River, People and Industry:

The Pol i t i c s and Pol l ut i on of Ri ver Chal i yar

( draft)
Report Submitted to
Kerala Research Programme to Local Level
Development


By
Abey George
&
Jyothi Krishnan












January2002
Contents
Abbreviations
Acknowledgements
1 Introduction 1
2 Grasim: The Process and Pollution 5
3 A History of Broken Promises 11
4 Corporate Irresponsibility: the Grasim Style 36
5 A Government that failed to govern 49
6 The struggle to protect their river 59
7 Conclusion: Did anybody learn anything? 71
8 Appendixes 79
9 References




Acknowledgements:

We deeply thank the common people of Vazhakkad and Mavoor
area who spent long hours with us, recollecting the history
of the factory and the struggle. A lot of individuals,
including Mr. P.K.M. Chekoo, Dr. Achuthan, Mr. A.Vasu, Mr. C.
Surendran, Mr. Sukur, Mr. Mohammed Kunji, and Dr. Hamid
helped us in this effort. Long conversations with some of the
above went a long way in the preparation of this report. They
have also shared with us their personal collection of
documents. In particular, we would like to thank the members
of late K.A Rehman Sahibs family, who permitted us to go
through his personal collection of documents.

We would also like to thank our research assistants Ms. Selvi
and Ms. Ajitha, who helped us in this effort.

Last, but not the least, we thank the KRPLLD for the funding
of this project which made this work possible. We would like
to especially thank Dr. K.N. Narayanan Nair for his valuable
comments and encouragement at various stages of the work.

Abey George and Jyothi Krishnan.
1
Introduction
One can perhaps say that the
foundation for industrial development
in Kerala over the past 5 decades was
laid by the first communist ministry
in the state led by late Sri. E.M.S.
Namboodiripad. This ministry put
forward a development strategy that
was focussed on industrialisation by
utilising the rich natural resources
of Kerala without exploiting the
working class. It was a part of the
same strategy that made them invite
the Birlas to start a factory in
Kerala. While doing so, the Birlas
were assured of using to their
satisfaction, the rich natural
resources of the state which was
considered to be plentiful at that
time i.e. they were permitted to use
all the bamboo in the forests of
Kerala at a nominal rate, the
plentiful water in the river Chaliyar
free of cost, and electricity at
extremely cheap rates.)
1


The factory began in 1962 with an
initial capital investment worth Rs
16 crores, and over the years, it
made profit which was many times the
initial investment. Beginning with
the Nilambur Valley, they increased
their area of resource exploitation
to cover the entire forests of
Malabar, and by 1988, all the bamboo
in the forests of the entire state
was opened up to them. Added to this,

1
In Kerala, during, the 19 60s, 70s and 80s, the high tension and extra high tension consumers
(big industries) were provided electricity at rates cheaper than what was available to domestic
consumers. For further details see George and Krishnan, 2000.
eucalyptus plantation were raised by
the Forest Department and the Kerala
Forest Department Corporation to
fulfil the promises made by the
government to the Birlas.
The story of pollution begins
with the claim of the Birlas that
there was no such problem, there was
only a colour change in the river
water. Air pollution was not even
considered as an issue. The
subsequent stand taken by the
management was that whatever little
pollution was caused by the factory
could be redressed by transporting
the effluents by a pipeline to the
Arabian Sea. Later the management
implemented the recommendations of
NEERI, but the pollution continued.
Thereafter it was a long list of
committees, expert teams and review
teams and the last one also said that
there was no pollution, but only a
slight colour-change in the river
water (A.D. Damodaran Committee in
1998).

This study attempts to understand
what happened between the agreements
and promises, between the claim and
the counter-claims, and what we
failed to see amidst the long list of
committees and expert opinions.

This study was conducted during
2000-2001. During this period, field
work was conducted in the pollution
affected areas of Grasim Industries
belonging to Malapuram and Kozhikode
districts of Kerala State. Extensive
conversations were held with various
groups of people viz. people affected
by pollution, people who lost their
livelihoods when the river got
polluted, present and former workers
of the factory, trade union leaders,
political party leaders, elected
members of the Panchayat Raj
Institutions, anti-pollution
campaigners etc. A detailed
Chronology of Events was prepared
based on available published
documents, as well as conversations
with various people associated with
this issue.

The report consists of 7 chapters.

Chapter 2 introduces the reader
to Grasim Industries, the production
process as well as the pollution
caused by it. Details about the
pattern of water used by the factory,
and of the effluents generated is
also given.

Chapter 3 deals with the history
of the factory as well as the anti-
pollution movement. In this chapter
we have attempted to trace the
history of the factory as well as the
anti-pollution movement. It also
traces the history of breached
agreements by the management and the
government.

Since the Birlas were invited to
set up a factory in Kerala, they
enjoyed an upper hand in almost all
their dealings with the government.
This is clear from the 1958 agreement
onwards. Chapter 4 analyses how the
monopoly over bamboo in the forests
of Kerala was transferred to the
Birlas through this agreement. This
chapter also discusses the
manipulation of a very shrewd
corporate management, which
highlights among other things, the
governments own inefficiency in
dealing with issue.

Chapter 5 discusses how the
government and the KSPCB dealt with
the issue of pollution, and how
their inefficiency came to the aid
of the management, especially in
securing added subsidies in
procuring resources, and in
postponing the implementation of
pollution control measures.

Chapter 6 discusses the nature of
the peoples resistance against the
pollution precipitated by Grasim,
and describes how they continued
with their struggle irrespective of
repeated breach of promises by the
management and the government.

In the concluding Chapter,
questions are raised regarding what
our society and the government
learnt from the story of Grasim.

Some of the relevant documents,
including the Original Agreement
between the government and the
Birlas, are given as Appendixes.
2
Grasim: The Process and Pollution

The Grasim Industries started
functioning as Gwalior Rayons Silk
Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd., in 1962. They
established their manufacturing unit
at Mavoor with two divisions,
producing pulp and staple fibre.

The manufacturing process that is
undertaken in the factory includes
two main activities, viz. pulping and
bleaching.

Pulping is the process by which
bamboo, eucalyptus and other mixed
hard woods are converted into pulp2.
There are three different kinds of
pulping- mechanical, chemical and
chemi-thermomechanical pulping.

What is produced at Grasim Industries?

NO. Division Item Quantity
1. Rayon Grade
Pulp
4800
tons/month
2.
Pulp
Division
Paper 270
tons/month
3. Viscose Staple
Fibre
2130
tons/month
4. Sodium
Sulphate
1355
tons/month
5. Sulphuric Acid 2100
tons/month
6.
Fibre
Division
Carbon
disulphide
373
tons/month


2
Wood is primarily composed of three types of compounds: cellulose, hemi -celluloses and lignins.
Other compounds present in wood include terpenes (the bases for terpentine), fatty acids, resin
acids, phenolic compounds and plant hormones. Cellulose and hemicellulose make up the wood
fibres and lignin is the main adhesive substance that holds the cellulose and hemicellulose fibres
together. To produce paper products, the lignin needs to be removed from the wood to release the
fibres: this is the process known as pulping( Christie and McEachern, 2000).
At Grasim, the method of chemical
pulping is resorted to There are two
types of chemical pulping, Kraft and
sulphate pulping and at Grasim the
former one is used.


All methods of pulping require a
lot of water, and the effluents
generated are highly polluted.
However, from amongst the three
methods, mechanical pulping produces
much less organic wasted due to its
high yield, whereas chemical pulping
creates a lot of organic waste as it
converts only 50% of the wood used
into pulp. The other difference
between the 2 methods is that
mechanical pulping needs less of
water, and less bleaching than
chemical pulping. However, chemical
pulping produces stronger, higher
quality pulp. From a commercial
perspective, chemical pulping is more
attractive as it produces better
quality pulp, but from an
environmental perspective, it
generates a lot more of chemical
waste, particularly sulphur
compounds, and organic waste (
Christie and McEachern, 2000).

At Grasim, the process in the pulp
units begin with the bamboo and other
hard woods being debarked, and then
washed by a continuous stream of
water. Following this the wood is
chipped finely into uniformly sized
chips. The wood chips are then
cooked in what is called digesters
with sulphuric acid under controlled
temperature and pressure
(prehydrolysis). The chips are then
washed in water. The residual liquor
(pH liquor), is then drained out as
effluent to the effluent treatment
plant. The wood chips are further
cooked with white liquor consisting
of sodium sulphide, sodium carbonate
and caustic soda in high-pressure
steam. The cooked wood chips are then
sent to the washing section, where
the pulp is thoroughly washed in
water in order to remove residual
chemicals. This thick liquid will be
filtered through the knowter screen
to remove uncooked particles. The
black liquor conisisting of residual
liquor and wash water is sent to the
soda recovery plant where chemicals
and heat are recovered. The final
pulp is washed ot the bleaching
section.

What is consumed at Grasim Industries?

No. Division Item Quantity
1. Bamboo,
Eucalyptus
and other
woods
16244
tons/month
2. Water 41,000
m3/day
a.)
Manufacturing
36,000m3/day
b.) Washing 2,000 m3/day
c.) Cooling 1,000 m3/day
d.) Domestic
purpose
2,000 m3/day
3.
Pulp
Division
Other Chemicals- Salt
cake, caustic soda, lime
shell, chlorine, sodium
chlorate, sulphuric acid,
alum, sodium silicate etc.
Fibre
Division
Wood Pulp 2200
tons/month
4. Water 10,650 m
3

/day
a.)
Manufacturing
process
7000
m
3
/day
b.) Cooling 3000
m
3
/day
c.) Other uses 650 m
3
/day
Other chemicals- caustic
soda, chlorine, charcoal,
sulphuric acid etc.
Total Water Use- 51,650 m
3
/day.


Bleaching
Regardless of the pulping method,
once the wood chips have been
converted into pulp the brownish pulp
needs to be brightened. The type of
bleaching depends on the pulping
process used and the degree of
whiteness desired. Mechanical pulp
has a light colour and only requires
mild bleaching. This is often
accomplished using hydrogen peroxide
and hydrosulfite.


Chemical pulp requires more intensive
bleaching because it is much darker
than mechanical pulp. Traditionally,
the most common method of bleaching
used elemental chlorine to dissolve
residual lignin, then added sodium
hydroxide to extract the lignin. At
Grasim, the final washed pulp is sent
to the bleaching section, where it is
bleached using chemicals and water.
The chemicals used are sodium
hypochlorite solution and chlorine
dioxide solution. The brown pulp is
bleached in 6 stages and the bleached
pulp is stored in towers from where
it is sent for cleaning and drying.
(refer to the schematic diagram in
the appendix). In each of the above-
described stages, enormous amounts of
water is used to bleach the slurry
liquid.

During this process of bleaching,
organic compounds react with the
chlorine to produce chlorinated
organics (organochlorines)such as
chlorinated phenols, alcohols,
aldehydes, dioxins and furans. Many
of these organochlorines produced
during bleaching are toxic and
persist in the environmentsome are
known carcinogens. As people became
more aware of the threat posed by
these compounds,the pulp industry
world wide, was forced to develop
technologies that limited, and in
some cases eliminated, the formation
of organochlorines. However, at
Grasim, we realize that the total
organic chloride (TOCL) is not even
measured in the effluent generated.
The Grasim management was of the
assumption that it was not present at
all in the effluent. It was only
after the Sengupta Committee in 1997,
directed the Pollution Control Board
to measure the level of TOCL and to
set an upper limit, that the issue
came into focus.

The bleached pulp is then taken to
the Fibre Division, where the pulp is
flattened out into sheets, and
treated with caustic soda solution.
The alkali is removed from the
alkaline pulp, and then treated with
carbon disulphide, and thus the
viscose is formed. This viscose is
filtered, dewatered and allowed to
ripen at low temperature. This
viscose is extruded through
spinnerettes to produce fibre, which
is bleached and washed again, and
then dried.

Water consumption at Grasim:

As we see from the table, the pulp
division consumes water at the rate
of 41,000 m3/day. The fibre division
the consumption is 10,650 m3/day. So,
a total of 51,650 m3/day of water is
used by the factory, all of which is
drawn from the Chaliyar river.

Waste water generation:

Waste water is generated from three
sources, namely the water treatment
plant, the pulp plant and the staple
fibre division. A total of 40,000 m3
of effluent water is generated from
the factory, and this is discharged
through two outlets into the river.
The table below gives the quality
of the treated effluents from Grasim,
along with the standards set by the
Kerala Pollution Control Board .
The company had 2 legally accepted
outlet points. One is at Elamaram,
and the other at Chungappaly. The
company was supposed to send only the
treated effluents though the outlets,
of which the Elamaram one was only to
be used during emergencies. However,
there were many illegal effluent
outlets through which the untreated
effluents were discharged into the
river.



Sl
no
Parameter Unit Standards
(Limits)
Quality
observed
1 PH 5.5-9 7.1-7.4
2 Suspended
Solids
mgl/l
(max)
100 24-548
3 BOD mgl/l
(max)
30 6-20
4 COD mgl/l
(max)
350 425-448
5 Sulphide mgl/l
(max)
2 13.2-41
6 Pleuolic
Compounds
mgl/l
(max)
1 Nil
7 Oil and
grease
mgl/l
(max)
10 0-10
8 Mercury mgl/l
(max)
.1 nil
9 Zinc mgl/l
(max)
1 .7-1
10 Ammoniacal
nitrogen
mgl/l
(max)
50 2.47-8.3
11 Lead mgl/l
(max)
.1 .03-.08
12 Colour APC
units
X+10 400-2500
Before the treatment plant was set
up, the effluents were discharged
directly to the river. Thus for about
one decade after the commencement of
factory production, company was
discharging all the polluted water ,
without any treatment to the river.
However, even the functioning of the
effluent treatment plant set up after
a decade, was inadequate in treating
the entire volume of effluents
generated. The plant was able to
treat only 50% of the total effluent
generated.



