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INTRODUCTION

Federalism is commonly identified with the theory of federal government.
According to this interpretation, put forward particularly by the Anglo-
Saxon school, federalism is specific form of government, a constitutional
model, with an historically determined juridical structure. There is therefore
an American federalism, a Swiss federalism, a German federalism, an
Australian federalism and so on. The definition of federal government by
Where is - according to this interpretation - the most accurate: In a federal
system, the functions of government are divided in such a way that the
relationship between the legislature which has authority over the whole
territory and those legislatures which have authority over parts of the
territory is not the relationship of superior to subordinates ... but it is the
relationship of co-ordinate partners in the governmental process.

A different interpretation of federalism has been put forward by the
`personalist' movement, which stresses the relevance of a `federalist' way of
thinking and acting. `Personalist' or `integral' federalists, such as Robert
Aron, Arnaud Dandieu, Alexandre Marc, Emmanuel Mounier, Daniel Rops,
Denis de Rougemont, and Henry Brugmans, have developed a global
conception of society with a metahistoric character, starting from the thought
of Proudhon.

A constitutionally guaranteed sharing of power between levels of
government. Some powers of decision are granted to provincial (sub-
national) government, while others remain the sole concern of the national
government. The degree of independence for provincial governments (and
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conversely, the power of the national government) varies from country to
country. Citizens of a federal system remain subject to the authority of both
the central and the provincial governments, each of which acts directly on
the citizen.

Meaning & Definition

Federation : Federation is a "convention by which several petty states agree
to become members of a large one which they intend to establish."
According to Finder, "a Federal State is one in which part of the authority
and power is vested in the local areas while another part is vested in a central
institution deliberately constituted by an association of the local areas." In
the words of Dicey, "a federal State is a political contrivance intended to
reconcile national unity and power with the maintenance of 'state rights'.

The word federation is derived from the Latin word loedus' which means
treaty or agreement. A federation comes into existence when two or more
hitherto independent States agree to form a new State surrendering their
sovereignty to the latter, or when the administrative units in a unitary
government make the centre agree to bestow autonomy upon them. The
former of these processes is known as 'integration' and the latter as
'disintegration'. When some economically backward or militarily weak
States voluntarily agree to unite, they form a federal union. Such a union is
brought about through a treaty or an agreement. A new State is created, to
which all the mutually agreeing States surrender their sovereignty. The
United States is an example of such a type of federation.

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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERALISM

Federalism was carefully defined in the Constitution as a founding principle
of the U.S. political system. Even so, the nature of federalism is dynamic
and has been shaped through the years by laws, Supreme Court decisions,
and debates among prominent elected officials and statesmen.

Federalism As Provided In The Constitution

When the colonies declared their independence from Britain in 1776, they
reacted against the British unitary system in which all political and economic
power was concentrated in London. Although the British did not impose this
power consistently until after the French and Indian War ended in 1763, new
controls on the colonial governments during the 1760s became a major
source of friction that eventually led to war. During the American
Revolution, the states reacted to Britain's unitary system by creating the
Articles of Confederation that gave virtually all powers to the states. The
framers at the Constitutional Convention tried to balance the perceived
tyranny of the unitary system with the chaos created by the confederal
system by outlining a hybrid federal system in the Constitution. Federalism,
then, became a major building block for preserving freedoms while still
maintaining order in the new nation.


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Characteristics of Federalism

Federalism has the following characteristics of its own and these
characteristics distinguish it from Unitarianism.
1. In a federal state there are two sets of governments, one is called
federal or central government, the other is provincial or Unit
governments. The union of these two sets of governments makes what
is called federation. Each government is independent of the other in its
own jurisdiction. The central and unit governments are
constitutionally equal in status and position :non s superior to other.
2. In a federation governmental powers are essentially distributed by the
constitution between the Central government on the one hand and the
unit government on the other. The details of division vary in different
federations. But the principle followed in the division is that all
matters which are primarily of common interest and require
uniformity of regulation throughout the country such as foreign
affairs, defense, currency and coinage are placed under the central
government, and the rest is left to the Unit governments.
3. Federal system essentially implies the supremacy of constitution. A
federal state derives its existence from the constitution; powers of
both central and unit governments are delegated by the constitution.
Every power whether of central or Unit governments is subordinate
to, and controlled by, the constitution. For instance, in the united
states neither the president nor the Congress nor the governor of New
York nor its legislature can legally exercise a single power which is
inconsistent with the articles of the constitution. Every legislature
existing under a federal constitution is merely a subordinate law-
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making body, whose laws are valid while within authority conferred
on it by the constitution, invalid if they go beyond the limits of such
authority.
4. To maintain in practice the supremacy of the constitution every
federal state must have a supreme court. It interprets the constitution,
decides disputes between center and province or provinces, or
between different organs of government. It puts them in check, keeps
them within their constitutional limits.
5. The federal constitution being a complicated contract and the supreme
law of the land is essentially a written and rigid one.
6. In a federal state there exists some sort of double citizenship and
allegiance. This means that a citizen has to show allegiance both to
the provincial and federal governments,
7. The central legislature under federal system is generally found
bicameral on the age old ground that the lower house enshrines the
national idea and represents the nation as a whole and the upper house
is enshrine federal idea and to represent the units as such.

