ATUN v.

NUEZ
GR No.L-8018, October 26, 1955
87 PHIL 762

FACTS: Estefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the possession of the plaintiffs, her neices and
nephews, a parcel of land. Such land was delivered by plaintiff Gil Atun to Silvestra Nuez (sister of
defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuez) for cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the Atuns a part of the harvest as
rental. In 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant Eusebio Nuez, who thereafter refused to recognize
plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the produce. The defendant turn sold the land to his co-
defendant Diego Belga, who took the property with the knowledge that it belonged, not to Nuez, but to
plaintiffs. There was no prior judicial declaration, however, that the plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the
decedent.

ISSUE: Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a successor of the decedent?

HELD: Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands registered in the name of Estefania Atun,
now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record that Estefania Atun died
without any issue or ascendants and left as her only surviving heirs the children of her brother Nicolas,
plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file an action arising out of a right
belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial declaration of their status as such, provided there is no
pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.


LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
GR No.L-44837, November 23, 1938
66 PHIL 547

FACTS: Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs. Plaintiff Ana
Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to declare her as compulsory
heir which the court however denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and because he left some
personal and real properties without a will, an intestate proceeding was instituted and a court order declaring
his compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one. Following such court action, the plaintiff proceeded
to collect the sum payable on a promissory note then issued in favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the
intestate proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties inherited by the
defendants represents that of the successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.

ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her father from her grandfather's estate?

HELD: No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are
not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any
property. While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his
father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of
representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or
mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of
inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with
the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from
whom they did not inherit anything.


LIMJOCO v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGRANTE
GR No.L-770, April 27, 1948
80 PHIL 776

FACTS: Petitioner opposed the issuance by the Public Service Commission of a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan to the respondent despite his demise,
contending that the Commission erred in allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of
Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in
subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.

ISSUE: Is the decision of the Commission correct and with basis?

HELD: Yes. If the respondent had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to
prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that
right... The aforesaid right of respondent to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its
nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which right
was a property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied his application,
although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of
the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant.


USON v. DEL ROSARIO
GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 530

FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson, the petitioner.
The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land occupied by defendant Maria
del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a defense, defendant presented a deed of
separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson containing among others an statement giving a parcel of
land to Uson as an alimony and the latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance from Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the
decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil
Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which
the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional
rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the
time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil
Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor
as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death"
(Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria
Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in view of her
expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in
the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance
cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given retroactive effect.
Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former
legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same
origin... As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands
in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative
provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death
(Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate
children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson
over the lands in dispute.


LITONJUA v. MONTILLA
GR No.L-4170, January 31, 1952, 90PHIL757
90 PHIL 757

FACTS: Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of a sum of P4,039.
Failing to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded to file a claim in the
intestate proceeding of the estate of Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the deceased. The estate has not yet been
properly probated.

ISSUE: Could the petitioner succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of the debtor's deceased parent?

HELD: No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was held that the
creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which pertains by
inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate have been paid and when the net assets
that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts of the deceased must first be paid before his
heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate,
has no right to intervene either in the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of
the succession. The foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because the appellant
is not a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the inheritance of
Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the net assets of the intestate estate have been determined.


DE GUZMAN vda. DE CARRILLO v. DE PAZ
GR No.L-4133, May 13, 1952
91 PHIL 265

FACTS: A lot had been mortgaged by spouses Severino Salak and Petra Garcia to Pedro Magat; the latter then
assigned the mortgage to Honoria Salak. After the death Petra, Severino transferred 1/2 of his rights to the
property to Honoria for the sum representing 1/2 of the consideratioin paid by her to the mortgagees Magat.
Severino later died leaving the defendants as heirs. Honoria also died, with the plaintiff as heir. Intestate
proceedings were instituted for the settlement and distribution of the estate of the deceased Severino and Petra,
including the lot in question which was adjudicated, after proper proceedings in favor of the defendants.
Plaintiff sued for reconveyance of the 1/2 of the portion of the lot in her favor as heir of Honoria.

ISSUE: May the petition prosper?