3
A History of Broken Promises.
The factory started functioning in
1963 and pollution came to be noticed
from the second day of its working
itself. Some of the images that come
to the minds of people as they
recollect that period are given below.
thick black smoke from the factory
chimney waves of foul smell, coming
on and off, as if a septic tank has
been kept open, thick, viscous
liquid with a lot of wood chips in it
lot of sluggish and dead fish in the
river.

As early as 2.5.65, a meeting had
been organised at Krishnaprabha
Auditorium, Faroke to discuss the
pollution issue, in which various
panchayat presidents were present. A
resolution passed at this meeting has
mentioned the work of a body called
Chaliyar Defence Committee.3It seems
that a number of meetings were
organised during this period, but it
was only after 1973 that the anti-
pollution activists organised
themselves into a somewhat formal
association, namely the Chaliyar Jala-
Vayu Shudhikarana Samiti (JVSS). One
of the formal meetings to mobilize the
collective support of the panchayats
affected by pollution was held on
24.9.73 at Imperial Hotel, Calicut.
The then Mukkam panchayat president,
Mr. B.P Unnimoyeen presided over the
meeting in which apart from the

3
*For further details, see the chapter 6
panchayat presidents, representatives
from trade unions including INTUC,
AITUC, STU, AEO etc were present. It
was at this meeting that a formal
committee called the Chaliyar-Java-
Vayu Shudhikarana committee ( Chaliyar
Air & Water Purification committee
henceforth referred to as JVSS ) was
formed. Mr. B.P. Unnimoyeen was
selected as president and Mr. K.A.
Rehman, Vice president of Vazakkad
panchayat, who later went on to become
one of the crusaders of this movement
till his death in 1998, was selected
as Secretary of this committee.
Presidents of the following panchayats
were also part of the committee, viz.
Mavoor, Pulikkal, Cherukavu, Kondotti,
Vazakkad, Cheekode, Peruvayal and
Faroke. This 19 member committee had 2
representatives from the trade union
movement also, Mr.K. Sankara Pillai of
AITUC Mavoor and Mr. Sebastian of
INTUC Mavoor. At the first meeting, it
was decided to hold a larger
convention 3 days later at Mavoor in
which MIAS and other panchayat
presidents of the affected area, and
various socio-political leaders were
to be invited. Two very strongly
worded resolutions were passed in this
first meeting.
Resolution No.1 of 24.9.73
Since the effluents released from
the Pulp Division of Gwalior Rayons,
and the poisonous gases released from
the Fibre Division of the factory
have put the lives of people living
in the vicinity of the factory, to
extreme difficulty esp. in Vazakkad
and Mavoor areas, this meeting
appeals to the Government of Kerala;
and to the factory management to take
immediate action to solve this
complex problem, once and for all.

Resolution No.2 of 24.9.73
We hereby warn the Chief Minister of Kerala, Home Minister and the
management of Gwalior Rayons that in the event of immediate and
practical steps not being taken to prevent the severe air and water
pollution from the fibre and pulp Divisions of Gwaliar Rayons, the
people of this area will be prepared, to organise a strong profit
against the same. We also state that the government and the
Management will be solely responsible for the long term and far
reaching consequences of such a peoples protest.
Presented by : B.P.Unnimoyeen,
President and supported by Mr.K.A.
Rehman, Secretary.

The above mentioned larger meeting
was held in the evening of 27.9.73 at
Mavoor Tourist Home Auditorium. At
this meeting, it was resolved to hold
a still larger, full day meeting on
6.10.73.

As per the earlier decision, a
major meeting was held on 6.10.1973,
at STU Office Auditorium, Mavoor.
Representatives from different
political parties and trade unions
were present at this meet. A 101
member General Council and a 41
member Executive Committee was
selected at this meeting. Panchayat
presidents of Mavoor, Pulikkal,
Cherukavu, Kondotti, Vazakkad,
Cheekode, Peruvayal and Faroke were
Excecutive Committee members. Beypore
MLA Mr. Chatunni Master,
Kunnamangalam MLA Mr. P.V.S. Mustafa
Pookoya Tangal, Kondotti MLA
Mr.M.P.M.A.Kurukkal, as well as
representatives of all the main trade
unions such as AITUC, INTUC, CITU,
HMS, STU,and political parties
including CPI, CPM, Muslim league,
and Congress were also members of the
Executive Committee. It was decided
at this meeting that the pollution
problems should be brought to the
notice of the District Collectors of
Kozhikode and Malappuram, and to the
company management, for prompt and
immediate action. As the factory was
flushing out its effluents into the
river from Kalpatty to the river
mouth at Farokke, the entire area was
severely polluted (Refer Map in the
Appendix). With the rise and fall of
tides, the effluents were found to
move upstream of the factory, esp.
during the summer months when the
water flow in the river was less.
Thus the effluent water could pollute
the intake point of the company, i.e.
the point from where the water is
taken from the river by the company.
There were occasions in which the
company had to stop its production
because of its own pollution.

Initially, it was the Grasim
management which was constructing
this bund to protect their intake
from getting polluted by the
effluents released from their own
factory. But the temporary
construction of this bund in the
summer months led to reduction in the
flow of water from upstream. This
along with the continuous release of
effluents increased the concentration
of toxic substances, creating a major
drinking water problem for the people
of that area. The JVSS protested
against the construction of this bund
by the company, which was essentially
to protect their own interests. The
Samiti asked the panchayats to take
action, for legally, the river bed
belongs to the panchayats. As the
pressure was mounting on the company,
the management withdrew from the
construction of the temporary bund.

The construction of the bund was
later taken up by the civil
authorities as the pump house which
pumps water to Calicut city was also
located upstream of the factory, and
the water there was also getting
polluted due to the above mentioned
reasons.

As the drinking water supply for
the Calicut city was getting
affected, instead of instructing the
company management to take immediate
action to reduce the pollution, the
civil authorities were spending
public money to construct the
temporary bund across the river.
Which came to the aid of the
management also.

As a result the Chaliyar Jala-Vayu
Samrakshana Samiti felt that the
civil authorities were giving undue
protection to the company by
indirectly keeping their intake point
safe from polluted effluents. So the
Samiti decided to agitate against the
construction of this temporary bund.

As part of the campaign, they
conducted a series of corner meetings
and on 17.12.73, they organised a
boat campaign from Elamaram to
Faroke. On 19th and 20th of December
1973, public meetings were held at
Mavoor and Vazhakkad. The Samity also
decided to block the construction of
the bund on 22.12.1973 and they also
asked the panchayats to take due
action in the event of the initiation
of bund construction work.

As the momentum of the agitation
picked up, and as they blocked the
construction of the bund on 22.12.73
the District Collector intervened and
a Conference was called on 27.12.73.
This conference was attended by
representatives from the management,
JVSS, elected body members of the
area, and government officials of the
district. It was decided that the
management should implement the
recommendations of the Expert
Committee which was set up on
30.7.72. Among other things, they
also discussed how the effluents
could be released directly into the
sea. As we understand from the
minutes of the meetings (See Apendix
I), the conference resolved to
appoint a Review Committee to review
the progress in implementation of
various recommendation made by the
Expert Committee of 30.7.1972. The
Review Committee
4
comprised of 28
members including the Collector as
the Chairperson. It seems that the
management and the District
Administration impressed upon the
JVSS that the only possible permanent
solution possible for the pollution
problem was to take the effluents
straight to the sea. It was suggested
in the Conference that during the
summer months, when the river flow
was minimum, the effluents should not
be discharged, but be stored in
lagoons created specially for this
purpose. On the assurance that this
would be done, JVSS withdrew its plan
to prevent the construction of the
temporary bund at Elamaram. The
concerned Resolution reads as

4
Refer to Appendix for the full text
Resolved to withdraw the public agitation and
to allow the temporary bund across the
Chaliyar river to be constructed
5
..

As per the decision taken at the
Conference of 27.12.73, the Review
Committee was constituted and its
first meeting was held on 17.1.74 at
the Club House of Gwalior Rayons
factory. They reviewed the progress
made by the Company in implementing
the recommendations made by the
Expert Committee. The Management
impressed upon this Review Committee
that all the recommendations of the
Expert Committee were in the process
of implementation. Regarding the
recommendation to create a lagoon to
store effluents during the summer

5
Refer Resolution No. 8 of Appendix for the full text)
months, the Company reported that it
could not make any headway, as the
land to house the lagoon belonged to
the local people, who were not
agreeing to the price offered by the
Company. So the management posed the
non-availability of land as the only
hindrance to the creation of the
proposed lagoons. The management
then requested the Collector to
revoke the provisions of the Kerala
Land Acquisition Act and to acquire
the land and hand it over to the
Company.
6


6
The company wants 25 acres of lands close to the factory for
this purpose. This question of making available these lands by
way of private negotiation was discussed, and it was found that
private negotiation will not be feasible. The company has agreed
to get these lands acquired under the provisions of the Kerala

Despite the setting up of the
Review Committee, and a face to face
negotiation and settlement between the
Grasim management and the JVSS, it was
found that the management was not
doing anything towards the effective
control of air and water pollution.

land Acquisition Act; and Sri Saboo promised to forward the
required requisition in this regard to the District Collector. In order
to construct the additional lagoons with the least possible delay,
the Chairman requested the local members to use their good
offices in securing advance possession of the lands when
acquisition proceedings are initiated. The members promised to
extend their cooperation in this respect and the company
assured taking up the construction as soon as the lands are
made available. Appendix for the full text


According to the agreement facilitated
by the Review Committee, the bund
remained at Elamaram for the summer of
1974. However by November 1974, the
JVSS found that the management had not
done much to control the pollution.
Contrary to the previous years
agreement to construct the temporary
structure at Chungappally, the
management was planning to go ahead
and construct the bund at Elamaram
itself. This angered the JVSS and they
conducted a series of meetings in
October and November 1974. On
30.11.1974, at a meeting at Kozhikode
Imperial Hotel, the Samity took the
following decisions.
1) To pressurise the collector as well as
the management to implement the
agreement reached between the JVSS and
the management, in the presence of the
Collector.
2) Government should take all the
responsibility to ensure that the
effluents are not dumped into the
river, but taken to the sea through a
pipeline.
3) To oppose the construction of the
temporary bund at Elamaram, which was
contrary to the Review committees
recommendation of 17.1.1974, which was
to construct the bund at Chungappally,
7 kms downstream of Elamaram.
4) To compel the management to put a
full stop to the functioning of the
acid plant within the Fibre Division
of the factory which caused the
emission of highly poisonous gases.
5) As poisonous gases were being emitted
from both the Fibre and Pulp Divisions
of the factory, regular free medical
check-ups should be organised to
people living in the affected area,
and necessary medicines should be
distributed free.
6) It was decided to send a delegation of
the following people to Trivandrum to
take up the issue with the Ministers
and the Government directly. They
include Mr. B.P. Unnimoyeen, Mr. K.C.
Ramachandran, Mr. E.T Mohammed
Basheer, Mr. K.A. Abdul Rahman, Mr.
P.C. Damodaran Namboodiri, Sri P.K.
Mohammed Haji.
7) The Muslim league was entrusted to
organise a meeting of all political
parties on 3.12.1974.

On 9.12.1974, JVSS held a Review
meeting which was unofficially
attended by some of the Review
Committee members. They discussed
issues related to the construction of
the bund and the managements
assurance that they would construct
the bund at Chungappally and not at
Elamaram.
The opposition to the construction of
the bund, expressed through a series
of meetings and mass mobilisation,
created a tense situation. The
Government intervened once again, and
called for another discussion of
various issues at Rama Nilayam,
Trichur on 16.12.1974. At this
meeting, which was convened by the
then Home Minister Mr.K. Karunakaran
, an agreement was drawn up, known
as the Rama Nilayam Agreement
(RamaNilayam Karar). According to
this agreement, the effluent was to
be taken by a pipeline to Chungapally
(6.4kms downstream from the factory)
and discharged into the river. The
basis for selecting Chungappally was
that in any case saline water
intrudes upto Chungappally during the
summer mouths which renders the river
water unsuitable for drinking and
irrigation purposes. As part of the
agreement, the management was asked
to lay the pipelines to Chungappally,
in a years time.

This agreement was the first of its
kind, in which both the state level
political leadership, and the
Government were involved in
addressing this issue. Naturally, the
people who were in the struggle, had
high expectations regarding the
outcome of this meeting. They
thought that unlike the earlier
agreements, which were violated time
and again by the management, this one
would be implemented. The joint
commitment by the political
leadership, government and the
management lent a greater legitimacy
to this agreement.

The people of Vazakkad, who were in
the forefront of the struggle,
thought that the shifting of the
effluent discharge point to
Chungappally would at least
temporarily reduce the pollution they
faced. Here it is interesting to note
that a pollution problem was
addressed by the Minister for Law and
order (Home). It can therefore be
derived that as far as the Government
was concerned, they had succeeded in
containing a law and order problem,
while the pollution issue remained
the same except for the fact that the
discharge point shifted to
Chungappally. Even this temporary
relief measure was not implemented by
the management for another 6 years. 6
years later, when the pipeline was
actually laid, people realised that
the tidal waves would bring back the
effluents upstream, and so the
pipeline too was yet another eyewash.

