Atty. Jerome J.

Jarales
Cagayan de Oro City
CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Q. The acknowledgment of the will made mention of 7 pages including the page on which
the ratification and acknowledgment are written. The will, however, had actually 8 pages
including the acknowledgment portion thus, necessitating the presentation of evidence
aliunde to explain the discrepancy. The court disallowed probate of the will for failure to
comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause
of the number of pages used upon which the will is written. Was the disallowance correct?
Yes. The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which
the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission
of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation
clause, the statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it
"consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written"
cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but
through the presentation of evidence alliunde.
On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of Article 809,
to wit:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by
an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether
the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or
the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even
omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total
number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each
other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against
perjury in the probate proceedings.
[Lopez v. Lopez, G.R. No. 189984, November 12, 2012]

Q. Petitioners allege that upon their fathers death, late Judge Romero, on 18 October 1974,
their mother, respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who held several
real and personal properties in trust for her children. Since that year until the present, she
continues to be the administrator of the properties, businesses, and investments comprising
the estate of her late husband. Despite pendency of the settlement proceedings for the estate
of the decedent, the heirs instituted a separate civil action for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of title against their brother and their mother. Is the separate action allowable?
No. It is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a
deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this
matter should be threshed out in a separate action. Although the Rules of Court do not specifically
state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special
proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in
its capacity as a probate court.
Indeed, implicit in the requirement for judicial approval of sales of property under
administration is the recognition that the probate court has the power to rescind or nullify the
disposition of a property under administration that was effected without its authority. That
petitioners have the prerogative of choosing where to file their action for nullification whether with
the probate court or the regular court is erroneous.
The authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with limited jurisdiction, as a probate
court over the estate of deceased individual, is not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once
invoked, and made effective, cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with
impunity by the very parties invoking its authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final
adjudication; to determine who are the heirs of the decedent; the recognition of a natural child; the
status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an
heir by the testator; and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights.
// Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if
the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.

2

Q. Petitioners contend that even if the probate court has the power to rule on their
complaint, the submission of the issues in this case to the probate court is merely
optional, and not mandatory upon them. Hence, they argue, they still have the right to
bring these issues in a separate civil action, if they so choose. They argue further that
Section 3, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable to the present case.
Decide.
The provision states that:
Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. When an executor or administrator is
appointed and assumes the trust, no action to recover the title or possession of lands or for
damages done to such lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is an
order of the court assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time allowed for paying
debts has expired.
Petitioners invoke the doctrine that while heirs have no standing in court to sue for the
recovery of property of the estate represented by an administrator, these heirs may maintain such
action if the administrator is unwilling to bring the suit, or has allegedly participated in the act
complained of.
Petitioners theory must fail. There is nothing on the record that would prove that Aurora
defied the orders of the probate court or entered into sale agreements in violation of her trust. In
fact, petitioners are really accusing a co-heir, their brother Vittorio, of having acquired certain
properties which they allege to be properties of their parents.
Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate, Aurora Romeros
acts as the administrator of the estate are subject to the sole jurisdiction of the probate court.
Petitioners do not pose issues pertaining to title or ownership. They are, in effect,
questioning the validity of the sales made by the administrator, an issue that can only be properly
threshed out by the probate court.
The validity of the sales made by Aurora can only be determined by the probate court,
because it is the probate court which is empowered to identify the nature of the property, and that
has jurisdiction over Auroras actions and dispositions as administrator.
[Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012]

