Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011 DOI: 10.

1163/156852711X562281
Numen 58 (2011) 157187 brill.nl/nu
Reading Satan, Remembering the Other
1
Jean Butler
Independent scholar
Copenhagen
butler@city.dk
Abstract
While the main subject of the present paper is the representation of Satan as the neg-
ative Other in the Qurn, the general objective of the paper is to show the relevance
of the concept of cultural memory as a framework for inquiry into the Qurn and
the theologies of othering that it carries. Te cultural memory embedded in the
Qurn not only gives us an idea of how an Islamic identity was invented, established,
and can be re-invented during centuries of multicultural co-existence and confict. It
also refects a normative image of religious opponents, minorities, and enemies
against which such an Islamic identity is continuously created. Te paper forwards a
reading of the main variations of sin, notably kufr, shirk and kibr, which the Quranic
Satan-narrative articulate, indicating how this Quranic fgure provides a way of com-
ing to terms with evil as a manifestation of otherness.
Keywords
Satan, the Other, Assmann, Mosaic distinction, cultural memory, sin, kufr, shirk, kibr
Introduction
In recent years, cultural memory has appeared as a paradigm within a
variety of scholarly disciplines ranging from psychology and sociology
(studies of individual versus collective memory, the psychology of
group dynamics, and trauma and confict research) to cultural history
studies, literary studies (processes of oral and textual transmission,
processes of canonization, intertextuality as spaces of memory
1)
Te present paper is based on my Ph.D. thesis, Myth and Memory: Satan and the
Other in Islamic Tradition, presented to the University of Copenhagen, 5 May 2008.
158 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
between texts), and semantics, as well as the history of religion. As
such, cultural memory represents an interdisciplinary discourse claim-
ing that a certain cultural heritage memorized in the shape of myths,
exemplary narratives, rituals, symbols, geographical places, and so
forth creates identity. In studies of history, for instance, cultural mem-
ory does not address traditional reconstructions of historical facts but
rather points to issues pertaining to the mental and cultural produc-
tion, or construction, of such facts. Tus, cultural memory does not
identify a verifable reality of the past but rather points to the texts,
images, customs and traditions which an individual, a group, or a soci-
ety will create in order to establish and maintain a certain collective
knowledge about that past.
As religions based on revelation, transmission, and hence interpreta-
tion of that revelation, monotheistic religions are essentially cultures of
memory; their members need to remember in order to continue to
belong to the party of the righteous. Monotheistic religions are also
religions of salvation; only through memory of the past and the divine
pact may the believers win the future. As opposed to purely oral reli-
gious traditions, where the gap between a recent past and mythical
origins may be somewhat blurred, monotheistic religions are scrip-
tural. Interpreting canonized memory the text exegesis repre-
sents a powerful means of transmitting the meaning of that memory
to future generations. As such, scripture-based monotheistic societies
are also exceedingly narrative societies, embedded in myths and meta-
narratives about origins, sin and salvation.
Jan Assmann has recognized these characteristics of monotheism
with much intellectual force in his Moses the Egyptian: Te Memory of
Egypt in Western Monotheism (1997). Tat study adds a crucial dimen-
sion to the concept of cultural memory as a meaningful framework for
studying the history of monotheism, namely, the concept of othering.
In Moses the Egyptian, Assmann argues that the monotheistic inven-
tion of one true God automatically involved a radical re-casting of
the ancient world into two incompatible worlds. Belief in one God
necessarily rejects the legitimacy of more gods, casting of the gods of
other peoples into a negative spectrum of other false gods (Assmann
1997:13). From this distinction between true and false in religion
follow more specifc distinctions such as Jews and Gentiles, Chris-
tians and pagans, Muslims and unbelievers (Assmann 1997:1). Te
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 159
Other is, however, not only distinguished and rejected but must also
be remembered, for only through the constellation of opposites
true and false, belief and unbelief, us and them do constructions
such as truth, belief, and we make sense. Constructions of self-
hood and community identity through diferentiation, alienation, and
stigmatization of the Other only continue to work if the distinction
between self and other is remembered. Assmann identifes the story of
Moses and the Israelites Exodus out of Egypt as representing on the
narrative level the Mosaic distinction between monotheism and divine
transcendence as truth, on the one hand, and paganism and idolatry as
false, on the other.
Te Islamic tradition carries a similar memory of a formative grand
narrative of radically distinguishing between true and false in religion,
namely, in Muh ammads hijra out of heathen Mecca into Muslim
Medina. Today, Muslims celebrate Mecca not only because they
believe Muh ammad was born there and the Kaba stands there, but
also because that city harbours the memory of trauma, confict, and
victory. Te hijra remains the key narrative of how an Islamic identity
was constructed on the grounds of a rejected jhil past represented by
Mecca. Roughly speaking, before the hijra there was no such thing as
an Islamic identity.
Psychologically speaking, recognizing the Other is about distin-
guishing between ones self and other human beings. From a sociolog-
ical perspective we defne ourselves in the mirror of others, and, as
such, the mechanism of otherness is frst and foremost a highly social
one, acting as a natural and necessary vehicle for human beings estab-
lishing selfhood and creating identity and order in a highly complex
world. Nevertheless, interacting with others is not only a social neces-
sity; it may also spark confict and polarization. Te natural desire to
distinguish ones self from that of others may in times of crisis,
imagined or real, but perceived as threatening to an established self,
community or order turn into lesser or greater acts of exclusion and
violation of others. As Assmann reminds us [c]ultural distinc-
tions . . . construct a universe that is not only full of meaning, identity
and orientation, but also full of confict, intolerance and violence
(Assmann 1997:1). In the rather pessimistic phrasing of Ithamar Gru-
enwald (1994:7):
160 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
Te concept of the Other is one of the key factors in the bipolar categorization
of the cognizable world. In relating to the Other, the Self usually operates in an
either/or mode: the very otherness of the Other creates separation from the self,
distancing and alienation. Te distinctness of the Other is all too often main-
tained in holding it at arms length, in estrangement and alienation. Mostly,
identifcation with the Other takes a negative form.
Te subject of the present paper is the representation of Satan as
the negative Other in the Qurn. Angelika Neuwirth has suggested
that the Quranic Satan-fgure is best understood as a powerful instru-
ment of a formative liturgy through which a righteous Muslim com-
munity gradually came into existence in stark opposition to a party of
unbelievers.
Since the agreement between God and Satan concluded in pre-existence foresees
that most of those put to the test by Ibls will not resist temptation, it is conse-
quent that the community of the frst listeners to the Qurn (ibdu llhi
l-mukhlas n Gods chosen servants), though themselves untouched by Ibls,
have to face a majority of insisting deniers of the message. Te beleaguered Mec-
can community and their opponents alike thus appear to have been pre-
conceived as such in pre-existence. Te mythical narrative serves as a consoling
memory, restoring the equilibrium between human doing and faring by vindi-
cating a hidden order subsisting underneath an apparently evil reality so to dis-
charge the deity from the blame of admitting injustice. But the story not only
reafrms the righteous of the justice of their cause it also legitimizes them as
a Biblically grounded religious community. [. . .] As such they have access to sal-
vation historical memory: they are told a story about previous divine manifesta-
tions of mercy and wrath, experienced by some of the equally severely tested
Biblical righteous, Ibrhm and particularly the family of Lt , whose fate mirrors
their own predicament. (Neuwirth 2001:131)
Satan, then, functions not only as the evil one in the Qurn but, more
importantly, the fgure seems to embody a pantheon of necessary
opposites to the Islamic cause against which an Islamic communal
identity of true believers may be formulated.
Tere is nothing uniquely Islamic about such constructions of self
and other by religious communities. In a study on the early Christian
movement and the social implications of the fgure of Satan, Elaine
Pagels (1995:xviii) has shown how the Biblical Satan-fgure is invoked
to express human confict and to characterize human enemies within
our own religious traditions. Her Te Origins of Satan (1995:xviii)
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 161
commences with an invitation to consider Satan as a refection of how
we perceive ourselves and those we call others. Satan has, after all,
made a kind of profession out of being the other; and so Satan defnes
negatively what we think of as human. Quoting William Scott Green,
Pagels (1995:xix) goes on to observe that a society does not simply
discover its others, it fabricates them, by selecting, isolating, and empha-
sizing an aspect of another peoples life, and making it symbolize their
diference. Acting as a defning means for the consolidation of a grad-
ually crystallizing Christian identity, the fgure of Satan frst came to
identify the enemy in the shape of the Jewish source of the Christian
origin, the counterpart necessary for distinguishing a new religion.