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FEDERALISM IN INDIA

Federation is the existence of dual polity. There are two governments in
existence- e.g. Government of Federation (in India Union Government) and
Government of Unit (in India- State Government). These two sets of
Government do not subordinate with each other. They cooperate with each
other and are independent to each other. Indian Constitution resembles a
federal constitution but in essence it is not a federal constitution. The unique
feature of Indian constitution is the presence of features which are necessary
for existence of a federation, at the same time there are provisions which
make the Union Government powerful vis-a-vis that of State governments.
Hence Indian constitution can be termed as "Quasi- federal" in nature and
Indian Union can be called as "Centralized Federation". Former Chief
Justice Beg, in State of Rajasthan v UOI, 1977 called the Constitution of
India as 'amphibian'. He said that "...if then our Constitution creates a
Central Government which is 'amphibian', in the sense that it can move
either on the federal or on the unitary plane, according to the needs of the
situation and circumstances of a case...". Likewise in S.R. Bommai v Union
of India, the phrase "pragmatic federalism" was used. In the words of Justice
Ahmadi, "....It would thus seem that the Indian Constitution has, in it, not
only features of a pragmatic federalism which, while distributing legislative
powers and indicating the spheres of governmental powers of State and
Central Governments, is overlaid by strong unitary features..."

India has a constitutional and political system which has some federal
features. The Constitution provides the Central government with
overarching powers and concentrates administrative and financial powers in
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its hands. At the same time, there is sharing of powers and resources
between the Central government and the states in a limited fashion. The
experience of partition at the time of independence conditioned the
Constitution makers to build in various features in the Constitution which
worked against the federal principle.

The Centre has the power to reorganise the states through Parliament;
Governors appointed by the Centre can withhold assent to legislation passed
by the state legislature; Parliament can override legislation passed by the
states in the national interests; the Governor can play a role in the formation
of state governments and the Centre is vested with the power to dismiss the
state governments under Article 356; residuary powers are vested with the
Centre and the major taxation powers lie with the Central authority.
Alongside these unitary features, there is a division of subjects between the
Centre and states and a concurrent list. Judicial review of Centre-state
relations exist as in a federal system. On the balance, the Indian political
system has federal features which are circumscribed with a built-in unitary
core.


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The History of federalism in India

The history of federalism and Centre-state relations in India is marked by
political mobilisation and intermittent struggle to fashion a more federal set-
up. Even though such efforts have not yet resulted in any major
constitutional changes towards a more federal orientation, the struggle has
not been entirely fruitless. It will be useful to trace the tortuous course of the
movement for federalism. In the first phase lasting till the late sixties, the
task of nation building and development was the main concern of Indias
rulers. There were separatist problems in Jammu & Kashmir and Nagaland
in the North-East but these were seen more as challenges to national unity
and issues of national security. The drive towards centralisation which
began in this period also coincided with the period of Congress dominance
both the Centre and in the states.

But this period was not solely dominated by the trend of centralisation. One
of the major democratic movements in the post-independence period -- the
movement for the formation of the linguistic states -- took place in the fifties
which resulted in the formation of the linguistic states in 1956. The ruling
Congress and the Central government resisted this demand and gave in, in
the face of strong popular movements. This laid the basis for the later
assertion by the states for greater powers. The second phase began with the
1967 general elections. The Congress party, for the first time lost in nine
states and non-Congress state governments came into being, including the
Left-oriented United Front governments in West Bengal and Kerala. The
demand for restructuring of Centre-state relations picked up momentum.
The political response of the ruling party at the Centre under Mrs. Gandhis
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leadership was to maneouvre to regain the lost political ground and pursue
policies designed to centralise more powers at the Centre both political and
economic.

The seventies and eighties, therefore, saw a tussle between the Congress on
the one hand and the regional and Left parties on the other for greater
powers to the states. Beginning with the Rajmannar Committee set-up by
the DMK government in 1969 to the memorandum on Centre-state relations
by the Left Front government of West Bengal in 1977 to the opposition
conclave on Centre-state relations in Srinagar in 1983 the framework for
the restructuring of Centre-state relations and a more federal political system
was prepared. The Central government responded by appointing the
Sarkaria Commission on Centre-state relations in 1983.