Q. Eleuterio filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City covering the estate of Rosita, who allegedly died without a will and
with no direct ascendants or descendants. The RTC issued letters of administration
appointing Eleuterio as Rositas estate administrator. Subsequently, Eleuterio filed in his
capacity as administrator a motion with the court to compel the examination and production
of documents relating to properties believed to be a part of Rositas estate, foremost of
which was the Sta. Teresita General Hospital that respondent Robert Ramirez had been
managing. The RTC granted the administrators motion and ordered Robert to bring to court
the books of account, financial statements, and other documents relating to the operations of
the Sta. Teresita General Hospital. Robert moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that
the documents belonged to the hospital, which had a distinct personality; that the hospital
did not form part of Rositas estate; and that Eleuterio, as administrator only of Rositas
estate, had no right to inspect and have access to Adolfos estate. The RTC denied Roberts
motion. Does the administrator have the authority to examine and secure evidence from
persons having knowledge of properties allegedly belonging to the decedents estate?
Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides that the right of the administrator of
Rositas estate to the production and examination of the specified documents believed to be in
Roberts possession can be allowed based on the administrators belief that the person named in the
request for subpoena has documents in his possession that tend to show the decedents right to real
or personal property.
The production and examination is nothing to be afraid of since the intestate court has no
authority to decide who the decedents heirs are in connection with such incident which is confined
to the examination of documents which may aid the administrator in determining properties
believed to belong to the decedents estate. What is more, that court has no authority to decide the
question of whether certain properties belong to the estate or to the person sought to be examined.
In fact, if after the examination the court has good reason to believe that the person
examined is in possession of properties that belong to the deceased, the administrator cannot
detain the property. He has to file an ordinary action for recovery of the properties. The purpose of
the production and examination of documents is to elicit information or secure evidence from
persons suspected of having possession of, or knowledge of properties suspected of belonging to
3

the estate of the deceased. The procedure is inquisitorial in nature, designed as an economical and
efficient mode of discovering properties of the estate.

Q. Robert filed a special civil action of certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion by
the RTC for allowing the production and examination of documents. The CA ruled that
Eleuterio and Rositas other collateral relatives were not her heirs since Rosita had an
adopted child, Raymond and that, consequently, Eleuterio, et al. had no standing to
request production of the hospitals documents or to institute the petition for the
settlement of her estate. The CA held that based on the article Women Physicians of
the World found in the record of the case before it, the late Rosita, a physician, had
adopted Raymond as her child. An adopted child, said the CA, is deemed a legitimate
child of the adopter. This being the case, Raymonds presence barred Eleuterio and
Rositas other collateral relatives from inheriting intestate from her. A further
consequence is that they also did not have the right to seek the production and
examination of the documents allegedly in Roberts possession. Is the CA correct?
No. Whether or not the late Rosita had judicially adopted Raymond as her child is a question
of fact that had neither been considered nor passed upon by the RTC in a direct challenge to the
claim of Eleuterio and Rositas other collateral relatives that they have the right to inherit from her.
The relevant issue before the RTC was only whether or not the duly appointed administrator of
Rositas estate had the right to the production and examination of the documents believed to be in
Roberts possession. Indeed, one of the reasons Robert brought the special civil action of certiorari
before the CA is that Eleuterio had no right to inspect the requested documents and have access to
Adolfos estate when Eleuterios authority as administrator extended only to Rositas estate.
The Court understands the CAs commendable desire to minimize multiple appeals. But the
issues regarding the late Rositas supposed judicial adoption of Raymond as her child and the
consequent absence of right on the part of Eleuterio, et al. to file a petition for the settlement of
Rositas estate were never raised and properly tried before the RTC. Consequently, the CA gravely
abused its discretion in adjudicating such issues and denying Eleuterio and his relatives their right to
be heard on them. [Rivera v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 189697, 27 June 2012]

Q. In an action for reconveyance and damages on the ground that the donation had
prejudiced the legitime of the compulsory heirs, may the trial court pass upon the issue of
impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs?
No. The issue regarding the impairment of legitime must be resolved in an action for the
settlement of estates. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A
probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge
the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of
estate.
An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application
of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
The trial court, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of petitioner,
inasmuch as the case for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not the proper
vehicle to thresh out said question.
[Doronio v. Doronio, G.R. No. 169454, December 27, 2007]

Q. The proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased. Plaintiffs sought to establish the
fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for Almahleen Liling S. Montaer
to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact. The parties to the case were
designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil
action. What is the nature of the action so filed?
The action for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the
estate of the deceased is a special proceeding.
Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has applied the Rules,
particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.
4

In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the
applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as
among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.

