allegiance owed to a nation by its citizens is one of those high privileges of citizenship which the law of nations denies to the occupant the power to interfere with. " . . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus forbidden to take certain measures which he may be able to apply, and that irrespective of their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon him are in theory designed to protect the individual in the enjoyment of some highly important privileges. These concern his allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family honor and domestic relations, religious convictions, personal service, and connection with or residence in the occupied territory.
"The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants to swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . ." (III Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed., pp 1898-1899.) ". . .Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since the authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance to him. . . ." (II Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-344) The occupant's lack of authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance of their allegiance to their own lawful sovereign. This allegiance does not consist merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign, but more essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume and pages of Oppenheim's work above cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the occupied territory owe no temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other hand, he may compel them to take an oath sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality' willingly to submit to his 'legitimate commands.' Since, naturally, such "legitimate commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows that said occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the right to compel the inhabitants to take an oath of obedience to his laws; and since, according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws, which he can exact from them, does not constitute allegiance. (c)The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when one's country is unable to afford him its protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the sacred ties of allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that precisely when his country is in such distress, and therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved from that loyalty. Love of country should be something permanent and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worthy offspring. The outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings, and prompting of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of the enemy's irresistible pressure, those invisible feelings and prompting of the spirit of the people should never allow them to act, to speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their Love and loyalty to the Fatherland. For them, indicted, to face their country and say to it that, because when it was overrun and vanquished by the barbarous invader and, in consequence, was disabled from affording them protection, they were released from their sacred obligation of allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore freely adhere to its enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no criminal responsibility therefor, would only tend to aggravate their crime. II.CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are the self-same people before and after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of the Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them under the Constitution; after the proclamation of independence that sovereignty remained with them under the very same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said Constitution stipulates that the government established thereby shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, "The Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines.' Under this provision the Government of the Philippines immediately prior to independence was essentially to be the identical government thereafter only the name of that government was to be changed. Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines were and are always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The People of the Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)." This was already true in prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing the law of treason. "The Government of the Philippines" spoke of in article 114 of said Code merely represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was continued, along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution, which constitutional provision further directs that "all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution" of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before, and the Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both governments sovereignty resided and resides in the people (Article II, section 1). Said sovereignty was never transferred from that people they are the same people who preserve it to this day. There has never been any change in this respect. If one committed treason against the people of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he continues to be criminally liable for the crime to the same people now. And if, following the literal wording of the Revised Penal Code, as continued by the Constitution, that accused owed allegiance upon the commission of the crime to the "Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of the Constitution (Articles XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most that can be said is that the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute after independence that they became, politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime against a minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his becoming of age, why should the responsibility for the crime of treason committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully politically independent be extinguished after they acquire this status? The offended party continues to be the same only his status has changed. PARAS, J ., dissenting: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is in full harmony with the generally accepted principles of international law adopted by our Constitution (Article II, section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion already stated that "laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation" (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75, Phil., 876,881.) The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant will naturally suspend all laws of a political nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command, such action to be made known to the inhabitants. (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, Article 287.) As allegiance to the United States is an essential element in the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in our political structure prior to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted and practiced in the United States necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines, to the exclusion of any other construction followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the isolated cases 1 brought to our attention, which, moreover, have entirely different factual bases. Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the proclamation of its Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a "result of the Japanese Military operations, the sovereignty of the United States of America over the Philippines has completely disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the Military Administration under martial law over the districts occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief of February 20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs until further orders provided that they are not inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military Administration;" and, thirdly, in the explanations to Order No. 3 reminding that "all laws and regulations of the Philippines have been suspended since Japanese occupation," and excepting the application of "laws and regulations which are not proper to act under the present situation the Japanese Military Administration," especially those "provided with some political purposes." The suspension of political laws during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane. The latter phase outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more or less at promoting the necessarily selfish motives and purposes of a military occupant. It is tuns consoling to note that the powers instrumental in the crystallization of the Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that they were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the interests of humanity and the over progressive needs of civilization," and that "in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of international law, as they result from the usage's established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of the inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before the belligerent occupant "takes a further step and by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to acquire the right of sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard himself as clothed with freedom to endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit the area concerned with his own political ideology, and to make that endeavor successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials who are permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental functions." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1879.)
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading power, whose interests and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of the displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and for the proper administration of the country (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country" (Hague Regulations, article 52); and if, as we have in effect said, by the surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary allegiance to the government of the occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it chooses to recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant 'is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions." (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 29a), citing United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II, Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944, p. 432.) He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people in an occupied territory were required to obey two antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we would adopt the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the following passage: "To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of those two puppet governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile governments, with their respective constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions on the one hand bound to continue owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan." The only sensible purpose of the treason law which is of political complexion and taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), must be the preservation of the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination. And yet the latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that what is suspended is merely the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government or the latter's authority to impose penal sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the suspension refers only to the military occupant. If this were to be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious that the fleeing or displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically assert its authority in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the occupant, on the other hand, will not take the absurd step of prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we were to believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to accept the absurd proposition that the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with illegal possession of firearms. It should be borne in mind that "the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can not compete with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempts interference, its action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality of what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus if the absent territorial sovereign, through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the occupant has ordained obedience to such command within the occupied territory would not safeguard the individual from prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.) As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute and punish the inhabitants for "war treason" or "war crimes," as an incident of the state of war and necessity for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupant, against which prosecution and punishment such inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by their native sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly rule that they may at the same time be prosecuted and punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code, but already taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant. In Peralta is. Director of Prisons. 75 Phil., 286, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States," and the meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in the following passage (page 298): "No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium, because 'a constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect,' (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and a case quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely." In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the Japanese military occupation against the United States or the Commonwealth Government, because article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not then in force. Nor may this penal provision be applied upon its revival at the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition against any ex post facto law and because, under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to enforce the Constitution, more essential to sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal Code ni the aforesaid case of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons if , as alleged by the majority, the suspension was good only as to the military occupant? The decision in United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our position. As analyzed and described in United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case "was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States the court of highest human authority on that subject and as the decision was against the United States, and in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the occurrence the war out of which it grew; and while no department of this Government was inclined to magnify the rights of Great Britain or disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the mind of the court in favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed to the court to warrant and demand such a decision. That case grew out of the war of 1812, between the United States and Great Britain. It appeared that in September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine, in the State of Maine, and held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held, foreign goods, by the laws of the United States subject to duty, had been introduced into that port without paying duties to the United States. At the close of the war the place was by treaty restored to the United States, and after that was done the Government of the United States sought to recover from the persons so introducing the goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws of the United States, they would have been liable. The claim of the United States was that its laws were properly in force there, although the place was at the time held by the British forces in hostility to the United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced there; and that a court of the United States (the power of that government there having since been restored) was bound so to decide. But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the court in the most summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that great luminary of the American bench, being the organ of the court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The single question is whether goods imported into Castine during its occupation by the enemy are liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods imported into the United States. . . . We are all of opinion that the claim for duties cannot be sustained. . . .. The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws could be obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was therefore, during this period, as far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subjects to such duties only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods were in no correct sense imported into the United States.' The court then proceeded to say, that the case is the same as if the port of Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the United States, and the goods had been imported there previous to its cession. In this case they say there would be no pretense to say that American duties could be demanded; and upon principles of public or municipal law, the cases are not distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt, be decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from authority.' Does this case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed belligerent occupation, is to be governed by him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States with entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and accomplished Story delivering the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in this case. Nay, more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory; that such country, so held, is for the purpose of the application of the law off its former government to be deemed foreign territory, and that goods imported there (and by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense done within the territory of its former sovereign, the United States."
But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty itself was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can have any important significance only when it may be exercised; and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in abeyance is the sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate the plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitant who remained and submitted to the conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of the majority, without in effect violating the rule of international law, hereinabove adverted to, that the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one, and that the territorial sovereign driven therefrom cannot compete with it on an even plane. Neither may the doctrine in United States vs. Rice be said to have become obsolete, without repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the United States, allowing the military occupant to suspend all laws of a political nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309). In fact, it is a recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation of a territory of another State does not operate to annex such territory to the occupying State, but that the inhabitants of the occupied district, no longer receiving the protection of their native State, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. ( Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 364.) The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying to argue that the law of treason was obligatory on the Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Thus it is insisted that a citizen or subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance" to the military occupant may be likened to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives therefrom. The comparison is most unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the territory of a power not hostile to or in actual war with his own government; he is in the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules of international law, the laws of political nature of his own government; and the protections received by him from that friendly or neutral power is real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied territory can expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that States, when they concede to other States the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are within the territorial limits of such other States, should insist that those States should provide system of la-v and of courts, and in actual practice, so administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This does not mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all the civil, or much less, all the political rights or privileges which it grants to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate opportunity to have such legal rights as are granted to them by the local law impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.) When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in foreign country or, in the language of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, "elsewhere," a territory other than one under belligerent occupation must have been contemplated. This would make sense, because treason is a crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the delivery, in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way for the enemy to obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory already under occupation can no longer be "delivered." The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable the military occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against their own government, without said inhabitants being liable for treason. This argument is not correct, because the suspension does not exempt the occupant from complying with the Hague Regulation (article 52) that allows it to demand all kinds of services provided that they do not involve the population "in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country." Neither does the suspension prevent the inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much less from dying and becoming heroes if compelled by the occupant to fight against their own country. Any imperfection in the present state of international law should be corrected by such world agency as the United Nations organization. It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the collaborators, an alarming number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by the ruthless, or we may say savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion that if the Filipinos did not obey the Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there would not be any Filipino nation that could have been liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go to and live in the mountains, or otherwise fight as guerrillas after the formal surrender of our and the American regular fighting forces, they would have faced certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering the latter's military strength at the time and the long period during which they were left militarily unmolested by America. In this connection, we hate to make reference to the atomic bomb as a possible means of destruction. If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation of the Philippines, it was because the feigned cooperation of their countrymen enabled them to get food and other aid necessary in the resistance movement. If they were able to survive, it was because they could camouflage themselves in the midst of the civilian population in cities and towns. It is easy to argue now that the people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits of life or otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this line of thought is that the Japanese are assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any such attitude. During belligerent occupation, "the outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp opposition between the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the hostile military force exercising control over them. At heart they remain at war with each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants from taking advantage of opportunities to interfere with the safety and success of the occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its passions and cause it to take vengeance in cruel fashion. Again, even when it is untainted by such conduct, the occupant as a means of attaining ultimate success in its major conflict may, under plea of military necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary prohibitions, proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of military achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It should be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few months; it extended over a little more than three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of the "presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim Clam vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon) 75 Phil., 371, 373. ) The law of nations accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of the merits of the occupant's cause. (Hyde, International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.) Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhered to will lead to an over-production of traitors, have a wrong and low conception of the psychology and patriotism of their countrymen. Patriots are such after their birth in the first place, and no amount of laws or judicial decisions can make or unmake them. On the other hand, the Filipinos are not so base as to be insensitive to the thought that the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and died during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were undoubtedly motivated by their inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as the treason law. The Filipino people, as a whole, passively opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of the treason statute but because they preferred and will prefer the democratic and civilized way of life and American altruism to Japanese barbaric and totalitarian designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart have been pro-Japanese; but they met and will unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The regular soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and informers subjected themselves to the perils of military operations, likely received summary liquidation or punishments from the guerrillas and the parties injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the military authorities of the returning sovereign; those who committed other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese army, may be prosecuted under the municipal law, and under this group, even the spies and informers, Makapili or otherwise, are included, for they can be made answerable for any act offensive to person or property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to reckon with. We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the majority of cases, those responsible for the death of, or injury to, any Filipino or American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted more by personal motives than by a desire to levy war against the United States or to adhere to the occupant. The alleged spies and informers found in the Japanese occupation the royal road to vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to the guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way legalized the penal sanctions imposed by them upon the real traitors.
It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by remembering that the obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos were effected while the Japanese were in complete control and occupation of the Philippines, when the r mere physical presence implied force and pressure and not after the American forces of liberation had restored the Philippine Government that we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was necessary to release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense indicated herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and obedience. If there were those who did not in any wise cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn the pages of Philippine history. Essentially, however, everybody who took advantage, to any extent and degree, of the peace and order prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of himself and his family, gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of the Philippines ineffective during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor and force only after the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, he ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute bolls of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," and that "all laws . . . of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control." Repeating what we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (76 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the President of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907." The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the population to take oath to the hostile power," was inserted for the moral protection and benefit of the inhabitants, and does not necessarily carry the implication that the latter continue to be bound to the political laws of the displaced government. The United States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions, has made the point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all laws of a political nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309), and as already stated, it is a doctrine of American Constitutional Law that the inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of their native state, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is prohibited is the application of force by the occupant, from which it is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw voluntary submission by the population. The only strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of this authors of the Conventions to give as much freedom and allowance to the inhabitants as are necessary for their survival. This is wise and humane, because the people should be in a better position to know what will save them during the military occupation than any exile government. "Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned against the use of the judicial process for non judicial ends, and attached cynics who 'see no reason why courts, just like other agencies, should not be policy weapons. If we want to shoot Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done as such, said he but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined to execute a man in any case there is no occasion for a trial; the world yields no respect for courts that are merely organized to convict.' Mussolini may have got his just desserts, but nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we go about punishing criminals. There are enough laws on the books to convict guilty Nazis without risking the prestige of our legal system. It is far, far better that some guilty men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long run the idea of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were taken from the editorial appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey ideas worthy of some reflection. If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience during the Japanese military occupation, they were at most borrowing the famous and significant words of President Roxas errors of the mind and not of the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not as an admission of the fallacy of the theory of suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an affirmation that the Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had always remained loyal by feeling and conscience to their country. Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese military occupation, the present Republic of the Philippines has no right to prosecute reason committed against the former sovereignty existing during the Commonwealth Government which was none other than the sovereignty of the United States. This court has already held that, upon a change of sovereignty, the provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, rebellion and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that, as contended by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "sovereignty resides in the people," but this did not make the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people sovereign, because said declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was subservient to and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the Constitution under which, in addition to its manly provisions essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is expressly made clear that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The framers of the Constitution had to mail said declaration of principle because the document was ultimately intended for the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not have announced that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and their posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose, will dare allege that the Philippines was an independent county under the Commonwealth Government. The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that existing under the Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status nevertheless remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed was the exercise of sovereignty delegated by the United States whose sovereignty over the Philippines continued to be complete. "The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. It has already been seen that the exercise of sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a State to the various organs which, collectively, constitute the Government. For practical political reasons which can be casually appreciated, it is desirable that the public policies of a State should be formulated and executed by governmental agencies of its own creation and which are not subject to the control of other States. There is, however, nothing in a nature of sovereignty or of State life which prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the governmental agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed, a sovereign State may go to any extent in the delegation of the exercise of its power to the governmental agencies of other States, those governmental agencies thus becoming quad hoc parts of the governmental machinery of the State whose sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these agencies do not cease to be instrumentalities for the expression of the will of the State by which they were originally created. "By this delegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating State, and the legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal competence again to draw to itself the exercise, through organs of its own creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right of control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable occurrence; yet, so long as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and the continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and not political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in a later chapter, in the so-called Confederate or Composite State, the cooperating States may yield to the central Government the exercise of almost all of their powers of Government and yet retain their several sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may, without parting with its sovereignty of lessening its territorial application, yield to the governing organs of particular areas such an amplitude of powers as to create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the characteristics of independent States. In all States, indeed, when of any considerable size, efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous powers of local self-government be granted to particular districts." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 15.)
The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the States of the American Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own sovereignty although limited by the United States. This is not true for it has been authoritatively stated that the Constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty, and that the sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested. "It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, even when selecting members for the national legislature, or electing the President, or ratifying proposed amendments to the federal Constitution, the States act, ad hoc, as agents of the National Government." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 250.) "This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.) Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." From this, the deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines and under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the Commonwealth Government possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the sovereignty delegated by the United States and did not cease to be an instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not receiving its power or sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against the United States or against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth Government, which exercised, but did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the Republic. Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the effect that all cases pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force, thereby insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the Philippines to enforce article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The latter article can remain operative under the present regime if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains, however, that said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, in that those liable for treason thereunder should owe allegiance to the United States or the Government of the Philippines, the latter being, as we have already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under the Constitution of the present Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are not required to owe allegiance to the United States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed to have been modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is deleted, and, as thus modified, should be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the enactment and application of an ex post facto law. In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has held in the case of Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines had a sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said case must be taken in the light of a subsequent decision of the same court in Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U. S., 308), rendered in May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier case can only be interpreted to refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by the mother country, the United States. No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on August 12, 1943, that "the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations in act all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood," since said statement was not meant as having accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation of the Philippine Independence as contemplated in the Tydings McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1) no less also than the President of the United States had to issue the proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the sovereignty of the United States and recognizing Philippine Independence; (2) it was General MacArthur, and not President Osmena who was with him, that proclaimed on October 23, 1944, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was not given official participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and not the Commonwealth Government, extended the tenure of office of the President and Vice President of the Philippines. The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial because, as we have already explained, treason against either is not and cannot be treason against the new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines. ||| (Laurel v. Misa, G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947)
EN BANC [G.R. No. L-49. November 12, 1945.] WILLIAM F. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent. William F. Peralta, in his own behalf. Solicitor General Taada, for respondent. City Fiscal Mabanag, as amicus curiae. SYLLABUS 1. CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND CONSTITUTION OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount force), the questions involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government, because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory (Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. II, Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944, p. 342); and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States, considered as de facto governments of the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which is a de facto government of paramount force. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. 2. VALIDITY OF THE CREATION OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL AND EXCLUSIVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION The so called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is a mere governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question. 3. VALIDITY OF THE SUMMARY PROCEDURE ADOPTED FOR SAID COURT. With respect to the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration does not violate these precepts. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and public conscience, for it is less objectionable, even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure, than the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe. 4. VALIDITY OF ACT NO. 65 OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. It was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimesof robbery and other offenses as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said Act were taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial law by international jurists, defined above by Hyde, in order, not only to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country, but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that in case of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them, as they did, and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of nations for their maintenance and subsistence (Art LII, sec. III, Hague Conventions of 1907). Especially taking into consideration the fact, of which this court may take judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly for their supply upon the produce of this country. 5. POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE CRIMES PENALIZED BY SAID ACT NO. 65 AND ORDINANCE NO. 7 OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SO- CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. The crimes penalized by Act No. 65 as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, and the crimes against public order, penalized by Ordinance No. 7 and placed under the jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction are all of a political complexion, because the acts constituting those offenses were punished, as are all political offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy and directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant. 6. VALIDITY OF SENTENCES DURING OCCUPATION FOR CRIMES OF POLITICAL COMPLEXION, AFTER REOCCUPATION OR LIBERATION. The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Islands and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. (Hall's International Law, seventh edition, p. 518; Westlake, International Law, Part Ii, War, pp. 97, 98; Wheaton's International Law, War, seventh edition, 1944, p. 245.) Per PERFECTO, J., concurring: 7. ORDINANCE NO. 7 NULLIFIED BY OCTOBER PROCLAMATION. Ordinance No. 7 issued by President Laurel, of the "Republic of the Philippines" under the Japanese regime, was nullified by the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944. 8. THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION. The October Proclamation was issued by General MacArthur in keeping with the official statement issued by the President of the United States of October 23, 1943, denying recognition or sympathy to the collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" and the Laurel "Philippine Republic." 9. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Ordinance No. 7 is incompatible with the fundamental principles and essential safeguards in criminal procedure, universally recognized in civilized modern nations, and can only be justified by a retrogressive and reactionary mentality developed under the social, cultural, and political atmosphere of the era of darkness. 10. WARRANTS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE. The provisions of Ordinance no. 7 as to issuance of search warrants are repugnant to the Filipino sense of right in the matter of warrants of search and seizure, sense of right which has been clearly and definitely stereotyped in Art. III, Sec. 1 (3), of the Constitution of the Philippines. Under the Constitution of the Philippines, search warrants should be issued only by a judge. 11. HABEAS CORPUS Section 7 of Ordinance No. 7, suspending the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, is violative of one of the fundamental guarantees in the Constitution of the Philippines. 12. SELF-INCRIMINATION The criminal procedure authorized by Ordinance No. 7, in relation with Executive Order No. 157, is violative of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. 13. REVOLTING PROCEDURE. The procedure provided under Ordinance No. 7 is so revolting, so nauseating, and so opposed to human nature, that it takes real courage to keep one's equanimity when analyzing it. It is beyond comprehension how a man, endowed with reason, could devise such an execrable system of judicial procedure, which is but a shameless mockery of the administration of justice. 14. THE GUARANTEE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION SHOULD BE RETAINED JEALOUSY It is necessary to be careful to retain jealously the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. It was acquired as a result of protests against all inquisitorial and third degree procedure. 15. THIRD DEGREE PROCEDURES. We must not forget that even during normal times, under the twentieth century lights, just before the last global war started, in America and in the Philippines, it was heard not rarely denunciations of third degree procedures employed by agents of the law. This very Supreme Court, not only once, had to deal with cases where such tactics were conclusively proved. Even today, among criminal cases we have under consideration, there is evidence of confessions exacted through cruel and brutal means. 16. EVERYBODY'S SECURITY JEOPARDIZED. Even with the existence of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, there are officers of the law who cannot resist the temptation of using their power to compel, through third degree methods, innocent of guilty persons to admit involuntarily real or imaginary offenses. Let us allow changes tending to nullify the protection against self- incrimination, and no man, however innocent be may be, shall be secure in his person, in his liberty, in his honor, in his life.
17. APPEAL IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ALL ACCUSED. Under the provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines (Art. VIII, sec. 2), the right of appeal has been recognized as one of the fundamental rights of all accused in the Philippines. 18. ID., REASONS OF THE DRAFTERS OF THE CONSTITUTION. The drafters of our Constitution, taught by the unerring lessons of human experience, came to the conclusion that mistake is one of the most irretrievable human weaknesses. To reduce to the minimum the effects of such innate human weakness, they provided n our fundamental law that appeal to the highest tribunal of the land may be enjoyed by any accused. 19. INSTRUMENTALITY IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE. The Supreme Court is just one of the instrumentalities created by the Constitution in the service of the people. It is one of the means considered necessary to better serve the supreme interest of the people. 20. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS ABRIDGED. The summary procedure in criminal cases under Ordinance No. 7 abridged the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 21. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE VIOLATED. The summary procedure established by Ordinance No. 7 violates the constitutional principle that all accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. 22. THE HAGUE CONVENTION. The Hague Convention of 1899 is flagrantly violated by the enactment of Ordinance No. 7. 23. INTERNATIONAL LAW. Under international law, under the most elemental principles of law, the legitimate government, once restored to his own territory, after expelling the invader, enjoys the absolute freedom of not recognizing or by nullifying any and all acts of the invader. 24. DECISION RENDERED UNDER FOREIGN AUTHORITY UNENFORCEABLE. The decision is by which petitioner was convicted and is being held for life, having been rendered by a tribunal created, functioning, and acting under the authority of a foreign state, the Emperor or the Imperial Government of Japan, is unenforceable. 25. VESTIGES OF A PEOPLE SPIRITUALLY PERVERTED AND DEBASED. The process and judgment under which petitioner has been convicted is one of the hateful vestiges left in our country by the moral savagery of a people spiritually perverted and debased. We must erase those vestiges if we want to keep immune from all germsof decay the democratic institutions which are the pride of our people and country. 26. PERFECTION OF ELEMENTAL HUMAN CONCEPTS. The procedure here in question exhibits either inversion, retroversion, subversion, or perversion of elemental human concepts. It ignores completely the high purposes of a judicial procedure. D E C I S I O N FERIA, J p: Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. 9 of the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the same Assembly. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the Presidentof the so-called Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in Chapter II of Executive Commission, made applicable to the trial for violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights"; that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose ofthe Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code." The Solicitor General, in his answer in behalf of the respondent, states that, in his own opinion, for the reasons expressed in his brief in the case of People of the Philippines, plaintiff- appellant, vs. Benedicto Jose y Santos, defendant-appellee, G.R. No. L- 22 (p. 612, post), the acts and proceedings taken and had before the said Courtof Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein petitioner, should now be denied force and efficacy, and therefore the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. The reasons advanced by the Solicitor General in said brief and in his reply memorandum in support of his contention are, that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the summary procedure prescribed therefor, by said Ordinance No. 7 in connection with Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, are tinged with political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate Constitution. And he cites, in support of this last proposition, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of Texas vs. White (7 Wall., 700, 743); Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570, 581); United States vs. Home Insurance Co. (22 Wall., 99, 104); Sprott vs. United States (20 Wall., 459). The City Fiscal of Manila appeared before this Court as amicus curi. In his memorandum he submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances and Executive Orders creating it are not of a political complexion, for said Court was created, and the crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an urgent necessity, according to the preamble ofOrdinance No. 7; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure established in said Ordinance No. 7 is not violativeof the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor ofthe provision of section 1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by the petitioner and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are; that the court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty, he may be immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case of the death penalty which cannot be executed unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three Justices. Before proceeding further, and in order to determine the law applicable to the questions involved in the present case, it is necessary to bear in mind the nature and status of the government established in these Islands by the Japanese forces of occupation under the designation of Republic of the Philippines. In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. R. No. L-5, pp. 113, 127, ante), recently decided, this Court, speaking through the Justice who pens this decision, held: "In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commanderof the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, 'the government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts.' (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence." And speaking of the so-called Republic of the Philippines in the same decision, this Court said: "The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and government. As general MacArthur stated in his proclamation ofOctober 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, 'under enemy duress, a so- called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the peoples' will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations."
As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount force), as the government established in Castine, Maine, during its occupation by the British forces, and as that of Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with that country by the United States Army, the questions involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government; because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory; and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States, considered as de facto governments of the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which is a de facto government of paramount force. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. In the case of United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, by the military occupation of Castine, Maine, the sovereigntyof the United States in the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the belligerent occupant. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. And Oppenheim, in his Treatise on International Law, says that, in carrying out the administration over the occupied territory and its inhabitants, "the (belligerent) occupant is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions." (Vol. II, Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944, p. 342.) The doctrine laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (in the cases of Texas vs. White, 7 Wall., 700; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; United States vs. Home Insurance Co., 20 Wall., 249; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459, and others) that the judicial and legislative actsof the Confederate States which impaired the rights of the citizens under the Constitution of the United States or of the States, or were inconflict with those constitutions, were null and void, is not applicable to the present case. Because that doctrine rests on the propositions that "the concession (of belligerency) made to the Confederate Government . . . sanctioned no hostile legislation . . . and it impaired in no respect the rights of loyal citizens as they had existed at the commencement of hostilities" (Williams vs. Bruffy, supra); that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble, and the obligation of allegiance to the state and obedience to her laws and state constitution, subject to the Constitution of the United States, remained unimpaired during the War of Secession (Texas vs. White, supra) and that the Confederate States "in most, if not in all instances, merely transferred the existing state organizations to the support of a new and different national head. The same constitutions, the same laws for the protection of property and personal rights remained and were administered by the same officers." (Sprott vs. United States, supra). In fine, because in the case of the Confederate States, the constitution of each state and that of the United States or the Union continued in force in those states during the War of Secession; while the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States. The questions which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are, first, the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary procedure adopted for that court; secondly, the validity of the sentence which imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of life imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation; and thirdly, if they were then valid, the effect on said punitive sentence of the re- occupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. (1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the authority ofthe legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 598.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is mere governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of a political complexion or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question. With respect to the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. For "the invader deals freely with the relations of the inhabitants of the occupied territory towards himself . . . for his security also, he declares certain acts, not forbidden by the ordinary laws of the country, to be punishable; and he so far suspends the laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the summary punishment of any one doing such acts." (Hall's International Law, seventh ed., p. 500.) A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless, so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for the maintenance of public order and safety,temporarily alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the laws regarding procedure." (Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p. 349.) No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium, because "a constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect" (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and cases quoted and cited in the footnote), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely. The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration does not violate those precepts. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and public conscience, for it is less objectionable, even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure, than the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe. (2) The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65 which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted. Westlake says that Article XLIII, Section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 "indicates that the laws to be enforced by the occupant consist of, first, the territorial law in general, as that which stands to the public order and social and commercial life of the district in a relation of mutual adaptation, so that any needless displacement ofit would defeat the object which the invader is enjoined to have in view, and secondly, such variations of the territorial law as may be required by real necessity and are not expressly prohibited by any of the rules which will come before us. Such variations will naturally be greatest in what concerns the relation of the communities and individuals within the district to the invading army and its followers, it being necessary for the protection of the latter, and for the unhindered prosecution of the war by them, that acts committed to their detriment shall not only lose what jurisdiction the territorial law might give them as committed against enemies, but shall be repressed more severely than the territorial law would repress acts committed against fellow subjects. Indeed the entire relation between the invaders and the invaded, so far as it may fall within the criminal department whether by the intrinsic nature of the acts done or in consequence of the regulations made by the invaders, may be considered as taken out of the territorial law and referred to what is called martial law." (Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, p. 96.)
According to Hyde (International Law, Vol. II, p. 386), the term "martial law," in so far as it is used to describe any fact in relation to belligerent occupation, does not refer to a particular code or system of law, or to a special agency entrusted with its administration. The term merely signifies that the body of law actually applied, having the sanction of military authority, is essentially martial. All law, by whomsoever administered, in an occupied district is martial law; and it is none the less so when applied by the civil courts in matters devoid of special interest to the occupant. The words "martial law" are doubtless suggestive of the power of the occupant to share the law as he sees fit; that is, to determine what shall be deemed lawful or unlawful acts, to establish tests for ascertaining the guilt of offenders, to fix penalties, and generally to administer justice through such agencies as are found expedient. And the United States Rules of Land Warfare provide that the belligerent occupant may promulgate such new laws and regulations as military necessity demands, and in this class will be included those laws which come into being as a result of military rule; that is, those which establish new crimes and offenses incident to a state of war and are necessary for the control of the country and the protection of the army, for the principal object of the occupant is to provide for the security of the invading army and to contribute to its support and efficiency and the success of its operations. (Pub. 1940, pp. 76,77.) From the above it appears clear that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No. 65 with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said Act were taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial law by international jurists, defined above by Hyde, in order, not only to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country, but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that, in case of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them, as they did, and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of nations for their maintenance and subsistence (Art. LII, Sec. III, Hague Conventions of 1907). Especially taking into consideration the fact, ofwhich this court may take judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly for their supply upon the produce of this country. The crime penalized by Act No. 65 as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, to wit: treason, espionage, inciting to war, violation ofneutrality, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, piracy; and the crimes against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms and other, penalized by Ordinance No. 7 and placed under the jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction are all of a political complexion, because the acts constituting those offenses were punished, as are all political offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy and directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant. While it is true that these offenses, when committed against the Commonwealth or United States Government, are defined and also penalized by the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, they became inapplicable as crimes against the occupier upon the occupation of the Islands by the Japanese forces. And they had to be taken out of the territorial law and made punishable by said Ordinance No. 7, for they were not penalized before under the Revised Penal Code when committed against the belligerent occupant or the government established by him in these Islands. They are also considered by some writers as war crimes in a broad sense. In this connection Wheaton observes the following: "Of 'war crimes' the number is naturally indefinite, depending as they do on the acts from time to time ordered to be done or forbidden to be done in the martial law proclamation or regulations of the invading or occupying commander. Thus, in the Anglo-Boer war, the British military authorities proclaimed the following to be offenses against their martial law; Being in possession of arms, ammunition, etc.; traveling without a permit; sending prohibited goods; holding meetings other than those allowed; using seditious language; spreading alarmist reports; overcharging for goods; wearing uniforms without due authority; going out of doors between certain hours; injuring military animals or stores; being in possession, without a permit, of horses, vehicles, cycles, etc.; hindering those in execution of military orders; trespassing on defense works. Such offenses, together with several others, were specified in the Japanese regulations made in the Russo-Japanese war." (Wheaton's International Law, War. seven edition, 1944, p. 242.) It is therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty oflife imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime ofwhich petitioner was convicted. (3) The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government; that is, whether or not, by the principle of postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that time. In order to resolve this last question, it is not necessary to enter into an elaborate discussion on the matter. It is sufficient to quote the opinion on the subject ofseveral international jurist and our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra. Hall, commenting on the effect of the principle of postliminy upon sentences of the tribunals continued or created by the belligerent occupant, opines "that judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. . . . Political acts on the other hand fall through as of course, whether they introduce any positive change into the organization of the country, or whether they only suspend the working of that already in existence. The execution also of punitive sentences ceases as of course when they have had reference to acts not criminal by the municipal law of the state, such for example as acts directed against the security or control of the invader." (Hall's International Law, seventh edition, p. 518.) Westlake, speaking of the duration of the validity of punitive sentences for offenses such as the one in question, which is within the admitted power or competenceof the belligerent occupant to punish, says that: "To the extent to which the legal power of the occupant is admitted he can make law for the duration of his occupation. Like any other legislator he is morally subject to the duty of giving sufficient notice of his enactments or regulations, not indeed so as to be debarred from carrying out his will without notice, when required by military necessity and so far as practically carrying out his will can be distinguished from punishment, but always remembering that to punish for breach of a regulation a person who was justifiably ignorant of it would be outrageous. But the law made by the occupant within his admitted power, whether morally justifiable or not, will bind any member of the occupied population as against any other member of it, and will bind as between them all and their national government, so far as it produces an effect during the occupation. When the occupation comes to an end and the authority of the national government is restored, either by the progress of operations during the war or by the conclusion of a peace, no redress can be had for what has been actually carried out but nothing further can follow from the occupant's legislation. A prisoner detained under it must be released, and no civil right conferred by it can be further enforced. The enemy's law depends on him for enforcement as well as for enactment. The invaded state is not subject to the indignity of being obliged to execute his commands." (Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, pp. 97, 98.) And Wheaton, who, as above stated, considers as war crimes such offenses as those penalized in Ordinance No. 7 and Act No. 65, says: "In general, the acts of the occupant possess legal validity, and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent government. But this rule does not necessarily apply to acts that exceed the occupant's power (e. g., alienation of the domains of the State or the sovereign), to sentences for 'war treason' and 'war crimes,' to acts of a political character,and to those that operate beyond the period of occupation. When occupation ceases, no reparation is legally due for what has already been carried out." (Wheaton's International Law, supra, p. 245.)
We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all judgment of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur. It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary and proper to invoke the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur declaring null and void all, laws, among them Act No. 65, of the so-called Republic of the Philippines under which petitioner was convicted, in order to give retroactive effect to the nullification of said penal act and invalidate the punitive sentence rendered against petitioner under said law, a sentence which, before the proclamation, had already become null and of no effect. We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of the of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Islands and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. Jaranilla, Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., concur. Moran, C.J., concur in the result. Separate Opinions OZAETA, J., concurring: Amidst the forest of opinions that have cropped up in this case it would seem unnecessary to plant an additional tree. To justify our effort lest we seem intent to bring coal to Newcastle we ought to state that the following opinion had been prepared before the others were tendered. It has been impossible for the Court to reconcile and consolidate the divergent views of its members although they arrive at practically the same result. Accused of robbery in the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of Manila, the petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. He commenced to serve the sentence on August 21, 1944. He now petitions this Court for the writ of habeas corpus, alleging that Ordinance No. 7, by which the Court ofSpecial and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction was created and which was promulgated on March 8, 1944, by the President of the "Republic of the Philippines," was null and void ab initio. The Solicitor General, answering the petition on behalf of the respondent Director of Prisons, expressed the opinion that "the acts and proceedings taken and had before the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein petitioner should now be denied force and efficacy," and recommended "that the writ of habeas corpus prayed for be granted and that the City Fiscal be instructed to prepare and file the corresponding information for robbery against the petitioner herein in the Court of First Instance of Manila." The case was argued before us on September 21 and 22, 1945, by the First Assistant Solicitor General on behalf of the respondent and the City Fiscal as amicus curi-the former impugning and the latter sustaining the validity of said Ordinance No. 7. Section 1 of the ordinance in question reads as follows: "Section 1. There is hereby created in every province and city throughout the Philippines one or more courts of special criminal jurisdiction as the President ofthe Republic of the Philippines may determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice, which courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try and determine crimes and offenses penalized by Act No. 65 entitled 'An Act imposing heavier penalties for crimes involving robbery, bribery, falsification, frauds, illegal exactions and transactions, malversation of public funds and infidelity as defined in the Revised Penal Code and violations of food control laws, when committed by public officers and employees, and for similar offenses when committed by private individuals or entities, and providing for a summary procedure for the trial of such offenders.," Section 2 confers upon the court mentioned in section 1 exclusive jurisdiction also to try the following crimes as defined in the Revised Penal Code; crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against public order, brigandage, arson and other crimes involving destruction, illegal detention committed by private individuals and kidnapping of minors; and illegal possession of firearms, as defined in an executive order. Section 3 provides for the appointment of one judge of first instance to preside over the court above mentioned and of a special prosecutor in each special court. Section 4 authorizes the court to impose a longer term ofimprisonment that fixed by law, or imprisonment for life or death where not already fixed by law, for crimes and offenses mentioned in section 2. The remaining sections read as follows: "Sec. 5. The trial of the cases arising under section 1 and 2 hereof shall be started within two days after the filing of the corresponding information, shall be summary in procedure, and shall aim at their expeditious and prompt disposition. Technicalities shall be avoided and all measures calculated to serve this end shall be taken by the trial judge. Said cases shall be decided within four days after the same are submitted for decision. The summary procedure provided in Act No. 65insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, shall govern the trial of the cases enumerated in said sections 1 and 2 hereof. "Sec. 6. The decisions of the special courts herein created shall be final except where the penalty imposed is death, in which case the records of the particular case shall be elevated en consulta to a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three members to be designated by the President of the Republic of the Philippines. The clerk of each special court, upon the promulgation of a decision imposing the death penalty, shall immediately forward the records of the case to the special division of the Supreme Court herein created, which shall decide the case within fifteen days from the receipt of the records thereof. "Sec. 7. The interest of public safety so requiring it, the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus are hereby suspended with respect to persons accused of, or under investigation for, any of the crimes and offenses enumerated in sections 1 and 2 hereof. "Sec. 8. All laws, rules or orders, or part thereof, inconsistent with the provisions hereof, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. "Sec. 9. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its promulgation." The summary procedure provided in Act No. 65 of the "Republic," as referred to in section 5 above quoted, is in turn that established by Chapter II of Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission, dated May 18, 1943. Under said procedure (section 17) "search warrants may be issued by the court or by any prosecuting officer, authorizing peace officers to search for and seize any articles or objects described in the warrant, including those which may be regarded as evidence of an offense under this Order even if such articles or objects are not included among those described in section 2, Rule 122, of the Rules of Court." Section 18 reads as follows: "Sec. 18. The accused or his representative may be examined by the court, and with the permission of the court, by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or unfavorable to him or his principal; and either may apply to the judge for the examination of the co-accused or the representative of the latter in matters related to the defense of the accused. Statements made by the accused, his co- accused, or the representative of the accused or person acting in a similar capacity, irrespective of the circumstances under which they were made, shall be admissible in evidence if material to the issue." Section 21 provides for the summary trial in the following manner: "Such trials shall be conducted according to the following rules: "(a) After arraignment and plea, the court shall immediately cause to explained to the accused the facts constituting the offenses with which he is charged, and the judge shall interrogate the accused and the witnesses as to the facts and circumstances of the case in order to clarify the points in dispute and those which are admitted. "(b) Refusal of the accused to answer any questions made or allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable to him. "(c) Except for justifiable reasons, the accused shall not be allowed to plead and assert defenses that are inconsistent with each other. "(d) If from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogation, it should appear that the accused is guilty of the crime charged in the information, or in any other information subsequently filed by the prosecuting officer, a sentence of conviction may be immediately rendered against the accused. Otherwise, the judge shall dictate an order distinctly specifying the facts admitted by the accused and those which are in dispute, and the trial shall be limited to the latter, unless the judge, for special reasons, otherwise directs. "(e) Unjustified absence of an accused who has been released on bail, or his representative shall not be ground for interrupting the proceedings or attacking the validity of the judgment. "The provisions of Rules 115 to 117 of the Rules of Court shall be suppletory to the foregoing insofar as they are not in conflict therewith." The record shows that during their existence the courts of special and exclusive criminal jurisdiction created by the ordinance in question convicted and sentenced a total of 94 individuals, 55 of whom had been prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and 15 for robbery; and that of the 94 convicts only 3, including the herein petitioner, remain in confinement, 21 having escaped, 37 having been released, and 33 having died.
In synthesis, the argument of the Solicitor General is as follows: Acts of the military occupant which exceed his power tested by the criterion set forth in article 43 ofthe Hague Regulations, are null and without effect as against the legitimate government. (Wheaton's International Law, 7th ed., p. 245.) Acts in furtherance or support ofrebellion against the United States, or intended to defeat the just rights of citizens, and other Acts of like nature, must, in general, be regarded as invalid and void. (Texas vs.White, 74 U. S. , 733; 19 Law. ed., 240.) Judicial or legislative acts in the insurrectionary states were valid where they were not hostile in their purpose or mode ofenforcement to the authority of the national government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution. (Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570-581; 21 Law. ed., 660.) All the enactments of the de facto legislatures in the insurrectionary states during the war, which were not hostile to the Union or to the authority of the General Government and which were not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, or of the states, have the same validity as if they had been enactments of legitimate legislatures. (United States vs. The Home Insurance Co., 22 Wall., 99-104; 22 Law. ed., 818.) Tested by these principles of international law, Ordinance No. 7 must be declared void (1) because it favored the forces of occupation and the civilian Japanese inasmuch as it provided an excessively heavy penalty for and the summary trial ofpossession of firearms and violations of food control regulations and (2) because it impaired the rights of citizens under the Constitution inasmuch as the procedure therein prescribed withdrew the privilege of the accused against self-incrimination and his right to appeal to the Supreme Court even where the penalty imposed was life imprisonment or death. In substance, the City Fiscal argues that the heavier penalty for the illegal possession of firearms than that fixed by the Administrative Code was not directed toward the suppression of underground activities against the Japanese army, and the rigid enforcement of the food control measures was not intended to insure the procurementof supplies by said army, because in any event the Japanese military occupant freely exercised the power recurring to the agencies of the "Republic," for there were even cases where the offenders were already in the hands of the police or courts of the "Republic" but they were unceremoniously taken from said agencies by the Japanese military police and punished or liquidated by it at Fort Santiago or elsewhere; and as regards food control, the Japanese forces did not have any need of the measures or agencies established by the "Republic" because the Japanese forces themselves commandeered what they needed or sent out their own agents to purchase it for them at prices even much higher than those fixed by the "Republic"; that the procedure prescribed afforded a fair trial and did not violate any fundamental rights; that the military occupant was not in duty bound to respect the constitution and the laws of the occupied territory; that he could abrogate all of them and promulgate new ones if he so chose; that the cases cited by the Solicitor General are not applicable because they deal with the validity of acts and processes of the governments of the rebel states during the Civil War and are based upon the indissolubility of the Union; that the validity or nullity of the ordinance in question should be judged in the light of the provisionsof the Constitution and the laws of the "Republic" and of generally accepted principles of international law; that even assuming that it should be judged by the standard ofthe Constitution of the Commonwealth, the ordinance satisfies all the requirements of said Constitution; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional but purely statutory right which may be granted or withheld at the pleasure of the state; and finally, that the supposed invalidity of the sentence imposed against the petitioner cannot be raised by habeas corpus. There is no question that in virtue of the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944 (41 Off. Gaz., 147, 148), Ordinance No. 7 is no longer of any force and effect since the restoration of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The question before us is whether said ordinance ever acquired any force and effect or was null and void ab initio. Invoking decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in cases involving the validity of Acts of the Confederacy and of a rebel state as a de facto government during the Civil War, the Solicitor General maintains that the ordinance in question was null and void because it impaired the rights of citizens under the Constitution and because it was hostile in its purpose to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The decisions invoked would be applicable if the so-called Republic of the Philippines should be considered as a government established by the Filipino people in rebellion against the Commonwealth and the sovereignty of the United States. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States declaring invalid Acts of a rebel state or of the Confederacy which were in furtherance or support of rebellion against the United States or which impaired the rights of citizens under the Constitution, rest on the proposition that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble and that the obligations of allegiance to the state, and obedience to her laws, subject to the Constitution ofthe United States, remained unimpaired during the War of Secession. (See Texas vs. White, 74 U. S., 700; 19 Law., 227, 237; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176; 24 Law. ed., 716.) Obviously, that proposition does not hold true with respect to a de facto government established by the enemy in an invaded and occupied territory in the course of a war between two independent nations. Such territory is possessed temporarily by a lawful government at war with the country of which the territory so possessed is a part, and during that possession the obligation of the inhabitants to their country are suspended, although not abrogated. (United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 253; Fleming vs.Page, 9 How., 614; Badly vs. Hunter, 171 U. S., 388; 43 Law. ed., 208, 210.) In the case of Williams vs. Bruffy, supra, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Field, observed: "The rule stated by Vattel, that the justice of the cause between two enemies being by the law of nations reputed to be equal, whatsoever is permitted to the one in virtueof war is also permitted to the other, applies only to cases of regular war between independent nations. It has no application to the case of a war between an established government and insurgents seeking to withdraw themselves from its jurisdiction or to overthrow its authority. The court further stated that the concession of belligerent rights made to the Confederate Government sanctioned no hostile legislation and impaired in no respect the rights of loyal citizens as they had existed at the commencement of hostilities. On the other hand, in war between independent nations "the rights of the occupant as a law-giver have broad scope." He may "suspended the existing laws and promulgate new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action. According to the Rules of Land Warfare he will naturally alter or suspend all laws of a political nature as well as political privileges, and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command." (Hyde on International Law, vol. 2, p. 367.) It will be seen then that in a war between independent nations the army of occupation has the right to enact laws and take measures hostile to its enemy, for its purpose was to harass and subdue the latter; and it is not bound to respect or preserve the rights of the citizens of the occupied territory under their Constitution. Let us now look into the nature and status of the government styled "Republic of the Philippines" in order to determine the criterion by which the validity of its enactments should be tested. In the recent case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. R. No. L-5, p. 113, ante), this Court, speaking through Justice Feria, had occasion to comment upon the nature of said government in the following words: "The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and government. As General Douglas MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which had been already quoted, 'under enemy duress a so- called government styled as the Republic of the Philippines" was established on October 14, 1943, based upon either the free expression of the peoples' will nor the sanction of the Government ofthe United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well- established doctrine in international law, recognized in Article 45 ofthe Hague Convention of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), that belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure government is during the period ofoccupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hoghead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs.Page, 9 Howard, 603; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude the Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or turning over the rights of government into the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief that, by doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States and other allied nations."
We reaffirmed those statements. To show further the fictitious character of the much-propagandized "independence" which Japan purported to grant to the Philippines through the establishment of the "Republic," we may add that, as a matter of contemporary history and of common knowledge, in practice the Japanese military authorities in the Philippines never treated the "Republic of the Philippines" as an independent government after its inauguration. They continued to impose their will on its executive officials when their interest so required. The Japanese military police arrested and punished various high officials of said government, including the First Assistant Solicitor General, and paid no attention to the protest and representations made on their behalf by the President of the "Republic." As a climax of their continual impositions, in December 1944 the Japanese military authorities placed the President and the members of his Cabinet under the "protective" custody of the military police, and on the 22d of that month forced them to leave the seat of government in Manila and hide with them in the mountains. The only measure they did not succeed in imposing upon the "Republic" was the conscription of the Filipino youth into an army to fight with the Japanese against the United States. So, while in theory and for the purpose of propaganda Japan professed to be a benefactor and liberator of the Filipinos, hoping thereby to secure their willing cooperation in her war efforts, in practice she continued to enslave and oppress the Filipinos, as she saw that the latter remained loyal to the United States. She found that the Filipinos merely feigned cooperation as their only means of self- preservation and that those who could stay beyond the reach of her army of occupation manifested their hostility by harassing and attacking that army. Thus Japan continued to oppress and tyrannize the Filipinos notwithstanding the former's grant of "independence" to the latter. It would therefore be preposterous to declare that the "Republic of the Philippines" was a government established by the Filipino people in rebellion against the Commonwealth and the sovereignty of the United States. The said government being a mere instrumentality of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese army as military occupant, the ordinance in question promulgated by the President of the "Republic" must be deemed as an act emanating from the power or authority of said occupant. The question, therefore, is whether or not it was within the competence of the military occupant to pass such a law. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides as follows: "Art. 43. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Commenting upon this article, Hyde in his work on International Law, volume 2, pages 366, 367, 368, says: "In consequence of his acquisition of the power to control the territory concerned, the occupant enjoys the right and is burdened with the duty to take all the measures within his power to restore and insure public order and safety. In so doing he is given great latitude with respect to choice of means and mode ofprocedure. This freedom may be partly due to the circumstance that the occupant is obliged to consider as a principal object the security, support, efficiency and success of his own force in a hostile land inhabited by nationals of the enemy. . . . xxx xxx xxx "The right to legislate is not deemed to be unlimited. According to the Hague Regulations of 1907, the occupant is called upon to respect, 'unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.' Thus in restoring public order and safety he appears to be bound to make serious endeavor to continue in force the ordinary civil and criminal laws which do not conflict with the security of his army or its support, efficacy, and success." In the exercise of his powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and his experience and a high sense of justice. (President McKinley, Order to the Secretary of War, July 18, 1898, on occupation of Santiago de Cuba by the American forces, Moore, Dig. VII, P. 261.) Acts of the military occupant which exceed his power tested by the criterion set forth in article 43 of the Hague Regulations, are null and without effect as against the legitimate government. (Wheaton's International Law, 7th ed. [1944], p. 245.) Hall in his treatise on International Law (7th edition), discussing the extent of the right of a military occupant, states: "If occupation is merely a phase in military operations, and implies no change in the legal position of the invader with respect to the occupied territory and its inhabitants, the rights which he possesses over them are those which is special circumstances represent his general right to do whatever acts are necessary for the prosecution of his war; in other words he has the right of exercising such control, and such control only, within the occupied territory as is required for his safety and the success of his operations. . . . On occupying a country an invader at once invest himself with absolute authority; and the fact of occupation draws with it as ofcourse the substitution of his will for previously existing law whenever such substitution is reasonably needed, and also the replacement of the actual civil and judicial administration by military jurisdiction. In its exercise however this ultimate authority is governed by the condition that the invader, having only a right to such control as is necessary for his safety and the success of his operations, must use his power within the limits defined by the fundamental notion of occupation, and with due reference to its transient character. He is therefore forbidden as a general rule to vary or suspend laws affecting property and private personal relations, or which regulate the moral order of the community. . . ." (pages 498, 499.) We deduce from the authorities that the power of the occupant is broad and absolute in matters affecting his safety. But in affairs which do not affect the security, efficacy, and success of his military operations, his power is qualified by the transient character of his administration. He is forbidden "to vary or suspend laws affecting property and private personal relations, or which regulate the moral order of the community." Unless absolutely prevented, he is bound to respect the laws, civil and criminal, in force in the country. Tested by this criterion, was it within the power or competence of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese army of occupation of the Philippines to promulgate Ordinance No. 7? In so far as said ordinance created new court of special criminal jurisdiction we think his power and enforce it during the occupation cannot be seriously disputed; but in so far as that ordinance varied radically our law of criminal procedure and deprived the accused of certain rights which our people have always treasured and considered inviolate, we are of the opinion that it transcended his power or competence. We base this opinion upon the following considerations: 1. The occupant was not absolutely prevented from respecting our law of criminal procedure and applying it in the Court of Special and Exclusive Jurisdiction. The application or nonapplication of said law did not affect the security, efficacy, and success of his military operations. The crimes over which the said court was vested with jurisdiction were mostly crimes against property penalized in our Revised Penal Code, which crimes did not affect the army of occupation. As to the illegal possession offirearms the City Fiscal himself, who sustains the validity of the ordinance, informs us that did not avail himself of said court but punished his enemies direct without recurring to the agencies of the "Republic"; and he further informs us that "as regards food control, the Japanese forces did not have any need of the measures or agencies established by the 'Republic', nor did they make use of them. 2. The summary procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 was inquisitorial, repugnant to the humanitarian method of administering criminal justice by all progressive, democratic, and freedom-loving countries of the world, and, therefore, devoid of that high sense of justice by which the military occupant must be guided in the exercise of his powers. This concept is, we think, borne out by an examination of the following features of said procedure: (a) Under the rule of procedure embodied in said ordinance any prosecuting officer may, on his own volition and even without probable cause, issue a search warrant for the seizure of documents and articles which may be regarded as evidence of an offense in violation of section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and of the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, which guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effect against unreasonable searches and seizures," and prohibits the issuance of warrants except after upon probable cause to be determine by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. (b) The trial must be commenced within two days after the filing of the information in violation of section 7, Rule 114, which gives the accused at least two days after the plea of not guilty within which to prepare for trial. (c) The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, in all criminal prosecutions until the contrary is proved, which is likewise guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, is violated in that, after the arraignment and before the presentation of any proof for the prosecution, the accused is interrogated by the judge as to the facts obtained by such interrogation it should appear (to the judge) that the accused is guilty a sentence of conviction may be immediately rendered against him, thereby also depriving himof his right to meet the witnesses face to face and of his privilege against self- incrimination.