The drive for centralisation sought to undo the prospects of democratic
decentralisation effected by the formation of the linguistic states in 1956.
Resistance to decentralisation and more powers to states had its class
dimension. The Indian big bourgeoisie was hostile to any dilution of the
unitary character of the state. Their quest for a homogenous market led
them to condemn the demand for linguistic states as heralding the
balkanisation of India.

The political onslaught on federalism found expression in the repeated use
of Article 356 by the Central government to dismiss state governments, most
of whom were run by parties who were in the opposition. The Governor, in
the garb of the Constitutional post, became an agent for the Centre.
Progressive legislation passed by the states such as those concerning land
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reforms by the West Bengal assembly were not given assent for years on
end. The division of financial resources between the Centre and the states,
instead of a Constitutional right, became a method to keep the states in a
supplicant and subordinate position. The Centre sought to transfer subjects
from the states list into the concurrent list whenever an opportunity
presented itself. Some of these actions reached their zenith during the
internal emergency when the 42
nd
Constitutional amendment was enacted.

The rigidity of the Constitutional political system with the Centre playing a
dominant and monopolistic role met with resistance. The rise of regional
parties, the DMK and the Akali Dal, were the earliest formations and the
subsequent proliferation of other regional parties had both an economic class
content and a cultural expression. The major linguistic-nationality groups
in India of which the most developed were the non-Hindi groups were
the first to throw up the regional parties. These regional parties expressed
the class interests of the rising bourgeois-landlord classes of that linguistic
group and they also tapped into the linguistic-cultural aspirations. In the
eighties, the rise of the Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh symbolised
this development.

The political contestation between the forces of centralisation and
federalism did not result in a clear-cut victory for either side. While there
has not been substantial changes in the unitary features of the Constitution
and the financial system, the political parties system has evolved on federal
lines. The end of Congress one-party dominance by the late eighties created
an atmosphere to check rampant centralisation.

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For the first time, in 1989, a National Front coalition government headed by
V.P. Singh, which had major regional parties like the TDP, DMK and AGP,
took office at the Centre. Though short-lived, this government took certain
steps to strengthen the federal principle. The Inter-state Council was
constituted in 1990. The provision in the Constitution to set-up such a
council was not exercised by the Centre earlier. The entry of the regional
parties in coalition governments at the Centre became a regular feature in
1996 with the formation of the United Front government and in all
subsequent ones -- the 1998 and 1999 coalitions headed by the BJP and the
current United Progressive Alliance headed by the Congress coalition. Both
the National Front government of 1989 and the United Front governments of
1996-1998 were supported by the Left parties who are strong supporters of
the federal principle.

The participation of the regional parties in the Central coalition governments
has led to checks on the centralisation trend initiated by the Central
government. The political give and take within a coalition precludes the
possibility of a roughshod approach to states. Even the BJP which has no
sympathy for federal values proved adept at responding to the concerns of
the regional parties.

One of the obnoxious anti-federal features was the use of Article 356 by the
ruling party at the Centre. Halting the arbitrary use of this clause by
demanding its removal or modification has been the priority for all the
forces advocating a more equitable Centre-state relations. The Supreme
Court, by the Bommai judgement of 1994, made a significant contribution
towards restraining the Central government from misusing these powers.
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The Court decreed that the exercise of the powers have been arbitrary and
militates against the federal principle. It provided for safeguards by
stipulating that a decision to dissolve the State legislature cannot be
implemented till both the Houses of Parliament approved the presidential
proclamation. Till then the dissolution should be kept in suspended
animation. The judgement also requires the President to set out the reasons
and the material on which basis the proclamation of Presidents rule is made.
The Court made this subject to judicial review. The judgement was
informed by the Constitutional perspective that federalism and democracy
are interconnected and one cannot be violated without harming the other.