Later, this distinction was turned against the Roman enemies of emerg-
ing Christianity, declaring Roman pagans and infdels to be creatures
of Satan, as well as against dissidents and heretics within the Christian
tradition itself.
While the main subject of this essay is the representation of Satan
as the negative Other in the Qurn, the general objective is to show
the relevance of the concept of cultural memory as a framework for
inquiry into the Qurn and the theologies of othering it carries. Te
cultural memory embedded in the Qurn not only gives us an idea
of how an Islamic identity was invented, established, and can be re-
invented during centuries of multicultural co-existence and confict; it
also refects a normative image of religious opponents, minorities, and
enemies against which such an Islamic identity is continuously cre-
ated. Tis essay forwards a reading of the main variations of sin, nota-
bly kufr, shirk, and kibr, which the Quranic Satan-narrative articulates,
indicating how this Quranic fgure provides a way of coming to terms
with evil as a manifestation of otherness. Evil, in this shape, may take
on a number of disguises, among them several of a recognizable Bibli-
cal fgure. Some of these will be conserved in Quranic memory as leg-
endary narratives on the evils of former religious societies, the so-called
Strafegenden or punishment stories, providing us with an insight into
the scriptural precursor of later Islamic polemics against non-Muslims.
Here I will argue that Satan comes to represent the negative Other
(as opposed to the positive or ambivalent Other, always and nec-
essarily present in human encounters), whose function it is to distin-
guish the rejected others from the righteous believers.
162 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
Reading Satan in the Qurn
In the Qurn, a dual image of evil presents itself in the abstract notion
of evil, on the one hand, and in the more mythic reality of that
notion as embodied by ibls, the Devil, or al-shayt n, Satan.
2
In his
Stalking Ibls: In Search for an Islamic Teodicy, Whitney Bodman
(1999:249) has suggested that what is at play here are two discourses
of evil, namely an ibls discourse, complex in terms of both myth and
narrative, and a shayt n, much more one-dimensional discourse, in
which Satan is evil par excellence. Ibls is, according to Bodman, a nar-
rative character, while al-Shayt n becomes the principle. Although the
two fgures of Ibls and al-Shayt n are heavily intertwined from a nar-
rative and a theological point of view, it is thus no mistake that both
Ibls and al-Shayt n appear in the Qurn. Rather, each fgure appears
to have its own raison dtre within that text, refecting diferent stages
in the Muslim communitys formation. Here al-Shayt n, according to
Bodman (1999:248),
functions as a representation of the evil inclination in humanity. He is not the
cause of evil; God ultimately causes evil and the mortal immediately causes it.
Shayt n serves only to guide us along the many attractive alternatives to the
straight path. Since good and evil cannot be rationally discerned, and should not
be examined in those terms (the Mutazilite error), the only question is that of
rightly perceiving what God has commanded in any situation. In essence, in this
view, there is no fundamental theology of evil in Islam. Instead, there is a theol-
ogy of submission.
Tis theology of submission is, I believe, given voice in the seven
Quranic sras that reiterate the exemplary story of the obedient angels,
submitting themselves to Adam at Gods command, and the disobedi-
2)
Both fgures of course owe their respective names and narratives to the same
source, i.e. the Biblical Hebrew satan, hindrance, or stumble block, and ha-satan,
accuser, or opponent, given in the Greek Septuagint translation of the Hebrew
Bible as diabolos, slanderer, or accuser. Te latter is probably the morphological
source from which the Arabic Ibls would be constructed (see Jefrey 1938:4748).
Most Muslim linguists and exegetes insist, however, that Ibls derives his name from
ibls, despair, as in ablasahu allh, God threw him into despair. Given that the
rare morphological stem of if l appears only in connection with loanwords of pri-
marily Greek, Persian and Latin origin in Arabic literature from the Qurn onwards,
that derivation seems, however, unwarranted.
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 163
ent Ibls, refusing to submit himself. In this drama, Ibls in many
respects begs our sympathy, not the least because he reveals many a
human quality, be they ever so reprehensible. He is proud, confused,
and stubborn in his argument with God about Adam, but it is only
with his transformation into al-Shayt n al-rajm, the Stoned Satan,
that he becomes really evil.
Te appearance of Ibls in the Qurn is dramatic yet, considering
the problem that fgure embodies in that scripture, namely evil, surpris-
ingly swift. He is mentioned by name in nine Quranic sras, two of
which merely mention Ibls briefy in terms suggesting that the name
al-Shayt n could just as easily have been applied (Q 26:95; 34:20).
Te seven remaining Quranic incidents involving Ibls (Q 2:34, 7:11,
15:31, 17:61, 18:50, 20:116, 38:74) display, at frst sight, a remark-
able monotonousness: same story, same outcome. In all seven nar-
rative versions of Satans opposition to God, we are situated in the
pre-historic time immediately before, or after, the creation of Adam.
In all seven versions, we are told how God commanded His angels
to bow down to Adam, and how they all did so together except Ibls
(Q 15:3031, 38:7374: fa-sajada al-malikatu kulluhum ajmana
ill Ibls; similar wording is given in 2:34, 7:11, 17:61, 18:50, 20:116).
Ibls is introduced to Adam, rejects him, falls, and, in his fall, is trans-
formed into al-Shayt n. Te narrative elements introducing and fol-
lowing this central chain of events difer only slightly from sra to
sra, adding what at frst sight appear to be minor morphological and
narrative variations, additions, and subtractions. Such shortness of
words opens up the possibility of many diferent strategies of interpre-
tation. Tere is little doubt that the story of Ibls means to convey a
message, but the question remains of why tell basically the same story
seven times?
According to Angelika Neuwirth (2001), the seven-fold Quranic
story of Ibls must be read as a liturgical marker for the coming into
existence of a new and quite distinct identity of Muslims as the last
and fnal carriers of Biblical tradition and the monotheistic pact. Tese
anthropogenic accounts not only represent imaginations of the
oldest memories of mankind (Neuwirth 2001:125126), but they
also refect the universal and everlasting dialectics between the innate
human liability to forget and the divine imperative to remember. Tey
document on the other hand the communitys real achievement of a
164 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
new collective memory of their own (Neuwirth 2001:116117). Pro-
posing a micro-structural reading of these accounts in order fully to
grasp the particular polemic apologetic discourse [of which] they are
[a] part (Neuwirth 2001:118), as opposed to the macrostructural
approach to the Qurn undertaken by other scholars such as Andrew
Rippin, Neuwirth prefers to approach the Qurn by focusing on the
canonical process and not on the canon per se. Tis approach allows
Neuwirth to view the recurring anthropogenic account of Adams cre-
ation and this creatures meeting with Ibls, not as
repetitions of an identical plot recurring in slightly divergent versions over and
again in a text commonly stigmatized as rather haphazardly compiled, but in a
more complex perspective as testimonies of the emergence of a community
refecting the process of a canonization from below of the successively pub-
lished liturgical texts, . . . [thus] the recollections of anthropogenic accounts gain
new value: Tey present themselves as novel readings of a familiar narrative with
the perspicuous tendency to demythicize it in some substantial traits, though not
without introducing new mythic elements meant to raise contemporary develop-
ments to a salvation history level. (Neuwirth 2001:120121)
Neuwirth divides this canonization process of the mythical drama of
Ibls meeting Adam into two distinct discourses. One is the bargain
story, identifed in the text as the pre-historic divine covenant of plac-
ing humans (and not the angels or Ibls, who oppose it) as the chosen
khalfa upon earth, a didactic narrative pointing to the near diabolic
opposition facing the tiny community of believers in real, historic
time. Te other is the transgression or test story, recognized as the
testing of individuals in the garden of paradise at the hands of God and
al-Shayt n (Neuwirth 2001:125126).
3
Gradually surfacing as a full-
fedged narrative, the twofold ibls liturgical discourse hence refects,
according to Neuwirth, the historical process of Quranic canonization
as a dynamic process shaping not only a distinct Islamic Satan-fgure
a fgure perhaps initially inspired by but ultimately set apart from its
Biblical origin but also a distinct community of memory.