The City Fiscal justifies this feature of the procedure by giving the following hypothetical case: "In the house of Juan and under his bed a policeman finds a revolver. Juan is arrested and an information for illegal possession of firearms is filed against him by the fiscal. He is brought before the judge of the corresponding special court for the preliminary interrogatory. He is asked whether or not he admits that the revolver was found in his house. He answers in the affirmative but says that he is not the owner of the revolver and he does not know how it was placed there. Asked whether he knows of anybody who could have placed the revolver under his bed, he answers that it might have been placed there by a guest who slept on his bed the night previous to its discovery by the police. He is asked to give the name of the guest referred to and his address, but he refuses to answer. Asked if he has other witnesses to support his claim, he answer that he has none. As may be seen, the evidence of guilt is complete, and there being no further evidence to be presented that may change the result the accused may be then and there sentenced by the court. In this case, the conviction of the accused is reasonable and fair, for his refusal to reveal the identity of his alleged guest may be due, either to the fact that there was no such guest, or that the cause for concealing his identity is worth suffering for. Volenti non fit injuria." But to us that hypothetical case is a good illustration of the injustice of such procedure. There the accused was convicted not because the prosecution had proved his guilt but because he was unable to prove his innocence. His inability to prove who the owner of the revolver was, did not to our mind prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, under the circumstances. He was accused of illegal possession of firearm, an offense punishable under the ordinance in question with imprisonment for six to twelve years. He pleaded not guilty, for according to him the revolver was not his and he did not know how it got into his house. He had no time harm had planted it before, for no sooner was the revolver seized than he was brought before the court and interrogated about it when he was naturally dazed and in a state of alarm. If the law ofcriminal procedure had been followed, he would had ample time to reflect and endeavor to unravel the mystery. He could have consulted a lawyer, and he would have been entitled to at least two days after the information was read to him to investigate the facts and prepare for the trial. At the trial he would not have been required to answer any question or present any proof in his defense until the prosecution had presented its witnesses, principally the policeman. His lawyer could have cross-examined the policeman and found out from him whether he had any grudge against the accused and how he happened to search the latter's house. From the testimony of the policeman the accused might have been enlightened as to how and by whom the revolver was placed in his house. Suppose that the policeman should say that his informant as to the presence of the revolver under the bed of the accused was a houseboy of the latter, and suppose that houseboy was really the one who planted the revolver because of some grievance he had against his master but that the latter had not suspected before that his houseboy had any revolver. In view of the revelation ofthe policeman he would have been able to investigate and ascertain that fact. In that way he could have satisfactorily explained how and by whom the revolver was placed under his bed. But under the procedure in question as outlined by the City Fiscal, the accused was of course utterly unable to do that and was consequently doomed to at least six years' imprisonment for a crime he had not committed. (d) Section 6 of the Ordinance in question provided: "The decisions of the special courts herein created shall be final except where the penalty imposed is death, in which case the records of the particular case shall be elevated en consulta to a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three members to be designated by the President of the Republic of the Philippines." Under our law of criminal procedure, which the military occupant was bound to respect unless absolutely prevented, all persons accused of any offense have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court. It is true that as a rule that right is statutory and may be withdrawn by the legislature except in certain cases where the right to appeal is provided in the Constitution itself, as in the cases involving life imprisonment and death penalty; but the question here is not whether the legislative department of the legitimate government has the power to abrogate that right but whether it was within the competence of the military occupant to do so. (e) In the instant case the penalty imposed upon the accused by the special court, after a summary trial, was life imprisonment, and he was denied the right to have that sentence reviewed by the Supreme Court, altho under subsection 4, section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, he could not have been deprived by law of that right. ( f ) Section 7 of the Ordinance suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons accused of or under investigation for any of the crimes and offenses enumerated in sections 1 and 2. The Constitution of the Commonwealth prohibits the suspension of that privilege except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion when the public safety requires it. The suspension by the ordinance was not motivated by any one of these cases but by the necessity for waging a campaign against certain classes of crimes; martial law was not declared; and the suspension of habeas corpus did not apply to all persons living in a specified territory (as should have been done if the public safety required such suspension) but only in those accused of or investigated for certain specified crimes or offenses. The result of such partial suspension was that persons accused of or under investigation for any of the offenses specified in sections 1 and 2 could be held in detention indefinitely, whereas persons accused of or under investigation for crimes other than those specified, such for example as theft, physical injuries, homicide, murder, and parricide, had the right to demand their release by habeas corpus after the lapse of six hours. The same discrimination holds true with reference to the other features already noted above, namely, unreasonable searches and seizures, summary trial, denial of the presumption of innocence, self-incrimination, and denial of the right to appeal. Such discrimination was unwarranted and unjust and was contrary to the concept of justice prevailing in all democratic countries, where every person is entitled to the equal protection of the laws. 3. It is apparent from the foregoing examination of the main features of the ordinance that while the methods thus adopted may not be unusual under totalitarian governments like those of the aggressor nations in the recent global war, they are strange and repugnant to the people of the democratic countries which united together to defeat said aggressors and "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and ofnations large and small, . . .and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." (Preamble Charter for Peace adopted by the United Nations at San Francisco, California, June 26, 1945.) The recent global war was a clash between two antagonistic ways of life, between facism and democracy. It would be strange indeed if this Court, which functions under a democratic government that fought with the other democratic nations in that war, should sanction or approve the way of life, against which that war was fought and won at the cost of millions of lives and untold sacrifices. 4. The case involves the interpretation not of constitutional but of international law, which "is based on usage and opinion"; and "he who in such a case bases his reasoning on high considerations of morality may succeed in resolving the doubt in accordance with humanity and justice." (Principles of International Law, Lawrence, 7th ed., pp. 12, 13.) We think the contentions for the petitioner against the validity of the ordinance in question are in accord with humanity and justice. Before concluding this opinion we deem it pertinent to comment on the remark of the City Fiscal that, as stated in its preamble, the ordinance in question was promulgated in response to "an urgent necessity for waging an immediate and relentless campaign against certain classes of crimes and offenses and expediting the trial and determination thereof in order to hasten the re-establishment of peace and order throughout the country and promote a feeling of security among the people conducive to the earlier return of normalcy in our national life." We concede that the objective of the author of the ordinance was commendable, but we think and in this we are supported by the actual result it was unattainable thru the means and methods prescribed in said ordinance. Peace and order and normalcy could not be restored unless the root cause of their disturbance were eliminated first. That cause was the presence in the country of the Japanese army, which wrecked our political, social, and economic structures, destroyed our means of communication, robbed the people of their food, clothing, and medicine and other necessities of life, ejected them from their own homes, punished and tortured innocent men and women, and otherwise made life unbearable. The relative rampancy of the crimes mentioned in said ordinance was but the effect of that cause. The cornering and hoarding of foodstuffs would not have occurred were it not for the scarcity produced by the seizures and requisitions made by the Japanese army and the disruption of our commerce and industries on account of the invasion. The possession of firearms was rendered desirable to many persons to defend themselves against or attack the invader. Robberies and other crimes against property increased as a result of hunger and privation to which the people were subjected by the rapacity of the Japanese. It was a delusion to expect peace and normalcy to return without eliminating the cause of their disturbance; and the eliminationof that cause meant the expulsion or destruction of the Japanese army in the Philippines an objective to which the ordinance was not addressed. So, even from the pointof view of the Filipino people and not of the Japanese army of occupation, the ordinance in question results untenable.
Having reached the conclusion that the enactment of the procedure embodied in said ordinance for the special court therein created was beyond the competence ofthe occupant, inasmuch as that procedure was inseparable from the first part of the ordinance which creates the special court and prescribes the jurisdiction thereof, we are constrained to declare the whole ordinance null and void ab initio. Consequently the proceedings in said court which resulted in the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are also void. PARAS, J., concurring: Charged with robbery, the petitioner herein was found guilty and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment. He commenced to serve the term on August 21, 1944. Inasmuch as he was a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary, the basis of the information was Act No. 65, passed during the Japanese-sponsored Republic of the Philippines and amending certain articles of the Revised Penal Code. The trial was held by the existing Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which was authorized to conduct proceedings in a special manner. (Ordinance No. 7 of the "Republic.") After General of the Army Douglas MacArthur had issued the Proclamation dated October 23, 1944, the Act under which the petitioner was charged and convicted stands nullified, and the original provisions of the Revised Penal Code restored. By virtue of article 22 of the said Code, "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication ofsuch laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." In the absence of other details, it may here be assumed that the offense committed is that defined in article 294, paragraph 5, which provides as follows: "Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: "The penalty of prision correccional to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases." In accordance with the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Acts Nos. 4103 and 4225), the maximum of the minimum penalty that can be imposed is six months of arresto mayor. This Court has already dismissed cases wherein the defendants were charged with the violation of laws in force at the time of the commission and trial of the crime, after said laws had been repealed by subsequent legislation, People vs. Moran (44 Phil., 287); People vs. Tamayo (61 Phil., 226), and also repeatedly released on writs ofhabeas corpus prisoners who, although sentenced to suffer long terms of imprisonment, were given the benefit of subsequent legislation either repealing the statute under which they had been convicted or modifying the same by imposing lesser penalties, Escalante vs. Santos (56 Phil., 483); Directo vs. Director of Prisons (56 Phil., 692). Prisoners who behave well are almost always liberated upon the expiration of the minimum penalty fixed in the judgments of conviction or within a reasonable time thereafter. In the present case, there being no information that the petitioner has acted otherwise, and having served more than double the period of the minimum penalty that could be imposed upon him, he should be released. As this is the effect of the decision of the majority, I concur in the result. DE JOYA, J., concurring: The principal question involved in this case is the validity of the judicial proceedings held in criminal case No. 66 of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, established in the City of Manila, during Japanese occupation, under the authority of Ordinance No. 7, issued by the President of the so-called Philippine Republic, and the effect on said proceedings of the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944. In said criminal case, herein petitioner was accused of the crime of robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment, on August 21, 1944. There can be no doubt that the government established in this country by the Commander in Chief of Japanese Imperial forces, under the name of the Philippine Executive Commission, was a de facto government, as already held by this Court in civil case G.R. No. L-5, entitled Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, decided on September 17, 1945 (p. 113, ante). Said government possessed all the characteristics of a de facto government, as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the following language: "But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated agovernment of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force." (MacLeod vs. United States [1913], 229 U. S., 416.) Under a de facto government, the courts of the country, under military occupation, should be kept open, and wherever practicable, the subordinate officers of the local administration should be allowed to continue in their functions, supported by the military force of the invader, because the responsibility of maintaining peace and public order, and of punishing crime, falls directly upon the commander in chief of the occupying forces. And in the performance of this duty, he may make use of the local courts, wholly or in part; or he may proclaim martial law (Davis, Elements of International Law [3d ed.], pp. 330-332). In occupied territory, the conquering power has a right to displace the pre-existing authority, and to assume to such extent as it may deem proper the exercise by itself of all the powers and functions of government. It may appoint all the necessary officers and clothe them with designated powers, according to its pleasure. It may prescribe the revenues to be paid, and apply them to its own use or otherwise. It may do anything necessary to strengthen itself and weaken the enemy. There is no limit to the powers that may be exerted in such cases, save those which are found in the laws and customs and usages of war (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How., 164; Leitensdorfervs. Webb, 20 Id., 176; The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. [U.S.], 129; New Orleans vs. Steamship Co. [1874], 20 Wall. [U.S.], 287). It is generally the better course for the inhabitants of the territory, under military occupation, that they should continue to carry on the ordinary administration under the invader; but the latter has no right to force them to do so. If they decline, his only rights, and it is also his duty, is to replace them by appointees of his own, so far as necessary for maintaining order and the continuance of the daily life of the territory: other purposes, as those of the superior judicial offices, can bide their time (Westlake, International Law, Parr II, 2d ed., pp. 121-123). Though the fact of occupation imposes no duties upon the inhabitants of the occupied territory, the invader himself is not left equally free. As it is a consequence ofhis acts that the regular government of the country is suspended, he is bound to take whatever means are required for the security of public order; and as his presence, so long as it is based upon occupation, is confessedly temporary, and his rights of control spring only from the necessity of he case, he is also bound to alter or override the existing laws as little as possible (Hall, International Law, 6th ed., p. 476). The government established here under the Philippine Executive Commission was more in consonance with the general practice among civilized nations, in establishing governments for the maintenance of peace and order and the administration of justice, in territories of the enemy under military occupation; because said government was of a temporary character. The government subsequently established under the so-called Philippine Republic, with a new constitution, was also of the nature of a de facto government, in accordance with International Law, as it was established under the authority of the military occupant and supported by the armed forces of the latter. But it was somewhat different from that established under the Philippine Executive Commission, because the former apparently, at least, had the semblance of permanency, which, however, is unusual in the practices among civilized nations, under similar circumstances. Under military occupation, the original national character of the soil and of the inhabitants of the territory remains unaltered; and although the invader is invested with quasi-sovereignty, which gives him a claim as of right to the obedience of the conquered population, nevertheless, its exercise is limited by the qualification which has gradually become established, that he must not, as a general rule, modify the permanent institutions of the country (Hall, International Law, 6th ed., p. 460). The Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted at the The Hague in 1899, lays down (Arts. 42, 43) definite rules concerning military authority over the territory of a hostile state. In addition to codifying the accepted law, it provides that the occupant must respect, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. It will thus be readily seen that the municipal law of the invaded state continues in force, in so far as it does not affect the hostile occupant infavorably. The regular courts of the occupied territory continue to act in cases not affecting the military occupation; and it is not customary for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands, as it is easier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials, and also because the latter are more competent to administer the laws of the territory; and the military occupant, therefore, generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial officers as are willing to serve under him, subjecting them only to supervision by the military authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by him (Young vs. United States, 97 U.S., 39; 24 Law. ed., 992; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S., 509; 24 Law. ed., 1118; Macleod vs. United States, 229 U.S., 416; 33 Sup. Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260; Taylor, International Law, secs. 576, 578; Wilson, International Law, pp. 331-337; Hall, International Law, 6th ed. (1909), pp. 464, 465, 475, 476; Lawrence, International Law, 7th ed., pp. 412- 413; Davis, Elements of International Law, 3rd ed., pp. 330-332, 335; Holland, International Law, pp. 356-57, 359; Westlake, International Law, Prt II, War, 2d ed., pp. 121-123).
The judicial proceedings conducted, under the municipal law of the territory, before the court established by the military occupant, are generally considered legal and valid, even after the government established by the invader had been displaced by the legitimate government of said territory. Thus the judgment rendered by the Confederate courts, during the Civil War, merely settling the rights of private parties actually within their jurisdiction, not tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United States, nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion, had been declared legal, valid and binding (Coleman vs.Tennessee, 97 U.S., 509; 24 Law. ed., 1118; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; Horn vs.Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; 21 Law. ed., 660; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 249; 22 law. ed., 371). When the military forces of the Confederate states were destroyed, their government perished, and with it all its enactments. But the legislative acts of the several States forming the Confederacy stood on a different ground, and so far as they did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights ofcitizens, under the Federal constitution, they were considered as legal, valid and binding (Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 177; 24 Law. ed., 716; Ford vs. Surget, 97 U.S., 594; 24 Law. ed., 1018; United States vs. Ins. Co., 22 Wall. [U.S.], 99; 22 Law. ed., 816; Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99 U.S., 188; Johnson vs. Atlantic G & W. I. Transit Co., 156 U.S., 618; 15 Sup. Ct., 520). In a later case, the Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed that the judicial and legislative acts of the rebellious States, as de facto governments, should be respected by the courts, if they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the national government, and did not impair the rights ofcitizens under the Federal Constitution. (Baldy vs. Hunter, 171 U.S., 388; 18 Sup. Ct., 890; 43 Law. ed., 208.) Under the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944, declaring null and void all laws, regulations and processes issued and promulgated by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation, said Ordinance No. 7 promulgated on March 8, 1944, creating the Court ofSpecial and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, ostensibly for the speedy reestablishment of peace and order, and Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, prescribing summary rules of procedure, and other allied laws, such as Act No. 65 of the puppet republic, prescribing heavier penalties, became null and void, once the Japanese armies in the Philippines had been defeated, as with them the de facto governments, successively established under them, perished, and with them all their enactments and processes of a hostile character. But there are other considerations equally important why judicial proceedings held and conducted before the courts established by said de facto governments, under laws promulgated by them, should be declared null and void, without violating, in the least, settled principles, judicial precedents or public policy. Said ordinance No. 7 adopted as integral parts thereof said Executive Order No. 157, as well as said Act. No. 65 of the National Assembly of the puppet republic, prescribing exceptionally heavy penalties for the crimes enumerated therein. The principal crimes mentioned in said Ordinance No. 7 and Act No. 65 of the puppet republic and other allied laws are illegal possession of firearms, robbery, violations of food-control laws, falsification, malversation and bribery; and it was under said laws that herein petitioner was prosecuted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the crime of robbery. The penalty of life imprisonment or death for robbery was aimed principally at the underground forces resolute and determined to seize and remove stores of food provisions, whenever possible, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy. The penalty of twelve years' imprisonment for illegal possession of firearms was directed mainly against those underground forces, that had been receiving arms from the forces of liberation across the seas. Violations of food-control laws were included and used as a pretext and justification for the seizure and confiscation of food provisions so badly needed by the invader. And the inclusion under said Ordinance No. 7 of the crime of bribery and others was used as a cloak to conceal its venom and make said law look innocent. By the imposition of excessive penalties, by the denial of the remedy of habeas corpus, by compelling the accused to testify against themselves, and by denying them the right of appeal to the highest court of the land, except where the death penalty was imposed, and by its summary procedure, said Ordinance No. 7 and the other allied laws impaired and defeated the just and legal rights of Filipino citizens under the Commonwealth Constitution, and the supremacy of the authority of the legitimate Government. Under said laws, the persons accused were deprived of liberty without due process of law. In the language of this Court, "the phrase 'due process of law' used in the Philippine Bill should receive a comprehensive interpretation, and no procedure should be treated as unconstitutional which makes due provision for the trial of alleged criminal before a court of competent jurisdiction, for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required to meet, for giving him an opportunity to be heard, for the deliberation and judgment of the court, and for an appeal from such judgment to the highest tribunal" (United States vs. Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122). In their conception, in their purpose and mode of enforcement and execution said laws were hostile to the authority of the Commonwealth Government and that ofthe United States of America; as they had been promulgated in furtherance of the war aims of the enemy, and they are, therefore, of a political character and complexion. Those repressive laws were aimed at the men and women who had kept the faith, and whose heroes and martyrs now lie in graves still unknown and whose names remain unsung; but whose heroic efforts and sacrifices have made immortal the legends of Filipino resistance, and made possible our participation in the councils of free and liberty-loving peoples and nations. Said laws are contrary to the principles of Democracy, championed by North America, whose gigantic efforts and heroic sacrifices have vindicated human rights, human dignity and human freedom, and consecrated them anew all over the earth with the generous blood of her children. They violate the fundamental principles ofJustice for which civilized Mankind stands, under the benign leadership of America, which has saved the World from the claws of Totalitarianism and given all the nations ofthe earth a new birth as well as a new charter of freedom, to enable each and everyone to live a nobler and more worthy life and realize the justice and prosperity of the future. For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the dispositive part of the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Feria. PERFECTO, J., concurring: On October 21, 1944, petitioner William F. Peralta began to serve, in the Muntinlupa Prison Camp, a sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created by Ordinance No. 7 issued by President Laurel of the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese regime, and now seeks a writ of habeas corpus in order that his liberty may be restored to him, contending that said Ordinance No. 7 was null and void ab initio because it was of a political complexion and its provisions are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Petitioner alleges that sometime in the month of September, 1943, he joined the Constabulary forces as a private, against his will, and, before joining it, he was for several times arrested and maltreated as a guerilla member, he being then a minor only 17 years old, and that he was prosecuted, not because he committed any crime, but because he joined the guerilla organization, deserted the Constabulary forces, and followed political and military activities in open allegiance to the Commonwealth Government and the United States of America. The Solicitor General, appearing in behalf of respondent Director of Prisons, answered the petition agreeing that the acts and proceedings taken and had before said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction should be denied force and efficacy, and therefore, recommended that the writ prayed for be granted. At the hearing held on September 21 and 22, 1945, there appeared to argue the First Assistant Solicitor General, impugning the validity of said Ordinance No. 7, and the City Fiscal of Manila, as amicus curi, who sustained the validity of the said Ordinance and the proceeding by virtue of which petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. I. ORDINANCE NO. 7 AND PROCESSES UNDER IT NULLIFIED BY THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL MACARTHUR On October 23, 1944, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the Philippine-American Forces, which fought in Bataan and later liberated the whole Philippines, as an aftermath of the liberation, issued a proclamation declaring: "1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; "2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and "3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government of the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control."
It appears that Ordinance No. 7 in question has been issued under the Japanese regime and that the judicial process under which petitioner has been sentenced to life imprisonment, having been held in a court not belonging to the Commonwealth of the Philippines but organized and established under the authority of the enemy, became null and void and without effect since October 23, 1944, by virtue of the above-quoted October Proclamation of General MacArthur. We have explained at length our position as to the effects of said October Proclamation in our dissenting opinion in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. R. No. L-5, p. 153, ante), and we deem it unnecessary to repeat what we stated in said opinion. It is fortunate that all the members of the Supreme Court arrived at a unanimous conclusion as to the absolute nullity of the process under which petitioner is now being held in prison. The shocking character of the provisions of Ordinance No. 7 and the processes held under it show once more how General MacArthur was absolutely right and justified in issuing the October Proclamation. There are indications that more processes held under the Japanese regime will come to our knowledge, revealing strong grounds for their annulment, justifying, like the process here in question, the wisdom of the decision of General MacArthur in nullifying in a sweeping manner all judicial processes held during enemy occupation. The October Proclamation is, besides, in keeping with the following official statement of the President of the United States: "On the fourteenth of this month, a puppet government was set up in the Philippine Islands with Jose P. Laurel, formerly a justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, as 'president.' Jorge Vargas, formerly a member of the Philippine commonwealth Cabinet and Benigno Aquino, also formerly a member of that cabinet, were closely associated with Laurel in this movement. The first act of the new puppet regime was to sign a military alliance with Japan. The second act was a hypocritical appeal for American sympathy which was made in fraud and deceit, and was designed to confuse and mislead the Filipino people. "I wish to make it clear that neither the former collaborationist 'Philippine Executive Commission' nor the present 'Philippine Republic' has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United States. . . . "Our sympathy goes out to those who remain loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth that great majority of the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy. . . . "October 23, 1943. "FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT "President of the United States"
(From U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1943, pp. 93, 94.). Putting aside the October Proclamation, by a mere perusal of the ordinance in question, we will see immediately how such law and the processes held under it are incompatible with the fundamental principles and essential safeguards in criminal procedure, universally recognized in civilized modern nations and how such ordinance and processes can only be justified by a retrogressive and reactionary mentality developed under the social, cultural, and political atmosphere of the era of darkness. II. VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Section 5 of Ordinance No. 7 provides that cases arising under it shall follow the summary procedure provided in Act No. 65 of the Laurel Philippine Republic, which, in turn, is the same as that established by Chapter II of Executive Order NO. 157 of the Chairman of the Vargas Philippine Executive Commission, dated May 18, 1943. Under said procedure, "search warrants may be issued by the court or by any prosecuting officer, authorizing peace officers to search for and seize any articles or objects described in the warrant, including those which may be regarded as evidence of an offense under this order even if such articles or objects are not included among those described in section 2, Rule 122, of the Rules of Court." This provision is repugnant to the Filipino sense of right in the matter of warrants of search and seizure, senseof right which has been clearly and definitely stereotyped in the following words of our fundamental law: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 3, Constitution of the Philippines.) This constitutional provision is violated by the summary, unreasonable, and arbitrary procedure provided under the authority of the ordinance in question:. (1) By authorizing "any prosecuting officer" to issue search warrants, when under our Constitution such search warrants should be issued only by a judge; (2) By trespassing the limits established by section 2, Rule 122, of the Rules of Court, considered as a necessary element to make the warrant reasonable; (3) By authorizing the search and seizure of articles or objects not described in the warrant, which is the real meaning of the words "including those which may be regarded as evidence of an offense under this Ordinance." III. DISCRIMINATORY AND INIQUITOUS SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Section 7 of Ordinance No. 7 in question provides that "the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus are hereby suspended with respect to persons accused of, or under investigation for, any of the crimes and offenses enumerated in sections 1 and 2 hereof." This provision is also violative of one of the fundamental guarantees established in the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides that the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended only in case of "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" and only "when the public safety requires it." "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist." (Art. III, sec. 1 No. 14, Constitution of the Philippines.) Again, it is evident that the ordinance in question is repugnant to the deep sense of right of our people. It is so, not only because it suspends the privilege of the writof habeas corpus, without the circumstances which can only justify said suspension, but because it flagrantly violates the fundamental principle of equality before the law, by depriving the accused, in cases falling under the ordinance in question, of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which is not denied to the accused in all other cases: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 1, Constitution of the Philippines.) IV. VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST SELF- INCRIMINATION Under section 18 of Executive Order No. 157, above mentioned, "the accused or his representative may be examined by the court, and with the permission of the court, by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or unfavorable to him or his principal." (Italics ours.) It is also provided that "statements made by the accused, his co- accused, or the representative of the accused or a person acting in a similar capacity, irrespective ofthe circumstances under which they were made, shall be admissible in evidence if material to the issue." (Italics ours.) Under section 21 of Executive Order No. 157, after arraignment and plea, "the judge shall interrogate the accused . . . as to facts and circumstances of the case in order to clarify the points in dispute and those which are admitted." In the same section it is also provided that "refusal of the accused to answer any questions made or allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable to him." (Italics ours.) Under the same section the absence of an accused or of his representative "shall not be a ground for interrupting the proceedings or attacking the validity of the judgment." From the foregoing, it appears: (1) That the accused may be examined by the court or any prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or unfavorable to him; (2) That the refusal of the accused to answer may be considered unfavorable to him; (3) That statements made by the accused, "irrespective of the circumstances under which they were made" (that is , even third degree procedure, or exacted through brutal kempei tortures), shall be admissible in evidence; (4) That not only the accused, but "his representative" (his lawyer, whose personal security was jeopardized under the Japanese regime), may be examined by the court or by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer, as if said representative or attorney is facing the same criminal prosecution instituted against his client; (5) That the statement made by said representative or attorney, although exacted under duress, intimidation, or torture, shall be admissible in evidence; (6) That statements made by any person acting in a similar capacity as a representative of the accused which may be a relative or a friend or, perhaps, just a mere acquaintance, or even an impostor who might pose as a representative to assure the doom of the accused, "irrespective of the circumstances under which they were made (that is, even if made in the absence of the accused, or in the same circumstances under which masked spies decreed the death of innocent citizens pointed by them during zoning concentrations), shall be admissible in evidence; (7) That trial shall proceed in the absence of the accused; (8) That trial shall proceed in the absence of his attorney or other representative.
It is evident that the procedure established violates the following provisions of our fundamental code: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf." (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 17, Constitution of the Philippines.) "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 18, Idem.) The procedure is so revolting, so nauseating, and so opposed to human nature, that it takes a real courage to keep our equanimity while we are compelled to analyze it. It is beyond our comprehension how a man, endowed with reason, could devise such an execrable system of judicial procedure, which is but a shameless mockery ofthe administration of justice. We must be very careful to retain zealously the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. We must not forge that constitutional guarantee was acquired as a result of protest against all inquisitorial and third degree procedures. We must not forge how, not very long ago, in the thirteen colonies of America, alleged witches were burned at the stake, as a means of compelling them to confess their fantastic compacts with the devil. We must not forget now an institution created in the twelfth century was the cause of so much tortures and sufferings, and that the terroristic menace of its rakes was abolished in Spain, and therefore in the Philippines, only in 1834. We must not forget that during normal times, under the twentieth century lights, just before the last global war started, in the United States of America and in the Philippines, denunciations of third degree procedures employed by agents of the law was often heard. This very Supreme Court, not only once, had to deal with cases where such tactics were conclusively proved. Even today, among criminal cases we have under consideration, there is evidence of confessions exacted through cruel and brutal means. No matter what merits can be found, from the theoretical point of view, in the arguments of those who are championing the suppression of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, the undeniable reality of human experience shows conclusively the absolute need of such guarantee if justice must be served. Even with the existence of such guarantee, there are officers of the law who cannot resist temptation of using their power to compel, through third degree methods, innocent or guilty persons to admit involuntarily real or imaginary offenses. Let us allow changes tending to nullify the protection against self-incrimination, and no man, however innocent he may be, shall be secure in his person, in his liberty, in his honor, in his life. V. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF APPEAL TRAMPLED UPON In section 6 of Ordinance No. 7, it is provided that "the decision of the special courts herein created shall be final except where the penalty imposed is death, in which case the records of the particular case shall be elevated en consulta to a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three members to be designated by the President of the Republic of the Philippines." This provision is a clear violation of the fundamental right of appeal, constitutionally guaranteed to all accused in the Philippines. Under the Constitution of the Philippines, all accused are entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) In all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulations is in question. (Art. VIII, sec. 2, No. 1, Constitutionof the Philippines.) (2) In all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (Art. VIII, sec. 2, No. 2, Idem.) (3) In all cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial courts is in issue. (Art. VIII, sec. 2, No. 3, Idem.) (4) In all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. (Art. VIII, sec. 2, No. 4, Idem.) (5) In all cases in which an error or question of law is involved. (Art. VIII, sec. 2, No. 5, Idem.) Before the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, it was the prevailing theory in judicial decisions that the right of appeal is not a fundamental one, but it is a mere privilege or mere statutory grant. The drafters of our Constitution, taught by the unerring lessons of human experience, came to the conclusion that mistake is one of the most irretrievable human weaknesses. The drafters of our Constitution, therefore, considered it necessary to establish constitutional guarantees to reduce to its minimum the effects of such innate human weakness by providing that appeal to the highest tribunal of the land may be enjoyed by any accused who, under the specific provisions of the Constitution, believed himself to be the victim of a wrong in any inferior court. The fact that the provisions of section 2, of Article VIII, of the Constitution, instead of stating that the accused shall not be denied of the right of appeal in the cases mentioned therein, provides that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ oferror as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts, in the specified cases, does not impair nor diminish the fundamental character of the right of appeal of the accused to the Supreme Court. The provisions of section 2, of Article VIII, of the Constitution, have been enacted by our Constitutional Convention, not for the benefit of the Supreme Court, but for the benefit and well- being of the people. In fact, the Supreme Court is just one of the instrumentalities created by the Constitution in the service of the people. The Supreme Court is not an entity or institution whose rights and privileges must be constitutionally guaranteed. It is only a means. It is one of the means considered necessary by our Constitution to better serve the supreme interest of the people. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court of the United States itself declared that the elimination of said tribunal is not incompatible with the existence of a governmentof laws. In a case of denaturalization wherein the Government of the United States sought to deprive a person of his American citizenship, on the ground that the 1928 platform of the Communist Party of the United States, to which the respondent belonged, advocated the abolition of the Supreme Court, of the Senate and of the veto power of the President, and replacement of congressional districts with "councils of workers" in which legislative and executive powers would be united, the Federal Supreme Court declared: "These would indeed be significant changes in our governmental structure changes which it is safe to say are not desired by the majority of the people in this country but whatever our personal views, as judges we cannot say that a person who advocates their adoption through peaceful and constitutional means is not in fact attached to the Constitution those institutions are not enumerated as necessary in the government's test of 'general political philosophy' and it is conceivable that 'orderly liberty' could be maintained without them. The Senate has not gone free of criticism and one object of the Seventeenth Amendment was to make it more responsive to the popular will. The unicameral legislature is not unknown in the country. It is true that this Court has played a large part in the unfolding of the constitutional plan (sometimes too much so in the opinion of some observers), but we would be arrogant indeed if we presume that a government of laws, with protection for minority groups, would be impossible without it. Like other agencies of government, this Court at various times in its existence has not escaped the shafts of critics whose sincerity and attachment to the Constitution is beyond question critics who have accused it of assuming functions of judicial review not intended to be conferred upon it, or of abusing those functions to thwart the popular will, and who have advocated various remedies taking a wide range." (Schneiderman vs. United States of America, June 21, 1943. VI. ABRIDGMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is evidently abridged in the summary procedure in criminal cases under Ordinance No. 7: (1) By the fact that the accused therein are victims of search warrants specially provided for them, where the guarantees against unreasonableness in search warrants issued against other accused are specially eliminated. (2) By depriving the accused, under Ordinance No. 7, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus enjoyed by the accused in other cases. (3) By depriving the accused, under Ordinance No. 7, of the fundamental right of appeal in all cases, except when sentence of death is imposed. (4) By discriminating against the accused, under Ordinance No. 7, where the right of appeal is retained for them, that is, in cases where the sentence imposed is death, by entrusting the power to revise said sentence to a small minority of the Supreme Court, under the Japanese regime, and a minority of three justices to be specially called out by the President of the Laurel Philippine Republic, undoubtedly with the evident purpose of assuring the confirmation of the conviction of the accused, and to make the appeal en consulta just an empty gesture to make the situation of the accused more pitiful by lengthening his days of agony. (5) By placing the accused, in the cases in question, under the sword of Damocles of an unfavorable presumption, should he refuse to answer any question that the court or any prosecuting officer might propound to him.
Under our constitution, no one shall be deprived of the "equal protection of the laws." (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 1, Constitution of the Philippines.) VII. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IN ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION VIOLATED Since the American flag began to fly over our soil, the fundamental guarantee that in all criminal prosecution the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt, has been implanted in our country to remain forever. That guarantee was consecrated in our Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf." (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 17, Constitution of the Philippines.) This guarantee is undoubtedly violated when, in the summary procedure established by Ordinance No. 7, it is provided that the refusal of the accused to answer any question, propounded by the court or any prosecuting officer, " may raise unfavorable presumption against him." If we have to keep democracy in our country, we must be vigilant in upholding the constitutional principle that all persons shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. This principle is the opposite of that prevailing under autocracies, or under facist or totalitarian regimes. During the Japanese occupation, all persons who might fall under the suspicion of any Japanese of their spies and lackeys, were presumed to be guilty of any imaginary crime until they were able to convince their victimizers of the contrary, beyond any reasonable doubt. Even then, they were submitted to preventive tortures and long months of imprisonment, just in case they might think later ofcommitting any offense against the Japanese or their collaborators. VIII. ORDINANCE NO. 7 VIOLATED THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1899 In the convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land, adopted by the Hague in 1899, it is provided that the military occupant must respect the laws in force in the occupied country, unless absolutely prevented. (Arts. 42 and 43.) This provision of the Convention has been flagrantly violated when, under the enemy occupation, the Laurel Philippine Republic enacted Ordinance No. 7 which suspended our laws, including the fundamental one, by substantially subverting the judicial procedures in the special criminal cases instituted under said ordinance. For this reason, said ordinance, being violative of international law, was null and void ab initio. Under international law, under the most elemental principles of law, the legitimate government, once restored to its own territory, after expelling the enemy invader, enjoys the absolute freedom of not recognizing or of nullifying any and all acts of the invader, including those internationally legal ones. The situation is exactly the same as that of the owner of a house who can do anything in it that pleases him, after expelling the bandit who was able to usurp its possession for a while. General MacArthur exercised correctly that power by the sweeping nullification decreed in his October Proclamation. But even without the October Proclamation, the judicial process maybe it is better to say injudicial process which resulted in the imprisonment of petitioner, must be shorn of all effects because it had taken place under the authority of an ordinance which was null and void ab initio. IX. THE DECISION CONVICTING THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN RENDERED UNDER FOREIGN AUTHORITY IS UNENFORCEABLE The decision by which petitioner William F. Peralta was convicted and is being confined for life having been rendered by a tribunal created, functioning, and acting under the authority of a foreign State, the Emperor of the Imperial Government of Japan, is unenforceable. It has, therefore, the nature of a foreign decision or judgment. For that reason, it is unenforceable within the Philippines or under the Commonwealth, as we have shown in our opinion in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G.R. No. L-5, p. 153, ante). Said decision, having been rendered under Ordinance No. 7, which was null and void ab initio, carries the same vice as the ordinance under which it was rendered. But even admitting arguendo that said decision is valid, because it is so under international law, and is not included in the nullification decreed by General Douglas MacArthur, still it cannot be enforced, being a foreign decision. A foreign decision can only be enforced through the institution of an action before our tribunals. Even decisions of a court of the United States or of any of its States territories can be enforced in the Philippines only by the institution of an action or special proceeding before our own courts. This theory is confirmed by sections 47 and 48, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, which read: "SEC. 47. Effect of record of a court of the United States. The effect of a judicial record of a court of the United States or of a court of one of the States or territories of the United States, is the same in the Philippines as in the United States, or in the State or territory where it was made, except that it can only be enforced here by an action or special proceeding, and except, also, that the authority of a guardian, or executor, or administrator does not extend beyond the jurisdiction of the Government under which he was invested with his authority. SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment, is as follows: "(a) In case of a judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; "(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." X. THE STUNNING FACTS REVEALED IN THE REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS At the hearing of this case, respondent Director of Prisons was required to submit statistical data concerning the number of prisoners and the various crimes for which they were convicted by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. In submitting said statistical data, the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondent, calls our attention to the fact that, out of the 92 prisoners committed by said courts to the Bureau of Prisons for confinement, fifty-five (55), that is more than one-half, were convicted of illegal possession of firearms, and that only 3 are now actually in confinement serving sentences, among them the petitioner in this proceeding, thus dissipating the unfounded fear entertained by the City Fiscal of Manila, to the effect that a pronouncement by this Supreme Tribunal that the sentences of the courts in question are null and void, will signify the release of hundreds of criminals, whose liberty and mixing with society will endanger public peace and order. Of the other two remaining prisoners serving sentence, one has been committed for evasion of service of sentence, and the other for illegal possession of firearms. Of the 55 prisoners convicted for illegal possession of firearms, 25 died, 23 were released, and 6 escaped, and this is the reason why only one remains in confinement. It is striking that so many prisoners died, 25 of those convicted for illegal possession of firearms, that is, almost 50% of them, and 33 of the total of 94 prisonerscommitted, or more than one-third of them. This unusual and shocking percentage of mortality is worth inquiring into and, certainly, cannot be counted very favorably to judicial proceedings which eventually lead to such wholesale death, if not outright massacre. The fact that a big number of the prisoners, 21 of them, were able to escape, was not explained to us. Is it reasonable to surmise, from the ruthless cruelty of the proceedings and of the penalties imposed, which exacted from the mouth of the First Assistant Solicitor General, who appeared to argue the case in behalf of the respondent, the adjective "ferocious"' that the wardens themselves, moved by pity, directly or indirectly helped the escape? More than one-third of the prisoners committed by the said courts in confinement to the Bureau of Prisons, that is, 33 of them died. May we ask if they died because they were executed? Of those who died, one was convicted of profiteering in rice, one of robbery, one of kidnapping of minor, one of violation of certain sections of Act No. 66, four of crimes against public order, and 25 of possession of firearms. If all of them were executed by virtue of sentences rendered by the courts in question, that fact does not speak very highly of their proceedings. If the accused died by natural death, there must be something physically or morally fatal in said proceedings. If a tree must be judged by the fruits it bears, how shall we judge proceedings so deadly, so fatal, so wantonly inhuman as the proceedings had in the special courts in question? The City Fiscal of Manila exerted great efforts to show that the fact that in the proceedings in question "the refusal of the accused to answer any question made or allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable to him," does not violate the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. He even goes to the extent ofmaintaining the theory that such constitutional guarantee is not essential for the protection of the substantial rights of an accused. His argument centered on the alleged freedom of the accused to refuse or not to refuse to answer any question made or allowed by the court, alleging that, if the accused chooses to refuse to answer, the court cannot compel him to answer under menace of punishment for contempt or through any other coercive or minatory measures.
The City Fiscal seems to labor under the belief that the fact the silence of the accused "may be considered unfavorable to him," is of no consequence at all. Such belief can logically be entertained alone by ignoring completely the lessons of experience in human conduct. If the refusal to answer can be considered unfavorably to the accused, is not that the same as placing him on the hard predicament of choosing between testifying self-incriminatingly and risking the fatal effects of a legal presumption of guilt? Is not that the same as placing him between the two steel cages of a dilemma: self- incrimination or presumption of guilt? Is not that the same as placing him between Scylla and Charybdis, between a dagger and a wall? Either way, he will always find himself under the inexorable sword of Damocles of sure punishment, whether he testifies or refuses to testify. It is not impossible to open a debate upon the abstract question whether the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should or should not remain. But the value of such a moot question, for purposes of this case, is nil. The constitutional guarantee had to be adopted as a protest against inquisitorial method of the past, when accused and suspects were submitted to the most brutal torture to compel them to confess real or imaginary crimes. That past is not far away. It seems that we are still smelling the stench of human flesh burned in the stakes, where suspected witches suffered iniquitous death. There is no doubt that the procedure in question shows the purpose of pandering to the most flagitious doctrines in criminal proceedings. The transgressions of the bill of rights in all its phases cannot be hidden even to a chela in constitutional law. It is the very negation of the administration of justice. Such procedure has absolutely no place in the framework of our judicial system. We will feel mere whifflers in our professed convictions, principles, and creed, if we should permit ourselves to fall into the weakness of abetting it even for a moment, which could only happen once the flambeau of reason has ceased completely to burn. No one but the truckling lackeys of the arrogant enemy could have the servility of applauding the implantation of the criminal procedure in question. All arguments and dissertations are useless to conceal the real fact. Behind and under said criminal process stealthily crawls and trundles the Nippon psychosis, like a cobra with fangs overflowing with venom. To ferret it out from the hole where it lurks, waiting for its victims, and crush its head with one hammer blow, is an imperative measure of national defense. XI. THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED ,AS A MATTER OF ABSOLUTE RIGHT, TO IMMEDIATE RELEASE. After showing the absolute nullity of the judicial process under which petitioner has been convicted to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, the inevitable consequence is that he is entitled, as a matter of absolute right, to be immediately released, so that he can once again enjoy a life of freedom, which is the natural boon to law- abiding residents of our country, and of which he was unjustly deprived through means most abhorrent to human conscience. We must not hesitate for one moment to do our duty in this case. The sooner we comply with it, the better. The process and judgment under which petitioner has been convicted and is now undergoing an unjust imprisonment, is one of the hateful vestiges left in our country by the moral savagery of a people spiritually perverted and debased. The seriousness of this matter cannot be viewed with insouciance. We must not lose time to wipe out such vestiges if we must protect ourselves against their poisonous effects in our political, social and cultural patrimony. We must erase those vestiges if we want to keep immune from all germs of decay the democratic institutions which are the pride of our people and country, under which we are enjoying the blessings of freedom and with which we hope to assure the well-being and happiness of the unending generations who will succeed us in the enjoyment of the treasures accumulated by a bountiful nature in this Pearl of the Orient. If we allow such vestiges to remain we are afraid that some historian may write about Philippine democracy, Philippine race, and Philippine culture, what, on ancient art, Hegel said in the "Phenomenology of the Spirit", according to Kohler, the greatest work of genius that the nineteenth century has produced: The statutes set up are corpses in stone, whence the animating soul has flown; while the hymns of praise are words from which all belief has gone. The tablesof the gods are bereft of spiritual food and drink, and from his game sand festivals, man no more receives the joyful sense of his unity with the Divine Being. The works of the muse lack the force and energy of the Spirit which derived the certainty and assurance of itself just from the crushing ruin of gods and men. They are themselves now just what they are for us beautiful fruit broken off the tree, a kindly fate has passed on those works to us, as a maiden might offer such fruit off a tree. It is not their actual life as they exist, that is given us, not the tree that bore them, not the earth and the elements, which constituted their substance, nor the climate that determined their constitutive character, nor the change of seasons which controlled the process of their growth. So, too, it is not their living world that fate preserves and gives us with those works of ancient art, not the spring and summer of that ethical life in which they bloomed and ripened, but the veiled remembrance alone of this reality." Our sense of national self-preservation compels us, as an imperative duty, not only to restore immediately the petitioner to his personal liberty, but, by all possible means, to obliterate even the memory of the inquisitorial summary procedure depicted in the present case. Such procedure exhibits either inversion, retroversion, subversion, or perversion of elemental human concepts. It ignores completely and debases the high purposesof a judicial procedure. It represents a hylistic ideology which proclaims the supremacy of the state force over fundamental human rights. We must never allow the neck ofour people to be haltered by the lethal string of that ideology. It is a virus that must be eliminated before it produces the logical disaster. Such ideology is a cancerous excrescence that must be sheared, completely extirpated, from the live tissues of our body politic, if the same must be saved. We cannot understand how any one can justify the summary process in question under the principles embodied in our Constitution. To profess attachment to those principles and, at the same time, to accept and justify such kind of criminal miscarriage of justice, is just sheer hypocrisy. It is a repetition of what Seneca did when, after preaching moral virtues, justified without any compunction the act of Nero, the sanguinary Roman Emperor, of murdering in cold blood his own mother. It is reproducing the crooked mentality of Torquemada, who, upon the pretext of combating and persecuting heresy to save souls from hell, conceived the diabolical idea of condemning their victims to an advanced version of hell in this life, and among those who suffered under the same spirit of intolerance and bigotry which was its very essence are counted some of the greatest human characters, such as Galileo, Giordano Bruno, and Girolamo Savonarola. That procedure might find justification in the thick heads of the Avars. Huns, Vandals, and Teutons, or in the stratified mentality of Japanese cullions, but not in a healthy mind of a cultured person of modern times. To allow any vestige ofsuch procedure to remain is tantamount to reviving the situation during which our citizens endured sleepless nights in constant fear of the hobnail terror stalking in the darkness, when their personal security and their life were hanging by the thin fibre of chance. We wish a way could be found to free completely our people of the sense of shame, which they cannot help feeling, engendered by members of our race who justified such abhorrent summary procedure and allowed themselves to become a party to the execution of a scheme only acceptable to the undeveloped mentalities ofthe dark ages. It is a shame that makes our blood boil when we think that countrymen of Father Gomez, of Rizal, of Mabini, could accept procedures representing the brutal ideology which is the very opposite of the humane, lofty, and dignified ideology that placed said heroes and martyrs among the purest and noblest specimens that humanity produced in all countries, in all time, and for all eons and light years to come. It is with joy and pride that we agree with all our brethren in unanimously granting petitioner the redress he seeks in his petition. HILADO, J., concurring: I concur in the result, as well as in the reasons stated in the majority opinion not inconsistent with the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in G.R. No. L-5, Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. 99, ante). However, I would additionally base my conclusion upon broader grounds. Firstly, I reiterate here by reference the arguments advanced in said dissenting opinion in additional support of the conclusion that the writ of mandamus herein sought should be granted. Secondly, the importance and transcendence of the legal principles involved justify further elaboration. From the allegations of the petition herein, it can be deduced that the petitioner William F. Peralta was a "guerrillero" when he was arrested, tried and convicted; and that he had never voluntarily submitted to the Japanese forces in his civil capacity. No attempt is made in the Solicitor General's answer to controvert the facts alleged in the petition from which the foregoing deduction flows, and from the record nothing appears which may tend to gainsay them. Even when he was forced temporarily to join the Constabulary, which had been organized under orders of the Japanese Army in the Philippines, he did so against his will.
Even granting for the sake of argument, and laying aside for the moment the reasons to the contrary set forth in my aforesaid dissenting opinion, that the rules ofInternational Law regarding the power of a belligerent army of occupation to establish a provisional government in an occupied enemy territory, are still binding upon the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, yet such rules would not be of any avail to bind the herein petitioner by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of the so-called "Republic of the Philippines", under and by virtue of which said petitioner has been convicted to life imprisonment by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of Manila in Criminal Case No. 66 thereof. If we analyze the different adjudications and treatises which have been cited in support of the validity or binding force of the acts of such provisional governments, which have been variously called de facto governments, or governments of paramount force, with a view to finding the real ground and philosophical justification for the doctrine therein announced, we will see that reason and that justification are made to consist in the submission of the inhabitants upon whom the said acts have been held to be of obligatory or binding force, to the army of occupation. Thus, to cite just a few typical examples, we quote the following excerpts from three leading cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States: Excerpts from Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall. [U.S.], 1; 19 Law. ed., 361): "That while it (government of paramount force) exists, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience, rendered insubmission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government" (p. 363; italics ours). " 'The authority of the United States over the territory was suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conqueror.' " (P. 364; italics ours.) Excerpts from Fleming vs. Page (9 Howard [U.S.], 603; 13 Law. ed., 276): "While it (Tampico) was occupied by our troops, they were in an enemy's country, and not in their own; the inhabitants were still foreigners and enemies, and owed to the United States nothing more than the submission and obedience, sometimes called temporary allegiance, which is due from a conquered enemy, when he surrenders to a force which he is unable to resist." (P. 281; italics ours.) Excerpts from the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheat. [U.S.], 246; 4 Law. ed., 562): "The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors." (P. 564; italics ours.) It results from the above quoted pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States that the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of the government that the occupying belligerent establishes are made binding only and precisely upon those inhabitants from whom obedience could be effectively exacted, namely, those who remain within the effective reach of the occupying forces and submit to them. This is plain common sense. Those who conceived and developed the doctrine could not logically have thought of the army of occupation setting upon a civil government for those who still continued resistance. As to them, further military operations would be necessary to reduce to submission, before one could think of civilly governing them. In the Philippines, during the occupation by the Japanese of Manila and certain other portions of the Archipelago, the overwhelming majority of the people never submitted to the Japanese invaders, and never recognized any legality in the invasion of their country, and to the very date of liberation refused to accept the alleged protection or benefits of the puppet governments of the "Philippine Executive Commission" and the "Republic of the Philippines." This majority of our people lived in the provinces, in the farms, hills and other places beyond the effective reach of the Japanese military garrisons. Only a small minority submitted to the invaders for various reasons, such as their having been caught in Manila or other parts of the Islands occupying government positions, or residing therein without adequate facilities for escaping from or evading said invaders, reasons of ill health, disabling them from living the hard life of the mountains, hills, or country places, and the like. To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of those two puppet governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile governments, with their respective constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions on the one hand bound to continue owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan. Among them we find the petitioner William F. Peralta. The surrender of the Fil-American forces in Bataan and Corregidor did not matter so far as this was concerned. Much less did that surrender obligate all the civil population to submit to the Japanese, and obey all their future dictations. If it did, President Roosevelt and President Osmea would not have so heartily commended the Philippine resistance movement and so enthusiastically extolled the firm stand of those who participated therein, in the former's message of October 23, 1943, and in the latter's speech of February 27, 1945, cited in the writer's above mentioned dissenting opinion. If these historic utterances should seem incompatible with any provision of the Hague Convention, we should understand from them that both Presidents must have considered such provision as no longer applicable to, or binding upon, the United States and the Philippines. Who knows but that their attitude was based upon the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy by their respective peoples, which renunciation necessarily includes all the "rights" of "powers" which may be claimed to be derived from war so employed? Or else, upon the ground that such provision does not support the wrongful acts of Japan in the Philippines? Another reason advanced to justify the creation of a provisional civil government, with its courts and other departments, in occupied enemy territory, is the alleged convenience of the civil population. It can immediately be asserted in reply that the convenience of the abovementioned overwhelming of our people, far from requiring the establishment of such a government, was in the very nature of things positively opposed thereto. They not only did not need the supposed benefits of such a government, but they actually reputed them as inimical to the larger interest of the very ideology and cause for which they were continuing their resistance to those who could extend here the brutal power and pernicious influence of the now exploded "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." They suffered, yes, and suffered much but they placed that ideology and that cause high above their private comfort. Let us not penalize them for it. If this government is democratic, and when it comes to a questionof convenience, whose will and whose convenience should prevail, that of the majority or that of the minority? Are we going to force those free citizens of this free country to accept the alleged benefits and assume the burdens of a government they have never consented to own? I am, furthermore, of opinion that there is another important consideration which argues against the recognition of the said government as a de facto government or government of paramount force during the Japaneses occupation of the Philippine Islands. Japan, in starting and prosecuting this war against the United States and her allies by breaking the most vital rules of civilized warfare as prescribed by International Law, must be deemed to have forfeited the right to invoke that law in so far as specific provisions thereof would favor her or her acts. Japan in treacherously attacking Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, successively on December 7 and 8, 1941, violated the rule providing for the necessity of declaring war as established at the Hague Conference of 1907 (Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 7th ed., pp. 321-322, 325); she has infringed the rule requiring that war prisoners be cared for and treated with humanity (Ibid, p. 377); the rule imposing the obligation to properly tend the sick and wounded (Ibid, 384), the rule interdicting bombing of open and defenseless cities (Ibid, 522, 523) when she bombed Manila after it had been declared an open city and all its military defenses had been removed; the rule exempting noncombatants from personal injury (Ibid, 397) her violations of one or the other of which were matters of daily occurrence, one might say, during her three and a half years of tyranny and oppression in this country, and were climaxed by the ignominious and indescribable atrocitiesof the mass massacre of innocent civilians during the battle for Manila. In the interpretation of doubtful provisions of International Law, Doctor Lawrence, in his work cited above, has the following to say: ". . . If a point of Municipal Law is doubtful, men resort to supreme court for a decision, or to a supreme legislature for an interpreting statute; but if a point ofInternational Law is doubtful, they can resort only to general reasoning for a convincing argument, unless, indeed, they settle the question by blows. And International Law in many of its details is peculiarly liable to disputes and doubts, because it is based on usage and opinion. He who in such a case bases his reasoning on high considerations of morality may succeed in resolving the doubt in accordance with humanity and justice." (Pp. 12, 13.)