Features of Indian federalism
Two sets of government: India has two sets of government - the Central or
Union government and the State government. The Central government
works for the whole country and the State governments look after the States.
The areas of activity of both the governments are different.
Division of Powers: The Constitution of India has divided powers
between the Central government and the state governments. The
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution contains three lists of subjects
which show how division of power is made between the two sets of
government. Both the governments have their separate powers and
responsibilities.
Written Constitution: The Constitution of India is written. Every
provision of the Constitution is clearly written down and has been
discussed in detail. It is regarded as one of the longest constitutions of
the world which has 395 Articles 22 Parts and 12 Schedules.
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Supremacy of the Constitution: The Constitution is regarded as the
supreme law of the land. No law can be made which will go against
the authority of the Constitution. The Constitution is above all and all
citizens and organizations within the territory of India must be loyal to
the Constitution.
Supreme judiciary: The Supreme Court of India is the highest court
of justice in India. It has been given the responsibility of interpreting
the provisions of the Constitution. It is regarded as the guardian of the
Constitution.
Bi-cameral legislation : In India, the legislature is bi-cameral. The
Indian Parliament, i.e., the legislature has two houses - the Lok Sabha
and the Rajya Sabha. The Rajya is the upper house of the Parliament
representing the States while the Lok Sabha is the lower house
representing the people in general.
These are some of the features of a federal form of government and the
Indian Constitution has included them in it. The Constitution has also
included some unitary or non-federal features which are discussed as below:

Unitary or Non-Federal Features

Division of power is not equal : In a federation, power are divided equally
between the two governments. But in India, the Central government has
been given has been given more powers and made stronger than the State
governments.
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Constitution is not strictly rigid : The Constitution of India can be
amended by the Indian Parliament very easily. On many subjects, the
Parliament does not need the approval of the State legislatures to
amend the Constitution. But in a true federation, both the Union and
the State legislatures take part in the amendment of the Constitution
with respect to all matters. Therefore, those constitutions are rigid and
difficult to amend.
Single Constitution: In India, we have only one Constitution. It is
applicable to both the Union as a whole and the Stares. There are no
separate constitutions for the States. In a true federation, there are
separate constitutions for the union and the States.
Centres control over States: The Centre exercises control over the
States. The States have to respect the laws made by the central
government and can not make any law on matters on which there is
already a central law. The centre can also give directions to the States
which they must carry out.
Rajya Sabha does not represent the States equality: In a true
federation, the upper house of the legislature has equal representation
from the constituting units or the States. But in our Rajya Sabha, the
States do not have equal representation. The populous States have
more representatives in the Rajya Sabha than the less populous States.
The upper house of the Indian Parliament, that is, the Rajya Sabha is
not properly representative of all the States of Indian union.
Existence of States depends on the Centre: In India, the existence of
a State or a federating unit depends upon the authority of the Centre.
The boundary of a State can be changed by created out of the existing
States.
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Single citizenship: In a true federal state, citizens are given dual
citizenship. First, they are the citizens of their respective provinces or
States and then they are the citizens of the federation. In India
however, the citizens enjoy single citizenship, i.e., Indian citizenship
or citizenship of the country as a whole.
Unified judiciary: India has a unified or integrated judicial system.
The High Courts which work in the States are under the Supreme
Court of India. The Supreme Court is the highest court of justice in
the country and all other subordinate courts are under it.
Proclamation of emergency: The Constitution of India has given
emergency powers to the President. He can declare emergency in the
country under three conditions. When emergency is declared, the
Union or Central governments become all powerful and the State
governments come under the total control of it. The State
governments lose their autonomy. This is against the principles of a
federation.

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RELATION BETWEEN STATES AND UNION

Generally, three models are followed in the matter of division of powers in a
federation. In the first model, the powers of the Centre are defined and the
residuary powers are left to the States. This model is found in America. In
the second module, the powers of the federating units or States are defined
and the residuary powers are given to the centre. Canada follows this model.
And in the third model, the powers of both the governments are clearly laid
down. Australia has this model of federation. In India, we follow the
combination of both the Canadian and the Australian models.

The Constitution of India divides powers between the Union and the State
governments. The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution includes three lists
of subjects - the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List. The
Central or Union Government has exclusive power to make laws on the
subjects which are mentioned in the Union List. The States have the power
to make law on the subjects which are included in the Concurrent List. With
regard to the Concurrent List, both the Central and State governments can
make laws on the subjects mentioned in the Concurrent List. Finally, the
subjects which are not mentioned in the above three lists are called residuary
powers and the Union government can make laws on them.

It may be noted here that in making laws on the subjects of the Concurrent
list, the Central government has more authority than the State governments.
And on the subjects of the State List also the Central government has
indirect control. All this shows that though the Indian Constitution has
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clearly divided powers between the two governments, yet the Central
government has been made stronger than the State governments.

We can discuss the division of powers between the two governments in
India under three headings, such as, legislative relations, administrative
relations and financial relations with reference to the three lists.

Legislative Relations

So far as the legislative relations between the Central government and the
State governments is concerned, the Central government has been given
exclusive power to make law on the subjects of the Union list. The union list
has 96 subjects. These subjects are of great importance for the country and
uniform in character. So, these subjects are given to the Union government.
Some such subjects are defence, foreign affairs, currency and coinage,
citizenship, census, etc.