3)
Belonging to the bargain story-category is, thus, sra 15:2648, while sras
20:115123 and 2:2839, according to Neuwirth 2001, seem to fall in between, a
conclusion which, of course, seems to counter somewhat the claimed clear distinction
between discourses.
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 165
Te emergence of the Islamic community has often been described as a success
story, leading out of a most dangerous crisis to an uncontested command of
religious authority and political power. Te process of attaining a new conscious-
ness allowing the community to view themselves as active responsible agents in
the implementation of the Quranic message was certainly conditioned by most
diverse factors and circumstances. . . . Scriptural memory serves . . . to extend their
horizons of time, leading them back beyond their ancestral memory to the
epochs of the Biblical patriarchs and the prophets. In short, Scriptural memory
ofered them an alternative world to inhabit, it enabled them to perform an
exodus out of their crisis-shaken reality, their interior exile, into a spacious
orbit of universal salvation historical dimensions. (Neuwirth 2001:150151)
While Neuwirth (2001) engages in an analysis of Q 2:2839, 7:1025,
15:2648, and 20:115123, Neuwirth (2000) basically duplicates the
approach and conclusions of that study while including in the study
the remaining Ibls passages, Q 17:6165, 18:5051 and 38:6785.
An important enhancement, however, is made in that study. Whereas
Ibls in Neuwirth (2001) is depicted in terms of a minor narrative fg-
ure, yet one holding specifc qualities and given certain roles to play,
he is given the added, and thus enlarged, corpus of Quranic mate-
rial worked with in Neuwirth (2000) also identifed and singled
out as the evil one and the adversary. Tis is so not only in pre-
mordial cosmic afairs but also especially in real life as Adam
descends to earth to fulfll his pact with God and thus faces the dual
roads of memory (God) and crisis (Satan). Emerging as the full grown
enemy in srat s d (Q 38), this late and highly polemical function of
Ibls in the Quranic Ibls-meets-Adam-narrative(s) is refected in the
shape of real, external opponents to the Islamic cause (Neuwirth
2000:14).
Despite her diachronic approach, Neuwirths perspective on the
Qurn as a scriptural memory of a formative crisis, on a pre-historical
(Adam meets Ibls) as well as on an actual, historical level (the
coming into being of a historical community of believers), inscribes
her study in the paradigm of cultural memory. It also addresses the
Qurns particular polemical potential as relevant for the understand-
ing of Muslim identity-making. According to Neuwirth, it is not so
much the origins of evil which is at stake in the Quranic account of
Ibls-meets-Adam as much as it is the coming-into-being of a Muslim
community in spite of the antagonism with which that community,
166 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
according to Muslim memory, was met. In this historical process of the
coming-into-being of a distinct Muslim identity or, as I would prefer
to phrase it, in later Islamic traditions creative remembering of this
coming-into-being, Satan plays the vital role of the unbelieving Other
against whom the members of the rising community may depict them-
selves as righteous believers.
Tree themes of otherness pertaining to notions of absolute sin in
Islam may initially be identifed as playing a role in the Quranic Ibls-
narratives: kibr (pride and haughtiness), kufr (ingratitude and
unbelief ), and shirk (polytheism). What role such variations on
sin precisely play in the Quranic narrative context will be examined in
the following. Te study here ofered is a mnemohistoric one, inter-
ested not so much in the possible historicity of the coming into being
of the Muslim community as in the theological importance to be
attached to the memory of that genesis. Here it will also be argued
that the peculiar repetitive nature of the Ibls narrative has to do with
the variety of otherness it points to.
Kufr and Haughtiness: Claiming To Know Better
Te frst sra in the canonized text of the Qurn in which we meet
Ibls is srat al-baqara, the second chapter. According to Islamic tradi-
tion, this sra is Medinan and thus among the latest to have been
revealed to Muh ammad. It is also among the more composite chapters
in terms of both content and vastness; it is the lengthiest sra of the
Qurn, numbering 286 yt, signs, or verses. Apart from introduc-
ing many of the basic pillars of the Islamic faith and prescriptions, the
sra presents several legendary Biblical fgures as being among the
founding fathers of Islamic monotheistic tradition. Signifcantly,
Ibrhm (Abraham) is described in this sra as being a h anf (Q 2:135).
Te precise meaning of this term is still disputed, but it is thought to
indicate some sort of proto-Muslim (Q 2:128), a man living according
to the Islamic creed long before the revelation of the Quranic message
itself, and, as such, it describes an unusually devoted believer in the
one true God, the epithet of a proto-monotheist (Q 2:135). As the
builder of the Kaba in Mecca (Q 2:127) and ancestor of the Arabs
through his son Isml (Ishmael) with his slave-wife Hagar, Abraham
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 167
is identifed as the frst prophet of Islam in the Qurn. Speaking of
cultural memory, Abraham seems to have been a favorite of
Muh ammads, the latter often likening himself and his personal reli-
gious plight to that of Abrahams as a prophet who met with much
resistance from his contemporaries.
Tus the frst part of srat al-baqara (verses 182) mainly takes the
form of a strong narrative reminder to those who believe to heed the
warning of Gods punishment of former generations who were negli-
gent of His pact, particularly addressing those who do not believe at
all. Te latter we fnd divided into three major categories, namely
alladhna kafar, the unbelievers or, more in keeping with the verbal
root meaning of kufr, those who ungratefully reject (the message);
al-munfqna, the hypocrites, or those who are not sincere (in
their faith); and alladhna yanqudna ahd allh, those who break
Gods covenant. A particularly strong reminder of the latter form of
unbelief and its punishment is referred to in this sra in the narrative
shape of the be ye apes-incident (Q 2:6366). With regard to those
who break Gods covenant, Ibls story here reads:
Tose who break Gods covenant after having frst ratifed it, and who cleave
what God has ordered to be joined, and who corrupt upon earth ( yufsidna fl-
ard ); those, they are losers! How can you reject faith in God (takfur bi-llh),
when you were dead and He gave you life? . . . It is Him who created for you all
that is on earth . . . and He has perfect knowledge (huwa bi-kull shay alm).
And when God said to the angels, Verily, I will place a vicegerent (khalfa) on
earth, they said: Will you place one thereupon who will corrupt upon it ( yuf-
sidu f-h) and shed blood, when we worship and honour You!? He said: I
know, what you know not (inn alamu m l talamna). And he taught Adam
(wa-allama dama) all the names, then He placed them before the angels and
said: Tell Me the names of these, since you are so righteous. Tey said: Praise
be You, we possess no knowledge, except for what You have taught us (l ilma
la-n ill m alamtun)! Verily, You are the Knowledgeable, the Wise (inna-ka
anta al-alm al-h akm). He said: O Adam, tell them their names, and when
he had informed them of their names, He said: Did I not tell you, I know the
secrets of the heavens and earth, and I know what you openly show and what
you conceal (inn alamu ghayb al-samawt wal-ard wa-alamu m tabdna
wa-m kuntum taktumna)? And when We said to the angels, Bow down
(usjud) to Adam, they bowed down, except Ibls; he refused (ab) and was
haughty (istakbara); he was one of the unbelievers (kna min al-kfrna)
(Q2:2734).
168 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
After this comes the paradise incident, with God setting up the couple
in the Garden, al-Shayt n leading them astray, and the two of them
falling to earth in mutual enmity as punishment for their transgres-
sion. A word of consolation is, however, ofered by God to humans:
Who follows My guidance, shall have no fear (Q 2:38). As for those
who kafar wa-kadhdhab bi-aytin, reject and belie Our signs,
they shall be the companions of Hell, as h b al-nr (Q 2:39). Imme-
diately after, the Jews are directly addressed:
O children of Israel! Remember (udhkur) the favour which I bestowed upon
you, and fulfll your covenant with Me (ahd), as I fulfll Mine with you,
and fear but Me! And believe in what I have sent down, confrming what is
already with you, and be not the frst to reject faith in it (l takn awwala kfri
bi-hi), nor sell My signs for a small price, but fear but Me! And do not dress
the truth in falsehood, nor conceal (taktum) it, when you are well aware of it.
(Q 2:4042).