Q. Petitioners argue that a petition for prohibition against a decedent or his estate
from being a party defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as
the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
Petitioners argument is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a
special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special
proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong

necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant.

On the other hand,
a special proceeding, by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact, has one
definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no
definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not
being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the
estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute
the residual to those entitled to the same. [Montaer v. Sharia District Court, G.R. No. 174975,
January 20, 2009]

Q. In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the heirs of Manuela alleged that during her lifetime
she was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Malate, Manila. Manuela held the
lot in trust for them, but she sold it to Anastacio and Rogelio Ng. Thus, the heirs prayed for
the issuance of letters of administration so that Manuelas properties could be inventoried
and settled in accordance with law. They pray for the liquidation of Manuelas estate and its
distribution among her legal heirs. During the pendency of said special proceeding case, the
heirs of Manuela instituted Civil Case No. 00-99207 in which they asked the trial court to
annul the said Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Manuela in favor of Anastacio and Rogelio
Ng, to cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Anastacio, and to issue
a new one in their names. Did plaintiffs commit forum shopping?
Yes. While the reliefs prayed for in the initiatory pleadings of the two cases are different in
form, a ruling in one case would have resolved the other, and vice versa. To illustrate, had the lot
been declared as part of the estate of Manuela in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, there would
have been no need for a decision annulling the sale in Civil Case No. 00-99207. Conversely, had the
sale in Civil Case No. 00-99207 been annulled, then the property would go back to the hands of the
heirs of Manuela. Placing the property under administration, as prayed for in Special Proceeding No.
99- 95587, would have been unnecessary. Thus, the relief prayed for, the facts upon which it is
based, and the parties are substantially similar in the two cases.
[Teodoro v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 6760, January 30, 2013]

Q. Respondents filed an ordinary civil action against petitioners and others, captioned as one
for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-
Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction". Petitioners
argued that the action is a proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person as only a probate court has the authority to determine (a) who
are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights; (c) the status of
each heir; and (d) whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or the exclusive property
of the deceased spouse. Is the instituted action proper?
Under Article 916 of the New Civil Code, disinheritance can be effected only through a will
wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. While the respondents in their Complaint sought
the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of
Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil
Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the
probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
In sum . . . the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be
achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the
respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC will find
grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the
reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251
5

was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and
distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically
sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover
from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may,
the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of
respondents' Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters which
need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.
[Ching v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 192828, 28 November 2011]

Q. Chua, the sole proprietor of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, died in 1999 and a special
proceeding for the settlement of his estate was commenced before the RTC of Pasay City.
Absolute Management Corporation filed an answer and third party-complaint while
Metrobank filed a fourth-party complaint. It appears that Metrobank made a mistake when it
deposited the AMC checks to Ayala Lumber and Hardwares account because Metrobank
assumed that the checks payable to AMC could be deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardwares
account because of Chuas control over AMC operations. Despite Chuas control over AMC and
Ayala Lumber and Hardware, however, it is established that the two entities are distinct, and
the checks exclusively and expressly payable to one cannot be deposited in the account of the
other. Is Metrobanks fourth-party complaint proper?
Yes. Metrobanks fourth-party complaint, as a contingent claim, falls within the claims that
should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. A distinctive character of Metrobanks
fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature the claim depends on the possibility that
Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This
characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the
claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. All
claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within
the time limited in the notice.
Metrobank's claim against Chua's estate is based on quasi-contract. It is also a contingent
claim that depends on another event. Both belong to the category of claims against a deceased
person that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court and, as such, should have
been so filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.