The State governments can make laws on the subjects mentioned in the State
list. The State list has 61 subjects. The subjects which are of local
importance and may vary from State to State are included in the State list.
Some subjects of the State list are - law and order, public health, forests,
revenue, sanitation, etc. Though the State governments have power to make
laws on the subjects of the State list, yet the Central government, on certain
occasions, can also make laws on these subjects. For example, during the
period of emergency, the Parliament makes laws on State subjects.

The Concurrent list has 52 subjects. On these subjects both the central and
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the state governments can make laws. The subjects which are of great
importance and uniform in character but man require local variations, are
included in the Concurrent list. In respect of Concurrent list also, though
both the governments can make laws on the subjects included in the list, yet
the laws made by the Central government will prevail over the State laws in
case of a conflict between the two. Some subjects of this list are economic
planning, social security, electricity, education, printing and news papers,
etc. In case of residuary powers, the Union government has exclusive power
to make laws. The States have nothing to do in this regard.

Thus, we find that in legislative matters, the Union Parliament is very
powerful. It has not only exclusive contral over the Union list and the
residuary powers, but it has also dominance over the Concurrent list and the
State list.

Administrative Relations

As in legislative maters, in administrative matters also, the Central
government has been made more powerful than the States. The Constitution
has made it clear that the State governments cannot go against the Central
government in administrative matters. The State governments have to work
under the supervision and control of the Central government. The States
should exercise its executive powers in accordance with the laws made by
the Parliament. The Central government can make laws for maintaining
good relations between the Centre and the States. It can control the State
governments by directing them to take necessary steps for proper running of
administration. If the State fails to work properly or according to the
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Constitution, it can impose Presidents rule there under Article 356 and take
over its (the States) administration. Again, there are some officials of the
Central government, working in the States, through which it can have
control over the State governments.

Financial Relations
To run the administration properly, both the Central and the State
governments need adequate sources of income. The income of the
government comes mainly from various taxes imposed by it. In financial
relations between the two governments, we will discuss how the sources of
income are adjusted between the to governments.

There are certain taxes like land revenue, tax on agricultural income, estate
duty, etc., which are levied and collected by the States. They are the sources
of State revenue. Some taxes are there like stamp duty, excise on medicine,
toilet preparations, etc. which are levied by the Union but collected and
appropriated by the States. There are some other taxes also which are the
sources of income of the Union government alone. They are revenue earned
from railways, posts and telegraphs, wireless, broadcasting, etc.