It was in 1974, that the Indian
Parliament passed the Water Act, and
according to this Act, any factory
which discharges effluents into a
water body requires a permission to
do so from the State Pollution
Control Board. This permission would
be granted by the Board only if the
toxic elements in the discharged
effluents confirmed to the standards
laid down by the Board. According
to this law, Pollution Control Boards
were to be set up in all Sates, and
one was set up in Kerala also
(hereafter Kerala State Pollution
Control Board, or KSPCB).Though the
KSPCB was set up in 1974, Grasim
industries applied for the mandatory
permission to dump the effluents into
the river, on 24th January 1975 only.
The KSPCB granted permission up to
31.1.76, specifying the permissible
upper limit of various factors in the
effluent, the details of which are
given in the following table.
TABLE I
Effluent Permissible
upper limit
PH 5.5 7.00
Suspended
particles
300 mg /l
BOD 100 mg /l
OIL/grease 10 mg /l
COD 250 mg /l
Colour ----


During this one year period, Grasim
was submitting the mandatory monthly
reports to the Board. However, a year
later in January 1976, they said that
they would try their best to
implement all the conditions
stipulated by the Board . Hence it
was clear that they had not fulfilled
the conditions laid down by the
Board, but had continued dumping the
effluents into the river. However it
seems that KSPCB had not only
abstained from taking any action
against them, but they went ahead and
gave them permission to discharge
effluents for one more year also.
Mean while Grasim was planning to set
up a coal based boiler plant in the
factory, which would aggravate the
existent air and water pollution.
This particular boiler had been
dismantled from the Birlas own Nagda
Rayons factory at Nagda, Madhya
Pradesh, following public protest
against the pollution it was causing.
It was an extremely old boiler, and
the factory workers at Nagda had
insisted on it being removed for
safety reasons. Here it may be noted
that the management had violated all
the agreements on pollution issues
with the people and the government
since 1963. When the Rama Nilayam
Agreement was signed in 1974, it was
expected that at least this agreement
would not be violated. Apart from the
fact that they did not implement any
of the conditions of the Rama Nilayam
agreement, they were ruthless enough
to import a dilapidated polluting
coal based boiler, which was
discarded at Nagda for the above-
mentioned reasons, and set it up at
Mavoor. Simultaneously they went
seeking and getting yearly permission
to discharge effluents to the river
from KSPCB, and submitting monthly
reports saying that everything was
under control!

The JVSS took up this issue once
again, and as before the District
collector called for a conference,
and once again it was agreed that all
previous agreements would be
implemented soon.

Meanwhile, the Estimate Committee
of Kerala Legislative Assembly
chaired by Mr. T.S. John visited the
area on June 3rd, 1977. This
committee submitted its first report
with 25 recommendations to the
government in February 1978. However
the Action Taken Report was filed by
the government only in 1980. The
committee found that out of the 25
recommendations, the action taken on
15 of them were unsatisfactory. The
committee therefore strongly
recommended that the management be
persecuted for its arrogant and
adamant stand on pollution related
issues. During their field visit, the
Estimate Committee had assured the
people of the area that the setting
up of the controversial coal based
boiler would not be permitted in the
factory. On July 5th, 1977 the people
from vazakkad and other affected
areas went to Trivandrum to stage a
dharana in front of the Secretariat
demanding the implementation of the
Rama Nilayam agreement, and for
taking punitive action against the
Grasim management for blatant
violation of the agreement and for
polluting the river

In 1979 through a mass action people
demolished the Elamaram bund.As the
discharge of the effluents affected
the functioning of the factory and
the drinking water distribution to
Kozhikode city, the then labour
Minister Mr. M.K Raghavan convened a
reconciliation meeting on 25th March
1979 at Calicut Civil Station. At
this tripartite meeting attended by 6
MLAs, 14 panchayat President, JVSS,
and the factory management, it was
decided that the factory would be
laid off till all the conditions in
the Rama Nilayam Agreement 1974 were
implemented. It was decided to lay
off the factory once again. Following
this, the company started work on the
pipeline on 27th March 1980, and the
work was completed by December 18th
1980.

Meanwhile other members of civil
society, other than the residents of
the area, began to involve them
selves in this struggle. SPEC and
KSSP were the 2 prominent groups who
came forward. This apart, individuals
like Dr. K.T. Vijayamadhavan and Dr.
Achuthan look initiatives in
conducting a series of awareness
programmes regarding the impact of
pollution on peoples health, Dr.
Vijayamadhavan emphasised the
possibility of mercury and other
heavy metal pollutants in the factory
effluents, and cited the Minamata
episode to explain the dangers of
heavy metal pollution. In 1981, a
study conducted by Dr. K.T.Gopinathan
of Calicut Medical college found out
that the incidence of cardio -
pulmonary diseases is higher in the
Mavoor-Vazhakkad area and the rate of
incidence was even higher than the
rate found in heavily polluted cities
like Delhi. As against 7% of the
males and 4.9% of females in Delhi
being affected by chronic bronchitis
in 1981, the rate at Mavoor-Vazhakkad
area was as high as 14% and 8.7%
respectively (almost double). This
means, that in the affected area, one
single factory was causing more
pollution than the combined effect of
all the pollutive elements in Delhi.

Hence the local struggle and the
supportive initiatives by various
individuals and organisations
mobilised public opinion in favour of
the struggle to protect the river and
the health of the people. This
heightened public opinion forced the
KSPCB to file a petition against
Grasim Industries. The petition
argued that the factory was
discharging effluents through
unauthorised outlets other than the
one at Chungappally and requested the
Court to restrain the company from
discharging effluents through their
unauthorised effluents, and to impose
a penalty on the company officials
for violation of the Water Act
(prevention and Control of Pollution
Act).

Though the Magistrate at
Kunnamangalam issued an order
restraining the company from using
unauthorised outlets to discharge
effluents, it permitted the use of
the same in emergencies. Later,
through a long drawn legal battle,
KSPCB won the case and the court
removed the clause which allowed the
company to release effluents through
unauthorised outlets in
emergencies. However the court did
not permit imposition of penalty on
officials of the company who were
responsible for the effluent
discharge, and who were therefore
violating the Water Act. One wonders
what this means? On the one hand, the
court was saying that the company
could not and should not use
unauthorised outlets to discharge
effluents, and on the other, it was
saying that nobody could be held
accountable in case of such an
offence! similarly, KSPCB, which
apparently initiated this legal
crusade against the Company, kept
complete silence regarding the
unauthorised discharge (without
adhering to the stipulated standards)
through the authorised outlets!.

Meanwhile, Dr. K.T. Vijayamadhavan
and 20 others filed a petition to the
Rajya Sabha, against the pollution
caused by the Company, and the Rajya
Sabha Petitions Committee chaired by
Mr. P.N. Sukul visited the area on
March 24th 1982. In their report, the
Petitions Committee criticised the
management for their, callous
attitude towards pollution problems
and their utter disregard for the
health of the people.

This committee was also highly
critical of the lukewarm attitude of
the KSPCB. The Committee noted that
the effluent treatment capacity of
the plant was not matching the
factorys production capacity, and
suggested that the government must
ensure that the factory take
appropriate measures to restrict its
production, so that the entire
effluent can be treated. They were
also of the view that there should be
a regular monitoring of air pollution
through periodic collection and
testing of air samples collected from
the area.

Apart from the above-mentioned
short term measures, the committee
also suggested certain long-term
measures. For instance, they proposed
that a legislation be enacted which
will enable the government to impose
penalties or even cancel the license
of the factory in the event of non-
compliance with prescribed pollution
control measures. They also suggested
that the government should have the
power to press upon the factory to
adopt the latest technology to
monitor and control pollution.
Similar to the recommendations of
previous expert committees and
tripartite discussions, this
committee also recommended that the
factory should take the effluents
straight, to the sea, to avoid the
contamination of the river water.

The period between 1982 to 1985,
was marked by some protests,
especially during the summer months,
when the lean flow in the river
brought out the horror of water
pollution. This period also witnessed
debates about the relationship
between pollution and health
problems, esp. the possibility of
cancer, and regarding the
availability and ability of
technology to solve the pollution
problem

Once the pipeline upto
Chungappally was in position, there
were incidents in which the pipeline
used to break open, on leak at the
joints, thereby contaminating the
fields and water bodies on the way.
So there were regular protests by the
local people living in the area
through which the pipeline passed.

Whenever there was a protest, the
Birla management was either
arrogantly brushing it aside, or very
skilfully taking it up with the trade
unions, posing the threat of a lock-
out. On March 24th, 1982, following
another incident of the pipeline
breaking, Grasim moved the High Court
for police protection of the
pipeline. The High Court not only
declined to sanction it, but strongly
reprimanded the management. The Court
said,
The banks of Chaliyar, once a health
resort, have virtually become a hell on
earth. At least for one decade, the
people there are suffering. The
Petitioner Company has liberally
contributed to this. If the State
Government and the Kerala State Board
for Prevention & Control of Water
Pollution had taken effective steps, this
could have been prevented long ago.
The Rayons is an industry where the
margin of profit is not only comfortable
but considerable. It is to be
remembered that one of the pollutants
here is nothing other than mercury.
Then what is the magnitude of the
threat to life caused by the effluent
discharged from the Petitioners
factories, I need not say. Life, especially
human life, should be not be so cheap
in this country.
7


During 82-85, the management went
about reducing production as well as
the number of employees, citing non-
availability of raw materials as the
main reason. According to a Works
Study commissioned by Grasim in
1983, the report suggested that as
much as 1418 employees had to be
retrenched. Naturally this invited
protests from the workers. Such
strikes and lockouts continued till
1985, when the company closed down

7
Justice K K Narendran, Judge, High Court of Judicature for Kerala. (From the judgement delivered on 30
th

March, 1982).

following a labour strike. This lock
out lasted for more than 3 years,
and proved to be a trump card which
was very cleverly and tactfully used
by the management in bargaining with
the government for increased supply
of raw materials at a shamefully
concessional price. Through the post
lock-out negotiations in 1988, the
management was able to negate all
the rights that workers had achieved
after long years of struggle.
Through this event, it was almost
established that the company had the
right to pollute and nobody could
question this right.
During the 3 year lock-out,13
employees committed suicide. Mr. A.
Vasu and Mr. Moyeen Bapu of the GROW
Trade union went on a hunger strike
demanding the re-opening of the
factory. The mounting pressure from
various trade unions forced the
government to initiate talks with the
Grasim management to re-open the
factory. After 3 years of continuous
struggle, the workers and trade
unions of the company were ready to
accept any kind of settlement. The
then Minister for Industries, Smt.
K.R. Gowri went to Delhi to meet the
top management officials of the
Birlas, to persuade them to re-open
the factory.

The management realised that this
was a golden opportunity for it to
bargain with the government to secure
added quantity of raw materials at
further reduced prices.
In 1971, after the passing of the
Vested forests Act, the government
had vested 30,000 hectares of private
forest which belonged to the Grasim
management. The management had bought
this private forest and had planted
it with eucalyptus. Since the vesting
of 1971, the company had always been
complaining about the resource crunch
it was facing. So the post lock-out
conciliatory measures initiated by
the government was used by the
management to further press for raw
materials.

Before the lock-out in 1985,GI was
getting raw material from the
government. @ Rs 550/ ton. After the
lock-out, they were to get it @ Rs
250/ ton, for a minimum of 5 years!
Thus for re-opening the factory, the
direct economic loss to the state
exchequer was not loss than Rs 5
crores per year. It may be recalled
here that the open market price of
eucalyptus in 1988 was more than Rs
1000/ton (The price in Assam was Rs
1,170/ton an in Maharashtra it was Rs
1,099/ton)

The reconciliation was one-sided.
The government and workers gave into
the management. While the management
was able to pressurise the government
to give into its demand for increased
supply of raw materials, it did not
accede to the workers demands. Most
of the issues which had prompted the
labourers to go for strike in 1985,
such as hike in wages, remained
unresolved. Stranger still, the issue
of pollution was not mentioned at all
at these reconciliatory meetings.
Thus when the factory re-opened in
November 10th 1988, the management
was on a much stronger footing, with
substantial bargaining power on
labour and environmental issues. The
threat of another lock-out was always
in the air, preventing all dissenters
and protestors from taking strong
positions.

The factory trade unions agreed
that they will not go on a strike for
5 years from October 27th 1988. From
this point onwards, trade unions who
were earlier sympathetic and at times
co- travellers to the cause of
fighting pollution, became
antagonistic to this cause. This
shift took place because they were
afraid that it would lead to another
lock-out, on even the closing down of
the factory. The management also
realised this total shift in
positions.

There were also problems within
the anti-pollution camp. For example,
there were organisations which took
positions that pollution can be
solved technologically and that was
all that had to be done. There were
some other groups which argued that
the factory should not be permitted
to work until the pollution problem
was solved. The latter position could
tantamount to the close-down of the
factory, for according to the
management, they had taken all
remedial measurers within their
capacity and following their economic
logic, to solve the pollution
problem. They had thus stated that
they prefer the close-down of the
factory to any more pollution control
measures.

The period between 1988 to
1995,witnessed, protests against the
air and water pollution, and a
growing rift between the trade unions
and the anti-pollution groups. As
more and more areas came to be
affected by the air and water
pollution, and more and more reports
started coming in regarding the
incidence of cancer in the affected
area, the protests began to intensify
once again. In 1994, during the
tenure of K.A. Rehman as Panchayat
President, the Vazhakkad Panchayat
conducted a cancer survey and the
result was shocking.