In order to create a historically viable framework for the Qurn,
Islamic tradition has successfully created a memory of Jewish society
in the pre-Islamic Arabian peninsula as a well-integrated and powerful
player in the otherwise Arabic, polytheistic milieu of Bedouins and
semi-nomads. According to this memory, as long as his opponents
were primarily to be found in polytheist Mecca, Muh ammad, possibly
in the vain hope of gathering under his authority all the monotheistic
groups of the area, preferred to ally himself with the Jewish tribes of
Yathrib. However, upon discovering that the Jews were not willing to
recognize him or his message, the confict between the two parties
escalated. Tis amounted to, among other incidents, the exile of the
Jewish tribes of Nadr and Qaynuq from Medina and, later, in the
infamous massacre of the men of Ban Qurayz a, the last major Jewish
tribe to oppose Muh ammad. If we follow the sources provided by
Islamic tradition itself as historical, there is reason to understand
alladhna yanqudna ahd allh, those who break the pact of God, in
terms of pointing to the Jews, Gods chosen people (Q 2:47).
A reading such as this would seem to be confrmed by the second
part of the sra (verses 83141) which consists of one long condemna-
tion of the arrogance of the ahl al-kitb, the people of the book, and
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 169
especially the reluctance of the Jews to acknowledge the new revelation
(Q 2:89) and Muh ammad (Q 2:101). In verse 2:43, immediately fol-
lowing Ibls fatal refusal to bow down to Adam, an admonishing
appeal is directed to the Jews: Pray and give alms and bow down
(arka) together with those who bow! Te narrative parallel to the
preceding command of God to Ibls and the angels, Bow down
(usjud) to Adam! is, in spite of slightly difering terminology, hardly
a coincidence. Te angels bow down to Adam out of obedience to
God, implicitly submitting themselves to Him in the act. Ibls, on the
other hand, refuses the command and hence denies the almightiness of
God. Te Jews, it is implied, who were formerly a community of
believers, now need admonishing; thus, warning verses of wrath and
retribution of old in order to submit themselves to the truth are sent
down, and still they refuse. So as to rule out any doubt as to who is
being targeted by sra 2:2739, verse 77 of that chapter says about the
Jews (of Medina, according to tradition): Do they not know, that
God knows what they keep secret ( yusirrna) and what they openly
reveal ( yulinna)? Again, diferent terminology, yet terminology
immediately comparable in meaning with that of verse 2:33, is used in
warning the angels not to be haughty: Did I not tell you, I know the
secrets of the heavens and earth, and I know what you openly show
(tabdna) and what you conceal (taktumna)?
Just as God knew what the reluctant angels of verse 2:3033 were
hiding (and revealing) of their innermost thoughts, so He knows the
wicked intentions of what appear to be reluctant Jews. Te verses lead-
ing up to the mildly threatening words of 2:77, read:
Do you really think they will believe in you, when a party of them already heard
the word of God and knowingly perverted it, after they knew it? And when they
meet those who believe, they say: We believe! But when they are alone
together, they say: Will you tell them about what God has revealed to you that
they may engage you in argument about it before your Lord? Dont you under-
stand? (Q 2:7576)
In an earlier verse of similar content, the hypocrisy of those who out-
wardly confess to believe is compared to being in the company of
Satan:
170 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
When they meet those who believe, they say: We believe! But when they are
alone with their satans (shayt ni-him) they say: We are with you; we were just
mocking [them]. (Q 2:14)
Te warning about hypocritical Jews is reiterated in even stronger
words in verse 102, where the Jews are accused of following the evil
ones (al-shayt n) in an act of kufr (Q 2:101102). Te context is here
mythical;
4
the Biblical King Solomon and some blasphemous shayt n
in his service are mentioned along with Hrt and Mrt, two angels
with a highly controversial record of disobedience in Islamic legendary
tradition. As these angels are linked to the mythical framework sur-
rounding Ibls owing their names to Persian angelology, but their
story to the Biblical tale of the benei ha-elhm, the disobedient sons of
gods of Genesis 6:16, sowing corruption and bloodshed on earth
5

4)
Here, one should keep in mind Assmanns critique of the usually sharp scholarly
diferentiation between historical texts and mythical texts as misleading: Loom-
ing large in this debate is the infelicitous opposition between history and myth, lead-
ing to an all-too antiseptic conception of pure facts as opposed to the egocentrism
of myth-making memory. History turns into myth as soon as it is remembered, nar-
rated and used, that is, woven into the fabric of the present. Te mythical qualities of
history have nothing to do with its truth values (Assmann 1997:14). It would thus
seem more proper to speak of myth and mythical narrative as technical terms
suggestive of a particular form of memory and communication, not necessarily
opposed to history and historical narrative.
5)
Te Biblical passage of Genesis 6:16, in general thought of as a prologue to disas-
ter, introduces the story of the food and Noahs ark. As such, it is reminiscent of
early Jewish apocalyptic thought, further expanded in the pseudepigraphical Ethio-
pian Book of Enoch (2nd century BCE1st century CE) and the Book of Jubilees (2nd
century BCE), mirroring what seems to have been the popular (or non-canonical)
interpretation of Genesis 6:16. Many controversies of both a philological and theo-
logical nature are linked to this Biblical passage, the most prominent of them being
the understanding of the term benei ha-elhm. Te literal translation sons of the
gods is, for obvious reasons, generally rejected by both Jewish and Christian ortho-
doxy. Not only does the term imply that more gods than the One represented in the
monotheistic faiths are in existence, it also, as expanded in the legends of the pseude-
pigrapha, ascribes a more rebellious nature to angels than normally admitted to by
the Biblical canon. Ultimately, as the original original sin story, the benei ha-elhm
of Genesis 6:16 became a formative element of Jewish and Christian apocalyptic
thought. As such they came to inspire the angelologies of Judaism, Christianity and
Islam, and formed the basis upon which the Islamic disobedient angel-fgure of Ibls
was to be moulded. For a more thorough treatment of this issue, see my 2000
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 171
their mention here is not coincidental. Rather, they, too come to act as
a rhetorical means of remembering and warning that the believers may
come to their senses in a type of super-mythical Strafegende.
In all cases, the ofence denounced by the Qurn is primarily that
of breaking Gods covenant, in essence rejecting belief (kufr) after hav-
ing entered into such a relationship with God. Tematic parallels
Iblss refusal to acknowledge Adam, the Jews refusal to acknowledge
Muh ammad as the prophet foretold by their own scripture are
apparent. Both parties are guilty of breaking Gods covenant, the for-
mer in the highly exemplary mythical sphere of pre-history, the latter
in the actual time of revelation. Hence, the failure of the Jews to
submit to the message of Muh ammad comes to mirror Ibls act of
utter haughtiness (kibr) and disobedience (kufr) towards God. As such,
the Jews punishment will not be light, either. Tey are the ones men-
tioned in Q 2:41 who sell Gods signs for a small price; indeed, they
are also the ones who buy the life of this world at the expense of the
Hereafter. Teir punishment shall be heavy, and they shall fnd no
help, mentioned later on (Q 2:86).
Not only do the Jews break their covenant with God by refusing to
acknowledge His promised prophet and the message he carries; they are
also hypocrites. Facing the new Arab prophet they outwardly acknowl-
edge him, while in their hearts they reject him. As such, they aspire to
hypocrisy (nifq). Tey are as are the Christians referred to as
people of the book on several occasions in this sra (Q 2:87, 101,
105, 144146), but by breaking their pact with God and consciously
altering His words as these are found in their own book
(Q 2:75, 78) so as not to recognize Muh ammad as a divine messenger,
they reveal their kufr. Moreover, they wish the believers to become
kufr like them (Q 2:109).
As Gods superior knowledge (ilm) in the face of such arrogance is
stressed throughout the sra, including the Ibls-narrative, the message
seems to be that humans should not ever pretend to know better than
God (see, for instance, Q 2:255). Gods creatures be they humans,
angels or jinn must always be prepared to submit to Gods will, for
University of Copenhagen M.A. thesis, Ibls in the Qurn: Selected Interpretations
from Muqtil to Ibn Kathr.