It would seem that to deny Japan the benefits, because she has refused to carry the burdens of the law, is to base our reasoning "on high considerations of morality", and to resolve any doubt, if doubt there be, as to the point in question, "in accordance with humanity and justice." In other words (even if we applied said rules to the instant case), Japan, under the circumstances of this case, could not be heard to say that the government which she established here was a de facto government, or a governmentof paramount force, as in the cases where such a government was deemed to exist. In addition to what has been said above, let us see if the Japanese- sponsored "Republic of the Philippines" did not introduce such fundamental and drastic changes in the political organization of this country, as it existed upon the date of the Japanese invasion, as to vitiate with invalidity the acts of all its departments, executive, judicial and legislative. To begin with, the Commonwealth Constitution was completely overthrown. It was replaced by the so-called constitution of the "Republic." A casual comparisonof these two instruments cannot fail to reveal a most revolutionary transformation of the political organization of the country. While under the Commonwealth Constitution the retention of American sovereignty over the Philippines is expressly recognized, for the purposes specified in the ordinance appended thereto, in the very preamble ofthe constitution of the "Republic" the "independence" of the Philippines is proclaimed. While under the Commonwealth Constitution the President and Vice-President are elected "by direct vote of the people" Art. VII, sec. 2), under the constitution of the "Republic" the President (no Vice-President is provided for) was elected "by majority ofall the members of the National Assembly" (Art. II, sec. 2). While under the Commonwealth Constitution the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Congress with a Senate and a House of Representatives (Art. VI, sec. 1), under the constitution of the "Republic" that power was vested in a unicameral National Assembly (Art. III, sec. 1). While under the Commonwealth Constitution the Senators are chosen at large by the qualified electors of the Philippines (Art. VI, sec. 2) and the Representatives by the qualified electors in the respective districts (Art. VI, sec. 5), under the constitution of the "Republic" the National Assembly was composed of the provincial governors and city mayors as members ex-oficio, and of delegates elected every three years, one from each and every province and chartered city (Art. III, sec. 2). While under the Commonwealth Constitution, respecting the Judicial Department, the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress (Art. VIII, sec. 5), under the constitution of the "Republic" the members of the Supreme Court were appointed by the President with the advice of the Cabinet, and all judges of inferior courts, by the President with the advice of the Supreme Court (Art. IV, sec. 4). These changes and innovations can be multiplied many times, but the foregoing will suffice for our purpose. It has been said constantly in this discussion that political acts, or acts of a political complexion of a de facto government or a government of paramount force, are the only ones vitiated with nullity. Of course, I disagree with those who so hold. But even by this test the "Republic" or, which is the same, the Imperial Japanese Forces which gave it birth in thus introducing such positive changes in the organization of this country or suspending the working of that already in existence, executed a political act so fundamental and basic in nature and operation that all the subsequent acts of the new government which of course had to be based thereon, inevitably had to be contaminated by the same vitiating defect. "Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. . . . Political acts on the other hand fall through as of course, whether they introduce any positive change into the organization of the country, or whether they only suspend the working of that already in existence. . . ." (Hall, International Law, 6th ed., p. 483; italics ours.) Finally, upon close scrutiny, we will find that all of the de facto governments or governments of paramount force which have been cited in all this discussion were at the same time bona fide governments. The British established such a government in Castine, and ran it as a purely British organization. The Americans established another such government in Tampico, and ran it as an American organization. The confederate States established a like government in the seceding States, and ran it as the Government of the Confederacy. They were all frank, sincere, and honest in theirs deeds as well as in their words. But what happened in this country during the Japanese occupation? When the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on October 14, 1943, under duress exerted by the Japanese Army, did the Japanese openly, frankly, and sincerely say that government was being established under their orders and was to be run subject to their direction and control? Far from it! They employed all the means they could conceive to deceive the Filipino people and the outside world that they had given the Filipinos their independence, and that the Filipino people had drafted their own constitution and established that "Republic" thereunder. But behind the curtain, from beginning to end, there was the Imperial Japanese Army giving orders and instructions and otherwise directing and controlling the activities of what really was their creature for the furtherance of their war aims. I cannot believe that those who conceived and developed the doctrine of de facto government of government of paramount force, ever intended to include therein such a counterfeit organization as the Japanese contrived here an organization which, like its counterparts in Manchukuo, Nanking, Burma, and Vichy, has been appropriately called "puppet" by the civilized governments of the world. ||| (Peralta v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-49, November 12, 1945)
SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 86773. February 14, 1992.] SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER- AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. FLOR LACANILAO (CHIEF), RUFIL CUEVAS (HEAD, ADMINISTRATIVE DIV.), BEN DELOS REYES (FINANCE OFFICER), petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND JUVENAL LAZAGA, respondents. Ramon Encarnacion for petitioners. Caesar T. Corpus for private respondent. SYLLABUS 1.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER- AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD). Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. 2.PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW; SEAFDEC-AQD; A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, WITH A DISTINCT JURIDICAL PERSONALITY. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political. Among the notable instances are the International Labor Organization, the International Institute of Agriculture, the International Danube Commission. In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading authority 'they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their own.' (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 83 [1956 ed.]) 3.REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; DOES NOT CONFER JURISDICTION. Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. 4.ID.; ID.; DECISION OF A TRIBUNAL NOT VESTED WITH JURISDICTION, NULL AND VOID; CASE AT BAR. Settled is the rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. Finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local agency of the Philippine government, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered without jurisdiction. D E C I S I O N NOCON, J p: This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the July 26, 1988 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission sustaining the labor arbiter, in holding herein petitioners Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD), Dr. Flor Lacanilao, Rufil Cuevas and Ben de los Reyes liable to pay private respondent Juvenal Lazaga the amount of P126,458.89 plus interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment benefits, and the resolution denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of said decision dated January 9, 1989. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country (Article 1, Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC). On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate on a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was appointed Senior External Affairs Officer on January 5, 1983 with a monthly basic salary of P8,000.00 and a monthly allowance of P4,000.00. Thereafter, he was appointed to the position of Professional III and designated as Head of External Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits. LLjur On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated at the close of office hours on May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits (Rollo, p. 153). Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the latter filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and attorney's fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC (Annex "C" of Petition for Certiorari). Petitioners in their Answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private respondent must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not yet been obtained by the private respondent. A formal hearing was conducted whereby private respondent alleged that the non-issuance of the clearances by the petitioners was politically motivated and in bad faith. On the other hand, petitioners alleged that private respondent has property accountability and an outstanding obligation to SEAFDEC-AQD in the amount of P27,532.11. Furthermore, private respondent is not entitled to accrued sick leave benefits amounting to P44,000.00 due to his failure to avail of the same during his employment with the SEAFDEC-AQD (Annex "D", Id.). On January 12, 1988, the labor arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents: 1.To pay complainant P126,458.89, plus legal interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment benefits; 2.To pay complainant actual damages in the amount of P50,000, plus 10% attorney's fees. All other claims are hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 51. Annex "E"). On July 26, 1988, said decision was affirmed by the Fifth Division of the NLRC except as to the award of P50,000.00 as actual damages and attorney's fees for being baseless. (Annex "A", p. 28, id.). LexLib On September 3, 1988, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Annex "G". id.) which was denied on January 9, 1989. Thereafter, petitioners instituted this petition forcertiorari alleging that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent Lazaga's complaint since SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to its international character and the complaint is in effect a suit against the State which cannot be maintained without its consent. The petition is impressed with merit. Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondentNLRC. It was established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam (Annex "H", Petition). The Republic of the Philippines became a signatory to the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC on January 16, 1968. Its purpose is as follows: "The purpose of the Center is to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development in Southeast Asia by mutual cooperation among the member governments of the Center, hereinafter called the 'Members', and through collaboration with international organizations and governments external to the Center. (Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, Art. 1; Annex "H", Petition)" (p. 310, Rollo). SEAFDEC-AQD was organized during the Sixth Council Meeting of SEAFDEC on July 3-7, 1973 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia as one of the principal departments of SEAFDEC (Annex "I", id.) to be established in Iloilo for the promotion of research in aquaculture. Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC mandates: "1.The Council shall be the supreme organ of the Center and all powers of the Center shall be vested in the Council." Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. As Senator Jovito R. Salonga and Former Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap stated in their book, Public International Law (p, 83. 1956 ed.): "Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes, economic or social and mainly non- political. Among the notable instances are the International Labor Organization, the International Institute of Agriculture, the International Danube Commission. In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading authority they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their own.' (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 83 [1956 ed.])". Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of the Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in the governing SEAFDEC Council (Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1, Annex "H", ibid) and that its national laws and regulations shall apply only insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of "an agreed amount of money, movable and immovable property and services necessary for the establishment and operation of the Center" are concerned (Art. 11, ibid). It expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD (Section 2, P.D. No. 292).
The then Minister of Justice likewise opined that Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-AQD in Opinion No. 139, Series of 1984 "4.One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. (See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44) The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization: besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states. In the case at bar, for instance, the entertainment by the National Labor Relations Commission of Mr. Madamba's reinstatement cases would amount to interference by the Philippine Government in the management decisions of the SEARCA governing board; even worse, it could compromise the desired impartiality of the organization since it will have to suit its actuations to the requirements of Philippine law, which may not necessarily coincide with the interests of the other member-states. It is precisely to forestall these possibilities that in cases where the extent of the immunity is specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations, jurisdictional immunity is specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations, jurisdictional immunity from the host country is invariably among the first accorded. (See Jenks, Id.; See also Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, pp. 284-1285)." Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is the rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. Thus, in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, this Court held: "A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel." (Calimlim vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. L- 34362, 118 SCRA 399 [1982]). LLjur Respondent NLRC's citation of the ruling of this Court in Lacanilao v. De Leon (147 SCRA 286 [1987]) to justify its assumption of jurisdiction over SEAFDEC is misplaced. On the contrary, the court in said case explained why it took cognizance of the case. Said the Court: "We would note, finally, that the present petition relates to a controversy between two claimants to the same position: this is not a controversy between the SEAFDEC on the one hand, and an officer or employee, or a person claiming to be an officer or employee, of the SEAFDEC, on the other hand. There is before us no question involving immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court, there being no plea for such immunity whether by or on behalf of SEAFDEC, or by an official of SEAFDEC with the consent of SEAFDEC (Id., at 300; underscoring supplied)." WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local agency of the Philippine government, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered without jurisdiction. No costs. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. ||| (Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department v. NLRC, G.R. No. 86773, February 14, 1992)
FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003.] KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents. Vicente D. Millora for petitioner. Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz for private respondent. SYNOPSIS Petitioner Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national, was charged for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." The narcotic agents who raided the house of Minucher were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo. Minucher was acquitted by the trial court of the charges. Minucherfiled a civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the Court, asking that the complaint be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissalof the complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with the Court, appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the decision ofthe appellate court and remanded the case to the lower court. The Manila RTC continued with its hearings on the case. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor ofpetitioner Khosrow Minucher and adjudged private respondent Arthur Scalzo liable in actual and compensatory damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention. Hence, the present petition for review. AScHCD The Supreme Court denied the petition. According to the Court, a foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Departmentof Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter, but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. HTIEaS SYLLABUS 1.POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY; A PREROGATIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT. Vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, the Courthas recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. The government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature." Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time basis. Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each individual to the appropriate functional category. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IF THE ACTS GIVING RISE TO A SUIT ARE THOSE OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DONE BY ITS FOREIGN AGENT, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY A DIPLOMATIC PERSONAGE, BUT ACTING IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, THE COMPLAINT COULD BE BARRED BY THE IMMUNITY OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN FROM SUIT WITHOUT ITS CONSENT. But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit. The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A FOREIGN AGENT, OPERATING WITHIN A TERRITORY, CAN BE CLOAKED WITH IMMUNITY FROM SUIT AS LONG AS IT CAN BE ESTABLISHED THAT HE IS ACTING WITHIN THE DIRECTIVES OF THE SENDING STATE. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Departmentof Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit. SHAcID D E C I S I O N VITUG, J p: Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused. ScHADI
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. "The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to the Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the Philippines. "He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his house and introduced to him by a certain Jose Iigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose Iigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines. "During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction of Jose Iigo, the defendant expressed his interest in buying caviar. As a matterof fact, he bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar, aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was his business after the Khomeini government cut his pension of over $3,000.00 per month. During their introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his calling card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the United States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the back of the card appears a telephone number in defendant's own handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted. "It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman named Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their conversation, however, was more concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant promised to see plaintiff again. "On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter for dinner at Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200 grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandise but for the reason that the defendant was not yet there, he requested the restaurant people to . . . place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however, came and plaintiff gave him the caviar for which he was paid. Then their conversation was again focused on politics and business. "On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that defendant did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come back the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with his $24,000.00, which he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of carpets. "At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back again to plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the latter's bedroom, where the latter and his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told him that he would be leaving the Philippines very soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while so that he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the street, he was brought inside the house by the defendant. He was made to sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant was inside his bedroom. The defendant came out of the bedroom and out from defendant's attach case, he took something and placed it on the table in front of the plaintiff. They also took plaintiff's wife who was at that time at the boutique near his house and likewise arrested Torabian, who was playing chess with him in the bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he was being handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his bedroom was invaded by defendant. He was not allowed to use the telephone. In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any warrant, but the defendant told him to 'shut up.' He was nevertheless told that he would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him. CTDAaE "The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come out to meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together with a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting he bought P30,000.00 together with his TV and betamax sets. He claimed that when he was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was, therefore, nothing left in his house. "That his arrest as a heroin trafficker . . . had been well publicized throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker . . . . In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only in the Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said places informed him that they saw him on TV with said news. "After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp Crame handcuffed together, where they were detained for three days without food and water." 1 During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special appearance for Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an answer pending a supposed advice from the United States Department of State and Department of Justice on the defenses to be raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo filed another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground that he, not being a resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam, was beyond the processes ofthe court. The motion was denied by the court, in its order of 13 December 1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to file an answer to the complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons which could likewise be construed a waiver of the requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration of the court order, contending that a motion for an extension of time to file an answer was not a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons since it did not seek an affirmative relief. Scalzo argued that in cases involving the United States government, as well as its agencies and officials, a motion for extension was peculiarly unavoidable due to the need (1) for both the Department of State and the Department of Justice to agree on the defenses to be raised and (2) to refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to first review the case. The court a quo denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of 15 October 1989. Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA- G.R. No. 17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated 06 October 1989, the appellate courtdenied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then elevated the incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this Court. The petition, however, was denied for its failure to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed to show that the appellate court was in error in its questioned judgment. Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a) declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file a responsive pleading (answer) and (b) setting the case for the reception of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the motion, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo denied the material allegations of the complaint and raised the affirmative defenses (a) of Minucher's failure to state a cause of action in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration ofthe United States Department of Justice. Scalzo interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation. Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent ofthe United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification, dated 11 June 1990, of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. In an order of 25 June 1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo, et al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per thisCourt's resolution of 07 August 1990. On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the Honorable Courtof Appeals, et al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a decision, dated 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The remand was ordered on the theses (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction over his person without even considering the issue of the authenticity ofDiplomatic Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint contained sufficient allegations to the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and, absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzo's diplomatic immunity could not be taken up. SCaTAc The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November 1995, the trial court reached a decision; it adjudged: "WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully established his claim by sufficient evidence, against the defendant in the manner following: "'Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs. 'The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the lien of the Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid docket fees considering that the plaintiff in this case instituted this action as a pauper litigant."' 2 While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trialcourt and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention. Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a two- fold issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, following the decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of Appeals from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely different manner, and (2) whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata, would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part of the court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of the parties, subject matter and causes of action. 3 Even while one ofthe issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 "whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune from civil suit conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" is also a pivotal question raised in the instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not resolved that point with finality. Indeed, the Court there has made this observation "It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the diplomatic immunity." 4 Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source ofprohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a number of documents 1.Exh. '2' Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990; 2.Exh. '1' Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June 1990; 3.Exh. '5' Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991; 4.Exh. '6' Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and 5.Exh. '7' Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988. 6.Exh. '3' 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court); 7.Exh. '4' Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh. '3'); and 8.Exh. '8' Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol, Department of Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court. 5 The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy accordingly advised the Executive Department of the Philippine Government that Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988; (2) that the United States Government was firm from the very beginning in asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate action to inform the trial court of Scalzo's diplomatic immunity. The other documentary exhibits were presented to indicate that: (1) the Philippine government itself, through its Executive Department, recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally advised the "Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status and his entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his reports of investigation on the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the Drug Enforcement Administration ofthe United States Department of Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned to the Philippines at all times relevant to the complaint, and the special power of attorney executed by him in favor of his previous counsel 6 to show (a) that the United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation of the Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as member of the mission, he investigated Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs itself recognized that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the functions of the overseas office of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host country, 2) to establish and maintain liaison with the host country and counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct complex criminal investigations involving international criminal conspiracies which affect the interests of the United States. DIEACH The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries- old customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states ofIndia, the person of the herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held sacrosanct. 7 By the end of the 16th century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established as a rule of customary international law. 8 Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the official usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. 9
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, 10 (b) envoys, 11 ministers orinternuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs 12 accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. 13 Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the membersof the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication ofdocuments, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An attach belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed by their respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. 14 These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank. In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos. 414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October 1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate the Court's initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz: "While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court ofjurisdiction over his person. "xxx xxx xxx "And now, to the core issue the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact that it took private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file the Answer because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States of America were studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses, before he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the sake of argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by petitioner cannot be peremptorily dismissed. "xxx xxx xxx "There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self- serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note . . . . The public respondent then should have sustained the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the self- serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court yielded to the private respondent's claim is arbitrary." A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November 1992, issued by the Office of Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the records of the Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as an Assistant Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines." No certified true copy of such "records," the supposed bases for the belated issuance, was presented in evidence. SEIDAC Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 15 the Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. 16 The government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature." 17 Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time basis. 18 Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each individual to the appropriate functional category. 19 But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrineof State Immunity from Suit. The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long- standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunityof a foreign sovereign from suit 20 and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. 21 If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. 22 The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. 23 In United States of America vs. Guinto, 24 involving officers of the United States Air Force and special officers of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators charged with the duty of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court has ruled "While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials ofthe state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. . . . It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. . . . As they have acted on behalf of the government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, [who were] responsible for their acts." 25
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of Appeals 26 elaborates: "It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368): 'Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. "xxx xxx xxx "(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction." 27 A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. cATDIH All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit. WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur. ||| (Khosrow Minucher v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003)
EN BANC [G.R. No. L-41299. February 21, 1983.] SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DAVID B. CRUZ, SOCORRO CONCIO CRUZ, and LORNA C. CRUZ, respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Eriberto D. Ignacio for respondents David Cruz, Socorro Concio Cruz and Lorna Cruz. SYLLABUS 1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; FINDINGS OF FACT OF COURT OF APPEALS GENERALLY NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY SUPREME COURT. The appraisal should be left undisputed following the general rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not subject to review by this Court, the present case not being one of the recognized exceptions to that rule. 2.POLITICAL LAW; STATE; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; WAIVER THEREOF BY THE GOVERNMENT IN RESPECT OF THE SSS; EFFECT OF WAIVER. We come now to the amenability of the SSS to the judicial action and legal responsibility for its acts. To our minds, there should be no question on this score considering that the SSS is a judicial entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the government. SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued inCourt. These words "sue and be sued'' embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by the waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract, and even for tort. 3.LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM; CONTRACTUAL LOAN AGREEMENTS; ENTERED INTO BY SSS FOR PROFIT. The proposition that theSSS is not profit-oriented was rejected in the case of SSS Employees' Association vs. Hon. Soriano. But even conceding that the SSS is not, in the main, operated for profit, it cannot be denied that, in so far as contractual loan agreements with private parties are concerned, the SSS enters into them for profit considering that the borrowers pay interest, which is money paid for the use of money, plus other charges. 4.ID.; ID.; EXPENDITURES; NOT CONFINED TO PAYMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. In so far as it is argued that to hold the SSS liable for damages would be to deplete the benefit funds available for its covered members, suffice it to say that expenditures of the System are not confined to the payment of the social security benefits. For example, the system also has to pay the salaries of its personnel. Moreover, drawing a parallel with the NASSCO and the Virginia Tobacco Administration, whose funds are in the nature of public funds, it has been held that those funds may even be made the object of a notice of garnishment. 5.CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ACTION TO RECOVER; WHEN DAMAGE IS CAUSED A CITIZEN, THE LATTER SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT OF REDRESS. What is of paramount importance in this controversy is that an injustice is not perpetrated and that when damage is caused a citizen, the latter should have a right of redress particularly when it arises from a purely private and contractual relationship between said individual and the System. 6.ID.; ID.; NO BASIS FOR AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES. As basis for the award of actual damages, the Trial Court relied on the alleged expenses incurred by the private respondents for the wardrobe they were supposed to use during their trip abroad which was allegedly aborted because of the filing of the foreclosure application by the SSS. We find the foregoing too speculative. There could have been other reasons why the trip did not materialize. Moreover, it appears that private respondents' passports has already expired but that they made no effort to secure new passports. Nor did they secure the necessary visas from the local consulates of foreign countries they intended to visit for their trip abroad. 7.ID.; ID.; SSS NOT LIABLE FOR MORAL AND TEMPERATE DAMAGES. Nor can the SSS be held liable for moral and temperate damages. As concluded by the Court ofAppeals "the negligence of the appellant is not so gross as to warrant moral and temperate damages," except that, said Court reduced those damages by only P5,000.00 instead of eliminating them. Neither can we agree with the findings of both the Trial Court and respondent Court that the SSS had acted maliciously or in bad faith. The SSS wasof the belief that it was acting in the legitimate exercise of its right under the mortgage contract in the face of irregular payments made by the private respondents, and placed reliance on the automatic acceleration clause in the contract. The filing alone of the foreclosure application should not be a ground for an award of moral damages in the same way that a clearly unfounded civil action is not among the grounds for moral damages. 8.ID.; ID.; GRANT OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES SET ASIDE IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF THAT SSS ACTED IN A WANTON, RECKLESS AND OPPRESSIVE MANNER. With the ruling out of the compensatory, moral and temperate damages, the grant of exemplary or corrective damages should also be set aside. Moreover, no proof has been submitted that the SSS had acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. 9.ID.; ID.; SSS CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUCH DAMAGES IS TO VINDICATE OR RECOGNIZE RIGHTS WHICH HAVE BEEN VIOLATED. However, as found by both the Trial and Appellate Courts, there was clear negligence on the part of SSS when they mistook the loan account of Socorro J. Cruz for that of private respondent Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention was called to the error, but it adamantly refused to acknowledge its mistake. The SSS can be held liable for nominal damages. This type of damages is not for the purpose of indemnifying private respondents for any loss suffered by them but to vindicate or recognize their rights which have been violated or invaded by petitioner SSS. 10.LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; ATTORNEY'S FEES; AWARD THEREOF JUSTIFIED AS RESPONDENTS WERE COMPELLED TO LITIGATE TO PROTECT THEIR INTEREST. The circumstances of the case also justify the award of attorney's fees, as granted by the Trial and Appellate Courts, particularly considering that private respondents were compelled to litigate for the protection of their interests. MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: 1.CIVIL LAW; TORTS; NEGLIGENT ACTS; COMMITTED BY OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF PETITIONER SSS AMOUNTED TO NOT SIMPLY A CONTRACTUAL BREACH BUT TORT. To begin with, the negligent acts committed by the officers and employees of the petitioner, Social Security System, amounted to not simply a contractual breach but tort. For the record is clear that petitioner's officers and employees were grossly negligent bordering on malice or bad faith in applying for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage contract executed in its favor by the spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio- Cruz, and that even after private respondents had brought to the attention of the petitioner's officers and employees their mistake, they insisted on their course of action, instead of making the necessary rectifications, which grossly negligent and oppressive acts caused damage to private respondents. 2.ID.; ID.; LIABILITY THEREOF EXISTS DESPITE PRESENCE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES AS THE ACT THAT BREAKS CONTRACT MAY ALSO BE A TORT. The circumstance that there was a pre-existing contractual relationship between the herein contending parties, does not bar the tort liability of the officers and employees ofpetitioner; because tort liability may still exist despite presence of contractual relations as the acts that breaks the contract may also be a tort as in this case (Air France vs. Carrascoso, L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966,18 SCRA 155, 161-169; Singson and Castillo vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, L- 24837, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 1117, 1119-20). 3.ID.; QUASI-DELICT; EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS; STATE LIABLE WHEN IT ACTS THROUGH A SPECIAL AGENT. Consequently, a tortious act being involved, the applicable provision of law is Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code. Under Article 2180, ". . . The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.'' 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; SINCE SSS DID NOT ACT THROUGH A SPECIAL AGENT, THE FORMER CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY TORTIOUS ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES WHILE IN PERFORMANCE OF THEIR REGULAR FUNCTIONS. In the case at bar, the petitioner Social Security Systems as the instrumentality of the State to implement the social justice guarantee enunciated in the Constitution, did not act through a special agent. Hence, the Social Security System cannot be liable for the damages caused by the tortious acts of its officers and employees while in the performance of their regular functions. The remedy therefore of private respondents is to proceed against the guilty officers and employees of petitioner Social Security System as mandated by Article 2176 of the New Civil Code. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT OF "SPECIAL AGENT" DOES NOT APPLY TO ANY EXECUTIVE AGENT WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE ACTIVE ADMINISTRATION AND WHO PERFORMS FUNCTIONS WHICH ARE INHERENT IN AND NATURALLY PERTAIN TO HIS OFFICE AND WHICH ARE REGULATED BY LAW AND REGULATIONS. "The responsibility of the State is limited by Article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent, . . . so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil. 311)
6.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL POWER; RULE-MAKING; POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO SUSPEND ITS OWN RULES TO SERVE ENDS OF JUSTICE. Further, We have, time and again, re-stated the rule that the Supreme Court can suspend its own rules to serve the ends of justice. (Jose vs. CA, et al., L-38581, March 31, 1976; Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization, et al., vs. PBM Co., et al., L-31195, 51 SCRA 189, 215; Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 304, 312-313; Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 215) 7.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR; FAILURE TO DESIGN A DEFENSE AS AN ERROR ON APPEAL IS A PURE TECHNICALITY THAT SHOULD NOT PREVAIL OVER SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES IN A CONTROVERSY AS SAME WOULD NOT SERVE INTEREST OF JUSTICE. While Article 2180 of the New Civil Code was not invoked by the petitioner as a defense, this does not prevent this Tribunal from taking cognizance of the same. For as stressed in Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines (June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 610, 633), failure to assign a defense as an error on appeal is a pure technicality that should not prevail over the substantial issues in a controversy as the same would not serve the interest of justice, and "this Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters even if they are not assigned as errors to the appeal, if it finds that our considerations is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case" (citing Saura and Export Co Inc., May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 143). 8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE THAT A DEFENSE NOT EXPRESSLY PLEADED IS DEEMED WAIVED UNLESS SUCH FAILURE SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED IS MERELY A GENERAL RULE SUBJECT TO EXCEPTIONS. The principle that a defense not expressly pleaded is deemed waived unless such failure is satisfactorily explained, is merely a general rule which is subject to exceptions, among which is when the Court can take judicial notice of the law, like Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. 9.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE; SECTION TWO; SCOPE OF TERM "GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES" REFERS TO THE CORPORATE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY THROUGH WHICH FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE EXERCISED THROUGHOUT THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Is cannot likewise be seriously questioned that the Social Security System is comprehended in the definition in Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of the term Government of the Republic of the Philippines . . . which refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised through out the Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other forms of local government" and the second paragraph of said Section 2 provides that the term "national government" refers to the central government as distinguished from the different forms of local government. There is nothing therein nor in the Social Security Act, as, amended, intimating that the national government does not include the Social Security System. 10.ID.; ID.; ID.; SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM ALTHOUGH HAVING A CORPORATE OR JUDICIAL PERSONALITY, IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE NATIONAL OR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. It is true that the Social Security System has a corporate or juridical personality of its own. But this does not remove it as an integral part of the national or central government. For such corporate or juridical personality invested in it is more for facility and convenience in the attainment of the objectives for which it was created by the legislative. 11.POLITICAL LAW; STATE; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; WAIVER THEREOF BY SSS AS AN ENTITY PERFORMING GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS AND BY THE LAW CREATING IT. Such vesting of corporate or juridical personality in the Social Security System was never intended to destroy the shield from liability afforded it as an integral part of the State or Government by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Relatedly, such corporate or juridical personality of the Social Security System and the express provision of the law creating the same that it can sue and be sued, have the effect of merely waiving its immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions. 12.ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER THEREOF NOT AN ADMISSION OF ITS LIABILITY. SSS waiver of its immunity from suit is not an admission of its liability. Such waiver merely allows a private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights, but always subject to the lawful defenses of the Social Security System one of which is Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforestated. In other words, such waiver of immunity from suit is not equivalent to instant liability. The Social Security System can only be held liable for damages arising from the tortious acts of its officers and employees only if it acts through a special agent, which is not true in the case at bar. 13.ID.; ID.; ID.; SSS NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES BECAUSE IT PERFORMS GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS. It must be finally stressed that the Social Security System cannot be liable for damages because it is an entity or government performing governmental functions; hence, not profit-oriented, The 1963 doctrine in SSSEA vs. Soriano (7 SCRA 1016 [1963]) that the system is exercising proprietary functions, is no longer controlling. For in 1969, the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of the Government as laid down in the case of Bacani vs. Nacoco (100) Phil. 468 [1956]) has been obliterated. In the case of Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) vs. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGGO) (30 SCRA 469 [1969]), this Court in re- examining the aforesaid Bacani ruling observed that the trend has been to abandon and reject the traditional "Constituent-Ministrant" criterion in governmental functions in favor of the more responsive postulate that the growing complexities of modern society have rendered the traditional classification of government functions unrealistic and obsolete. 14.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FUNCTION OF SSS IS THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF AN ADEQUATE SOCIAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL SERVICES. Considering therefore that the establishment and maintenance of an adequate social security and social services, which the Social Security System seeks to perform and achieve are functions pursuant to the basic constitutional mandate directing the State to promote "social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people'' as well as the police power of the State, the inescapable conclusion is that the function of the SSS is and has always been governmental. D E C I S I O N MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p: This Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 stems from the following facts, as narrated by the Trial Court, adopted by the Court of Appeals, and quoted by both petitioner 2 and private respondents 3 : "Sometime in March, 1963 the spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2000 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as collateral. Pursuant to this real estate ban said spouses executed on March 26, 1963 the corresponding real estate mortgage originally in the amount of P39,500.00 which was later increased to P48,000.00 covering the aforementioned property as shown in their mortgage contract, Exhibit A and I. From the proceeds of the real estate loan the mortgagors constructed their residential house on the mortgaged property and were furnished by the SSS with a passbook to record the monthly payments of their amortizations (Exhibits B and B-1). The mortgagors, plaintiffs herein, complied with their monthly payments although there were times when delays were incurred in their monthly payments which were due every first five (5) days of the month (Exhibits 3-A to 3-N). On July 9, 1968, defendant SSS filed an application with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground, among others: 'That the conditions of the mortgage have been broken since October, 1967 with the default on the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the principal debt and the interest thereon, and, all of the monthly installments due and payable thereafter up to the present date; . . . 'That by the terms of the contract herein above referred to, the indebtedness to the mortgagee as of June, 1968 amounts to Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos & 58/100 (P10,702.58), Philippine Currency, excluding interests thereon, plus 20% of the total amount of the indebtedness as attorney's fees, also secured by the said mortgage." (Exhibit "C") "Pursuant to this application for foreclosure, the notice of the Sheriff's Sale of the mortgaged property was initially published in the Sunday Chronicle in its issue ofJuly 14, 1968 announcing the sale at public auction of the said mortgaged property. After this first publication of the notice, and before the second publication of the notice, plaintiff herein thru counsel formally wrote defendant SSS, a letter dated July 19, 1968 and received on the same date by said entity demanding, among others, for said defendant SSS to withdraw the foreclosure and discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to-date in the payment of their monthly amortizations (Exhibits "E" and "E-1"). In answer to this letter defendant SSS sent a telegram to Atty. Eriberto Ignacio requesting him to come to their office for a conference. This telegram was received by said counsel on July 23, 1968 (Exhibit "G" and "G-1). To this telegraphic answer, Atty. Ignacio sent a telegraphic reply suggesting instead that a representative of the SSS be sent to him because his clients were the aggrieved parties (Exhibit "G-2"). Nothing came outof the telegraphic communications between the parties and the second and third publications of the notice of foreclosure were published successively in the Sunday Chronicle in its issues of July 21 and 28, 1968 (Exhibits "N- 1" and "0-1")." 4
On July 24, 1968, the Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz, instituted before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorney's fees against the Social Security System (SSS) and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging, among other things, that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment. cdrep In its Answer, with counterclaim, the SSS stressed its right to foreclose the mortgage executed in its favor by private respondents by virtue of the automatic acceleration clause provided in the mortgage contract, even after private respondents had paid their amortization installments. In its counterclaim, the SSS prayed for actual and other damages, as well as attorney's fees, for malicious and baseless statements made by private respondents and published in the Manila Chronicle. On September 23, 1968, the Trial Court enjoined the SSS from holding the sale at public auction of private respondent's property upon their posting of a P2,000.00 bond executed in favor of the SSS. The Trial Court rendered judgment on March 5, 1971, the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered against defendant SSS, directing it to pay plaintiffs the following amounts: (a)P2,500.00 as actual damage; (b)P35,000.00 as moral damage; (c)P10,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages; and (d)P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. Defendant SSS shall further pay the costs." 5 In respect of the moral and temperate damages awarded, the Trial Court stated: "With respect to moral and temperate damages, the Court holds that the first publication of the notice was made in good faith but committed by defendant SSS in gross negligence considering the personnel at its command and the ease with which verifications of the actual defaulting mortgagors may be made. On this initial publication of the notice of foreclosure (Exhibits "M" and "M-1"), the Court believes plaintiffs are entitled to the amount of P5,000.00. The second publication of the notice of foreclosure is another matter. There was already notice by plaintiffs to defendant SSS that there was no reason for the foreclosure of their mortgaged property as they were never in default. Instead of taking any corrective measure to rectify its error, defendant SSS adopted a position of righteousness and followed the same course of action contending that no error has been committed. This act of defendant indeed was deliberate, calculated to cow plaintiffs into submission, and made obviously with malice. On this score, the Court believes defendant SSS should pay and indemnify plaintiffs jointly in the sum of P10,000.00. Lastly, on the third publication of the notice of foreclosure, the Court finds this continued publication an outright disregard for the reputation and standing of plaintiffs. The publication having reached a bigger segment of society and also done with malice and callous disregard for the rights of its clients, defendant SSS should compensate plaintiffs jointly in the sum of P20,000.00. All in all, plaintiffs are entitled to P35,000.00 by way of moral damages." 6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower Court judgment in a Decision promulgated on March 14, 1975, but upon SSS's Motion for Reconsideration, modified the judgment by the elimination of the P5,000.00 moral damages awarded on account of the initial publication of the foreclosure notice. To quote: LexLib xxx xxx xxx After a re-examination of the evidence, we find that the negligence of the appellant is not so gross as to warrant moral and temperate damages. The amount ofP5,000.00 should be deducted from the total damages awarded to the plaintiffs. "WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on March 14, 1975 is hereby maintained with the sole modification that the amount of P5,000.00 awarded on account of the initial publication is eliminated so that the said amount should be deducted from the total damages awarded to the plaintiffs. SO ORDERED." 7 In so far as exemplary and corrective damages are concerned, the Court of Appeals had this to say. "The Court finds no extenuating circumstances to mitigate the irresponsible action of defendant SSS and for this reason, said defendant should pay exemplary and corrective damages in the sum of P10,000.00 . . ." Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration by respondent Court, the SSS filed this Petition alleging: "I.Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that under Condition No. 10 of the Mortgage contract, which is a self-executing, automatic acceleration clause, all amortizations and obligations of the mortgagors become ipso jure due and demandable if they at any time fail to pay any of the amortizations or interest when due; "II.Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that a previous notice to the mortgagor was necessary before the mortgage could be foreclosed; "III.Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that, assuming that there was negligence committed by subordinate employees of the SSS in mistaking 'Socorro C. Cruz' for 'Socorro J. Cruz' as the defaulting borrower, the fault cannot be attributed to the SSS, much less should the SSS be made liable for their acts done without its knowledge and authority; "IV.Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that there is no extenuating circumstance to mitigate the liability of petitioner; "V.Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioner is not liable for damages not being a profit-oriented governmental institution but one performing governmental functions." 8 For failure of the First Division to obtain concurrence of the five remaining members (Justices Plana and Gutierrez, Jr. could take no part), the case was referred to the Court en banc. The pivotal issues raised are: (1) whether the Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would have warranted the publications ofthe notices of foreclosure; and (2) whether or not the SSS can be held liable for damages. The first issue revolves around the question of appreciation of the evidence by the lower Court as concurred in by the Court of Appeals. The appraisal should be left undisturbed following the general rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not subject to review by this Court, the present case not being one of the recognized exceptions to that rule. 9 Accordingly, we are upholding the finding of the Court of Appeals that the SSS application for foreclosure was not justified, particularly considering that the real estate loan of P48,000.00 obtained by the Cruzes in March, 1963, was payable in 15 years with a monthly amortization of P425.18, and that as of July 14, 1968, the date of the first notice of foreclosure and sale, the outstanding obligation was still P38,875.06 and not P10,701.58, as published. cdrep "The appellant was not justified in applying for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage contract executed in its favor by the spouses, David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz. Exh. 'A'. While it is true that the payments of the monthly installments were previously not regular, it is a fact that as of June 30, 1968 the appellee, David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-date and current in the payment of their monthly installments. Having accepted the prior late payments of the monthly installments, the appellant could no longer suddenly and without prior notice to the mortgagors apply for the extra- judicial foreclosure of the mortgage in July 1968."10 A similar conclusion was reached by the trial Court. "Defendant's contention that there was clerical error in the amount of the mortgage loan due as of June, 1968 as per their application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage is a naive attempt to justify an untenable position. As a matter of fact plaintiffs were able to establish that the mortgagor who actually committed the violation of her mortgage loan was a certain 'Socorro J. Cruz' who was in arrears in the amount of P10,702.58 at the time the application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage was filed (Exhibits "BB" and "EE"). Defendant mortgagee must have committed an error in picking the record of plaintiff 'Socorro C. Cruz' instead of the record of 'Socorro J. Cruz'. Defendant SSS, however, denied having committed any error and insists that their motion for foreclosure covers the real estate mortgageof spouses David E. Cruz and Socorro C. Cruz. This Court is nonetheless convinced that the foreclosure proceedings should have been on the real estate mortgage of'Socorro J. Cruz' who was in arrears as of June, 1968 in the amount of P10,701.58, the exact amount mentioned in the application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage by defendant SSS." 11 We come now to the amendability of the SSS to judicial action and legal responsibility for its acts. To our minds, there should be no question on this score considering that theSSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. 12 It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the Government. 13 SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. 14 These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. 15 So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSSperforms governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract 16 , and even for tort.
A recent case squarely in point anent the principle, involving the National Power Corporation, is that of Rayo vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 110 SCRA 457 (1981), wherein this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos, ruled: "It is not necessary to write an extended dissertation on whether or not the NPC performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operationof the Angat Dam. It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any courtunder its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3[d]). As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. (See National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L- 17874, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 781). Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can 'sue and be sued in any court' is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners." The proposition that the SSS is not profit-oriented was rejected in the case of SSS Employees' Association vs. Hon. Soriano. 17 But even conceding that the SSS is not, in the main, operated for profit, it cannot be denied that, in so far as contractual loan agreements with private parties are concerned, the SSS enters into them for profit considering that the borrowers pay interest, which is money paid for the use of money, plus other charges. Cdpr In so far as it is argued that to hold the SSS liable for damages would be to deplete the benefit funds available for its covered members, suffice it to say, that expenditures ofthe System are not confined to the payment of social security benefits. For example, the System also has to pay the salaries of its personnel. Moreover, drawing a parallel with the NASSCO and the Virginia Tobacco Administration, whose funds are in the nature of public funds, it has been held that those funds may even be made the object of a noticeof garnishment. 18 What is of paramount importance in this controversy is that an injustice is not perpetrated and that when damage is caused a citizen, the latter should have a right of redress particularly when it arises from a purely private and contractual relationship between said individual and the System. We find, however, that under the circumstances of the case, the SSS cannot be held liable for the damages as awarded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Tribunal. As basis for the award of actual damages, the Trial Court relied on the alleged expenses incurred by private respondents for the wardrobe they were supposed to use during their trip abroad, which was allegedly aborted because of the filing of the foreclosure application by the SSS. We find the foregoing too speculative. There could have been other reasons why the trip did not materialize. Moreover, it appears that private respondents' passports had already expired but that they made no effort to secure new passports. 19 Nor did they secure the necessary visas from the local consulates of foreign countries they intended to visit for their trip abroad. 20 Nor can the SSS be held liable for moral and temperate damages. As concluded by the Court of Appeals "the negligence of the appellant is not so gross as to warrant moral and temperate damages", 21 except that, said Court reduced those damages by only P5,000.00 instead of eliminating them. Neither can we agree with the findings of both the TrialCourt and respondent Court that the SSS had acted maliciously or in bad faith. The SSS was of the belief that it was acting in the legitimate exercise of its right under the mortgage contract in the face of irregular payments made by private respondents, and placed reliance on the automatic acceleration clause in the contract. The filing alone ofthe foreclosure application should not be a ground for an award of moral damages in the same way that a clearly unfounded civil action is not among the grounds for moral damages. 22 With the ruling out of compensatory, moral and temperate damages, the grant of exemplary or corrective damages should also be set aside. 23 Moreover, no proof has been submitted that the SSS had acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. 24 However, as found by both the Trial and Appellate Courts, there was clear negligence on the part of SSS when they mistook the loan account of Socorro J. Cruz for that ofprivate respondent Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention was called to the error, but it adamantly refused to acknowledge its mistake. The SSS can be held liable for nominal damages. This type of damages is not for the purpose of indemnifying private respondents for any loss suffered by them but to vindicate or recognize their rights which have been violated or invaded by petitioner SSS. 25 The circumstances of the case also justify the award of attorney's fees, as granted by the Trial and Appellate Courts, particularly considering that private respondents were compelled to litigate for the prosecution of their interests. 26 WHEREFORE, the judgment sought to be reviewed is hereby modified in that petitioner SSS shall pay private respondents: P3,000.00 as nominal damages; and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. prcd Costs against petitioner Social Security System. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur. Fernando, C.J., in the result. Separate Opinions AQUINO, J., concurring: I concur. The award of moral damages is not justified under arts. 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. I vote to award the private respondents the additional sum of P2,000 as litigation expenses. Plana, Escolin * and Gutierrez, Jr., ** JJ., took no part. MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: I dissent. I To begin with, the negligent acts committed by the officers and employees of the petitioner, Social Security System, amounted to not simply a contractual breach but tort. For the record is clear that petitioner's officers and employees were grossly negligent bordering on malice or bad faith in applying for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage contract executed in its favor by the spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz, and that even after private respondents had brought to the attention of the petitioner's officers and employees their mistake, they insisted on their course of action, instead of making the necessary rectifications, which grossly negligent and oppressive acts caused damage to private respondents. As found by the Court of Appeals: "The appellant was not justified in applying for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage contract executed in its favor by the spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz, Exh. 'A'. While it is true that the payments of the monthly installments were previously not regular, it is a fact that as of June 30, 1968 the appellees, David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-date and current in the payment of their monthly installments. Having accepted the prior late payments of the monthly installments, the appellant could no longer suddenly and without prior notice to the mortgagors apply for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage in July, 1968. "It is obvious that the appellant applied for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage in question because of the gross negligence of its employees. This negligence was aggravated when the appellant, after being informed of the error, insisted on proceeding with the extra-judicial foreclosure by invoking alleged violations of the mortgage contract. But these violations are either too minor to warrant the drastic step of foreclosure or were deemed condoned when the appellant accepted late payments prior to June 30, 1968. Hence the trial court did not err in concluding that 'the act of defendant indeed was deliberate, calculated to cow plaintiffs into submission and made obviously with malice' " (p. 54, rec.; emphasis supplied). The circumstance that there was a pre-existing contractual relationship between the herein contending parties, does not bar the tort liability of the officers and employees ofpetitioner; because tort liability may still exist despite presence of contractual relations as the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort, as in this case (Air France vs. Carrascoso, L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 155, 168-169; Singson & Castillo vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, L- 24837, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 1117, 1119-20). Consequently, a tortious act being involved, the applicable provision of law is Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code. Under Article 2180, ". . . The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable." In the case at bar, the petitioner Social Security System as the instrumentality of the State to implement the social justice guarantee enunciated in the Constitution, did not act through a special agent. Hence, the Social Security System cannot be liable for the damages caused by the tortious acts of its officers and employees while in the performanceof their regular functions. The remedy therefore of private respondents is to proceed against the guilty officers and employees of petitioner Social Security System as mandated by Article 2176 of the New Civil Code. cdll For as held in the leading case of Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil. 311). "The responsibility of the State is limited by Article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent, . . . so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations."
While Article 2180 of the New Civil Code was not invoked by the petitioner as a defense, this does not prevent this Tribunal from taking cognizance of the same. For as stressed in Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines (June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 610, 633), failure to assign a defense as an error on appeal is a pure technicality that should not prevail over the substantial issues in a controversy as the same would not serve the interest of justice, and: "this Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that our consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case" (citing Saura & Export Co., Inc., May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 143). Further, We have, time and again, re-stated the rule that the Supreme Court can suspend its own rules to serve the ends of justice (Jose vs. C.A., et al., L-38581, March 31, 1976; Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization, et al. vs. PBM Co., et al., L-31195, 51 SCRA 189, 215; Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 304, 312-313; Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275). The principle that a defense not expressly pleaded is deemed waived unless such failure is satisfactorily explained, is merely a general rule which is subject to exceptions, among which is when the Court can take judicial notice of such defense. In this case, We can take judicial notice of the law, like Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. It must be emphasized that the courts have as much duty as the Commission on August to protect the public treasury from being mulcted or raided illegally. And this becomes more imperative considering that a substantial portion of the funds of the petitioner comes from the contributions of employees and workers in private firms and is therefore in the nature of a trust fund to be expended only for their welfare and benefit, with the government merely giving some subsidy. Any amount of damages illegally assessed against the Social Security System will deplete the benefit funds available to its covered members for the contingencies of sickness, disability, retirement or death. LLpr It cannot likewise be seriously questioned that the Social Security System is comprehended in the definition in Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of the term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines . . . which refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other forms of local government." And the second paragraph of said Section 2 provides that the term "national government" refers to the central government as distinguished from the different forms of local government. There is nothing therein nor in the Social Security Act, as amended, intimating that the national government does not include the Social Security System. It is true that the Social Security System has a corporate or juridical personality of its own. But this does not remove it as an integral part of the national or central government. For such corporate or juridical personality invested in it is more for facility and convenience in the attainment of the objectives for which it was created by the legislative. Such vesting of corporate or juridical personality in the Social Security System was never intended to destroy the shield from liability afforded it as an integral part of the State or Government by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Relatedly, such corporate or juridical personality of the Social Security System and the express provision of the law creating the same that it can sue and be sued, have the effect of merely waiving its immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions. Such waiver of its immunity from suit is not an admission of its liability. Such waiver merely allows a private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights, but always subject to the lawful defenses of the Social Security System one of which is Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforestated. In other words, such waiver of immunity from suit is not equivalent to instant liability. The Social Security System can only be held liable for damages arising from the tortious acts of its officers and employees only if it acts through a special agent, which is not true in the case at bar. II It must be finally stressed that the Social Security System cannot be liable for damages because it is an entity of government performing governmental functions; hence, not profit-oriented. The 1963 doctrine in SSSEA vs. Soriano (7 SCRA 1016 [1963]) that the system is exercising proprietary functions, is no longer controlling. For in 1969, the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of the Government as laid down in the case of Bacani vs. Nacoco (100 Phil. 468 [1956]) has been obliterated. In the case of Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) vs. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO) [30 SCRA 649 (1969)], this Court in re- examining the aforesaid Bacani ruling observed that the trend has been to abandon and reject the traditional "Constituent-Ministrant" criterion in governmental functions in favor of the more responsive postulate that the growing complexities of modern society have rendered the traditional classification ofgovernment functions unrealistic and obsolete. WE held in the ACCFAcase, thus: LibLex "The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or groups of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must have undertaken in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere, else, the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course, this development was envisioned indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice." Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice, in his concurring opinion stressed that: "The decision reached by this Court so ably given expression in the opinion of Justice Makalintal, characterized with vigor, clarity and precision, represents what for me is a clear tendency not to be necessarily bound by our previous pronouncements on what activities partake of a nature that is governmental. Of even greater significance, there is a definite rejection of the 'constituent-ministrant' criterion of governmental functions, followed in Bacani vs. National Coconut Corporation. That indeed is cause for gratification. For me at least, there is again full adherence to the basic philosophy of the Constitution as to the extensive and vast power lodged in our government to cope with the social and economic problems that even now sorely beset us. There is therefore full concurrence on my part to the opinion of thecourt, distinguished by its high quality of juristic craftsmanship' (pp. 666-667). xxx xxx xxx "4.With the decision reached by us today, the government is freed from the compulsion exerted by the Bacani doctrine of the 'constituent- ministrant' test as a criterion for the type of activity in which it may engage. It constricting effect is consigned to oblivion. No doubts or misgivings need assail us that government efforts to promote the public weal, whether through regulatory legislation of vast scope and emplitude or through the undertaking of business activities, would have to face a searching and rigorous scrutiny. It is clear that their legitimacy cannot be challenged on the ground alone of their being offensive to the implications of the laissez-faire concept. Unless there be a repugnancy then to the limitations expressly set forth in the Constitution to protect individual rights, the government enjoys a much wider latitude of action as to the means it chooses to cope with grave social and economic problems that urgently press for solution. For me, at least, that is to manifest deference to the philosophy of our fundamental law. Hence my full concurrence, as announced at the outset" (pp. 682-683, emphasis supplied). The 1935 Constitution declared: "Sec. 5.The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State" (Art. II, Declaration ofPrinciples). The present 1973 Constitution provides under its Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article II), that "The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits" (Section 6); and "The State shall establish, maintain, and ensure adequate social services in the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare, and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Section 7). The strictly governmental function of the SSS is spelled out unmistakably in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1161 entitled "The Social Security Act of 1954," thus: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines, and shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."
As stated in the Explanatory Note to the Bill that became R.A. No. 1161, the Social Security Act of 1954: "It is a recognized principle in free societies that the State must help its citizens to make provision for emergencies beyond their control, such as unemployment, sickness requiring expensive medical treatment, and similar emergencies to a greater or lesser degree by means of social security legislation in a variety of forms." And this Court, in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. SSS (L-15045, 1 SCRA 10 [1961]), declared that "the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the 'policy of the Republic to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and provide protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death' (Sec. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended). Such enactment is a legitimate exercise ofthe police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the 'promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all the people." It is interesting to note that aforesaid pronouncement of this Court was incorporated in the Social Security Act (R.A. 1161) by Presidential Decree No. 24 issued on October 19, 1972. Thus, as amended by said Decree, its section 2 now reads: "It is the policy of the Republic of the Philippines to establish, develop, promote and perfect a sound viable tax-exempt social security service suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines, which shall provide to covered employees and their families protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age, and death, with a view to promoting their well-being in the spirit of social justice" (emphasis supplied). And one of its whereases expressly states that "the measure is necessary to effect reforms in SSS operations and to revitalize its structure as an important agency in the promotion of the social and economic development programs of the Government; . . ." (emphasis supplied). Considering therefore that the establishment and maintenance of an adequate social security and social services, which the Social Security System seeks to perform and achieve are functions pursuant to the basic constitutional mandate directing the State to promote "social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people" (1935 Constitution) or "to insure the dignity, welfare and security of all the people" as well as the police power of the State, the inescapable conclusion is that the function of the SSS is and has always been governmental. LibLex It thus becomes clear that petitioner Social Security System, under the obtaining facts and applicable laws in the case, is not liable for the damages caused to private respondents by the tortious acts of its officers and employees to whom the task done properly pertained. prLL A contrary rule as that enunciated in the majority opinion invites conspiracy between officials and employees of the Social Security System and private parties to create financial liabilities against the System. Its funds are public funds and more importantly trust funds, which must be protected. ||| (SSS v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41299, February 21, 1983)
EN BANC [G.R. No. L-15751. January 28, 1961.] BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners, vs. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO TOLERAN, respondents. Solicitor General for petitioner. Eulogio Lerum for respondents. SYLLABUS 1.JURISDICTION; FUNCTIONS OF BUREAU OF PRINTING NOT EXCLUSIVELY PROPRIETARY IN NATURE; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE BROUGHT AGAINST THE BUREAU. The Bureau of Printing is primarily a service bureau and is not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary benefit. Although it receives outside jobs and many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Hence, the Court of Industrial Relations is without jurisdiction to hear and determine complaints for unfair labor practice filed against the Bureau of Printing. 2.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; SUITS AGAINST THE STATE; BUREAU OF PRINTING NOT SUBJECT TO SUIT WITHOUT ITS CONSENT. As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. (Angat River Irrigation System, et. al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et. al., 102 Phil., 789.) D E C I S I O N GUTIERREZ DAVID, J p: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul certain orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to restrain it from further proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice pending before it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Giving due course to the petition, this Court ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for without bond. The action in question was upon complaint of the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU), Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma, the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practice by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly the members of the complaining association, in the exercise of their right to self-organization and discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing their union activities. Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to them and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing governmental functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having been also denied by the court en banc, the petitioners brought the case to this court through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. We find the petition to be meritorious. The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and is obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit. It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev. Adm. Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Anent the additional work it executes for private persons, we find that such work is done upon request, as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the requirements of Government work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms fixed by the Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department Head" (sec. 1665, id.). As shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of these works consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas from government officials, and for printing of checks of private banking institutions. On those greeting cards, the Government seal, of which only the Bureau of Printing is authorized to use, is embossed, and on the bank checks, only the Bureau of Printing can print the reproduction of the official documentary stamps appearing thereon. The volume of private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is only one-half of 1 per cent, and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does not include profit, because it is not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions. From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent Bureau of Printing, and is thus devoid of any authority to take cognizance of the case. This Court has already held in a long line of decisions that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or corporations not organized for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or business organization. This is so because the Industrial Peace Act was intended to apply only to industrial employment, and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial employees. (University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R No. L-15416, April 28, 1960; University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., G.R No. L-13282, April 22, 1960; See also the cases cited therein.) Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz., 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et al., G.R. Nos. L- 10943-44, December 28, 1957). The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said administrative charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute and investigate administrative charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it, which is in effect a review of the acts of executive officials having to do with the discipline of government employees under them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such functions by said officials. WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the respondent court.
Bengzon, Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur. Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result. ||| (Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees Ass'n, G.R. No. L-15751, January 28, 1961)
THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993.] DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents. Roy Lago Salcedo for private respondents. SYLLABUS 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; CONSTRUED. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued without its consent," reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. As has been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. We have had occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. 2.ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION ON NON-SUABILITY OF THE STATE. The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent"; its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States' consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPLIED CONSENT THROUGH CONTRACTS; QUALIFICATION. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. (United States of America vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487) 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the contract on security services; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e., for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Security Services, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, . . ." 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MONEY CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE; PROVISIONS OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 327 REQUIRING FILING OF CLAIMS WITH THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE LABOR CODE. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1445, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit. (Carabao, Inc. vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission) We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims against the State. The Labor Code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down inC.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445. 6.ID.; ID.; CONSENT NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH LIABILITY; REQUISITE FOR LIABILITY TO ATTACH. When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. In Republic vs. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. D E C I S I O N VITUG, J p: For consideration are the incidents that flow from the familiar doctrine of non- suability of the state. llcd In this petition for certiorari, the Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the Resolution, 1 dated 27 November 1991, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, denying the petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision 2 of 31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing on petitioner's property. The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract 3 on 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly rate of the guards, the same terms and conditions were also made to apply to another contract, dated 01 May 1990, between the same parties. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner. On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, 4 before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as NLRC Case No. 10-09-00455-90 (or 10-10-00519-90, its original docket number), against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency. LLjur The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May 1991, finding herein petitioner jointly and severally liable with sultan Security Agency for the payment of the money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory. cdrep On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution, 5 commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents. Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e., one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit Toyota Crown. 6 These units were put under the custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come first. A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction, was filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC"), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal effect. The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.
On 27 November 1991, the NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution; viz: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are issued: 1.The enforcement and execution of the judgments against petitioner in NLRC RABX Cases Nos. 10-10-00455-90; 10-10-0481-90 and 10-10- 00519-90 are temporarily suspended for a period of two (2) months, more or less, but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991 to enable petitioner to source and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it; 2.Meantime, petitioner is ordered and directed to source for funds within the period above-stated and to deposit the sums of money equivalent to the aggregate amount it has been adjudged to pay jointly and severally with respondent Sultan Security Agency with the Regional Arbitration Branch X, Cagayan de Oro City within the same period for proper disposition; 3.In order to ensure compliance with this order, petitioner is likewise directed to put up and post sufficient surety and supersedeas bond equivalent to at least to fifty (50%) percent of the total monetary award issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Supreme Court or by the Regional Trial court of Misamis Oriental to answer for the satisfaction of the money claims in case of failure or default on the part of petitioner to satisfy the money claims; 4.The City Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the properties of petitioner levied on execution within ten (10) days from notice of the posting of sufficient surety or supersedeas bond as specified above. In the meanwhile, petitioner is assessed to pay the costs and/or expenses incurred by the City Sheriff, if any, in connection with the execution of the judgments in the above-stated cases upon presentation of the appropriate claims or vouchers and receipts by the city Sheriff, subject to the conditions specified in the NLRC Sheriff, subject to the conditions specified in the NLRC Manual of Instructions for Sheriffs; 5.The right of any of the judgment debtors to claim reimbursement against each other for any payments made in connection with the satisfaction of the judgments herein is hereby recognized pursuant to the ruling in the Eagle Security case, (supra). In case of dispute between the judgment debtors, the Executive Labor Arbiter of the Branch of origin may upon proper petition by any of the parties conduct arbitration proceedings for the purpose and thereby render his decision after due notice and hearings; 6.Finally, the petition for injunction is Dismissed for lack of basis. The writ of preliminary injunction previously issued in Lifted and Set Aside and in lieu thereof, aTemporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of two (2) months but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991, conditioned upon the posting of a surety or supersedeas bond by petitioner with in ten (10) days from notice pursuant to paragraph 3 of this disposition. The motion to admit the complaint in intervention is Denied for lack of merit while the motion to dismiss the petition filed by Duty Sheriff in Noted. LLpr SO ORDERED." In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued without its consent," 7 reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. 8 It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. As has been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 9 True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. 10 We have had occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. 11 The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. 12 The States' consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law 13 or a special law. 14 In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found inAct No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." 15 Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim 16 or when it enters into a contract. 17 In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non- suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. 18 In United States of America vs. Ruiz, 19 where the questioned transaction dealt with the improvements on the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay, we held: "The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts ( jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts ( jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe. xxx xxx xxx The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes." In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e., for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Security Services, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, . . ." Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1445, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Thus, in Carabao, Inc., vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission, 20 we ruled: "(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that 'no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed.' " We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims against the State. The Labor Code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.
