The Decline in French Power

1
Theodora Boric
Statecraft and Strategy HIS103Y1
November 19
th
2012
Decline of Frances Position as a Great Power During 1764-1788
Under the rule of Louis XIV France had the ability to intimidate other European
states to bend at her will. However, only a generation after Louis XIVs reign, France
would find herself useless in the realm of international politics. The Seven Years War
and the War of American Independence would cause the decline in Frances international
position. The effects of these two wars would be seen in Frances financial situation, her
polices, alliances and lack of intervention in European politics.

The French defeat in the Seven Years War in both the Americas and Europe was
partially the product of British Prime Minister William Pitts successful aim to destroy
French power. Pitt exploited Frances involvement on both continents to Britains
advantage, while Louis XV had Frances great resources at his disposal they were not
enough for France to participate in two continental wars.
1
Pitts strategy was of
containing and keeping France occupied in Europe while defeating her overseas.
2
Britain
ensured Frances occupation in Germany by financing the Army of Observation, which
would participate in a series of hit-and-run attacks along Frances coastline. These
attacks spread French forces even further across both continents by ensuring French units
remained in Western France rather than Germany.
3
This British contribution, among

1
Mckay, Scott, A New Pattern, in The Rise of The Great Powers, 1648-1815 (Canada: Pearson Education Limited, 1983), 197.
2
3
2
others, was one of strategy as it allowed for British resources to be focused in America.
4

Furthermore, a series of British naval blockades in Frances Atlantic and Mediterranean
ports left Frances possessions exposed to British attack and without supplies or
reinforcements.
5
In part, Frances colossal defeat was due to Pitts strategy of occupying
France on both continents and keeping her resources widespread, while British resources
could be focused in America. This French defeat would lead to an unbalance in colonial
stability that would favor Britain.

British naval superiority played a large role in Frances defeat overseas and the
extensive loss of her external territories. France could not compete with Britains naval
power, this was confirmed by British victories in 1759 off of Lagos and in Quiberon Bay
as well as successful British blockades of French ports.
6
Frances inability to send
supplies and reinforcements to her colonies left her possessions exposed to British attack,
which translated into several British victories.
7
Frances territorial losses were colossal.
In North America Britain captured Louisbourg in 1758, Quebec in 1759 and Montreal in
1760.
8
French trading posts in West Africa were captured to disrupt the supply of slaves
necessary for French plantations in the Caribbean and from 1759 to 1762 a series of
combined operations destroyed Frances position in the West Indies.
9
Furthermore, the
British victory at Plassey destroyed Frances position in India and opened the way to
British dominance over the subcontinent.
10
Spain joined France in the Third Family
Compact and intervened in the Seven Years War overseas, this lead to further British

4
5
6
7
8
9
Mckay, Scott, A New Pattern, in The Rise of The Great Powers, 1648-1815 (Canada: Pearson Education Limited, 1983), 198-9.
10
Mckay, Scott, A New Pattern, in The Rise of The Great Powers, 1648-1815 (Canada: Pearson Education Limited, 1983), 198-9.
3
acquisitions and when the final terms of the peace were settled, further French losses. The
peace of Paris was signed on February 10
th
1763 and was evidence of Britains
impressive victory.
11
France had been totally excluded from the mainland of North
America, keeping only a precarious position in Newfoundland fisheries by her
possessions in St. Pierre and Miquelon.
12
France had also compensated for Spains loss of
Florida with Louisiana.
13
It was only in the West Indies where France avoided substantial
loses.
14
The Seven Years War was essentially a fight between France and Britain for
colonies and commerce.
15
Frances embarrassing defeat would be translated into a shift in
power on the European continent away from France and towards Britain.