HELD: No. The property now sought to be recovered from the defendants was adjudicated in their favor after
all claims, indebtedness and obligations chargeable against the intestate estate of the deceased Severino Salak
and Petra Garcia had been all paid and accounted for out of the estate of the deceased; so that, in the eyes of
the law, the properties now in the hands of the defendants are presumed to be free from all claims whatsoever.
The claim of the plaintiff set up in the complaint should have been interposed during the pendency and
progress of Special Proceeding No. 3; but plaintiff not having done so, she cannot now bring this action against
the defendants, for it is clear that there exists no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendants upon
which plaintiff can predicate her action against the present defendants.


IBARLE v. PO
GR No.L-5064, February 27, 1953
92 PHIL 721

FACTS: Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina Navarro and some
minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who later sold the same land to the
plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment as guardian of her minor children, Catalina
again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion now belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant
Esperanza Po.

ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD: The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession
of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different language, this article is
incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the
entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial
declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far
as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court was
undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were
necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his
own opposition.


OSORIO v. OSORIO
GR No.L-10474, March 29, 1916
41 PHIL 531

FACTS: Francisco Osorio y Garcia filed a written complaint alleging that he is a natural son of one Francisco
Osorio y Reyes who died in 1896; and that he had been in continuous possession of the status of natural son of
said Osorio y Reyes, as proven by direct acts of the latter and of his family; that the defendant Soledad Osorio,
lawful daughter and lawful heir of said Osorio y Reyes, be ordered to recognize the plaintiff as a natural son of
said Osorio y Reyes, and is entitled to share in his father's estate; and, furthermore, that said defendant be
ordered to furnish subsistence to plaintiff in such amount as the court might deem proper to fix. The evidence
offered relating to the fact of filiation of Osorio y Garcia to Osorio Reyes is strong and unimpeachable, so that
the court found the legitimacy of claim of Osorio y Garcia to be properly established.

ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right to be recognized as co-heir and be entitled to the rights appertaining to his
deceased father's estate?

HELD: Yes. Recognition of the child as a natural child must be made if he has been in continuous possession
of his filiation, proven by the attendance of his father at his baptism, in the certificate in which his name and
that of his mother appear, though the document contains errors, and by his father's statement to various friends
that the boy was his natural son, and by his father's always having attended to the care, education and support
of his son.
So that the plaintiff, Francisco Osorio y Garcia, according to the facts proven in this case and the law on the
subject, is entitled to have his half sister Soledad Osorio, a legitimate daughter of the father of both of them,
recognize him as being the natural, recognized son of Francisco Osorio y Reyes and as entitled to the rights
granted him by law in respect to his deceased father's estate, all of which is in possession of the defendant
spouses.


RAMIREZ v. BALTAZAR
GR No.L-25049, August 30, 1968
22 SCRA 918

FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in this case. Upon
demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate proceedings
of Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs of the deceased.
Felimon was later appointed as adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio Diawan was appointed as
judicial administrator of the estate. The mortgagees then filed a foreclosure of the property in question and
succeeded, after Diawan failed to file an answer against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the property
was bought by the mortgagees themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court. Felimon sued for the
annulment of the entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the failure of the judicial administrator
to protect their interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and hava no cause
of action.

ISSUE: Have plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?

HELD: Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs from
the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or recognition to such
successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special circumstances, protected these
rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was
ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court upon the commencement of testate or intestate
proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as "when the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event
the heirs may act in his place."


DE BORJA v. MENCIAS
GR No.L-20609, September 29, 1966
21 SCRA 1133

FACTS: Petitioners Juan De Borja et al. petitioned for the reversal of the order of Judge Mencias, denying
their petition cause the sale of the properties levied upon to satisfy the money judgment in a civil case rendered
in favor of petitioners against respondent Crisanto de Borja. Petitioners levied aganst the rights, interest and
participation which Crisanto de Borja had in certain real properties, as an heir of the decedents Josefa Tangco
and Francisco de Borja, whose estates were then pending settlement in Special Proceedings Nos. F-7866 and
1955 of the aforementioned court, respectively.
this Court hereby holds that whatever interest, claim or right which Crisanto de Borja may have in the testate
estate of Josefa Tangco and in the intestate estate of Francisco de Borja are subject to attachment and
execution for the purpose of satisfying the money judgment rendered against the said heir
ISSUE: May the sale of the property levied for execution proceed?