When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. 21 In Republic vs. Villasor 22 this Court, in nullifying the issuance of analias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. 23 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner. SO ORDERED. Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ ., concur. ||| (Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993)
FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. L-46930. June 10, 1988.] DALE SANDERS, and A.S. MOREAU, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents. D E C I S I O N CRUZ, J p: The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents. Once this question is decided, the other answers will fall into place and this petition need not detain us any longer than it already has. Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. 2 Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines,3 as so was private respondent Wyer, who died two years ago. 4 They were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA, the former having been hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969. 5 On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. 6 Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. The report on the hearing contained the observation that "Special Services management practices an autocratic form of supervision." 7 In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the complaint), Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear." On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a letter (Annex "B" of the complaint) purportedly coming from petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction," presumably of Moreau. On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976. 8 The plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in an order dated March 8, 1977, 9 on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond by the plaintiffs, against the properties of petitioner Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines. Subsequently, to make matters worse for the defendants, petitioner Moreau was declared in default by the trial court in its order dated August 9, 1977. The motion to lift the default order on the ground that Moreau's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of some misunderstanding, and the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss, which was filed by the petitioner's new lawyers, were denied by the respondent court on September 7, 1977. This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter filed before this Court, on the contention that the above-narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which the private respondents have sued them for damages. It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case. The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts were prima facie personal and tortious, decided to proceed to trial to determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of the evidence to be submitted by the parties. The petitioners have objected, arguing that no such evidence was needed to substantiate their claim of jurisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this question, we issued a temporary restraining order on September 26, 1977, that has since then suspended the proceedings in this case in the court a quo. LLjur In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act complained of can be determined from the pleadings exchanged between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court to require them to belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted. Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair to the defendant who is subjected to unnecessary and avoidable inconvenience. Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against the commanding general of the Olongapo Naval Base should not have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. It was the reverse situation in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 11 where we sustained the order of the lower court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of the American government. The United States had also not waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in United States of America v. Ruiz, 12 we set aside the denial by the lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed against the United States and several of its officials, it appearing that the act complained of was governmental rather than proprietary, and certainly not personal. In these and several other cases, 13 the Court found it redundant to prolong the proceedings after it had become clear that the suit could not prosper because the acts complained of were covered by the doctrine of state immunity. It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. 14 Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticism in effect a direct attack against him that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision." As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA. In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it. Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz., the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent. cdrep
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state immumity as applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts. 15 The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." 16 In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." 17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land." All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous consent of the state. To be sure, there are a number of well- recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of sale;18 or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the national treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; 20 or the commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax overpayments from a fund already available for the purpose; 21 or, in general, to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act to assist him. We have also held that where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the government even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice." 22 This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, 23 where the Court held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act. The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recognized exceptions. The government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 24 This, too, is well-settled. 25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the letters come under the concept of privileged communications and are not punishable, 26 let alone the fact that the resented remarks are not defamatory by our standards. It seems the private respondents have overstated their case. A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private respondents are themselves American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base. The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with citations of American cases, as if they were arguing before a court of the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude. While these decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at best be invoked only to support our own jurisprudence, which we have developed and enriched on the basis of our own persuasions as a people, particularly since we became independent in 1946. LLjur We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only from the United States but also from Spain and other countries from which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But we should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. The private respondents must, if they are still so minded, pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming that our own laws are applicable, the United States government has not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts, which therefore has not acquired the competence to act on the said claim. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8, 1977, August 9, 1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order of September 26, 1977, is made PERMANENT. No costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. ||| (Sanders v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988)
EN BANC [G.R. No. 84607. March 19, 1993.] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. RAMON MONTANO, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. EDGAR DULA TORRES, COL. CEZAR NAZARENO, MAJ. FILEMON GASMEN, PAT. NICANOR ABANDO, PFC SERAPIN CEBU, JR., GEN. BRIGIDO PAREDES, COL. ROGELIO MONFORTE, PFC ANTONIO LUCERO, PAT. JOSE MENDIOLA, PAT. NELSON TUAZON, POLICE CORPORAL PANFILO ROGOS, POLICE LT. JUAN B. BELTRAN, PAT. NOEL MANAGBAO, MARINE THIRD CLASS TRAINEE (3CT) NOLITO NOGATO, 3CT ALEJANDRO B. NAGUIO, JR., EFREN ARCILLAS, 3CT AGERICO LUNA, 3CT BASILIO BORJA, 3CT MANOLITO LUSPO, 3CT CRISTITUTO GERVACIO, 3CT MANUEL DELA CRUZ, JR., MARINE (CDC) BN., (CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL), MOBILE DISPERSAL TEAM (MDT), LT. ROMEO PAQUINTO, LT. LAONGLAANG GOCE, MAJ. DEMETRIO DE LA CRUZ, POLICE CAPTAIN RODOLFO NAVAL, JOHN DOE, RICHARD DOE, ROBERTO DOE AND OTHER DOES, petitioners, vs. HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE EVANGELIO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR., EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, and ROSELLA ROBALE, respondents. [G.R. No. 84645. March 19, 1993.] ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE EVANGELIO, RODRIGO GRAMPA, ANGELITO GUTIERREZ, BERNABE LAKINDANUM, ROBERTO YUMUL, LEOPOLDO ALONZO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR. EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, ROSELLA ROBALE, petitioners, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, respondents. SYLLABUS 1.POLITICAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF STATE'S IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; CONSTRUED. Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government. 2.ID.; ID.; NOT DEEMED WAIVED WHEN THE GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZES THE INDEMNIFICATION FOR THE VICTIM OR THROUGH PUBLIC ADDRESSES MADE BY THE PRESIDENT. Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnity the heirs and victims of the Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by then President Aquino in the aftermath of the killings, the State has consented to be sued. This is not a suit against the State with its consent. Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place." In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads: "1. Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission of any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper court." In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body. Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people." Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquino's speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit. 3.ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE; RULE; CASE AT BAR. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are" (1) When the Republic is sued by name; (2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; (3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. 4.ID.; ID.; CANNOT INSTITUTIONALIZE IRRESPONSIBILITY AND NON- ACCOUNTABILITY NOR GRANT A PRIVILEGE STATUS NOT CLAIMED BY ANY OTHER OFFICIAL OF THEREPUBLIC. As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. Until recently in 1991, this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non- accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. The military and police forces were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to guarantee the safety of the very people that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court showed that they fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the latter. 5.ID.; ID.; DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE RELIEF DEMANDED BY THE SUIT REQUIRES NO AFFIRMATIVE OFFICIAL ACTION ON THE PART OF THE STATE NOR THE AFFIRMATIVE DISCHARGE OF ANY OBLIGATION WHICH BELONGS TO THE STATE IN ITS POLITICAL CAPACITY. While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another."
D E C I S I O N CAMPOS, JR., J p: People may have already forgotten the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. It is quite ironic that then, some journalists called it a Black Thursday, as a grim reminder to the nation of the misfortune that befell twelve (12) rallyists. But for most Filipinos now, the Mendiola massacre may now just as well be a chapter in our history books. For those however, who have become widows and orphans, certainly they would not settle for just that. They seek retribution for the lives taken that will never be brought back to life again. LLjur Hence, the heirs of the deceased, together with those injured(Caylao group), instituted this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 84645, under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Orders of respondent Judge Sandoval, 1 dated May 31 and August 8, 1988, dismissing the complaint for damages of herein petitioners against the Republic of the Philippines in Civil Case. No. 88-43351. Petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, through a similar remedy, docketed as G.R. No. 84607, seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated May 31, 1988, in Civil Case No. 88-43351 entitled "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al." The pertinent portion of the questioned Order 2 dated May 31, 1988, reads as follows: "With respect however to the other defendants, the impleaded Military Officers, since they are being charged in their personal and official capacity, and holding them liable, if at all, would not result in financial responsibility of the government, the principle of immunity from suit can not conveniently and correspondingly be applied to them. WHEREFORE, the case as against the defendant Republic of the Philippines is hereby dismissed. As against the rest of the defendants the motion to dismiss is denied. They are given a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this order within which to file their respective pleadings." On the other hand, the Order 3 , dated August 8, 1988, denied the motions filed by both parties, for a reconsideration of the abovecited Order, respondent Judge finding no cogent reason to disturb the said order. The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of encampment by members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco Administration Building along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City. The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments. The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on January 15, 1987. The two days that followed saw a marked increase in people at the encampment. It was only on January 19, 1987 that Jaime Tadeo arrived to meet with then Minister Heherson Alvarez, only to be informed that the Minister can only meet with him the following day. On January 20, 1987, the meeting was held at the MAR conference room. Tadeo demanded that the minimum comprehensive land reform program be granted immediately. Minister Alvarez, for his part, can only promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President Aquino, during the cabinet meeting on January 21, 1987. Tension mounted the following day. The farmers, now on their seventh day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from going inside their offices. They hoisted the KMP flag together with the Philippine flag. At around 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Minister Alvarez, in a meeting with Tadeo and his leaders, advised the latter to instead wait for the ratification of the 1987 Constitutionand just allow the government to implement its comprehensive land reform program. Tadeo, however, countered by saying that he did not believe in the Constitution and that a genuine land reform cannot be realized under a landlord-controlled Congress. A heated discussion ensued between Tadeo and Minister Alvarez. This notwithstanding, Minister Alvarez suggested a negotiating panel from each side to meet again the following day. On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to Malacaang to air their demands. Before the march started, Tadeo talked to the press and TV media. He uttered fiery words, the most telling of which were: ". . . inalis namin ang barikada bilang kahilingan ng ating Presidente, pero kinakailangan alisin din niya ang barikada sa Mendiola sapagkat bubutasin din namin iyon at dadanak ang dugo . . ." 4 The farmers then proceeded to march to Malacaang, from Quezon Memorial Circle, at 10:00 a.m. They were later joined by members of other sectoral organizations such as the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS) and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML). At around 1:00 p.m., the marchers reached Liwasang Bonifacio where they held a brief program. It was at this point that some of the marchers entered the eastern side of the Post Office Building, and removed the steel bars surrounding the garden. Thereafter, they joined the march to Malacaang. At about 4:30 p.m., they reached C.M. Recto Avenue. In anticipation of a civil disturbance, and acting upon reports received by the Capital Regional Command (CAPCOM) that the rallyists would proceed to Mendiola to break through the police lines and rush towards Malacaang, CAPCOM Commander General Ramon E. Montao inspected the preparations and adequacy of the government forces to quell impending attacks. OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task Force Nazareno under the command of Col. Cesar Nazareno was deployed at the vicinity of Malacaang. The civil disturbance control units of the Western Police District under Police Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim were also activated. Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated by CPP/NPA elements and that an insurrection was impending. The threat seemed grave as there were also reports that San Beda College and Centro Escolar University would be forcibly occupied. In its report, the Citizens' Mendiola Commission (a body specifically tasked to investigate the facts surrounding the incident, Commission for short) stated that the government anti-riot forces were assembled at Mendiola in a formation of three phalanges, in the following manner: "(1)The first line was composed of policemen from police stations Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and the Chinatown detachment of the Western Police District. Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, was designated as ground commander of the CDC first line of defense. The WPD CDC elements were positioned at the intersection of Mendiola and Legarda Streets after they were ordered to move forward from the top of Mendiola bridge. The WPD forces were in khaki uniform and carried the standard CDC equipment aluminum shields, truncheons and gas masks. (2)At the second line of defense about ten (10) yards behind the WPD policemen were the elements of the Integrated National Police (INP) Field Force stationed at Fort Bonifacio from the 61st and 62nd INP Field Force, who carried also the standard CDC equipment truncheons, shields and gas masks. The INP Field Force wasunder the command of Police Major Demetrio dela Cruz. (3)Forming the third line was the Marine Civil Disturbance Control Battalion composed of the first and second companies of the Philippine Marines stationed at Fort Bonifacio. The marines were all equipped with shields, truncheons and M-16 rifles (armalites) slung at their backs, under the command of Major Felimon B. Gasmin. The Marine CDC Battalion was positioned in line formation ten (10) yards farther behind the INP Field Force. At the back of the marines were four (4) 6 x 6 army trucks, occupying the entire width of Mendiola street, followed immediately by two water cannons, one on each side of the street and eight fire trucks, four trucks on each side of the street. The eight fire trucks from Fire District I of Manila under Fire Superintendent Mario C. Tanchanco, were to supply water to the two water cannons. Stationed farther behind the CDC forces were the two Mobile Dispersal Teams (MDT) each composed of two tear gas grenadiers, two spotters, an assistant grenadier, a driver and the team leader. In front of the College of the Holy Spirit near Gate 4 of Malacaang stood the VOLVO Mobile Communications Van of the Commanding General of CAPCOM/INP, General Ramon E. Montao. At this command post, after General Montao had conferred with TF Nazareno Commander, Colonel Cezar Nazareno, about the adequacy and readiness of his forces, it was agreed that Police General Alfredo S. Lim would designate Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torres and Police Major Conrado Francisco as negotiators with the marchers. Police General Lim then proceeded to the WPD CDC elements already positioned at the foot of Mendiola bridge to relay to Police Colonel Torres and Police Major Francisco the instructions that the latter would negotiate with the marchers." 5 (Emphasis supplied) The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000. From C.M. Recto Avenue, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place between the marchers and the anti-riot squad. It was at this moment that a clash occurred and, borrowing the words of the Commission "pandemonium broke loose". The Commission stated in its findings, to wit: ". . . There was an explosion followed by throwing of pillboxes, stones and bottles. Steel bars, wooden clubs and lead pipes were used against the police. The police fought back with their shields and truncheons. The police line was breached. Suddenly shots were heard. The demonstrators disengaged from the government forces and retreated towards C.M. Recto Avenue. But sporadic firing continued from the government forces.
After the firing ceased, two MDTs headed by Lt. Romeo Paguinto and Lt. Laonglaan Goce sped towards Legarda Street and lobbed tear gas at the remaining rallyist still grouped in the vicinity of Mendiola. After dispersing the crowd, the two MDTs, together with the two WPD MDTs, proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio upon order of General Montao to disperse the rallyists assembled thereat. Assisting the MDTs were a number of policemen from the WPD, attired in civilian clothes with white head bands, who were armed with long firearms." 6 (Emphasis ours) After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead, although according to Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he was not able to give the name and address of said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were wounded by gunshots and twelve (12) sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of the marchers. Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained gunshot wounds and twenty (20) suffered minor physical injuries such as abrasions, contusions and the like. In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11, 7 (A.O. 11, for brevity) dated January 22, 1987, which created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. The body was composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman, retired Supreme Court Justice Jose Y. Feria and Mr. Antonio U. Miranda, both as members. A.O. 11 stated that the Commission was created precisely for the "purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place in the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the afternoon of January 22, 1987". The Commission was expected to have submitted its findings not later than February 6, 1987. But it failed to do so. Consequently, the deadline was moved to February 16, 1987 by Administrative Order No. 13. Again, the Commission was unable to meet this deadline. Finally, on February 27, 1987, it submitted its report, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 17, issued on February 11, 1987. In its report, the Commission recapitulated its findings, to wit: "(1)The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by Jaime Tadeo, together with the other sectoral groups, was not covered by any permit as required under Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985, in violation of paragraph (a) Section 13, punishable under paragraph (a), Section 14 of said law. (2)The crowd dispersal control units of the police and the military were armed with .38 and .45 caliber handguns, and M-16 armalites, which is a prohibited act under paragraph 4(g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880. (3)The security men assigned to protect the WPD, INP Field Force, the Marines and supporting military units, as well as the security officers of the police and military commanders were in civilian attire in violation of paragraph (a), Section 10, Batas Pambansa 880. (4)There was unnecessary firing by the police and military crowd dispersal control units in dispersing the marchers, a prohibited act under paragraph (e), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880. (5)The carrying and use of steel bars, pillboxes, darts, lead pipe, wooden clubs with spikes, and guns by the marchers as offensive weapons are prohibited acts punishable under paragraph (g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (e), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880. (6)The KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with the MAR officials and were determined to march to Malacaang, emboldened as they are, by the inflammatory and incendiary utterances of their leader, Jaime Tadeo "bubutasin namin ang barikada. Dadanak and dugo . . . Ang nagugutom na magsasaka ay gagawa ng sariling butas . . ." (7)There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the government forces. Upon approaching the intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the marchers began pushing the police lines and penetrated and broke through the first line of the CDC contingent. (8)The police fought back with their truncheons and shields. They stood their ground but the CDC line was breached. There ensued gunfire from both sides. It is not clear who started the firing. (9)At the onset of the disturbance and violence, the water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the rioting crowd. (10)The water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because (a) there was no order to use them; (b) they were incorrectly prepositioned; and (c) they were out of range of the marchers. (11)Tear gas was not used at the start of the disturbance to disperse the rioters. After the crowd had dispersed and the wounded and dead were being carried away, the MDTs of the police and the military with their tear gas equipment and components conducted dispersal operations in the Mendiola area and proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio to disperse the remnants of the marchers. (12)No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but no official reason was given for its absence." 8 From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended 9 the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals, shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers. In connection with this, it was the Commission's recommendation that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be tasked to undertake investigations regarding the identities of those who actually fired their guns that resulted in the death of or injury to the victims of the incident. The Commission also suggested that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police District and the INP Field Force, who were armed during the incident, be prosecuted for violation of paragraph 4(g) of Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. The Commission's recommendation also included the prosecution of the marchers, for carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but whose identities have yet to be established. As for Jaime Tadeo, the Commission said that he should be prosecuted both for violation of paragraph (a), Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 for holding the rally without a permit and for violation of Article 142, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code for inciting to sedition. As for the following officers, namely: (1) Gen. Ramon E. Montao; (2) Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim; (3) Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres; (4) Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz; (5) Col. Cezar Nazareno; and (5) Maj. Felimon Gasmin, for their failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola, administrative sanctions were recommended to be imposed. LLpr The last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the government. Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received by the victims. Thus, on July 27, 1987, herein petitioners, (Caylao group) filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the Government. 10 This formal demand was indorsed by the office of the Executive Secretary to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on August 13, 1987. The House Committee on Human Rights, on February 10, 1988, recommended the expeditious payment of compensation to the Mendiola victims. 11 After almost a year, on January 20, 1988, petitioners (Caylao group) were constrained to institute an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident, before the trial court. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43351. On February 23, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent. Petitioners opposed said motion on March 16, 1988, maintaining that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights. Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed the complaint as against the Republic of the Philippines on the ground that there was no waiver by the State. Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for Reconsideration therefrom, but the same was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated August 8, 1988. Consequently, Caylao and her co-petitioners filed the instant petition. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers and personnel impleaded as defendants in the court below, filed its petition for certiorari. Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically identical issues, the two (2) petitions were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this Decision. The resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit. Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims of the Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by then President Aquino in the aftermath of the killings, the State has consented to be sued. Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 12 It also rests on reasons of public policy that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government. 13
This is not a suit against the State with its consent. Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place." 14 In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads: "1.Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission of any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper court." 15 In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body. Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people". Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquino's speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit. Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: 16 (1)When the Republic is sued by name; (2)When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; (3)When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. 17 Moreover, the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 18 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. 19 As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. 20 Until recently in 1991, 21 this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. The military and police forces were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to guarantee the safety of the very people that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court showed that they fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the latter. While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. 22 This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another." 23 The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this court in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 24 herein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for damages. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C . J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., J., on terminal leave. ||| (Republic v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 84607, 84645, March 19, 1993)
SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 2947. October 19, 1906.] THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. VICENTE RUIZ, defendant-appellant. Hartigan, Rohde, & Gutierrez, for appellant. Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee. SYLLABUS 1.ESTAFA. To convict of estafa in this case it was not necessary to prove that the defendant failed to deliver the same coins received. It is a legal maxim that "one owes 'the same' as one receives, and that 'the same' is the thing or amount itself or amount itself or its proper equivalent." D E C I S I O N ARELLANO, J p: The defendant has been sentenced to five months' imprisonment (arresto mayor) with the accessories of article 61 of the Penal Code, to pay to the New York Life Insurance Co., of the city, the sum of $172.74, United States currency, or its equivalent, P345.58, Philippine currency, or in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment to the extent of one-third of the provincial penalty, and to pay the costs. The defendant has appealed from the judgment, but has pointed out no fundamental error. Article 535, paragraph 5, of the Penal Code, provides that the crime ofestafa is committed by those who, to the prejudice of another, convert or misappropriate money or any other chattel which they may have received on deposit, on commission, or for administration. The accused misappropriated money received in commission for that company for which he was soliciting agent, to the amount expressed in the judgment. He has consequently been guilty of the crime charged. One of the arguments advanced by the defendant in this instance is that he who fails to deliver or return the same thing which he was under obligation to return or deliver is guilty of estafa, and that as the accused did not receive the money in question in United States currency, he could not be guilty of misappropriating in United States currency. The court did not convict him for having converted a chattel received other than on commission - that is, received under any other title than that included in the words "on deposit, on commission, or for administration" - but convicted him for having misappropriated money received on commission. To this end it was not necessary that he should have failed to deliver the same coins received. It was sufficient if he failed to deliver the money received under this circumstances. The code furthermore punish as guilty of estafa he who converts to his own use any chattel received by him, on deposit, commission, or for administration, or by virtue of any other contract from which "arises the obligation of delivering it up, or returning," as for example, comodato, pledge, and others. In this case the delinquent converted specific thing which it was his duty to deliver or return. Moreover, in the case of money, it is a legal maxim that "one owes 'the same' as one receives, and that the same' is the thing or amount itself or its proper equivalent." It is contended by the defense that no evidence has been introduced in order to establish the equivalence between the two sums. This is not correct inasmuch as the defendant himself, in his letters to the complaining witness and in his testimony, indicates the rate of exchange upon which be acted in collecting the insurance premiums, and issuing receipts expressed in United States currency. It follows, therefore, that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with law, with the exception that the words "fifty-eight cents" should be amended to read "forty-eight cents." The judgment is, therefore, affirmed in its entirely with the costs of this instance. The amount of 345.58 pesos in the judgment is to be changed to 345.48 pesos, Philippine currency. After the expiration of ten days from the entry of judgment the cause will be remanded for execution. So ordered. Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur. ||| (US v. Ruiz, G.R. No. 2947, October 19, 1906)
THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. L-34548. November 29, 1988.] RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PACIFICO P. DE CASTRO and PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, respondents. Meer, Meer & Meer for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondents. SYLLABUS 1.REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; ATTACHMENT; GARNISHMENT; BANK NOT LIABLE FOR RELEASING DEPOSITOR'S FUND SUBJECT OF GARNISHMENT. Petitioner bank cannot be held solidarily liable with the judgment creditor for reimbursement of the garnished funds to the depositor because it merely obeyed a mandatory court directive to deliver the amount by check to the sheriff. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GARNISHED FUNDS ARE IN CUSTODY LEGIS. Upon the order of garnishment, the funds are in custodia legis. Subsequent encashment by the sheriff is in exercise of the court's power of control over the funds, and is not the bank's concern. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF COURT ORDER DOES NOT PREJUDICE BANK. The bank's compliance with the court order before the decree of nullity should not work to its prejudice, the presumption being that judicial orders are valid and issued in the regular performance of the duties of the court. 4.POLITICAL LAW; PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, AN ORDINARY CORPORATION. The Philippine Virginia Tobacco Corporation is an ordinary corporation subject to the Corporation Law, and has a personality separate and distinct from the government which owns and controls it. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; FUNDS CAN BE GARNISHED; RATIONALE. The funds of the PVTA are not public funds therefore not exempt from garnishment. When the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. D E C I S I O N CORTES, J p: The crux of the instant controversy dwells on the liability of a bank for releasing its depositor's funds upon orders of the court, pursuant to a writ of garnishment. If in compliance with the court order, the bank delivered the garnished amount to the sheriff, who in turn delivered it to the judgment creditor, but subsequently, the order of the court directing payment was set aside by the same judge, should the bank be held solidarily liable with the judgment creditor to its depositor for reimbursement of the garnished funds? The Court does not think so. In Civil Case No. Q-12785 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch IX entitled "Badoc Planters, Inc. versus Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, et al.," which was an action for recovery of unpaid tobacco deliveries, an Order (Partial Judgment) was issued on January 15, 1970 by the Hon. Lourdes P. San Diego, then Presiding Judge, ordering the defendants therein to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff Badoc Planters, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "BADOC") within 48 hours the aggregate amount of P206,916.76, with legal interests thereon. On January 26, 1970, BADOC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Writ of Execution of the said Partial Judgment which was granted on the same day by the herein respondent judge who acted in place of the Hon. Judge San Diego who had just been elevated as a Justice of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court on the very same day, issued a Writ of Execution addressed to Special Sheriff Faustino Rigor, who then issued a Notice of Garnishment addressed to the General Manager and/or Cashier of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as RCBC), the petitioner in this case, requesting a reply within five (5) days to said garnishment as to any property which the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (hereinafter referred to as "PVTA") might have in the possession or control of petitioner or of any debts owing by the petitioner to said defendant. Upon receipt of such Notice, RCBC notified PVTA thereof to enable the PVTA to take the necessary steps for the protection of its own interest [Record on Appeal, p. 36]. cdll Upon an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated January 27, 1970 filed by BADOC, the respondent Judge issued an Order granting the Ex-Parte Motion and directing the herein petitioner "to deliver in check the amount garnished to Sheriff Faustino Rigor and Sheriff Rigor in turn is ordered to cash the check and deliver the amount to the plaintiff's representative and/or counsel on record." [Record on Appeal, p. 20; Rollo, p. 5.] In compliance with said Order, petitioner delivered to Sheriff Rigor a certified check in the sum of P206,916.76. Respondent PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated February 26, 1970 which was granted in an Order dated April 6, 1970, setting aside the Orders of Execution and of Payment and the Writ of Execution and ordering petitioner and BADOC "to restore, jointly and severally, the account of PVTA with the said bank in the same condition and state it was before the issuance of the aforesaid Orders by reimbursing the PVTA of the amount of P206, 916.76 with interests at the legal rate from January 27, 1970 until fully paid to the account of the PVTA. This is without prejudice to the right of plaintiff to move for the execution of the partial judgment pending appeal in case the motion for reconsideration is denied and appeal is taken from the said partial judgment." [Record on Appeal, p.58.]. The Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order of April 6, 1970 filed by herein petitioner was denied in the Order of respondent judge dated June 10, 1970 and on June 19, 1970, which was within the period for perfecting an appeal, the herein petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals from the said Orders. This case was then certified by the Court of Appeals to this Honorable Court, involving as it does purely questions of law. The petitioner raises two principal queries in the instant case: 1) Whether Or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to garnishment; and 2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the herein petitioner to reimburse the amount paid to the Special Sheriff by virtue of the execution issued pursuant to the Order/Partial Judgment dated January 15, 1970. The record reveals that on February 2, 1970, private respondent PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order/Partial Judgment of January 15, 1970. This was granted and the aforementioned Partial Judgment was set aside. The case was set for hearings on November 4, 9 and 11, 1970 [Rollo, pp. 205-207.] However, in view of the failure of plaintiff BADOC to appear on the said dates, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the case against PVTA for failure to prosecute [Rollo, p. 208.]. prLL It must be noted that the Order of respondent Judge dated April 6, 1970 directing the plaintiff to reimburse PVTA the amount of P206,916.76 with interests became final as to said plaintiff who failed to even file a motion for reconsideration, much less to appeal from the said Order. Consequently, the order to restore the account of PVTA with RCBCin the same condition and state it was before the issuance of the questioned orders must be upheld as to the plaintiff, BADOC. However, the questioned Order of April 6, 1970 must be set aside insofar as it ordered the petitioner RCBC, jointly and severally with BADOC to reimburse PVTA. The petitioner merely obeyed a mandatory directive from the respondent Judge dated January 27, 1970, ordering petitioner "to deliver in check the amount garnished to Sheriff Faustino Rigor and Sheriff Rigor is in turn ordered to cash the check and deliver the amount to the plaintiff's representative and/or counsel on record." [Record on Appeal, p. 20.]. PVTA however claims that the manner in which the bank complied with the Sheriff's Notice of Garnishment indicated breach of trust and dereliction of duty on the part of the bank as custodian of government funds. It insistently urges that the premature delivery of the garnished amount by RCBC to the special sheriff even in the absence of a demand to deliver made by the latter, before the expiration of the five-day period given to reply to the Notice of Garnishment, without any reply having been given thereto nor any prior authorization from its depositor, PVTA and even if the court's order of January 27, 1970 did not require the bank to immediately deliver the garnished amount constitutes such lack of prudence as to make it answerable jointly and severally with the plaintiff for the wrongful release of the money from the deposit of the PVTA. The respondent Judge in his controverted Order sustained such contention and blamed RCBC for the supposed "hasty release of the amount from the deposit of the PVTA without giving PVTA a chance to take proper steps by informing it of the action being taken against its deposit, thereby observing with prudence the five-day period given to it by the sheriff." [Rollo, p. 81.] Such allegations must be rejected for lack of merit. In the first place, it should be pointed out that RCBC did not deliver the amount on the strength solely of a Notice of Garnishment; rather, the release of the funds was made pursuant to the aforesaid Order of January 27, 1970. While the Notice of Garnishment dated January 26, 1970 contained no demand of payment as it was a mere request for petitioner to withhold any funds of the PVTA then in its possession, the Order of January 27, 1970 categorically required the delivery in check of the amount garnished to the special sheriff, Faustino Rigor. In the second place, the bank had already filed a reply to the Notice of Garnishment stating that it had in its custody funds belonging to the PVTA, which, in fact was the basis of the plaintiff in filing a motion to secure delivery of the garnished amount to the sheriff. [See Rollo, p. 93.]. Lastly, the bank, upon the receipt of the Notice of Garnishment, duly informed PVTA thereof to enable the latter to take the necessary steps for the protection of its own interest [Record on Appeal, p. 36]. cdll
It is important to stress, at this juncture, that there was nothing irregular in the delivery of the funds of PVTA by check to the sheriff, whose custody is equivalent to the custody of the court, he being a court officer. The order of the court dated January 27, 1970 was composed of two parts, requiring: 1) RCBC to deliver in check the amount garnished to the designated sheriff and 2) the sheriff in turn to cash the check and deliver the amount to the plaintiff's representative and/or counsel on record. It must be noted that in delivering the garnished amount in check to the sheriff, the RCBC did not thereby make any payment, for the law mandates that delivery of a check does not produce the effect of payment until it has been cashed. [Article 1249, Civil Code.]. Moreover, by virtue of the order of garnishment, the same was placed in custodia legis and therefore, from that time on, RCBC was holding the funds subject to the orders of the court a quo. That the sheriff, upon delivery of the check to him by RCBC encashed it and turned over the proceeds thereof to the plaintiff was no longer the concern ofRCBC as the responsibility over the garnished funds passed to the court. Thus, no breach of trust or dereliction of duty can be attributed to RCBC in delivering its depositor's funds pursuant to a court order which was merely in the exercise of its power of control over such funds. . . . The garnishment of property to satisfy a writ of execution operates as an attachment and fastens upon the property a lien by which the property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. It is brought into custodia legis, under the sole control of such court . . . [De Leon v. Salvador, G.R. Nos. L-30871 and L-31603, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 567, 574.]. The respondent judge however, censured the petitioner for having released the funds "simply on the strength of the Order of the court which, far from ordering an immediate release of the amount involved, merely serves as a standing authority to make the release at the proper time as prescribed by the rules." [Rollo, p. 81.] This argument deserves no serious consideration. As stated earlier, the order directing the bank to deliver the amount to the sheriff was distinct and separate from the order directing the sheriff to encash the said check. The bank had no choice but to comply with the order demanding delivery of the garnished amount in check. The very tenor of the order called for immediate compliance therewith. On the other hand, the bank cannot be held liable for the subsequent encashment of the check as this was upon order of the court in the exercise of its power of control over the funds placed in custodia legis by virtue of the garnishment. In a recent decision [Engineering Construction Inc., v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. L-34589, June 29, 1988] penned by the now Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan, this Court absolved a garnishee from any liability for prompt compliance with its order for the delivery of the garnished funds. The rationale behind such ruling deserves emphasis in the present case: But while partial restitution is warranted in favor of NPC, we find that the Appellate Court erred in not absolving MERALCO, the garnishee, from its obligations to NPC with respect to the payment of ECI of P1,114,543.23, thus in effect subjecting MERALCO to double liability. MERALCO should not have been faulted for its prompt obedience to a writ of garnishment. Unless there are compelling reasons such as: a defect on the face of the Writ or actual knowledge on the part of the garnishee of lack of entitlement on the part of the garnisher, it is not incumbent upon the garnishee to inquire or to judge for itself whether or not the order for the advance execution of a judgment is valid. Section 8, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides: Effect of attachment of debts and credits. All persons having in their possession or under their control any credits or other similar personal property belonging to the party against whom attachment is issued, or owing any debts to the same, at the time of service upon them of a copy of the order of attachment and notice as provided in the last preceding section, shall be liable to the applicant for the amount of such credits, debts or other property, until the attachment be discharged, or any judgment recovered by him be satisfied, unless such property be delivered or transferred, or such debts be paid, to the clerk, sheriff or other proper officer of the court issuing the attachment. Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. Under the above-cited rule, the garnishee [the third person] is obliged to deliver the credits, etc. to the proper officer issuing the writ and "the law exempts from liability the person having in his possession or under his control any credits or other personal property belonging to the defendant, . . ., if such property be delivered or transferred, . . ., to the clerk, sheriff, or other officer of the court in which the action is pending. [3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 34 (1970 ed.)]. Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, MERALCO, as garnishee, after having been judicially compelled to pay the amount of the judgment represented by funds in its possession belonging to the judgment debtor or NPC, should be released from all responsibilities over such amount after delivery thereof to the sheriff. The reason for the rule is self-evident. To expose garnishees to risks for obeying court orders and processes would only undermine the administration of justice. [Emphasis supplied.] The aforequoted ruling thus bolsters RCBC's stand that its immediate compliance with the lower court's order should not have been met with the harsh penalty of joint and several liability. Nor can its liability to reimburse PVTA of the amount delivered in check be premised upon the subsequent declaration of nullity of the order of delivery. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner: xxx xxx xxx That the respondent Judge, after his Order was enforced, saw fit to recall said Order and decree its nullity, should not prejudice one who dutifully abided by it, the presumption being that judicial orders are valid and issued in the regular performance of the duties of the Court" [Section 5(m) Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court]. This should operate with greater force in relation to the herein petitioner which, not being a party in the case, was just called upon to perform an act in accordance with a judicial fiat. A contrary view will invite disrespect for the majesty of the law and induce reluctance in complying with judicial orders out of fear that said orders might be subsequently invalidated and thereby expose one to suffer some penalty or prejudice for obeying the same. And this is what will happen were the controversial orders to be sustained. We need not underscore the danger of this as a precedent. xxx xxx xxx [Brief for the Petitioner, Rollo, p. 212.] From the foregoing, it may be concluded that the charge of breach of trust and/or dereliction of duty as well as lack of prudence in effecting the immediate payment of the garnished amount is totally unfounded. Upon receipt of the Notice of Garnishment, RCBC duly informed PVTA thereof to enable the latter to take the necessary steps for its protection. However, right on the very next day after its receipt of such notice, RCBC was already served with the Order requiring delivery of the garnished amount. Confronted as it was with a mandatory directive, disobedience to which exposed it to a contempt order, it had no choice but to comply. The respondent Judge nevertheless held that the liability of RCBC for the reimbursement of the garnished amount is predicated on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. Hon. San Diego [G.R. No. L-30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616] which he found practically on all fours with the case at bar. Cdpr The Court disagrees. The said case which reiterated the rule in Republic v. Palacio [G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899] that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment is definitely distinguishable from the case at bar. In the Commissioner of Public Highways case [supra], the bank which precipitately allowed the garnishment and delivery of the funds failed to inform its depositor thereof, charged as it was with knowledge of the nullity of the writ of execution and notice of garnishment against government funds. In the aforementioned case, the funds involved belonged to the Bureau of Public Highways, which being an arm of the executive branch of the government, has no personality of its own separate from the National Government. The funds involved were government funds covered by the rule on exemption from execution. This brings us to the first issue raised by the petitioner: Are the PVTA funds public funds exempt from garnishment? The Court holds that they are not. Republic Act No. 2265 created the PVTA as an ordinary corporation with all the attributes of a corporate entity subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law. Hence, it possesses the power "to sue and be sued" and "to acquire and hold such assets and incur such liabilities resulting directly from operations authorized by the provisions of this Act or as essential to the proper conduct of such operations." [Section 3, Republic Act No. 2265.]. Among the specific powers vested in the PVTA are: 1) to buy Virginia tobacco grown in the Philippines for resale to local bona fide tobacco manufacturers and leaf tobacco dealers [Section 4(b), R.A. No. 2265]; 2) to enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of its purpose with any person, firm or corporation, with the Government of the Philippines or with any foreign government, subject to existing laws [Section 4(h), R.A. No. 2265]; and 3) generally, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act [Section 4(k), R.A. No. 2265.].
From the foregoing, it is clear that PVTA has been endowed with a personality distinct and separate from the government which owns and controls it. Accordingly, this Court has heretofore declared that the funds of the PVTA can be garnished since "funds of public corporation which can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment" [Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan, G.R. No. L- 33112, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 595, 598.]. In National Shipyards and Steel Corp. v. CIR [G.R. No. L-17874, August 31, 1964, 8 SCRA 781], this Court held that the allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government and that as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon is untenable for, as a government-owned or controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the government. This court has likewise ruled that other government-owned and controlled corporations like National Coal Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), the National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) and the Price Stabilization Council (PRISCO), which possess attributes similar to those of the PVTA are clothed with personalities of their own, separate and distinct from that of the government [National Coal Company v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil. 583 (1924); Bacani and Matoto v. National Coconut Corporation et al., 100 Phil. 471 (1956); Reotan v. National Rice & Corn Corporation, G.R. No. L-16223, February 27, 1962, 4 SCRA 418.] The rationale in vesting it with a separate personality is not difficult to find. It is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation [Manila Hotel Employees' Association v. Manila Hotel Co. and CIR, 73 Phil. 734 (1941).] Accordingly, as emphatically expressed by this Court in a 1978 decision, "garnishment was the appropriate remedy for the prevailing party which could proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned or controlled by the government" inasmuch as "by engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations" [Philippine National Bank v. CIR, G.R No. L- 32667, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 314, 319.] Furthermore, in the case of PVTA, the law has expressly allowed its funds to answer for various obligations, including the one sought to be enforced by plaintiff BADOC in this case (i.e. for unpaid deliveries of tobacco). Republic Act No. 4155, which discounted the erstwhile support given by the Central Bank to PVTA, established in lieu thereof a "Tobacco Fund" to be collected from the proceeds of fifty per centum of the tariff or taxes of imported leaf tobacco and also fifty per centum of the specific taxes on locally manufactured Virginia type cigarettes. LLpr Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4155 provides that this fund shall be expended for the support or payment of: 1.Indebtedness of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration and the former Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration to FACOMAS and farmers and planters regarding Virginia tobacco transactions in previous years; 2.Indebtedness of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration and the former Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration to the Central Bank in gradual amounts regarding Virginia tobacco transactions in previous years; 3.Continuation of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration support and subsidy operations including the purchase of locally grown and produced Virginia leaf tobacco, at the present support and subsidy prices, its procurement, redrying, handling, warehousing and disposal thereof, and the redrying plants trading within the purview of their contracts; 4.Operational, office and field expenses, and the establishment of the Tobacco Research and Grading Institute. [Emphasis supplied.]. Inasmuch as the Tobacco Fund, a special fund, was by law, earmarked specifically to answer obligations incurred by PVTA in connection with its proprietary and commercial operations authorized under the law, it follows that said funds may be proceeded against by ordinary judicial processes such as execution and garnishment. If such funds cannot be executed upon or garnished pursuant to a judgment sustaining the liability of the PVTA to answer for its obligations, then the purpose of the law in creating the PVTA would be defeated. For it was declared to be a national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and to create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes [Section 1, Republic Act No. 4155.]. The Commissioner of Public Highways case is thus distinguishable from the case at bar. In said case, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as custodian of funds belonging to the Bureau of Public Highways, an agency of the government, was chargeable with knowledge of the exemption of such government funds from execution and garnishmentpursuant to the elementary precept that public funds cannot be disbursed without the appropriation required by law. On the other hand, the same cannot hold true for RCBCas the funds entrusted to its custody, which belong to a public corporation, are in the nature of private funds insofar as their susceptibility to garnishment is concerned. Hence,RCBC cannot be charged with lack of prudence for immediately complying with the order to deliver the garnished amount. Since the funds in its custody are precisely meant for the payment of lawfully-incurred obligations, RCBC cannot rightfully resist a court order to enforce payment of such obligations. That such court order subsequently turned out to have been erroneously issued should not operate to the detriment of one who complied with its clear order. LLphil Finally, it is contended that RCBC was bound to inquire into the legality and propriety of the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment issued against the funds of the PVTA deposited with said bank. But the bank was in no position to question the legality of the garnishment since it was not even a party to the case. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, it had neither the personality nor the interest to assail or controvert the orders of respondent Judge. It had no choice but to obey the same inasmuch as it had no standing at all to impugn the validity of the partial judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff or of the processes issued in execution of such judgment. RCBC cannot therefore be compelled to make restitution solidarily with the plaintiff BADOC. Plaintiff BADOC alone was responsible for the issuance of the Writ of Execution and Order of Payment and so, the plaintiff alone should bear the consequences of a subsequent annulment of such court orders; hence, only the plaintiff can be ordered to restore the account of the PVTA. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the petitioner is ABSOLVED from any liability to respondent PVTA for reimbursement of the funds garnished. The questioned Order of the respondent Judge ordering the petitioner, jointly and severally with BADOC, to restore the account of PVTA are modified accordingly. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur. ||| (Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. v. De Castro, G.R. No. L-34548, November 29, 1988)
THIRD DIVISION [G.R. Nos. 89898-99. October 1, 1990.] MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Judge RTC of Makati, Branch CXLII, ADMIRAL FINANCE CREDITORS CONSORTIUM, INC., and SHERIFF SILVINO R. PASTRANA, respondents. Defante & Elegado for petitioner. Roberto B. Lugue for private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors' Consortium, Inc. R E S O L U T I O N CORTES, J p: The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at Mayapis St., San Antonio Village, Makati and registered in the name of Arceli P. Jo under TCT No. S-5499. LLpr It appears that the action for eminent domain was filed on May 20, 1986, docketed as Civil Case No. 13699. Attached to petitioner's complaint was a certification that a bank account (Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had been opened with the PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510.00, made pursuant to the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 42. After due hearing where the parties presented their respective appraisal reports regarding the value of the property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision on June 4, 1987, fixing the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment ofP338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent. After this decision became final and executory, private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. This motion was granted by respondent RTC judge. After issuance of the writ of execution, a Notice of Garnishment dated January 14, 1988 was served by respondent sheriff Silvino R. Pastrana upon the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch. However, respondent sheriff was informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of petitioner. As a result of this, private respondent filed a motion dated January 27, 1988 praying that an order be issued directing the bank to deliver to respondent sheriff the amount equivalent to the unpaid balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987. Petitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground that the manner of payment of the expropriation amount should be done in installments which the respondent RTC judge failed to state in his decision. Private respondent filed its opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed on July 20, 1988 a "Manifestation" informing the court that private respondent was no longer the true and lawful owner of the subject property because a new title over the property had been registered in the name of Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. (PSB). Respondent RTC judge issued an order requiring PSB to make available the documents pertaining to its transactions over the subject property, and the PNB Buendia Branch to reveal the amount in petitioner's account which was garnished by respondent sheriff. In compliance with this order, PSB filed a manifestation informing the court that it had consolidated its ownership over the property as mortgagee/purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale held on April 20, 1987. After several conferences, PSB and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby they agreed to divide between themselves the compensation due from the expropriation proceedings. Respondent trial judge subsequently issued an order dated September 8, 1988 which: (1) approved the compromise agreement; (2) ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 which corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of the subject property under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, from the garnished account of petitioner; and, (3) ordered PSB and private respondent to execute the necessary deed of conveyance over the subject property in favorof petitioner. Petitioner's motion to lift the garnishment was denied. LibLex Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was duly opposed by private respondent. On the other hand, for failure of the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch to comply with the order dated September 8, 1988, private respondent filed two succeeding motions to require the bank manager to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. During the hearings conducted for the above motions, the general manager of the PNB Buendia Branch, a Mr. Antonio Bautista, informed the court that he was still waiting for proper authorization from the PNB head office enabling him to make a disbursement for the amount so ordered. For its part, petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio [G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899]. Respondent trial judge issued an order dated December 21, 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the doctrine enunciated in Republic v.Palacio did not apply to the case because petitioner's PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was an account specifically opened for the expropriation proceedings of the subject property pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 42. Respondent RTC judge likewise declared Mr. Antonio Bautista guilty of contempt of court for his inexcusable refusal to obey the order dated September 8, 1988, and thus ordered his arrest and detention until his compliance with the said order. Petitioner and the bank manager of PNB Buendia Branch then filed separate petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which were eventually consolidated. In a decision promulgated on June 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed both petitions for lack of merit, sustained the jurisdiction of respondent RTC judge over the funds contained in petitioner's PNB Account No. 265-537154-3, and affirmed his authority to levy on such funds. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioner now files the present petition for review with prayer for preliminary injunction. On November 20, 1989, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent RTC judge, respondent sheriff, and their representatives, from enforcing and/or carrying out the RTC order dated December 21, 1988 and the writ of garnishment issued pursuant thereto. Private respondent then filed its comment to the petition, while petitioner filed its reply. Petitioner not only reiterates the arguments adduced in its petition before the Court of Appeals, but also alleges for the first time that it has actually two accounts with the PNB Buendia Branch, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (1)Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property, with an outstanding balance of P99,743.94. (2)Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 for statutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government, with a balance of P170,098,421.72, as of July 12, 1989. xxx xxx xxx [Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 11-12.] Because the petitioner has belatedly alleged only in this Court the existence of two bank accounts, it may fairly be asked whether the second account was opened only for the purpose of undermining the legal basis of the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge and the decision of the Court of Appeals, and strengthening its reliance on the doctrine that public funds are exempted from garnishment or execution as enunciated in Republic v. Palacio [supra.] At any rate, the Court will give petitioner the benefit of the doubt, and proceed to resolve the principal issues presented based on the factual circumstances thus alleged by petitioner. Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was specifically opened for expropriation proceedings it had initiated over the subject property, petitioner poses no objection to the garnishment or the levy under execution of the funds deposited therein amounting to P99,743.94. However, it is petitioner's main contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by respondent sheriff in excess of P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for the municipal government's other statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute [Republic v. Palacio, supra.; The Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, G.R. No. L- 30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616]. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52 (1926); The Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 (1950); Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 61744, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 56]. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council ofMakati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum ofP99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7. llcd
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil. 247 (1960)]. In the case at bar, the validity of the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987 is not disputed by petitioner. No appeal was taken therefrom. For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the property since the same has been the site of Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized that, within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, . . . [j]ust compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence ofbeing immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss [Coscolluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 393, 400. See also Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, G.R. No. 64037, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 291]. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipalityhas had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation. WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner Municipality of Makati to immediately pay Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. and private respondent the amount ofP4,953,506.45. Petitioner is hereby required to submit to this Court a report of its compliance with the foregoing order within a non-extendible period of SIXTY (60) DAYS from the date of receipt of this resolution. LLjur The order of respondent RTC judge dated December 21, 1988, which was rendered in Civil Case No. 13699, is SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order issued by theCourt on November 20, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur. ||| (Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 01, 1990)
EN BANC [G.R. Nos. 55963 & 61045. February 27, 1991.] SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, respondents. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, respondents. R E S O L U T I O N PARAS, J p: In its Motion for Reconsideration 1 of the Court's Second Division decision in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA, for brevity), through the Solicitor General, maintains that, on the strength of Presidential Decree No. 552 (which amended certain provisions of Republic Act 3601, the law creating the NIA) and the case of Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et al., 102 Phil. 790 "the NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent." Although the majority opinion in the cited case of Angat System declares that the Angat System (like the NIA) exercised a governmental function because the nature of the powers and functions of said agency does not show that it was intended to "bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit," there is a strong dissenting opinion penned by then Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and concurred in by then Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes which held the contrary view that the Angat River System is a government entity exercising proprietary functions. To buttress said stand, the former Chief Justice cited some authorities which will be useful in the proper resolution of this case. Quoting from said dissenting opinion which cited McQuillin's The Law of Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed., Vol. 18, pp. 423-424: "In undertaking to supply water at price, municipality is not performing governmental function but is engaged in trade, and is liable first as private company would be for any negligence in laying out of its pipes, in keeping them in repair, or in furnishing potable water through them. Harvard Furniture Co., Inc. vs. City of Cambridge, 320 Mass. 227, 68 N.E. (2d) 684." "Municipality in contracting to provide water supply acts under its proprietary power and not under its legislative, public or governmental powers. Farmers' State Bank vs. Conrad, 100 Mont. 415, 47 P. (2d) 853." In this connection, the opinion is that irrigation districts in the United States are basically identical to our irrigation systems under Act No. 2152. Because of such similarity, it is found appropriate to consider certain doctrines from American jurisprudence, which are as follows, to wit: "An irrigation district is a public quasi corporation, organized, however, to conduct a business for the private benefit of the owners of land within its limits. They are members of the corporation, control its affairs, and alone are benefited by its operations. It is, in the administration of its business, the owner of its system in a proprietary rather than a public capacity, and must assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership." (Nampa vs. Nampa & M. Irrig. Dist. 19 Idaho, 779, 115 Pac. 979) ". . . the plaintiff sought damages for injuries to crops on his land during 1923, 1924, 1925, and 1926, caused by water seeping, percolating, and escaping from the defendant's canal. The defendant contended that irrigation districts were agencies of the state, and were, therefore, not liable for the negligent construction or operation of their canals or ditches. The court, after a careful review of the authorities defining an irrigation district, conceded that such a quasi public corporation possessed some governmental powers and exercised some governmental functions, but held that the construction and operation of its irrigation canals and ditches was a proprietary rather than a governmental function, and hence the district was responsible in damages for the negligent construction or operation of its canal system." (69 A.L.R., p. 1233) It may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. The Solicitor General argues that the reasons presented by P.D. 552 for the existence of the NIA (the WHEREAS clauses of said decree) indubitably reveal that the responsibility vested in said agency concerns public welfare and public benefit, and is therefore an exercise of sovereignty. On the contrary, We agree with the former Chief Justice Concepcion in saying that the same purpose such as public benefit and public welfare may be found in the operation of certain enterprises (those engaged in the supply of electric power, or in supplying telegraphic, telephonic, and radio communication, or in the production and distribution of prime necessities, etc.) yet it is certain that the functions performed by such enterprises are basically proprietary in nature. Thus, as held in Holderbaum vs. Hidalgo County Water Improvement District (297 S.W. 865, aff'd in 11 S.W. [2d] 506) cited in the dissenting opinion by Justice Concepcion: ". . . Primarily, a water improvement district is in no better position than a city is when exercising its purely local powers and duties. Its general purposes are not essentially public in their nature, but are only incidentally so; those purposes may be likened to those of a city which is operating a waterworks system, or an irrigation system. . . . A water improvement district can do nothing, it has and furnishes no facilities, for the administration of the sovereign government. Its officers have no power or authority to exercise any of the functions of the general government, or to enforce any of the laws of the state or any of its other subdivisions, or collect taxes other than those assessed by the district. They have no more power or authority than that of the officers of a private corporation organized for like purposes. As a practical matter, the primary objects and purposes of such district are of a purely local nature, for the district is created and operated for the sole benefit of its own members, and an analysis of those objects and purposes discloses that they directly benefit only the landowners who reside within and whose lands form a part of the district, to the exclusion of all other residents therein. It is true, of course, that the state and the general public are greatly benefited by the proper operation of the district, and to that extent its objects and accomplishments are public in their nature, but this characteristic is only incidental to the primary and chief object of the corporation, which is the irrigation of lands forming a part of the district. It is obvious, then, that the purposes and duties of such districts do not come within the definition of public rights, purposes, and duties which would entitle the district to the exemption raised by the common law as a protection to corporations having a purely public purpose and performing essentially public duties." Of equal importance is the case of National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA 766, which propounds the thesis that "the NAWASA is not an agency performing governmental functions; rather it performs proprietary functions . . . ." The functions of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of government even though the service rendered caters to the community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society. The business of furnishing water supply and sewerage service, as held in the case of Metropolitan Water District vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 91 Phil. 840, "may for all practical purposes be likened to an industry engaged in by coal companies, gas companies, power plants, ice plants, and the like." Withal, it has been enunciated that "although the State may regulate the service and rates of water plants owned and operated by municipalities, such property is not employed for governmental purposes and in the ownership and operation thereof the municipality acts in its proprietary capacity, free from legislative interference." (1 McQuillin, p. 683) LLphil Like the NAWASA, the National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government- function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands. Cdpr We must not lose sight of the fact that the NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides: "Section 1.Name and Domicile A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business." (Emphasis supplied). Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that: "(b)To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration, such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy; to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first, upon the land benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land, and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . ." The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court. Thus, "b). . . Judicial actions for the collection of unpaid irrigation fees or charges, drainage fees or other charges which the National Irrigation Administration is authorized to impose and collect, shall henceforth be governed by the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines for similar actions, the provisions of other laws to the contrary notwithstanding." xxx xxx xxx "(e). . . xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx All actions for the recovery of compensation and damages against the National Irrigation Administration under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) hereof, shall be filed with a competent court within five (5) years from the date of entry of the land or destruction of the improvements or crops, after which period, the right of possession and/or ownership of the National Irrigation Administration shall be considered vested and absolute. All other actions for the recovery of compensation and damages to private property and improvements occasioned by the construction, operation and maintenance of irrigation facilities and other hydraulic structures under the administration of the National Irrigation Administration, which have accrued ten (10) or more years prior to the approval of this decree are deemed to have prescribed and are barred forever." It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. To quote Section 2, subsection (f): "(f). . . and to transact such business, as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives, including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied). On the basis of the foregoing considerations, We conclude that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED. Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur in the result. Separate Opinions FELICIANO, J ., concurring: I agree with the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, both in the Decision of the Court's Second Division dated 1 December 1989 (179 SCRA 685 [1989]) and in the present Resolution on the motion for reconsideration, which has been referred to the Court En Banc. cdll I agree, in other words, that the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) is liable for the acts of its employee Hugo Garcia which resulted in injury to the spouses Jose Fontanillaand Virginia Fontanilla. However, I reach this result through a slightly different route which is traced below. In the original decision of the Court's Second Division, it is stated that: "Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the Government, are more or less generally agreed to be 'governmental' in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a 'proprietary' one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment." The original Decision and the Resolution on the motion for reconsideration hold that the NIA is "an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions." I would respectfully submit that the liability of an agency or instrumentality of the Government for torts of its employees under Article 2180, 6th paragraph, of the Civil Code is not contingent upon the technical characterization of the functions or activities carried out by that agency or instrumentality as "governmental," on the one hand, or "proprietary," upon the other. In the first place, it is merely commonplace to note that governments in our day and age do not restrict themselves to the original basic and primitive functions of repelling invasion by a foreign enemy, maintaining peace and order in society and protecting the physical integrity or the food supplies of its citizens or inhabitants, but instead assumed and carry out all kinds of activities which they may determine to redound to the general interest and benefit of the population. Thus, the classical laissez-faire concept of a state, which prevailed during the 19th century, has today been replaced by the concept of the welfare state. Moreover, activities which in other states more economically advanced than our own have been undertaken by private enterprise, are here still being carried out by the Government or, more generally, the public sector in view of the inadequacy of private capital and private entrepreneurial spirit. LLphil Secondly, under Section 2(1) of Article IX of the Constitution, whether or not a government owned or controlled corporation or entity forms part of the Government and is embraced within the civil service depends, not upon the "governmental," as distinguished from "proprietary," nature of the activities performed by such entity or corporation, but rather upon whether or not the corporation or entity is possessed of an "original charter." Thus, it appears to me that the framers of the 1987 Constitution had given up the notion of trying to distinguish between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions for purposes of determining whether employees of a particular agency or instrumentality should be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations or, alternatively, by the Labor Code and its Implementing Regulations administered by the National Labor Relations Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. prcd Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides in part as follows: "xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or entity. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. xxx xxx xxx" (Emphases supplied) My basic submission that the term "State" as used above properly refers to the "Government of the Republic of the Philippines." This latter term is defined in Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 in the following manner: "The Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government." (Emphases supplied) In other words, the term "State" as used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code refers to that juridical person that is constituted by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and logically does not include agencies, instrumentalities or other entities which their enabling laws have invested with juridical personality separate and distinctfrom that of the Republic of the Philippines. It should be noted in this connection, that in Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil. 311 [1960]), the Court said: "It is therefore evident that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903 [of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889] and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent." (Emphasis supplied; parentheses in the original; 34 Phil. at 323) Clearly, Mr. Justice Trent considered "the State" and "the Government of the Philippine Islands" as equivalent terms. The decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated 7 January 1898 which the Court in Merritt cited, read in part as follows: "That the obligation to indemnify for damages, which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the State, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individual in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the State in the organization of branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the State, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a [juridical] person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations." (Emphases supplied)
The term " juridical" person was translated (by Mr. Justice Trent?) as " judicial" person. This appears plain error for the judgment of 7 January 1898 in fact read: ". . . entre los cuales y el Estado, por tanto, no pueden surgir relaciones de orden privado regidas por el derecho civil, salvo el caso de que el mismo Estado obre como persona juridica capaz de adquirir derechos y contraer obligaciones: xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied; 83 Jurisprudencia Civil 36 [1898]) Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain itself recognized that between private persons and the State, relations of a private nature governed by the Civil Code can arise where the State acts as or through the medium of a separate juridical person that is capable of acquiring rights and entering into obligations. In the present case, there is no question that the NIA has juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines which owns all NIA's capital and assets. In other words, the NIA is not part of the "State" or of the "Government of the Republic of the Philippines"; it follows, I respectfully submit, that the NIA should not be regarded as part of the State for purposes of application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. What I have outlined above is in fact very close to the position taken by Mr. Justice Paras in the Resolution on the motion for reconsideration. For he has rightly stressed that the NIA has clearly been invested with a distinct legal personality and thus with capacity to sue and be sued. Judicial actions may be brought by the NIA for the collection of unpaid irrigation fees, drainage fees or other charges which the NIA is authorized to impose and collect, under the provisions of the Rules of Court. Correlatively, actions against the NIA for the recovery of compensation and damages are expressly allowed and prescribed in either five (5) or ten (10) years depending upon the subject matter thereof. The State itself has determined, in other words, that the NIA shall not be covered by the general immunity from suit without its consent pertaining to the State. Finally, the Resolution underscores the fact that under Section 2(f) of the NIA charter, the NIA is generally authorized "to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of [the NIA charter]." Since the NIA has been vested with all the powers of a corporate person, it seems only reasonable to believe that it is at the same time subjected to all the ordinary liabilities of a corporate person: one of those liabilities is the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, 6th paragraph, for injurious acts done by its employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. prLL I suggest then that the investing of an agency or instrumentality of the Government with separate juridical personality is not a matter of "form" as suggested by my equally distinguished brother in the Court, Mr. Justice Padilla, in his dissenting opinion. The effect of the foregoing provisions of its charter may be seen to be clearly a matter of "substance": to render the NIA both suable and liable on the same causes of action which may be asserted against any corporate entity that is a separate juridical person. It seems also relevant to point out that the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), the agency or instrumentality involved in the Merritt case, did not (in contrast with the NIA) have legal personality separate and distinct from that of the Philippine Government at the time that Merritt was decided. The PGH was established under Act No. 1688 of the Philippine Commission as a division of the Bureau of Health, a non-incorporated entity. Later, it was removed from the administrative jurisdiction of the Bureau of Health and made into an independent bureau under the supervision of the Department of the Interior. Still later, the PGH was placed under the Department of Instruction and subsequently, under the Office of the President. In 1947, by virtue of Executive Order No. 94, the PGH was made a part of the University of the Philippines, itself a separate corporate entity. Clearly, therefore, at the time Merritt was decided, the PGH was part and parcel of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as defined by the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. For all the foregoing, I vote to DENY the motion for reconsideration and to AFFIRM the Decision dated 1 December 1989 in G.R. Nos 55963 and 61045. Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur. PADILLA, J ., concurring and dissenting: On 1 December 1989, this Court, through its Second Division, rendered a decision declaring petitioner National Irrigation Administration (NIA, for brevity) a government agency performing proprietary functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIA's driver-employee Hugo Garcia; and NIA was ordered to pay petitioner-spouses Fontanilla, the victim's parents, the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of the victim; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages, and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.LexLib Assailing the said decision of this Court, NIA filed the present Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that NIA does not perform solely or primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions; thus, it may not be held liable for damages for injuries caused by its employee to a third person. Citing PD 552, NIA argues that its functions and responsibilities directly concern public benefit and public welfare. To start with, NIA is an agency of the government with an original charter. 1 Section 1 of Republic Act 3601 provides: "SECTION 1.Name and domicile. A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces for the proper conduct of its business." NIA's said charter confers upon it a separate juridical personality to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with said charter. 2 Under PD 552 amending NIA's original charter, it is made clear that said agency was created primarily for the purpose of undertaking integrated irrigation projects, by the construction of multiple-purpose water resource projects to increase agricultural production for the financial upliftment of the people. In relation to its purpose, NIA has the power and authority to undertake concomitant projects, such as, flood control, drainage, land reclamation, hydraulic power development, domestic water supply, road or highway construction, reforestation and projects to maintain ecological balance, in coordination with other agencies concerned. Thus "WHEREAS, the enunciation policy is for a comprehensive development, utilization and conservation of water resources of the Philippines, and in pursuit of this policy, one of the primary objectives of the National Irrigation Administration is to effectuate an economic means of achieving the optimal and diversified utilization and control of water by undertaking integrated irrigation projects. "WHEREAS, the National Irrigation Administration assumes as its primary responsibility, the implementation of the irrigation integrated program of the government and the attainment of the 'Irrigation Age', as envisioned under Republic Act No. 3601; "WHEREAS, an effective means of implementing multiple-purpose projects in line with program-oriented and comprehensive water resources development necessitates broader powers and authority of the NIA to undertake concomitant projects such as flood control, drainage, land reclamation, hydraulic power development, domestic water supply, road or highway construction, reforestation, and projects to maintain ecological balance, in coordination with the agencies concerned; "WHEREAS, the construction of multiple-purpose water resources projects involves substantial investment of government funds to increase agricultural production for the financial upliftment of the People for them to be able to assume and comply with their obligations and responsibilities to the government." NIA is thus maintained and operated by the government in the performance of its governmental function of providing the Filipino people, particularly, the farmers nationwide,improved irrigation systems to increase the country's agricultural production. Only the government has the capacity and facilities to successfully undertake a project or venture of such magnitude. That the NIA is empowered to charge minimal fees from all the beneficiaries of the irrigation systems that it establishes and operates, does not change the nature of the function or purpose for which it was created. The fees that are collected by NIA are used to cover the cost of operation, maintenance, insurance, cost of construction, and the rehabilitation of irrigation systems. 3 Such monetary charges do not constitute monetary gain or profit to NIA, but are merely reimbursements of the operational cost of the agency's projects. LLpr It cannot be denied that public service is the thrust in the creation of NIA in contrast to a business venture or proprietary enterprise for monetary gain. That the NIA is also empowered to enter into transactions in order to acquire real and personal properties, appurtenant rights, easements, privileges in the development of its projects 4 and enter into other business transactions, does not mean that it performs proprietary functions, for it is expressly provided in its charter that the business transactions it may enter into are only those which are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of its purposes and objectives. 5
Furthermore, the fact that its charter treats the NIA as incorporated under the Corporation Law, and confers upon it a separate juridical personality, is not the test in determining whether it is performing a governmental or proprietary function. The spirit, intent or purpose behind its creation determines its true character. It has been held that were the nature of the duties imposed on an agency and performed by it does not reveal that it was intended to bring any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit to the government, said agency is deemed to be exercising a governmental function. 6 After having established that the NIA is a government agency, with an original charter, possessed of juridical personality under the Corporation Law, and performing governmental functions, it is equally important to determine whether (1) the sovereign immunity of the state from suit is enjoyed, or has been waived by NIA and (2) the NIA is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees. prLL For incorporated agencies of the government, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is performing. 7 The charter of the NIA provides that it may sue and be sued, thus, consent of the state for NIA to be sued has been given, 8 so that the rule on immunity from suit normally extended to government agencies performing governmental functions is no longer available to NIA. By waiving that immunity from suit in its charter, it would appear that NIA has opened itself to suits based on causes of action arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts, and even quasi-delicts. But to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing; to say that it is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees, is still another thing. As discussed in the now assailed decision, pursuant to the provisions of substantive law on quasi-delict, whoever by his act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage caused. 9 The obligation imposed by the foregoing rule is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible, such that an employer is held liable for damages caused by its employees who were acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. 10 But the state or a government agency performing governmental functions may be held liable for tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a special agent. 11 This is not the first time this Court is confronted with a situation akin to the one at bar. In Merritt vs. Government of the Phil. Islands, 12 the plaintiff was hit by an ambulance of the Philippine General Hospital, while operated by its regular driver. Since the Philippine government was immune from suit, Act No. 2457 was approved by the Philippine legislature which authorized Merritt to sue the Philippine government in the CFI in order to fix the responsibility for the collision and to determine the amount or extent of the damages. In due course, it was determined that the ambulance operated by the General Hospital's regular driver was responsible for the mishap. The damages sustained by Merritt as a result of the accident was likewise quantified by the trial court and ultimately increased by the Supreme Court. But then the crucial question remained thus "Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that no Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized." The Court answered its own query thus "In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. 'The Government,' says Justice Story, 'does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.'" (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491 citing U.S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L.Ed., 199; and Beers vs. State, 20 How., 527; 15 L.Ed., 991.) xxx xxx xxx ". . . we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: "The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. "The Supreme Court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said: "That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state organization of branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations." (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1988; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.) The dispositive part of the Merritt decision states: "For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts." This Court in the now assailed decision found that NIA was negligent in the supervision of its driver Hugo Garcia who bumped petitioner-spouses' son, causing the death of the latter "It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Marikina National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA group was then 'in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible', as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial reaction. "Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the City. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and recklessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group." 13 There is thus no doubt that NIA should be held responsible for the negligent acts of its regular driver, resulting in the death of petitioner-spouses' son, except that under Article 2180, par. 6 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the state is not liable for tort save when it acts through a special agent, and Hugo Garcia was not a special agent but NIA's regular driver. Under the circumstances, and in order not to perpetuate a cruel injustice, I believe that this Court, while granting the Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration, should recommend to Congress the enactment of the appropriate legislation to compensate the petitioner-spouses, parents of the victim Francisco Fontanilla, and to appropriate the necessary funds therefor, which could be equal to the amount of damages already determined by this Court. During the deliberations of this case, it was suggested that the term "State" as used in Article 2180, par. 6 of the Civil Code 14 could be limited to the State proper and not construed to include incorporated entities even if performing governmental functions, such as the NIA. The intended effect of this suggestion would be to render only the State, meaning, the government of the Republic of the Philippines and its unincorporated agencies, such as government bureaus, exempt from liability for tort committed by their officials and employees, except their special agents, but incorporated governmental entities, even if performing governmental (as distinguished from business functions) will be liable for the tort committed by their officials and employees. I am of the considered opinion that the aforestated suggestion is untenable because it would lay stress on form rather than substance. To me, the test should still be whether the governmental entity performs governmental and, therefore, sovereign functions, regardless of whether it is incorporated or not. If the government agency performs governmental and, therefore, sovereign functions, such as the NIA, it is within the context of the term "State" as used in Art. 2180, par. 6 of the Civil Code and may not, as a consequence, be held liable for tort committed by its officials and employees, except when they are "special agents."