Results (Consolidated) of the medical Survey
conducted by Vazhakkad Panchayat (1994
November 22-30)
Ward
No
Canc
er
pati
ents
Can
cer
dea
ths
aft
er
199
0
TB
patie
nts
Hear
t
Pati
ents
Ulcer
patien
ts
Kidne
y
patie
nts
Asthm
a
patie
nts
Cons
tant
Head
ache
s
Sk
in
di
se
as
es
Epil
epsy
Men
tal
Ret
ard
ati
on
Le
pr
os
y
Ele
pha
nti
tis
Proble
ms
with
Eyesig
ht
Other
Diseas
es
Total
1 4 9 7 4 9 2 1
1
8
6
4 3 2 1 62 8 140
2 5 1
2
1
4
5 7 4 1
0
4
4
1
0
8 1 - 54 18 156
3 4 1
0
1
0
4 5 3 5 7
5
6 2 1 - 13 9 84
4 8 1 1 8 10 5 6 6
3
1 5 1 1 49 14 155
5 3 1
5 1
0
2
1
1
2
4 12 8 1
4
1
0
4
9 4 2 - 28 12 150
6 5 9 1
6
2 8 4 9 9
7
8 1
2
3 - 41 15 148
7 9 2
0
1
9
8 9 6 2
6
1
1
8
5
1
2
1
0
2 - 78 25 347
8 6 1
9
2
4
3 11 5 1
2
7
2
6
1
6
9 1 - 24 40 248
9 8 2
3
1
3
5 16 3 1
0
1
0
15
1
1
6 3 - 32 19 175
1
0
9 2
8
2
1
6 12 4 1
8
4
2
12
1
8
9 3 2 57 36 277
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
7
9 18 6 1
3
5
8
14
2
4
7 2 - 76 28 326


This spurred off debates about the
causes of cancer. To what extent had
pollution caused cancer, was the most
debated issue. The management claimed
that they were not polluting the
area, and that the incidence of
cancer was due to the excessive
smoking habits of the people. The
trade unions stated that the
effluents were treated and the level
of pollutants subscribed to the
standards stipulated by the KSPCB.
They made their guess too, saying
that the cancer may be due to the
pesticide contamination in the food
people ate.
However, the death of 3 workers on
23rd June, 1995 while they were
repairing a faulty valve in the
effluent pipeline at Chungappally,
brought back into focus the entire
issue of pollution as well as the
callous attitude of the management.
It was found that the workers who
died were not provided with any
protective equipments, not even a
mask, while they were working in
chambers filled with noxious gases.

Let alone prosecuting the
management for this serious lapse,
the government did not even conduct a
proper enquiry into the whole issue.
The air samples collected a few days
after the incident, showed very high
levels of pollution, as against the
stipulated standard of the KSPCB.
The KSPCB filed yet another case at
the Magistrate Court of Kunnamangalam
against the Grasim management for the
violation of the Water (Pollution and
Control) Act. Admitting the petition,
the Magistrate, in an interim order,
ordered an immediate stay on effluent
discharge to the river on 4.9.95. The
interim order was passed based on the
air samples collected and analysed
by the PCB on June 26th, July 1st and
July 28th 1995. KSPCB argued that the
chemicals in the effluent was much
more than what was permissible.
Irrespective of the court order,
Grasim continued discharging
effluents into the river. They argued
that the court order was not against
discharging effluents, but against
discharging untreated effluents. It
is pitiful to note that though the
Court passed the interim order on
4.9.95, the final order which
reinforced the interim order was
passed only on 7.2.1998 (almost 3
years later).

Following the death of the 3
workers, as usual, another Expert
committee was set up to look into the
pollution issue. This committee
submitted its report in January
1996.On January 12th 1996, KSPCB
Member-Secretary, rejected the
companys application for discharging
effluents into the river (it was for
the first time since the getting up
of the Board in 1974, that permission
was being withheld) and passed an
order forbidding discharge of
effluents into the Chaliyar. The
Grasim factory simply ignored this
order and approached the Water
Appellate Authority Chaired by
Justice C. Khalid. The Appellate
Authority while agreeing to the
KSPCBs observations regarding
pollution, stayed the order issued by
the Board on April 30th, 1996. They
made it very clear that this time the
stay order was issued keeping in mind
the 3000 employees who would lose
their job, and that this should not
be repeated in future. In the event
of a violation by the management in
future, the KSPCB was asked to bring
the matter to the notice of the
Appellate Authority, which never
happened. The Appellate Authority
also considered the option of taking
the effluents directly to the sea by
way of a pipeline. Grasim industries
argued back saying that it was not
economically viable. The Appellate
Authority agreed to this proposition,
and even went further in agreeing to
the alternative suggested by Grasim
which was to extend the effluent pipe
to the middle of the river with the
outlet (spout) below the water
surface. The KSPCB was apparently
worried about the pollution standards
followed by Grasim and had filed a
case against them. But who will pay
for the Boards own double
standards?.
Irrespective of all the claims by
the Grasim management which said that
there was no pollution, and
irrespective of the belief of some
that technology could and would solve
the problem of pollution, the river
was dying. A study conducted by the
National Institute of Oceanography
in 1994, found that the living
organisms in this river was
significantly lesser than in less
polluted rivers. A comparative study
of Chaliyar and Korapuzha rivers
found that the density of living
organisms in per CU.M.. in the
Chaliyar ranged from 63 to 1600 per
CU.M.in the pre-monsoon period. The
corresponding figure for Korapuzha
was 1105 to 17967 per CU.M. This data
shows that the maximum density in
Chaliyar is somewhat close to the
minimum in Korapuzha.

K.V.K. Elayath, a Grasim worker
filed a PIL at SC on 18.4.1996
regarding the health impact of air
and water pollution, praying the
Court to order remedial measures and
to compensate the victims of
pollution. The SC directed the
Chairman of KSPCB on 23.6.1996 to
take immediate action on this matter.
It is very strange to note that
though the KSPCB was at that time
fighting a case against Grasim for
its violation of pollution norms, it
replied to the SC defending the
measures taken by the company to
reduce pollution.

From 1996 onwards, the struggle
against pollution further
intensified as more and more people
were dying due to cancer, (the
victims started making their
presence felt). The effluent
pipeline broke at 6 places on March
11th, 1997, and the companys
attempt to repair the pipeline was
forcefully stopped by the local
people. The people demanded that the
effluent be treated properly, and
that they be provided clean drinking
water. On an earlier occasion when
the drinking water of the area
through which the pipeline was
passing had been contaminated by the
effluents leaking from the pipeline,
the people had protested and the
company has offered to provide piped
drinking water to them. This offer
was unfulfilled, and people were
insisting on it. Even though the
company managed to repair the
pipeline under heavy police
protection, it became clear once
more that the so-called pollution
control measures that were
supposedly taken by the company were
ineffective.

It is pertinent to mention that
this time it was the trade unions
who were openly defending the
company against the anti-pollution
groups. On March 30th, 1997, the
trade unions condemned the moves by
the anti-pollution groups, saying
that these groups were interested in
closing down the factory and that
they were not ready to accept the
fact that scientific and
technological advancement could
solve the problem of pollution. They
went on to say that the effluents
from Grasim were treated and the
pollution levels were much below the
limit set by the KSPCB.

On 2nd April 1997, The Chaliyar
Action Council organised a major
march to the Secretariat at
Trivandrum. They demanded that the
Government should take over the
pollution control process in the
company and that the Birlas should
pay for the same. They also demanded
that the sulpluric plant within the
factory which was one of the major
causes of pollution, should be shut
down. The other demands included the
following:
1. The purified effluents should
be taken to the sea through a
pipe.
2. The work of the diesel thermal
power plant should be stopped.
3. The Carbon disulphide plant
should be shifted to a place
with lesser population density.
4. Adequate compensation should be
given to the victims of
pollution, and regular medical
camps should be conducted to
identify health problems of the
people of the affected area,
especially cancer, and provide
free medical aid to them.

As usual, the government
responded with the getting up of yet
another committee under the
Chairmanship of Mr. B. Sengupta form
the Central Pollution Control
Board
8
. More than a year later, this

8
The recommendations of the Sengupta Committee Report are given
as Appendix $.
committee, in its report submitted
in August 1998, made 28
recommendations to be implemented.

On December 10th 1997, which was
also World Human Rights Day, the
Samyukta Samara Samity organised a
major protest march towards the
factory in which they declared that
the factory should be closed down if
it was unable to prevent pollution
completely. However, the momentum
created by this march could not be
sustained as a leader like K.A.
Rehman was unable to fully involve
himself in the struggle as he was
undergoing cancer treatment. He died
a year later on January 11th, 1999.

The death of Sri K.A. Rehman due
to cancer, convinced the people of
the whole area that it was pollution
which was causing cancer. The link
between cancer and pollution had
been a highly debated issue but when
cancer began to claim the lives of
those who lived amongst them,
especially the life of their leader,
what was a doubt in their minds,
became a conviction. It was at this
point that they launched what they
called the final protest, a protest
for the right to life on 26th
January 1999. An indefinite fast was
launched by Chaliyar Action Council
in front of the factory. On March
14th 1999, Grasim Industries
suspended its production citing non
availability of raw material as the
main reason. They put up the
application for closure under the
Industrial Disputes Act. The
government rejected this application
and at the behest of the trade
unions initiated various
negotiations with the Birlas.

Meanwhile, the Birals were planning to sell off the
factory to Moonlight Chemfab, a newly registered chemical
company based at Indore. There were a lot of protests from
the trade unions. Chaliyar Action Council demanded that the
management should compensate the workers for the loss of
employment, and the victims of pollution.
Finally when the company wound up in
2001, some compensation was given to
the workers, but there was no
mention of compensating the victims
of pollution.
4
Corporate Irresponsibility: the Grasim Style.

For the Birla group of business
houses, this factory in Kerala was
one which produced the raw material
for their rayon producing factories
at Nagda and Gwalior. As they came
to Kerala on invitation, they were
always enjoying an upper hand in all
the negotiations with the
government. So when they signed the
first agreement with the government
of Kerala on May 3rd 1958, they
signed to set up the factory as if
they were doing a favour to the
state. They bargained well in order
to get the raw materials, almost
free. Not only that, in this
skilfully drafted agreement, they
had ensured their monopoly over pulp
production in the state. As we see
in the agreement they were ensured
exclusive nights to extract any
natural resource from the area
earmarked for them. In 1958, when
the agreement was signed, the area
was limited to Nilambur Valley.
However in 1962, when the factory
was ready to begin production,
through a Supplementary Agreement,
the area of their reach was
increased to include a substantial
portion of Malabar i.e Kozhikode,
Wayanad and Nilambur forest
divisions. This was only the first
of the many supplementary agreements
that were to follow. By 1985, the
entire forest area in the state
except the Quillon Circle was set
apart for bamboo and eucalyptus
extractions.

In 1967, Grasims reach was
extended up to Trichur, Vazhachal
and Perumbavoor forest divisions. By
1984, the entire forest area of the
state covering Malayatoor, Kochi,
Ranni, Achenkovil, Trivandrum,
Tenmala and Punalur divisons was
also given away to the factory. The
only forest circle left was the
Quillon circle, and as a part of the
negotiation to re-open the Grasim
factory, in 1988,after the 3 year
lock-out, Grasim managed to lay
their hands on the Quillon circle
too. This is to say that since 1967,
the forest tracts of North and
Central Kerala was open for Grasims
plunder, and since 1984 practically
the entire forest tract of the
entire state was aside for them.

This manner of slowly but surely
increasing their grasp over the
forest tract of the state, is an
example of the shrewd negotiation
skills of the company. When they
began in 1958, they had asked for
only the Nilambur Valley, which the
government very readily gave to
them, almost free (@ Rel. per ton).
Keeping Nilambur Valley in focus,
the Birlas drafted the agreement in
a manner that would suit their
interests for a very long time. For
example, the very first condition of
the agreement was the one which gave
exclusive right and license to
fell and cut bamboo from the
Nilambur Valley.

Condition No. 1. a) The
Company shall have the
exclusive right and licence
for a term of 20 years
reckoned from the date of
actual commencement of the
regular working of the
factory, subject to the
restrictions, terms and
conditions, here in after
contained to fell and cut
bamboos for the purpose of
conversion into rayon grade
wood pulp or for purposes
connected with its factory
and to remove the same from
such areas in the Nilambur
Valley as are hereinafter
more particularly
described). This issue of
exclusive right is stated
time and again in the
agreement.
Condition No.2
The company shall have the
exclusive right to extract bamboos as
aforesaid from the areas in the
Nilambur Valley hereinafter referred
to as the Contact Areas as
described in the Schedule hereto and
in accordance with such rotation as
the Chief Conservator of Forests,
Kerala, may in consultation with the
Company from time to time decide, and
to the intent that the Grantor shall
at all times give to the Company
reasonable facilities to enable it to
extract its requirements for
operating a hundred tons per day wood
pulp (rayon grade) plant which
requirements ae presently estimated
at 1,60,000 (One hundred and sixty
thousand) tons of bamboos yearly. It
is further agreed that if the
Contract Areas are not capable of
yielding to the Company the said
quantity of bamboos annually, the
Grantor shall permit the Company to
fell and remove bamboos from such
other areas in proximity of the
Contract Areas to be specified
hereinafter in the said Schedule and
described therein as Additional
Contract Areas as will enable the
Company to obtain the aforesaid
quantity annually.
Again, in Condition No.4, the
exclusive right of the company to
extract resources were extended to
additional areas also. Condition No.4
The grantor undertakes that the
contract areas and additional
contract areas will be exclusively
reserved for the Company and he will
not during the continuance of this
agreement grant any lease or
concession within this area to any
other person.