French intervention in the War of American Independence was both a diplomatic
victory for France and an economic failure. The financial repercussions of the American
Revolution would temporarily remove France from the rank of great powers. From the
beginning of their rebellion, American agents sought out French support, believing it was
important for their success.
16
The French agreed to support the colonists, but for France
the war of American Independence was a means to an end rather than an end in itself.
17

Frances goal was to reduce the prestige and maritime predominance of Britain by
depriving her of the naval and commercial power drawn from Britains American
colonies.
18
Due to the debt accumulated during the Seven Years War French finances

11
12
13
14
15
Mckay, Scott, Anglo-Bourbon Relations in Europe and Overseas, 1763-1790, in The Rise of The Great Powers, 1648-1815
(Canada: Pearson Education Limited, 1983), 253
16
17
18
M.S. Anderson, European Diplomatic Relations, 1763-90), The American And French Revolutions, 1763-1793 8 (1965): 267
4
were curtailed of expenses, though when France agreed to intervene in the American
Revolution this reduction of expenditures ended. France supported the colonists by
providing them with money and arms.
19
Political logic suggested that France intervene in
the war directly but the level of naval preparedness determined otherwise. As a result
Frances commitment to directly intervene in the War of American Independence was
reflected in the considerable increase in naval expenditure.
20
By July 1778 France and
Britain were openly at war and by April 1779 Spain had entered alongside France under
the Aranjuez convention.
21
The worldwide Bourbon intervention meant that Britains
naval efforts would be over-stretched around the globe.
22
This allowed for the French
capture of some islands in the West Indies, though these victories did not compare to the
complete collapse of French power in India and her failure to give real support to land
operations in North America.
23
In 1781 Frances commitment to the American cause
became more positive, as a result French troops managed to hold off British
reinforcements while the Americans forced the surrender of Yorktown. This victory
brought the fighting on the mainland to an end and secured American independence.
24

Once again, the diplomatic French victory did not compare to that of the British, who
destroyed the French fleet at the battle of the Saints, seized Gibraltar,
25
put an end to
French conquests in the Caribbean and had just begun her recovery in the last months of

19
20
(Canada: Pearson Education Limited, ___YEAR?), 259
21
22
23
24
(Canada: Pearson Education Limited, 1983), 262-3
25
M.A. Jones, The American Revolution in its Imperial, Strategic and Diplomatic Aspects, The American and French
Revolutions, 1763-93 8 (1965): 505
5
the war.
26
France was desperate for immediate peace as a victory at sea was impossible
and French finances could not continue to support the war effort.
27
The peace of
Versailles brought about few territorial changes. The state of French finances and
Britains success towards the end of the war meant that Britain had to make fewer
concessions than previously expected.
28
Britain lost little of real value from the
recognition of independence of her former colonies, as her near-monopoly of trade
remained with them.
29
Frances goal of weakening Britain by depriving her of her
colonies had failed. In fact, the War of American Independence weakened France instead,
leaving her with a debt of 3.4 billion livres.
30
The financial strain would prove to be
enough to remove France from the ranks of great powers, a fact that can be seen by
Frances inaction in the period after the War of American Independence.

Signs of French decline in power can be seen in the policies adopted by French
foreign ministers during the Seven Years War and American Revolution. The policies
that were adopted during this time period were either ones directed towards establishing
French power or of weakening Britains power. The regeneration of strength and self-
confidence in France after the Seven Years War was due, in part, to tieen Franois, duc
de Choiseau who was French foreign minister from 1766-1771.
31
Choiseau concentrated
on the reorganization of the French army, the reconstruction of Frances navy and the