In Maclan v. Garcia, Gabriel Maclan filed a civil case to recover from Ruben Garcia the
necessary expenses he spent as possessor of a piece of land. Garcia acquired the land as an heir of
its previous owner. He set up the defense that this claim should have been filed in the special
proceedings to settle the estate of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand, contended that his
claim arises from law and not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need not be filed in the
settlement of the estate of Garcias predecessor, as mandated by Section 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (now Section 5, Rule 86).
The Court held under these facts that a claim for necessary expenses spent as previous
possessor of the land is a kind of quasi-contract. . . . The term implied contracts, as used in our
remedial law, originated from the common law where obligations derived from quasi-contracts and
from law are both considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term quasi-contract is included in the
concept implied contracts as used in the Rules of Court. Accordingly, liabilities of the deceased
arising from quasi-contracts should be filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
A quasi-contract involves a juridical relation that the law creates on the basis of certain
voluntary, unilateral and lawful acts of a person, to avoid unjust enrichment. The Civil Code provides
an enumeration of quasi-contracts, but the list is not exhaustive and merely provides examples.
[Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. AMC, G.R. No. 170498, January 9, 2013]

Q. What are escheat proceedings? What is the rule respecting escheat proceedings on
dormant bank deposit?
Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of its
sovereignty, steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed property, without there being
an interested person having a legal claim thereto.
6

In the case of dormant accounts, the state inquires into the status, custody, and ownership of
the unclaimed balance to determine whether the inactivity was brought about by the fact of death or
absence of or abandonment by the depositor. If after the proceedings the property remains without
a lawful owner interested to claim it, the property shall be reverted to the state to forestall an open
invitation to self-service by the first comers. However, if interested parties have come forward and
lain claim to the property, the courts shall determine whether the credit or deposit should pass to
the claimants or be forfeited in favor of the state. We emphasize that escheat is not a proceeding to
penalize depositors for failing to deposit to or withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding
whereby the state compels the surrender to it of unclaimed deposit balances when there is
substantial ground for a belief that they have been abandoned, forgotten, or without an owner.
Act No. 3936, as amended, sets a detailed system for notifying depositors of unclaimed
balances. This notification is meant to inform them that their deposit could be escheated if left
unclaimed. Accordingly, before filing a sworn statement, banks and other similar institutions are
under obligation to communicate with owners of dormant accounts. The purpose of this initial
notice is for a bank to determine whether an inactive account has indeed been unclaimed,
abandoned, forgotten, or left without an owner. If the depositor simply does not wish to touch the
funds in the meantime, but still asserts ownership and dominion over the dormant account, then the
bank is no longer obligated to include the account in its sworn statement. It is not the intent of the
law to force depositors into unnecessary litigation and defense of their rights, as the state is only
interested in escheating balances that have been abandoned and left without an owner.
In case the bank complies with the provisions of the law and the unclaimed balances are
eventually escheated to the Republic, the bank shall not thereafter be liable to any person for the
same and any action which may be brought by any person against in any bank xxx for unclaimed
balances so deposited xxx shall be defended by the Solicitor General without cost to such bank.
Otherwise, should it fail to comply with the legally outlined procedure to the prejudice of the
depositor, the bank may not raise the defense provided under Section 5 of Act No. 3936, as
amended.
[Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. v. Hi-Tri Devt Corp., G.R. No. 192413, June 13, 2012]

Q. What is the general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent?
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists a sequence to be observed, an order of
preference, in the appointment of an administrator.
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.
This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin
and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence. The
paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrators interest in the estate. This is the
same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that
those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in
the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the
rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedents
estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any
other candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the administration of
a decedents estate presupposes the surviving spouses interest in the conjugal partnership or
community property forming part of the decedents estate. Likewise, a surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir of a decedent which evinces as much, if not more, interest in administering the
7

entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community
property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator of a decedents estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been allowed,
but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically
states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin.
In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that x
x x [w]hen an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x.
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator
for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein. We recognized that the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of a persons suitability for the office
of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the
power of appointment.
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American
jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of
their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and
equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of
the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to
settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the
best interests of the estate; and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to
have another competent person associated with him in the office.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does
not ipso facto entitle an interested person to coadministration thereof. Neither does squabbling
among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set
forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator. [Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. N o. 183053, 10 October 2012]