Through these clauses, the
company ensured that they will
have the exclusive right in
Nilambur Forest Area, and all
so-called additional contract
areas. By condition No:13, they
ensured that the company will
enjoy this exclusive right
extending beyond the initial 20
year period. The condition reads
as
13. The company will have the
option of renewing the lease for
further periods of 20 (twenty) years
at a time on the same terms and
conditions as these presents, except
tht the rate of seigniorage payable
on bamboos will be liable to revision
at ten year intervals after the first
twenty years.
When the contract was signed, it was
with the understanding that the
grantor shall at all times give the
company reasonable facility to enable
it to extract its requirement for
operating a hundred tones per day wood
pulp (rayon grade) pulp. (Condition
No: 2 of the Original Agreement-
Appendix?). However, as we read
further, we find that the Government
had agreed to wait for a period of 3
years after the commencement of the
factory (a date about which the
government did not have a clear idea)
before permitting any other industry
to extract resources from the area
(contract and additional contract
areas) earmarked for the Birlas. This
was to ensure that in future if the
Birlas wished to increase their
production capacity from 100 to 200
tonnes per day, they would not have to
complete with any other industry in
procuring raw material. In other
words, the agreement gave the Birlas
sole right over raw material.
The main reason cited for inviting
the Birlas to set up a pulp factory
here was to initiate and facilitate
industrial development in the state.
Politically, it was also to prove the
point-that contrary to the claim of
the opposition, the communist Ministry
was capable of getting industrial
houses like the Birlas to set up
factories in Kerala. It was expected
that more of such industrial houses
will come to Kerala and thus the
industrialisation process will be
launched in the state. However, the
Agreement with the Birlas gave them
exclusive rights over the forest
resources, and excluded any other
forest based industry from setting up
their operations in the state. In
each of the supplementary agreements
that were to follow, the management
was able to secure further
concessions.


Once the factory started functioning
in 1963, the company used the
employees as scapegoats for bargaining
for additional resources at cheaper
rates. Within 2-3 years, the company
realised that the bamboo resources
would not last long at the current
rate of extraction. So it wanted to
purchase 30,000 acres of private
forest in the Malabar area to raise
eucalyptus plantation. They came to an
agreement with the government. whereby
it was agreed that the government
would not acquire this land for the
next 60 years. However, this land,
along with other private forests of
Kerala, got nationalised after the
passing of the Kerala Forest (Vesting
of Private Forest) Act, 1971.
Thereafter, the Birlas kept
reiterating this loss while
negotiating with the Government for
more resources. All the subsequent
agreements were made use of by the
Birlas in securing more and more
concesions from the Government on the
pretext that additional resources
would help them to give full
employment (30 days a month) to the
existing workers.
The functioning of pulp factories require quite a lot of
water. The Grasim factory needed- litres of water a day. The
Grasim factory was meeting all its water requirements by pumping
water from the river, free of cost, without even a contract (free
access to free resources!). A substantial portion of this water
was discharged back into the river, in a heavily polluted form,
without any proper treatment. During the first 10 years of its
working, the factory was discharging the untreated polluted
effluents, straight into the river. At that time they had not even
set up simple lagoons or aerators. This freely taken water was not
only used for the processing of pulp in the factory, but
additional quantities were pumped to dilute the polluted
effluents, and this was thrown back into the river. Hence dilution
was the only so-called pollution control measure in use at that
time! As the anti-pollution agitation gained strength, the company
started discharging the effluents in an increasingly diluted,
from, during the nights so that it would not be so starkly
visible.
By making pulp out of bamboo that would otherwise flower and
perish (!) and through this process, giving employment to 3000
people directly and 10,000 people indirectly, and producing rayon
grade pulp for the country, thereby saving valuable foreign
exchange, the company claimed to be doing a great service to
society. It is a fact that the management employed a large number
of people, on a daily wage basis, and used them to increase their
bargaining power at various levels, be it to bargain with the
anti-pollution campaigners, or the government or the political and
trade union leadership.
The nerve centre of the anti-pollution agitation was the Vazhakkad
area which was the biggest victim of the pollution. Whenever the
anti-pollution movement gained strength and momentum, some of the
campaigners were absorbed into the workforce of Grasim. Many of
those who were in the forefront of the movements, and/or their
relatives were absorbed into the workforce, in this manner.
Through this the management was not only able to weaken the
intensity of the struggle, but also able to raise doubts in the
minds of the people regarding the integrity of some of those who
were in the forefront of the struggle. This kind of arbitrariness
by the management in employing people created opportunities for
political and trade union leaders whereby they could use their
power and influence in getting people recruited as casual
labourers in the factory.
When the number of casual labourers began to increase, each
casual labourer used to get only 13 days of work a month. This had
led to labour unrest in the factory on many occasions. The labour
dispute negotiation would always end up in the managements demand
for more raw materials. Their explanation was that the factory was
not able to function in full plant capacity due to shortage of raw
material, and hence they were not able to provide full employment
to the labourers. On every such occasion, the management would
place the onus on the government and say that they have requested
the government to allot more raw materials. The management also
advised the trade union leadership to use their goodwill with
the government in procuring more raw materials for Grasim.
By 1974-75, the management had raised the alarm that the
factory may close down for want of raw materials. They used to
constantly remind the labourers and the government that it was
only their cooperation that would prevent the factory from
closing down. By closing down the factory between July 5th 1985
and November 10th 1988 following a labour strike, the management
sent the message that closing down the factory was not a problem
at all for them, and that if the need arises they would close it
down forever. During the negotiation to re-open the factory in
1988, we find that the company was able to force the government
and the trade unions to accept all the conditions laid down by
them. We need to note here that, a strike that was initiated by
the labourers was resolved 3 years later only after accepting all
the conditions laid down by the management ! Though it was the
labour strike that was cited as the reason for the companys
closing down for 3 years , in reality, it was the growing protest
and public opinion against the pollution caused by the factory
which was the main reason. In the negotiations for the re-opening
of the factory in 1988, the prime concern of both the government
and the trade union was in somehow re-opening the factory. Hence,
let alone laying down conditions, there was not even a mention of
the pollution issue. To an outside observer, it was almost as
though the government and the trade unions would not rake up the
issue of pollution in future, such was the compromising stance
taken by them. So, the company turned this 3 years lock-out fully
to their advantage.
After 1988, we see that the trade unions took up the
responsibility of countering the anti-pollution protests. It was
the trade union leaders who strongly argued that the level of
pollutants in the effluent was well within the limits prescribed
by the KSPCB, and hence they said that the argument that the
factory was causing pollution was totally false. The trade unions
saw the anti-pollution struggle as an attempt to close down the
factory. What we need to understand is that the skill of the
management was in posing the issue of pollution as a trade union
VS affected people issue. So, when the issue of the carcinogenic
nature of the factory pollution came up, the explanation given by
the trade union was that it, was not the pollution from the
factory, but the pesticide contamination in the vegetables
consumed by the people of the area which caused cancer.

Box:Workers Health and Medical Compensation
One of the key issues to be addressed by factories
using/producing chemicals of toxic nature, is the health of its
workers. The health of the worker who works within this
environment, and who will come in direct contact with these
chemicals, is a matter of grave concern. There were a
series of labour disputes, strikes and negotiations for
ensuring medical claims, health insurance etc for the
workers of Grasim. Initially trade unions played a critical role
in legitimising these demands.
Later, once this system of medical check-up and medical
insurance got established, vested interests began to
operate in this front also. Even though this factory was not
declared as a chemical factory, many toxic materials such
as $ were used in the production process. Routine medical
check-ups were held for the workers in a few specific
hospitals in Calicut. Blood, urine etc were checked. Soon,
this process got subverted, and reduced to a mockery,
whereby all the parties fooled each other for a mere
pittance. As per the designed procedure, workers had be to
checked in one of the following hospitals: Koyas Hospital,
National Hospital or Calicut Nursing Home. They would be
treated for any illness and the actual bills were reimbursed
by the Company management. If properly conducted, this
would have left us with a valuable record of changing health
profiles of the workers in the company. However, the
agents who functioned between the hospital and the
workers, provided workers with false documents stating
their illness, and they would pay the workers a maximum
sum of Rs. 1000. The workers would get this amount at
home, without even going for a check-up. Staff in the
hospitals, Company staff, workers, agents, all got a share at
the cost of the health of the workers. The company
management was happy because everything was under
control and going smoothly. It has been reported to us,
during personal conversations with the workers that even
some of the trade union leaders had a financial stake in this
process.
The company used to distribute bottles of
Dashamoolarishtam and vitamin tablets to the workers on
a monthly basis. It is reported that though these arishtams
were specifically made and ordered for the workers, its
quality was suspect!
This shows how lightly and flippantly an issue as serious as that of health was dealt with. Neither the
management who resorted to such practices nor the workers who accepted what was given free irrespective of
whether they needed it or not, were critical of this routine doling out of medicines. The management esp.
benefited out of this process, for whenever there was a public hue and cry about the health of the residents of the
Mavoor- Vazakkad area, the workers were peaceful. Had the workers been more conscious of their health
problems, there would have been a possible alliance between the workers and the public.
When the trade union was asked the question of whether
they wanted employment or life, they said that they even if
they lost their lives, they wanted their jobs. (Jeevan
poyalum joli venum) A wrongly framed question, but an
equally absurd answer

The manner in which the company evaded implementation of
pollution control measures is a clean example of the
irresponsible attitude of the management. In almost all
conferences, and meetings which were held to discuss the
finding and recommendations of various review/expert
committees, the management would agree to implement all the
recommendations related to pollution control and then they
would keep silence. This was a repeated strategy.

Within few days of the commencement of the factory, the
people of Vazhakkad were protesting inside the factory
premises. The thick black smoke and the viscous, foul
smelling polluted water that was released into the river, was
much beyond what the people could bear with. When the protest
took place, though the management took the help of the
district administration and the police in containing this
apparent law and order problem,they found that a better
strategy would be to console the protectors by holding
negotiation meetings with them. Way back in 1962 they said
that pollution was just a starting problem and that this
could be resolved by taking the effluents through a pipe to
sea. Needless to say, pollution continued, protests
continued, and more assurances were given. This game
continued for 37 years, till 1999.

The story of the bund at Elamaram will further
illustrate this hide and seek game of assurances.As the water
flow in the river falls during summer, a temporary bund for
the summer months, built by the management at Elamaram
separated the fresh water from the polluted and saline water.
This bund protected the intake points of the factory and the
pumping station at Koolimadu from where water was taken to
the city of Calicut. But when the bund was made, the entire
stretch of the river downstream of the bund became thoroughly
polluted. In effect from October-November to May-June when
the monsoons begin, the portion of the river downstream of
the bund was transformed into a dirty, polluted sewer. This
in turm contaminated the wells situated by the side of the
river. Thus not only did the river become unfit for drinking,
bathing, washing, and irrigation, but the other drinking
water sources like the wells also got contaminated. So the
bund became a very contentious issue during the summer
months. Needless to say, people strongly agitated against the
construction in 1973, but gave in after a conciliatory
meeting convened by Collector. They gave in only because the
bund was protecting the drinking water source of the
Kozhikode city from getting contaminated, and thereby risking
their own drinking water sources. However, all promise of
pollution redressal made by the management at this
conciliatory meeting was violated, and in 1974, people
demolished the bund.

After the infamous Rama Nilayam Agreement of December
16th 1974, in which the management agreed to build a regular
to cum-bridge at Chungappally, and to lay pipelines to take
the treated effluents beyond Chungappally, there were hopes
of this issue getting resolved, at least temporarily, but as
usual the management slept over it for the next 6 years. It
was only after 1979, when angry protectors broke the
Elamaram bund and the polluted water intruded into the
companys own intake point, which halted the production
process, that they some any started laying the pipeline to
Chungappally. But since the promised regulator was not
constructed at Chungappally, the polluted waters which had
been taken to Chungappally through the pipeline, began to
move upstream with the tide and so the problem surfaced
again. This rejected the earlier stance of the management
that if the effluents were taken by the pipeline to
Chungappally, then there was no need to treat it. As the
polluted water started coming back upstream, the bund at
Elamaram had to be constructed again. Almost every year there
would be agitations, following which meetings would be
convened by the Collector/R.D.O and some more decisions would
be taken regarding Pollution control to the extent that the
protectors would somehow agree to the construction of that
years bund.

Though difficult to believe, this drama continued till
1999 when the regular to cum-bridge (which was promised
during the Rama Nilayam negotiations of 1974,) was finally
built at Kavanakkal.
Their routine neglect of almost all recommendations made
by various review/expert committees during their working
history makes clear the managements total disregard for all
democratic institutions and grievance redressal mechanisms.
Whether it was the recommendation of the Estimate Committee
of the Kerala Legislative Assembly chaired by Mr. T.S. John
in 1977, or the recommendations of the Rajya Sabha Petitions
Committee in 1996 (89th Report), or the Sengupta Committee
Report of 1998, the story is the same. The Environmental
Committee of Kerala Legislative Assembly chaired by Prof.A.V.
Tamarakshan further recommended that the Sengupta Committee
report should be implemented in full letter and spirit. The
Estimate Committee of the Legislative Assembly (1977) after
seeing the Action Taken Report filed by the Government in
1980, strongly recommended a prosecution action against the
management for its adamant and arrogant stand.