172 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
only He knows. As a Medinan revelation, srat al-baqara may thus be
read as a fnal show-down with ban Isrl s all-too self-satisfed image
of themselves as the (only) chosen people with carte blanche to accept
or reject Gods prophets. As such, an occasion is also provided for
highlighting the new, righteous community of believers and for spell-
ing out its creedal and ritual characteristics as opposed to those of the
other self-proclaimed monotheists (specifcally Q 2:116, God has
begotten a son and 2:138, baptism). Belief in one God, the last
day, the angels, the books and the prophets, praying towards a new
qibla (Q 2:142144), giving alms, fasting and pilgrimage become the
new marks of membership.
It is within this thematic framework of superior divine knowledge on
the one hand and human ignorance and arrogance on the other that we
must understand the performance of Ibls in srat al-baqara. As with
the Jews, he thinks himself chosen and therefore proceeds to act, in a
fatal blend of ignorance and arrogance, in direct opposition to Gods
command. Te other angels, on the other hand, although they initially
question Gods plan, in the end submit themselves to Gods will as true
Muslims. Te foremost message of the Islamic creed inherent in the
very term islm, submission is stressed in the second (but most
probably among the last historically, it should be recalled) sra of the
Qurn as the only way of worship. In fact, the very opposite phenom-
enon of islm kufr, rejection and its adherents are addressed
throughout this sra in a continued efort to stress the Mosaic distinc-
tion between faith and unbelief.
Shirk and Polytheism: An Inter-Monotheistic Dispute?
In srat al-kahf (Q 18), Ibls story is narratively framed by denounce-
ment of another group of people in opposition to the message of
Muh ammad. Q 18:50, which has been one of the more important
Quranic statements for defning the nature of Ibls in post-Quranic
Islamic tradition, reads:
And when We said to the angels, Bow down to Adam, they bowed down,
except Ibls; he was from among the jinn (kna min al-jinn) and strayed from the
command of his Lord (fa-fasaqa an amri rabbi-hi). So will you really take him
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 173
and his ofspring as protectors instead of Me, when they are your enemy? Evil
(bisa) the wrongdoers would get in exchange!
Among Muslim interpreters of the Qurn there is a general unwilling-
ness to acknowledge Ibls as one among the angels commanded to bow
down to Adam. Here, one should think, matters are quite explicit, for
not only does God bid His angels to bow down, but they all do so,
except Ibls. We are even told that he fasaqa an amri rabbi-hi,
strayed from the command of his Lord, leaving no doubt that Ibls
really was among those commanded to bow down. Te intermediary
phrase kna min al-jinn, he was from among the jinn, however,
leaves us with a problem as to Iblss nature. Was he an angel or was
he a jinn, and is there any diference? We are, it appears, told that his
reason for straying had something to do with him being a jinn. Te
statement has been read by most Muslim interpreters as pointing
directly to the innate nature of Satan, that being fre, nr, as in
wa-khuliq al-jinn min mrij min nr, the jinn were created of the
burning tip of the fres tongue, and al-nr, the fre of hell. But what
is the point of singling out Ibls as jinn in a context where he is obvi-
ously an angel? Te primary object of the fnal rhetorical phrase, Will
you really take him and his ofspring as protectors instead of Me?,
and hence the motive for denouncing Ibls as a jinn is, I believe, indi-
cated in the two verses immediately following:
I did not ask them to witness the creation of the heavens and the earth, nor their
own creation, and I did not take as helpers such as lead astray! One day He will
say: Call upon those you thought were My partners! And they will call upon
them, but they will not answer. And We shall place between them a place of
destruction. (Q 18:5152)
Here the Qurn appears to be explicitly polemical against those who
ascribe partners to God, al-mushrikn, and implicitly against those
who take jinn and their like to be gods in Gods place. Now, remain-
ing within the framework of the cultural memory provided by the
life story of Muh ammad (Sra) and elaborated by the post-Quranic
Islamic tradition, these polytheists are depicted as representing the
dominant culture prevalent in the Arabian peninsula around the time
of Muh ammad and among his frst and fercest opponents. With its
174 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
unambiguous call for monotheism, these people would also seem to
have been among those to feel most immediately threatened by the new
message he carried. Muh ammad challenged their religion and ritual
practice, hitherto translatable to surrounding polytheistic cultures,
by calling for the submission to one God only and thus for the abo-
lition of polytheism; by doing so, he targeted the very basis of their
existence. Abolishing polytheism in Mecca would have meant a serious
threat to the economic foundation of that town, and that is appar-
ently why its townsmen rejected Muh ammad in the frst place. Teir
religious faith was supported by a strong economic, social, and reli-
gious network centred round the commercial and pilgrimage activities
in Mecca. Not only was Mecca the starting point and end destina-
tion for trade caravans from the Near and Far East, but the town was
also home to the Kaba, visited by polytheist pilgrims the year round.
Indeed, at that time the inhabitants of Mecca seem to have profted
from such a position and the religious prestige it ofered. In socio-
economic and religious terms, this was apparently the tightly knit insti-
tution of greed and ignorance attacked by the enlightened Muh ammad
with words, and later, when that strategy had failed, with the sword. In
this battle, the Qurn appears to have been a signifcant weapon. Just
as the Meccan poets loved to ridicule Muh ammad as a madman and a
poet too taken in by his own words, Muh ammad, armed as he was with
the very words of God, would bite back and threaten the unbelieving
polytheists in a language equally powerful to their own:
Say: the truth is from your Lord, so let him who wishes believe ( fa-la-yumin),
and let him who wishes reject ( fa-la-yakfur). We have prepared for the wrong-
doers a fre the tent of which will surround them like a wall, and if they ask for
relief they will be given water like melted brass, burning their faces! Evil the
drink and bad the resting place! (Q 18:29)
Tat polytheists may indeed be the target of Q 18:5052, is indicated
by the wording of Q 18:50s fnal rhetorical question, Will you really
take him [Ibls] and his ofspring as protectors instead of Me? It
appears to have been a widespread pre-Islamic belief among the Arabs
(and other contemporary polytheistic cultures) that gods had ofspring,
including daughters (see Q 37:150153). Hence, introduced to the
new god al-ilh, or simply Allh, the God, it appears to have been
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 175
only natural for polytheists to ascribe to this God ofspring as well.
Srat al-s ft (Q 37), which also addresses the issue of belief in more
than one God in highly polemical terms, is informative in this regard.
Verses 149158 of that sra read:
So ask them, are there for your Lord daughters and for them sons? Or did We
create the angels female, while they witnessed? Is it not [rather] that they say
from their own invention, God has begotten children? Tey are liars! Should
He have chosen daughters over sons? What is with you?! How do you judge
[thus]? Will you not be reminded? Or do you have a clear authority? Bring then
your book, if you are so sincere! And they have placed between Him and the
jinna a blood relationship, but the jinna knew quite well that they are to be taken
forth [before His judgement]!
It appears that God, should He ever agree to have ofspring, would
surely not choose daughters! Besides voicing a somewhat dubious
admonition for a strictly monotheistic setting, the above verses actu-
ally refect the pre-Islamic conception of the spiritual world: God has
ofspring, so why not daughters? Tis latter phenomenon is, of course,
given credibility by the fact that people in and around Mecca appear
to have worshipped goddesses as well as gods, and in particular three
major goddesses, Allt, al-Uzz, and Mant. At some point the Arabs,
possibly infuenced by Jewish and Christian angelologies, appear to
have ascribed to the angels the role as Gods interceding ofspring, and
as such they seem not to have discriminated between angels and jinn
at all. Both entities are represented in the above verses in the perfect
morphological synthesis of al-jinna, a feminine form of jinn. In spite
of its problematical origin in the morphological root of j-n-n, the jinna
have, nevertheless, from early exegesis onwards, been interpreted as
signifying angels and not simply female jinn. Tat fact, along with
other Quranic indications of a blurred, and not so black-and-white,
universe of spiritual beings, holds, I think, some interesting perspec-
tives for the notion of jinn in general and for the fgure of Ibls and the
issue of his disputed nature in particular. Tis is not the place for an
elaborate discussion of the matter, however; sufce it to say that the
sharp distinction usually made by interpreters of the Qurn between
angels and jinn, and between the angels and Ibls in particular, does
not seem to be warranted in scripture or in the early interpretative
tradition.