Q. In Special Proceeding Case No. 17-R, the RTC after finding that Nora Fe Sagun was able to
substantiate her election of Filipino citizenship granted the petition entitled In re: Judicial
Declaration of Election of Filipino Citizenship, Nora Fe Sagun v. The Local Civil Registrar of
Baguio City. The Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, sought the
reversal thereof contending that respondents petition for judicial declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Decide.
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or
the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific
legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part
of our citizenry Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies,
which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said
right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the
adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts competence.
The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an
action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of
citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent... [T]he prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry.
[Republic v. Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, 15 February 2012]

Q. In an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, the court issued an order of support
pendente lite. Subsequently, upon motion by respondent the amount of support was reduced,
while petitioners own motion to increase support was denied. Appealing from the trial
courts ruling, petitioner argues that the courts ruling with respect to support in arrears
which have remained unpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment under the
previous orders for support were in the nature of final orders assailable by ordinary appeal
8

considering that the orders referred to under Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 61 of the Rules of Court
can apply only prospectively. Thus, petitioner argues that from the moment the accrued
amounts became due and demandable, the orders under which the amounts were made
payable by private respondent have ceased to be provisional and have become final. Is
petitioner correct?
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears, as
the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the
case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioners claims as to the ground
of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support and conjugal assets.
Moreover, respondents obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed by the RTC in
the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the early stage of the
proceedings when the court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and ordered
himarrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support pendente lite. A few
years later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce support while petitioner filed her own
motion to increase the same, and in addition sought spousal support and support in arrears. This
fact underscores the provisional character of the order granting support pendente lite. Petitioners
theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred by
private respondent is therefore untenable.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the
subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA.
[Calderon v. Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, 09 January 2013]

Q. Upon learning of the corporations dissolution by revocation of its corporate franchise, the
CA dismissed the pending the intra-corporate Complaint holding that the complaint, which
aims to continue the corporations business, must now be dismissed under Section 122. While
petitioners concede that a dissolved corporation can no longer continue its business, they
argue that Section 122 allows a dissolved corporation to wind up its affairs within 3 years
from its dissolution. Petitioners maintain that the Complaint, which seeks only a declaration
that respondents are strangers to the corporation and have no right to sit in the board or act
as officers thereof, and a return of Vitalianos stockholdings, intends only to resolve
remaining corporate issues. The resolution of these issues is allegedly part of corporate
winding up. Did the CA correctly dismiss the complaint?
No. The complaint does not seek to enter into contracts, issue new stocks, acquire properties,
execute business transactions, etc. Its aim is not to continue the corporate business, but to
determine and vindicate an alleged stockholders right to the return of his stockholdings and to
participate in the election of directors, and a corporations right to remove usurpers and strangers
from its affairs. The Court fails to see how the resolution of these issues can be said to continue the
business of FQB+7.
Neither are these issues mooted by the dissolution of the corporation. A corporations board
of directors is not rendered functus officio by its dissolution. Since Section 122 allows a corporation
to continue its existence for a limited purpose, necessarily there must be a board that will continue
acting for and on behalf of the dissolved corporation for that purpose. In fact, Section 122 authorizes
the dissolved corporations board of directors to conduct its liquidation within three years from its
dissolution. Jurisprudence has even recognized the boards authority to act as trustee for persons in
interest beyond the said three-year period.43 Thus, the determination of which group is the bona
fide or rightful board of the dissolved corporation will still provide practical relief to the parties
involved.
The same is true with regard to Vitalianos shareholdings in the dissolved corporation. A partys
stockholdings in a corporation, whether existing or dissolved, is a property right44 which he may
vindicate against another party who has deprived him thereof. The corporations dissolution does
not extinguish such property right.
Intra-corporate disputes remain even when the corporation is dissolved.
It bears reiterating that Section 145 of the Corporation Code protects, among others, the
rights and remedies of corporate actors against other corporate actors. The statutory provision
assures an aggrieved party that the corporations dissolution will not impair, much less remove,
his/her rights or remedies against the corporation, its stockholders, directors or officers. It also states
that corporate dissolution will not extinguish any liability already incurred by the corporation, its
stockholders, directors, or officers. In short, Section 145 preserves a corporate
9