26
27
28
29
30
Denis Smyth, Eclipse of France (Lecture presented in the course Statecraft and Strategy at the University of Toronto,
Toronto, ON, November 2012).
31
6
consolidation of Frances wartime alliance with Spain.
32
Choiseau understood that the
Anglo-Bourbon conflict made sea power crucial and thus he concentrated on the
reconstruction of French and Spanish armed forces after the peace of Paris. However,
because both states lacked the materials such as timbre, money and trained manpower
they could not become major sea powers quickly.
33
The British territorial acquisitions
during the Seven Years War had destroyed the colonial equilibrium established in the
peace of Utretcht and as a result Choiseaus goal was to build a sufficient navy to
challenge Britains mastery at sea.
34
French foreign minister, Emmanuel Armand de
Vignerot du Plessis de Richelieu, duc dAiguillon, from 1771-1774 shared Louis XVs
love for peace and he adopted a consolatory attitude towards Britain with a policy based
on the correct analysis that the eastern powers influence in continental affairs was
increasing while French and British influence was declining.
35
This decline was evident
by events such as the partition of Poland without French intervention.
36
DAiguillon
desired better relations with Britain. Both countries were having similar problems with
their respective political institutions and finances and culminated closer political relations
while discussing a possible alliance.
37
While the discussions for an alliance were
ultimately to no avail
38
the direction in which DAiguillons policymaking had turned
was to one of improving French influence and power on the continent by allying herself
with Britain. Finally, French foreign minister Charles Gravier, commte de Vergennes,

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
7
who served Louis XVI from 1774-1787, aimed his policies towards the weakening of
British power and in turn the increase of French power. Vergennes aim was to weaken
Britains international position by depriving her of the naval and commercial power
drawn from her colonies and then to make an eventual reconciliation with Britain on
French terms.
39
This lead to French intervention in the War of American Independence.
Vergennes rationalized that British supremacy overseas was causing France to spend too
much money on her navy while restricting money that could have been used for Frances
army and for subsidies to other continental states.
40
This misallocated expenditure was
what Vergennes believed could be used to restore French European power and thus
weakening British power would lead to an Anglo-French rapprochement that would
allow France to cut expenditure on the navy.
41
Even when Vergennes plan to weaken
Britain through the loss of her American colonies failed he still attempted to weaken
Britains position during the peace negotiations by encouraging Britains possession of
Canada so that Britain would be strategically weaker by having to take North America
into account.
42
Choiseau, DAiguillon and Vergennes all used French foreign policy to
attempt to strengthen Frances international position, whether through weakening British
power or through strengthening Anglo-French relations.

Before the War of Spanish Succession, the prospect of a joint Bourbon monarchy
terrified all of Europe. In comparison, the decline in both French and Spanish power can

39
40
41
42
8
be seen in the disappointment of the Third Family Compact. The Family Compact did not
improve Frances trade, it did not bring France closer to the war of revenge against
Britain and militarily it was useless as it succumbed to British naval intimidation.
Choiseul believed that France and Spain could increase the number of naval ships fit for
service considerably in the 5 years following the Seven Years War.
43
Choiseul planned
to wage a war of revenge against Britain and needed a powerful navy to compete with
Britains.
44
However, Frances navy experienced a slow recovery because of a shortage
of funds and timbre.
45
Spains navy was recovering at an even slower rate than Frances
and as a result of this insufficient naval recovery from both states, Choiseul had to
continually postpone the war of revenge.
46
Frances disappointment with the Bourbon
alliance extended to the unmet expectation that French exports would meet Spanish
markets.
47
Spain was useless to France in the war of revenge and therefore the concern
now was to ensure French advantages in Spanish markets. This expectation would prove
to be a disappointment for France though, because during the negotiations for the peace
of Paris Britain declared that the commercial treaties with Sprain would stand.
48
In this
case, the Bourbon alliance seemed useless for both Frances future war and commercial
aims. Instances where the Family compact submitted to British naval blackmail is another
example of Bourbon weakness. When an Anglo-Spanish war seemed near in 1770 over
Spanish possession of the small British settlement of Port Egmont in the Falkland Islands,

43
Daniel Baugh, Conclusion and Aftermath, in The Global Seven Years War, 1754-1763 (Britain: Pearson Education Limited,
2011), 646
44
45
2011), 646
46
2011), 646
47
2011), 647
48
2011), 647
9
Spain gave way to British demands because she lacked the immediate prospect of French
help.
49
Together the Bourbon allies did not have enough sea power to match Britains
navy in a war for revenge, the countries were dependent on each other and even together
they were intimidated by the prospect of facing British naval power.