176 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
In any case, in sra 18:50 Ibls is a jinn, and the audience is asked,
Will you really take him and his ofspring as protectors instead of
Me? As another pre-Islamic god, Ibls and his ofspring are placed
opposite God, that the polytheist Arabs may fnally come to their
senses. Multiple gods are, quite obviously, likened to evil in the shape
of Ibls and his ofspring. It is for the polytheist to choose between
submission to the one true God and worshiping several false ones,
between reward in the garden of paradise and punishment in the fre
of hell.
One day he will say: Call upon those you thought were My partners! And they
will call upon them, but they will not answer. And We shall place between them
a place of destruction. And the sinners shall see the Fire and fear that they may
ft it, and indeed, they shall fnd no way of turning away from it. (Q 18:5253)
By naming Ibls a jinn, and hence something diferent from angels,
as understood by most interpreters of the Qurn, Q 18:50 accom-
plishes two important ends. First of all, as a jinn, Ibls is formally sepa-
rated from the other obedient angels, and the foundation for a rather
idealistic angelology is laid. It will be for the later Quranic revelation
(Q 2:177) and post-Quranic Islamic interpretative tradition to develop
and defne the fnal dogma of angels as pure and ever-abiding servants
of God, and to this end distinguishing Ibls from their spiritual sphere is
defnitely necessary. As the only divine means for communication with
humans and prophets, lest God reveal Himself to all humans, angels
must necessarily be one-dimensionally and unequivocally good. Tey
cannot have a bad side to them, lest they corrupt the divine revela-
tion. Te infamous incident of the Satanic verses fully attests to this
danger.
Secondly, having defned Ibls as the black sheep of the spiritual fam-
ily, embodying all the hitherto possible negative aspects of angels, the
jinn and belief in them as the daughters of God are cast in terms of
false beliefs punishable by eternal damnation in hell. Belief in the
jinn(a) as interceding creatures is tantamount to worshipping the devil
himself. Tus, while the mushrikn may not be demonized explicitly in
this sra, their beliefs certainly are.
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 177
Alternatively, and following the reading suggested by Gerald Haw-
ting in his Te Idea of Idolatry and the Emergence of Islam (1999),
Q 18:5053 could be read as polemicizing not against polytheists but
against fellow monotheists such as Christians and their belief in Jesus
as Gods son. At least, the sra commences with a clear warning to
those who say that God has begotten a son (Q 18:45), a reproach
that is echoed in Q 6:100101 in terms equally confusing as to who
exactly it is that ascribes partners to God. Is the admonition directed
against proper polytheists of what is imagined to be the Meccan
Quraysh, or is it directed against Christians in general? Following a
reminding phrase, Tese are signs for a people who believe, the rele-
vant verses read:
But they place for God the jinn as partners (shurak), when He created them,
and they falsely and having no knowledge attribute to Him sons and daughters.
Praised be He, and elevated above what they attribute to Him! From Him origi-
nated the heavens and the earth; how could there be for Him a son, when He has
no consort? He created all things and He is all-knowledgeable. (Q 6:100101)
Another indication that Q 18:50 formed part of a polemical reminder
directed against other monotheists rather than against polytheists is
the narrative context in which that verse appears. It is, on the one
hand, framed by the Quranic version of the popular Christian legend
of the Companions of the Cave (Q 18:926) and, on the other, by the
story of Moses and the mysterious Khidr, the green man, testing the
faith and patience of Moses (Q 18:6082), followed by the legendary
tale of Dh l-Qarnayn, the two-horned, identifed by Islamic tradi-
tion as either the Macedonian general Alexander the Great (d. 323
BCE) or some great Persian king, and his putting an end to the mis-
chief of the unbelieving peoples of Yjj and Mjj (Gog and Magog)
(Q 18:8398). Sra 18 ends with a fnal warning to those unbeliev-
ers (alladhna kafar) who think that they can take Gods servants as
their protectors instead of Him. Teir punishment will be in hell,
while those who believe and do good deeds will be rewarded in par-
adise (Q 18:102107). While it is hard not to notice the implicit
denouncement of the Christian faith in Jesus as Gods son in the fnal
warning statement, the three legends of the Companions of the Cave,
178 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
Moses and Khidr, and Dh l-Qarnayn, appear to be united by a
another spiritual motive: Moses and Dh l-Qarnayn, each in his own
way, embark on journeys leading them to greater insight into weighty
spiritual matters such as the greater good of seemingly evil events
(Moses) and that human action, however formidable, only counts as
much as God allows it to (Dh l-Qarnayn). Te fantastic legend of the
young righteous men of the Cave, who sleep for an indefnite amount
of time only to wake up and fnd that their people have forgotten the
object of true worship and have taken to worshiping other gods than
Him, seems to ft this over-all pattern, too. As a parable, however, it
may also be read as illustrating to an audience of monotheists the per-
ils of corrupting ones faith, a charge forwarded against Christians as
well as Jews on more than one occasion in the Qurn.
Qiys: Te Perils of Ignorance
A third and fnal theme to be treated here illustrating othering as per-
sonifed by Ibls in the Qurn distinguishes itself in several ways from
the ones already mentioned. Comprised here under the term qiys,
meaning the act of coming to a conclusion on an issue through draw-
ing analogy between it and former cases of a similar nature, this narra-
tive theme appears to be embedded in at least four variations of the
Ibls-story in the Qurn.
Qiys is an interpretative instrument surrounded by some contro-
versy in Islamic theology and jurisprudence. While deduction by anal-
ogy appears to have been viewed with much scepticism and fear that
its practitioners confuse qiys with ray making up ones own opin-
ion as opposed to sound and well-founded knowledge, ilm
especially by early Muslims, it has, nonetheless, become accepted as
the last resort of the four sources of law (us l al-fqh) of the four Sunni
schools of law. Te dry remark of the Qurn commentator al-T abar
(d. 923), awwalu man qsa Ibls, Ibls was the frst to draw analogy
(T abar 1969:XII, 327), recalls, however, the prevalent sceptical atti-
tude of the early generations of learned Muslims towards this tool of
interpretation.
Te four versions of the Quranic Ibls-narrative to be considered
here touch upon some of the same themes of othering as the ones
mentioned above but are further characterized by the fact that they, at
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 179
least implicitly, target Muslims as well. Te tone of voice found in
sras 7, 15, 17 and 38 is, to a large degree, much more solemn and
hence impersonal than that in the other Ibls-sras. For instance, God
no longer appeals to humans that they may grasp His message before
it is too late; rather, He establishes in a resigned manner the
state of human afairs:
To every people there is an appointed time; and when their time comes,
not an hour can they cause to be delayed, nor can they advance it.
O children of Adam! When there come to you prophets from among you telling
you about My signs; who are god-fearing and righteous, no fear shall they have
and they shall not grieve. But those who deny Our signs (kadhdhab bi-yti-n)
and are haughty towards them (wa-istakbar an-h), they are the companions of
the Fire; they shall stay therein forever. (Q 7:3436)
Visions of the judgment day are prevalent in all four sras as are vivid
descriptions of the pleasures of paradise and the terrors of hell. Sras 7
and 17 especially are rife with Strafegenden. We are reminded of the
exemplary cases of Noah and the food (sra 7), Lot and the annihila-
tion of the sodomizers (sra 15), the destruction of the ancient city of
Tamd (sra 17) and, on a more abstract level, of the suferings of
Job (sra 38). In these sras God is very similar to the Torahs destruc-
tive God of wrath: He is the punisher, the destroyer:
Tere are not a people, but We shall destroy it before the Day of Judgement, or
punish it with a terrible punishment. Tat was written in the Book. (Q 17:58)
Te sin of arrogance in the face of truth people thinking that they
always know best and its repercussions in terms of ultimate divine
punishment describe the general theme of these four sras. It is as a
symbol of this haughty attitude that Ibls enters the scene at the very
beginning of srat al-arf (Q 7):
We established you frmly on earth, and provided for you what is necessary
for living thereupon. Small are the thanks that you give! We created you,
then We gave you shape, then We said to the angels: Bow down to Adam! And
they bowed down, except Ibls; he was not among those to bow down (lam yakun
min al-sjidna). He said: What prevented you from bowing down, when I
bade you?
180 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
He said: I am better than him! You created me of fre (nr) and him of clay
(t n)! (Q 7:1012)
Following various expressions of divine omnipotence (Q 15:125 and
17:4160) and human humility (Q 38:6570), the ungratefulness and
haughtiness of Ibls is further stressed in the slightly more detailed
divine-satanic dialogue of sras 15, 17, and 38:
We created man from hollow sounding clay moulded into shape from putrid
mud (s als lin min h amin masnn); the jnn, him We had already created from
the fre of the burning hot wind (nr al-samm). And your Lord said to the
angels: I am creating a man of hollow sounding clay moulded into shape from
putrid mud, and when I have formed him into shape and blown into him of My
spirit, fall down to him in obedience! And so all the angels bowed down
together, except Ibls; he refused (ab) to be with those prostrating (an yakna
maa al-sjidna). He said: O Ibls, what is with you that you are not among
those prostrating? He said: I am not going to bow down to a man whom You
created from hollow sounding clay moulded into shape from putrid mud!
(Q 15:2633)
And when We said to the angels, Bow down to Adam, they all bowed down,
except Ibls; he said: shall I bow down to whom You created of clay (t n)?
He said: Have You seen this that You have honoured above me? Verily, if You
give me respite until Judgement Day, I will surely bring his ofspring under my
power, but for a few! (Q 17:6162)
Your Lord said to the angels: I am creating a man from clay (t n), and when I
have formed him into shape and blown into him of My spirit, fall down to him
in obedience! And so all the angels bowed down together, except Ibls; he was
proud (istakbara) and among those ungrateful (wa-kna min al-kfrna). He
said: O Ibls, what prevented you from bowing down to what I created with
My own hands? Are you proud? Or [do you think] you are among the high ones
(al-lna)? He said: I am better than him; You created me of fre (nr) and him
of clay (t n)! (Q 38:7176)
All four versions of the Ibls-story are remarkably alike in their focus
on the haughtiness of Ibls as the key characteristic of his disobedience.
He refuses to be among those to prostrate themselves to Gods new
creation and he is deemed to be one of the kfrn; but it is his pride
(istikbr) and haughtiness an khayrun minhu, I am better than
him! that appears to secure him damnation until the judgement
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 181
day. Te basic error committed by Ibls in these verses is commented
upon by al-T abar thus:
Al-H asan and Ibn Sayrayn used to say, Te frst to deduct through analogy was
Ibls (awwalu man qsa Ibls), by which they mean to say that deducting
through drawing analogy is an error (al-qiys khat a). (T abar 1969:XII, 327)
Te analogy that Ibls draws is, of course, the one of I am created of
fre and he is created of clay. Fire being the stronger element, it burns
clay thus, I am better than him! In comparing the two natural ele-
ments of fre and clay, however, Ibls overlooks a crucial detail: God
has blown into man of His own spirit, His rh , and thus given humans
an important advantage to the rest of His creation. Te seemingly hol-
low fgure of putrid clay before Ibls is not hollow at all. Created in the
image of God, given a substance of Gods, Adam is God. Te angels,
apparently not aware of this divine element in Adam either but simply
obeying divine orders, may seem to bow down but in the end they are
really submitting themselves to Gods will. Ibls, on the other hand,
not only rejects Gods command, but he also does so for the wrong
reasons, claiming to know the nature of Gods creation better than the
creator Himself. Tragically, Ibls appears to be acting in good faith.
Why should he bow down to what is clearly, outwardly, a creature
inferior to himself? Tis is the origin of the paradox of opposites and
the tragedy of Ibls, which Sufs such as al-T abars contemporary, the
10th century Mans r al-H allj, contemplated with a clear view to
human nature. To the ecstatic mystics mind, the answer is, of course,
that only by following Gods order in what appears to be the reverse
of Gods will do not worship anybody but Me! will one arrive at
the truth of the matter. As for Ibls, to al-H allj, an exemplary indi-
vidual alongside Muh ammad himself, he is only apparently punished;
in fact, in his destruction he is united with God as the true and ulti-
mate true believer (muwah h id ) that he is (H allj 1913).
Tese four versions of the Quranic Ibls narrative touch upon a very
human theme, namely the desire to understand, and to understand
what lies beyond immediate understanding through interpretation.
Tis seems to be the lesson taught by Ibls tragedy in sras 7, 15, 17,
and 38. Do not think; know! Never trust your intellectual faculties so
182 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
much as to lose faith in God! Ultimate knowledge belongs to God
alone; therefore submit to Him in absolute obedience, islm! Within
this didactic framework, Iblss case comes to illustrate the conse-
quences of arrogantly placing too much trust in human understanding
instead of commemorating God at all times. Te explicit connection
made between Ibls and qiys in classical Muslim readings of especially
srat al-arf is all the more interesting since the enemy to be is not
pictured here as, for instance, a Jew or a pagan mushrik. Rather, what
is brought to mind and warned against is the principle of arrogance
itself, epitomized by the fgure of Ibls. As we are not dealing with the
usual lot of human opponents to the Islamic monotheistic cause but
rather with a general principle, the enemy may even be a muslim, one
among the believers, just as Ibls appeared among the angels until his
fatal choice of interpreting through analogy placed him as an unbeliev-
ing outcast. Consequently, one may argue, fear of misuse of qiys
comes to exercise a certain amount of control on the freedom of scrip-
tural interpretation among the believers themselves.
Treating Ibls analytically as a narrative fgure of memory epitomiz-
ing various themes of sin in the literary text of the Qurn exposes him
as a symbolically loaded entity: Unbelievers, hypocrites, polytheists,
Jews and Christians, and even other Muslims, all fnd a common
denominator in the seven versions of this characters story in the
Qurn. Besides issues of dogma the nature of angels and jinn, free
will and predestination intimately connected to the mythical back-
ground story of Ibls, a reading of the narrative Quranic context in
which this story is set reveals several layers of meaning, each and every
one providing us with some meaning as to why this story has to re-
appear seven times in more or less difering versions.
Tere seems to be an inner as well as an outer logic connected to the
Quranic tale of the origins of Satan and these are only loosely joined
together. Te inner, the very mythical tale of the creation of humans
and the disobedience of the angel Ibls, reaches back into even older
Semitic and probably also Indo-European myths of creation and the
simultaneous coming into being of evil. Remnants of this mythical
framework are found in the Qurn, not only in its story about Adam
and Ibls but also drifting about in that text as mythical variations of
that story.
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 183
Te outer logic, that is, the narrative Quranic context framing the
seven versions of Ibls story, may be a much later construction, having
in fact nothing to do with the mythical Ibls at all. Instead, his story
is told and re-told by the Quranic author within certain appropriate
narrative frameworks aiming at didactically educating and warning a
community of potential believers. Te seven versions represent inter-
pretations of one and the same general theme, namely sin or, as
Islamic tradition does not operate with the notion of sin in the same
theologically loaded manner as does the Christian, this may be better
termed ways of going wrong. Within the framework of seven Quranic
sras, Ibls personifes the many faces of ways of going wrong and
hence communicates a strong message to the believers: Tese (and their
ways) are your enemies!
As several of the seven versions overlap textually, in some cases actu-
ally repeating each other word by word, their contextuality being
set within parallel narrative frameworks of either former communities
of believers who forgot the meaning of true worship, became corrupt
and were punished, or within what appears to be a contemporary
polytheistic community obviously becomes extremely important
for their interpretation. Here, I have indicated three major sub-themes
of othering at play in the Qurns story about Ibls: 1) kufr, nifq and,
to some extent, nasy unbelief (rightly; lack of gratitude), hypoc-
risy and forgetting or putting aside Gods pact; 2) shirk idolatry
and polytheism; and 3) qiys arrogantly interpreting the words of
God against proper knowledge. As such, none is dispensable; each rep-
resents an aspect not of evil but of sin in its Islamic sense of going
wrong. To be sure, what we are dealing with here are not lesser sins,
but absolute sins, the ones challenging the fundamental trinity of
Islamic faith and ritual: Gods almightiness, Gods unity, and Gods
knowledge. Ibls personifes the very antithesis of these central Quranic
dogmas; without him and the alternative path(s) he epitomizes, these
dogmas would not in themselves make sense to humans. As such, Ibls
is the ultimate sinner, his story providing the frame for narrating a host
of variations of sin worthy of remembrance, so that the believer does
not go wrong.