We need to understand that even court orders were not
spared from the managements arrogance and their lack of
respect for democratic institutions. For eg: after admitting
the petition of the KSPCB on 4.9.95, and considering the
emergency of the situation, the First Class Magistrate of the
Kunnamangalam Count in its interim order stayed the discharge
of effluent into the river. However Grasim continued to
discharge the effluents and gave their own explanation for
the court order. They said that the court order was not to
stop the effluent discharge, but to stop the discharge of
untreated effluents.

Since this was a clear case of contempt of court, a
contempt of court case was filed against the management, and
they had to take a bail for the same.

Though the managements incorrigible attitude may seem
frustrating to many an onlooker, they continued with their
manipulations till the very end. Needless to say, the
governments inefficiency and lack of will aided the
management. But equally important is the regulatory role that
can be played by members of civil society. If we agree to the
fact that the Grasim management is guilty of very grave
mistakes, then are we ready to make them accountable to
society at large?

5
A Government that failed to govern

Kerala, being a part of the
Indian Union, which is a declared
welfare state, has the
responsibility to govern its
resources and people in a way that
ensures the welfare of all its
citizens and the protection of its
environment. While exploring the
history of Grasim we understand that
not only has the government totally
failed in performing the above
mentioned constitutional
responsibilities, but it has chosen
to facilitate the most unethical and
unjust exploitation of its forest
and water resources, in order to
satisfy the ever-increasing greed of
the Birlas. All of this, the
government explained as efforts
towards industrial development, and
through it, employment generation in
the state. While it is a highly
debatable question as to whether
the setting up of this factory
actually led to industrial
development in the state or not, it
a fact that the Government reduced
itself to an almost silent spectator
as Grasim packed off from the state,
after having made a major
contribution to the ill-health of
the factory workers and to the
residents of Mavoor-Vazakkad area
and putting at risk, the health of
the children yet to be born on the
banks of the Chaliyar. .

In 1958, when the first Communist
Ministry in the state invited the
Birlas to set up this factory which
would exploit the forest and water
resources of the state, the
Communist government under the
leadership of Sri. E.M.S.
Namboodiripad was in a hurry to make
a political statement to those in
the opposition. They were replying
to the oppositions allegation that
the communists who had shut down
factories through their labour
strikes, were not capable of
bringing industrial progress to the
state. The fact that they were able
to get one of the biggest industrial
houses in the country to set up
their factory here, was considered
as a major political success at that
time. But the price that had to be
paid by the forests and tribal
communities of Kerala, the Chaliyar
river, and the people of the Mavoor-
Vazhakkad area was never considered.

As per the agreement signed
between the Government of Kerala and
the Birlas on May 3
rd
1958, the
government had the responsibility of
providing the Birlas with sufficient
quantities of bamboo (@ Re 1 per
ton) almost free of cost. The
government not only took on the
responsibility of meeting the raw
material requirements of a private
industry, but it also placed this on
top priority. In order to meet the
conditions of the agreement, the
government opened up its bamboo
forests to the Birlas, and when
these forests fell short of the
companys hunger for resources, the
government even gave away its under-
grown eucalyptus plantations at
subsidised rates. We have to note
here that these eucalyptus
plantations were raised on hitherto
ecologically valuable shola forests
and grasslands, under the World
Banks Social Forestry Programme.
While we may be able to comprehend
the economic loss incurred to the
state exchequer by the subsidised
supply of bamboo, eucalyptus and
other raw materials to the company,
we are yet to acknowledge the
ecological loss incurred due to the
destruction of unique and valuable
shola forests and grassland
ecosystems. Today, as the summers
witness the drying of rivers and
wells throughout the length and
breadth of the state, and we wait in
long queues to collect our quota of
drinking water supplied through
tanker lorries, we perhaps may
realise that the real value of
bamboo and shola forests, and
precious grasslands, may not be
captured in monetary terms. It was
the states irresponsibility that
allowed the Birlas to plunder its
forest wealth, to make pulp through
a highly polluting process and
thereafter flooding the Mavoor-
Vazhakkad area with toxic effluents.
Though it was the 1958 agreement
which gave the Birlas the initial
access to Keralas forest tracts,
they were able to tactfully renew
this agreement a number of times,
and in some cases even before the
scheduled time of renewal. This
periodic renewals which gave them
increased access to the forests of
Kerala which hastened the pace of
their destruction, took place during
the tenures of both left and right
governments, and hence both the
blocks can not wash their Lands off
this grave mistake. It is shameful
to see that never was the
implementation of pollution control
measures placed as a precondition to
be fulfilled by the company, while
resuming resource contracts with the
government.

As we mentioned before, it was
economic development through
industrialisation that was cited as
the main aim of inviting the Birlas
n 1958. The Marxist critique of this
process of industrial development
was that the interests of the
workers was not given due
consideration. However, when they
themselves invited the Birlas here
in 1958,the interests of the Birlas
was given a priority over that of
the workers
9
!

9
It seems that 2 agreements were signed in 1958 between the government and the company
management. One related to the raw material supply by the government to the Birlas, and the
other related to the general functioning of the company. During the labour strike between 1985 and
1988, it was the management who disclosed information regarding the latter agreement through a
paid advertisement. The conditions in the latter agreement read as follows: 6(A) The government
covenants that the company observing and performing the several functions and stipulations
indicated herein shall peaceably hold and enjoy the premises, liberties and powers granted in
pursuance of this agreement or any other agreement without any interruption by the government or
any person rightfully claiming to act for them. Government shall at all times endeavour to bring
about cordial relationship between management and labour and in case of any dispute involving
harassement of management and/or any other illegal act resulting in interruption in production,
take timely and positive steps to prevent such occurrences.
(B). The government agree with the Company that it will be difficult for them to carry on their
activities if the conditions obtaining at the time of starting their work are materially altered and new
burdens imposed on them in subsequent years. They will therefore, do their utmost to ensure that


In 1958 itself these was
controversy regarding these clauses,
and the CPI Secretariat and the Party
state committee seem to have assessed
this issue and concluded that there
were some lapses in the agreement.
These controversial clauses seem to
have been used by the management in
their negotiations with the
government during the long-drawn
lock-out between 1985 and 1988. So,
there was displeasure regarding the
outcome of the 1988 negotiations to
re-open the factory amongst the
workers and some of the trade union
leaders like Mr. A. Vasu of GROW.

the laws, rules and regulations relating to the companys relations with the labour, and taxes and
levies on company are so administered as not to alter the conditions under which the company
begins its operations.
Many from other trade unions have
also privately stated during personal
conversations that the 1988
settlement was a more or less a
defeat for the workers.
It should be pointed out that the
government did not ever undertake any
comprehensive survey to assess the
pollution related health hazards
faced by the factory workers and the
residents of the affected area. As a
result, the issue of pollution
induced diseases suffered by the
factory workers and residents of the
area, was never included during the
discussions on the issue of
compensation which were held during
the time of the companys final
closure in 2001. If the government
wanted to, they could have insisted
on the factory paying compensation to
its citizens.

It has been found that on many
occasions, various arms of the
government such as the Rajya Sabha
petitions Committee, of 1986,
Estimate Committee of 1977, etc had
conducted enquiries about the
pollution issue, and submitted
reports and recommendations. However,
neither did the management adhere to
these recommendations, nor did the
government attempt to enforce
adherence. For example, in 1968 there
was a strong public protest against
the excessive air pollution caused by
the Carbon disulphide plant in the
factory. Following the protest, an
Expert committee was appointed to
look into the matter and make
recommendations for ensuring
pollution control. However, 4 years
later in 1972, it is found that
another committee was formed to
review the status of implementation
of the recommendations of the earlier
committee. By 1973-74, the people
lost their patience with such
committees and recommendations, and
the lack of follow-up from the
governments side, and they broke the
Elamaram bund in 1974 (See details on
P -). This forced the government to
arrive at the Rama Nilayam Agreement
of 1974, which was then considered as
a final agreement on the pollution
issue.( Even during the Emergency
Period, the recommendations of the
Rama Nilayam Agreement of 1974 which
was convened by the then powerful
Home Minister K. Karunakaran, went
unimplemented).Finally the Elamaram
bund was broken once again by a mass
action in 1979, to once again remind
the government and the management of
the lapses on their part. Therefore,
it was only the constant struggle by
the people that created a situation
whereby the government and the
management were forced to take some
action.
Whenever recommendations were implemented by the
management, it was done in a very half-heated and careless
manner. For example, after frequent protests forced the
management to lay the pipeline to Chungapally, breaks and
leaks in the pipeline let the effluents out, thereby
contaminating the land, ponds and wells in the area. The
attitude of the management at this point was that effluent
treatment was no longer necessary as they were being
discharged 7.4 km downstream at Chungapally where in any case
the river water is saline during the summer. However the
absence of the regulator cum bridge at Chungapally which was
supposed to have been built when the pipeline was laid, led
to the upstream movement of the effluents from Chungapally.
In effect, the conditions of the Rama Nilayam Agreement too
had been violated.

The PCB is an institution within
the government to address issues
related to pollution. Set up in 1974
under the Water (Prevention and
Control of Pollution) Act of 1974,
the KSPCBs functioning in relation
to the Grasim Pollution issue is yet
another example of the people paying
the cost for the failure of a
government institution. As per the
Water Act of 1974, all factories had
to seek consent from the KSPCB, every
year, before discharging effluents
into any water body. It is found that
this yearly consent was given by the
Board even when the conditions
attached to this consent was ignored
by the management. In one instance,
on 17.5.1980, the Water Apellate
Authority, while setting aside the
KSPCBS notice in lieu of consent,
said the following $ .
Hence we find that between 1975 and
1982, the management had evaded
almost all the conditions laid down
by the Board, and the Board had not
taken any action against the
management. On rare occasions, when
the Board initiated action against
the company, the government and KSPCB
realised that the company was capable
of evading action by making use of
the loopholes in the law.

In this context, it is important
to discuss the issue of legal
samples. As per the law, if the
KSPCB has to take samples from
effluents discharged by the factory,
it has to inform the company in
advance by serving a notice to this
effect and the sample has to be
collected in the presence of the
company representatives. Only then
will the sample be considered as a
legal sample. Since the company was
always given prior notice about the
visit of the KSPCB Officials, they
were able to make temporary
reductions in pollution levels. This
was achieved by temporarily reducing
the volume of production, by diluting
the effluents with plenty of water,
or by adding some chemicals like
lime. So in effect, the concept of
legal sample was self-defeating. Even
though this issue was taken up during
the visit of the Rajya Sabha
Petitions Committee, this loophole
has not yet been rectified.

Though the company was not
fulfilling the conditions laid down
by KSPCB ever since it was set up in
1974, the latter continued to give
yearly sanction to the company to
discharge its effluents into the
river. In 1980, the Water Appellate
Authority pulled up the KSPCB and set
aside the above mentioned yearly
sanction (what is referred to as the
Notice In lieu of consent), The
Authority in its judgement made in
May 1980, said that the liberal and
ineffective, attitude taken by the
Board while discharging its statutory
functions and responsibility, must
have prompted the appellant to be
very unmindful of even the penal
provisions of the Act, but it was to
be remembered that they were playing
with human life in a vast area
covered by the Chaliyar river basin.
The entire locality was being
affected due to the careless
discharge of the polluted effluent
from the factory. 10

It was only after a Conference
convened by the Chief Minister on
11.2.1982, following a controversy
around the breaking of the pipeline
to Chungapally, that the company
agreed to augment the effluent
treatment system. When the KSPCB
examined the system after
augmentation, it found that even the

10
89
th
Rajya Sabha Petitions Committee Report, 1996, p.4.
new system was inadequate in
treating the total effluents that
were generated. However, in view of
the improvements made by the
company, the consent to continue
discharging effluents into the river
was given to the Board.
From 1983-1988, there were
intermittent lay offs and also a 3
year lockout from 1985 onwards. So
during this period, pollution was
not such a serious problem. But
after the factory re-opened in 1988,
after prolonged negotiation,
pollution control was almost a non-
issue.

Meanwhile, studies from across
the world revealed that effluents
from pulp mills contained highly
toxic heavy metals, as well as
organochlorines such as dioxins and
furans. Neither did the KSPCB
attempt to assess the pollution from
the factory in this light, nor were
they technically equipped to do so.
For instance organochlorines were
never mentioned, within the KSPCBs
stipulated list of upper limits, and
hence its measure was not tested. It
was only in 1997, that the Sengupta
Committee directed the KSPCB to set
an upper limit to the presence of
organochlorines in the effluent.

While reviewing the functioning
of the government and the PCB in the
light of the Grasim experience, we
cannot help but ask- what are these
institutions for? For whom do they
function? When the government chose
to allocate its forest resources in
favour of the Birlas, did it
consider the other less powerful
stakeholders? When it justified the
above in the name of employment to
3000 people, did the government care
to find out the numbers who lost
their livelihoods in this process,
let alone rehabilitating them?

So, then what is the function of
the state? Who is the protector of
the fundamental rights of the
subsistence communities?