In financial matters also, the central government is more powerful than the
States. The President of India has the power to make alterations in the
distribution of revenues earned from income-tax between the centre and the
States. The Centre has also the power to great loans and great-in-aid to the
State governments. The Comptroller and Auditor General India and the
Finance Commission of India which are the central agencies also have
control over the State finances.
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Efforts For The Improvement Of Centre-State Relations
It should be noted that since independence till 1967, the Union government
exercised increasing powers over the States because of the rule of a single
party (Congress) over both the Centre and the States. The party discipline
and the role of national political leaders oversha-dowed the issue of State
autonomy. In 1967, non-Congress governments were formed in many States
which raised the issue of State autonomy and demanded more powers and
financial resources to the States. Inspite of opposition from the States, the
Union governments have been using various provisions of the Constitution
to increase their power and control over States. Some of the important
mechanisms of the Union government are given belowl
1. The Constitutional Amendments. more important are third, sixth,
seventh, forty.-second and fifty - ninth Constitutional amend-ments.
2. By invoking emergency provi-sions.
3. By imposing President's rule in the States. For example, the Pre-
sident's rule was imposed in Punjab for 2100 days from June 1951 to
April 1988.
4. By the appointment and func-tioning of the office of the Gov-ernor.
The Governors have created troubles for the State governments at the
behest of the ruling party at the Centre
5. By the arrangement of All India Services.
6. By the appointment and transfer of Judges of High Court/ Supreme
Court.
7. By exploiting the dependency of the States on the Union govern-ment.
8. By a centralised Election Machi-nery
9. By the control of the means of communications such as Radio and
Television.
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Federalism and Inequality in India
The empowerment of Indias sub-national political actors rolls on with the
news that the Samajwadi Party are set to triumph in the elections of Uttar
Pradesh, a huge state in North-East India with a population of over 200
million people. Widely reported as being a state-of-the-nation litmus test for
public opinion towards the ruling coalition headed by the Congress Party,
the results indicate the continuation of emergent trends and, potentially, the
increased opposition to entrenched problems, within Indias politics.
Congress currently look likely to finish fourth in the polls, despite vigorous
campaigning from party darling Rahul Gandhi, whilst the incumbent
Mayawati, of the Dalit-oriented Bahujan Samaj Party, has failed to hold onto
control.
Post-Cold War transformation in India has seen a shift, in economic,
political, and social affairs, away from a heavily centralised model to a new,
equally choatic but more dispersed structure. This is not to say that the
monolithic Indian state of old no longer exists, but as economic policy has
empowered states to develop their own models, so political power has
drifted away from the centre, with concurrent impacts on social
mobilisation. Victory of the Samajwadi Party further institutionalises the
new reality of weakened national parties, coalition government, and the
empowerment of state-level actors and authority.
This is a process that has been ongoing for decades but the elections in Uttar
Pradesh (UP) bring three key areas into focus: the division of the electoral
dividend created by anti-corruption campaigning and sentiment, the
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enduring validity of dynastic political control, and the aforementioned
impact of a redefined federalism. There is, of course, a fourth meta-point
that never disappears: the role of caste politics.
Whilst the high profile leader of last year's protests against governmental
corruption, Anna Hazare, has largely disappeared from the political scene,
the discontent on which he capitalised, and the lack of resolution to the
problems he broadly addressed, remains. Corruption is no stranger to Indian
politics but there is certainly an increasing dismay at the extent to which it
appears endemic and immovable. At a time when the political paralysis
caused by clientalism and rent-seeking behaviour poses grave danger for the
rising India vision that middle classes have bought into, the spluttering of
the growth engine exacerbates outrage at an increasingly dishevelled
establishment. With GDP forecasts reduced, and inflation rising, the ruling
United Progressive Alliance coalition headed by Congress needed to
dynamically demonstrate that it is in touch with an India in flux. Despite
this, in entrusting reinvigoration to the latest product of the Nehru-Gandhi
dynasty, Congress may have compounded its own crisis.
Rahul Gandhi is the latest in a long-line of politicians drawn from the
bloodline of Jawaharlal Nehru, Indias central founding father and first
Prime Minister. At 41 he is General-Secretary of the Congress Party and,
following in the footsteps of other prominent family members such as
former Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, and current Congress
President Sonia Gandhi (widow of Rajiv), Rahul is the most high profile
face of a new generation of politicians within a party whose current leader,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, is 79. During the UP elections he
campaigned vigorously, making over 200 appearances on the stump to
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promote his partys message. Whilst honestly accepting responsibility for
the defeat is commendable, the reality of failure may indicate a wider loss of
legitimacy relating to one of the bones of contention highlighted by
Ramachandra Guha recently as emblamatic of stagnation within Indias
democracy the stifling of credible politicians at the hands of dynastic
elites.
With all this in mind, the reinvigoration of representative democracy within
India is likely to come from the local level (though obviously local is a bit
relative when UP is the size of Brazil). Mayawati, incumbent Chief Minister
since 2007, is a much-debated example of this possible trend. Rising to
power on the back of an electoral base in the Dalit (untouchable)
community, Mayawati has faced criticism for a huge rise in her personal
wealth since assuming office and also for constructing prominent statues of
herself and other members of the Bahujan Samaj Party throughout the state.
This fuzziness over corruption, while possibly not the central factor in her
failure to retain office, is certainly a weakness and may have played into the
Samajwadi Partys successful campaigning within Other Backward Caste
communities left out of the alleged patrimonial spoils.
The great success of India as a democracy has been the endurance of
pluralism amidst stupendous diversity. Devolution of political power is a
logical extension of this, even more so half a century out from independence
as the contemporaries of Gandhi and Nehru depart the scene. Nonetheless
the central institutions of the Indian state are essential, and they surely
demand strong mass parties capable of leading coalitions and responding
proactively to the needs of the majority of Indians who are yet to reap the
tangible benefits of recent resurgence. There is, arguably, an increasing
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sense that simply trotting out the latest Nehruvian prince, however gifted, is
not sufficient to placate the demands of a majority who are hungry for their
piece of the much-heralded bigtime.
As regards Indias role in the world, the management of inequality is
completely central. Where India presents itself as the worlds largest free
market democracy it is hindered by enduring mass poverty, especially in a
political system where the voting poor cannot be sidelined. Equally, linked
to the Nehruvian foreign policy angle that presented India as a representative
of the global poor seeking to construct an equitable global order away from
post-colonial power politics, an argument that presents India as a potential
global swing state is undercut by attempting to speak morally
internationally without having solved the same problems domestically. India
is, very obviously, not China. Nor is it Russia. Defining its worldwide
identity as a democratic force for the global good means ensuring the
economic success story continues to lift people out of poverty. It means, in
short, backing up some old-school great power rhetoric with some
iconoclastic great power responsibility. That example, successfully
achieved, would be phenomenal.
It is not a gigantic step for an electorate appalled by public corruption to
zero in upon issues relating to wider economic inequality. The UK itself is
an example of this, where public outrage towards MPs expenses and cash for
questions has drawn a line whose precedent is undermined by turning a blind
eye to bank bailouts, big business tax avoidance, and the simultaneous
imposition of austerity policies. The solidification of such a position within
India could coalesce around a series of sub-national groups, linked to caste
status, that may force not only significant reform upon central parties such as
25