From the ruling of this Court in Manila Hotel Employees Asso. vs. Manila Hotel, 15 which states that by "engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hoc vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules governing private corporations," it can be reasonably inferred that it is the business character of the corporation and not its corporate form which divests it of the immunity (and, similarly, exemption from liability for tort committed by its employees) which its owner-sovereign enjoys. In the case of Prisco vs. CIR, 17 In an advisory opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan with respect to the creation of the state housing authority, it was held that a state agency intended to take measures to promote construction of housing, performs a proper governmental function, and that the grant of corporate powers to such an agency makes it a quasi-corporation only but it remains an instrumentality of the state. Such quasi-corporations are described as bodies of citizens who have no personal nor private interests to be subserved, but are simply required by the state to do some public work. The state merely clothes one of its agencies or instrumentalities with such corporate powers. It is neither a private corporation but a class of artificial entity. 18 The NIA qualifies as a quasi-corporation, retaining at all times the attributes and prerogatives of the sovereign State which entirely owns and operates it. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, I vote to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration and to SET ASIDE the decision of this Court dated 1 December 1989, subject to the recommendation to Congress as earlier stated. ||| (Spouses Fontanilla v. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. 55963 & 61045, February 27, 1991)
EN BANC [G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008.] THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents. [G.R. No. 183752. October 14, 2008.] CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, City Mayor of Zamboanga, and in his personal capacity as resident of the City of Zamboanga, Rep. MA. ISABELLE G. CLIMACO, District 1, and Rep. ERICO BASILIO A. FABIAN, District 2, City of Zamboanga,petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as represented by RODOLFO C. GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, respondents. [G.R. No. 183893. October 14, 2008.] THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE LLUCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and duly appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents. [G.R. No. 183951. October 14, 2008.] THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented by HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in his capacity as Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, HON. CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman, 1st Congressional District, HON. CESAR G. JALOSJOS, Congressman, 3rd Congressional District, and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga del Norte, namely, HON. SETH FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON. FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR., HON. ULDARICO M. MEJORADA II, HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS, HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC L. ADRIATICO, HON. FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO, HON. JOSEPH BRENDO C. AJERO, HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S. DARUNDAY, HON. ANGELICA J. CARREON and HON. LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as represented by HON. RODOLFO C. GARCIA and HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser of Peace Process, respondents. [G.R. No. 183962. October 14, 2008.] ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman RODOLFO C. GARCIA, and the MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents. FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners- in-intervention. SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioner-in-intervention. MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N. DEANO, petitioner-in-intervention. THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P. SANTOS-AKBAR, petitioner-in- intervention. THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDADATU, in his capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of theProvince of Sultan Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention. RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao Not Belonging to the MILF, petitioner-in-intervention. CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT, JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and RICHALEX G. JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of Palawan,petitioners-in-intervention. MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention. MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC. (MUSLAF), respondent-in-intervention. MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE & DEVELOPMENT (MMMPD), respondent-in-intervention. D E C I S I O N CARPIO-MORALES, J p: Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively. I.FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations. 1 The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. IECcaA The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going. 2 Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. 3 In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. cHDaEI When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP. 4 The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions. 5 Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20- 22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral DomainAspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting". A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. 6 ISCHET In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. II.STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an instrument the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain. 7 and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato 8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. 9 Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. 10 This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition. 11 filed by the City of Zamboanga, 12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void. By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD. 13 The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD, 14 to which she complied. 15 Meanwhile, the City of Iligan 16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent. HSDCTA The Province of Zamboanga del Norte, 17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members 18 of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, 19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD. On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition, 20 docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal. Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-in-intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela 21 and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat 22 and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte, 23 Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention. aIHSEc By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed Comments on the petitions, while some of petitioners submitted their respective Replies. Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners. The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following principal issues: 1.Whether the petitions have become moot and academic (i)insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and (ii)insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft; 2.Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 3.Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis- -vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5; 4.Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;] If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy; 5.Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself ACcISa a)to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; b)to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; c)to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;] If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; 6.Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and 7.Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 24 The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their memoranda on time. III.OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five petitions and six petitions-in-intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of the MOA. The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF. Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements between the GRP and MILF, but also two agreements between the GRPand the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of President Fidel Ramos. TICAcD The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 25 and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),26 and several international law instruments the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others. The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact) anddar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device". During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or ineffective. 27 This way of viewing the world, however, became more complex through the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the international community of nations. As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and inter-governmental organizations, the classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islamand dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada(land of compact) and dar-ul- sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, though under a secular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim States, having been bound to each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which, though not bound by treaty with Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for Muslims. 28 It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government the Philippines being the land of compact and peace agreement that partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as "any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]". 29
The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS", and starts with its main body. The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance. A.CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as 'Bangsamoros'". It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses. 30 Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro", as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only "Moros" as traditionally understood even by Muslims, 31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. ICTaEH The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland", the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights ofoccupation. 32 Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain. 33 The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self- governance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state in the modern sense. 34 The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others. 35 The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the 'First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations". The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory, particularly those known as Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First Nation", hence, all of them are usually described collectively by the plural "First Nations". 36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" suggesting its exclusive entitlement to that designation departs from the Canadian usage of the term. The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro. 37 ADaECI B.TERRITORY The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu- Palawan geographic region. 38 More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. 39 Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA- AD. 40 Category B areas, also called "Special Intervention Areas", on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement the Comprehensive Compact. 41 The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its "internal waters", defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; 42 that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters", which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. 43 Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint". The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation agreement. 44 The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and safety measures. 45 There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internal waters of the BJE. C.RESOURCES The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements. 46 ACcaET The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. 47 With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial jurisdiction". This right carries the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires", the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the operation ofsuch resources. 48 The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. 49 The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties. 50STDEcA The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the present ARMM. 51 D.GOVERNANCE The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. 52 The "associative" relationship between the Central Government and the BJE The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative", characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact. The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non- derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on the legality of this provision. The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact. AIaDcH As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the representatives of the Parties", meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and not merely of the negotiating panels. 53 In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5, 2008.
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces, municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY. IV.PROCEDURAL ISSUES A.RIPENESS The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. 54 Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. 55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. 56 An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 57 The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination. 58 CEHcSI Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 59 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, 60 and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. 61 He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 62 The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present petitions, reasoning that: The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligationsuntil the list of operative acts required have been duly complied with. . . . xxx xxx xxx In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere contemplated steps toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring supplied) The Solicitor General cites 63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD: TERRITORY xxx xxx xxx 2.Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations: xxx xxx xxx d.Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing ofthe MOA-AD. caTESD xxx xxx xxx GOVERNANCE xxx xxx xxx 7.The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively. CASTDI Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact andupon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non- derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. 64 (Underscoring supplied) The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade. Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 65 this Court held: . . . [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. DEaCSA xxx xxx xxx By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws . . . settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. 66 In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 67 the United States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led under the policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on its face. 68 That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York v. United States, 69 decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to take immediate action to avoid the provision's consequences. 70 The present petitions pray for Certiorari, 71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.72 Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. 73 Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. 74 The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28, 2001. 75 The said executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process . . . be governed by this Executive Order". 76 The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework", implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again, these points will be discussed in more detail later. As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 77 HSIDTE B.LOCUS STANDI For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions". 78 Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. 79 When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 80 When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. 81 EaHcDS
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 82 The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit. 83 In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 84 An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members, 85 but the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing. 86 As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. 87 Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention, . 88 such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties. In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 89 where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 90 The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of fundamental rights. In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine whether the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limitsof the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside technical rules of procedure. 91 ScHADI In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt. In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of"undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in these petitions. With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor. With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al.,as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest in the issues at hand. ECaAHS Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing. B.MOOTNESS Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement ofthe Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA". 92 In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel. 93 In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 95 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; 96 (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 97 and (d) the case is capable ofrepetition yet evading review. 98 Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation. 93 SICDAa The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo 100 and Manalo v. Calderon 101 where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding. Petitions not mooted Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA- AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court's issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus points", especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of these "consensus points", foremost of which is the creation ofthe BJE. In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA- AD, 101 the manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel notwithstanding. Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant part of the country's territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity. Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al. 103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole". The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties the government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific government procurement policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in the controversy. ATcaID
The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on theAncestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and theHumanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002. Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-AD]", mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001. Need to formulate principles-guidelines Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be assured", it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral Domain. Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes 104 in which he stated that the doctrine of"capable of repetition yet evading review" can override mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance". They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked. DHSEcI The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved. 105 At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. 106There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD. V.SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz.: 1.Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD? 2.Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws? ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights: Sec. 7.The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. 107 As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, 108 Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status. SaHTCE The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right. 109 In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano, 110 the Court ruled that access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters ofpublic concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. . . . The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." . . . 111 In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation 112 so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs ofthe government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people. 113 The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern 114 faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeedof public concern. 115 In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, 116 the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, 117 the civil service eligibility of a public employee, 118 the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, 119 the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, 120 and the identity of party-list nominees, 121 among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subjectof the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. ACcHIa Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled: . . . [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction". Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." 122 (Emphasis and italics in the original) Intended as a "splendid symmetry" 123 to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28.Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. 124 The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill ofRights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. 125 The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. 126 These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people. 127 DcaCSE Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose: MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until after Congress shall have provided it.
MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, the implementing law will have to be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer. 128 The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening. MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as having said that this is not a self- executing provision? It would require a legislation by Congress to implement? MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as may be provided by law". MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and Congress may provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest? MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately influence the climate of the conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle, which is inconsistent with this policy. 129 (Emphasis supplied) Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards". The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader 130 right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. SDHAEC An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest ofthe State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. 131 Envisioned to becorollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate? Will the government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and can react where the existing media facilities are not able to provide full feedback mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be part of the government implementing operational mechanisms. MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses take place. There is a message and a feedback, both ways. xxx xxx xxx MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence? I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials but also network of private business o[r] community-based organizations that will be reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the private network of volunteers and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid that there will be another OMA in the making. 132 (Emphasis supplied) ScCEIA The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. 133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people's participation. One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community". 134 Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace process". 135 Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations, contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation". 136 Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process". 137 E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives". 138 aTADcH In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and craftedruns contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may, however, require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the President. 139 Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in justifying the denial of petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lip service. 140 It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the premises. The argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's righteven before the GRP makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers its definite propositions. 141 It bears emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue. AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam. ESTDcC Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions" 142 is well- taken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy: Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 143 (Italics and underscoring supplied) In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao, 144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above- quoted provision of the LGU apply only to national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented. 145 The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, 146 which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies. 147 The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act, 148 which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the legal framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following section. TcSHaD Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them. 149 ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions therein which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. aTCAcI 4.The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA- AD. cdrep Keitner and Reisman state that [a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. . . . 150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN membership. According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either government. In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from having access to these territories for military purposes. It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an international association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right ofindependence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of independence. 152 ACTISE In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples ofstates that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis- Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent states. 153 Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. caTIDE Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X: SEC. 1.The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall beautonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SEC. 15.There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework ofthis Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed,BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, 154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, agovernment, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. AEITDH
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region". (Emphasis supplied) As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2 (c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2 (d) and 2 (e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE. ScCIaA The MOA-AD, moreover, would not comply with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows: SEC. 20.Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1)Administrative organization; (2)Creation of sources of revenues; (3)Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4)Personal, family, and property relations; (5)Regional urban and rural planning development; (6)Economic, social, and tourism development; (7)Educational policies; (8)Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9)Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied) Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines . . . ." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary 155 instructs: In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) CIHAED Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associativearrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act ofplacing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to nationalunity. Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054 156 or the Organic |Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA. 157 Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES states: 1.It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time ofconquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice ofthe Indigenous people shall be respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cHAaCE This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows: "As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous region who are: (a)Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and (b)Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions." Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domainof the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of TERRITORY, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region". Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions thereof: SEC. 52.Delineation Process. The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures: xxx xxx xxx b)Petition for Delineation. The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs; CSaIAc c)Delineation Proper. The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and participation by the members of the communities concerned; d)Proof Required. Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents: 1)Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions; 2)Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution; ISaCTE 3)Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old villages; 4)Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs; 5)Survey plans and sketch maps; 6)Anthropological data; 7)Genealogical surveys; 8)Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds; 9)Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and 10)Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community. e)Preparation of Maps. On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein; f)Report of Investigation and Other Documents. A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;
g)Notice and Publication. A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available; aCTADI h)Endorsement to NCIP. Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below. xxx xxx xxx To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a discussion of not only the Constitution and domestic statutes, but alsoof international law is in order, for Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land". Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 158 held that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had not been executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu 159 applied the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals. International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples", understood not merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OFQUEBEC 160 had occasion to acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond 'convention' and is considered a general principle of international law". Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 161 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 162which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development". DICSaH The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made between the right ofinternal and external self-determination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive: "(ii)Scope of the Right to Self-determination 126.The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to externalself-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. . . . External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, as The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self- determination by that people. (Emphasis added) HDAaIS 127.The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that support the existence of a people's right to self-determination also contain parallel statements supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external self-determination can arise, namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial context, and less definitely but asserted by a number of commentators is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to internal self-determination. The Court ultimately held that the population of Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development, citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein. The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION. 163 There, Sweden presented to the Council of the League of Nations the question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be authorized to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the question, appointed an International Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on the preliminary issue of whether the dispute should, based on international law, be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee stated the rule as follows: . . . [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty ofevery State. Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusalof the right to a portion of its population of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitively constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such a question, under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question which International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned. Any other solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State", but would also endanger the interests of the international community. If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can it be held by the State to which the national group wishes to be attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) DHTCaI The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is left by international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation originated at a time when Finland was undergoing drastic political transformation. The internal situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national government was disputed by a large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps and the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a "definitively constituted" sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the right to withhold from a portion of its population the option to separate itself a right which sovereign nations generally have with respect to their own populations.
Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well as international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as "indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest. 164 Examples of groups who have been regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada. As with the broader category of "peoples", indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under international law, 165 but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination. In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government, to wit: Article 3 Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. TAHCEc Article 4 Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions. Article 5 Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been understood as equivalent to "internal self- determination". 166 The extentof self-determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of which are quoted hereunder: Article 8 1.Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture. 2.States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: (a)Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; (b)Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources; (c)Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights; (d)Any form of forced assimilation or integration; (e)Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them. Article 21 1.Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas ofeducation, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security. SHCaDA 2.States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities. Article 26 1.Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 2.Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 3.States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. ScCIaA Article 30 1.Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned. 2.States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military activities. Article 32 1.Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources. 2.States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. CEHcSI 3.States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact. Article 37 1.Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements. 2.Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements. Article 38 States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration. EScIAa Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as embodying customary international law a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here the obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality ofthe BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States. There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands a function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. IDTSEH Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near- independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows: 1.Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States. Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary. It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as presently worded.Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below for convenience: AcSIDE 7.The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively. Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected.While the word "Constitution" is not mentioned in the provision now under consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad enough to include the Constitution. Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government, have already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with . . . the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines". (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing. HDAaIS Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive clause is invalid, as discussed below. The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5 (c), which states that there shall be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups". These negotiating panels are to report to the President, through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the negotiations. It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its negotiations with the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as they presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace", is the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which may require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec. 4 (a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates Section 3 (a), of E.O. No. 125, 167 states: HSEcTC SEC. 4.The Six Paths to Peace. The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following: a.PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think outside the box", so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and political reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the present legal framework, and which thus would require new legislation and constitutional amendments. The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause", however, cannot stop here, because it must be asked AIcaDC whether the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4 (a). The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of HIEAcC the extent of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 168 in issue was the authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion an authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The Court held thus: "In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's . . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. cEITCA Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. 169 As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will show, however, peace is rarely attained by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure is required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit: . . . [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten years, conflict cessation without modification of the political environment, even where state-building is undertaken through technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building, is unlikely to succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a substantial proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies. The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the political and governance transition. Constitution- making after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will operate. 170 In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace agreements, observed that the typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human rights institutions. 171 In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been recognized by no less than the framers of the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions 172 is the framers' intention to implement a particular peace agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between theGRP and the MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari. aTIEcA MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if they are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions. I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim region; it is working very well; it has, in fact, diminished a great dealof the problems. So, my question is: since that already exists, why do we have to go into something new? MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right that certain definite steps have been taken to implement the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement with respect to an autonomous region in Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is no question that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Agreement itself and to the fuller standard of regional autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state policy. 173 (Emphasis supplied) The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities. DAaIEc
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. While the President does not possess constituent powers as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. In Sanidad v. COMELEC, 174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly submitting proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly which was the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the power to propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened the interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled the President as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Court's concern at present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided in that controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side. Justice Teehankee's dissent, 175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the President may directly submit proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he would have upheld the President's action along with the majority had the President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined: "Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, defines and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrees proposing and submitting constitutional amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis." 176 (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President in the course of conducting peace negotiations may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. TEAaDC Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments through initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative. These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine "people's initiative". The only initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court stated in Lambino v. COMELEC: 177 "The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the 'people's voice'. However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that 'ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms'. The Lambino Group thus admits that their 'people's' initiative is an 'unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of 'people's voice' or 'sovereign will' in the present initiative." SEcITC It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, 178 only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act. The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which for all intents and purposes is a proposal for new legislation coming from the President. 179 The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested. Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework". This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event but of a term. It is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact". Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework contemplated in the MOA-AD which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears noting that, TSHcIa By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the "prior agreements" from which there could be no derogation. What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for these "consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework. Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional. A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing in the 1996 final peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive. As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two phases. Phase I covered a three-year transitional period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the new regional autonomous government through amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM. The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded autonomous region envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two agreements. While the MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall be recommended by theGRP to Congress for incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law". cHECAS Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law obligation on the part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either as a binding agreement under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in international law, however. The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In addition, representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status of a binding international agreement had it been signed. An examination of the prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the contrary conclusion.
The Decision on CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION: LOM ACCORD AMNESTY 180 (the Lom Accord case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lom Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had been in armed conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There were non-contracting signatories to the agreement, among which were the Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of West African States, and the UN. On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary- General and the Sierra Leone Government, another agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the Special Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special Court, an international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996. AETcSa Among the stipulations of the Lom Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the conflict began. In the Lom Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally binding obligation not to prosecute the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation of foreign dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law, not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction. "37.In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy to assume and to argue with some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants seem to have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the document formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state or their representatives and representatives of international organizations, means the agreement ofthe parties is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law. cHITCS xxx xxx xxx 40.Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and who do not claim any obligation from the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the settlement. 41.In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF which has no status of statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within the state. The non-contracting signatories of the Lom Agreement were moral guarantors of the principle that, in the termsof Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an understanding of the extent ofthe agreement to be implemented as not including certain international crimes. 42.An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by international law so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which will also provide principle means of enforcement. The Lom Agreement created neither rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by international law. An agreement such as the Lom Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual situation of restoration of peace that the international community acting through the Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert it to an international agreement which creates an obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal, law.A breach of the terms of such a peace agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to peace in the determination of the Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited with possible legal consequences arising from the new situation of conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which settles an internalarmed conflict cannot be ascribed the same status as one which settles an international armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more warring States. The Lom Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. . . ." (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) AHSaTI Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law. In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine State, binding under international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view is Australia v. France, 181 also known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). EcIaTA In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France refused to appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and similar statements from other French officials including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the case. 182 Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking addressed to the international community, which required no acceptance from other States for it to become effective. Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to the international community in issuing its public statements, viz.: 43.It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made. 44.Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for. cCSTHA xxx xxx xxx 51.In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of these statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and their legal consequences must be considered within the general framework of the security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in the relations among States. It is from the actual substance ofthese statements, and from the circumstances attending their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The objectsof these statements are clear and they were addressed to the international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an undertaking possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic, in deciding upon the effective cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the international community to which his words were addressed. . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances. The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali, 183 also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of that case was a statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to be issued by a commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina Faso. CaASIc
Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral act with legal implications. It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit: 40.In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of all the factual circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the view that since the applicant States were not the only ones concerned at the possible continuance of atmospheric testing by the French Government, that Government's unilateral declarations had 'conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests' (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular circumstances of those cases, the French Government could not express an intention to be bound otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its conduct was lawful. The circumstances of the present case are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder the Parties from manifesting an intention to accept the binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of African Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's head of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the present case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and international organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lom Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and international organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law. HaAIES Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such commitments would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse to the trust and confidence essential in the relations among States. In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine government before the international community, which was one of the difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no intention to be bound to the international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD maynot be considered a unilateral declaration under international law. The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. aTIAES The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus Cogens. 184 Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision. SUMMARY The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation ofthe Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. EDcICT The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosureof all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.HcaATE The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement. An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda. One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society. AIHECa Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draftof the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. ISCDEA IN SUM, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated byE.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. ScaEIT While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act ofguaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP- MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION. DTcASE SO ORDERED. Quisumbing, J., concurs. Puno, C.J., please see separate concurring opinion. Ynares-Santiago, J., see separate concurring opinion; I concur with separate opinion of C.J. Puno. Carpio, J., see concurring opinion. Austria-Martinez, J., also concurs with C.J.'s separate opinion. Corona, J., shares the dissent of Mr. Justice Tinga. Azcuna, J., concurs in a separate opinion. Tinga, J., dissents from the result. See separate opinion. Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Brion, JJ., please see dissenting opinion. Reyes, J., certifies that J. Reyes filed a Separate Opinion concurring with the majority. C.J., Puno (RSP). Leonardo-de Castro, J., please see concurring and dissenting opinion. Separate Opinions PUNO, C.J., concurring: It is the duty of the government to seek a just, comprehensive and enduring peace with any rebel group but the search for peace must always be in accord with the Constitution. Any search for peace that undercuts the Constitution must be struck down. Peace in breach of the Constitution is worse than worthless. I.Historical Roots A historical perspective of our Muslim problem is helpful. From time immemorial, an enduring peace with our Muslim brothers and sisters in Mindanao has eluded our grasp. Our Muslim problem exploded in March of 1968 when Muslim trainees were massacred by army officers at Corregidor. About 180 Muslim trainees had been recruited in the previous year as a part of a covert force named Jabidah,1 allegedly formed to wrest away Sabah from Malaysia. The trainees were massacred when they reportedly protested their unbearable training and demanded the return to their home. 2 The Jabidah Massacre fomented the formation of Muslim groups clamoring for a separate Islamic state. One of these groups was the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), founded by the then Governor of Cotabato, Datu Udtog Matalam. 3 Another was the Nurul Islam, led by Hashim Salamat. On September 21, 1972 Martial Law was declared by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Among the reasons cited to justify martial law were the armed conflict between Muslims and Christians and the Muslim secessionist movement in the Southern Philippines. 4 The imposition of martial law drove some of the Muslim secessionist movements to the underground. One of them was the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) headed by Nur Misuari. In 1974, the MNLF shot to prominence, when the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) officially gave it recognition. During the 5th ICFM, they strongly urged "the Philippines Government to find a political and peaceful solution through negotiation with Muslim leaders, particularly with representatives of the MNLF in order to arrive at a just solution to the plight of the Filipino Muslims within the framework of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines"; and recognized "the problem as an internal problem with the Philippine Government to ensure the safety of the Filipino Muslims and the preservation of their liberties in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". 5 ECTAHc In December 1976, the Philippine government and the MNLF under the auspices of the OIC started their peace negotiation in Tripoli, Libya. It bore its first fruit when on January 20, 1977, the parties signed the Tripoli Agreement in Zamboanga City in the presence of the OIC Representative. President Marcos immediately implemented the Tripoli Agreement. He issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1628, "Declaring Autonomy in Southern Philippines". A plebiscite was conducted in the provinces covered under the Tripoli Agreement to determine the will of the people thereat. Further, the legislature enacted Batasang Pambansa Blg. 20, "Providing for the Organization of Sangguniang Pampook (Regional Legislative Assembly) in Each of Regions IX and XII". President Marcos then ordered the creation ofAutonomous Region IX and XII. In the meanwhile, the MNLF continued enhancing its international status. It was accorded the status of an observer in Tripoli, Libya during the 8th ICFM. In the 15th ICFM at Sana'a, Yemen, in 1984, the MNLF's status was further elevated from a mere 'legitimate representative' to 'sole legitimate representative' of the Bangsamoro people. 6 In April 1977, the peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and MNLF Talks collapsed. Schism split the MNLF leadership. The irreconcilable differences between Nur Misuari and Hashim Salamat led to the formation of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), headed by Hashim Salamat. Thus, the Maguindanao-led MILF, parted ways with the Tausug-led MNLF. HCSEcI In 1986, the People Power Revolution catapulted Corazon C. Aquino to the Presidency. Forthwith, she ordered the peace talks with the MNLF to resume. The 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people. It provided for the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao through an act of Congress. But again the talks with the MNLF floundered in May 1987. 7 Be that as it may, it was during President Aquino's governance that a culture of peace negotiations with the rebellious MNLF and MILF was cultivated. 8 Thus, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created through Republic Act No. 6734. The law took effect on August 1, 1989. Then came the presidency of President Fidel V. Ramos. He issued on September 15, 1993, Executive Order No. 125 (E.O. 125) which provided for a comprehensive, integrated and holistic peace process with the Muslim rebels. E.O. 125 created the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to give momentum to the peace talks with the MNLF. In 1996, as the GRP-MNLF peace negotiations were successfully winding down, the government prepared to deal with the MILF problem. Formal peace talks started on Januaryof 1997, towards the end of the Ramos administration. The Buldon Ceasefire Agreement was signed in July 1997 9 but time ran out for the negotiations to be completed. President Joseph Estrada continued the peace talks with the MILF. The talks, however, were limited to cessation of hostilities and did not gain any headway. President Estrada gave both sides until December 1999 to finish the peace process. 10 They did not meet the deadline. The year 2000 saw the escalation of acts of violence and the threats to the lives and security of civilians in Southern Mindanao. President Estrada then declared an "all-out war" against the MILF. 11 He bowed out of office with the "war" unfinished. Thereafter, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed office. Peace negotiations with the MILF were immediately set for resumption. Executive Order No. 3 was issued "Defining Policy and Administrative Structure: For Government's Comprehensive Peace Efforts". On March 24, 2001, a General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks between the GRP and the MILF was signed. Republic Act No. 9054 12 was also enacted on March 31, 2001 and took effect on August 14, 2001 to strengthen and expand the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Through the Organic Act of 2001, six municipalities in Lanao del Norte voted for inclusion in the ARMM.
On June 22, 2001, the ancestral domain aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement was signed in Libya. Several rounds of exploratory talks with the MILF followed. Unfortunately, on April 2, 2003, Davao was twice bombed. Again, the peace talks were cancelled and fighting with the MILF resumed. On July 19, 2003 the GRP and the MILF agreed on "mutual cessation of hostilities" and the parties returned to the bargaining table. The parties discussed the problem of ancestral domain, divided into four strands: concept, territory, resources, and governance. cASIED On February 7, 2006, the 10th round of Exploratory Talks between the GRP and the MILF ended. The parties issued a joint statement of the consensus points of the Ancestral Domain aspect of GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of June 22, 2001. The Joint Statement provides that: "Among the consensus points reached were: Joint determination of the scope of the Bangsamoro homeland based on the technical maps and data submitted by both sides; EDSHcT Measures to address the legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from the unjust dispossession and/or marginalization; Bangsamoro people's right to utilize and develop their ancestral domain and ancestral lands; Economic cooperation arrangements for the benefit of the entire Bangsamoro people." On July 27, 2008, a Joint Statement on the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was signed by Chairperson Rodolfo C. Garcia on behalf of theGRP Peace Panel, and Mohagher Iqbal on behalf of the MILF Panel. In the Joint Statement, it was declared that the final draft of the MOA-AD has already been initialed. It was announced that "both sides reached a consensus to initial the final draft pending its official signing by the Chairmen of the two peace panels in early August 2008, in Putrajaya, Malaysia." 13 The Joint Statement triggered the filing of the petitions at bar. These Petitions, sought among others, to restrain the signing of the MOA-AD. On August 4, 2008, a day before the intended signing of the initialed MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order stopping the signing of the MOA-AD. Several petitions-in-intervention were also filed praying for the same relief. On August 8, 2008 and September 1, 2008, the respondents through the Solicitor General, submitted official copies of the initialed MOA-AD to the Court and furnished the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention with copies of the same. All the petitions were heard by the Court in three separate days of oral arguments. In the course of the arguments, the Solicitor General informed the Court that the MOA-AD will not be signed "in its present form or any other form". 14 Thereafter, the government Peace Panel was dismantled by the President. II.Petitions should be Decided on the Merits The first threshold issue is whether this Court should exercise its power of judicial review and decide the petitions at bar on the merits. I respectfully submit that the Court should not avoid its constitutional duty to decide the petitions at bar on their merit in view of their transcendental importance. The subjectof review in the petitions at bar is the conduct of the peace process with the MILF which culminated in the MOA-AD. The constitutionality of the conduct of the entirepeace process and not just the MOA- AD should go under the scalpel of judicial scrutiny. The review should not be limited to the initialed MOA-AD for it is merely the productof a constitutionally flawed process of negotiations with the MILF. HEDSCc Let us revisit the steps that led to the contested and controversial MOA-AD. Peace negotiations with the MILF commenced with the execution of ceasefire agreements. The watershed event, however, occurred in 2001, with the issuance of Executive Order No. 3 15 entitled "Defining Policy and Administrative Structure for Government's Comprehensive Peace Efforts". Government Peace Negotiating Panels were immediately constituted to negotiate peace with rebel groups, which included the MILF. Significantly,Executive Order No. 3 provides that in the pursuit of social, economic and political reforms, administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments may be required. 16 Section 4 of Executive Order No. 3 states, viz.: SEC. 4.The Six Paths to Peace. The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following: a.PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments. xxx xxx xxx c.PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH THE DIFFERENT REBEL GROUPS. This component involves the conduct of face-to-face negotiations to reach peaceful settlement with the different rebel groups. It also involves the effective implementation of peace agreements. (Emphasis supplied) HSAcaE Executive Order No. 3 was later amended by E.O. No. 555, 17 and was followed by the Tripoli Peace Agreement of 2001. The Tripoli Peace Agreement of 2001 became the basis for several rounds of exploratory talks between the GRP Peace Panel and the MILF. These exploratory talks resulted in the signing of the Joint Statements of the GRP and MILF peace panels to affirm commitments that implement the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, including the ancestral domain aspect. The issuance of the Joint Statements culminated in the initialing of the MOA-AD. 18 It is crystal clear that the initialing of the MOA-AD is but the evidence of the government peace negotiating panel's assent to the terms contained therein. If the MOA-AD is constitutionally infirm, it is because the conduct of the peace process itself is flawed. It is the constitutional duty of the Court is to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the government peace negotiating panel in the conduct of the peace negotiations with the MILF. The Court should not restrict its review on the validity of the MOA-AD which is but the end product of the flawed conduct of the peace negotiation with the MILF. Requirements of Ripeness and Mootness are not bars to review In contending that this Court should refrain from resolving the merits of the petitions at bar, two principal defenses were deployed by the Solicitor General: the issues raised for resolution are not ripe for adjudication and regardless of their ripeness, are moot. With due respect, the defenses cannot be sustained. To contend that an issue is not ripe for adjudication is to invoke prematurity; 19 that the issue has not reached a state where judicial intervention is necessary, hence, there is in reality no actual controversy. On the other hand, to urge that an issue has become moot concedes that judicial intervention was once proper but subsequent developments make further judicial action unnecessary. Together, mootness and ripeness act as a two-pronged pincer, squeezing the resolution of controversies within a narrow timeframe. 20 First, the issues at bar are ripe for resolution. In Ohio Forestry Ass'n., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 21 the following factors were identified as indicative of the ripeness of a controversy: IASEca 1.Whether delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; 2.Whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action; 3.Whether the Court would benefit from further factual development of the issues presented; Underlying the use of the foregoing factors is first, the setting of a threshold for review and second, judicial application of the threshold to the facts extant in a controversy. I respectfully submit that where a controversy concerns fundamental constitutional questions, the threshold must be adjusted to allow judicial scrutiny, in order that the issues may be resolved at the earliest stage before anything irreversible is undertaken under cover of an unconstitutional act. Schwartz cites one vital consideration in determining ripeness, viz.: In dealing with ripeness, one must distinguish between statutes and other acts that are self-executing and those that are not. If a statute is self executing, it is ripe for challenge as soon as it is enacted. For such a statute to be subject to judicial review, it is not necessary that it be applied by an administrator, a prosecutor, or some other enforcement officer in a concrete case. 22 Although Schwartz employs the term "statute", he qualifies that the principle enunciated applies to other governmental acts as well. 23 Prescinding from these parameters, it is evident that the Court is confronted with a MOA-AD that is heavily laden with self-executing components. Far from the representation of the Solicitor General, the MOA-AD is not a mere collection of consensus points, 24 still bereft of any legal consequence. The commitments made by the government panel under the MOA-AD can be divided into (1) those which are self-executory or are immediately effective by the terms of the MOA- AD alone, (2) those with a period or which are to be effective within a stipulated time, and (3) those that are conditional or whose effectivity depends on the outcome of a plebiscite. Let us cast an eye on the self executory provisions of the MOA-AD which will demolish the argument of the respondents that the issues in the petitions at bar are not ripe for adjudication. CaDEAT The MOA-AD provides that "the Parties affirm that the core of the BJE shall constitute the present geographic area of the ARMM, including the municipalities of Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal in the province of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite".