The PCB also presents an equally
grim picture. Can they be complacent
by merely prescribing a few limits
for the presence of toxic elements,
and not take any action against the
violation of even these few
standards? We need to note here that
it was not the PCB, but an
independent study by the Calicut
University, which detected high
levels of mercury in the
effluents11. The PCB chose to
believe the management who denied
the presence of mercury in the
effluents they released. Until the
Sengupta Committee in 1997, directed
the PCB to fix an upper limit to the
presence of organochlorines (which
are known carcinogens) in the
effluent, they had not done so.
Let us understand that these
institutions have ben created with

11
A study conducted by Dr. Souriar and Dr. Madhavankutty, from the Dept of Chemistry, Calicut University,
revealed that during 1979-81, as against the permissible limit of 0.002 ppm Chaliyar river water contained
2.81 ppm of mercury in it.
public money, to play the critical
role of a watchdog, in order to
protect the interests of all members
of society, be they organised or
unorganised, powerful or powerless.
How does the PCB explain the undue
delay in initiating action against
the company management for having
violated almost all major pollution
control norms? A delay that took its
toll on human lives and the life of
the river?

Though the Grasim story is a
telling example of repeated
violations of laws and agreements, it
is not just that. Pollution is not
just about some limits and standards.
We need to understand that pollution
is an encroachment into the
fundamental right to life.


6
The struggle to protect their river

While looking at the history of
environmental movements in Kerala,
the struggle against Grasim is
perhaps the first instance of people
organising themselves to fight
against the pollution caused by a
factory. It is relevant to note that
this struggle, which dates back from
1962 onwards, began even before the
publication of Silent Spring by
Rachel Carson
12


The struggle which began in 1962
when the factory went on stream, has
not ended with the winding up of the
factory in 2001. The damaged and

12

12
Rachel Carson, an American environmental Scientist, brought out her pioneering work titled Silent Spring in 1964.
This classic became a source of inspiration for the modern environmental movement in the West. This book contains a
detailed critique of the use of toxic chemicals in the form of pesticides
polluted river, and a disease ridden
society are struggling to come back
to life. So though the factory has
wound up, the struggle against
pollution will have to continue.

Chaliyar river was not just a
source of water for drinking and
bathing, it was not just source of
fish and kaka which formed a
substantial portion of peoples diet
, especially that of the poor;
neither was it just a travel route
for people and commodities It was all
of this, and much more. It gave life
and rhythm to the folksongs of the
area, and provided rich, living
background to the folklores and myth
of the one.


When the Government entered into
an agreement with the Birlas in 1958,
the people of Mavoor and Vazakkad had
no idea that the factory was going to
be located close to their homes. In
those days, there was not a single
road to Mavoor. People had to take
country boats from Vazhakkd to reach
Mavoor which lay across the Chaliyar.
It was towards the end of 1958 that
the first meeting to discuss the
coming of the factory and the
possibilities of locating land for
the same, was held at the Aided
School at Mavoor. This meeting was
organised by Sri. A. Balagopalan,
Member of the Madras Legislative
Assembly, and Sri Chatunni Master who
later went on to become MLA and MP.
At this meeting, it was impressed
upon the people that development was
going to be ushered into the area and
with the coming of the factory, daily
wage workers of the area would soon
earn monthly salaries. It was decided
at this meeting, that the people of
Mavoor would give away 200 acres of
land to the company @ Re. 1 per cent
(Rs. 100 per acre). Fenced and
protected by guards, this 200-acre
plot housed a mammoth complex, which
was the result of the sweat and toil
of hundreds of workers. This complex
was frequented by engineers (both
Indian and foreign), and by the top
brasses of the Birlas who would make
aerial observations from helicopters.
The local people viewed all of this
with a sense of awe and bewilderment
looking forward to the employment
that would be generated and also to
all the good things that development
was supposed to bring.

One the day in 1962, the factory
began operations. After the sound of
the sirens, what came out was black
smoke, and foul smelling effluents,
which resembled a thick, viscous,
brown soup. This polluted the entire
area and the river Chaliyar. Within a
few days, the people of the area
collected together and went to the
factory protested and declared that
their river could not be polluted. If
the companys function was going to
cause pollution, then they did not
want such a company, they said. One
of the first slogans raised was We
dont want this Birla Company which
pollutes drinking water (Kudikunna
Vellam Kulumalakiya Birla Company,
Vende Venda). What followed
thereafter was a series of struggles
and protests, of differing intensity.
It is to be noted that the initial
years of the struggle, was marked by
more of spontaneous
protests/responses to the pollution
in the river. As years passed, and as
the problem of pollution continued
unabated, these spontaneous protests
consolidated into Chaliyar Defence
Committee, Chaliyar Jala-Vayu
Samaraskhna Samiti etc. Those who
were involved in the initial phase
never thought that it would be such a
long-drawn affair. To them the
problem was obvious, and so they
thought that the government and the
management would understand it, and
rectify it. However, by 1965, they
realised that the problem was not so
simple and that too many vested
interests were involved

What we can derive from the
Resolution passed at a meeting held
at Krishnaprabha Auditorium, Faroke,
on 2.5.1965 is that much before 1965
itself (Ref), a committee by the name
of Chaliyar Defence Committee had
been in existence. This committee
seemed to have had many rounds of
discussions with the government and
the management, and they had been
given assurances by both the
government and the management
(However, over time they realised
that the assurances given by the
government and management
representatives at various meetings
were only of face-value). The above
mentioned resolution also indicates
that by 1965 itself, people had begun
to experience the intensity of
pollution. The resolution reads as
from time immemorial, people who have
lived by the side of this river, have
used the river water for drinking and
bathing, and the livelihoods of
thousands of people have depended on
this river. This river is now unfit
for any use, as it is polluted by
toxic effluents discharged into the
river by the Gwalior Rayons factory
established at Mavoor. As a result,
over a lakh of people who live by the
riverside, are experiencing,
undescribable, difficulties, as they
are not getting pure water for
drinking and bathing. Over and above,
thousands of people who are taking
care of their families by fishing and
Kakka collection, are now losing
their livelihoods. They are helpless
and moving towards perpetual hunger.

Many of those whose livelihoods
were reported to have been endangered
by the factory-induced pollution in
1965,are not found in later
references. These include the small
merchants who sold, various
commodities including grocery items
in boats, people who transported wood
and other material along the river,
people in the boat-making profession
etc. This may be due to the fact that
these groups of people may have
migrated, or given up their
professions.

Apart from humans, pollution took
its foil on fish and other organisms
in the river too. In 1965 itself,
there were reports of cattle dying
after they drank water from the
river.

The above mentioned meeting on
2.5.65 was attended by
representatives of Mavoor and
Vazakkad panchayat, Chaliyar Defence
Committee members and the STU
representatives. At this meeting a
resolution was passed which read as
follows, We hereby warn the
government and the company, that if
there is a further delay in finding
a permanent solution to this problem
which has affected the livelihoods,
health and property of lakhs of
people, it will create long-lasting
and dangerous consequences.

During the Assembly election of
1966, it was not the coming of the
factory, but the pollution issue,
which was the main issue. Following
the election, in 1968, due to the
pressure from the MLAS and the
Chaliyar Defence Committee, a
Committee was instituted by the
government to find a solution to the
pollution problem (Bhairavan
Committee). After four long years, in
1972, another Committee was formed to
review the status of implementation
of the recommendations made by
Bhairavan Committees. This marked the
beginning of a series of Committees,
Reviews, Recommendations but the
pollution continued. Each of these
committees were set up to study the
pollution problem, Interestingly, all
of them have been instituted
following a strong public protest.
Consequently these committees and
their recommendations were used to
pacify the protestors than to control
the pollution .

The years between 1965 to 1974,
when the Rama Nilayam Agreement was
signed, witnessed regular struggle
and the Elamaram bund was at the
focus of the anti-pollution struggle.

From the very beginning of the
factory, taking the effluents to the
sea by a pipeline and discharging it
there was portrayed as a so-called
permanent solution to the problem of
water pollution. In 1962-63 itself
the management had started giving
propaganda that this was the
solution, and at all future
negotiation meetings with the
protestors, this was projected and
discussed. Though the management was
aware of the fact that it was not
practical to lay a pipeline for 26-28
kms to the sea, it used to repeatedly
state this in order to pacify the
agitating public
13
. It was this
promise of a pipeline, which allowed

13
The management s doubl e st andar ds bec ame c l ear i n 1996 w hen t he Wat er Appel l at e
Aut hor i t y ask ed t he c ompany t o l ay t he pr oposed pi pel i ne t o t he sea, and t he c ompany
r ef used t o do so sayi ng i t w as unec onomi c al
the company to function between 1962
to 1972,without installing even a
lagoon, (aerobic and anaerobic) or
siltation tank. It seems that the
Chaliyar Defence Committee and later
the JVSS sincerely believed the
viability of the proposal for a
pipeline. For instance, the earlier
mentioned resolution, of 2.5.65
discusses this issue as follows- So
this problem will be solved only by
taking the effluents to the sea by a
pipeline, instead of discharging it
into the river
14
. We need to view
the acceptance by the JVSS of the
proposal to lay the pipeline up to
Chungappally during the Rama Nilayam

14

14
I nt er est i ngl y w e see si mi l ar demands voi c ed as l at e as 11.3.1997 by Mavoor Gr asi m
Pour avak asha Samr ak shana Sami t i l ed by Sr i . K.A. Rehman and t hen MLA Sr i E.T.
Mohammed Basheer , w ho l at er w ent on t o bec ome Educ at i on Mi ni st er of Ker al a St at e.

negotiations in 1974 against this
background. The laying of the
pipelines up to Chungappally was
considered as the first step towards
extending it to the sea.

By late 1970s, organisations such
as SPEC, KSSP etc began to actively
involve themselves in the anti-
pollution struggle, and these groups
conducted a few studies on issues
related to pollution. During 1980-85,
when the effluents began to be taken
to Chungappally, and when the KSPCB
in response to strong peoples
agitations, tightened its monitoring
operations, pollution was marginally
reduced. (This was also the period
when the factory was intermittently
laid-off due to labour strikes). So
the anti-pollution campaigners
centred around Vazakkad became less
active. This marginal reduction in
pollution was also brought about by a
reduction in the total production of
the factory. This in turn created
lesser number of working days for the
daily wage labourers, which led to
further labour strikes.

During the same period, the main
problem encountered by the people was
the constant breaking and leaking of
the pipes to Chungappally, and there
were sporadic protests. However, in
1983, air pollution caused by the
functioning of the Sulphuric acid
plant within the factory, led to
another series of protests. However
as the factory laid-off for short
periods during 1983 and 1984, the
impact of pollution was less felt.
During 1985-1988, there was a 3 year
lock-out following a labour strike,
and it was only after conceding to
almost all the demands of the
management that the company re-opened
on November 10th, 1988. During this
lockout, 13 factory employees
committed suicide. Though the people
of the area were struggling to deal
with pollution they were moved by the
difficulties faced by the factory
employees and their families during
the 3 year lock-out, and they were
found to involve themselves at times
in the workers, struggle to re-open
the factory.

Though the labour strike was the
immediate reason for the 1985-1988
lockout, both the management and the
trade unions knew that the real
reason was the anti-pollution
agitation. As a result, after the
factory re-opened in 1988, the trade
unions were antagonistic to all anti-
pollution protests. The managements
stance was that they were ready to
shut down the factory any day, and
that they were running it inspite of
the raw material shortage only at the
insistence of the government and the
employees.
After 1988 different groups which
involved themselves in the struggle
focussed their attention on the heavy
raw material subsidy given to the
company, as well as the disturbing
trend in the morbidity pattern of the
affected area. These groups and the
local people became painfully aware
of the fact that some of the trends
predicted by the study conducted by
doctors of Calicult Medical College
were slowly coming true
15
. Yet
another medical survey conducted by
the District Medical Officer,
Kozhikode in the panchayats of
Mavoor, Peruvayal, Cheruvannoor,
Beypore, Chemancheri, Ramanattukara,
Faroke and Olavanna found that cancer
and other respiratory diseases were
on the higher side in these

15
Disturbed by the growing incidence of cancer in the
pollution affected areas, Vazakkad panchayat under the
leadership of the their President Sri. K.A. Rehman conducted
a cancer survey in the area. The Survey revealed that during
the period 1990-1994, 213 people died of cancer in Vazakkad
panchayat alone. During the survey they located at least 79
people who were undergoing treatment for cancer, 176 people
with Tb, 56 heart patients, 117 ulcer patients and 134 asthma
patients in the panchayat.
panchayats. The following table gives
details of the same.
Dt. medical officers report




Place Population Death
Rate
(Two
Years)
Cancer
Death
Respiratory
Disease
Mavoor 26144 4.2/1000 20% 12%
Peruvayil 53190 3.4 12% 19%
Cheruvannur 43785 4.2 12% 12%
Beppur 56496 4.4 12% 12%
Chemachery 32652 4.0 9% 3%
Ramanattukara 26845 8 12% 19%
Faroke 46825 2 3% 18%
Olavanna 45733 4 11% 31%







A debate was started regarding the
possible ways of controlling
pollution. One arguement was that
pollution could be controlled by the
use of latest technologies, and as
these were available, they should be
used to solve the problem. The other
arguement was that the machinery and
technology used by the factory dated
back to the early 1960s, and it was
not possible to significantly alter
it to the extent of eliminating
pollution. Even if it was possible,
the management would not be agreeable
due to the economic implications of
the same it, they argued. The
management and the trade union argued
that all necessary pollution control
measures had been taken and that the
level of effluents conformed to the
KSPCB standards.