Congress or the Bharatiya Janata Party, but also challenge the accelerated
model of federalised liberalisation that has empowered and caught the
imagination of the new Indian middle classes. This faultline, between the
passengers and the baggage in the Indian transformation, will represent the
pivotal issue around which continued reform turns and Indias new global
role is defined.


26

THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF SARKARIA COMMISSION
:UNION-STATE RELATIONS:
For a review of whole gamut Centre-State relations, the Union Government
appointed the Sarkaria Commission in 1983. Justice R.S. Sarkaria (Retd.)
was made the Chairman and Mr. B Sivaraman, the Cabinet Secretary, Mr.
S.R. Sen, a former Executive Director of IBRD and Rama Subramaniam
(Member Secretary) were nominated as other members. The Sarkaria
Commission was to examine and review the working of the existing
arrangements between the Union and States in regard to powers, functions
and responsibility in all spheres and recommend such changes or other
measures as may be appropriate. Report of Sarkaria Commission. The
Sarkaria Commission thereafter examined the whole gamut of Centre-State
relations and prepared a report and submitted it to the Union Government in
October 1987. Some of the main recommendations of the Commission have
been as under :

1. Strong Centre should continue. The Sarkaria Commission has
favoured the retention of a Strong Centre. It has firmly rejected the
demand for the curtailment of the powers of the Centre in the interest
of national unity and integrity. "We absolutely need to have a strong
Centre and there is no doubt about it. Without that everything will
wither away." The Commission did not favour fundamental changes
in the provisions of the Constitution and asserted that the Constitution
had worked reasonably well and withstood the stresses and strains of
the heterogeneous society in the throes of change. However,
alongwith it, the report accepted the importance of preventing undue
centralism.
27

2. Rejection of demand for the Transfer of some subjects of the State
List to the Concurrent List. The Commission rejected the demand for
the transfer of certain State subjects to the Concurrent List. On the
other hand, it held that the Centre should consult the States on
concurrent subjects. The Commission also did not favour restrictions
on the powers of the Centre to deploy armed forces in the States, even
though it favoured consultations with the concerned State goverments
before these forces were actually deployed in the States.
3. Support for Cooperative Federalism. The Report favoured greater
cooperation between the Centre and the States. It wanted an end of
confrontation which had been a feature of Centre-State relations in
India for the last few years.
4. Recommendation regarding the Office of Governor. The Report
rejected the demand for the abolition of the office of the Governor. It
also rejected the suggestion regarding selection of Governors out of a
panel of names given by the States. It suggested that active politicians
should not be appointed as Governors. When a State and the Centre
were ruled by different parties, the Governor should not belong to the
ruling party at the Centre. Further, the Governor on retirement should
not be permitted to hold any office of profit.
5. Recommendation regarding the issue of Appointment of Chief
Minister. The report suggested that the leader of the majority party in
the legislature should be appointed as the Chief Minister. If no single
party enjoyed a clear-cut majority in the State Legislature, the person
who was likely to command a majority in the Assembly be appointed
Chief Minister by the Governor. In such a case, it should be obligatory
28

for the Chief Minster to seek a majority vote in the Assembly within
30 days.
6. Recommendation regarding summoning of the Sessions of the State
Legislature. Generally, the Governor should convene the session of
State Assembly only on the recommendations of the State Ministry,
but under certain circumstances he should have the right to use his
discretion in the matter oi summoning the session of the State
Legislature.
7. Changes in Financial Scheme. The Report did not agree with the
demand for major changes in the scheme of distribution of financial
resources as provided by the Constitution. However, it favoured
necessary modifications in the matter of sharing of corporate tax as
well as tax on advertisement and broadcasting.
8. Recommendation regarding Article 356. The Report turned down the
demand for doing away with Article 356 of the Constitution under
which President Rule could impose on a State on the grounds of
failure of constitutional government in the State. However, for
preventing its misuse by the Centre, the Report favoured that (i) it
should be sparingly used ; (ii) the reasons for the imposition of.
presidential rule in the State should be clearly stipulated in the
proclamation of emergency ; (iii) the State Legislative Assembly
should not be dissolved unless the proclamation has been approved by
the Parliament; and (iv) all possibilities of forming an alternative
government should be fully exhausted before imposing Emergency
under Artcle 356.
9. Three-language Formula favoured. The Report favoured the
implementation of the Three-language formula throughout the
29