HELD: The above question must be answered in the affirmative, provided it is understood that the sale shall be
only of whatever rights, interest and participation may be adjudicated to said heir as a result of the final
settlement of the estates, and that delivery thereof to the judgment creditor or to the purchaser at the public sale
thereof shall be made only after the final settlement of the estates and in the manner provided by the legal
provision mentioned above.


RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA
GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966
17 SCRA 418

FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of
Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners filed a petition before
the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought
the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate based on the purported will,
questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?

HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto
of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon
the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving
the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the
Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, intestate succession is
only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative
will.


CHAVEZ v. IAC
GR No. L-68282, November 8, 1990

FACTS: Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso among her 6 children,
while possession of such property still remains with her. Three of her children sold each their share to private
respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of sale were therefor executed with the
conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter sold the entire property to one of the siblings, herein
petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued for the annulment of the later sale to Raquel which was denied by
the trail court but which later decision overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends
that their mother has left a last will and this will supercedes the earlier transfers.

ISSUE: Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last will supercede that of the
partition inter-vivos?

HELD: Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in
accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by
an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided
that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds of Sale are not contracts
entered into with respect to future inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of
Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by
the property owner herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she
herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale
in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had
received in the partition inter vivos.


NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
74 PHIL 185

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his first marriage, the
herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he
had already given each of the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was
occupied by the respondents over which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an
aggregate amount of money which the respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance in this
case?

HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground that
testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, without expressly
disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already
more shares in his property than those given to the children by his second marriage. Disinheritance made
without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to
the disinherited person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.


BARANDA v. BARANDA
GR No.73275 May 20, 1987

FACTS: Paulina Baranda died without issue, but before her demise, two of her supposed heirs, the herein
respondents Evangelina and Elisa Baranda, have already taken possession of 6 parcels of land and caused the
transfer of such by virtue of questionable sales which the late widow had also sought the reconveyance which
did not however materialized. The petitioners, siblings of the decedent, now sought the annulment of the
supposed sale or transfers. Respondents question the petitioners legal standing, them being not a party-in-
interest in the deed of sale.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners impugn the validity of the sales?

HELD: This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to
commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased, without separate judicial
declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no pending special proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent's estate.
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda's estate, the petitioners, as her
intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed properties, not to them, but to the
estate itself of the decedent, for distribution later in accordance with law. Otherwise, no one else could
question the simulated sales and the subjects thereof would remain in the name of the alleged vendees, who
would thus have been permitted to benefit from their deception, In fact, even if it were assumed that those
suing through attorneys-in-fact were not properly represented, the remaining petitioners would still have
sufficed to impugn the validity of the deeds of sale.


BALAIS v. BALAIS
GR No.L-33924, March 18, 1988
159 SCRA 47

FACTS: On an action for recovery of real property filed by the respondents, spurious children of the late
Escolastico Balais who died in 1948, against the petitioners, legitimate children of the deceased, the trial court
decreed reconveyance of the portion of the property belonging to the legitime and further declaring partition
that sent 1/4 portion of the legitime to the respondents. Petitioners come now questioning the partition and
seeking the reconveyance of the 1/4 share that went to the spurious children, relying on the provisions of the
old civil code, and thereby questioning the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court,

ISSUE: Is the court competent to decree the partition, without it being asked in the complaint? Could the
provisions of the new civil code be applied over a case which occurs prior to its effectivity?

HELD: 1. Yes. The court acquired jurisdiction by estoppel. It must be noted that, in spite of the broad
challenge the appellants present against the jurisdiction of the trial court to order the distribution of the
property, they, in reality, question only that part of the decision awarding a one-fourth part of the property to
the illegitimate children of the deceased, upon the ground that under the old Civil Code illegitimate children
other than natural enjoyed no successionary rights. They do not contest the delivery of the estate to the
deceased's widow or to themselves in the proportions decreed by the court.
2. No. The court erred in applying the provisions of the new code. But as stated, the error of the court
notwithstanding, the case is a closed chapter, the decision having been rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction, have become final and executory. A decision, no matter how erroneous, becomes the law of the
case between the parties upon attaining finality.


CONDE v. ABAYA
GR No.L-4275, March 23, 1909
13 PHIL 249

FACTS: Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by herein plaintiff-
appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural children of the deceased. The trial
court, with the opposition of the defendant-appellant Roman Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered
judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of the decedent's natural children.

ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the acknowledgment of the
natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the
deceased natural father.

HELD: The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life,
while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed
parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the
heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during the minority of
the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child,
executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It cannot be
transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.


REIRA v. PALMAROLI
GR No.14851, September 13, 1919
40 PHIL 105

FACTS: Antonia Reira, widow of Juan Pons who was at the time of the latter's death residing at Palma de
Mallorca, sought the annulment of the order of the trial court admitting the probate of a purported will of her
husband. The purported will was submitted to be admitted to probate by respondent Consul General Palmaroli.
The petitioner contends that the probate of the will, in view of her absence, deprived her of her right to contest
the original application.

ISSUE: Should the probated will yield to the rights of the decedent's heir?

HELD: Yes. A will is nothing more than a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control in a certain degree the disposition of his property after his death. Out
of consideration for the important interests involved the execution and proof of wills has been surrounded by
numerous safeguards, among which is the provision that after death of the testator his will may be judicially
established in court. xxx The probate of a will, while conclusive as to its due execution, in no wise involves the
intrinsic validity of its provisions. If, therefore, upon the distribution of the estate of the decedent, it should
appear that any provision of his will is contrary to the law applicable to his case, the will must necessarily
yield upon that point and the disposition made by law must prevail.


MONTINOLA v. HERBOSA

FACTS: Montinola filed an action against the heirs of Dr. Jose Rizal for recovery of possession of personal
property (the RIZAL RELICS) allegedly sold to him by Doa Trinidad Rizal. The trial court held that neither
party is entitled to the possession of such property, relying principally on the fact that in Rizal's Mi Ultimo
Adios, there is a line where Rizal bequeathed all his property to the Filipino people. The court argued that the
handwritten work of Rizal constitutes a holographic will giving the State all his property.

ISSUE: Does Mi Ultimo Adios constitute a last will?

HELD: No. An instrument which merely expresses a last wish as a thought or advice but does not contain a
disposition of property, and executed without Animus Standi cannot be legally considered a will. Rizal's Mi
Ultimo Adios is but a literary piece of work, and was so intended. It may be considered a will in a grammatical
sense but not in a legal or juridical sense. Moreover, it also lacks the requirements of a holographic will such
as a statement of the year month and day of its execution and his signature.


MERZA v. PORRAS
GR No.L-4888, May 25, 1953
93 PHIL 142

FACTS: Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a so-called codicil (Exhibit B), disinheriting her
husband Pedro Porras and some of her relatives. The two documents were submitted to probate but were
denied by the trial court, upon the grounds such as the defect of the attestation clause on Exh. A and that Exh.
cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed by the testator a day before Exhibit A, thus it cannot be
included in the probate proceedings.

ISSUE: Should a document, expressly disinheriting certain heirs, executed by the testator prior to a supposed
last will, be probated?

HELD: Yes. The trial court and the CA is correct that Exhibit B having been executed one day before Exhibit
A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is only an addition to, or
modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the contents of Exhibit B are couched in the
language ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may not have the legal effect and force to a
testamentary disposition."
However, Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the Civil code of
Spain as "the act by which a person dispose of all his property or a portion of it," and in article 783 of the new
Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. Exhibit B comes within this definition.


CASTAEDA v. ALEMANY
GR No.1439, March 19, 1904
3 PHIL 426

FACTS: Appellant constested the validity of the will of Doa Juana Moreno upon the ground that although the
attestation clause in the will states that the testator signed the will in the presence of three witnesses who also
each signed in each presence, the will was not actually written by the testator.

ISSUE: Is it necessary that a will be written by the testator herself?

HELD: No. Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator
sign it himself or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his express
direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore,
that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence.


MICIANO v. BRIMO
GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927
50 PHIL 867

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which one of the clauses states that the law of
the Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and that legatees have to respect the
will, otherwise the dispositions accruing to them shall be annulled. By virtue of such condition, his brother,
Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus excluded because, by his action of having opposed the partition
scheme, he did not respect the will. Andre sued contending that the conditions are void being contrary to law
which provides that the will shall be probated according to the laws of the nationality of the decedent.

ISSUE: Is the condition as set by the testator valid?

HELD: No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. Said condition then, in the
light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.