Frances eclipse as a great power can be seen through examples of Frances
decline in influence and intervention in European politics. This paralysis can be seen in
instances such as the election of the Polish king, the Dutch Patriot Revolt and the
outbreak of war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The election of the Polish king
is an example of Frances waning power in Eastern Europe. In Februrary 1763 Russian
statesmen and military leaders decided that the next King of Poland would be a Polish
noble.
50
France and her ally Austria would attempt to influence the Polish royal
election.
51
However, Catherine II of Russia made arrangements for bribing influential
Poles and signed an alliance with Prussia guaranteeing that the elective character of the
Polish monarchy would be Stanislaus Poniatowski, who was elected in January 1764.
52
It
was clear then that France, who considered herself the traditional protector of the Poles,
could not exert much real influence in Poland.
53
What was more concerning was that
there were few French statesmen who really cared about what happened to in Poland
because their attention was focused on their own colonial and maritime affairs.
54
It was
clear that before the War of American Independence French influence in Europe was
diminishing. The Dutch Patriot Revolt is an example of Frances inability to intervene in

49
50
51
52
53
54
10
European politics after the War of American Independence. Prime Minister William Pitt
the Younger considered Frances support of the Patriot party a threat to Britain. To avoid
French dominance in the lower countries, Pitt mobilized his forces for war.
55
However
Frances influence of the Patriots had been exaggerated, France could not afford a war at
all and would avoid a conflict at all costs.
56
When Pitt realized that the French would
avoid the crisis in the Dutch Republic, Britain demobilized.
57
Frances financial
weakness had been the deciding factor in French policy since 1783, and she simply could
not afford a new war with Britain.
58
Finally, the outbreak of war between Russia and the
Ottoman Empire in August 1787 revealed Frances uselessness as an ally. When the war
broke out Joseph II reluctantly entered the war as the terms of the Austro-Russian
alliance came into play.
59
Austria was not ready for the war
60
and Joseph II soon found
that the demands of the war were constantly increasing.
61
Despite the Diplomatic
Revolution, France did not come to the aid of Austria because with 5 billion livres in
debt, she could not afford to involve herself in another war.
62
When Belgium revolted
against Austria, Poland signed an alliance with Prussia agreeing to invade Bohemia and
when Spain and Sardinia made moves against Austrian territories in Italy France
remained uninvolved.
63
Furthermore, Frances decline in her international position can be

55
56
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60
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63
11
seen by the collapse of negotiations for an alliance between Austria, Russia, France and
Spain.
64
Such an alliance would have strengthened Austria and Russias positions in the
war with the Ottoman Empire, however negotiations failed because of the complete
worthlessness of France as an ally.
65
France was doomed to be of relative impotence to
international affairs after 1763,
66
even more so after 1788 when the state declared
bankruptcy.
67

In summation, it was the Seven Years War and the War of American
Independence that caused the decline in Frances international position. The effects of
both wars can be seen in the extensive loss of overseas territory and Frances
accumulative debt. Furthermore the extent of Frances decline in power can be seen in
her inability to intervene in European politics, her foreign ministers use of policy to
strengthen Frances international power and Frances disappointment in the Third Family
Compact.

64
65
66
67
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Bibliography
Anderson, M.S. European Diplomatic Relations, 1763-90. The American and French
Revolutions, 1763-93 8 (1965): 252-278

Baugh, Daniel. Conclusion and Aftermath. Chap. 16 in The Global Seven Years War,
1754-1763. Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2011.

Jones, M.A. The American Revolution in its Imperial, Strategic and Diplomatic
Aspects. The American and French Revolutions, 1763-93 8 (1965): 480-508

Mckay, Scott. A New Pattern. Chap 6 in The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815.
Canada: Pearson Education Limited, 1983.

McKay, Scott. Anglo-Bourbon Relations in Europe and Overseas, 1763-1790. Chap.
9 in The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815. Canada: Pearson Education
Limited, 1983

Smyth, Denis. The Eclipse of France. Lecture presented in the course Statecraft and
Strategy at the University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, November 2012.

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