country. It stressed special steps for activating the Linguistic
Minorities Commission.
10. Retention of All India Services. The Report rejected the demand for
the disbanding of All-India Services on the ground that it would
greatly undermine the unity and integrity of the country.
11. Autonomy of Mass Media. The Report favoured relaxation of
Central control over Radio and T.V. and wanted greater
decentralisation of authority in matters of their day-to-day operation.
It wanted the Radio and T.V. to strive for harmonious adjustments
between imperatives of national interest and aspirations of States. It
favoured use of simple Hindustani for broadcasts and use of common
words from other regional languages for evolving a uniform
vocabulary.
12. Miscellaneous Recommendations. The Report suggested several other
measures : (i) The Report recommended that judges should be
transferred only with their consent. (10 No Commission of Enquiry
against any Chief Minister of a State or a former minister of a State
Government should be appointed unless both the Houses of Union
Parliament make such a demand. (iii) No Inquiry Commission should
be appointed for holding an inquiry into the conduct of a Minister of
State in office, ur,less the proposal was approved by the Inter-
governmental Council. These have been the salient features of the
Report submitted by the Sarkaria Commission to the Union
Government. The Government of India has not yet taken any action
on the report. The non-Congress leaders, however, rejected this report
in the New Delhi meeting held in January 1988. The Regional parties
have also not accepted the recommendations made by this Report as it
30

fails to meet their demand for State Autonomy. Now the constitution
review commission has been examining the issue of the relations
between the union and states for suggesting certain desireable and
possible amendments designed for making these relations more
conducive for a healthier socio-economic development of the country
as a whole as well as for overcoming regional imbalances and
persisting under-development in several areas of the country. In this
era of Coalition Politics, in which regional parties and some state
parties have come to be power holders in the union government, it is
essential to check the new tendency towards regionalisation of
national decisions. There is every need to develop centre-state
relations in a cooperative-competitive mode. Neither the Union should
act as a commanding big brother dictating orders/policies to the states
nor tolerate the attempts of the states/regional parties at
regionalisation of national decisions.


31

CONCLUSION

The Constitution of India has described India as a Union of States and not
a federation. Dr. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the
Indian Constitution, while explaining the meaning of the phrase, said that
though India was to be a federation, it was not the result of an agreement by
the States to join a federation which is why no state had the right to secede
from it. The federation is a union, because it is indestructible. He again said
that the States are sovereign in the field which is left to them by the
Constitution as the centre is in the field which is assigned to it.
So, though the Constitution makers made the Central government stronger
than the State governments, yet they wanted a cooperative federation. They
wished that States would perform their functions in their allotted spheres
freely and both the governments would co-operate rather than confront each
other.

But the real working of the Constitution in all these years shows that the
Centre has grown stronger day by day and that the States have become just
like administrative units of the Centre. They have not been able to work
freely and independently. The Centre has been changing the boundary of the
existing States from time to time in which the consent of the concerned
States was not regarded as necessary. Again, the Centre has also been using
Article 356 to have control over the States mostly in a discriminating way.
The role of the Planning Commission has also been contributing to the
strength of the Central government in financial matters. The Planning
Commission exercises control over the working of the State governments
and thus reduced the position of the States to the units of local
32

administration in a unitary system of government.But the States are always
resenting the stronger position of the centre and demanding autonomy so
that they can work independently in their own matters. The Rajamanner
committee, the West Bengal Government Memorandum on Union-State
Relations, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and the J & K Assembly
Autonomy Resolution have all given a call for the grant of more powers to
the States. The Sarkaria Commission, in its report while accepting the need
for a strong Centre also favoured the devolution of more powers to the States
in some areas. The demand for State autonomy has become stronger with the
emergence of the regional political parties in different States and with their
growing influence in national politics.

In recent years, we have seen an important development in the working of
Indian federalism. No single national political party has been able to secure
absolute majority in the Parliament to form the government independently.
Various regional and local political parties have been emerging and playing
crucial role in the formation of coalition governments at the Centre. This
development to some extent has changed the face of Indian federalism.

However, India has been continuing with a strong Central government. But,
it is hoped that Coalition politics will enable Indian federalism to bring
about some positive changes in the Center-State relations, particularly, in the
use of Article 356 by the Central government, role of the Governor in a State
and the distribution of financial powers between the two governments. These
are some of the issues which have been constraining Centre-State relations
from the very beginning.