actors cause of action and remedy against another corporate actor. In so doing, Section 145 also
preserves the nature of the controversy between the parties as an intra-corporate dispute.
The dissolution of the corporation simply prohibits it from continuing its business. However,
despite such dissolution, the parties involved in the litigation are still corporate actors. The
dissolution does not automatically convert the parties into total strangers or change their intra-
corporate relationships. Neither does it change or terminate existing causes of action, which arose
because of the corporate ties between the parties. Thus, a cause of action involving an
intracorporate controversy remains and must be filed as an intra-corporate dispute despite the
subsequent dissolution of the corporation.
[Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc., G.R. No. 170770, January 9, 2013]

Q. What is the nature of the action for declaration of presumptive death under the Family
Code? What is the remedy of the aggrieved party?
A petition for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a summary
judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The
decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice
of Appeal is unavailing.
[Republic v. Granada, G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012]

The remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding is not an ordinary appeal, but a
petition for certiorari. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal
can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that
an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As a
result, the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not
tolled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questiGned.
Consequently, petitioner's contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief
that his absentee spouse is dead" may no longer be entertained by this Court.
[Republic v. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013]

Q. What is the rationale behind allowance of multiple appeals?
The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of
the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held
to be final. In this multi-appeal mode, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject
matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was
taken for purposes of further remedies the parties may avail of.

Q. May petition for certiorari be allowed in special proceedings in view of the fact that
multiple appeals may be allowed?
Where multi-appeals are allowed, we see no reason why a separate petition for certiorari
cannot be allowed on an interlocutory aspect of the case that is separate and distinct as an issue
from the aspect of the case that has been adjudged with finality by the lower court.
NOTE: In this case, the matter appealed was the special administrators commission, a charge
that is effectively a claim against the estate under administration, while the matter covered by the
petition for certiorari was the appointment of an auditor who would pass upon the special
administrators final account. By their respective natures, these matters can exist independently of
one another and can proceed separately as envisioned by the Rules under Rule 109.

10

Q. In the event of multiple appeals where one order is appealed while another order is
assailed via petition for certiorari, may the petitioner be deemed guilty of forum
shopping?
We see no forum shopping after considering that neither litis pendentia nor res judicata
would result in one case from a ruling in the other, notwithstanding that the appeal that
subsequently became the separate subject of two petitions for certiorari and mandamus with the CA
although both stemmed from the trial courts Order. The simple reason is that the petition and the
appeal involve two different and distinct issues so that a ruling in either one will not affect the other.
Forum shopping is further negated when the nature of, and the developments in, the
proceedings are taken into account i.e., an estate proceedings where the Rules expressly allow
separate appeals and where the respondents have meticulously distinguished what aspect of the
RTCs single Order could be appealed and what could not. Thus, the petitioner cannot take comfort
in the cases it cited relating to forum shopping; these cases, correct and proper in their own factual
settings, simply do not apply to the attendant circumstances and special nature of the present case
where the issues, although pertaining to the same settlement of estate proceedings and although
covered by the same court order, differ in substance and in stage of finality and can be treated
independently of one another for the purposes of appellate review. [Briones v. Henson-Cruz, G.R. No.
159130, August 22, 2008]

NOTE: Section 1, Rule 109 in part states:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. An interested
person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of
First Instance or a Juvenile Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
x x x x
(c) allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) constitutes, in the proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person x x x a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator.