A.C. No.

7781 September 12, 2008

DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE, NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, JORGE V. LEGASPI,
and JUANITO V. LEGASPI, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J .:
In their complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., Dolores L. Dela Cruz,
Milagros L. Principe, Narcisa L. Faustino, Jorge V. Legaspi, and Juanito V. Legaspi alleged that on July
16, 2004, respondent notarized a document denominated asExtrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with
Waiver of Rights purportedly executed by them and their sister, Zenaida V.L. Navarro. Complainants
further alleged that: (1) their signatures in this document were forged; (2) they did not appear and
acknowledge the document on July 16, 2004 before respondent, as notarizing officer; and (3) their
purported community tax certificates indicated in the document were not theirs.
According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements in the acknowledgment portion
of the notarized document when he made it appear, among other things, that complainants "personally
came and appeared before him" and that they affixed their signatures on the document in his presence.
In the process, complainants added, respondent effectively enabled their sister, Navarro, to assume full
ownership of their deceased parents property in Tibagan, San Miguel, Bulacan, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-303936 and sell the same to the Department of Public Works and Highways.
In his answer, respondent admitted having a hand in the preparation of the document in question, but
admitted having indeed notarized it. He explained that "he notarized [the] document in good faith relying
on the representation and assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and the community tax
certificates appearing in the document were true and correct." Navarro would not, according to
respondent, lie to him having known, and being neighbors of, each other for 30 years. Finally,
respondent disclaimed liability for any damage or injury considering that the falsified document had been
revoked and canceled.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner of the Office of the Commission on
Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), found the following as established: (1) the
questioned document bore the signatures and community tax certificates of, and purports to have been
executed by, complainants and Navarro; (2) respondent indeed notarized the questioned document on
July 16, 2004; (3) complainants did not appear and acknowledge the document before respondent on
July 16, 2004; (4) respondent notarized the questioned document only on Navarros representation that
the signatures appearing and community tax certificates were true and correct; and (5) respondent did
not ascertain if the purported signatures of each of the complainants appearing in the document
belonged to them.
The Commission concluded that with respondents admission of having notarized the document in
question against the factual backdrop as thus established, a clear case of falsification and violation of
the Notarial Law had been committed when he stated in the Acknowledgment that:
Before me, on this 16th day of July 16, 2004 at Manila, personally came and appeared the
above-named persons with their respective Community Tax Certificates as follows:
x x x x
who are known to me to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument and they
acknowledge to me that the same is their own free act and deed. x x x
For the stated infraction, the Commission recommended, conformably with the Courts ruling
in Gonzales v. Ramos,
1
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year; that his
notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked; and that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary
public for two (2) years. On September 28, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-147, adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the Commission.
We agree with the recommendation of the Commission and the premises holding it together. It bears
reiterating that notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a
document unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally
appeared before the notaries public to attest to the truth of what are stated therein, for under Section 1
of Public Act No. 2103 or the Notarial Law, an instrument or document shall be considered authentic if
the acknowledgment is made in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by
law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the
act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not,
his certificate shall so state.
2

Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, notaries public
would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain
that the document is the partys free act or deed.
3
Furthermore, notaries public are required by the
Notarial Law to certify that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented before the
notaries public the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter
its number, place, and date of issue as part of certification.
4
Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice
5
now requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence of identity. Sec.
12 provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.-The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to
the identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport, drivers license,
Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police
clearance, postal ID, voters ID, Barangay certification, Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien certificate of
registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID, certificate from the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare
and Development certification [as amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008];
or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public
documentary identification.
One last note. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the
duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It
must be remembered that notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a
private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.
6
A notarized document is by law entitled to full
credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic requirements in
notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public on notorized documents will be eroded.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Jose R.
Dimaano, Jr., if still existing, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary
public for a period of two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision, with WARNING that a repetition of the same
negligent act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP and the Office of the
Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it entered into respondents personal record.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing,Chairperson Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Brion, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 9514 April 10, 2013
BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J .:
Before us is a complaint
1
for disbarment filed by complainant Bernard N. Jandoquile against respondent Atty.
Quirino P. Revilla, Jr.
The Facts of the case are not disputed.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit
2
signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa and
Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile
complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to perform the notarial act
3
per Section 3( c), Rule IV of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
x x x x
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the
principal
4
within the fourth civil degree.
Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show
their valid identification cards.
In his comment
5
to the disbarment complaint, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but admitted Jandoquiles material
allegations. The issue, according to Atty. Revilla, Jr., is whether the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of
relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present valid
identification cards is a ground for disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr. submits that his act is not a ground for disbarment.
He also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he should be considered more as counsel than as a
notary public when he notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to present valid identification
cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas and Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while
Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family.
Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to resolve the case instead of referring it to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. We agree with him, however, that his violation is not a sufficient ground for disbarment.
Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is beyond dispute. Atty. Revilla, Jr. readily admitted
that he notarized the complaint-affidavit signed by his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Section 3(c),
Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from
performing the notarial act, since two of the affiants or principals are his relatives within the fourth civil degree of
affinity. Given the clear provision of the disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence
and refuse notarizing the document. We cannot agree with his proposition that we consider him to have acted more
as counsel of the affiants, not as notary public, when he notarized the complaint-affidavit. The notarial certificate
6
at
the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his signature as a notary public, with a notarial commission valid until
December 31, 2012.
He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three affiants.
On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held liable. If the notary public knows the
affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the
definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in
which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument
or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or
affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. In this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of
Atty. Revilla, Jr.s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his wifes sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in
houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants personally. Thus, he was justified in no
longer requiring them to show valid identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing to indicate
such fact in the "jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No statement was included therein that he knows the three affiants
personally.
7
Let it be impressed that Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the complaint-affidavit of his
relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. While he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not
exempt him from liability for violating the disqualification rule.
As we said, Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice is not a sufficient ground to disbar him. To our mind, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for disbarment under Section
27,
8
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. We recall the case of Maria v. Cortez
9
where we reprimanded Cortez and
disqualified him from being commissioned as notary public for six months. We were convinced that said punishment,
which is less severe than disbarment, would already suffice as sanction for Cortezs violation. In Cortez, we noted
the prohibition in Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice that a person shall not perform a
notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notarys presence
personally at the time of the notarization and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified
by the notary public through a competent evidence of identity. Cortez had notarized a special power of attorney
without having the alleged signatories appear before him. In imposing the less severe punishment, we were mindful
that removal from the Bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe such as reprimand,
temporary suspension or fine would accomplish the end desired.1wphi1
Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation committed by Atty. Revilla, Jr., we are in
agreement that a punishment less severe than disbarment would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public, or from performing any notarial act if he is presently commissioned as a notary
public, for a period of three (3) months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED to INFORM the Court, through an
affidavit, once the period of his disqualification has lapsed.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
A.C. No. 7350 February 18, 2013
PATROCINIO V. AGBULOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROSELLER A. VIRAY, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
The case stemmed from a Complaint
1
filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) by complainant Mrs.
Patrocinio V. Agbulos against respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray of Asingan, Pangasinan, for allegedly notarizing a
document denominated as Affidavit of Non-Tenancy
2
in violation of the Notarial Law. The said affidavit was
supposedly executed by complainant, but the latter denies said execution and claims that the signature and the
community tax certificate (CTC) she allegedly presented are not hers. She further claims that the CTC belongs to a
certain Christian Anton.
3
Complainant added that she did not personally appear before respondent for the
notarization of the document. She, likewise, states that respondent's client, Rolando Dollente (Dollente), benefited
from the said falsified affidavit as it contributed to the illegal transfer of a property registered in her name to that of
Dollente.
4

In his Comment,
5
respondent admitted having prepared and notarized the document in question at the request of his
client Dollente, who assured him that it was personally signed by complainant and that the CTC appearing therein is
owned by her.
6
He, thus, claims good faith in notarizing the subject document.
In a Resolution
7
dated April 16, 2007, the OBC referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation or decision.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position Papers.
8
Complainant
insists that she was deprived of her property because of the illegal notarization of the subject
document.
9
Respondent, on the other hand, admits having notarized the document in question and asks for apology
and forgiveness from complainant as a result of his indiscretion.
10

In his report, Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa (Commissioner Funa) reported that respondent indeed notarized the
subject document in the absence of the alleged affiant having been brought only to respondent by Dollente. It turned
out later that the document was falsified and the CTC belonged to another person and not to complainant. He
further observed that respondent did not attempt to refute the accusation against him; rather, he even apologized for
the complained act.
11
Commissioner Funa, thus, recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, and that he be meted the penalty of
six (6) months suspension as a lawyer and six (6) months suspension as a Notary Public.
12

On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-166 which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Roseller A. Viray is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
month.
13

Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the above decision, but the same was denied. The above resolution
was further modified in Resolution No. XX-2012-117, dated March 10, 2012, to read as follows:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, and unanimously MODIFY as it is hereby
MODIFIED Resolution No. XVIII- 2008-166 dated April 15, 2008, in addition to Respondents SUSPENSION from
the practice of law for one (1) month, Atty. Roseller A. Viray is hereby SUSPENDED as Notary Public for six (6)
months. (Emphasis in the original)
The findings of the IBP are well taken.
Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice emphasizes the necessity of the affiants personal
appearance before the notary public:
14

x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document
(1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
Moreover, Section 12,
15
Rule II, of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice defines the "competent evidence of identity"
referred to above.
In this case, respondent admits that not only did he prepare and notarize the subject affidavit but he likewise
notarized the same without the affiants personal appearance. He explained that he did so merely upon the
assurance of his client Dollente that the document was executed by complainant. In notarizing the document,
respondent contented himself with the presentation of a CTC despite the Rules clear requirement of presentation of
competent evidence of identity such as an identification card with photograph and signature. With this indiscretion,
respondent failed to ascertain the genuineness of the affiants signature which turned out to be a forgery. In failing to
observe the requirements of the Rules, even the CTC presented, purportedly owned by complainant, turned out to
belong to somebody else.
To be sure, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very
same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are
stated therein.
16
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary
public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that
the document is the partys free act or deed.
17

As aptly observed by the Court in Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan:
18

The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary public to authenticate documents
without requiring the physical presence of affiants. However, the adverse consequences of this practice far outweigh
whatever convenience is afforded to the absent affiants. Doing away with the essential requirement of physical
presence of the affiant does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the
affiants may not be who they purport to be. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify
the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free
act and deed.
19

The Court has repeatedly emphasized in a number of cases
20
the important role a notary public performs, to wit:
x x x [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest. The
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
his duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
21

Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the
notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of
notarization.
22
He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a
lawyer.
23
The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment
or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of
Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
24
Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
25
1wphi1
As to the proper penalty, the Court finds the need to increase that recommended by the IBP which is one month
suspension as a lawyer and six months suspension as notary public, considering that respondent himself prepared
the document, and he performed the notarial act without the personal appearance of the affiant and without
identifying her with competent evidence of her identity. With his indiscretion, he allowed the use of a CTC by
someone who did not own it. Worse, he allowed himself to be an instrument of fraud. Based on existing
jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as such, he is meted the
penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year.
26

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray GUILTY of breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of
law for one (1) year; REVOKES his incumbent commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned
as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP and the Office of the Bar
Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it entered into respondent's personal record.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice


A.C. No. 6655
PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J .:
Before the Court is the verified affidavit-complaint
1
of Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua for allegedly falsifying a public document and evading the payment of correct
taxes through the use of falsified documents.
Complainant alleges that on September 15, 2001, respondent prepared and notarized two Deeds of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Lope Caalim with Sale. The first deed
2
was for a consideration of P250,000
and appears to have been executed and signed by Lopes surviving spouse, Caridad Tabarrejos, and her children
(complainant, Virginia Caalim-Inong and Marivinia Caalim) in favor of spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. The
second deed
3
was for a consideration of P1,000,000 and appears to have been executed by and for the benefit of
the same parties as the first deed. The two deeds have identical registration numbers, page numbers and book
numbers in the notarial portion.
Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious because all the heirs signatures were falsified. She contends that
her sister Marivinia does not know how to sign her name and was confined at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center,
Tuguegarao City, at the time the deeds were allegedly signed by her, as shown by a certification
4
from said hospital.
The certification, dated February 6, 2004 and signed by Dr. Alice Anghad, Medical Officer IV, attested that Marivinia
has been confined at the Psychiatry Ward of the Cagayan Valley Medical Center since May 3, 1999 after being
diagnosed of "Substance Induced Psychosis" and "Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type."
Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not presented to any of them and they came to know of their
existence only recently. She further claims that the Community Tax Certificates
5
(CTCs) in her name and in the
names of her mother and her sister Marivinia were procured only by the vendee Shirley and not by them.
Complainant submits the affidavit
6
executed by Edwin Gawayon, Barangay Treasurer of C-8, Claveria, Cagayan, on
August 3, 2002, attesting that the CTCs were procured at the instance of Shirley and were paid without the
complainant and her co-heirs personally appearing before him. Gawayon stated that the signatures and
thumbmarks appearing on the CTCs are not genuine and authentic because it can be seen with the naked eyes that
the signatures are similar in all three CTCs.
Lastly, complainant alleges that the two deeds were used by respondent and Shirley to annul a previously simulated
deed of sale
7
dated June 20, 1979 purportedly executed by Lope in favor of the spouses Madki and Shirley
Mipanga. Said deed was likewise a complete nullity because at that time Shirley Mipanga was only sixteen years old
and still single.
In his comment,
8
respondent admits having prepared and notarized the two disputed Deeds of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Sale (subject deeds), but denies any irregularity in their execution. He claims that the
preparation and notarization of the subject deeds were made under the following circumstances:
In the morning of September 15, 2001, complainant, Caridad, Virginia and Shirley Mipanga went to his house and
requested him to prepare a deed of sale of a residential lot located in Claveria, Cagayan. He was informed by the
parties that the agreed purchase price is P1,000,000 and was presented the certificate of title to the property. Upon
finding that the registered owner is "Lope Caalim, married to Caridad Tabarrejos" and knowing that Lope already
died sometime in the 1980s, he asked for, and was given, the names and personal circumstances of Lopes
surviving children. He asked where Marivinia was, but Caridad told him that Marivinia remained home as she was
not feeling well. As Caridad assured him that they will fetch Marivinia after the deed of conveyance is prepared, he
proceeded to ask the parties to present their CTCs. Caridad and Pacita, however, told him that they have not
secured their CTCs while Virginia forgot to bring hers. So he instructed them to get CTCs from Claveria.
An hour later, Caridad and Shirley came back with the CTCs of Caridad, Virginia, complainant and Marivinia. After
he finished typing the deed and the details of the CTCs, Caridad said that she will bring the deed with her to
Claveria for her daughters to sign. He then told them that it was necessary for him to meet them all in one place for
them to acknowledge the deed before him as notary public. It was agreed upon that they will all meet at the house of
the Mipangas between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on that same day.
Respondent arrived at the Mipanga residence shortly before 12:00 noon. There he saw Shirley, Caridad,
complainant, Pacita and Marivinia with two other persons whom he later learned were the instrumental witnesses to
the execution of the document. Upon being informed that the parties have already affixed their signatures on the
deed, he examined the document then inquired from the heirs if the signatures appearing therein were theirs and if
they were truly selling the property for P1,000,000. The heirs answered in the affirmative, thereby ratifying and
acknowledging the instrument and its contents as their own free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, he notarized the
document and then gave the original and two carbon copies to Shirley while leaving two in his possession.
Respondent adds that Shirley thereafter asked him what steps were needed to effect registration of the deed and
transfer of the title in her and her husbands name. He replied that all the unpaid land taxes should be paid including
the capital gains tax, documentary stamp taxes and estate tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) which will
then issue the necessary clearance for registration. When asked how much taxes are payable, he replied that it
depends on the assessment of the BIR examiner which will be based on the zonal value or selling price stated in the
deed of sale. He added that the estate taxes due, with interests and surcharges, would also have to be paid. Since
the consideration for the sale is P1,000,000, the taxes payable was quite enormous. Shirley asked him who
between the vendor and the vendee should pay the taxes, and he replied that under the law, it is the obligation of
the vendors to pay said taxes but it still depends upon the agreement of the parties. He asked if there was already
an agreement on the matter, but the parties replied in the negative.
Shirley then told the vendors that they should shoulder the payment of taxes. Caridad and her co-vendors, however,
refused and said that a big portion of the P1,000,000 paid to them was already used by them to pay and settle their
other obligations. Shirley then offered to pay one-half of whatever amount the BIR will assess, but Caridad insisted
that another document be prepared stating a reduced selling price of only P250,000 so that they need not contribute
to the payment of taxes since Shirley was anyway already willing to pay one-half of the taxes based on the selling
price stated in the first deed. This resulted in a heated discussion between the parties, which was, however, later
resolved by an agreement to execute a second deed. The prospect of preparing an additional deed, however,
irritated respondent as it meant additional work for him. Thus, respondent went home.
Later, the parties visited respondent at his house and pleaded with him to prepare the second deed with the reduced
selling price. Moved by his humane and compassionate disposition, respondent gave in to the parties plea.
In the presence of all the heirs, the vendees and the instrumental witnesses, respondent prepared and notarized the
second deed providing for the lower consideration of only P250,000. He used the same document number, page
number and book number in the notarial portion as the first deed because according to him, the second deed was
intended by the parties to supplant the first.
Respondent denies complainants assertions that the two deeds are simulated and falsified, averring that as stated
above, all the parties acknowledged the same before him. Likewise, he and his clients, the spouses Madki and
Shirley Mipanga, presented the subject deeds as exhibits in Civil Case No. 2761-S also pending before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
As to the allegation that Marivinia did not appear before him as she was allegedly under confinement at the
Cagayan Valley Medical Center on September 15, 2001, respondent cites a medical certificate
9
stating that Marivinia
was confined in said hospital from May 3, 1999 to August 10, 1999. He also points out that Marivinia is one of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2836-S pending before the RTC, Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, for the annulment
of the subject deeds, and nothing in the complaint states that she is mentally or physically incapacitated. Otherwise,
her co-plaintiffs would have asked the appointment of a guardian for her.
By Resolution
10
dated August 10, 2005, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation
11
dated May 3, 2007, Commissioner Jose Roderick F. Fernando found
respondent administratively liable on account of his indispensable participation in an act designed to defraud the
government. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months and that his
notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked and that respondent be prohibited from being commissioned as a
notary public for two years.
According to Commissioner Fernando, respondent did not offer any tenable defense to justify his actions. As a
notary, it was his responsibility to ensure that the solemnities of the act of notarization were followed. As a lawyer, it
was likewise incumbent upon him that the document he drafted and subsequently notarized was neither unlawful
nor fraudulent. Commissioner Fernando ruled that respondent failed on both counts since he drafted a document
that reflected an untruthful consideration that served to reduce unlawfully the tax due to the government. Then he
completed the act by likewise notarizing and thus converting the document into a public document.
On June 26, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Fernandos report and
recommendation but imposed a higher penalty on respondent. Its Resolution No. XVII-2007-285 reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A;" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondents violation of Notarial Law and for his participation to a transaction that
effectively defrauded the government, Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years and SUSPENSION of his Notarial Commission for two (2) years with Warning that a similar
violation in the future will be dealt with severely.
12

The above resolution is well taken.
By respondents own account of the circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of the subject deeds
of sale, there is a clear basis for disciplining him as a member of the bar and as notary public.
Respondent did not deny preparing and notarizing the subject deeds. He avers that the true consideration for the
transaction is P1,000,000 as allegedly agreed upon by the parties when they appeared before him for the
preparation of the first document as well as the notarization thereof. He then claimed to have been "moved by his
humane and compassionate disposition" when he acceded to the parties plea that he prepare and notarize the
second deed with a lower consideration of P250,000 in order to reduce the corresponding tax liability. However, as
noted by Commissioner Fernando, the two deeds were used by respondent and his client as evidence in a judicial
proceeding (Civil Case No. 2671-S), which only meant that both documents still subsist and hence contrary to
respondents contention that the second deed reflecting a lower consideration was intended to supersede the first
deed.
As to the charge of falsification, the Court finds that the documents annexed to the present complaint are insufficient
for us to conclude that the subject deeds were indeed falsified and absolutely simulated. We have previously ruled
that a deed of sale that allegedly states a price lower than the true consideration is nonetheless binding between the
parties and their successors in interest.
13
Complainant, however, firmly maintains that she and her co-heirs had no
participation whatsoever in the execution of the subject deeds. In any event, the issues of forgery, simulation and
fraud raised by the complainant in this proceeding apparently are still to be resolved in the pending suit filed by the
complainant and her co-heirs for annulment of the said documents (Civil Case No. 2836-S).
With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the true consideration of the
sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for
making an untruthful statement in a public document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an
amount much lower than the actual price paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in depriving the Government
of the right to collect the correct taxes due. His act clearly violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
X x x x
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of the law, he likewise
displayed lack of respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing
such illegal and fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and credit upon its face, which it obviously does not
deserve considering its nature and purpose.
In Gonzales v. Ramos,
14
we elucidated on how important and sacrosanct the notarial act is:
By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private
document into a public document. Such act is no empty gesture. The principal function of a notary public is to
authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a document under his
hand and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to
be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and
delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and
delivery. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies
and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed before a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are
impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.
15

Moreover, while respondents duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant and the
voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement or at least refrain from being a party to its consummation.
16
Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice in fact proscribes notaries public from performing any notarial act for transactions similar to the
herein document of sale, to wit:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any
person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral;
x x x x
In this case, respondent proceeded to notarize the second deed despite knowledge of its illegal purpose. His
purported desire to accommodate the request of his client will not absolve respondent who, as a member of the
legal profession, should have stood his ground and not yielded to the importunings of his clients. Respondent should
have been more prudent and remained steadfast in his solemn oath not to commit falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any.
17
As a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the integrity of the legal profession.
18

Respondent also failed to comply with Section 2, Rule VI of the 2004Rules on Notarial Practice when he gavethe
second document the same document number, page number and book number as the first:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. x x x
x x x x
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a
number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of
his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
X x x x
Respondent admitted having given the second deed the same document number, page number and book number
as in the first deed, reasoning that the second deed was intended to supplant and cancel the first deed. He therefore
knowingly violated the above rule, in furtherance of his clients intention of concealing the actual purchase price so
as to avoid paying the taxes rightly due to the Government.
Even assuming that the second deed was really intended to reflect the true agreement of the parties and hence
superseding the first deed they had executed, respondent remains liable under the afore-cited Section 2(e) which
requires that each instrument or document, executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before the notary public shall be
given a number corresponding to the one in his register. Said rule is not concerned with the validity or efficacy of the
document or instrument recorded but merely to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the entries in the notarial
register.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.
19
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds _herefore. A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, of for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
X x x x
In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories
was meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from re-appointment for two
years. The notary in Gonzales was likewise suspended from the practice of law for one year. Said penalty was in
accord with the cases of Bon v. Ziga,
20
Serzo v. Flores,
21
Zaballero v. Montalvan
22
and Tabas v. Mangibin.
23
The
Court found that by notarizing the questioned deed, the respondent in Gonzales engaged in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
24

In the instant case, we hold that respondent should similarly be meted the penalty of suspension and revocation of
his notarial commission for having violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. In line withcurrent jurisprudence,
and as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification
from re-appointment as notary public for two years is in order.
With respect, however, to his suspension from the practice of law, we hold that the one-year suspension imposed in
Gonzales and the other cases is not applicable considering that respondent not only failed to faithfully comply with
the rules on notarial practice, he also violated his oath when he prepared and notarized the second deed for the
purpose of avoiding the payment of correct amount of taxes, thus abetting an activity aimed at defiance of the law.
Under these circumstances, we find the two-year suspension recommended by the IBP Board of Governors as
proper and commensurate to the infraction committed by respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he
isDISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is further WARNED that
any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator, as
well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal
records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

A.C. No. 5377 June 15, 2006
VICTOR LINGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J .:
This is a complaint for disbarment
1
filed by Victor Lingan against Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga on
November 16, 2000. Complainant alleged that respondents, both notaries public, falsified certain public documents.
The case has its roots in a complaint for annulment of title with damages
2
filed by Isaac Villegas against
complainant with the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 5036. Respondent
Calubaquib signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
3
of the complaint as notary public and
entered the same as Doc. No. 182; Page No. 38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of 1996. Complainant alleges that this
document was falsified because according to the records of the National Archives, the document entered as Doc.
No. 182; Page 38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of 1996 in respondent Calubaquibs notarial register was an affidavit of
one Daniel Malayao.
4

The trial court decided Civil Case No. 5036 in favor of complainant
5
and, as a result, the plaintiff there, through
respondent Calubaquib, appealed it to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 55837.
On file with the records of this case is a special power of attorney
6
dated September 10, 1996 executed by Isaac
Villegas appointing respondent Calubaquib as his attorney-in-fact to "enter into a compromise agreement under
such terms and conditions acceptable to him" which was notarized by respondent Baliga and entered as Doc. No.
548, Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996.
7
Complainant alleged that this special power of attorney was also
falsified because, according to respondent Baligas notarial register, Doc. No. 548; Page No. 110; Book No. VIII;
Series of 1996 pertains to an affidavit of loss of one Pedro Telan,
8
dated August 26, 1996.
In addition, on January 2, 1995, respondent Baliga filed a petition for reappointment as notary public for and in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, which was notarized by respondent Calubaquib and entered in his notarial register as Doc.
No. 31, Page No. 08, Book No. CXXX, Series of 1995. However, Notarial Register Book No. CXXX was for the year
1996 and entered there as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08 was a cancellation of real estate mortgage dated January 11,
1996.
In his answer,
9
respondent Baliga admitted the incorrectness of the entries and simply attributed them to the
inadvertence in good faith of his secretary to whom he had left the task of entering all his notarial documents.
Respondent Calubaquibs comment,
10
however, contained a much lengthier account of the alleged events leading
up to this case, the bulk of which was meant to cast complainant and his motives in a sinister light. In a nutshell, he
made it appear that the reason for the complaint was that he (respondent) thwarted a fraudulent attempt by
complainant to grab a parcel of land. He also stated that complainant had filed a case for falsification of documents
against him with the Ombudsman but it was dismissed.
In the end, however, he (like his co-respondent Baliga) admitted to the mistaken entries and also ascribed the same
to his "legal assistants." Similarly, by way of defense, he pointed out that the Notarial Law "provides that only
contracts need to have their copies included in the notarial records. It does not require affidavits, verifications or
subscriptions of petitions which are mere allegations of facts to be entered in the Notarial Register, despite
widespread practice to the contrary."
Upon receipt of respondents comments, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In the course of the proceedings before the IBP, complainant alleged that respondent Calubaquib, with the help of
respondent Baliga and several other persons, was trying to deprive him (complainant) of a parcel of land he had
bought from Isaac Villegas mother-in-law. According to complainant, respondent impersonated Villegas, who was in
hiding due to several civil and criminal cases pending against him, by forging his signature in all documents and
pleadings related to the civil case filed against him (complainant). He pointed to the incorrect notarial entries as
proof of this falsification.
He presented in evidence a motion for withdrawal
11
filed in the Court of Appeals, apparently by Villegas, disavowing
any involvement in the case filed by respondent Calubaquib.
To further buttress his allegations of falsification, complainant pointed out that respondent Calubaquib seemed
unable to physically produce Villegas. For example, when the Ombudsman ordered him to produce Villegas,
respondent Calubaquib merely presented an affidavit
12
supposedly executed by Villegas and sworn to before a
"highly regarded [Department of Justice] official."
In the IBPs report and recommendation,
13
dated December 7, 2001, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
found respondents "liable for inexcusable negligence" and recommended the revocation of the commission of
respondents Calubaquib and Baliga as notaries public for two years from receipt of the final decision. Commissioner
Maalas report did not touch on complainants allegations of forgery.
When the IBP resolved
14
to adopt Commissioner Maalas report and recommendation, both complainant
15
and
respondent Baliga
16
filed motions for reconsideration
17
with this Court. Respondent Calubaquib
opposed
18
complainants motion for reconsideration.
In his motion for reconsideration, complainant assailed the penalty recommended by the IBP as grossly inadequate.
Reiterating his allegation of forgery, he attached documents bearing Villegas allegedly forged signature as well as
documents with his supposed real signature
19
for comparison.
In his opposition/comment, respondent Calubaquib refuted complainants scathing accusations of fraud and abuse
of his public position, and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. In his motion for reconsideration, respondent
Baliga decried the penalty imposed as disproportionate to the infraction he had committed.
The respondents having admitted responsibility for the notarial entries, the question now is whether these were the
product of a mere mistake or evidence of larger scheme to defraud complainant whose allegations, if true, are
serious enough to merit the disbarment of both respondents.
The missing link, as it were, between the admitted infractions of respondents and the nefarious machinations
alleged by complainant is whether or not the latter was able to prove that Villegas signature on the documents
notarized by respondents was in fact forged.
Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation thereof
is not evidence.
20
One who alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same.
21
We find that complainant failed to
discharge this burden.
Complainant alleged mainly that Villegas could not possibly have signed the documents in question because he was
a fugitive from justice, with "several civil and criminal cases pending against him." Assuming this allegation to be
true, it proved nothing. The mere fact that Villegas was a fugitive from justice did not preclude the possibility that he
might have secretly met with his lawyer for purposes of filing a suit. It would have been different had complainant
presented evidence that Villegas was, at the time the questioned documents were executed, definitely somewhere
else. But the bare argument that Villegas being a fugitive rendered it impossible for him to sign some documents
was simply too nebulous to inspire belief.
As additional evidence, complainant presented, as attachments to his motion for reconsideration, a number of
documents purportedly bearing Villegas real signature, the latest of which was the motion to withdraw allegedly filed
by Villegas himself. However, the veracity of the last of those documents was vigorously contested by an affidavit
also purportedly filed by Villegas. The two documents, both notarized, effectively cancelled each other out, absent
some other credible proof.
It is true that there were dissimilarities between the signatures purportedly belonging to Villegas and his genuine
signature on the conforme of the general power of attorney
22
executed by his wife in favor of his mother-in-law.
However, the fact of forgery cannot be presumed simply because there are dissimilarities between the standard and
the questioned signatures.
23
If complainant was so sure the signatures were fake, he should have submitted them
for expert analysis to the National Bureau of Investigation, the Philippine National Police or some other handwriting
expert. The records are bereft of any such analysis or even any attempt to have the signatures examined.
Furthermore, all the documents on which the contested signature appeared were notarized. Notarial documents
carry the presumption of regularity. To contradict them, the evidence presented must be clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant.
24
Complainants uncorroborated theory of an entire conspiracy of lawyers and
government officials beholden to respondent Calubaquib did not constitute such evidence.
The forgery of Villegas signature having remained unproven, we can only hold respondents liable for their
omissions that have actually been proved.
In this respect, we find that the recommendations of IBP Commissioner Maala adopted by the IBP were supported
by the evidence on record, particularly the documents themselves as well as the respondents own admission.
In response, on the other hand, to respondents feeble attempts to deflect the blame from themselves and onto their
staff, we call their attention to Sections 245, 246 and 249(b) of the Notarial Law.
25

Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:
SEC. 245. Notarial Register. Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the notarial register,
wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified copy of such record, or
any part thereof, to any person applying for it and paying the legal fees therefore. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 246. Matters to be entered therein. The notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the
nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or
acknowledging the instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date of execution, oath, or
acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees collected by him for his services as notary in connection therewith, and,
when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise
enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof and shall give to each entry a consecutive number,
beginning with number one in each calendar year. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument
the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:
SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission.The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public
shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in
the manner required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally accountable for all
entries in his notarial register. Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid
sections by passing the buck to their secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our
open condemnation.
26
Respondents, especially Calubaquib, a self-proclaimed "prominent legal practitioner," should
have known better than to give us such a simple-minded excuse.
We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act but one invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized to do so may act as notaries
public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be
prevented from inflicting themselves upon the public, the courts and the administrative offices in general.
27

Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity.
28
Notaries public must therefore observe utmost care with respect to the
basic requirements of their duties.
29

Being not only lawyers but also public officers, respondents should have been acutely aware of their responsibilities.
Respondents acts did not amount to mere simple and excusable negligence. Having failed to perform their sworn
duty, respondents were squarely in violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
30
and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore.A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondents Atty. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga are
hereby found guilty of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of their
lawyers oath. They are both ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately,
with a warning that another infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
Their present commissions as notaries public, if any, are hereby REVOKED, with DISQUALIFICATION from
reappointment as notaries public for a period of two years.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Atty. Jimmy P.
Baliga, and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator and Office of
the Bar Confidant for dissemination to all courts nationwide.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 129416 November 25, 2004
ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B. TIGNO, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ESTAFINO AQUINO and FLORENTINA AQUINO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS,respondents

D E C I S I O

TINGA, J .:
The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of a single document, a deed of sale involving
interest over real property, notarized by a person of questionable capacity. The assailed ruling of the Court of
Appeals, which overturned the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court, relied primarily on the presumption of
regularity attaching to notarized documents with respect to its due execution. We conclude instead that the
document has not been duly notarized and accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals.
The facts are as follow:
On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino and Florentina Aquino (the Aquinos) filed a complaint for
enforcement of contract and damages against Isidro Bustria (Bustria).
1
The complaint sought to enforce an alleged
sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) square meter fishpond located in Dasci,
Pangasinan. The property was not registered either under the Land Registration Act or under the Spanish Mortgage
Law, though registrable under Act No. 3344.
2
The conveyance was covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2 September
1978.
Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise agreement, whereby Bustria agreed to recognize
the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos in turn agreed to grant to Bustria the right to repurchase the same property
after the lapse of seven (7) years.
Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VII, approved and incorporated the
compromise agreement in a Decision which it rendered on 7 September 1981.
Bustria died in October of 1986.
3
On 1 December 1989, petitioner Zenaida B. Tigno (Tigno), in substitution of her
deceased father Isidro Bustria,
4
attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for Consignation. She
deposited the amount of Two Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the trial court, now Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 55 at Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 18 December 1989, the Aquinos filed an opposition, arguing
that the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had failed to make a tender of payment. In an
Order dated 10 October 1999, the RTC denied the Motion for Consignation.
5

In June of 1991, Tigno filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution, which was likewise opposed by the Aquinos, and
denied by the RTC. Then, on 6 September 1991, Tigno filed an action for Revival of Judgment,
6
seeking the revival
of the decision in Civil Case No. A-1257, so that it could be executed accordingly.
7
The Aquinos filed an answer,
wherein they alleged that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a deed of sale dated 17
October 1985.
8

Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De Francia (De Francia), the instrumental
witness to the deed of sale, and former Judge Franklin Cario (Judge Cario), who notarized the same. These two
witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria. Thereafter, in their
Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission as their Exhibit No. "8," the deed of sale
(Deed of Sale)
9
purportedly executed by Bustria. The admission of the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on
the ground that it was a false and fraudulent document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own;
and that its existence was suspicious, considering that it had been previously unknown, and not even presented by
the Aquinos when they opposed Tigno's previous Motion for Consignation.
10

In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in evidence.
11
A Motion for
Reconsideration praying for the admission of said exhibit was denied in an Order dated 27 April 1994.
12

Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered by the RTC in favor of Tigno. The RTC therein expressed
doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, characterizing the testimonies of De Francia and Cario as
conflicting.
13
The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there any statement that it
was acknowledged by Bustria;
14
that it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or represented by his counsel in
connection with the preparation and execution of the deed of sale
15
or that Aquino had raised the matter of the deed
of sale in his previous Opposition to the Motion for Consignation.
16
The RTC then stressed that the previous Motion
for Execution lodged by Tigno had to be denied since more than five (5) years had elapsed from the date the
judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257 had become final and executory; but the judgment could be revived by action
such as the instant complaint. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the revival of the judgment dated 7 September 1981 in
Civil Case No. A-1257.
17

The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
18
In the meantime, the RTC allowed the execution
pending appeal of its Decision.
19
On 23 December 1996, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division promulgated a
Decision
20
reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision. The appellate court ratiocinated that there were no
material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Cario and De Francia that would taint the
document with doubtful authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and substitution instead of a jurat did
not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel did not render
the document null and ineffective.
21
It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor the presumption of
regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant evidence to contradict the same. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC erred in refusing
to admit the Deed of Sale, and that the document extinguished the right of Bustria's heirs to repurchase the
property.
After the Court of Appeals denied Tigno's Motion for Reconsideration,
22
the present petition was filed before this
Court. Tigno imputes grave abuse of discretion and misappreciation of facts to the Court of Appeals when it
admitted the Deed of Sale. He also argues that the appellate court should have declared the Deed of Sale as a
false, fraudulent and unreliable document not supported by any consideration at all.
The general thrusts of the arguments posed by Tigno are factually based. As such, they could normally lead to the
dismissal of this Petition for Review. However, while this Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts,
23
factual review may
be warranted in instances when the findings of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court are contrary to
each other.
24
Moreover, petitioner raises a substantial argument regarding the capacity of the notary public, Judge
Cario, to notarize the document. The Court of Appeals was unfortunately silent on that matter, but this Court will
take it up with definitiveness.
The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both
parties known to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing instrument.
FRANKLIN CARIO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan
There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified by way of a jurat instead of an
acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who
has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a
jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that the same was sworn before him.
25
Under Section 127
of the Land Registration Act,
26
which has been replicated in Section 112 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
27
the
Deed of Sale should have been acknowledged before a notary public.
28

But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which is determinative of this petition. This
pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin Cario to notarize the Deed of Sale.
It is undisputed that Franklin Cario at the time of the notarization of the Deed of Sale, was a sitting judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos.
29
Petitioners point out, citing Tabao v. Asis,
30
that municipal judges may not
undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts, and other acts of conveyance
which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges.
31
In response, respondents claim that the
prohibition imposed on municipal court judges from notarizing documents took effect only in December of 1989, or
four years after the Deed of Sale was notarized by Cario.
32

Respondent's contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges
are empowered to perform the functions of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
33
However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya,
34
the Court explicitly declared that municipal court judges
such as Cario may notarize only documents connected with the exercise of their official duties.
35
The Deed of Sale
was not connected with any official duties of Judge Cario, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. Our
observations as to the errant judge in Borre are pertinent in this case, considering that Judge Cario identified
himself in the Deed of Sale as "Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge, MTC:"
[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business.
In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize documents involving private transactions and
sign the document in this wise: "GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-Officio, City Judge" (p. 16, Rollo, Annex
D of Complaint). In doing so, he obliterated the distinction between a regular notary and a notary ex officio.
36

There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court Circular No. I-90 permits
notaries public ex officio to perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public provided that
certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception applies.
37
The
facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Cario's improper notarial activity. There was no
such certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one was produced, we would be hard put to accept the veracity of its
contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city,
38
was even then not an isolated backwater town and
had its fair share of practicing lawyers.
There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge Cario, who ceased being a judge in 1986, for his improper
notarial activity. Perhaps though, formal sanction may no longer be appropriate considering Judge Cario's
advanced age, assuming he is still alive.
39
However, this Decision should again serve as an affirmation of the rule
prohibiting municipal judges from notarizing documents not connected with the exercise of their official duties,
subject to the exceptions laid down in Circular No. 1-90.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at all. The validity of a
notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public does not have
the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized. The
rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the
proferred authority of the notary public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render
merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial
commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public will have the
same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document converts such
document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.
40
Thus,
notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the
protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from
imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.
41

On the other hand, what then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was not notarized? True enough, from a civil law
perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the transaction
evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes
real rights over immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to
observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form
required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for
convenience.
42
We have even affirmed that a sale of real property though not consigned in a public instrument or
formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal
contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects between the parties.
43

Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of valid notarization of the Deed of Sale from the
perspective of the law on evidence. After all, the case rests on the admissibility of the Deed of Sale.
Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon by the Court of Appeals no longer holds true since the Deed of
Sale is not a notarized document. Its proper probative value is governed by the Rules of Court. Section 19, Rule 132
states:
Section 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration of public documents; hence, it
must be considered a private document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization performed by Judge
Cario is sufficient to exclude the document in question from the class of public documents. Even assuming that the
Deed of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as a private document, since it was not properly
acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.
Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule 132,
which states:
Section 20. Proof of private document.Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which is claimed to be.
The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the Aquinos, who likewise insist that its enforceability
militates against Tigno's claim. Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove its authenticity and due
execution. The Court of Appeals clearly erred in not appreciating the Deed of Sale as a private document and in
applying the presumption of regularity that attaches only to duly notarized documents, as distinguished from private
documents.
Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale? We hold that it did not. Section 20, Rule 132 provides
ample discretion on the trier of fact before it may choose to receive the private document in evidence. The RTC
wisely refused to admit the Deed of Sale, taking great lengths as it did to explain its doubts as to its veracity. The
RTC was not convinced of the proffered proof by the Aquinos, and the exercise of its sound discretion as the
primary trier of fact warrants due respect.
The most telling observation of the RTC relates to the fact that for the very first time respondents alleged the
existence of the Deed of Sale when they filed their answer to petitioner's current action to revive judgment.
44
Prior to
the initiation of the present action, Tigno had tried to operationalize and implement the Compromise Agreement
through two judicial means: consignation and execution of judgment. The Aquinos duly opposed these prior
attempts of the petitioner to exercise the right to repurchase, but they did not raise then the claim that such right to
repurchase was already extinguished by the Deed of Sale. Tigno attempted to exercise the right to repurchase only
a few years after the execution of the Deed of Sale to which respondents themselves were signatories. Thus, it is
incredulous that the Aquinos did not invoke the Deed of Sale when they opposed in court petitioner's successive
attempts at consignation and execution of judgment. The Deed of Sale, if in existence and valid, would have already
precluded Tigno's causes of action for either consignation or execution of judgment. The only believable conclusion,
as drawn by the RTC, was that the Deed of Sale had yet to be created when petitioner moved in 1990 for
consignation and execution of judgmentan existential anomaly if we were to agree with the respondents that such
document had been signed and notarized back in 1985.
The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not alleviated by the other observations of the RTC. It also pointed
to certain incredible aspects in the Aquinos' tale of events. It noted that no receipts were ever presented by the
respondents to evidence actual payment of consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation of the
respondents that the amount was covered by seven (7) receipts.
45
The Aquinos claimed that Bustria kept all the
receipts, an assertion which the RTC found as unbelievable, citing ordinary human nature to ask for receipts for
significant amounts given and to keep the same.
46
In itself, the absence of receipts, or any proof of consideration,
would not be conclusive since consideration is always presumed. However, given the totality of the circumstances
surrounding this case, the absence of such proof further militates against the claims of the Aquinos.
We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation of the Court of Appeals that Bustria did not bother to seek his
lawyer's assistance as regards the execution of the Deed of Sale, considering that the subject property had
previously been fiercely litigated. Although the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the document would not
be rendered null or ineffective due to the lack of assistance of counsel, the implausibility of the scenario strikes as
odd and therefore reinforces the version found by the RTC as credible.
The Court likewise has its own observations on the record that affirm the doubts raised by the Court of Appeals.
Isidro Bustria, who would die in 1986, was already ninety-three (93) years old when he allegedly signed the Deed of
Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos asserted before the RTC that Bustria traveled unaccompanied from his home in
Dasol, Pangasinan, passing through two towns to Alaminos, to execute the Deed of Sale. Without discrediting the
accomplishments of nonagenarians capable of great physical feats, it should be acknowledged as a matter of
general assumption that persons of Bustria's age are typically sedentary and rarely so foolhardy as to insist on
traveling significant distances alone.
Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the alleged signature of Bustria on the Deed of Sale
and as it otherwise appears on the judicial record. Bustria's signature in the 1981 Compromise Agreement is
noticeably shaky which is not surprising, considering that it was subscribed when Bustria was eighty-nine (89) years
old. However, Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale, which if genuine was affixed when he was already ninety-
three (93) years old, is remarkably steady in its strokes. There are also other evident differences between Bustria's
signature on the Deed of Sale and on other documents on the record.
Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief from an appreciation of circumstantial evidence. These have to be
weighed against the findings of the Court of Appeals that the fact that Bustria signed the Deed of Sale was
established by the respective testimonies of witnesses De Francia and Judge Cario. In its own appreciation of
these testimonies, the RTC alluded to notable inconsistencies in their testimonies. As a final measure of analysis,
the Court shall now examine whether the appellate court was in error in reversing the conclusion of the RTC on
these testimonies.
The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De Francia testified that Judge Cario himself prepared and typed
the Deed of Sale in his office, where the document was signed,
47
while Judge Cario testified that he did not type
the Deed of Sale since it was already prepared when the parties arrived at his office for the signing.
48
On this point,
the Court of Appeals stated with utter nonchalance that a perusal of the record revealed no material or substantial
inconsistencies between the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia.
Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as to the inconsistency pointed out by the RTC as to who prepared
the Deed of Sale. If the only point of consideration was the due execution of the Deed of Sale, then the Court of
Appeals should have properly come out with its finding. Other variances aside, there are no contradictions in the
testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia on the question of whether or not Bustria signed the Deed of Sale.
However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is a private document. Thus, not only the due execution of the
document must be proven but also its authenticity. This factor was not duly considered by the Court of Appeals. The
testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia now become material not only to establish due execution, but also the
authenticity of the Deed of Sale. And on this point, the inconsistencies pointed out by the RTC become crucial.
The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the identity of the progenitor of this all-important
document is a material evidentiary point. It is disconcerting that the very two witnesses of the respondent offered to
prove the Deed of Sale, flatly contradict each other on the basis of their own personal and sensory knowledge.
Worse, the purported author of the Deed of Sale disavowed having drafted the document, notwithstanding the
contrary testimony grounded on personal knowledge by the documentary witness.
Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale would not ordinarily be necessary to establish the
validity of the transaction it covers. However, since it is the authenticity of the document itself that is disputed, then
the opposing testimonies on that point by the material witnesses properly raises questions about the due execution
of the document itself. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia are irreconcilable. It is
not possible to affirm the testimony of either without denigrating the competence and credibility of the other as a
witness. If Judge Cario was truthful in testifying that he did not write the Deed of Sale, then doubt can be cast as to
the reliability of the notarial witness De Francia. It takes a leap of imagination, a high level of gumption, and
perverse deliberation for one to erroneously assert, under oath and with particularities, that a person drafted a
particular document in his presence.
However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity of the notary public, Judge Cario, would be
obviously compromised. Assuming that Judge Cario had indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it would indeed be odd
that he would not remember having written the document himself yet sufficiently recall notarizing the same. If his
testimony as to authorship of the document is deemed as dubious, then there is all the reason to make a similar
assumption as to his testimony on the notarization of the Deed of Sale.
These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need to indubitably establish the author of the Deed
of Sale. They are important because they cast doubt on the credibility of those witnesses of the Aquinos, presented
as they were to attest to the due execution and authenticity of the Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals was clearly in
error in peremptorily disregarding this observation of the RTC.
As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute conclusive value to the testimonies of de Francia
and Judge Cario. The totality of the picture leads us to agree with the trial court that the Deed of Sale is ineluctably
dubious in origin and in execution. The Court deems as correct the refusal of the RTC to admit the Deed of Sale,
since its due execution and authenticity have not been proven. The evidence pointing to the non-existence of such a
transaction is so clear and convincing that it is sufficient even to rebut the typical presumption of regularity arising
from the due execution of notarial documents. However, for the reasons stated earlier, the Deed of Sale is
ineluctably an unnotarized document. And the lower court had more than sufficient basis to conclude that it is a
spurious document.
Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed, Tigno's right to repurchase was not
extinguished at the time of the filing of the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly concluded by the RTC. The
Court of Appeals being in error when it concluded otherwise, the reinstatement of the RTC Decision is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 23 December 1996 and Resolution dated 9
June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is REVERSED, and the Decision dated 18 August
1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1918 is REINSTATED.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concu
G.R. No. 114829 March 1, 1995
MAXIMINO GAMIDO Y BUENAVENTURA, petitioner,
vs.
NEW BILIBID PRISONS (NBP) OFFICIALS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J .:
In the Resolution of 7 September 1994, we required Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea of No. 42 National Road corner
Bruger Subdivision, Putatan, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him for making it appear in the jurat of the petition in this case that the petitioner subscribed the verification
and swore to before him, as notary public, on 19 April 1994, when in truth and in fact the petitioner did not.
In his Explanation of 23 December 1994 which was received by this Court on 25 January 1995, Atty. Icasiano M.
dela Rea admitted having executed the jurat without the presence of petitioner Gamido. He alleges:
Firstly, I must honestly admit that I notarized it not in his presence. I did it in the honest belief that
since it is jurat and not an acknowledgement, it would be alrights [sic] to do so considering that prior
to April 19, 1994 and thereafter, I know Mr. Gamido since I have been in and out of New Bilibid
Prisons, not only because my office is here only across the Municipal Building of Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila but because I handled a number of cases involving prisoners and guards of NBP as well as
some of its personnels [sic]. That in fact, I attempted to have the document personally signed by him
but considering that I have to strictly observe rules and regulations of the NBP, particularly on visit, I
did not pursue anymore my intention to have it notarized before me.
Secondly, that in notarizing the document, I honestly feel and by heart and in good faith, that as a
notary public and as a practicing lawyer, I could modestly contribute in the orderly administration of
justice. The Gamido family use to come in the office and in fact hiring the legal services of the
undersigned but I refused to handle since I am already pre-occupied in other cases of similar
importance. That on December 13, 1994 I receive a letter from Mr. Gamido, last paragraph of which
is read as follows:
Sanay po Atty. ay maawa kayo sa akin na nagdudusa nang walang kasalanan. Alang
alang po sa kaawa awa kong familiya, kailangan ang aking kalinga. Ang tulong ninyo
ang siyang daan upang ako ay makaalis sa pagpapahirap nang mga taong walang
puso at kaluluwa, walang awa sa kapwa, at sa sambayanang Pilipino.
Then he apologizes to the Court and assures it that henceforth he would be more careful and circumspect:
That I am praying for an apology to the Hon. Supreme Court if what I did was wrong and the Hon.
Supreme Court is assured that perhaps what transpired was a wrong judgment or honest mistake.
That the Hon. Chairman and its Hon. Members are assured that when I signed the petition not in
Gamido's presence it is never intended to do a wrong, to commit illegal or criminal acts but merely in
the honest and sincere belief that it is valid and legal. The Hon. Supreme Court is assured that it is
never intended for malice or for money.
This Hon. Chairman and its Hon. Members are further assured that from hereon, I am more careful
and circumspect in the exercise of this noble and grand profession and that no amount or
consideration will sway or change this conviction. This is my life. This is the life of my family.
Atty. dela Rea's explanation is unsatisfactory; however, his spontaneous voluntary admission may be considered in
mitigation of his liability.
As a notary public for a long time, as evidenced by the fact that his questioned jurat is indicated to have been
entered in Book 45 of his notarial register, he should know the similarities and differences between a jurat and
anacknowledgement.
A jurat which is, normally in this form:
Subscribed and sworn to before me in _______________, this ____ day of ____________, affiant
having exhibited to me his Community (before, Residence) Tax Certificate No. ____________
issued at ______________ on ____________.
"is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that the instrument was sworn to before him (Theobald vs.
Chicago Ry. Co., 75 Ill. App. 208). It is not a part of a pleading but merely evidences the fact that the affidavit was
properly made (Young vs. Wooden, 265 SW 24, 204 Ky. 694)." (LORENZO M. TAADA and FRANCISCO A.
RODRIGO, Modern Legal Forms, vol. I, sixth ed., 1985 printing, 31). The jurat in the petition in the case also begins
with the words "subscribed and sworn to me."
To subscribe literally means to write underneath, as one's name; to sign at the end of a document (Black's Law
Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1279). To swear means to put on oath; to declare on oath the truth of a pleading, etc. (Id.,
1298). Accordingly, in a jurat, the affiant must sign the document in the presence of and take his oath before a
notary public or any other person authorized to administer oaths.
As to acknowledgment, Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgement shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law
of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is
done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
(See Lorenzo M. Taada and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Modern Philippine Legal Forms, vol. II, 1964
Fifth ed., 735).
It is obvious that the party acknowledging must likewise appear before the notary public or any other person
authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents.
The claim or belief of Atty. dela Rea that the presence of petitioner Gamido was not necessary for the juratbecause
it is not an acknowledgment is patently baseless. If this had been his belief since he was first commissioned as a
notary public, then he has been making a mockery of the legal solemnity of an oath in a jurat. Notaries public and
others authorized by law to administer oaths or to take acknowledgments should not take for granted the solemn
duties appertaining to their offices. Such duties are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.
His prior acquaintance and friendship with petitioner Gamido provides no excuse for non-compliance with his duty. If
Atty. dela Rea were faithful to his duty as a notary public and if he wanted to accommodate a friend who was inside
a prison, he could have gone to the latter's cell since he openly admitted that he has "been in and out of New Bilibid
Prisons, not only because [his] office is here only across the Municipal Building of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila but
because [he] handled a number of cases involving prisoners and guards of NBP as well as some of its personnels
[sic]."
Administratively, as a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea committed grave
misconduct when he agreed to prepare the jurat in the petition in this case in the absence of petitioner Gamido,
thereby making it appear that the latter personally signed the certification of the petition and took his oath before him
when in truth and in fact the said petitioner did not.
WHEREFORE, for grave misconduct, ATTY. ICASIANO I. DELA REA is hereby FINED in the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), without prejudice to criminal prosecution as may be warranted under the
circumstances. He is WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.