The MOA-AD then proceeds to enumerate the powers that the BJE possesses within its area. The BJE is granted powers of governance which it can exercise without need ofamendments to be made to the Constitution or existing law or without imposing any condition whatsoever. The MOA-AD also gives the BJE the unconditional right to participate in international meetings and events, e.g., ASEAN meetings and other specialized agencies of the United Nations. 26 It grants BJE the right to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations that are engaged in the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection, equitable sharing of incomes and revenues, in addition to those of fishing rights. 26 Again, these rights are given to the BJE without imposing prior conditions such as amendments to the Constitution, existing law or the enactment of new legislation. Next, let us go to provisions of the MOA-AD with a period which will further demonstrate the lack of merit of respondents' posture that the petitions at bar are not ripe for adjudication. The MOA-AD provides that "without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, 27 the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A . . . the Parties shall endeavor to complete negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from signing of the MOA- AD". 28 Once more, it is evident that no conditions were imposed with respect to the conduct of a plebiscite within twelve months following the signing of the MOA-AD. The provision starkly states that within twelve months, the government will conduct and deliver a plebiscite covering areas under Category A of the MOA-AD. We now come to respondents' argument on mootness. In determining whether a case has been rendered moot, courts look at the development of events to ascertain whether the petitioner making the constitutional challenge is confronted with a continuing harm or a substantial potential of harm. Mootness is sometimes viewed as "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest must exist at the commencement of the litigation and must continue throughout its existence". 29Stated otherwise, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of judicial review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. 30 cDTaSH Respondents insist that the petitions at bar are moot for three reasons: (1) the petitioners North Cotabato and Zamboanga have already been furnished copies of the MOA-AD; (2) the Executive Secretary has issued a Memorandum that the government will not sign the MOA-AD and, (3) the GRP Peace Panel has been dissolved by the President. These grounds are barren grounds. For one, the press statements of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., are clear that the MOA-AD will still be used as a major reference in future negotiations. 31 For another, the MILF considers the MOA-AD a "done deal", 32 hence, ready for implementation. On the other hand, the peace panel may have been temporarily dismantled but the structures set up by the Executive and their guidelines which gave rise to the present controversy remain intact. With all these realities, the petitions at bar fall within that exceptional class of cases which ought to be decided despite their mootness because the complained unconstitutional acts are "capable of repetition yet evading review". 33 This well-accepted exception to the non-reviewability of moot cases was first enunciated in the case of Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC. 34 The United States Supreme Court held that a case is not moot where interests of a public character are asserted under conditions that may be immediately repeated, merely because the particular order involved has expired. In the petitions at bar, one need not butt heads with the Solicitor General to demonstrate the numerous constitutional infirmities of the MOA-AD. There is no need to iterate and reiterate them. Suffice to stress that it is because of these evident breaches, that the MOA-AD requires the present Constitution to undergo radical revisions. Yet, the unblushing threat is made that the MOA-AD which shattered to smithereens all respect to the Constitution will continue to be a reference point in future peace negotiations with the MILF. In fine, the MOA-AD is a constitutional nightmare that will come and torment us again in the near future. It must be slain now. It is not moot. Let us adhere to the orthodox thought that once a controversy as to the application of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is hide-bound to decide. 35 Supervening events, whether contrived or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution has already been committed or the threat of being committed again is not a hypothetical fear. 36 It is the function of judicial review to uphold the Constitution at all cost or we forfeit the faith of the people. III.The Deviation from the MNLF Model of Pursuing Peace with Rebels is Inexplicable The MNLF model in dealing with rebels which culminated in the Peace Agreement of 1996, was free from any infirmity because it respected the metes and bounds of the Constitution. While the MNLF model is ostensibly based on the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, its implementation was in perfect accord with Philippine laws. The implementationof the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 came in two phases: the first, under the legislative power of then President Marcos and the second, under the provisions of Article X of the1987 Constitution and its implementing legislation, Republic Act No. 6734. 37 aACHDS Under President Marcos, autonomy in the affected provinces was recognized through Presidential Proclamation No. 1628. It declared autonomy in 13 provinces and constituted a provisional government for the affected areas. The proclamation was followed by a plebiscite and the final framework for the autonomous region was embodied in Presidential Decree No. 1618. The establishment of the autonomous region under P.D. 1628 was constitutionalized by the commissioners in the 1987 Constitution as shown by the following exchangeof views: MR. ALONTO: Madam President, I have stated from the start of our consideration of this Article on Local Governments that the autonomous region exists now in this country. There is a de facto existence of an autonomous government in what we call now Regions IX and XII. Region IX is composed of the provinces of Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del Sur and Zamboanga del Norte, including all the component cities in the provinces. Region XII is composed of theProvinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato. This autonomous region has its central governmental headquarters in Zamboanga City for Region IX and in Cotabato City for Region XII. In fact, it is stated by Commissioner Ople that it has an executive commission and a legislative assembly. MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President. MR. ALONTO: These two regions have been organized by virtue of P.D. No. 1618 of President Marcos, as amended by P.D. No. 1843. MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President. MR. ALONTO: If the Gentleman will bear with me, I will explain to him. That is why there is a de facto autonomous government existing in Mindanao DHaEAS MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: May we please allow Commissioner Alonto to finish his remarks before any interruption? MR. DE CASTRO: Yes Madam President. MR. ALONTO: Madam President, this autonomous region is recognized by the present regime for the very reason that the present regime is now in the process of a negotiation with the Moro National Liberation Front. In a way, what we are doing is to give constitutional basis for the President of this country today to proceed with the negotiation with the Moro National Liberation Front. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Uka is recognized. MR. UKA: Madam President, not only that. President Corazon C. Aquino has appointed Mr. Albert Tugum as the Chairman of Region IX and Mr. Datu Zakaria Candau as chairman of Region XII. They are doing their work well right now. So there are two recognized autonomous regions. They have also a complete regional assembly as the legislative body. So, it is only a matter of putting this in the Constitution. THE PRESIDENT: So, what is before the body is the proposed amendment on Line 11 of Section 1. DcSEHT Commissioner de Castro is recognized. MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President, if there is now an autonomous region in Mindanao and if, according to the Honorable Ople, this has the recognition of the central government, what then is the use of creating autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and going through the process of a plebiscite and enacting an organic act? My amendment is simply to clarify the term "Muslim Mindanao". I really did not expect that this will go this far that it is being placed in the Constitution, that it is a fait accompli and that all we have to do here is say "amen" to the whole thing and it we do not say "amen", they will still continue to be autonomous regions. I insist on my amendment, Madam President. MR. OPLE: May I provide more information to Commissioner de Castro on this matter. First of all, we have to correct the misimpression that the autonomous regions, such as they now exist in Mindanao, do not enjoy the recognition of the central government. Secondly, may I point out that the autonomy existing now in Regions IX and XII is a very imperfect kind of autonomy. We are not satisfied with the legal sufficiency of these regions as autonomous regions and that is the reason the initiative has been taken in order to guarantee by the Constitution the right to autonomy of the people embraced in these regions and not merely on the sufferance of any existing or future administration. It is a right, moreover, for which they have waged heroic struggles, not only in this generation but in previous eras and, therefore, what we seek is constitutional permanence for this right. cHCIDE
May I also point out, Madam President, that the Tripoli Agreement was negotiated under the aegis of foreign powers. No matter how friendly and sympathetic they are to our country, this is under the aegis of the 42-nation Islamic Conference. Should our brothers look across the seas to a conclave of foreign governments so that their rights may be recognized in the Constitution? Do they have to depend upon foreign sympathy so that their right can be recognized in final, constitutional and durable form. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Ople, the consensus here is to grant autonomy to the Muslim areas of Mindanao? MR. OPLE: Yes. (Emphasis supplied) 38 Clearly, the mandate for the creation of the ARMM is derived principally from the 1987 Constitution. Thereafter, ARMM was given life by Republic Act No. 6734, 39 the Organic Act of the ARMM. Our executive officials were guided by and did not stray away from these legal mandates at the negotiation and execution of the Peace Agreement with the MNLF in 1996. Without ifs and buts, its Whereas Clauses affirmed our sovereignty and territorial integrity and completely respected our Constitution. 40 In stark contrast, the peace process with the MILF draws its mandate principally from Executive Order No. 3. This executive order provided the basis for the execution of the Tripoli Agreement of 2001 and thereafter, the MOA- AD. During the whole process, the government peace negotiators conducted themselves free from the strictures of the Constitution. They played fast and loose with the do's and dont's of the Constitution. They acted as if the grant of executive power to the President allows them as agents to make agreements with the MILF in violation of the Constitution. They acted as if these violations can anyway be cured by committing that the sovereign people will change the Constitution to conform with the MOA-AD. They forgot that the Constitution grants power but also sets some impotence on power. IV.The Exercise of Executive Power is Subject to the Constitution Clearly, the respondents grossly misunderstood and patently misapplied the executive powers of the President. The MILF problem is a problem of rebellion penalized under the Revised Penal Code. 41 The MILF is but a rebel group. It has not acquired any belligerency status. The rebellion ofthe MILF is recognized expressly by E.O. No. 3 42 as well as by E.O. No. 555. 43 The President's powers in dealing with rebellion are spelled out in Article VII, section 18 of the Constitution, viz.: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. ACIDTE The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. TcSICH These are the well crafted commander-in-chief powers of the President. They enumerate with exactitude the powers which the President should use in dealing with rebellion. They are graduated in degrees. The strongest of these powers is the power to declare martial law and worthy to note, its exercise is subject to restraints. But more important, all these commander-in-chief powers can only be used to quell the rebellion. They cannot be utilized to dismember the State or to create a state within our State and hand it over to the MILF rebels. In dealing with the MILF rebellion, the President may, however, opt not to use force but negotiate peace with the MILF. Undoubtedly, the President as Chief Executive can negotiate peace with rebels, like the MILF. Article VII, section 1 of the Constitution vests in the President the entire panoply of executive power, to reach peace with rebels. But undoubtedly too, the exercise of executive power to secure peace with rebels is limited by the Constitution. aTICAc All these are due to the preeminent principle that our government is fundamentally one of limited and enumerated powers. As well stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 44 viz.: But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departmentsof the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. In fine, there is no power in the Constitution that can run riot. There is no power in the Constitution that is unbounded. There is no power in the Constitution that can be exercised if it will destroy the Constitution. For all powers in the Constitution are designed to preserve the Constitution. In other words, the President as Chief Executive can negotiate peace with the MILF but it is peace that will insure that our laws are faithfully executed. The President can seek peace with the MILF but without crossing the parameters of powers marked in the Constitution to separate the other branches of government to preserve our democracy. For even in times of war, our system of checks and balances cannot be infringed. 45 More so in times where the only danger that faces the State is the lesser danger of rebellion. Needless to stress, the power of the President to negotiate peace with the MILF is not plenary. While a considerable degree of flexibility and breadth is accorded to the peace negotiating panel, the latitude has its limits the Constitution. The Constitution was ordained by the sovereign people and its postulates may not be employed as bargaining chips without their prior consent. V.The Constitution as Compact of the People The question may be asked: In the process of negotiating peace with the MILF, why cannot the Executive commit to do acts which are prohibited by the Constitution and seek their ratification later by its amendment or revision? Many philosophical perspectives have been advanced in reply to this question. Yet, no theory has been as influential, nor has been as authoritative, as the social contract theory, 46 articulated by John Locke, viz.: For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, empowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which empowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law ofnature and reason, the power of the whole. 47 AcSHCD The French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rosseau stressed the non- derogability of this social contract, viz.: But the body politic or sovereign, deriving its existence only from the sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to others, in anything that derogates from the original act, such as alienation of some portion of itself, or submission to another sovereign. To violate the act by which it exists would be to annihilate itself; and what is nothing produces nothing. 48
Dean Vicente Sinco of the U.P. College of Law articulated these precepts in his seminal work, Philippine Political Law, viz.: As adopted in our system of jurisprudence a constitution is a written instrument which serves as the fundamental law of the state. In theory, it is the creation of the will of the people, who are deemed the source of all political powers. It provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, determines and limits their powers, and prescribes guarantees to the basic rights of the individual. 49 xxx xxx xxx Some authorities have also considered the constitution as a compact, an "agreement of the people, in their individual capacities, reduced to writing, establishing and fixing certain principles for the government of themselves". This notion expresses the old theory of the social contract obligatory on all parties and revocable by no one individual or group less than the majority of the people; otherwise it will not have the attribute of law. 50 (Emphasis supplied) aETASc In sum, there is no power nor is there any right to violate the Constitution on the part of any official of government. No one can claim he has a blank check to violate the Constitution in advance and the privilege to cure the violation later through amendment of its provisions. Respondents' thesis of violate now, validate later makes a burlesque of the Constitution. I vote to grant the petitions. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J ., concurring: I join the majority opinion and concur in the views expressed in the ponencia. More particularly, I register my agreement in prohibiting respondents and their agents from signing and executing the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), or any similar instruments. The said MOA-AD contains provisions which are repugnant to the Constitution and which will result in the virtual surrender of part of the Philippines' territorial sovereignty, which our people has spent decades fighting for and which scores of men in uniform have valiantly defended. While the ponencia exhaustively discusses the grounds upon which the Court must invalidate and strike down the many questionable provisions of the MOA- AD, I wish to add some important points which, I hope, will serve to further highlight and underscore the serious constitutional flaws in the MOA-AD. Only after certain quarters took notice and raised a clamor, and only after this Court has issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the signing of the MOA- AD, did respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General and the Executive Secretary, openly declare that the MOA-AD or any similar instrument will not be signed by the GRP. On this basis, respondents assert that the petitions have become moot and academic. This, to my mind, was a mere afterthought. For were it not for the timely exposure ofthe MOA-AD in the public light, the signing thereof would have gone ahead as planned. aHDTAI Furthermore, respondents' protestations that the petitions have become moot and academic in view of the disclosure and non-signing of the MOA-AD is unavailing, as it is well-recognized that mootness, as a ground for dismissal of a case, is subject to certain exceptions. In David v. Pres. Arroyo, 1 we held that the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the situation is exceptional in character and paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issues raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. To my mind, all ofthese circumstances are present in the cases at bar. It is beyond cavil that these petitions involve matters that are of paramount public interest and concern. As shown by recent events, the MOA-AD has spawned violent conflicts in Mindanao and has polarized our nation over its real import and effects. The controversy over the agreement has resulted in unnecessary loss of lives, destruction ofproperty and general discord in that part of our country. Strong reasons of public policy and the importance of these cases to the public demands that we settle the issues promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. The petitions also allege that the GRP panel committed grave violations of the Constitution when it negotiated and agreed to terms that directly contravene the fundamental law. The basic issue which emerged from all the assertions of the parties is not only whether the MOA-AD should be disclosed or signed at all but, more significantly, whether the GRP panel exceeded its powers in negotiating an agreement that contains unconstitutional stipulations. Considering that it has been widely announced that the peace process will continue, and that a new panel may be constituted to enter into similar negotiations with the MILF, it is necessary to resolve the issue on the GRP panel's authority in order to establish guiding and controlling principles on its extent and limits. By doing so, a repetition of the unfortunate events which transpired in the wake of the MOA-AD can hopefully be avoided. There is also the possibility that an agreement with terms similar to the MOA-AD may again be drafted in the future. Indeed, respondents cannot prevent this Court from determining the extent of the GRP panel's authority by the simple expedient of claiming that such an agreement will not be signed or that the peace panel will be dissolved. There will be no opportunity to finally the settle the question of whether a negotiating panel can freely stipulate on terms that transgress our laws and our Constitution. It can thus be said that respondents' act of negotiating a peace agreement similar to the MOA-AD is capable of repetition yet evading review. 2 DAEIHT The ultimate issue in these cases is whether the GRP panel went beyond its powers when it negotiated terms that contravene the Constitution. It is claimed that the panel stipulated on matters that were outside of its authority and under the exclusive prerogative of Congress. In other words, the constitutional as well as legal limits of executive authority in the drafting of a peace agreement have been squarely put in issue. This involves a genuine constitutional question that the Court has the right and duty to resolve. Respondents insist that it is not necessary to discuss the constitutionality of each provision of the MOA-AD, because the latter is but a codification of consensus points which creates no rights and obligations between the parties. The MOA-AD allegedly has no legal effects, even if it is signed, because it is merely a preliminary agreement whose effectivity depends on subsequent legal processes such as the formulation of a Comprehensive Compact, the holding of a plebiscite, the amendment of laws by Congress as well as constitutional amendments. Consequently, it would be premature for the Court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the MOA-AD since it is neither self-executory nor is it the final peace agreement between the GRP and MILF. A reading of the MOA-AD shows that its pertinent provisions on the basic concepts, territory, resources and governance of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) have been made to depend for its effectivity on "changes to the legal framework". Paragraph 7 on the provisions on Governance states: 7.The parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively. EADSIa Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. The provisions of the MOA-AD which require "amendments to the existing legal framework" include practically all the substantive terms of the document. It is not difficult to foresee that the material provisions of the MOA-AD will require either an amendment to the Constitution or to existing laws to become legally effective. Some of the required constitutional or statutory amendments are the following: a)Article I, Section 1 3 of the Constitution has to be amended to segregate the BJE territory from the rest of the Republic of the Philippines, as the MOA-AD delineates the Bangsamoro homeland under its paragraph 1 4 on Territory; b)Section 1, Article X 5 of the Constitution will have to include the BJE as among the five kinds of political subdivisions recognized under the fundamental law. The provision of an Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) will also have to be removed as the same is incorporated in the BJE per paragraph 2.c 6 of the MOA-AD provisions on Territory; c)The provision in Section 15, Article X 7 of the Constitution which declares the creation of the ARMM "within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" must also be changed since there is no provision in the MOA-AD that subjects the BJE to the authority, territory and sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines; aTICAc d)Section 16, Article X 8 of the Constitution which gives the President power to supervise autonomous regions will have to be amended since the MOA-AD does not provide for such supervision over the BJE; e)Section 18, Article X 9 of the Constitution which requires personal, family and property laws of autonomous regions to comply with the Constitution and laws will have to be changed as the MOA-AD grants the BJE the power to make its own laws; f)An overhaul of the various constitutional provisions relating to the Executive, Judicial and Legislative Departments as well as the independent constitutional commissions must be undertaken to accommodate paragraph 8 10 of the MOA-AD provision on Governance which grants the BJE the power to create its own civil institutions;
g)Section 3, Article II of the Constitution which declares the Armed Forces of the Philippines as protector of the people and the State will have to be changed because the MOA-AD provides that the BJE shall have its own internal security force 11 and the AFP will only defend the Bangsamoro homeland against external aggression; 12 aIcHSC h)Section 2, Article XII 13 of the Constitution must be changed to allow the BJE to manage, explore, develop, and utilize the natural resources within the Bangsamoro territory, pursuant to paragraphs 2.f, 14 g (1) 15 and h 16 on Territory and paragraphs 1 17 and 2 18 on Resources of the MOA-AD; i)Section 21, Article VII 19 of the Constitution has to be amended to exempt the BJE from the ratification requirements of treaties and international agreements since it is given the power to enter into its own economic and trade agreements with other countries; j)The Bangsamoro homeland will have to be exempted from the power of the President to exercise general supervision of all local governments under Section 4, Article X 20 of the Constitution because the MOA-AD does not provide for any such stipulation; k)Since the BJE will have its own laws, it is not subject to limitations imposed by Congress on its taxing powers under Section 5, Article X 21 of the Constitution; l)R.A. No. 6734 and R.A. No. 9054, or the ARMM Organic Acts, have to be amended to allow for the existing ARMM to be included within the Bangsamoro homeland to be governed by the BJE; m)The Bangsamoro people will have to be exempted from the application of R.A. No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) insofar as the MOA-AD declares the Bangsamoro territory as ancestral domain and recognizes in the Bangsamoro people rights pertaining to indigenous peoples under the IPRA; n)Existing laws which regulate mining rights and the exploitation of natural resources will also have to exempt the BJE from its coverage, as the MOA-AD grants the BJE the power to utilize, develop and exploit natural resources within its territory as well as the authority to revoke or grant forest concessions, timber licenses and mining agreements; and o)The BJE will also have to be exempted from existing agrarian statutes as the BJE is empowered to enact its own agrarian laws and program under paragraph 2.e22 on Resources. CSEHcT From the foregoing, it is clear that the substantive provisions of the MOA-AD directly contravene the fundamental law and existing statutes. Otherwise, it would not be necessary to effect either statutory or constitutional amendments to make it effective. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, the GRP panel exceeded its authority when it categorically undertook to make these statutory and constitutional changes in order to fully implement the MOA- AD. Paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD on Governance states that provisions therein which require amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework. These "necessary changes" shall be undertaken "with due regard to non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact". The language of the aforesaid paragraph 7 on Governance, in relation to paragraph 2 (d) on Territory, indicates that the GRP panel committed itself to cause the necessary changes to the legal framework within a stipulated timeframe for the MOA-AD to become effective. Paragraph 2 (d) on Territory reads: caTIDE 2.Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations: xxx xxx xxx d.Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA- AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the Annex). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD. Pursuant to the above, the GRP panel bound itself to "complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD". On the other hand, it is explicitly provided in paragraph 7 on Governance that the Comprehensive Compact shall contain a stipulated timeframe within which to effect the necessary changes to the legal framework. In other words, the GRP panel undertook to change the legal framework within a contemplated period to be agreed upon within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD. SEcITC It should also be noted that, in accordance with paragraph 2 (a) 23 on Territory, the GRP panel committed itself "to the full and mutual implementation of this framework agreement on territory". To fully realize the MOA-AD stipulations on territory, it would be necessary to effect both statutory and constitutional amendments as well as complete negotiations on the Comprehensive Compact. The plebiscite envisioned under paragraph 2 (c) on Territory, for instance, would require not only an amendment of the ARMM Organic Acts, but also a constitutional amendment that would allow for the very creation of the BJE. Thus, the full implementation of the territory provisions of the MOA- AD presupposes changes in the legal framework, which the GRP panel guaranteed under paragraph 7 on Governance. Additionally, paragraph 7 on Governance provides that necessary changes to the legal framework shall likewise be effected "with due regard to non- derogation of prior agreements". This can only mean that any change to the legal framework should not diminish or detract from agreements previously entered into by the parties. It also implies that provisions of prior agreements are already final and binding, as these serve as take-off points for the necessary changes that will be effected to fully implement the MOA-AD. In my opinion, the MOA-AD is intended to be included among the prior agreements whose terms cannot be decreased by any of the changes that are necessary for it to come into force. More specifically, by the time the Comprehensive Compact shall have prescribed the timeframe for effecting these changes, the MOA-AD shall have become a prior agreement that is subject to the non-derogation clause found in paragraph 7 on Governance. This signifies that any change in the legal framework should adapt to the terms ofthe MOA-AD. The latter becomes the parameter of any statutory or constitutional amendments which are necessary to make the MOA-AD effective. As such, it cannot be denied that the GRP panel committed itself to the full implementation of the MOA-AD by effecting changes to the legal framework. Respondents cannot deny this by saying that the parties further undertook to negotiate a Comprehensive Compact or a final peace agreement. Although it may be conceded that the parties have yet to enter into a Comprehensive Compact subsequent to the signing of the MOA-AD, the nature of this compact shows that the MOA-AD was intended as the controlling document for the essential terms of the Comprehensive Compact. Paragraphs 3 and 7 of the MOA-AD provisions on Governance invariably describe the Comprehensive Compact as merely embodying details for the effective enforcement and actual implementation of the MOA-AD. Thus, the Comprehensive Compact will simply lay down the particulars of the parties' final commitments, as expressed in the assailed agreement. cSATEH Consequently, paragraph 7 on Governance in relation to paragraph 2 (a) on Territory contradict respondents' assertion that the MOA-AD is merely a preparatory agreement devoid of any real effects. The language employed in these provisions do not support respondents' contention that the MOA-AD is just a reference for future negotiations or consists of mere proposals that are subject to renegotiation. The words used in these provisions are categorical in stating that the GRP panel committed itself to the full implementation of the MOA-AD by effecting changes to the legal framework within a stipulated timeframe. In other words, these are definite propositions that would have to be undertaken under the agreement of the parties. The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the MOA-AD is not merely a draft of consensus points that is subject to further negotiations between the GRP panel and the MILF. The language of the MOA-AD shows that the GRP panel made a real and actual commitment to fully implement the MOA- AD by effecting the necessary amendments to existing laws and the Constitution. The GRP panel's obligation to fully implement the provisions on Territory and to effect these "necessary changes" is in itself not dependent on any statutory or constitutional amendment. It is only subject to a timeframe that will be specified in the Comprehensive Compact, per stipulation of the parties. At this point, it is worth noting that the MOA-AD cannot even be subjected to subsequent legal processes, such as a plebiscite or statutory and constitutional amendments. The MOA-AD cannot be validated by any of these means considering that the GRP panel does not even have the power to make these legal processes occur. This is because the panel is not authorized to commit to statutory and constitutional changes to fully implement the MOA-AD. Thus, it is not legally possible to undertake these legal processes under the circumstances provided in the agreement. AcEIHC To emphasize, the GRP panel had neither power nor authority to commit the government to statutory and constitutional changes. The power to amend laws and to cause amendments or revisions to the Constitution belongs to Congress and, to a certain extent, the people under a system of initiative and referendum. Only Congress and the people have the competence to effect statutory and constitutional changes in the appropriate manner provided by law. The GRP panel, as a mere organ of the Executive branch, does not possess any such prerogative.
In the matter of legislation, it is settled that the power of Congress under Article VI, Section 1 24 of the Constitution is plenary and all-encompassing. The legislature alone determines when to propose or amend laws, what laws to propose or amend, and the proper circumstances under which laws are proposed or amended. As held in Ople v. Torres:25 . . . Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them". The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Similarly, the power to amend or revise the Constitution also pertains to Congress in the exercise of its constituent functions. The same power is also reserved to the people under a system of initiative, pursuant to Article XVII 26 of the Constitution. In Lambino v. COMELEC, 27 the Court stated that there are three modes of amending the Constitution under Article XVII. The first mode is through Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, upon three-fourth's vote of all its Members; the second mode is through a constitutional convention created under a law passed by Congress; and the third mode is through a people's initiative. Nowhere in the Constitution does it state that the Executive or any of its organs can effect constitutional changes, as assumed by the GRP panel under the MOA-AD. Notwithstanding the apparent lack of power or authority, the GRP panel undertook to effect changes to the Constitution and to statutes in order to fully implement the MOA-AD. In doing so, the GRP panel pre-empted Congress by determining, firsthand, the wisdom of effecting these changes as well as the nature of the required amendments to laws and the Constitution. It encroached upon the exclusive prerogative of Congress by assuming to exercise a discretion that it did not possess. It thus exceeded its authority and acted without jurisdiction. HcDSaT It should have been evident to the GRP panel that it could not bargain away laws enacted by Congress or the people's sovereign will as expressed in the Constitution. Apart from the fact that it had no power to do so, its acts were in clear disregard of the instructions of the President as stated in the Memorandum of Instructions From the President dated March 1, 2001. The President clearly directed therein that "(t)he negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with the mandates of the Philippine Constitution, the Ruleof Law, and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines". The GRP panel did otherwise and failed to act in accordance with this directive. The GRP panel derives its authority from the Chief Executive, whose sworn duty is to faithfully execute the laws and uphold the Constitution. In negotiating the terms of the MOA-AD, however, the GRP panel violated our Constitution and our laws by subscribing to stipulations that could very well lead to their emasculation. The GRP panel agreed to illegal and unconstitutional concessions and guaranteed the performance of a prestation that it could not deliver. This constitutes manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is beyond question that the MOA-AD is patently unconstitutional. Had it been signed by the parties, it would have bound the government to the creation of a separate Bangsamoro state having its own territory, government, civil institutions and armed forces. The concessions that respondents made to the MILF would have given the latter leverage to demand that the Bangsamoro homeland be recognized as a state before international bodies. It could insist that the MOA-AD is in fact a treaty and justify compliance with its provisions, under the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines would have been compromised. For these reasons, I vote to grant the petitions. Respondents must be prohibited and permanently enjoined from negotiating, executing and entering into a peace agreement with terms similar to the MOA-AD. Although respondents have manifested that the MOA-AD will not be signed "in its present form or in any other form", the agreement must nonetheless be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void ab initio, to remove any doubts regarding its binding effect on the Republic. Under no circumstance could the MOA-AD acquire legitimacy and force against the entire nation, and no less than a categorical declaration to this effect should put the issue to rest. aEHADT I so vote. CARPIO, J., concurring: If this Court did not stop the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), this country would have been dismembered because the Executive branch would have committed to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD gives to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) the attributes of a state, with its own people, territory, government, armed forces, foreign trade missions, and all other institutions of a state, 1 under the BJE's own basic law or constitution. 2 Usurpation of the Powers of Congress and the People The initialed MOA-AD between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is patently unconstitutional. The Executive branch's commitment under the MOA-AD to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD violates Sections 1 and 4, Article XVII of the Constitution. The Executive branch usurps the sole discretionary power of Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as the exclusive power of the sovereign people to approve or disapprove such proposed amendments. Sections 1 and 4, Article XVII of the Constitution provide: Section 1.Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1)The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or (2)A constitutional convention. Section 4.Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. aEcTDI Indisputably, the Executive branch has no power to commit to the MILF that the Constitution shall be amended to conform to the MOA-AD. Such commitment is a grave abuseof discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 3 The MOA-AD states, in paragraph 2 (a) on Territory, that "the Parties to this Agreement commit themselves to the full and mutual implementation of this framework agreement". The MOA-AD further states, in paragraph 7 on Governance, that: Any provisions of the MOA on Ancestral Domain requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. (Emphasis supplied) The Executive branch commits to implement fully the MOA-AD by amending the "existing legal framework", impliedly referring to the Constitution. The Executive branch further commits that such constitutional amendments shall not derogate from prior GRP-MILF agreements. At the time of the constitutional amendments, the MOA-AD will be a prior agreement, along with several other GRP-MILF agreements. 4 THcEaS The phrase "due regard to non-derogation of prior agreements" means there shall be no deviation from previous GRP-MILF agreements. The word "due" means a right to something, as in something that is "due" a person. This is the same usage of the word "due" in the phrase "due process of law", which means one's right to legal process. The word "regard" means attention or observance. "Non-derogation" means no deviation. Thus, "due regard to non- derogation of prior agreements" simply means observance ofwhat the MILF is entitled under previous GRP-MILF agreements, to which there shall be no deviation. The phrase "due regard" means mandatory observance and not discretionary observance. When one speaks of "due regard for the law", one intends mandatory observanceof the law. The same is true for "due regard to non- derogation of prior agreements", which means mandatory observance of non- derogation of previous agreements. The following pronouncements of the Court reveal the mandatory nature of the phrase "due regard": The least this Court can do under the circumstances is to make clear to all and sundry, especially to members of police forces, that the authority conferred on them to maintain peace and order should be exercised with due regard to the constitutional rights, most especially so of those who belong to the lower-income groups. If in a case like the present, the full force of the penal statute is not felt by the perpetrator of the misdeed, then the law itself stands condemned. This we should not allow to happen. 5 (Emphasis supplied) Entrapment is allowed when it is undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. It has repeatedly been accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. 6 (Emphasis supplied) The phrase "due regard" is commonly found in international treaties and conventions, like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) where the phrase appears at least 16 times. The phrase "due regard" as used in UNCLOS is explained as follows: [T]he requirement of "due regard" is a qualification of the rights of States in exercising the freedoms of the high seas. The standard of "due regard" requires all States, in exercising their high seas freedoms, to be aware of and consider the interests of other States in using the high seas, and to refrain from activities that interfere with the exercise by other States of the freedom of the high seas. As the ILC [which prepared drafts of the 1958 LOS Conventions], stated in its Commentary in 1956, "States are bound to refrain from any acts that might adversely affect the use of the high seas by nationals of other States". The construction in paragraph 2 recognizes that all States have the right to exercise high seas freedoms, and balances consideration for the rights and interests of all states in this regard. 8 (Emphasis supplied) IDAEHT
The phrase "due regard", as used in the Convention on International Civil Aviation, is understood as giving rise to "a duty of 'due regard' upon operators of state aircraft, and thus, upon military aircraft, for the safety of the navigation of civil aircraft". 8 Thus, "the 'due regard' rule remains the principal treaty obligation imposed upon States for the regulation of the flight of military aircraft applicable during times of peace and armed conflict". 9 The Chairman of the MILF and its highest-ranking official, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, candidly admitted that the MILF's understanding is that the Constitution shall be amended to conform to the MOA-AD. In an ABS-CBN television interview aired nationwide on 20 August 2008, and widely reported in the newspapers, MILF Chairman Murad stated: TIHCcA It may be beyond the Constitution but the Constitution can be amended and revised to accommodate the agreement. What is important is during the amendment, it will not derogate or water down the agreement because we have worked this out for more than 10 years now. 10 (Emphasis supplied) During the oral arguments, Atty. Sedfrey Candelaria, principal counsel to the GRP Panel, when asked about this statement, did not dispute that MILF Chairman Murad made the statement. Atty. Candelaria simply told the Court that MILF Chairman Murad "did not sit in the negotiating table". 11 Clearly, under the MOA-AD, the Executive branch assumes the mandatory obligation to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD. During the oral arguments, Atty. Sedfrey Candelaria admitted that the implementation of the MOA-AD requires "drastic changes" to the Constitution. 12 As directed by Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Atty. Candelaria undertook to submit to the Court a listing of all provisions in the Constitution that needed amendment to conform to the MOA-AD. 13 In their Memorandum dated 24 September 2008, respondents stated: "In compliance with the said directive, the constitutional provisions that may be affected, as relayed by Atty. Sedfrey Candelaria, are the following Sections 1, 5, 18, 20 and 21 of Article X under Local Autonomy". 14 This listing is grossly incomplete. A more thorough scrutiny shows that the "drastic changes" are amendments to the following provisions of the Constitution: 1.Article 1 on the National Territory. 15 During the oral arguments, Atty. Sedfrey Candelaria stated that this provision would have to be amended to conform to the MOA-AD. 16 2.Section 3, Article II on the role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines as "protector of the people and the State". 17 Under the MOA-AD, the AFP's role is only to defend the BJE against external aggression. 18 3.Article III on the Bill of Rights. The MOA-AD does not state that the Bill of Rights will apply to the BJE. The MOA-AD refers only to "internationally recognized human rights instruments" 19 such as the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. No reference is made to the Bill of Rights or even to the Constitution. HSDaTC 4.Section 1, Article VI on the Legislative Department. 20 Legislative power shall no longer be vested solely in the Congress of the Philippines. Under the MOA-AD, the BJE shall "build, develop and maintain its own institutions" 21 like a legislature whose laws are not subordinate to laws passed by Congress. 22 5.Section 1, Article VII on executive power. 23 Executive power shall no longer be vested exclusively in the President of the Philippines. The BJE shall have its own Chief Executive who will not be under the supervision of the President. 24 6.Section 16, Article VII on the President's power to appoint certain officials, including military officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the consentof the Commission on Appointments. 25 All public officials in the BJE, including military officers of any rank in the BJE internal security force, will be appointed in accordance with the BJE's own basic law or constitution. HcACTE 7.Section 17, Article VII on the President's control over all executive departments. 26 The President will not control executive bureaus or offices in the BJE, like foreign trade missions of the BJE. 8.Section 18, Article VII on the President as "Commander-in- Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines". 27 Under the MOA- AD, the President will not be the Commander-in-Chief of the BJE's internal security force. The BJE's internal security force will not be part of the AFP chain of command. 9.Section 21, Article VII on the ratification of treaties and international agreements by the Senate. 28 This will not apply to the BJE which, under the MOA-AD, has the power to enter into economic and trade treaties with other countries. 29 10.Section 1, Article VIII on judicial power being vested in one Supreme Court. 30 Since the BJE will have "its own . . . judicial system", 31 the BJE will also have its own Supreme Court. 11.Section 2, Article VIII on the power of Congress to define and apportion the jurisdiction of lower courts. 32 Under the MOA-AD, Congress cannot prescribe the jurisdiction of BJE courts. 12.Section 5(2), Article VIII on the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of lower courts and to promulgate rules of pleadings and practice in all courts.33 Under the MOA-AD, the BJE will have its own judicial system. Decisions of BJE courts are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. 13.Section 5(6), Article VII on the power of the Supreme Court to appoint all officials and employees in the Judiciary. 34 This power will not apply to courts in the BJE. ASIDTa 14.Section 6, Article VIII on the Supreme Court's administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel. 35 Under the MOA-AD, the Supreme Court will not exercise administrative supervision over BJE courts and their personnel. 15.Section 9, Article VIII on the appointment by the President of all judges in the Judiciary from nominees recommended by the Judicial and Bar Council. 36 This provision will not apply to courts in the BJE. 16.Section 11, Article VIII on the power of the Supreme Court to discipline judges of all lower courts. 37 This power will not apply to judges in the BJE. 17.Section 1(1), Article IX-B on the power of the Civil Service Commission to administer the civil service. 38 Under the MOA-AD, the BJE will have "its own . . . civil service". 39 The Civil Service Commission will have no jurisdiction over the BJE's civil service. 18.Section 2(1), Article IX-C on the power of the Commission on Elections to enforce and administer all election laws. 40 Under the MOA-AD, the BJE will have "its own . . . electoral system". 41 The Commission on Elections will have no jurisdiction over the BJE's electoral system. IDScTE 19.Section 2(1), Article IX-D on the power of the Commission on Audit to examine and audit all subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government. 42Under the MOA-AD, the BJE can "build, develop and maintain its own institutions" 43 without limit. The BJE can create its own audit authority. The Commission on Audit will have no jurisdiction over the BJE or its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities. 20.Section 1, Article X on the political subdivisions of the Philippines. 44 A new political subdivision for the BJE will have to be created. 21.Section 4, Article X on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over all local governments. 45 Under the MOA-AD, this provision will not apply to the BJE. 22.Section 5, Article X subjecting the taxing power of local governments to limitations prescribed by Congress. 46 Under the MOA-AD, the BJE shall have "its own . . . legislation". 47 The BJE's taxing power will not be subject to limitations imposed by national law. 23.Section 6, Article X on the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. 48 Since the BJE is in reality independent from the national government, this provision will have to be revised to reflect the independent status of the BJE and its component cities, municipalities and barangays vis- -vis other local government units. AEcIaH 24.Section 10, Article X on the alteration of boundaries of local government units, which requires a plebiscite "in the political units affected". 49 Under paragraph 2(d) on Territory of the MOA- AD, 50 the plebiscite is only in the barangays and municipalities identified as expansion areas of the BJE. There will be no plebiscite "in the political units affected", which should include all the barangays within a city, and all municipalities within a province. 25.Section 15, Article X on the creation of autonomous regions within the framework of the Constitution, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines. 51 This will have to be revised since under the MOA-AD the BJE has all the attributes of a state. 26.Section 16, Article X on the President's power to exercise general supervision over autonomous regions. 52 This provision will not apply to the BJE, which is totally independent from the President's supervision. 27.Section 17, Article X which vests in the National Government residual powers, or those powers which are not granted by the Constitution or laws to autonomous regions. 53 This will not apply to the BJE. 28.Section 18, Article X which requires that personal, family and property laws of autonomous regions shall be consistent with the Constitution and national laws.54 This will not apply to the BJE which will have its own basic law or constitution. 55 29.Section 20, Article X on the legislative powers of autonomous regional assemblies whose laws are subject to the Constitution and national laws. 56 This provision will not apply to the BJE. EHcaDT 30.Section 21, Article X on the preservation of peace and order within autonomous regions by the local police as provided in national laws. 57 Under the MOA-AD, the BJE shall have "its own . . . police" 58 to preserve peace and order within the BJE.
31.Section 2, Article XII on State ownership of all lands of the public domain and of all natural resources in the Philippines. 59 Under paragraph 3 on Concepts and Principles of the MOA- AD, 60 ancestral domain, which consists of ancestral lands and the natural resources in such lands, does not form part of the public domain. The ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro refers to land they or their ancestors continuously possessed since time immemorial, excluding the period that their possession was disrupted by conquest, war, civil disturbance, force majeure, other forms of usurpation or displacement by force, deceit or stealth, or as a consequence of government project, or any voluntary dealings by the government and private parties. Under paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles of the MOA-AD, . 61 the Bangsamoro people are the Moros and all indigenous peoples of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. Thus, the ancestral domain ofthe Bangsamoro refers to the lands that all the peoples in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan possessed before the arrival of the Spaniards in 1521. In short, the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro refers to the entire Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. This negates the Regalian doctrine in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. 32.Section 9, Article XII on the establishment of an independent economic and planning agency headed by the President. 62 This agency is the National Economic and Development Authority. Under the MOA-AD, the BJE will have its own economic planning agency. 33.Section 20, Article XII on the establishment of an independent monetary authority, now the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 63 Under the MOA-AD, the BJE will have its own financial and banking authority. 64 34.Section 4, Article XVI on the maintenance of "a regular force necessary for the security of the State". 65 This provision means there shall only be one "Armed Forces of the Philippines" under the command and control of the President. This provision will not apply to the BJE since under the MOA-AD, the BJE shall have"its own . . . internal security force" . 66 which will not be under the command and control of the President. ECSHAD 35.Section 5(6), Article XVI on the composition of the armed forces, whose officers and men must be recruited proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable. 67 This will not apply to the BJE's internal security force whose personnel will come only from BJE areas. 36.Section 6, Article XVI on the establishment of one police force which shall be national in scope under the administration and control of a national police commission. 68 The BJE will have "its own . . . police" 69 which is a regional police force not administered or controlled by the National Police Commission. The Executive branch thus guarantees to the MILF that the Constitution shall be drastically overhauled to conform to the MOA-AD. The Executive branch completely disregards that under the Constitution the sole discretionary power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies with Congress, and the power to approve or disapprove such proposed amendments belongs exclusively to the people. SaIEcA The claim of respondents that the phrase "prior agreements" does not refer to the MOA-AD but to GRP-MILF agreements prior to the MOA-AD is immaterial. Whether the prior agreement is the MOA-AD or any other GRP-MILF agreement prior to the constitutional amendments, any commitment by the Executive branch to amend the Constitution without derogating from such prior GRP-MILF agreement would still be unconstitutional for the same reason usurpation by the Executive branch of the exclusive discretionary powers of Congress and the Filipino people to amend the Constitution. Violation of Constitutional Rights of Lumads Under the MOA-AD, the Executive branch also commits to incorporate all the Lumads in Mindanao, who are non-Muslims, into the Bangsamoro people who are Muslims. There are 18 distinct Lumad groups in Mindanao with their own ancestral domains and their own indigenous customs, traditions and beliefs. The Lumads have lived in Mindanao long before the arrival of Islam and Christianity. For centuries, the Lumads have resisted Islam, a foreign religion like Christianity. To this day, the Lumads proudly continue to practice their own indigenous customs, traditions and beliefs. Suddenly, without the knowledge and consent of the Lumads, the Executive branch has erased their identity as separate and distinct indigenous peoples. The MOA-AD, in paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles, provides: It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization and their descendants whether mixed or of full native blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the indigenous people shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied) AcICHD The declaration that it is the "birthright of . . . all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as 'Bangsamoros'" is cultural genocide. It erases by a mere declaration the identities, culture, customs, traditions and beliefs of 18 separate and distinct indigenous groups in Mindanao. The "freedom of choice" given to the Lumads is an empty formality because officially from birth they are already identified as Bangsamoros. The Lumads may freely practice their indigenous customs, traditions and beliefs, but they are still identified and known as Bangsamoros under the authority of the BJE. The MOA-AD divests the Lumads of their ancestral domains and hands over possession, ownership and jurisdiction of their ancestral domains to the BJE. In paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 on Concepts and Principles, the MOA-AD gives ownership over the Bangsamoros' ancestral domain to the Bangsamoro people, defines the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoros, and vests jurisdiction and authority over such ancestral domain in the BJE, thus: 2.It is essential to lay the foundation of the Bangsamoro homeland in order to address the Bangsamoro people's humanitarian and economic needs as well as their political aspirations. Such territorial jurisdictions and geographic areas being the natural wealth and patrimony represent the social, cultural and political identity and pride of all the Bangsamoro people. Ownership of the homeland is vested exclusively in them by virtue of their prior rights of occupation that had inhered in them as sizeable bodies of people, delimited by their ancestors since time immemorial, and being the first politically organized dominant occupants. 3.. . . Ancestral domain and ancestral land refer to those held under claim of ownership, occupied or possessed, by themselves or through the ancestors ofthe Bangsamoro people, communally or individually . . . . DHcSIT xxx xxx xxx 6.Both Parties agree that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) shall have the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral lands, including both alienable and non- alienable lands encompassed within their homeland and ancestral territory, as well as the delineation of ancestral domains/lands of the Bangsamoro people located therein. (Emphasis supplied) After defining the Bangsamoro people to include all the Lumads, the MOA-AD then defines the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people as the ancestral domain of all the Bangsamoros, which now includes the ancestral domains of all the Lumads. The MOA-AD declares that exclusive ownership over the Bangsamoro ancestral domain belongs to the Bangsamoro people. The MOA-AD vests jurisdiction and authority over the Bangsamoros' ancestral domain in the BJE. Thus, the Lumads lost not only their separate identities but also their ancestral domains to the Bangsamoros and the BJE. The incorporation of the Lumads as Bangsamoros, and the transfer of their ancestral domains to the BJE, without the Lumads' knowledge and consent, 70 violate the Constitutional guarantee that the "State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development". 71The incorporation also violates the Constitutional guarantee that the "State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shallprotect the rights of indigenous cultural minorities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being." . 72 These Constitutional guarantees, as implemented in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, grant the Lumads "the right to participate fully, if they so chose, at all levelsof decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies." 73 Since the Executive branch kept the MOA-AD confidential until its publication in thePhilippine Daily Inquirer on 4 August 2008, the day before its scheduled signing in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, there could have been no participation by the 18 Lumad groups ofMindanao in their incorporation into the Bangsamoro. This alone shows that the Executive branch did not consult, much less secure the consent, of the Lumads on their rights, lives and destinies under the MOA- AD. In fact, representatives of the 18 Lumad groups met in Cagayan de Oro City and announced on 27 August 2008, through their convenor Timuay Nanding Mudai, that "we cannot accept that we are part of the Bangsamoro". 74 The incorporation of the Lumads, and their ancestral domains, into the Bangsamoro violates the Constitutional and legislative guarantees recognizing and protecting the Lumads' distinct cultural identities as well as their ancestral domains. The violation of these guarantees makes the MOA-AD patently unconstitutional. HcTDSA The incorporation of the Lumads, and their ancestral domains, into the Bangsamoro without the Lumads' knowledge and consent also violates Article 8 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 75 Section 8 of the Declaration states:
Article 8. 1.Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture. 2.States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: (a)Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; (b)Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources; (c)Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights; (d)Any form of forced assimilation or integration; (e)Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them. (Emphasis supplied) SECIcT The provisions of Article 8 were designed to prevent cultural genocide of indigenous peoples. This will happen if the Lumads are identified from birth as Bangsamoros and their ancestral domains are absorbed into the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoros. There is another provision in the MOA-AD that could prove oppressive to the Lumads, and even invite conflicts with Christians. The MOA-AD, in paragraph 4 on Territory,empowers the BJE to establish political subdivisions within the Bangsamoro ancestral domain, as follows: All territorial and geographic areas in Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago that have been declared recognized, and/or delineated as ancestral domain and ancestral land of the Bangsamoro people as their geographical areas, inclusive of settlements and reservations, may be formed or constituted into political subdivisions of the Bangsamoro territorial jurisdictions subject to the principles of equality of peoples and mutual respect and to the protection of civil, political, economic, and cultural rights in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, the BJE can create political subdivisions barangays and municipalities within the Bangsamoro ancestral domain. Under the MOA-AD, the Bangsamoro ancestral domain includes the ancestral domains of the Lumads. The BJE can create barangays and municipalities in areas that are presently the ancestral domains of the Lumads. The BJE can station its police and internal security force in these areas. Many of these areas the present ancestral domains of the Lumads are located withinprovinces, cities and municipalities where Christians are the majority. IaCHTS There are obvious possible adverse ramifications of this power of the BJE to create political subdivisions within provinces, cities and municipalities outside of the BJE territory. The creation by the BJE of such political subdivisions will alter the boundaries of the affected provinces, cities and municipalities, an alteration that, under the Constitution, requires an act of Congress and a plebiscite in the affected political units. 76 The Executive branch must conduct widespread consultations not only with the Lumads, but also with the Christians who, under the MOA-AD, will be affected by the creation of such BJE political subdivisions within their provinces, cities and municipalities. Petitions Present Justiciable Controversy The claim of respondents that the MOA-AD, not having been signed but merely initialed, does not give rise to an actual controversy cognizable by the Court, is gravely erroneous. The MOA-AD has two features: (1) as an instrument of cession of territory and sovereignty to a new state, the BJE; and (2) as a treaty with the resulting BJE, governing the associative relationship with the mother state, 77 the Philippines, whose only important role in the relationship is "to take charge of external defense". 78 Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a former member of this Court and a recognized authority on constitutional law, states: It is indeed true that the BJE is not fully independent or sovereign and indeed it is dependent on the Philippine government for its external defense and only lacks foreign recognition, at least at the present time. Nonetheless it is a state as the Philippines was a state during the Commonwealth period, which was not a part of the territory of the United States although subject to its sovereignty. As a state, it was a signatory to several treaties and international agreements, such as the Charter of the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and a participant in several conferences such as that held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, on July 1-22, 1944, on the GATT. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, the adoption of the 1935 Constitution prepared the way for the complete independence of the Philippines and the government organized under it had been given, in many aspects, by the United States "the status of an independent government which has been reflected in its relation as such with the outside world". Similarly, the Supreme Court of the Philippines held in Laurel v. Misa that "the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government although not absolute". 79 (Emphasis supplied) cTaDHS Thus, once the MOA-AD is signed, the MILF, as the acknowledged representative of the BJE, can exercise the rights of the BJE as a state. The MILF, on behalf of the BJE, can then demand that the Philippines comply, under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, with the express terms of the MOA- AD requiring the Philippines to amend its Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD. Under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Philippines cannot invoke its internal law, including its Constitution, as justification for non- compliance with the MOA-AD, which operates as a treaty between the GRP and the BJE. 80 Thus, under international law, the Philippines is obligated to amend its Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD, whether Congress or the Filipino people agree or not. If this Court wants to prevent the dismemberment of the Philippines, a dismemberment that violates the Constitution, the Court should not wait for the GRP Panel to sign the MOA-AD. Once the MOA-AD is signed, international law steps in resulting in irreversible consequences extremely damaging to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines. No subsequent ruling or order of this Court can undo this terrible damage, or put back a dismembered Philippines. The initialed MOA-AD already contains definitive and settled propositions between the GRP and the MILF, and all that is lacking are the signatures of the GRP and MILF representatives to make the MOA-AD a binding international agreement. 81 Under these circumstances, the petitions certainly present an actual justiciable controversy of transcendental importance to the nation. IEHScT The forum for the resolution of any dispute between the GRP and the MILF under a signed MOA-AD will not be this Court but the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is not bound to respect the Philippine Constitution. The MILF, under the sponsorship of any member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) 82 that recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, 83 can bring the dispute to the ICJ. The OIC Special Envoy for the Peace Process in Southern Philippines, Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, who is also the Secretary-General of the OIC, is a signatory to the MOA-AD. Above the space reserved for his signature are the words "ENDORSED BY". A party to the Statute of the ICJ, like the Philippines, is bound by the ICJ's determination whether the ICJ has jurisdiction over a dispute. 84 In deciding the issue of jurisdiction, the ICJ may or may not follow past precedents in the light of special circumstances of the case before it. The Philippines will be risking dismemberment of the Republic in the hands ofan international tribunal that is not bound by the Philippine Constitution. More importantly, the BJE, represented by the MILF and endorsed by the OIC, may apply to be a party to the Statute of the ICJ and accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 85 A State that recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ has the right to sue before the ICJ any State that has accepted the same compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 86 The fact that the BJE has all the attributes of a state, with the acknowledged power to enter into international treaties with foreign countries, gives the BJE the status and legal personality to be a party to a case before the ICJ. 87 In fact, by agreeing in the MOA-AD that the BJE, on its own, can enter into international treaties, 88 the Philippines admits and recognizes the international legal personality of the BJE, with the capacity to sue and be sued in international tribunals. CIETDc In short, for this Court to wait for the signing of the MOA-AD before assuming jurisdiction will allow an international tribunal to assume jurisdiction over the present petitions, risking the dismemberment of the Republic. It is providential for the Filipino people that this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the signing of the MOA-AD in the nick of time on 4 August 2008. When the Court issued the TRO, the members of the GRP Panel were already on their way to Malaysia to sign the MOA-AD the following day, 5 August 2008, before representativesof numerous states from the OIC, Europe, North America, ASEAN and other parts of Asia. Indeed, public respondents should be thankful to this Court for saving them from inflicting an ignominious and irreversible catastrophe to the nation. Petitions Not Mooted The claim of respondents that the present petitions are moot because during the pendency of this case the President decided not to sign the MOA-AD, "in its present form or in any other form", 89 is erroneous. Once the Court acquires jurisdiction over a case, its jurisdiction continues until final termination of the case. 90 The claim of respondents that the President never authorized the GRP Panel to sign the MOA-AD 91 is immaterial. If the GRP Panel had no such authority, then their acts in initialing and in intending to sign the MOA-AD were in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, vesting this Court jurisdiction over the present petitions to declare unconstitutional such actsof the GRP Panel.
Needless to say, the claim that the GRP Panel had no authority to sign the MOA- AD is a grave indictment of the members of the GRP Panel. At the very least this shows that the members of the GRP Panel were acting on their own, without following the instructions from the President as clearly laid down in the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated 1 March 2001, which states in part: This Memorandum prescribes the guidelines for the Government Negotiating Panel (GPNP) for the peace negotiation process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF): 1.The negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with the mandates of the Philippine Constitution, the Rule of Law, and the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. TEIHDa 2.The negotiation process shall be pursued in line with the national Comprehensive Peace Process, and shall seek a principled and peaceful resolution of the armed conflict, with neither blame nor surrender, but with dignity for all concerned. 3.The objective of the GPNP is to attain a peace settlement that shall: a.Contribute to the resolution of the root cause of the armed conflict, and to societal reform, particularly in Southern Philippines; b.Help attain a lasting peace and comprehensive stability in Southern Philippines under a meaningful program of autonomy for Filipino Muslims, consistent with the Peace Agreement entered into by the GRP and the MNLF on 02 September 1996; and c.Contribute to reconciliation and reconstruction in Southern Philippines. 4.The general approach to the negotiations shall include the following: a.Seeking a middle ground between the aspirations of the MILF and the political, social and economic objectives of the Philippine Government; b.Coordinated Third Party facilitation, where needed; c.Consultation with affected communities and sectors. (Emphasis supplied) Indisputably, the members of the GRP Panel had clear and precise instructions from the President to follow Philippine constitutional processes and to preserve the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines. 92 The members of the GRP Panel failed to follow their basic instructions from the President, and in the process, they recklessly risked the near dismemberment of the Republic. Glaring Historical Inaccuracy in the MOA-AD The MOA-AD likewise contains a glaring historical inaccuracy. The MOA-AD declares the Bangsamoro as the single "First Nation". 93 The term "First Nations" originated in Canada. 94 The term refers to indigenous peoples of a territory, with the assumption that there are one or more subsequent nations or ethnic groups, different from the indigenous peoples, that settled on the same territory. Thus, in Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, the white Europeans settlers are the subsequent nations belonging to a different ethnic group that conquered the indigenous peoples. In Canada, there is not a single First Nation but more than 600 recognized First Nations, reflecting the fact that the indigenous peoples belong to various "nation" tribes. In Mindanao, the Lumads who kept their indigenous beliefs, as well as those who centuries later converted to either Islam or Christianity, belong to the same ethnic Malay race. Even the settlers from Luzon and Visayas belong to the same ethnic Malay race. Declaring the Bangsamoros alone as the single "First Nation" is a historical anomaly. If ethnicity alone is the criterion in declaring a First Nation, then all peoples of Mindanao belonging to the Malay race are the First Nations. If resistance to foreign beliefs is the criterion in declaring a First Nation, then the 18 Lumad groups in Mindanao are the First Nations. cSTHAC When asked during the oral arguments why the MOA-AD declares the Bangsamoros as the single "First Nation", the Solicitor General answered that "the MILF requested that they be considered a First Nation". 95 The GRP Panel should not readily agree to include in the text of the agreement, an official document, anything that the MILF Panel wants. Claims to historicity must be verified because historical inaccuracies have no place in a peace agreement that resolves a dispute rooted to a large extent in historical events. The Cost of Reparation Could Bankrupt the National Government The MOA-AD recognizes that the Bangsamoro's ancestral domain, homeland and historic territory cover the entire Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan areas. 96 While the MOA-AD recognizes "vested property rights", 97 other than licenses or contracts to exploit natural resources which are revocable at will by the BJE, the MOA-AD requires the Government to provide "adequate reparation" to the Bangsamoro for the "unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization". 98Such unjust dispossession includes not only the lands taken from the Bangsamoro since the arrival of the Spaniards in 1521, but also all the natural resources removed from such lands since 1521. In short, the Government must pay compensation to the BJE for all titled private lands, as well as all natural resources taken or extracted, in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. STaCIA If the lands are still State owned like public forests, military and civil reservations, public school sites, public parks or sites for government buildings the Government must return the lands to the BJE. The MOA-AD further states, "Whenever restoration is no longer possible, the GRP shall take effective measures or adequate reparation collectively beneficial to the Bangsamoro people, in such quality, quantity and status to be determined mutually by both Parties". The cost of reparation could bankrupt the Government. The Executive branch never consulted Congress, which exercises exclusively the power of the purse, about this commitment to pay "adequate reparation" to the BJE, a reparation that obviously has a gargantuan cost. Of course, under Philippine law Congress is not bound by this commitment of the Executive branch. Under international law, however, the Philippines is bound by such commitment of the Executive branch. There is no Disarmament under the MOA-AD Respondents have repeatedly claimed during the oral arguments that the final comprehensive peace agreement will lead to the disarmament of the MILF. 99 However, paragraph 8 on Governance of the MOA-AD allows the BJE "to build, develop and maintain its own . . . police and internal security force". Clearly, the BJE's internal security force is separate from its police. The obvious intention is to constitute the present MILF armed fighters into the BJE's internal security force. In effect, there will be no disarmament of the MILF even after the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement. The BJE can deploy its internal security force not only within the "core" 100 BJE territory, but also outside of the core BJE territory, that is, in ancestral lands of the Lumads that are located in Christian provinces, cities and municipalities. Under paragraphs 1 and 3 on Concepts and Principles of the MOA-AD, the Lumads and all their ancestral lands in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan are made part of the BJE. Thus, the MOA-AD even allows the MILF to station permanently its MILF armed fighters within Christian provinces, cities and municipalities outside of the core BJE territory. Duty to Preserve Territorial Integrity and National Sovereignty Under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which is one of the documents referred to in the Terms of Reference of the MOA-AD, the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples does not mean a right to dismember or impair the territorial integrity or political unity of a sovereign and independent State like the Philippines. Article 46 of the Declaration states: cHAaEC Article 46 1.Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States. (Emphasis supplied) Under international law, every sovereign and independent State has the inherent right to protect from dismemberment its territorial integrity, political unity and national sovereignty. The duty to protect the territorial integrity, political unity and national sovereignty of the nation in accordance with the Constitution is not the duty alone of the Executive branch. Where the Executive branch is remiss in exercising this solemn duty in violation of the Constitution, this Court, in the appropriate case as in the present petitions, must step in because every member of this Court has taken a sworn duty to defend and uphold the Constitution. A Final Word No one will dispute that the nation urgently needs peace in Mindanao. The entire nation will truly rejoice if peace finally comes to Mindanao. The Executive branch must therefore continue to pursue vigorously a peaceful settlement of the Moro insurgency in Mindanao. No nation can progress and develop successfully while facing an internal armed conflict. 101 However, any peace agreement that calls for amendments to the Constitution, whatever the amendments may be, including the creation of the BJE must be subject to the constitutional and legal processes of the Philippines. The constitutional power of Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution, and the constitutional power ofthe people to approve or disapprove such amendments, can never be disregarded. The Executive branch cannot usurp such discretionary sovereign powers of Congress and the people, as the Executive branch did when it committed to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD. There must also be proper consultations with all affected stakeholders, where the Constitution or existing laws require such consultations. The law requires consultations for a practical purpose to build consensus and popular support for an initiative, in this case the peace agreement. Consultations assume greater importance if the peace agreement calls for constitutional amendments, which require ratification by the people. A peace agreement negotiated in secret, affecting the people's rights, lives and destinies, that is suddenly sprung on the people as a fait accompli, will face probable rejection in a plebiscite.
In short, a peace agreement that amends the Constitution can be lasting only if accepted by the people in accordance with constitutional and legal processes. ATCaDE Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petitions and declare the MOA-AD UNCONSTITUTIONAL. AZCUNA, J.: I agree with the ponencia but I hold the view that, had the MOA-AD been signed as planned, it would have provided a basis for a claim in an international court that the Philippines was bound by its terms at the very least as a unilateral declaration made before representatives of the international community with vital interests in the region. Whether the case of Australia v. France 1 or that of Burkina Faso v. Mali, 2 is the one applicable, is not solely for this Court to decide but also for the international court where the Philippines could be sued. While we may agree that the Philippines should not be considered bound, the international court may rule otherwise. There is need to consult the people before risking that kind of outcome. caHCSD On this point, Martin Dixon and Robert McCorquodale, in their CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, observe: B.Unilateral statements Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France and New Zealand v. France) Merits ICJ Rep. 1974 253, International Court of Justice Australia and New Zealand brought proceedings against France arising from nuclear tests conducted by France in the South Pacific. Before the Court had an opportunity to hear in full the merits of the case, statements were made by French authorities indicating that France would no longer conduct atmospheric nuclear tests. The court held by nine votes to six that, due to these statements by France, the claim of Australia and New Zealand no longer had any object and so the Court did not have to decide the issues in the case. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context ofinternational negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, not even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made. . . . xxx xxx xxx NOTES: 1.It is very rare that a Court will find that a unilateral statement will bind a State. In Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v. Mali) 1986 ICJ Rep 554, a Chamber of the International Court of Justice held that a statement by the President of Mali at a press conference did not create legal obligations on Mali, especially as 'The Chamber considers that it has a duty to show even greater caution when it is a question of a unilateral declaration not directed to any particular recipient.' (para. 39). 3 SDHAcI Finally, precedents are not strictly followed in international law, so that an international court may end up formulating a new rule out of the factual situation of our MOA-AD, making a unilateral declaration binding under a new type of situation, where, for instance, the other party is not able to sign a treaty as it is not yet a State, but the declaration is made to a "particular recipient" and "witnessed" by a host of sovereign States. As to the rest, I concur. TINGA, J.: As a matter of law, the petitions were mooted by the unequivocal decision of the Government of the Philippines, through the President, not to sign the challenged Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The correct course of action for the Court is to dismiss the petitions. The essential relief sought by the petitioners a writ of prohibition under Rule 65 has already materialized with the Philippine government's voluntary yet unequivocal desistance from signing the MOA-AD, thereby depriving the Court of a live case or controversy to exercise jurisdiction upon. At the same time, I deem it impolitic to simply vote for the dismissal the cases at bar without further discourse in view of their uniqueness in two aspects. At the center is an agreement and yet a party to it was not impleaded before it was forsaken. And while the unimpleaded party is neither a state nor an international legal person, the cases are laden with international law underpinnings or analogies which it may capitalize on to stir adverse epiphenomenal consequences. According to news reports, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has adopted the posture that as far as it is concerned, the MOA-AD is already effective, and there may be indeed a tenuous linkage between that stance and the apparent fact that the MOA-AD, though unsigned, bears the initials of members of the Philippine negotiating panel, the MILF negotiating panel and the peace negotiator of the Malaysian government. These concerns warrant an extended discussion on the MOA-AD, even if the present petitions are moot and academic. aSIAHC I. It is a bulwark principle in constitutional law that an essential requisite for a valid judicial inquiry is the existence of an actual case or controversy. A justiciable controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 1 The exercise of the power of judicial review depends upon the existence of a case or controversy. Consequently, if a case ceases to be a lively controversy, there is no justification for the exercise of the power, otherwise, the court would be rendering an advisory opinion should it do so. 2 We held in Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor: 3 It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. acAIES In the recent ruling in Suplico v. NEDA, 4 the President officially desisted from pursuing a national government project which was challenged before this Court. The Court was impelled to take mandatory judicial notice 5 of the President's act, and consequently declare the pending petitions as moot and academic. The Court, through Justice Reyes, held: Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy is the judiciary's role of strengthening political stability indispensable to progress and national development. Pontificating on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole. Wise exercise of judicial discretion militates against resolving the academic issues, as petitioners want this Court to do. This is especially true where, as will be further discussed, the legal issues raised cannot be resolved without previously establishing the factual basis or antecedents. Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement. Kapag wala nang buhay na kaso, wala nang dahilan para magdesisyon ang Husgado. 6 The live controversy relied upon by the petitions was the looming accession by the Philippine government to the MOA-AD, through a formal signing ceremony that was to be held at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 5 August 2008. This ceremony was prevented when the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 4 August 2008, yet even after the TRO, it appeared that the Government then was still inclined to sign the MOA-AD after the legal obstacles had been cleared. However, on 1 September 2008, the Government through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Compliance, manifesting the pronouncement of Executive Secretary Ermita that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA". This declared intent was repeated in a Manifestation dated 4 September 2008, and verbally reiterated during the oral arguments before this Court. HSTaEC In addition, the President herself publicly declared, as recently as on 2 October 2008, that regardless of the ruling of the Supreme Court on these petitions, her government will not sign the MOA-AD, "in the light of the recent violent incidents committed by MILF lawless groups". 7 Clearly following Suplico the Court has no choice but to take mandatory judicial notice of the fact that the Government will not sign or accede to the MOA-AD and on this basis dismiss the petitions herein. Thus, the Court is left with petitions that seek to enjoin the Government from performing an act which the latter had already avowed not to do. There is no longer a live case or controversy over which this Court has jurisdiction. Whatever live case there may have been at the time the petitions were filed have since become extinct.
Admittedly, there are exceptions to the moot and academic principle. The fact that these exceptions are oft-discussed and applied in our body of jurisprudence reflects an unbalanced impression, for most petitions which are rendered moot and academic are usually dismissed by way of unsigned or minute resolutions which are not published in the Philippine Reports or the Supreme Court Reports Annotated. Still, the moot and academic principle remains a highly useful and often applied tool for the Court to weed out cases barren of any current dispute. Indeed, even with those exceptions in place, there is no mandatory rule that would compel this Court to exercise jurisdiction over cases which have become academic. For the exceptions to apply, it would be necessary, at bare minimum, to exhibit some practical utilitarian value in granting the writs ofprohibition sought. Otherwise, the words of the Court would be an empty exercise of rhetoric that may please some ears, but would not have any meaningful legal value. A usual exception to the moot and academic principle is where the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. A recent example where the Court applied that exception was in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 8 which involved the power of the President to declare a state of rebellion. Therein, the Court decided to exercise jurisdiction "[t]o prevent similar questions from re-emerging." 9 It was clear in Sanlakas that the challenged act, the declaration by the President of a state of rebellion was a unilateral act that was clearly capable of repetition, it having actually been accomplished twice before. Contrast that situation to this case, where the challenged act is not a unilateral act that can be reproduced with ease by one person or interest group alone. To repeat the challenged act herein, there would have to be a prolonged and delicate negotiation process between the Government and the MILF, both sides being influenced by a myriad ofunknown and inconstant factors such as the current headlines of the day. Considering the diplomatic niceties involved in the adoption of the MOA-AD, it is well-worth considering the following discussion on the complexity in arriving at such an agreement: The making of an international agreement is not a simple single act. It is rather a complex process, requiring performance of a variety of different functions or tasks by the officials of a participating state. Among the functions which must be distinguished for even minimal clarity are the following: (1) the formulation of rational policies to guide the conduct ofnegotiations with other states; (2) the conduct of negotiations with the representatives of other states; (3) the approval of an agreement for internal application within the state, when such internal application is contemplated; (4) the approval of an agreement for the external commitment of the state; (5) the final utterance ofthe agreement as the external commitment of the state to other states. 10 aASDTE Assuming that the act can be repeated at all, it cannot be repeated with any ease, there being too many cooks stirring the broth. And further assuming that the two sides are able to negotiate a new MOA-AD, it is highly improbable that it would contain exactly the same provisions or legal framework as the discarded MOA-AD. II. Even though the dismissal of these moot and academic petitions is in order in my view, there are nonetheless special considerations that warrant further comment on the MOA-AD on my part. As intimated earlier, the MILF has adopted the public position that as far as it is concerned, the MOA-AD has already been signed and is binding on the Government. To quote from one news report: "The MILF leadership, which is the Central Committee of the MILF, has an official position, that the memorandum of agreement on the Bangsamoro Ancestral Domain has been signed", said Ghadzali Jaafar, MILF vice chairman for political affairs. cHSTEA xxx xxx xxx Jaafar said the MILF considers the MOA binding because its draft agreement was "initialed" last July 27 in Kuala Lumpur by Rodolfo Garcia, government chief negotiator; Mohagher Iqbal, MILF chief negotiator; Hermogenes Esperon, presidential adviser on the peace process, and Datuk Othman bin Abdulrazak, chief peace facilitator for the Malaysian government. "Our position is that after initialing, both parties initialed the MOA, that is a signing", Jaafar said. Jaafar said the scheduled signing yesterday in Kuala Lumpur was merely "ceremonial and a formality, in a way to announce to all throughout the world that a memorandum of agreement has been signed but actually the signing, actual signing was done". "So it's a done deal as far as the MILF is concerned", he said. Jaafar said the MILF and the government set a ceremonial signing of the MOA "because this is a very important document". "We want to be proud of it we want to announce it throughout the world that there is a memorandum of agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the government of the Republic of the Philippines." He said the MILF expects the government to abide by the MOA "because this agreement is binding on both parties". 11 It appears that the persons who initialed the MOA-AD were Philippine Presidential Peace Adviser Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., Philippine government peace negotiator Rodolfo Garcia, MILF chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal, and Datuk Othman bin Abdulrazak, chief peace facilitator of the Malaysian government. 12 The MILF is not a party to these petitions, and thus its position that the MOA-AD was in fact already signed through the initials affixed by representatives of the Philippine and Malaysian governments and the MILF has not been formally presented for the Court for adjudication. In an earlier submission to the Court, I discussed the position of the MILF from the following perspective: CcHDSA There is the danger that if the petitions were dismissed for mootness without additional comment, it will be advocated by persons so interested as to make the argument that the intrinsic validity of the MOA- AD provisions has been tacitly affirmed by the Court. Moreover, the unqualified dismissal of the petitions for mootness will not preclude the MILF from presenting the claim that the MOA-AD has indeed already been signed and is therefore binding on the Philippine government. These concerns would especially be critical if either argument is later presented before an international tribunal, that would look to the present rulingof this Court as the main authority on the status of the MOA-AD under Philippine internal law. The use of municipal law rules for international judicial and arbitral procedure has been more common and more specific than any other type of application. 13 The International Court of Justice has accepted res judicata as applicable to international litigation. 14 The following observations by leading commentators on international law should give pause for thought: It is clear that, in general, judicial decisions (of national tribunals) in cases involving international law, domestic as well as international, can and will be cited for their persuasiveness by parties to an international legal dispute, the decisions of courts and other tribunals often being seen to affirm or announce a treaty-based rule or interpretation, a tenet of customary international law, or a general principle of law, international or domestic. Judicial decisions are seen as trustworthy evidenceof what the law really is on a given subject; and this point is verified by most of the leading international adjudicative and arbitral decisions that have helped to lay the foundations of, and otherwise articulate, the substance of international law. 15 (Words in parenthesis and emphasis supplied) TCDHIc Thus, in my earlier submission, I stated that should this matter ever be referred to an international tribunal for adjudication, it is highly probable that a ruling based on mootness alone without more would be taken as an indicative endorsement of the validity of the MOA under Philippine law. That misimpression should be rectified for purposes that transcend the ordinary adjudicative exercise, I stressed. Firstly, is the MILF correct when it asserted that the MOA-AD may already be considered as binding on the Philippine government? Reference to the initialed but unsigned copy of the MOA-AD is useful. 16 There are three distinct initials that appear at the bottom of each and every page of the 11- page MOA-AD: that of Garcia and Esperon for the Philippine negotiating panel, and that of Iqbal for the MILF. Page 11, the signature page, appears as follows: IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned being the representatives of the Parties hereby affix their signatures. Done this 5th day of August, 2008 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. FOR THE GRP:FOR THE MILF (unsigned)(unsigned) RODOLFO C. GARCIAMOHAGHER IQBAL ChairmanChairman GRP Peace Negotiating PanelMILF Peace Negotiating Panel WITNESSED BY: (unsigned) DATUK OTHMAN BIN ABD RAZAK Special Adviser to the Prime Minister ENDORSED BY: (unsigned) AMBASSADOR SAYED ELMASRY Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines aEIADT IN THE PRESENCE OF: (unsigned)(unsigned) DR. ALBERTO G. ROMULODATO' SERI UTAMA DR. RAIS Secretary of Foreign AffairsBIN YATIM Republic of the PhilippinesMinister of Foreign Affairs Malaysia Initialed by: Sec. Rodolfo Garcia (initialed)Mohagher Iqbal (initialed) Sec. Hermogenes Esperon (initialed) Witnessed by: Datuk Othman bin Abd Razak (initialed) Dated 27 July 2008 Two points are evident from the above-quoted portion of the MOA-AD. First, the affixation of signatures to the MOA-AD was a distinct procedure from the affixation of initials to the pages of the document. Initialization was accomplished on 27 July 2008, while signature was to have been performed on 5 August 2008. The initialing was witnessed by only one person, Razak, while the signing of the MOA-AD was to have been witnessed by the respective heads of the Foreign Affairs departments of the Philippines and Malaysia. Clearly, signing and initialing was not intended to be one and the same.
Second, it is unequivocal from the document that the MOA-AD was to take effect upon the affixation of signatures on 5 August 2008 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and not through the preliminary initialing of the document on 27 July 2008. Under our domestic law, consent of the parties is an indispensable element to any valid contract or agreement. 17 The three stages of a contract include its negotiation or preparation, its birth or perfection, and its fulfillment or consummation. The perfection of the contract takes place only upon the concurrence of its three essential requisites consent of the contracting parties, object certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and cause of the obligation which is established. 18 Until a contract is perfected, there can be no binding commitments arising from it, and at any time prior to the perfection of the contract, either negotiating party may stop the negotiation. 19 Consent is indubitably manifested through the signature of the parties. That the Philippine government has not yet consented to be bound by the MOA-AD is indubitable. The parties had agreed to a formal signature ceremony in the presence of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the alter ego of the President of the Philippines. The ceremony never took place. The MOA-AD itself expresses that consent was to be manifested by the affixation of signatures, not the affixation of initials. In addition, the subsequent announcement by the President that the Philippine Government will not sign the MOA-AD further establishes the absence of consent on the part of the Philippines to the MOA-AD. Under domestic law, the MOA-AD cannot receive recognition as a legally binding agreement due to the absence of the indispensable requisite of consent to be bound. HDTISa Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the MILF or any other interested party will seek enforcement of the MOA with the Philippine courts. A more probable recourse on their part is to seek enforcement of the MOA before an international tribunal. Could the Philippines be considered as being bound by the MOA under international law? Preliminarily, it bears attention that Justice Morales has exhaustively and correctly debunked the proposition that the MOA-AD can be deemed a binding agreement under international law, or that it evinces a unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international community that it will grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions stated in the MOA-AD. It would thus be improper to analyze whether the MOA-AD had created binding obligations through the lens of international law or through an instrument as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as it should be domestic law alone that governs the interpretation of the MOA-AD. Nonetheless, even assuming that international law principles can be utilized to examine that question, it is clear that the MILF's claim that the MOA-AD is already binding on the Philippine government will not prevail. The successful outcome of negotiation of international agreements is the adoption and authentication of the agreed text. 20 Once a written text is agreed upon and adopted, it is either signed, or initialed and subsequently signed by the diplomats and then submitted to the respective national authorities for ratification. 21 Once a treaty has been adopted, the manner in which a state consents to be bound to it is usually indicated in the treaty itself. 22 Signature only expresses consent to be bound when it constitutes the final stage ofa treaty-making process. 23 Reisman, Arsanjani, Wiessner & Westerman explain the procedure in the formation of international agreements, including the distinction between initialing and signing: Treaties are negotiated by agents of states involved. Usually, once the agents agree on a text, the authenticity of this agreed-upon mutual commitment is confirmed by the agents placing their initials on the draft agreement ("initialing"). Their principals, usually the heads of state or their representatives, then sign the treaty within a time period specified in the treaty, and submit it to internal processes, usually legislative authorities, for approval. Once this approval is secured, the heads of state express the consent of their state to be bound by depositing an instrument of ratification with the depositary power (in the case of a multilateral treaty) or with the other state party (in the case of a bilateral treaty). In the case of a multilateral treaty not signed in time, a state can still validly declare its consent to be bound by submitting an instrument of accession. 24 DaAIHC This discussion is confirmatory that initialing is generally not the act by which an international agreement is signed, but a preliminary step that confirms the authenticity of the agreed-upon text of the agreement. The initialing of the agreement reflects only the affirmation by the negotiating agents that the text of the prospective agreement is authentic. It is plausible for the negotiating agents to have initialed the agreement but for the principal to later repudiate the same before signing the agreement. Article 12 (2) (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does provide that "the initialing of a text constitutes a signature of the treaty when it is established that the negotiating States so agreed". At bar, it is evident that there had been no agreement that the mere initialing of the MOA-AD would constitute the signing of the agreement. In fact, it was explicitly provided in the MOA-AD that the signing of the agreement would take place on a date different from that when the document was initialed. Further, a formal signing ceremony independent of the initialing procedure was scheduled by the parties. The fact that the MOA-AD reflects an initialing process which is independent of the affixation of signatures, which was to be accomplished on a specific date which was days after the MOA-AD was initialed, plainly indicates that the parties did not intend to legally bind the parties to the MOA through initialing. There is no cause under international law to assume that the MOA-AD, because it had been initialed, was already signed by the Philippine Government or the MILF even. HSaIET III. The position of the MILF that the MOA-AD already creates binding obligations imposable on the Government cannot ultimately be sustained, even assuming that the initialingof the document had such binding effect. That position of the MILF supposes that the provisions of the MOA-AD are intrinsically valid under Philippine law. It takes no inquiry at great depth to be enlightened that the MOA-AD is incongruous with the Philippine Constitution. The Constitution establishes a framework for the administration of government through political subdivisions. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. 25 In addition, there shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, in accordance with respective organic acts enacted by Congress. 26 The Constitution has adopted decentralization as a governing principle with respect to local government rule, and this especially holds true with respect to the autonomous regions. As we explained in Disomangcop v. DPWH: 27 Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local government unit vis- -vis the central government. In international law, the right to self-determination need not be understood as a right to political separation, but rather as a complex net of legal-political relations between a certain people and the state authorities. It ensures the right of peoples to the necessary level of autonomy that would guarantee the support of their own cultural identity, the establishment of priorities by the community's internal decision-making processes and the management of collective matters by themselves. aACHDS If self-determination is viewed as an end in itself reflecting a preference for homogeneous, independent nation-states, it is incapable of universal application without massive disruption. However, if self-determination is viewed as a means to an end that end being a democratic, participatory political and economic system in which the rights of individuals and the identity of minority communities are protected its continuing validity is more easily perceived. Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the people of a particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central government. The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a common tradition and shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge of their own business. This is achieved through the establishment of a special governance regime for certain member communities who choose their own authorities from within the community and exercise the jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide internal community affairs. In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more positive means for national integration. It would remove the wariness among the Muslims, increase their trust in the government and pave the way for the unhampered implementation of the development programs in the region. . . . 28 CIDcHA At the same time, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only "within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines". 29 At present, the constitutional mandate of local autonomy for Muslim Mindanao has already been implemented. Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled "An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao", was enacted and signed into law on 1 August 1989. The law contains elaborate provisions on the powersof the Regional Government and the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the National Government. The year 2001 saw the passage of Republic Act No. 9054, entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended". Rep. Act No. 9054 contains detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the retained areas of governance of the National Government.
Nothing prevents Congress from amending or reenacting an Organic Act providing for an autonomous region for Muslim Mindanao, even one that may seek to accommodate the terms of the MOA-AD. Nonetheless, the paramount requirement remains that any organic act providing for autonomy in Mindanao must be in alignment with the Constitution and its parameters for regional autonomy. The following provisions from Article X of the Constitution spell out the scope and limitations for the autonomous regions in Mindanao and the Cordilleras: Sec. 18.The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure ofgovernment for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws. ISHCcT The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. Sec. 20.Within its territorial and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1)Administrative organization; (2)Creation of sources of revenues; (3)Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4)Personal, family, and property relations; (5)Regional urban and rural planning development; (6)Economic, social, and tourism development; (7)Educational policies; (8)Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9)Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. Sec. 21.The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government. 2005jurcd The autonomous regional government to be established through the organic act consists of the executive and legislative branches of government, both of which are elective. With respect to the judicial branch, the Constitution authorizes the organic acts to provide for special courts with jurisdiction limited over personal, family and property law. The scope of legislative powers to be exercised by the autonomous legislative assembly is limited to the express grants under Section 20, Article X. The national government retains responsibility over the defense and security of the autonomous regions. In addition, under Section 17, Article X, "[a]ll powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government". The MOA-AD acknowledges that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) shall have authority and jurisdiction over the territory defined in the agreement as the ancestral domainof the Bangsamoro people. For the BJE to gain legal recognition under the Constitution, it must be identifiable as one of the recognized political subdivisions ordained in the Constitution. That is not the case. In fact, it is apparent that the BJE would have far superior powers than any of the political subdivisions under the Constitution, including the autonomous regional government for Muslim Mindanao. The powers of government extended to the BJE are well in excess than that which the Constitution allocates to the autonomous regional government for Muslim Mindanao. For example, it was agreed upon in the MOA that: [T]he BJE shall be empowered to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, inclusive of, civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, and police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, necessary for developing a progressive Bangsamoro society. . . 31 Under the Constitution, the extent through which the autonomous regional government could establish a judicial system was confined to the extent of courts with jurisdiction over personal, property and family law. 31 Obviously, the MOA-AD intends to empower the BJE to create a broader-based judicial system with jurisdiction over matters such as criminal law or even political law. This provision also derogates from the authority of the constitutional commissions, most explicitly the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The CSC administers the civil service, which embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government. 32 Yet the MOA-AD would empower the BJE to build, develop and maintain its own civil service. The BJE is likewise authorized to establish its own electoral institutions. Yet under the Constitution, it is the COMELEC which has the exclusive power to enforce and administer election laws. 33 ACIESH Much of the MOA-AD centers on agreements relating to the exploitation of the economic resources over the proposed Bangsamoro homeland. The BJE is vested with jurisdiction, power and authority over land use, development, utilization, disposition and exploitation of natural resources within that territory. To that end, the BJE is empowered "to revoke or grant forest concessions, timber license, contracts or agreements in the utilization and exploitation of natural resources". 34 One provision of the MOA-AD makes it certain that it is the BJE which has exclusive jurisdiction in the exploitation of natural resources, particularly those utilized in the production of energy: Jurisdiction and control over, and the right of exploring for, exploiting, producing and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, in situ, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, whether onshore or offshore, is vested in the Bangsamoro juridical entity as the party having control within its territorial jurisdiction, provided that in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires, the Central Government may, during the emergency, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed by both Parties, temporarily assume or direct the operations of such strategic resources. 35 caTESD These powers, which are unavailable to any of the political subdivisions, are reserved under the Constitution to the Republic as the owner of all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources. 36 As a corollary to the BJE's power over the exploitation of natural resources, the MOA-AD accords it freedom "to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries", including "the option to establish and open Bangsamoro trade mission in foreign countries with which it has economic cooperation agreements". 37 Such a "freedom" is contrary to the long-established principle that "[i]n our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations". 38 The MOA-AD even assures that "the Central Government shall take necessary steps to ensure the Bangsamoro juridical entity's participation in international meetings and events, e.g., ASEAN meetings and other specialized agencies of the United Nations". 39 These terms effectively denote a concession on the part of the Republic of the Philippinesof a segregate legal personality to the BJE before international fora. It bears reminder that regional autonomy under Article X of the Constitution remains "within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines". These provisions of the MOA-AD are extra-constitutional and diminish national sovereignty as they allocate to the BJE powers and prerogatives reserved under the Constitution to the State. Clearly, the framework of regional government that premises the MOA-AD is unworkable within the context of the Constitution. IV. A member of the GRP Peace Panel, Atty. Sedfrey Candelaria, had admitted to the Court during the oral arguments held on 29 August 2008 that the implementation of the MOA-AD would require amendments to the Constitution. That admission effectively concedes that the MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution, and thus cannot acquire valid status under Philippine law. It was evident thought on the part at least of the Philippine negotiating panel, that the price for peace in Mindanao involved in part, the amendment of the Philippine Constitution. There is nothing theoretically wrong with that notion, but because that choice is the most fundamental one the sovereign people can adopt, any binding commitment to enact charter change undertaken by an agent of government must be intensely scrutinized. Any legally binding commitment to amend the Constitution can only come from the political institutions and the sovereign people who are empowered by the charter to amend the Constitution. The President nor any other member or office of the executive branch does not have the power to effect changes to the Constitution even if he wanted to in the paramount interest of the country and of the people. Any commitment to any entity on the part of the President or his political appointees to amend the Constitution is inherently ultra vires, because the Executive Branch does not have the innate power to effectuate such changes on its own. Neither does the President have the power to bind to positive action those whom the Constitution entrusts the power to amend the charter, namely; the Congress, the delegates to a constitutional convention, and the electorate. CDaTAI
Constitutional order cannot be sacrificed for expediency, even if in the name of peace in Mindanao. Assuming that the executive branch has in good faith become intractably convinced that it is necessary to amend the Constitution in order to obtain lasting peace in Mindanao, the consequent step should not be to make promises it has no power alone to keep, hoping against hope that the Congress and the voters would ultimately redeem the promises. Since constitutional amendments are involved, the ability of the executive branch to undertake any legally binding commitment to amend the Constitution can only be recognized, if at all, with the prior appropriate authorization of Congress, acting with the specified majorities provided in Section 1 (1), Article XVII of the Constitution. 40 Under such a mechanism, any constitutionally-oriented concessions offered by the Philippine government would contemporaneously bear the preliminary seal of approval by the people or institutions authorized to propose amendments to the Constitution, subject to final ratification by the people through a plebiscite. The Government would have been spared of the embarrassment and outcry had it acted with more prudence by first securing the necessary political mandate to undertake charter change for the benefit of Mindanao, instead of acting brashly and rashly by acceding at the outset to the undertaking without consulting the Congress or the people. In the end, the issuance of the TRO by this Court proved highly providential, as even the Government wound up seeing the proverbial light before it was too late. With the foregoing qualifications, I vote to dismiss the petitions and register my dissent from the result reached by the majority. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: The piece of writing being assailed in these consolidated Petitions is a peace negotiation document, namely the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA). The Solicitor General explained that this document, prepared by the joint efforts of the Government ofthe Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland. 1 Subsequently, the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the consolidated cases at bar based on changed circumstances as well as developments which have rendered them moot, particularly the Executive Department's statement that it would no longer sign the questioned peace negotiation document. 2 Nonetheless, several parties to the case, as well as other sectors, continue to push for what they call a "complete determination" of the constitutional issues raised in the present Petitions. IEAaST I believe that in light of the pronouncement of the Executive Department to already abandon the MOA, the issue of its constitutionality has obviously become moot. The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two requisites. 3 For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale. 4 An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because theissues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. Simply stated, there is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. 5 Such is the case here. The MOA has not even been signed, and will never be. Its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court. ADHCSE An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 6 For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of the MOA will merely be an academic exercise. It would, in effect, only be delivering an opinion or advice on what are now hypothetical or abstract violations of constitutional rights. In Abbas v. Commission on Elections, 7 the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and Republic Act No. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) were challenged for purported violations of the provisions of the Constitution on freedom of religion. The Court held therein that it should not inquire into the constitutionality of a peace agreement which was already consummated (the 1976 Tripoli Agreement) and an Organic Act which was already passed into law (R.A. No. 6734) just because of potential conflicts with the Constitution. Then, with more reason should this Court desist from ruling on the constitutionality of the MOA which is unsigned, and now entirely abandoned, and as such, cannot even have any potential conflict with the Constitution. The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law. ACIEaH The Executive Department has already manifested to this Court, through the Solicitor General, that it will not sign the MOA in its present form or in any other form. It has declared the same intent to the public. For this Court to insist that the issues raised in the instant Petitions cannot be moot for they are still capable of repetition is to totally ignore the assurance given by the Executive Department that it will not enter into any other form of the MOA in the future. The Court cannot doubt the sincerity of the Executive Department on this matter. The Court must accord a co-equal branch of the government nothing less than trust and the presumption of good faith. Moreover, I deem it beyond the power of this Court to enjoin the Executive Department from entering into agreements similar to the MOA in the future, as what petitioners and other opponents of the MOA pray for. Such prayer once again requires this Court to make a definitive ruling on what are mere hypothetical facts. A decree granting the same, without the Court having seen or considered the actual agreement and its terms, would not only be premature, but also too general to make at this point. It will perilously tie the hands of the Executive Department and limit its options in negotiating peace for Mindanao. Upon the Executive Department falls the indisputably difficult responsibility of diffusing the highly volatile situation in Mindanao resulting from the continued clashes between the Philippine military and Muslim rebel groups. In negotiating for peace, the Executive Department should be given enough leeway and should not be prevented from offering solutions which may be beyond what the present Constitution allows, as long as such solutions are agreed upon subject to the amendment of the Constitution by completely legal means. Peace negotiations are never simple. If neither party in such negotiations thinks outside the box, all they would arrive at is a constant impasse. Thus, a counsel for one of the intervenors who assert the unconstitutionality of the MOA 8 had no choice but to agree as follows: EHIcaT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Well, we realize the constitutional constraints of sovereignty, integrity and the like, but isn't there a time that surely will come and the life of our people when they have to transcend even these limitations? IcESDA DEAN AGABIN: Yes, we have seen it happen in several instances, Your Honor. xxx xxx xxx ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And in pursuit of that purpose, the Supreme Court cannot look beyond the horizon and look for more satisfying result? DEAN AGABIN: Well, if you mean by looking beyond the horizon, it would mean a violation of the provisions of the Constitution, then it should not be, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: In some part, we have gone to Malaysia. We have gone to the OIC, and we have even gone to Libya. DEAN AGABIN: Yes, Your Honor. But in all these, we have always insisted on preserving the territorial integrity of the country. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And this dicta or [dogma] is unassailable forever. There cannot be an exception. DEAN AGABIN: It is unassailable under the present Constitution, Your Honor. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: But, at least, you can also agree that the Constitution ought to be changed in order for a country to fulfill its internal obligation as a matter of necessity. CcHDaA DEAN AGABIN: Yes, if the people so will it, your Honor. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: You remember how the emperor of Japan lost his divinity? They just changed their Constitution, isn't it? DEAN AGABIN: Yes, it was enforced upon him by Mr. McArthur, and they have no choice. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Isn't that a very good example of thinking outside the box? That one day even those who are underground may have to think. But frankly now Dean, before I end, may I ask, is it possible to meld or modify our Constitutional Order in order to have some room for the newly developing international notions on Associative Governance Regulation Movement and Human Rights? DEAN AGABIN: Yes. It is possible, Your Honor, with the consent of the people. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And, therefore, we vote it to a referendum or any consultation beforehand? AIcaDC DEAN AGABIN: If there is such a proposal for or amendment or revision of the Constitution, yes, Your Honor. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: So, either initiative or CHA-CHA or CON-AS? DEAN AGABIN: Yes, Your Honor. 9 It must be noted that the Constitution has been in force for three decades now, yet, peace in Mindanao still remained to be elusive under its present terms. There is the possibility that the solution to the peace problem in the Southern Philippines lies beyond the present Constitution. Exploring this possibility and considering the necessary amendment of the Constitution are not per se unconstitutional. The Constitution itself implicitly allows for its own amendment by describing, under Article XVII, the means and requirements therefor. In Tan v. Macapagal, 10 where petitioners claim that the Constitutional Convention was without power to consider, discuss, or adopt proposals which seek to revise the Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than the form outlined in the then governing Constitution, the Court ruled that: [A]s long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by [the Convention], there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the Courts are devoid of jurisdiction. . . . . At this point, there is far from a concrete proposed amendment to the Constitution which the Court can take cognizance of, much less render a pronouncement upon. CaAcSE At most, the Court can only exhort the Executive Department to keep in mind that it must negotiate and secure peace in Mindanao under terms which are most beneficial for the country as a whole, and not just one group of Muslim insurgents. Transparency and consultation with all major players, which necessarily include affected local government units and their constituents, are essential to arrive at a more viable and acceptable peace plan. The nature and extent of any future written agreements should be clearly established from the very beginning, and the terms thereof carefully drafted and clearly worded, to avoid misunderstandings or misconstructions by the parties and the public. If a document is meant to be a list of consensus points still subject to further negotiations, then it should just simply state so. As a final note, I find it necessary to stress that the Court must not allow itself to be mired in controversies affecting each step of the peace process in Mindanao. It is not within the province or even the competence of the Judiciary to tell the Executive Department exactly what and what not, how and how not, to negotiate for peace with insurgents. Given this kind of situation where war and peace hang in the balance, where people's lives are at stake, and the Executive Department, under its residual powers, is tasked to make political decisions in order to find solutions to the insurgency problem, the Court should respect the political nature of the issues at bar and exercise judicial restraint until an actual controversy is brought before it. CSDAIa In view of the foregoing, I vote for the GRANT of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Solicitor General and, accordingly, for the DISMISSAL of the Petitions at bar for being MOOT and ACADEMIC. VELASCO, JR., J., dissenting: It is a well-settled canon of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a government act should be avoided whenever possible. 1 Put a bit differently, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality save when the decision upon the constitutional question is absolutely necessary to the final determination of the case, i.e., the constitutionality issue must be the very lis mota of the controversy. 2 It is along the line set out above that I express my dissent and vote to dismiss the consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention principally seeking to nullify the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) proposed to be entered into by and between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Non-Joinder of MILF: Fatal The Rules of Court requires all actions to be brought by or against the real party in interest. The requirement becomes all the more necessary with respect to indispensable parties. For: Indispensable parties are those with such interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights so that courts cannot proceed without their presence. All of them must be included in a suit for an action to prosper or for a final determination to be had. 3 As it were, the MILF was not impleaded in this case except in G.R. No. 183962. But it would appear that MILF, doubtless a real party in interest in this proceedings, was not served a copy of and asked to comment on the petition in G.R. No. 183962. Significantly, when queried during the oral arguments on the non-inclusion of the MILF, the petitioners feebly explained that first, they could not implead the MILF because they did not know where it could be served with summons; and second, they feared that impleading the MILF would be futile as the group does not acknowledge the Court's jurisdiction over it. ASDCaI The importance of joining the MILF in this case cannot be over-emphasized. While the non-joinder of an indispensable party will generally not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only prejudice to the winning party being the non-binding effect of the judgment on the unimpleaded party, the situation at bar is different. Here, the unimpleaded party is a party to the proposed MOA-AD no less and the prospective agreement sought to be annulled involves ONLY two parties the impleaded respondent GRP and the MILF. The obvious result is that the Court would not be able to fully adjudicate and legally decide the case without the joinder of the MILF the other indispensable party to the agreement. The reason is simple. The Court cannot nullify a prospective agreement which will affect and legally bind one party without making said decision binding on the other contracting party. Such exercise is not a valid, or at least an effective, exercise of judicial power for it will not peremptorily settle the controversy. It will not, in the normal course of things, write finis to a dispute. 4 Such consequent legal aberration would be the natural result of the non- joinder of MILF. A court should always refrain from rendering a decision that will bring about absurdities or will infringe Section 1, Article 8 of the Constitution which circumscribes the exercise of judicial power. Prematurity and Mootness The MOA-AD is but a proposal on defined consensus points. The agreement has remained and will remain a mere proposal as the GRP has put off its signing permanently. 5The parties to the MOA do not have, in short, the equivalent of, or what passes as, a perfected and enforceable contract. As things stand, the line dividing the negotiation stage and the execution stage which would have otherwise conferred the character of obligatoriness on the agreement is yet to be crossed. In a very real sense, the MOA-AD is not a document, as the term is juridically understood, but literally a piece of paper which the parties cannot look up to as an independent source of obligation, the binding prestation to do or give and the corollary right to exact compliance. Yet, the petitioners would have the Court nullify and strike down as unconstitutional what, for all intents and purposes, is a non-existent agreement. Like a bill after it passes third reading or even awaiting the approval signature of the President, the unsigned draft MOA-AD cannot plausibly be the subjectof judicial review, the exercise of which presupposes that there is before the court an actual case or, in fine, a justiciable controversy ripe for adjudication. A justiciable controversy involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their demanding and conflicting legal interests. 6 And a dispute is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had direct adverse effect on the person challenging it and admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character. As aptly observed in Tan v. Macapagal, 7 for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had been accomplished by either branch of government before a court may step in. In the concrete, the Court could have entered the picture if the MOA-AD were signed. For then, and only then, can we say there is a consummated executive act to speak of. DAHaTc
As opposed to justiciable controversy, academic issues or abstract or feigned problems only call for advices on what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 8Were the Court to continue entertain and resolve on the merits these consolidated petitions, the most that it can legally do is to render an advisory opinion, 9 veritably binding no one, 10 but virtually breaching the rule against advisory opinion set out, if not implied in Section 1, Article VIII charging "courts of justice [the duty] to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable". AIDSTE Prescinding from and anent the foregoing considerations, it can categorically be stated that what the petitions are pressing on the Court are moot and academic questions. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. 11 In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. 12 To be sure, the mootness of a case would not, in all instances, prevent the Court from rendering a decision thereon. 13 So it was that in a host of cases, we proceeded to render a decision on an issue otherwise moot and academic. Dela Camara v. Enage, 14 Gonzales v. Marcos, 15 Lacson v. Perez, 16 Albania v. COMELEC, 17 Acop v. Guingona II 18 and David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 19 among other cases, come to mind. David lists the exceptions to the rule on mootness, thus: The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable ofrepetition yet evading review. A perusal of the cases cited, however, readily reveals that the subject matters thereof involved justiciable controversies. In Dela Camara, for example, there was the challenged order approving an application for bail bond but at an excessive amount. The case was rendered moot by the issuance of a subsequent order reducing the amount. In Gonzales, the petition questioning the validity of the creation of the CCP Complex by then President Marcos via an executive order which was viewed as a usurpation oflegislative power was mooted by the issuance of a presidential decree upon the declaration of martial law. In Lacson, assailed was the issuance of Proclamation No. 36 declaring a state of rebellion; in Albania, the petition to nullify the decision of the COMELEC annulling the proclamation of petitioner as municipal mayor was rendered moot by the election and proclamation of a new set of municipal officers; in Acop, the petition to exclude two police officers from the Witness Protection Program was rendered moot by the fact that the coverage of the two officers under the program was terminated; and in David, the petition challenging the validity of Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 declaring a state of emergency was rendered moot by the issuance of PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased. The element of justiciable controversy is palpably absent in the petitions at bar. For, as earlier explained, there is really no MOA-AD to speak of since its perfection or effectivity was aborted by supervening events, to wit: the TRO the Court issued enjoining the Kuala Lumpur signing of the MOA and the subsequent change of mind of the President not to sign and pursue the covenant. To repeat, there is, from the start, or from the moment the first petition was interposed, no actual justiciable controversy to be resolved or dismissed, the MOA-AD having been unsigned. Be that as it may, there can hardly be any constitutional issue based on actual facts to be resolved with finality, let alone a grave violation of the Constitution to be addressed. Surely the Court cannot reasonably formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar based on a non-existing ancestral domain agreement or by anticipating what the executive department will likely do or agree on in the future in the peace negotiating table. AIaDcH Some of my esteemed colleagues in the majority have expressed deep concern with the ramifications of a signed MOA-AD. Needless to stress, their apprehension as to such ramifications is highly speculative. Thus, judicial inquiry, assuming for the nonce its propriety, has to come later, again assuming that the peace instrument is eventually executed and challenged. At its present unsigned shape, the MOA-AD can hardly be the subject of a judicial review. The allegations of unconstitutionality are, for now, purely conjectural. The MOA- AD is only a part of a lengthy peace process that would eventually have culminated in the signing of a Comprehensive Compact. Per my count, the MOA- AD makes reference to a Comprehensive Compact a total of eight times. The last paragraph of the MOA-AD even acknowledges that, before its key provisions come into force, there would still be more consultations and deliberations needed by the parties, viz.: AaCcST Matters concerning the details of the agreed consensus [point] on Governance not covered under this Agreement shall be deferred to, and discussed during, the negotiations of the Comprehensive Compact. Separation of Powers to be Guarded Over and above the foregoing considerations, however, is the matter of separation of powers which would likely be disturbed should the Court meander into alien territory ofthe executive and dictate how the final shape of the peace agreement with the MILF should look like. The system of separation of powers contemplates the division of the functions of government into its three (3) branches: the legislative which is empowered to make laws; the executive which is required to carry out the law; and the judiciary which is charged with interpreting the law. 20 Consequent to the actual delineation of power, each branch of government is entitled to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. 21 Being one such branch, the judiciary, as Justice Laurel asserted in Planas v. Gil,22 22 "will neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative action]". Expressed in another perspective, the system of separated powers is designed to restrain one branch from inappropriate interference in the business, 23 or intruding upon the central prerogatives, 24 ofanother branch; it is a blend of courtesy and caution, "a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other." 25 But this is what the petitioners basically seek: through the overruling writs of the Court, to enjoin the Philippine Peace Negotiating Panel, or its equivalent, and necessarily the President, from signing the proposed MOA-AD and from negotiating and executing in the future similar agreements. The sheer absurdity of the situation where the hands ofexecutive officials, in their quest for a lasting and honorable peace, are sought to be tied lest they agree to something irreconcilable with the Constitution, should not be lost on the Court. Under our constitutional set up, there cannot be any serious dispute that the maintenance of the peace, insuring domestic tranquility 26 and the suppression of violence are the domain and responsibility of the executive. 27 Now then, if it be important to restrict the great departments of government to the exercise of their appointed powers, it follows, as a logical corollary, equally important, that one branch should be left completely independent of the others, independent not in the sense that the three shall not cooperate in the common end of carrying into effect the purposes of the constitution, but in the sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by or subjected to the influence of either of the branches. 28 Favorably accommodating the petitioners under the premises cannot but be viewed as an indirect attempt on the part of the Court to control and dictate on the peace prerogatives of the executive branch, and in the process unduly impairing that branch in the performance of its constitutional duties. It will distort the delicate balance ofgovernance which the separation of powers seeks to safeguard. AaSIET One Last Word The Executive Secretary has categorically declared that the government will not sign the MOA-A, 29 which, as couched, may indeed be constitutionally frail or legally infirm. But the more important point is that the challenged agreement is an unsigned document without effect and force whatsoever. It conveys no right to and imposes no correlative obligation on either negotiating party. As an unsigned writing, it cannot be declared unconstitutional, as some of my colleagues are wont to do. SEIcHa Accordingly, I vote to DENY the petitions. The factual and legal situations call for this disposition. NACHURA, J., dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the ponencia of Justice Carpio-Morales, even as I agree with its holding that the MOA-AD is not an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law. Statement of the Case We are confronted with various petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel (GRP), 1 and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 2 to wit: 1.a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) docketed as G.R. No. 183591, filed by the province of North Cotabato 3 against respondents GRP, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., 4 and Secretary Eduardo Ermita, 5 enjoining this Court to: (a) compel respondents to disclose the contents of the MOA-AD, (b) prohibit respondents from formally signing the MOA-AD, or, in the alternative, (c) declare the initialed MOA-AD as unconstitutional; TIcEDC
2.a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with urgent prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order docketed as G.R. No. 183752 filed by the City Government of Zamboanga, et al., 6 against respondents (except Sec. Ermita), enjoining this Court to: (a) compel respondents to disclose the contents of the MOA-AD, (b) prohibit respondents from signing the MOA-AD, (c) exclude the City of Zamboanga from being part of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), subject-matter of the MOA-AD, or, should the MOA- AD be signed, (d) declare it as null and void. 3.a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order docketed as G.R. No. 183893 filed by the City of Iligan 7 against respondents, enjoining this Court to: (a) enjoin respondents from signing the MOA-AD, or, in the alternative, from implementing the same, and (b) declare the MOA-AD as unconstitutional; 4.a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with prayer for issuance of Writ of Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order docketed as G.R. No. 183951 filed by provincial government of Zamboanga Del Norte, 8 Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos Carreon, 9 Rep. Cesar G. Jalosjos, 10 and Seth Frederick Jalosjos, Fernando R. Cabigon, Jr., Uldarico Mejorada II, Edionar Zamoras, Edgar J. Baguio, Cedric Adriatico, Felixberto Bolando, Joseph Brendo Ajero, Norbideiri Edding, Anecito Darunday, Angelica Carreon, and Luzviminda Torrino 11 against respondents (except Sec. Ermita), enjoining this Court to: (a) declare the MOA-AD as null and void and without operative effect, and (b) restrain respondents from executing the MOA-AD. 5.a petition for Prohibition filed by Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino L. Pimentel III against respondents (except Gen. Esperon and Sec. Ermita) and the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel, 12 enjoining this Court to: (a) prohibit and permanently enjoin respondents from formally signing the MOA-AD or any other agreement derive therefrom or with terms similar thereto as well as from executing any of its provisions, and (b) nullify the MOA-AD for being contrary to the Constitution and the laws; 6.a petition-in-intervention for Prohibition filed by Hon. Marino Ridao and Kisin Buxani, residents of Cotabato City, lodged with the petitions of the Province of Cotabato and the City of Zamboanga in G.R. Nos. 183591 and 183752, enjoining this Court to: (a) prohibit respondents from signing the MOA-AD, (b) declare the MOA-AD as null and void, or, in the alternative, (c) exclude all the thirty-seven (37) barangays of Cotabato City from the coverage of the BJE territory; ATcEDS 7.a petition-in-intervention for Prohibition, Mandamus and Injunction filed by the Municipality of Linamon, 13 enjoining this Court to: (a) permanently restrain respondents from signing the MOA-AD, or (b) permanently restrain respondents from implementing the initialed MOA-AD, if and when the MILF insists on its enforcement, and (c) declare the MOA-AD as unconstitutional. 8.a petition-in-intervention for Prohibition filed by the City Government of Isabela, Basilan Province, 14 enjoining this Court to: (a) prohibit respondents from signing the MOA-AD, in the alternative, (b) declare the MOA-AD as null and void, and (c) exclude all the forty-five (45) barangays of the City of Isabela from the BJE territory; 9.a petition-in-intervention for Prohibition filed by the province of Sultan Kudarat, 15 enjoining this Court to: (a) prohibit respondents from signing the MOA-AD, (b) declare the MOA-AD as null and void, and (c) exclude the two hundred fourteen (214) barangays of Sultan Kudarat Province from the BJE territory; aAHSEC 10.a petition-in-intervention for Prohibition filed by members of the bar Carlos Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, and Richalez Jagmis, all from Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, enjoining this Court to: (a) prohibit respondents from implementing the MOA-AD which they had signed with the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel, in the alternative, (b) declare the MOA-AD as null and void, and (c) exclude the Province of Palawan and the Municipalities of Bataraza and Balabac from the BJE territory; 11.a petition-in-intervention for Prohibition filed by Ruy Elias Lopez as a member of the Bagobo tribe of indigenous people living in Mindanao, enjoining this Court to: (a) permanently enjoin respondents from signing the MOA-AD, and, in the alternative, (b) declare the MOA-AD as unenforceable against other indigenous peoples; 12.a petition-in-intervention for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Senator Manuel Roxas, enjoining this Court to: (a) direct respondents to publicly reveal or disclose the contents of the MOA-AD, including all documents pertinent, related, attached thereto, and order respondents to furnish petitioner-in-intervention Sen. Roxas with the draft and/or final, complete, official, and initialed copies of said MOA-AD, and (b) command respondents from acting on and signing and implementing the MOA-AD; and 13.a petition-in-intervention for Prohibition filed by former Senator Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, enjoining this Court to prohibit and permanently enjoin respondents from further signing, executing, and entering into the MOA-AD or any other agreement with terms similar to the MOA and/or from proceeding or implementing the MOA-AD. These cases have been consolidated and jointly heard on oral argument by the Court. In all, the main petitions and the petitions-in-intervention bewail the lack of public consultation and invoke violation of the people's right to information 16 in the drafting of the MOA-AD. The numerous petitions pray for the following reliefs: SDAaTC 1.To prevent the signing of, and, in the alternative, implementation of the initialed, MOA-AD; 2.To be furnished copies of the MOA-AD grounded on their right to information on matters of public concern; 3.To exclude certain cities and barangays from the BJE territory; 4.To declare the MOA-AD as unconstitutional riddled as it is with constitutional infirmities; and 5.As regards Intervenor Lopez, to declare the MOA-AD unenforceable against indigenous peoples. AcaEDC The Facts Before anything else, however, the difficult facts leading to this cause celebre. The advent of the 1987 Constitution captured and reflected our nation's quest for true and lasting peace in Muslim Mindanao. The new constitution included authority for the creation of an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). 17 This trailblazing legal framework was actually catalyzed, as early as 1976, with the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in Libya between the GRP and the MNLF. On August 1, 1989, Congress passed and approved Republic Act 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao". Out ofthe thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities subjected to a plebiscite conducted on November 19, 1989, only four (4) provinces voted for their inclusion in the ARMM, namely:Provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao Del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Then, on September 2, 1996, the almost elusive pursuit of peace appeared to be within reach the GRP and the MNLF entered into and signed a total and final peace agreement implementing the 1976 Tripoli Agreement entitled "The Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front". Consistent thereto, on March 31, 2001, Congress amended the first Organic Act (R.A. 6734) and enactedR.A. 9054 for the expansion of the ARMM. The plebiscite for the ratification of the amended Organic Act conducted on August 14, 2001 resulted in the addition of BasilanProvince and Marawi City to the original four (4) provinces comprising the ARMM. AHcCDI Peace was almost at hand, but not quite. The MILF, a break-away faction of the MNLF, wanted a separate peace. It rejected the final peace agreement between the GRP and the MNLF, and continued their armed hostilities. Once again, in the quest for lasting peace, the GRP initiated peace talks with the MILF. On July 18, 1997, the Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities was signed between the GRP and the MILF Peace Panels. Next, on August 27, 1998, the General Framework of Agreement of Intent was signed by both parties at the Dawah Center, Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao. All these agreements, notwithstanding, at the end of 1999 to 2000, the MILF fortified its stronghold in forty-six (46) camps, attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao, and took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte. Government responded by twice declaring an "all-out war" against the MILF. On April 30, 2000, the MILF unilaterally suspended the GRP-MILF Peace Talks and, likewise, declared an all-out war against the GRP and ordered an all- out offensive on Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) camps all over Mindanao. Various attempts at a peace settlement were unsuccessful. TAIDHa On February 28, 2001, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 3 defining the policy and administrative structure for the government's comprehensive peace effort, in relevant part: Section 3.The Three Principles of the Comprehensive Peace Process. The comprehensive peace process shall continue to be governed by the following underlying principles: a.A comprehensive peace process should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos. Thus, it shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community. b.A comprehensive peace process aims to forge a new social compact for a just, equitable, humane and pluralistic society. It seeks to establish a genuinely pluralistic society, where all individuals and groups are free to engage in peaceful competition for predominance of their political programs without fear, through the exercise of rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, and where they may compete for political power through an electoral system that is free, fair and honest. CAaDSI
c.A comprehensive peace process seeks a principled and peaceful resolution to the internal armed conflicts, with neither blame nor surrender, but with dignity for all concerned. Section 4.The Six Paths to Peace. The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These components processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following: a.PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative action, new legislation, or even constitutional amendments. b.CONSENSUS-BUILDING AND EMPOWERMENT FOR PEACE. This component includes continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace process. c.PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH THE DIFFERENT REBEL GROUPS. This component involves the conduct of face-to-face negotiations to reach peaceful settlement with the different rebel groups. It also involves the effective implementation of peace agreements. d.PROGRAMS FOR RECONCILIATION, REINTEGRATION INTO MAINSTREAM SOCIETY AND REHABILITATION. This component includes programs to address the legal status and security of former rebels, as well as community-based assistance programs to address the economic, social and psychological rehabilitation needs of former rebels, demobilized combatants and civilian victims of the internal armed conflicts. e.ADDRESSING CONCERNS ARISING FROM CONTINUING ARMED HOSTILITIES. This component involves the strict implementation of laws and policy guidelines, and the institution of programs to ensure the protection of non-combatants and reduce the impact of the armed conflict on communities found in conflict areas. f.BUILDING AND NURTURING A CLIMATE CONDUCIVE TO PEACE. This component includes peace advocacy and peace education programs, and the implementation of various confidence-building measures. In addition thereto, President Arroyo issued Memorandum of Instructions to the GRP Peace Panel providing the General Guidelines on the Peace Talks with the MILF. TSDHCc On April 3, 2001, as a consequence of the signing of the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks between the GRP and the MILF on March 24, 2001, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the MILF suspended all military actions in their areas of operation. Subsequently, two (2) rounds of Formal Peace Talks occurred in June 20-22, 2001 and August 5-7, 2001, respectively, with the latter resulting in the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 and effectively placing the parties on a cease-fire status. This agreement contained three (3) strands, specifically: (1) the Security Aspect; (2) Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects; and (c) the Ancestral Domain Aspect. And as previously stated, R.A. 9054 amending the Organic Act was ratified with the inclusion of Basilan Province and Marawi City in the ARMM. Yet, incidences of violence and violation of the cease-fire pact by the MILF continued to occur. On July 19, 2003, the GRP and the MILF once again agreed to a cessation ofhostilities and resume peace talks. In connection therewith, on September 2, 2003, President Arroyo issued Memorandum of Instructions to the GRP Peace Panel, i.e., Revised General Guidelines on the Peace Talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. ECSHAD Therefrom, the continuation of several rounds of previously held exploratory talks was held on June 20-21, 2005 at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and resulted in the forging of clear parameters and principles to be pursued on the Governance Strand (Aspect) of the Ancestral Domain. This was followed by another round of Exploratory Talks on September 15-16, 2005 also in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where both panels adopted the points on the same strand/aspect of Ancestral Domain provided in the Peace Agreement of 2001 between the GRP and the MILF. The peace process finally culminated in the drafting of the subject MOA-AD intended to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on August 5, 2008. News report began to appear on the contents of the MOA-AD and its scheduled signing on August 5, 2008. Main petitioners, except petitioners in G.R. No. 183962, all scrambled to procure a copy of the draft of this MOA-AD. Inability to secure copies thereof and a categorical response from respondent GRP, prompted the filing of these petitions. On the eve of the scheduled signing, by Resolution dated August 4, 2008, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD. We likewise required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD. On August 8, 2008, the OSG filed its Compliance with our Resolution. ASICDH Meanwhile, outbreak of violence occurred in some of the herein petitioner local government units. Oral arguments were held on August 15, 22, & 29, 2008. On August 19, 2008, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the petitions on the ground that the Executive Department has declared it will thoroughly review MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations addressing all objections hurled against said document. The OSG's motion was greatly opposed by the petitioners. On August 28, 2008, the Executive Department pronounced that it would no longer sign the MOA-AD. On the last day of the oral arguments, Madame Solicitor General, on interpellation, declared that the Executive Department, specifically, respondent Sec. Ermita has declared that the MOA-AD "will not be signed in this form, or in any other form". Moreover, on September 3, 2008, President Arroyo dissolved the GRP Peace Panel. Finally, in compliance to the Court's directive upon termination of the oral arguments, the parties submitted their respective Memoranda. Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention maintain that despite the supervening events and foregoing declarations and acts of the Executive Department, there remains a justiciable controversy, a conflict of legal rights by the parties that ought to be adjudicated by this Court. They asseverate that, supervening events notwithstanding, the cases at bench have not been mooted, or, even if so, the issues they raised fall within the exceptions to the moot and academic principle. Consequently, even with the dissolution ofthe GRP Peace Panel and the positive and unequivocal declaration by the Executive Department that the MOA-AD will not be signed in this form or in any other form, the constitutionality of the MOA- AD may still be ruled upon. At the other end of the spectrum, however, the OSG is adamant that this contentious MOA-AD is, in fact, only a codification of "consensus points" and does not, in any way, create rights and obligations that must be declared infirm, and thus, is not ripe for adjudication by this Court. Furthermore, the OSG insists that the petitions and petitions-in-intervention must be dismissed on the ground of mootness, supervening events having rendered the assailed MOA-AD inexistent and all the reliefs prayed for satisfied and fulfilled. In addition, the OSG argues that a ruling by this Court on the constitutionality of the MOA-AD violates the doctrine of separation of powers as the negotiation of the MOA-AD is embraced in the President's powers and in the nature of a political question, outside the pale of judicial review. cESDCa The Issues From the pleadings and as delineated on oral arguments, the issues raised are both procedural and substantive, namely: 1.Procedural (i)Whether petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention have locus standi; (ii)Whether the petitions and petitions-in-intervention continue to present a justiciable controversy still ripe for adjudication; and TIaCcD (iii)Whether the petitions and petitions-in-intervention have become moot and academic. 2.Substantive (i)Whether the MOA-AD is unconstitutional; (ii)Whether the GRP Peace Panel (respondents) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initialed the MOA-AD. I submit that because of supervening events, the petitions and petitions-in- intervention are no longer ripe for adjudication and that these cases have been rendered moot and academic. Accordingly, the petitions should be dismissed. I.PROCEDURAL i.Locus Standi Our pronouncements in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo 18 are instructive: The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer. HITEaS xxx xxx xxx However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activitiesof governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as,Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan, where the transcendental importance of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the far-reaching implications of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. xxx xxx xxx By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1)the cases involve constitutional issues; (2)for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3)for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4)for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and aATHES (5)for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. The test we have laid down is whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult questions. 19 When an individual sues as a citizen, he must allege that he has been or is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 20 When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. 21 ISAcHD The petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention claim locus standi with their invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues involved and their assertion of public rights to information and to consultation. Considering that the Court has discretion to relax this procedural technicality, and given the liberal attitude it has adopted in a number of earlier cases, we acknowledge the legal standing of the petitioners herein. ii.Ripeness for Adjudication A mandatory requirement for the Court's exercise of the power of judicial review is the existence of an actual case or controversy. An actual case or controversy is a conflict oflegal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 22 The controversy must be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests. 23 But it is not enough that the controversy exists at the outset. To qualify for adjudication, it is necessary that the actual controversy be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. 24 This is to say that the case is ripe for judicial determination. In Guingona v. Court of Appeals, 25 we had occasion to declare: Closely related to the requirement of "actual case", Bernas continues, is the second requirement that the question is "ripe" for adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Thus, in PACU v. Secretary of Education, the Court declined to pass judgment on the question of the validity of Section 3 of Act No. 2706, which provided that before a private school may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit from the secretary of education, because all the petitioning schools had permits to operate and were actually operating, and none of them claimed that the secretary had threatened to revoke their permit. EcICDT In Tan v. Macapagal, the Court said that Petitioner Gonzales "had the good sense to wait" until after the enactment of the statute [Rep. Act No. 4913 (1967)] requiring the submission to the electorate of certain proposed amendments to the Constitution [Resolution Nos. 1 and 3 of Congress as a constituent body (1967)] before he could file his suit. It was only when this condition was met that the matter became ripe for adjudication; prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Being one such branch, the judiciary, Justice Laurel asserted, "will neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative action] . . . ." The legislative and the executive branches are not allowed to seek advice on what to do or not to do; thus, judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meantime. Before a court may enter the picture, a prerequisite is that something has been accomplished or performed by either branch. Then may it pass on the validity of what has been done but, then again, only "when . . . properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding". DcIHSa In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that at the time of the filing of the initial petitions up to the issuance by this Court of the Temporary Restraining Order, there was an actual extant controversy. The signing of the MOA-AD in Malaysia had been scheduled; several foreign dignitaries were invited to grace the ceremony. The timeliness of the exercise of power by the Court may have prevented a possible constitutional transgression. It was so timely an exercise of judicial review over an actual controversy by the Court such that it may have provided the impetus sufficient for the Executive Department to "review" its own acts, and to decide, subsequently, to abort the entire MOA-AD. However, supervening events effectively eliminated the conflict of rights and opposite legal claims. There is no longer an actual case or controversy between the parties. TheGRP Peace Panel, respondents in these consolidated cases, has been disbanded by the President, along with the resounding declaration that "the MOA-AD will not be signed in its present form, or in any other form". The Memorandum issued by Executive Secretary Ermita to the Solicitor General is unequivocal: "No matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides, the government will not sign the MOA". The subsequent events were sufficient to alter the course of these judicial proceedings. The President's decision not to sign the MOA-AD may even be interpreted as a rectification of flawed peace negotiations by the panel. But to this Court, it is clearly a supervening event that affects the ripeness of the case for adjudication. With an abandoned and unsigned MOA-AD and a dissolved peace Panel, any purported controversy has virtually disappeared. Judicial review cannot be exercised where the incipient actual controversy does not remain extant until the termination of the case; this Court cannot provide reliefs for controversies that are no longer there. After the mandamus aspect of the initial petitions had been satisfied, what remains are basically the petitions for certiorari and prohibition. 26 The reliefs prayed for include the declaration of nullity of the MOA-AD and the prohibition on the members of the Peace Panel from signing the MOA-AD. These reliefs are unavailing, because the peace Panel has been dissolved and, by the nature of things, rendered permanently unable to sign any agreement. On the other hand, the MOA-AD sought to be nullified does not confer any rights nor impose any duties. It is, as of today, non-existent. In Montesclaros v. COMELEC, 27 we held that a proposed bill is not subject to judicial review, because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill having no legal effect violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. This ruling finds a parallel in a proposed agreement to be entered into by the Executive Department which has been aborted, unsigned, and "will not be signed in its present form or in any other form". TEHIaA iii.Mootness A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness. 28 Thus, in Gonzales v. Narvasa, 29 where the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was questioned, the Court dismissed the petition because by then, the PCCR had ceased to exist, having finished its work and having submitted its recommendations to then President Estrada. In Abbas v. COMELEC, 30 we refused to rule on a perceived potential conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the national law.
However, it is axiomatic that courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character ofthe situation and the paramount public interest involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or fourth, when the case is capable of repetition yet evasive of review. 31 As to the first exception, there is no violation of the Constitution that will justify judicial review despite mootness, because the MOA-AD has not been signed and will not be signed. The eminent Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his separate opinion, even as he expressed fears of numerous "drastic changes" in the Constitution, acknowledges that these will take place only IF the MOA-AD will be signed. The scholarly ponencia concludes with the finding that the MOA-AD is unconstitutional, obviously referring to its provisions. So does the separate opinion of Justice Ruben T. Reyes. But, to repeat, the MOA-AD is, as of today, non-existent. Thus, as it is, these dreaded constitutional infractions are, at best, anticipatory, hypothetical or conjectural. Neither will the second exception apply. The issue of paramount public interest will arise only IF the MOA-AD is signed. With the Peace Panel dissolved, and with the unequivocal pronouncement of the President that the MOA-AD will not be signed, there is no occasion to speak of the exceptional or extraordinary character of the controversy as would render the case ripe for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination. aDcTHE Given the events that led to the issuance by the Court of a TRO in order to stop the signing of the MOA-AD in Malaysia on August 5, 2008, it would appear that there is a need for the Court to formulate controlling principles, precepts and rules to guide the bench, the bar and the public particularly a peace negotiating panel in future peace talks. However, a scrutiny of the factual antecedents of this case reveals that no such imperative exists. It is well to note that Executive Order No. 3, which created the GRP Peace Panel, explicitly identifies the Constitution as the basic legal framework for the peace negotiations. It states that the GRP Peace Panel was created with the primary objective to attain "a just, comprehensive and enduring peace under a rule of law and in accordance with constitutional processes", 32 with "a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people's participation".33 The same Executive Order provides sufficient standards to guide the GRP Peace Panel in the performance of its avowed work. Then, there is the March 1, 2001 Memorandum of Instructions from the President, followed by the Memorandum of Instructions dated September 8, 2003. Common to the instructions is the provision that the negotiation shall be conducted "in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution, the Rule of Law, and the Principles of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of the Republic of the Philippines". These are adequate guidelines for the GRP Peace panel; it would be superfluous for the Court to issue guidelines which, presumably, will be similar to the ones already in existence, aside from possibly trenching on the constitutional principle of separation of powers. ScaHDT If the respondents-members of the GRP Peace Panel, in the conduct of the negotiation, breached these standards or failed to heed the instructions, it was not for lack ofguidelines. In any event, the GRP Peace Panel is now disbanded, and the MOA-AD unsigned and "not to be signed". There is no necessity for this Court to issue its own guidelines as these would be, in all probability, repetitive of the executive issuances. The fourth exception, that the issue is "capable of repetition yet evasive of review", is likewise inapplicable in this case. In this connection, we recall Sanlakas v. Reyes, 34 where the Court dismissed the petitions which assailed as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 427, declaring a state of rebellion, and General Order No. 4, after the President had issued Proclamation No. 435 declaring that the state of rebellion had ceased to exist. Apart from the brilliant ponencia of Justice Dante O. Tinga, particularly illuminating is the separate opinion of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban when he wrote: While the Petitions herein have previously embodied a live case or controversy, they now have been rendered extinct by the lifting of the questioned issuances. Thus,nothing is gained by breathing life into a dead issue. Moreover, without a justiciable controversy, the Petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction. Be it remembered that they were filed directly with this Court and thus invoked its original jurisdiction. On the theory that the "state of rebellion" issue is "capable of repetition yet evading review", I respectfully submit that the question may indeed still be resolved even after the lifting of the Proclamation and Order, provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance. ESDHCa In the present case, petitioners have not shown that they have been or continue to be directly and pecuniarily prejudiced or damaged by the Proclamation and Order. Neither have they shown that this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. I would venture to say that, perhaps, if this controversy had emanated from an appealed judgment from a lower tribunal, then this Court may still pass upon the issue on the theory that it is "capable of repetition yet evading review", and the case would not be an original action for declaratory relief. In short, the theory of "capable of repetition yet evading review" may be invoked only when this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. It cannot be used in the present controversy for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Given the similar factual milieu in the case at bench, I submit that judicial review of the instant controversy cannot be justified on the principle that the issue is "capable ofrepetition yet evasive of review". IDCHTE II.SUBSTANTIVE I respectfully submit that the Court should view this case from the perspective of executive power, and how it was actually exercised in the formulation of the GRP Peace Panel until the challenged MOA-AD was crafted in its present abandoned form. The President is the Chief Executive of the Republic and the Commander-in- Chief of the armed forces of the Philippines. Section 1, Article VII of the Philippine Constitution provides: "The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines". Additionally, Section 18, Article VII, states: Sec. 18.The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. HIETAc In Sanlakas v. Reyes, 35 we held that the above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers, to wit: (1) the calling out power, (2) the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (3) the power to declare martial law. Thus: In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise ofthe calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary', the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'" Implicit in these is the President's power to maintain peace and order. In fact, in the seminal case of Marcos v. Manglapus, 36 we ruled: [T]his case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
Undoubtedly, then, the President has power to negotiate peace with the MILF, and to determine in what form and manner the peace process should be conducted. IcTCHD In the exercise of this power, the President issued Executive Order No. 3, where she mapped out the principles to be followed in the comprehensive peace process: (a) community-based and defined by all Filipinos as one community, (b) a new social compact establishing a genuinely pluralistic society, and (c) a principled and peaceful resolution to the internal armed conflicts. 37 In Section 4 thereof, the president identified the 6 paths to peace, with processes being interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion: (a) pursuit of social, economic and political reforms, (b) consensus- building and empowerment for peace, (c) peaceful, negotiated settlement with the different rebel groups, (d) programs for the reconciliation, reintegration into mainstream society and rehabilitation, (e) addressing concerns arising from continuing armed hostilities, and (f) building and nurturing a climate conducive to peace. Executive Order No. 3, together with the Memorandum of Instructions of March 1, 2001 and the Memorandum of Instructions of September 8, 2003, constitutes the mandateof the GRP Peace panel. It was within the parameters of this mandate that the GRP Peace panel was to negotiate with the MILF and arrive at a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It was pursuant to these strictures that the MOA-AD was crafted, initialed and scheduled for signing. Even as the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention roundly condemn the MOA-AD, as currently worded, to have violated constitutional and statutory principles and assail the GRP Peace Panel for having acted with grave abuse of discretion because of its failure to abide by its mandate it is noteworthy they do not raise any question about the validity of Executive Order No. 3 and the Instructions issued by the President. Considering the events that have supervened since the filing of the initial petition and the issuance by this Court of a TRO, it is suggested that the angle of vision for the discussion of the substantive issues in this case should be from the perspective of the relief/s that this Court can grant the parties, taking into account their respective prayers. These are: TECIaH 1.Mandamus. a)Three petitions and two petitions-in-intervention praying for a writ of mandamus, to compel the production of the official copy of the MOA-AD, the petitioners invoking their right to information. These petitions are now mooted, because the requested documents have already been produced. b)Two respondents-intervenors who pray that the Executive Department be directed to sign the MOA-AD and to continue with the peace negotiations. With the definite pronouncement of the President that the MOA-AD will not be signed in its present form or in any other form, this prayer cannot be granted, because the Court cannot compel a party to enter into an agreement. 2.Declaratory Relief. One petition for declaratory relief which may not be granted because the Court has no original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. 38 3.Certiorari and Prohibition. One petition for certiorari and twelve petitions for prohibition, including the petitions-in-intervention, seek a declaration of nullityof the MOA-AD (for being unconstitutional), a writ of certiorari against the members of the GRP Peace Panel for having acted with grave abuse of discretion, and a writ of prohibition to prevent the signing of the MOA-AD. TaCDAH There's the rub. Because the MOA-AD will not be signed "in its present form, or in any other form", certiorari will not lie. The Court cannot review an inexistent agreement, an unborn contract that does not purport to create rights or impose duties that are legally demandable. Neither will the remedy of prohibition lie against a GRP Peace Panel that no longer exists. To do so would be to flog a dead horse. The ponencia would wish to get around this inescapable truth by saying: "The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion". With due respect, I beg to disagree. Grave abuse of discretion can characterize only consummated acts (or omissions), not an "almost (but not quite) consummated act". CDHSac Chief Justice Panganiban, in his separate opinion in Sanlakas, writes: "The first requirement, the existence of a live case or controversy, means that the existing litigation is ripe for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination, as opposed to one that is conjectural or anticipatory, hypothetical or feigned". It is not the province of this Court to assume facts that do not exist. It is for the foregoing reasons that I respectfully register my dissent. I vote to DENY the petitions. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting: I vote to consider the cases moot and academic considering the manifestation in the Memorandum, dated September 24, 2008, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that: ". . . The Executive Department has repeatedly and categorically stated that the MOA-AD will not be signed in its present form or in any other form. The Chief Executive has in fact gone to the extent of dissolving the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Panel and has decided to take on a different tack and launch talks, no longer with rebels or rebel groups, but with more peace-loving community-based groups. . . ." 1 DAaIEc This development renders unnecessary a detailed analysis of each of the stipulations contained in the said MOA-AD, which have grave constitutional implications on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional processes of the Republic of the Philippines, all of which are non-negotiable when viewed in the context of the nature of the internal conflict it seeks to address and the state of our nation today. I believe this is a prudent move on the part of the Executive Department. By the very essence of our republican and democratic form of government, the outcome of our constitutional processes, particularly the legislative process and the constituent process of amending the constitution, cannot be predetermined or predicted with certainty as it is made to appear by the consensus points of the MOA-AD. Consequently, it is beyond the authority of any negotiating panel to commit the implementation of any consensus point or a legal framework which is inconsistent with the present Constitution or existing statutes. Moreover, our constitutional processes are well-defined by various provisions of the Constitution. The establishment of a political and territorial "space" under a so-called Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is nowhere to be found in the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the country's territorial and political subdivisions as follows: "The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided." 2 In the case of the autonomous regions, their creation is the shared responsibility of the political branches of the government and the constituent units affected. The Constitution is explicit in this regard, to wit: "The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composedof representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this constitution and national law. cIECaS The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." 3 (Emphasis supplied) If the establishment of autonomy requires the joint participation of Congress, the President, and of the people in the area affected, from the inception of the process ofcreation of an autonomous region, with more reason, the creation of the BJE an entity intended to have its own basic law to be adopted in accordance with an "associative arrangement" which would imply, in legal terms, semi-independence if not outright independence cannot be negotiated without the participation of Congress and consultations with the people, residing not only in the area to be placed under the BJE but also in the rest of our country. Even with the participation of Congress and the consultation with stakeholders, the process at the onset must conform and explicitly be subject to our Constitution. This is specially important as the unsigned MOA-AD stipulates a definite framework that threatens to erase, through the "policies, rules and regulations" and basic law of the BJE, the objective existence of over four hundred (400) years of development and progress of our people by unsettling private voluntary agreements and undoing the official acts of our government institutions performed pursuant to the Constitution and the laws in force during the said long period in our history, within the identified areas, to be carved out of a substantial portion of the national territory, and with only the "details", the "mechanisms and modalities for actual implementation" to be negotiated and embodied in a Comprehensive Compact. To my mind, this alarming possibility contemplated in the MOA-AD may be the cause of chaos and even greater strife for our brothers in the south, rather than bring about the intended peace.
BRION, J., concurring and dissenting: The Petitions for Mandamus I concur with the ponencia's conclusion that the mandamus aspect of the present petitions has been rendered moot when the respondents provided this Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). 1 The Petitions for Prohibition I likewise concur with the implied conclusion that the "non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) panel mooted the prohibition aspect of the petitions", but disagree that the exception to the "moot and academic" principle should apply. The ponencia alternatively claims that the petitions have not been mooted. I likewise dissent from this conclusion. a.The Ponencia and the Moot and Academic Principle. As basis for its conclusion, the ponencia cites David v. Macapagal-Arroyo 2 for its holding that "'the moot and academic' principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it [the Court] will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it feels that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 3 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; 4 (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; 5 and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review." 6 cCaATD In further support of its position on the mootness issue, the ponencia additionally cites the American ruling that "once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation". 7 b.The Context of the "Moot and Academic" Principle. The cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo defines a "moot and academic" case to be "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value." It goes on to state that "generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such cases and dismiss it on the ground ofmootness". 8 This pronouncement traces its current roots from the express constitutional rule under the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. . ." This rule, which can conveniently be called the traditional concept of judicial power, has been expanded under the 1987 Constitution to include the power "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government". Whether under the traditional or the expanded concept, judicial power must be based on an actual justiciable controversy at whose core is the existence of a case involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Without this feature, courts have no jurisdiction to act. Even a petition for declaratory relief 9 a petition outside the original jurisdiction of this Court to entertain must involve an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication. 10 In light of these requirements, any exception that this Court has recognized to the rule on mootness (as expressed, for example, in the cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo) is justified only by the implied recognition that a continuing controversy exists. Specifically involved in the exercise of judicial power in the present petitions is the Court's power of judicial review, i.e., the power to declare the substance, application or operation of a treaty, international agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. 11 A first requisite for judicial review is that there be an "actual case" calling for the exercise of judicial power. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., an eminent constitutional law expert, comments in this regard that This is a manifestation of the commitment to the adversarial system. Hence, the Court has no authority to pass upon issues of constitutionality through advisory opinions and it has no authority to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests. Nor will the Court normally entertain a petition touching on an issue that has become moot because then there would no longer be a 'flesh and blood' case for the Court to resolve." [Citations deleted, emphasis supplied.] 12 cCSDTI Other than the rule on actual case and standing (which aspect this separate opinion does not cover), jurisprudence holds that this Court will not touch upon the issue ofconstitutionality unless it is unavoidable or is the very lis mota. 13 As will be discussed in refuting the ponencia's various positions, this rule finds special application in the present case in light of the political sensitivity of the peace talks with the MILF and the issues it has placed on the agenda, namely, peace and order in Mindanao and the MILF's aspirations for freedom. My disagreement with the ponencia on the application of the exceptions to the mootness principle of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo is essentially based on how the mootness principle and its exceptions should be applied. While the mootness principle is "not a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving cases", so also should the exceptions not be considered magical formulas that should apply when the Court is minded to conduct a review despite the mootness of a petition. In other words, where an issue is moot on its face, the application of any of the exceptions should be subjected to a strict test because it is a deviation from the general rule. The Court should carefully test the exceptions to be applied from the perspectives both of legality and practical effects, and show by these standards that the issue absolutely requires to be resolved. I do not believe that the exceptions were so tested and considered under the ponencia. c.The Ponencia's Positions Refuted i.Mootness and this Court's TRO A first point the ponencia stresses with preeminence in its discussion of the mootness issue is the observation that "the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the court's issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order". The implication, it seems, is that the intervening events subsequent to the filing of the petition and the issuance of the temporary restraining order (TRO) specifically, the respondents' commitment that the MOA-AD shall not be signed in its present form or in any other form, 14 and the President's act of dissolving the GRP negotiating panel 15 had no effect on the petitions because the signing of the MOA-AD had by then been stopped by our TRO. I find this a disturbing implication as the petitions for prohibition presented live controversies up to and beyond the issuance of this Court's TRO; they were rendered moot only by the above mentioned intervening events. By these intervening and unequivocal acts, the respondents effectively acknowledged that the MOA-AD should indeed not be signed as demanded by the petition. Thus, the TRO from this Court only immediately ensured that the MOA-AD would not be signed until this Court had spoken on the constitutional and statutory grounds cited by the petitions, but it was the respondents' acts that removed from controversy the issue of whether the MOA-AD should be signed or not. In simpler terms, after the respondents declared that the MOA-AD would not be signed, there was nothing left to prohibit and no rights on the part the petitioners continued to be at risk of violation by the MOA-AD. Thus, further discussion of the constitutionality of the MOA-AD now serves no useful purpose; as the discussion below will show, there may even be a considerable downside for our national interests if we inject another factor and another actor in the Mindanao conflict by ruling on the unconstitutionality of the MOA-AD. DICSaH ii.Mootness and Constitutional Implications The ponencia posits as well that the MOA-AD has not been mooted because it has far-reaching constitutional implications and contains a commitment to amend and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework. The same reason presented above suffices to defuse the ponencia's fear about the adverse constitutional effects the MOA-AD may bring or might have brought: without a signed MOA-AD none of these feared constitutional consequences can arise. From another perspective, what the ponencia appears to fear are the constitutional violations and adverse consequences of a signed and effective MOA-AD. These fears, however, are relegated to the realm of speculation with the cancellation of the signing of the MOA-AD and the commitment that it shall not be signed in its present or any other form. Coupled with the subsequent dissolution of the GRP negotiating panel, the government could not have communicated and conveyed any stronger message, short of totally scuttling the whole peace process, that it was not accepting the points covered by the aborted MOA-AD. Government motivation for disavowing the aborted agreement is patently evident from Executive Order No. 3 that outlines the government's visions and intentions in the conduct of peace negotiations. That the GRP negotiating panel came up with a different result is a matter between the Executive and the negotiating panel and may be the immediate reason why the Executive's response was to forthwith dissolve the negotiating panel. iii.GRP Obligation to Discuss Ancestral Domain A consistent concern that runs through the ponencia is that the Philippines is bound under the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF in June 2001 to have an agreement on the Bangsamoro ancestral domain. This concern led the ponencia to conclude that the government decision not to sign the MOA-AD will not render the present petitions moot. In other words, the MOA-AD will recur and hence should be reviewed now. DHTCaI
A basic flaw in this conclusion is its unstated premise that the Philippines is bound to come to an agreement on ancestral domain, thereby equating the commitment to discussthis issue with the obligation to have an agreement. To quote the ponencia's cited Tripoli Agreement of June 2001, 16 the provision on Ancestral Domain Aspect reads: On the aspect of ancestral domain, the Parties, in order to address the humanitarian and economic needs of the Bangsamoro people and preserve their social and cultural heritage and inherent rights over their ancestral domain, agree that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting." [Emphasis supplied.] Under these terms, it is plain that the GRP's commitment extends only to the discussion of the ancestral domain issue. The agreement to discuss, however, does not bind the GRP to come to an agreement; the GRP is merely bound to try to reach an agreement or compromise. Implicit in this commitment is that the Philippines can always say "no" to unacceptable proposals or walk away from the discussion if it finds the proposed terms unacceptable. This option has not been removed from the Philippines under any of the duly signed agreements on the Mindanao peace process. I believe that this is the message that should come out in bold relief, not the ponencia'smisreading of the June 2001 agreement. cDIHES With the present MOA-AD effectively scuttled, the parties are back to the above quoted agreement under which the GRP bound itself to discuss ancestral domain with the MILF as part of the overall peace process. If the ponencia's fear relates to the substance of these future talks, these matters are not for this Court to rule upon as they belong to the realm of policy a matter for other branches of government other than the Judiciary to determine. This Court can only speak with full force and authority on ripe, live, and actual controversies involving violations of constitutional or statutory rights. 17 As a rule, courts look back to past actions, using the Constitution, laws, rules and regulations as standards, to determine disputes and violations of constitutional, and statutory rights; the legislature and the executive, on the other hand, look forward to address present and future situations and developments, with their actions limited by existing constitutional, statutory and regulatory parameters that the courts are duty-bound to safeguard. Thus, if this Court can speak at all on the substance of future talks, this can only be by way of a reminder that the government's positions can only be within constitutional and statutory parameters and subject to the strict observance of required constitutional and statutory procedures if future changes to the constitution and to current statutes are contemplated. iv.Mootness and Paramount Public Interest In justifying the application of the exception on the basis of paramount public interest, the ponencia noted that the MOA-AD involved a significant part of the country's territory and wide-ranging political modifications for affected local government units. It also claimed that the need for further legal enactments provides impetus for the Court to provide controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and the government and its negotiating entity. 18 Unfortunately, the ponencia's justifications on these points practically stopped at these statements. Surprisingly, it did not even have an analysis of what the paramount public interest is and what would best serve the common good under the failed signing of the MOA-AD. We note, as a matter of judicial experience, that almost all cases involving constitutional issues filed with this Court are claimed to be impressed with public interest. It is one thing, however, to make a claim and another thing to prove that indeed an interest is sufficiently public, ripe, and justiciable to claim the attention and action of this Court. It must be considered, too, that while issues affecting the national territory and sovereignty are sufficiently weighty to command immediate attention, answers and solutions to these types of problems are not all lodged in the Judiciary; more than not, these answers and solutions involve matters of policy that essentially rest with the two other branches of government under our constitutional system, 19 with the Judiciary being called upon only where disputes and grave abuse of discretion arise in the course applying the terms of the Constitution and in implementing our laws. 20 Where policy is involved, we are bound by our constitutional duties to leave the question for determination by those duly designated by the Constitution the Executive, Congress, or the people in their sovereign capacity. HAaDTI In the present case, the peace and order problems of Mindanao are essentially matters for the Executive to address, 21 with possible participation from Congress and the sovereign people as higher levels of policy action arise. Its search for solutions, in the course of several presidencies, has led the Executive to the peace settlement process. As has been pointed out repetitively in the pleadings and the oral arguments, the latest move in the Executive's quest for peace the MOA-AD would have not been a good deal for the country if it had materialized. This Court, however, seasonably intervened and aborted the planned signing of the agreement. The Executive, for its part, found it wise and appropriate to fully heed the signals from our initial action and from the public outcry the MOA-AD generated; it backtracked at the earliest opportunity in a manner consistent with its efforts to avoid or minimize bloodshed while preserving the peace process. At the moment, the peace and order problem is still with the Executive where the matter should be; the initiative still lies with that branch of government. The Court's role, under the constitutional scheme that we are sworn to uphold, is to allow the initiative to be where the Constitution says it should be. 22 We cannot and should not interfere unless our action is unavoidably necessary because the Executive is acting beyond what is allowable, or because it has failed to act in the way it should act, under the Constitution and our laws. aSTcCE My conclusion is in no small measure influenced by two basic considerations. First, the failure to conclude the MOA-AD as originally arranged by the parties has already resulted in bloodshed in Mindanao, with blood being spilled on all sides, third party civilians included. Some of the spilled blood was not in actual combat but in terror bombings that have been inflicted on the urban areas. To date, the bloodletting has showed no signs of abating. Lest we become confused in our own understanding of the issues, the problems confronting us may involve the socio-economic and cultural plight of our Muslim and our indigenous brothers, but at core, they are peace and order problems. Though others may disagree, I believe that socio-economic and cultural problems cannot fully be addressed while peace and order are elusive. Nor can we introduce purely pacific solutions to these problems simply because we are threatened with violence as an alternative. History teaches us that those who choose peace and who are willing to sacrifice everything else for the sake of peace ultimately pay a very high price; they also learn that there are times when violence has to be embraced and frontally met as the price for a lasting peace. This was the lesson of Munich in 1938 and one that we should not forget because we are still enjoying the peace dividends the world earned when it stood up to Hitler. 23 In Mindanao, at the very least, the various solutions to our multi- faceted problems should come in tandem with one another and never out of fear of threatened violence. Rather than complicate the issues further with judicial pronouncements that may have unforeseen or unforeseeable effects on the present fighting and on the solutions already being applied, this Court should exercise restraint as the fears immediately generated by a signed and concluded MOA-AD have been addressed and essentially laid to rest. Thus, rather than pro-actively act on areas that now are more executive than judicial, we should act with calibrated restraint along the lines dictated by the constitutional delineation of powers. Doing so cannot be equated to the failure of this Court to act as its judicial duty requires; as I mentioned earlier, we have judicially addressed the concerns posed with positive effects and we shall not hesitate to judicially act in the future, as may be necessary, to ensure that the integrity of our constitutional and statutory rules and standards are not compromised. If we exercise restraint at all, it is because the best interests of the nation and our need to show national solidarity at this point so require, in order that the branch of government in the best position to act can proceed to act. Second, what remains to be done is to support the government as it pursues and nurses the peace process back to its feet after the failed MOA-AD. This will again entail negotiation, not along the MOA-AD lines as this recourse has been tried and has failed, but along other approaches that will fully respect our Constitution and existing laws, as had been done in the 1996 MNLF agreement. In this negotiation, the Executive should be given the widest latitude in exploring options and initiatives in dealing with the MILF, the Mindanao peace and order problem, and the plight of our Muslim brothers in the long term. It should enjoy the full range of these options from changes in our constitutional and statutory framework to full support in waging war, if and when necessary subject only to the observance of constitutional and statutory limits. In a negotiation situation, the worse situation we can saddle the Executive with is to wittingly or unwittingly telegraph the Executive's moves and our own weaknesses to the MILF through our eagerness to forestall constitutional violations. We can effectively move as we have shown in this MOA-AD affair, but let this move be at the proper time and while we ourselves observe the limitations the Constitution commonly impose on all branches of government in delineating their respective roles. TaEIAS
v.The Need for Guidelines from this Court The cases of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, and Lacson v. Perez presented a novel issue that uncovered a gray area in our Constitution: in the absence of a specific constitutional provision, does the President have the power to declare a state of rebellion/national emergency? If the answer is in the affirmative, what are the consequences of this declaration? David v. Macapagal-Arroyo answered these questions and went on to further clarify that a declaration of a state of national emergency did not necessarily authorize the President to exercise emergency powers such as the power to take over private enterprises under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution. Prior to this case, the correlation between Section 17, Article XII and the emergency powers of the President under Section 23 (2), Article VI has never been considered. HAECID In contrast, the present petitions and the intervening developments do not now present similar questions that necessitate clarification. Since the MOA-AD does not exist as a legal, effective, and enforceable instrument, it can neither be illegal nor unconstitutional. For this reason, I have not bothered to refute the statements and arguments about its unconstitutionality. I likewise see no reason to wade into the realm of international law regarding the concerns of some of my colleagues in this area of law. Unless signed and duly executed, the MOA-AD can only serve as unilateral notes or a "wish list" as some have taken to calling it. If it will serve any purpose at all, it can at most serve as an indicator of how the internal processes involving the peace negotiations are managed at the Office of the President. But these are matters internal to that Office so that this Court cannot interfere, not even to make suggestions on how procedural mistakes made in arriving at the aborted MOA-AD should be corrected. To be sure, for this Court to issue guidelines relating to unapplied constitutional provisions would be a useless exercise worse than the "defanging of paper tigers" that Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga abhorred in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo. 24 In terms of the results of this exercise, the words of former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary are most apt "nothing is gained by breathing life into a dead issue". 25 vi.The "Capable of Repetition but Evading Review" Exception The best example of the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to mootness is in its application in Roe v. Wade, 26 the U.S. case where the American Supreme Court categorically ruled on the legal limits of abortion. Given that a fetus has a gestation period of only nine months, the case could not have worked its way through the judicial channels all the way up to the US Supreme Court without the disputed pregnancy being ended by the baby's birth. Despite the birth and the patent mootness of the case, the U.S. Supreme Court opted to fully confront the abortion issue because it was a situation clearly capable of repetition but evading review the issue would recur and would never stand effective review if the nine-month gestation period would be the Court's only window for action. EHTSCD In the Philippines, we have applied the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception to at least two recent cases where the Executive similarly backtracked on the course of action it had initially taken. The earlier of these two cases Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary 27 involved the failed Oakwood mutiny of July 27, 2003. The President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a "state of rebellion" and calling out the armed forces to suppress the rebellion. The President lifted the declaration on August 1, 2003 through Proclamation No. 435. Despite the lifting, the Court took cognizance of the petitions filed based on the experience of May 1, 2001 when a similar "state of rebellion" had been imposed and lifted and where the Court dismissed the petitions filed for their mootness. 28 The Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception "to prevent similar questions from re-emerging . . . and to lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the President's calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding." The second case (preeminently cited in the present ponencia) is David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. The root of this case was Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 that the President issued in response to the conspiracy among military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People's Army, and members of the political opposition to oust or assassinate her on or about February 24, 2006. On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of emergency, the President lifted the declaration. In taking cognizance of the petitions, the Court justified its move by simply stating that "the respondents' contested actions are capable of repetition". SIcEHC Despite the lack of extended explanation in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court's actions in both cases are essentially correct because of the history of "emergencies" that had attended the administration of President Macapagal-Arroyo since she assumed office. Thus, by the time of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court's basis and course ofaction in these types of cases had already been clearly laid. This kind of history or track record is, unfortunately, not present in the petitions at bar and no effort was ever exerted by the ponencia to explain why the exception should apply. Effectively, the ponencia simply textually lifted the exception from past authorities and superimposed it on the present case without looking at the factual milieu and surrounding circumstances. Thus, it simply assumed that the Executive and the next negotiating panel, or any panel that may be convened later, will merely duplicate the workof the respondent peace panel. This assumption is, in my view, purely hypothetical and has no basis in fact in the way David v. Macapagal-Arroyo had, or in the way the exception to mootness was justified inRoe v. Wade. As I have earlier discussed, 29 the ponencia's conclusion made on the basis of the GRP-MILF Peace Agreement of June 2001 is mistaken for having been based on the wrong premises. Additionally, the pronouncements of the Executive on the conduct of the GRP negotiating panel and the parameters of its actions are completely contrary to what the ponencia assumed. Executive Order No. 3 (entitled Defining Policy and Administrative Structure for Government's Comprehensive Peace Efforts) sets out the government's visions and the structure by which peace shall be pursued. Thus, its Section 2 states The Systematic Approach to peace; Section 3, The Three Principles of the Comprehensive Peace Process; Section 4, The Six Paths to Peace; and Section 5 (c) the Government Peace Negotiating Panels. 30 The Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 2001 to the Government Negotiating Panel, states among others that: 1.The negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with the mandates of the Philippine Constitution, the Rule of Law, and the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. aDHCEA 2.The negotiation process shall be pursued in line with the national Comprehensive Peace Process, and shall seek a principled and peaceful resolution of the armed conflict, with neither blame nor surrender, but with dignity for all concerned. xxx xxx xxx 4.The general approach to the negotiations shall include the following: a.Seeking a middle ground between the aspirations of the MILF and the political, social and economic objectives of the Philippine Government; b.Coordinated Third Party Facilitation, where needed; c.Consultations with affected communities and sectors. 31 Under these clear terms showing the Executive's vision on how the peace process and the negotiations shall proceed, I believe that it is fallacious to assume that any renewed negotiation with the MILF will entail a repetition of the discarded MOA-AD. Understandably, it may be asked why the MOA-AD turned out the way it did despite the negotiating panel's clear marching orders. The exact answer was never clarified during the oral arguments and I can only speculate that at some point, the negotiating panel lost its bearings and deviated from the clear orders that are still in force up to the present time. As I mentioned earlier, 32 this may be the reason why the negotiating panel was immediately dissolved. What is important though, for purposes of this case and of the peace and order situation in Mindanao, is that the same marching orders from the Executive are in place so that there is no misunderstanding as to what that branch of government seeks to accomplish and how it intends this to be done. The fact that an issue may arise in the future a distinct possibility for the ponencia unfortunately does not authorize this Court to render a purely advisory opinion, i.e., one where a determination by this Court will not have any effect in the "real world". A court's decision should not be any broader than is required by the precise facts. Anything remotely resembling an advisory opinion or a gratuitous judicial utterance respecting the meaning of the Constitution must altogether be avoided. 33 At best, the present petitions may be considered to be for declaratory relief, but that remedy regrettably is not within this Court's original jurisdiction, as I have pointed out earlier. 34 Finally, let me clarify that the likelihood that a matter will be repeated does not mean that there will be no meaningful opportunity for judicial review 35 so that an exception to mootness should be recognized. For a case to dodge dismissal for mootness under the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception, two requisites must be satisfied: (1) the duration of the challenged action must be too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there must be reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again. 36 cTECIA
The time constraint that justified Roe v. Wade, to be sure, does not inherently exist under the circumstances of the present petition so that judicial review will be evaded in a future litigation. As this Court has shown in this case, we can respond as fast as the circumstances require. I see nothing that would bar us from making a concrete ruling in the future should the exercise of our judicial power, particularly the exercise of the power of judicial review, be justified. vii.The Right to Information The petitions for mandamus essentially involved the demand for a copy of the MOA-AD based on the petitioners' right to information under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. In light of the commonly-held view that the mandamus aspect of the petitions is now moot, focus now shifts to the right to consultation (an aspect of the constitutional right to information and as guaranteed under the Indigenous People's Rights Act 37 and the Local Government Code) 38 that the petitioners now capitalize on to secure the declaration of the nullity of the MOA-AD. I note in this regard though that it is not so much the lack of consultations that the petitioners are rallying against, but the possibility under the MOA-AD's terms that they may be deprived of their lands and properties without due process of law (i.e., that the lumads' ancestral domains will be included in and covered by the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity[BJE] without the benefit of prior consultations). 39 Thus, the equation they present to this Court is: lack of consultations = deprivation of property without due process of law. The short and quick answer to this proprietary concern is that the petitioners' claim is premature. With the MOA-AD unsigned, their fears need not materialize. But even with a signed MOA-AD, I do not believe that the immediate deprivation they fear and their due process concerns are valid based alone on the terms of this aborted agreement. Under these terms, the MOA-AD's execution and signing are but parts of a series of acts and agreements; its signing was not to be the final act that would render its provisions operative. The MOA-AD itself expressly provides that the mechanisms and modalities for its implementation will still have to be spelled out in a Comprehensive Compact and will require amendments to the existing legal framework. This amendatory process, under the Constitution, requires that both Congress and the people in their sovereign capacity be heard. Thus, the petitioners could still fully ventilate their views and be heard even if the MOA-AD had been signed. STcaDI It is in the above sense that I doubt if the ponencia's cited case Chavez v. PEA 40 can serve as an effective authority for the ponencia's thesis: that the process of negotiations as well as the terms of the MOA-AD should have been fully disclosed pursuant to the people's right to information under Section 7, Article III and the government's duty to disclose under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution. The Chavez case dealt with a commercial contract that was perfected upon its signing; disclosure of information pertaining to the negotiations was therefore necessary as an objection after the signing would have been too late. As outlined above, this feature of a commercial contract does not obtain in the MOA-AD because subsequent acts have to take place before the points it covers can take effect. But more than this, the contract involved in Chavez and the purely commercial and proprietary interests it represents cannot simply be compared with the MOA-AD and the concerns it touched upon recognition of a new juridical entity heretofore unknown in Philippine law, its impact on national sovereignty, and its effects on national territory and resources. If only for these reasons, I have to reject the ponencia's conclusions touching on the right to information and consultations. HETDAa My more basic disagreement with the ponencia's treatment of the right to information and the duty of disclosure is its seeming readiness to treat these rights as stand-alone rights that are fully executory subject only to the safeguards that Congress may by law interpose. In the first place, it was not clear at all from the ponencia's cited constitutional deliberations that the framers intended the duty of disclosure to be immediately executory. The cited deliberation recites: MR. DAVIDE: I would to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as having said that this is not a self- executory provision? It would require a legislation by Congress to implement? MR. OPLE: Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interests are modified by the clause "as may be provided by law". MR. DAVIDE: But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and Congress may provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground of national interest? MR. OPLE: Yes. I think so. Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately influence the climate of the conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle, which is inconsistent with this policy. 41 TIcAaH In my reading, while Mr. Davide was sure of the thrust of his question, Mr. Ople was equivocal about his answer. In fact, what he actually said was that his original intention was for the provision to be self-executing, but Mr. Regalado introduced an amendment. His retort to Mr. Davide's direct question was a cryptic one and far from the usual Ople reply that the right should immediately influence the climate of public affairs, and that Congress can no longer revoke it. Mr. Ople's thinking may perhaps be better understood if the exchanges in another deliberation on the issue of whether disclosure should extend to the negotiations leading to the consummation of a state transaction is considered. The following exchanges took place: MR. SUAREZ: And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself? MR. OPLE: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. SUAREZ: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction. MR. OPLE: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest. 42 Thus, even if Mr. Ople did indeed mean that the constitutional provisions on the right to information and the duty of disclosure may immediately be effective, these provisions have to recognize, other than those expressly provided by Congress, "reasonable safeguards on the national interest". In constitutional law, this can only refer to safeguards inherent from the nature of the state transaction, the state interests involved, and the power that the state may bring to bear, specifically, its police power. Viewed in this light, the duty to disclose the various aspects of the MOA-AD should not be as simplistic as the ponencia claims it to be as this subject again opens up issues this Court has only began to deal with in the Neri petition 43 and the JPEPA controversy. 44 Of course, this is not the time nor the case for a full examination of the constitutional right to information and the government's duty to disclose since the constitutionality of the MOA-AD is a dead issue. cdtai As my last point on a dead issue, I believe that the ponencia did not distinguish in its discussion between the disclosure of information with respect to the peace process in general and the MOA-AD negotiation in particular. I do not believe that these two matters can be interchanged and discussed from the prisms of information and disclosure as if they were one and the same. The peace process as embodied in E.O. No. 3 relates to the wider government effort to secure peace in Mindanao through various offices and initiatives under the Office of the President interacting with various public and private entities at different levels in Mindanao. The peace negotiation itself is only a part of the overall peace process with specifically named officials undertaking this activity. Thus, the consultations for this general peace process are necessarily wider than the consultations attendant to the negotiations proper that has been delegated to the GRP Negotiating Panel. The dynamics and depth of consultations and disclosure with respect to these processes should, of course, also be different considering their inherently varied natures. This confusion, I believe, renders the validity of the ponencia's discussions about the violation of the right to information and the government's duty of disclosure highly doubtful. Conclusion The foregoing reasons negate the existence of grave abuse of discretion that justifies the grant of a writ of prohibition. I therefore vote to DISMISS the consolidated petitions. REYES, R.T., J.: Nemo dat quod non habet. You cannot give what you do not have. Hindi mo maibibigay ang hindi sa iyo. CacTSI This maxim forcefully applies in these consolidated petitions and petitions-in- intervention for mandamus and prohibition which in the main seek the nullification of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) entered into between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP Panel) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The issues may be compressed as follows: (1) whether the petitions and petitions-in-intervention have become moot due to supervening events; and (2) whether the MOA-AD is constitutional. I.The petitions and petitions-in-intervention have become moot due to supervening events. However, they should be decided given the exceptional circumstances, following well known precedents.
During the August 29, 2008 oral arguments before the Court, the Solicitor General manifested that the MOA-AD will not be signed "in its present form or in any other form." 1The August 28, 2008 memorandum of the Executive Secretary also says that "the government will not sign" the MOA-AD. 2 Due to these statements, the petitions and petitions-in-intervention have clearly become moot. Be that as it may, the Court is not precluded from passing judgment on them. It is hornbook doctrine that courts will decide cases, otherwise moot, when (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved demand; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 3 Let me cite a few examples. In Javier v. Commission on Elections, 4 petitioner Evelio B. Javier was assassinated on February 11, 1986 before his petition to the Court could be decided. In his petition, Javier argued that the proclamation of his rival, Arturo F. Pacificador, was void because it was made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the1973 Constitution. The new Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of mootness in view of supervening events. The Court refused, saying: The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent both of whom have gone their separate ways could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in the quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint on the future. 5 (Emphasis supplied) In Salonga v. Cruz-Pao, 6 the Court had already deliberated on the case, a consensus on the judgment of the Court had been reached, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and if any. However, on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against petitioner. In accordance with the instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution reevaluated its evidence and decided the exclusion of petitioner as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution. aSTAHD However, this did not prevent the Court from deciding the merits of the petition. In doing so, the Court reasoned that "[t]he setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, ofintrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's function." It "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees." 7 Similarly, Dela Camara v. Enage, 8Gonzales v. Marcos, 9 and Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile 10 were decided under the same aegis. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 11 the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the consolidated petitions on the ground of mootness. It was argued that because the President had already lifted her declaration of state of national emergency, there was no longer an actual case or controversy. The Court was not convinced, saying that "[t]he "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case." 12 It then proceeded to declare unconstitutional major parts ofthe declaration of state of national emergency by the President. Just recently, in Manalo v. Calderon, 13 "[n]otwithstanding the mootness of the issues on restrictive custody and monitoring of movements of petitioners", the Court opted to resolve the petition for habeas corpus, due to "(a) the paramount public interest involved, (b) their susceptibility of recurring yet evading review, and (c) the imperative need to educate the police community on the matter." The petitions and petitions-in-intervention call for a similar or analogous treatment by the court, due to their transcendental importance and in the national interest. IcESaA II.The MOA-AD is unconstitutional. The GRP Panel went beyond their marching orders from the President. The March 1, 2001 Memorandum of Instructions from the President, 14 which prescribes the guidelines for the GRP Panel in negotiating with the MILF, partly states: 1.The negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with the Mandates of the Philippine Constitution, the Rule of Law, and the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 2.The negotiation process shall be pursued in line with the national Comprehensive Peace Process, and shall seek the principled and peace resolution of the armed conflict, with neither blame nor surrender, but with dignity for all concerned. 3.The objective of the GPNP is to attain a peace settlement that shall: a.Contribute to the resolution of the root cause of the armed conflict, and to societal reform, particularly in Southern Philippines; b.Help attain a lasting peace and comprehensive stability in Southern Philippines under a meaningful program of autonomy for Filipino Muslims, consistent with the Peace Agreement entered into by the GRP and the MNLF on 02 September 1996; and c.Contribute to reconciliation and reconstruction in Southern Philippines. 4.The general approach to the negotiations shall include the following: a.Seeking a middle ground between the aspirations of the MILF and the political, social and economic objectives of the Philippine Government; b.Coordinated Third Party facilitation, where needed; c.Consultation with affected communities and sectors. (Emphasis supplied) cISAHT In an apparent compliance with the Directive of the President, the MOA-AD mentions the following documents as terms of reference, to wit: 1.The Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities dated July 18, 1997 Between the GRP and the MILF, and its Implementing Administrative and Operational Guidelines; 2.The General Framework of Agreement of Intent Between the GRP and the MILF dated August 27, 1998; 3.The Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF dated March 24, 2001; 4.The Tripoli Agreement on Peace Between the GRP and the MILF dated June 22, 2001; 5.The Tripoli Agreement Between the GRP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) dated December 23, 1976 and the Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement Between the GRP and the MNLF dated September 2, 1996; 6.Republic Act No. 6734, as amended by R.A. 9054, otherwise known as "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)"; 7.ILO Convention No. 169, in correlation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and Republic Act No. 8371 otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, the UN Charter, the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and internationally recognized human rights instruments; and 8.Compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul- mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device. For the purpose of this Agreement, a "treaty" is defined as any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the Agreement. ADTCaI Curiously missing in the enumeration, however, is the Constitution. The omission could only mean that the parties intended the MOA-AD not to be bound by the fundamental law. The Constitution is supposed to be the one to conform to the MOA-AD, and not the other way around. 15 There can be no doubt as to the marching orders by the President. In negotiating with the MILF, the GRP Panel should use the Constitution as the parameter. Too, the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines should be maintained at all times. The GRP Panel, however, appears to have failed to follow those instructions. The commitment of the GRP Panel to the MILF to change the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Under the present constitutional scheme, the President is a mere bystander as far as the process of constitutional amendment or revision is concerned. The President is deprived of any participation because the Constitution 16 only allows three political agents, namely: (1) the Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; (2) a constitutional convention; 17 and (3) the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve (12) per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of its registered voters.
Thus, since the President is bereft of any power in effecting constitutional change, the GRP Panel, who acts under the imprimatur of the President, cannot commit to the MILF that the Constitution will be amended or revised in order to suit the MOA-AD. That would be a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum. No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly. Sinuman ay hindi pinapayagan na gawin nang di tuwiran ang ipinagbabawal na gawin nang tuwiran. DAcSIC The MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that appear unconstitutional. Respondents claim that the contents of the MOA-AD are mere concession points for further negotiations. The MILF, however, publicly announced that the MOA- AD is already a "done deal" and its signing a mere formality. 18 I find both claims of respondents and the MILF difficult to swallow. Neither position is acceptable. The GRP Panel has not presented any proof to buttress its point that, indeed, the parties intended the MOA-AD to be mere concession points for further negotiations. The MILF have not also shown proof to support its claim. In this regard, the MOA-AD should be interpreted according to its face value. Having said that, let me point out the defects of the MOA-AD. First. The MOA-AD creates a new political subdivision, the so-called Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). This is not permitted by the Constitution, which limits the political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines into provinces, cities, municipalities, barangays and autonomous regions. 19 Worse, the BJE also trenches on the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 20 This is so because pursuant to the MOA-AD: (1) The Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory is clearly demarcated; 21 (2) The BJE is given the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral lands. This includes both alienable and non-alienable lands encompassed within their homeland and ancestral territory, 22 specified "internal waters" 23 as well as "territorial waters"; 24 (3) The declared ultimate objective of entrenching the Bangsamoro homeland as a territorial space is "to secure their identity and posterity, to protect their property rights and resources as well as to establish a system of governance suitable and acceptable to them as a distinct dominant people. The Parties respect the freedom of choice of the indigenous peoples;" 25 and (4) The BJE is empowered "to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, inclusive of, civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, and police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, necessary for developing a progressive Bangsamoro society, . . . ." 26Otherwise stated, respondents agreed to create a BJE out of the national territory of the Republic, with a distinct and separate system of government from the Republic of the Philippines. 27 SEIcHa Notably, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, while recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination, does not give them the right to undermine the territorial integrity of a State. 28 Second. The creation of the BJE is prohibited even assuming that the MOA-AD only attempts to create the BJE as an autonomous region. Only Congress is empowered to create an autonomous region. 29 In fact, RA Nos. 6734 30 and 9054, 31 the laws creating and expanding the ARMM, have already been passed by Congress. As a result of these Organic Acts, the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi and the City of Marawi voted to comprise the ARMM territory under the control of the Regional Government of the ARMM. In the case ofthe MOA-AD, no implementing law is provided to implement its terms. What it purports to do, instead, is to provide for structures of government within the MOA-AD itself. It also obligates the GRP Panel to "conduct and deliver" a plebiscite "within twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD." 32 Third. The MOA-AD creates the Bangsamoro Homeland as an ancestral domain. However, there is non-compliance with the procedure laid down under RA No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). True, Article II, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution recognizes the rights of all indigenous peoples. 33 This, however, cannot be used in the MOA-AD as a blanket authority to claim, without sufficient proof, a territory spanning an entire geographical region, the entire Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. 34 Indeed, Chapter VIII of the IPRA provides for stringent requirements and strict process of delineation for recognition of ancestral domains, thus: SEC. 51.Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Domains. Self- delineation shall be the guiding principle in the identification and delineation of ancestral domains. As such, the ICCs/IPs concerned shall have a decisive role in all the activities pertinent thereto. The Sworn Statement of the Elders as to the scope of the territories and agreements/pacts made with neighboring ICCs/IPs, if any, will be essential to the determination of these traditional territories. The Government shall take the necessary steps to identify lands which the ICCs/IPs concerned traditionally occupy and guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession thereto. Measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the ICCs/IPs concerned to land which they may no longer be exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators. DAEICc SEC. 52.Delineation Process. The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures: EScAHT xxx xxx xxx (b)Petition for Delineation. The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or though a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs. (c)Delineation Proper. The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and participation by the members of the communities concerned. (d)Proof Required. Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents: 1)Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions; 2)Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution; 3)Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old villages; 4)Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs; 5)Survey plans and sketch maps; 6)Anthropological data; 7)Genealogical surveys; 8)Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds; HTcADC 9)Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and 10)Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community. (e)Preparation of Maps. On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein. (f)Report of Investigation and Other Documents. A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP. (g)Notice and Publication. A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen days (15) from dateof such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute; Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available. (h)Endorsement to NCIP. Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence; Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP. Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the Section below. aATESD
The MOA-AD is problematic when read in conjunction with the IPRA because it does not present any proof or specific reference that all the territories it enumerates accurately represent the "ancestral domains" of the Bangsamoro Homeland. The MOA-AD assumes that these territories are included in the Bangsamoro Homeland as ancestral domains, without proof or identification of native title or other claim of ownership to all the affected areas. Section 3 (g) of the IPRA 35 also requires that there be a "free and informed prior consent" by the indigenous peoples concerned to be exercised through consultations before any decision relating to their ancestral domain is made. This rule not only guarantees the right to information 36 of the people in these areas, but also the right of the indigenous peoples to "free and informed prior consent" as an element of due process. 37 Obviously, respondents did not conduct the required consultation before negotiating the terms ofthe MOA-AD. Otherwise, no petitions and petitions-in-intervention would have been filed in the first place. Fourth. Under the MOA-AD, the BJE is vested with jurisdiction, powers and authority over land use, development, utilization, disposition and exploitation of natural resources within the Bangsamoro Homeland. 38 In doing so, respondents in effect surrendered to the BJE ownership and gave it full control and supervision over the exploration, development, utilization over the natural resources which belong to the State. This is in clear contravention of the Regalian Doctrine now expressed under Article XII, Section 2 ofthe 1987 Constitution, thus: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production- sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. IAEcCT The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large- scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. ETDHSa The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. Fifth. The MOA-AD also grants to the BJE powers to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries. It compels the Republic of the Philippines to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and events, participation in Philippine official missions and delegations engaged in the negotiation of, among others, border agreements, sharing of incomes and revenues. 39 Thus, by assenting to install an intra sovereign political subdivision independent of the single sovereign state that is the Republic of the Philippines, respondents violated not only the Constitution, Article V, Section 2 of RA No. 6734, 40 but also the unitary system of government of the Republic of the Philippines. Sixth. Article 1, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides: The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. Without the benefit of any factual determination, the MOA-AD dismembers parts of Mindanao, turning it into a geographical dalmatian. It creates a Bangsamoro Homeland with a specified land mass, maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial dominions, (with definite internal 41 and territorial 42 waters), aerial domain, atmospheric space, 43 and even distinct "territorial waters" within the RP baselines. 44 Seventh. The MOA-AD grants to the BJE plenary power to undo executive acts and delegate to the BJE the authority to revoke existing proclamations, issuances, policies, rules and guidelines, forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements in the utilization of natural resources, mining concessions, land tenure instruments. 45 This constitutes an undue delegation of executive power. The President may delegate its executive power only to local government units or an administrative body attached to the executive department. 46 The delegation of power to the BJE, on the other hand, is delegation of executive power to an entirely different juridical entity that is not under its supervision or control. That is impermissible. Eighth. The MOA-AD empowers the BJE to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. This includes civil service, electoral, financial and banking institutions, education, legislation, legal, economic, police, internal security force, and judicial system. 47 This is anathema to several provisions of the Constitution, namely: (1) the authority of the Commission on Elections to administer all election laws in the Philippines; 48 (2) that there shall only be one police force, national in scope to be administered and controlled by the National Police Commission; 49 (3) that the defense of the Republic shall belong exclusively to the Armed Forces of the Philippines; 50 (4) that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such other inferior courts as may be established by law; 51 (5) that there shall only be one independent central monetary authority, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; 52 and (6) that there shall be one independent economic planning agency. 53 All told, respondents appear to have committed grave abuse abuse of discretion in negotiating and initialing the MOA-AD. Grave abuse of discretion has been traditionally understood as implying such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner. 54 The definition has been expanded because now, grave abuse of discretion exists when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. 55 DSAacC Negotiate within the Constitutional bounds During the American Civil War, the Union had to win the Confederates and bring them back to the fold. It was the bloodiest war the United States ever had. But what made the war most pathetic is that it was fought by countrymen, people who called themselves brothers. With the recent hostilities in the South, I hope the day will not come for a full-scale civil war in this land we all proudly call Home. It is our solemn duty to avert that war. The aborted MOA-AD is a setback to the government. But the setback is only temporary, not a permanent one. The path to peace is long. But it can be travelled. On one hand, the government should be commended in its effort to bring lasting peace to the South. On the other hand, it needs to be reminded that any negotiation it enters into, even in the name of peace, should be within the parameters of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petitions and petitions-in-intervention and to strike down the MOA-AD as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. ||| (Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, G.R. No. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, 183962, October 14, 2008)
Report of the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations on the Petition of the Honourable Thomas Walpole, Benjamin Franklin, John Sargent, and Samuel Wharton, Esquires, and their Associates
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