One may perhaps even go as far as to speak of Satan, the prophet; in
this mode, Satan represents the very anti-message of Gods divine decree,
184 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
the path not to be followed by any means. As such, Satan becomes an
ya in his own right, a sign on the road, so to speak, of the individuals
spiritual path, indicating the road not to be taken and a sure stumbling
block the original meaning of the term satan should one venture
onto his road anyway (see Awn 1983). As opposed to God, Satan rep-
resents the anti-thesis; as opposed to the prophet Muh ammad, Satan
holds the anti-message. Still, his message is, as attested to by the Qurn
as well as traditional sayings from Muh ammad, one of great dynamics,
power, and magic (see e.g., Q 7:27).
Tree elements may be identifed in this respect. According to the
Qurn, Satan has a clear mission of his own, namely to lead humans
astray with the permission of God (Q 7:1618, 15:3942, 17:6265,
38:8285). To this end, Satan uses his waswasa (Q 7:20, 20:120), his
alluring deceitful whisper, to bring about Gods judgement. In the
Qurn, Satan actually functions as a bringer of knowledge, almost
along Promethean lines, ofering his gift of knowledge to Adam and
Eve in paradise with fatal consequences for them all. As the couple
taste the forbidden tree of knowledge, their individual sexes are
revealed to them, as are hitherto unknown feelings of desire and shame
(Q 7:2022, 20:121). Adam and Eve hide, but to no avail: God sees
everything and punishes the couple by sending them into their predes-
tined exile on earth along with Satan as each others mutual enemies
(Q 2:36). As Gods chosen khalfa, Adam carries with him the critical
knowledge of knowing wrong from right; a knowledge which he,
as Gods frst prophet, must make sure to spread to his successors.
Authority, as in authority to transmit revelation, is central here;
this is a narrative theme apparent also in Quranic references to unbe-
lievers mocking Muh ammad as an impostor (kdhib, Q 25:4142,
34:78), a poet (shir) or a soothsayer (khin, Q 69:4042), or as
someone possessed (majnn, Q 7:184, 68:2, 81:22). Tese references
to what is perceived as lack of authority are no coincidence. On the
issue of authority, Wansbrough (2006:50 and 7071) states:
Within the monotheistic tradition the organizing principle of a confessional
community may be located in its defnition of authority. By authority I mean
the immediate and tangible instruments of legitimation: those means by which
the sanctions of a transcendent deity are realized in practice, those terms within
which a theodicy becomes credible and workable. . . . Te Islamic concept of
authority may be fairly described as apostolic. In the midrashic styles of salva-
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 185
tion history the functions of scripture were to generate (historicization) and to
embellish (exemplifcation) a portrait of the early community, and simultane-
ously to provide bona fdes of its covenantal dispensation. Dominant there is the
charismatic fgure of the Apostle of God in an essentially public posture. Inform-
ing the narrative is a polemical concern to depict the emergence of religious pol-
ity (umma) out of a more or less traditionally articulated theophany (wah y).
Te polemic refected by the Qurn in terms of unbelievers mocking
the prophet as not being authorized as claimed, appears then, it would
seem, as an efective means to counter the very accusation. It provides
the Quranic narrator with an opportunity, not only to polemicize
against the unbelievers, but also, and perhaps more signifcantly, to
establish once and for all Muh ammad as an authoritative revealer of
truth. In the process, Satan is placed as the teller of untruths.
Conclusion
Islam is a religious tradition defned by memory in so many ways that
many of us have yet to realize the true signifcance of memory as the
single most formative discourse characterizing the religious heritage of
Muslims. From the Qurns self-refection as a fnal remembrance
for the people (dhikr lil-ns), incessantly reminding its audience of
the need to remember the monotheistic pact with God through pun-
ishment stories of old and to Muslims taking great efort and pride
in memorizing their holy scripture, from the (alledgedly) built-on-
memory massive corpus of h adth conserving, as well as defning, for
future generations of Muslims the exemplary practice of Muh ammad
and his aboriginal community of believers to the circular-style argu-
mentation of modern day Islamists, claiming to win the future by refer-
ring to the memory of an ideal past, the concept of memory and the
expressed need to remember the distinction between faith and unbelief,
submission and arrogant rejection, appears to play a signifcant role for
the formation and constant reformation of the religious heritage that is
Islam. In particular, memory and the urge to remember strongly per-
vades the ethico-religious language of the Qurn.
Te living on in the present of what is perceived to be certain
foundational events of the past, what Assmann has called cultural
memory, seems very much to be a hermeneutical source drawn upon
by the Quranic author in his attempt to outline a new and more
186 J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187
righteous monotheistic identity. Te factuality of historical events is
not relevant to such identity-making (although it will be claimed to be
so); only their actuality is. Relevance comes not from a historical past
but from a chaotic present in which these events must be remembered
as important signs of the eternal divine pact. Te grand narratives of
Quranic salvation history, describing the events in which Muh ammad,
following in the footsteps of Gods Biblical prophets, carved out the
space of a new religion in stark opposition to a contemporary polythe-
ist environment, inform the Islamic traditions defning of itself as the
last inheritor of an ancient monotheistic tradition of distinguishing
between true and false in religion. Te narratives ofered by Quranic
cultural memory are not only polemical, meant to establish and main-
tain a strong sense of monotheistic communal identity, but they are
also inherently intolerant towards the religious communities rejected
as polytheistic, thus ofering a counter-image of the Other gone wrong
against which the new community of righteous believers may orient
themselves. It is the critical aspect of such identity making and its nec-
essary parallel constructions of othering that has been the subject of
this paper. Te point has been made that the Quranic Ibls-fgure
ofers an illustrative case study not only of mythical proto-typical ene-
mies of the Islamic cause but also of exemplary narratives indicating a
course of action for the righteous. Just as the narrative fgure of Ibls is
instrumental to Gods cause of laying down the two mutually exclud-
ing paths of true and false worship, so too the believers, mirroring
themselves in these narratives, will be able to perceive themselves as
being placed in a salvation historical setting in which their choice actu-
ally makes a diference. In short, Quranic cultural memory ofers
myths to live by.
References
Assmann, Jan. 1997. Moses the Egyptian: Te Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Awn, Peter J. 1983. Satans Tragedy and Redemption. Ibls in S f Psychology. Leiden:
E. J. Brill.
Bodman, Whitney. 1999. Stalking Ibls: In Search for an Islamic Teodicy. In
Myth, Historical Archetypes and Symbolic Figures in Arabic Literature, ed. Angelika
J. Butler / Numen 58 (2011) 157187 187
Neuwirth, Birgit mbalo, Sebastian Gnther, and Maher Jarrar, Beirut and Stutt-
gart: Franz Steiner, 247269.
Gruenwald, Ithamar. 1994. Te Other Self: Introductory Notes. In Concepts of the
Other in Near Eastern Religions, ed. Ilai Alon, Ithamar Gruenwald, and Itamar
Singer (Israel Oriental Studies 14), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 717.
H allj, H usayn Ibn Mans r al-. 1913. Kitb al-T awsn. Ed. Louis Massignon. Paris:
Paul Geuthner.
Hawting, Gerald R. 1999. Te Idea of Idolatry and the Emergence of Islam: From
Polemic to History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jefrey, Arthur. 1938. Te Foreign Vocabulary of the Qurn. Baroda: Oriental Institute.
Neuwirth, Angelika. 2000. Negotiating Justice: A Pre-Canonical Reading of the
Quranic Creation Accounts, part I and II. Journal of Quranic Studies
2(1):2541; 2(2):118.
. 2001. Qurn, Crisis and Memory: Te Quranic Path Towards Canoniza-
tion as Refected in the Anthropogonic Accounts. In Crisis and Memory in
Islamic Societies: Proceedings of the Tird Summer Academy of the Working Group
Modernity and Islam Held at the Orient Institute of the German Oriental Society in
Beirut, eds. Angelika Neuwirth and Andreas Pfitsch, Beirut/Wrzburg: Ergon
Verlag, 113153.
Pagels, Elaine. 1995. Te Origin of Satan. New York: Random House.
T abar, Ibn Jarr al-. 1969. Jmi al-bayn an tawl y al-Qurn. Ed. Mah md
Muh ammad Shkir. Cairo: Dr al-Marif bi-Mis r.
Wansbrough, John. 2006. Te Sectarian Milieu: Content and Composition of Islamic
Salvation History. New York: Prometheus Books.