From the findings of the Calicut
University Study, and from incident
reported from other parts of the
world, the anti-pollution activists
were suspecting that the mercury and
organochlorine levels in the effluent
were much higher then the permissible
limits. As the PCB was ill-equipped
to test the presence of these toxic
components, their increased levels
had gone unnoticed so far. They were
thus demanding for more stringent
pollution control measures to
eliminate the presence of these
extremely dangerous elements in the
water. If not, they argued that the
company should be shut down till
these measures were implemented.

Even when the 1994 study by the
National Institute of Oceanography
16
,
revealed that the Chaliyar river was
dying due to pollution, the
management continued to argue that
the pollution was within the limits
prescribed by the KSPCB. However the
death of 3 workers on June 23
rd
1995
by inhaling noxious gases while they
were repairing faulty values on the
pipeline, revealed the

16
for details page 32
ineffectiveness of the pollution
control measures undertaken by the
company so far. On December 1997, the
frustrated people under the
leadership of Sri. K.A. Rehman
organised a major protest rally, and
demanded the closure of the factory.
This was for the first time that the
demand to shutdown the factory was
voiced with full strength. Though the
struggle continued for some more
time, it could not carry on further
due to the ill health of the leader
Sri. K.A. Rehman, who was also
fighting cancer, and due to financial
constraints. On January 11
th
, Sri
K.A. Rehman died of cancer.

Following the death of Sri K.A.
Rehman, at the State Level Convention
of Peoples Movements fighting against
pollution at Calicut, it was decided
to launch a final struggle to close
down the factory. According to the
decision taken at the convention, an
indefinite relay fast was launched in
front of the factory on January 26
th

1999.

On May 26
th
1999, production
processes came to a halt in the
company after they issued a notice to
the government for closing down the
factory. Even though the government
rejected this notice, following
negotiations with the government and
trade unions, the company closed down
forever in 2001.

Before the factory closed down, an
attempt was made to sell off the
factory to a newly registered
company, Moonlight Chemfab Limited
which was based at Indore. The Birlas
made this move in order to evade
payment of compensation to the
workers as well as to the victims of
factory-induced pollution. However
due to the timely intervention of the
trade unions, the government and the
Chaliyar Action Council, this did not
take place. This forced the Birla
management to discuss the issue of
compensation with the government and
the trade unions. Unfortunately the
issue of compensation to the
pollution victims was not given due
consideration.

So after functioning for 38 years,
when the factory closed down in 2001,
the people who struggled through and
through against pollution, had to
change the course of their struggle.
Had it not been for the continuous
struggle of the people, the company
would have continued evading
pollution control measures, as during
the 1960s. We need to understand
that the common people of the Mavoor-
Vazakkad area were fighting against a
company which had the power and the
resources to manipulate and overcome
the restrictions imposed by the
government and government
institutions. Whatever little
pollution control measures that we
see in place today, with which the
management has washed its hands off
taking further responsibilities with
regard to pollution control, are the
result of long years of struggle.
Similarly, each expert committee that
was appointed to look into pollution
matters came up after a spell of
protests.

At times, the management and the
government, through false promises
and assurances have cheated the
peoples struggle for years. For
instance, the government and the
KSPCB chose to ignore the fact that
the company had installed an effluent
treatment plant which was capable of
treating only 50% of the total
effluents generated by the factory.

People of the pollution affected
areas were aware of the need and the
importance of employment; and so in
most cases, they were never fully
unified in their struggle against a
company which was capable of
generating employment. For the same
reason, those who were involved in
the anti-pollution struggle, were
also concerned about the fate of the
employees. Perhaps it was this
concern which held back the struggle
from really moving ahead with greater
intensity. So they waited for 33
years, till December 10
th
1996,
before they finally declared that the
factory that pollutes the air they
breathe and the water they drink,
should be shut down.

Sri K.A. Rehman who led the
struggle from the very beginning,
like many other people of the
affected area, succumbed to cancer on
Jan 11
th
1999. Before his death, he
shared his dream of seeing the
Chaliyar river coming back to life.
He asked whether the river would ever
come back to life. He asked whether
the people of the area ever be able
to breathe pure air?

Although the factory has closed
down, till the victims of pollution
get their due compensation, the
struggle will have to continue,
perhaps in new ways and forms.



7
Conclusions: Did anybody learn anything?

The story of Grasim does not end
with the shutting down of the Grasim
factory. Grasim remains as a stark
and sad example of how the entire
bamboo forests of a state and all the
pure water in a full, following river
like Chaliyar, can be lawfully
plundered in full day-light by a
ruthless private corporate
management, with the full consent of
the government and the cooperation of
the trade unions.It seems that those
in the decision making process
(whether they are in political
parties or in the government), are
yet to treat this as an serious and
grave issue.

This is indicated by the
governments recent plan to revive
the Travancore Rayons (Trayons)
factory at Perumbavoor, central
Kerala, which has been running at a
loss for the past 10 years. A 2025
crore rupee proposal for its revival
is being studied by a High Power team
headed by the Principal Secretary
(Industries), Government of Kerala.
It is envisaged that after the
proposed modernisation, Trayons will
have a pulp plant with a capacity of
90,000 tons, and a fibre division
with a capacity of 70,000 tons. (It
may be noted here that this by far
exceeds the total capacity of the
closed down, Grasim plant which had a
total capacity of 72,000 tons in the
pulp division and 26,000 tons in the
fibre division). This proposal also
asks for 25,000 hectares of forest
land for raising captive plantations.

A government which could not deal
with various issues precipitated
during the 38 year working history of
Grasim, is now attempting to
facilitate the revival of yet another
pulp and rayons factory with a
significantly increased production
capacity, which implies an increased
potential for consuming more of
forest and water resources, and also
creating higher levels of pollution,
and resultant health hazards. We
dont know which patch of remaining
shola forest and grassland will be
converted into eucalyptus or softwood
plantations. We dont know how many
more wildlife habits will be lost in
the process, who are the unfortunate
subsistence communities who will
have to pay the price? Who all
amongst us will suffer from fatal
diseases caused by pollution?

Have we learnt anything from the
story of Grasim? Grasim also tells us
the story of how workers and trade
unions, in their hurry to ensure
their salaries, perks, and bonus,
seem to have consciously abandoned
the larger social and ecological
responsibilities. When there is a
conflict between (the creation of
salaried jobs for a few and
subsistence livelihoods of a large
number of people, the priority has to
be given to the latter.)

People living in Vazakkad and
neighbouring areas, who have been for
years inhaling the noxious and toxic
gases emitted by the factory, are now
battling with fatal diseases such as
cancer, Through their sufferings,
they remind the lager society, that
their right to live in unpolluted
environments is the most fundamental
right.

It needs to be noted that for 38
years, the people of this area
continued to struggle in varying
intensities. They continued their
struggle despite the repeated breach
of trust and violation of agreements
by the government and the management.
They continued the struggle even when
pollution-induced cancer claimed the
lives of their co-travellers. This is
not to say that the struggle was
without pitfalls. They too, at
different points were misled and
perhaps confused by the conflicting
demands for employment Vs livelihood.
They too saw that some of their
leaders and comrades were bought over
by the management. Some others among
them used this struggle as a platform
to launch their political careers.
But the important point is that they
did not fully give in to the
shrewdness and connivance of the
management, to the irresponsibility
of the government, or to the
neutrality of scientific
institutions. Hence, we cannot say
that their struggle was just against
one Grasim, or the pollution caused
by it alone. It was a struggle to
protect the right to life from being
encroached in the name of development
and progress.

The history of Grasim exemplifies
the failure in development strategies
that were centred around industries,
in post-Independence India. The
unsustainable use of natural
resources as well as problems of
pollution are the inevitable
consequences of such a pattern of
industrial development. Such a
development policy does not account
for the loss of livelihoods suffered
by the people of subsistence
economies, be it the fish worker or
the tribal.

When we let polluted waters
intrude into the complex web of life
which lins the seemingly unconnected
bamboo forests, elephants, tribals,
drinking water, the river, the tide
which brings the saline water and the
fish that migrate with the tide to
lay their eggs, the responsibility
and commitment of institutions (be it
the Pollution Control Board, or the
government or the management) ends
with ensuring that the toxic elements
are below the prescribed upper
limit. Being a part of the above
mentioned web of life, there can be
no upper limits to human
responsibility. Perhaps, we will be
reminded of this responsibility only
when the toxic chemicals that we
release into our environment,
(measured and unmeasured, within and
outside prescribed limits) through
the process of bio-accumulation,
begin to alter our own genetic codes.
Worser still, mercury pollution may
even obliterate our memories of right
and wrong.

In this regard, another issue that
is to be addressed is the commitment
and responsibility of our scientific
community and institutions. Who
should take up the responsibility of
finding out whether pollution leads
to cancer and other fatal diseases?
Anyway, we cannot expect the cancer
patient to take up that
responsibility too. Though it was
noted at the Regional Cancer Centre
(R.C.C) at Trivandrum that
substantial number of patients from
Vazakkad were frequenting R.C.C.,
they have not bothered to look into
the matter seriously.

It was under the leadership of the
then Vazakkad Panchayat President
Sri. K.A. Rehman that the first
cancer survey was conducted in
Vazakkad in 1994. The results of the
survey was both shocking and
unbelievable (For details see-?).
Following this, a survey was
conducted by the District Medical
Officer, and this survey pointed out
that the incidence of cancer was
higher in the pollution affected
areas. But the next round of survey
conducted by the R.C.C. was more to
disprove the findings of the earlier
surveys, than to find out the reasons
for the increased cancer rate in
these areas. The R.C.C. survey stated
that there was no increased incidence
of cancer in the Vazakkad area and
that the existing cancer patients had
developed the disease due to habits
such as tobacco, chewing and smoking.
Though one would like to believe the
R.C.C. study findings, the increasing
number of people falling prey to
cancer calls for a re-valuation of
the R.C.C. findings. Though a second
study was conducted by R.C.C. under
the leadership of the R.C.C.
Director, Dr. Krishnan Nair, the
findings of this study are yet to be
disclosed. So, what we are left is
the first R.C.C. Report which has
contradicted the findings of the
earlier surveys conducted by the
Vazakkad panchayat and the District
Medical Officer.

In a state where the Right to
Information has been legally
recognised, when people of a
particular area are suffering serious
health problems, their the right to
be informed about the cause of their
disease is as important as the right
to life. Moving one step further, if
a disease like cancer is spreading so
fast in one area, then dont we need
to find the reasons for the same? If
it is the side-effects of somebodys
insatiable need for profit that has
led to the recurrence of these
diseases, then dont we need to put
an end to such profit-making
activities ? Doesnt the suffering
endured so far, need to be
compensated at least?

Will the history of Grasim help us
in giving honest answers to these
questions?

Though the 1958 agreement between
the government of Kerala and the
Birlas was a very costly blunder,
marked by irresponsibility, the years
to follow had provided opportunities
to redeem it. Even since the factory
began functioning in 1962, there has
been no dearth of controversies
regarding regarding the pollution
caused by the factory, the raw
materials supplied to the company at
shamefully subsidised prices etc. But
the government did not pay any heed.
Not only did they continue to renew
the same old 1958 agreement, but they
gave the company increased access to
its forest resources (read as raw
materials) through Supplementary
Agreements.
Throughout the working history of
the factory, the resource allocation
in favour of the Birlas, and the
governments silence towards
pollution control issues was
explained in the name of employment
given to 3000 people. Our trade
unions also had the opportunity to
insist upon a cleaner production
process, but they chose not to do so.
The Grasim pollution controversy
provided an opportunity for the trade
unions and the peoples movement to
strike and strive together for a
cleaner production process. We would
then have been able to send a message
to the would outside that we will
welcome only those enterprises which
ensure the sustainability of the
resource used, and the quality of the
environment, and place these goals
above that of profit-making.
Irrespective of the fact that both
the groups were at the receiving end
of the Birla managements shrewd
manipulations, they could not launch
a common struggle against the
Company.

At yet another level, the question
that has to be asked is about the
end-product of this production
process. How critical is rayon in
ensuring human subsistence?
Conventional economics measures the
countrys economic development in
terms of the tons of pulp and rayon
that is produced, but fails to
account for the cost incurred in
terms of pollution and ecological
damage, and the loss of livelihoods.

Rayon suitings may be seen as a
must while attending a party hosted
by the rich, but it is nowhere on the
common mans list of necessities. Do
we need to pledge precious forest
resources and the Chaliyar river to
produce this commodity? Can
employment generation for a few
people, for a short period of time,
justify irreversible destruction of
otherwise long lasting sources of
wealth, be it the forest or aquatic
ecosystems?
During the last 40 years, we never
gave a thought to alternate ways of
harnessing bamboo resources, and
thereby creating employment
17
. The
ideology that ushered in the era of
industrial development in the 19
th
and
20
th
century, considered roaring
machines and the factory chimneys
which touched the sky and emitted
thick, black smoke, as visible signs

17
The only attempt in this regard was made by the Chaliyar Action Council, in a detailed
memorandum submitted to the Industries Secretary, government of Kerala in -. In this
memorandum, they have given a detailed account of the possible alternative and ecologically
benign ways of using bamboo resources to create more employment that what is provided by
Grasim.


of progress. This ideology is
undergoing significant changes even
in Europe, where it took root.
However, former colonies like India
are still not prepared to give up
their belief in this ideology and the
system and institutions that it
creates. Industrial development in
Europe had been fuelled by the
plunder of resources which was
available in plenty in its colonies.
These colonies provided the resources
and the market for the end-products-
(today they are the dumping grounds
for the industrial waste from
developed nations).

After Independence, when former
colonies such as India adopted the
same development model, the rural
areas within these countries, which
were considered under developed,
were converted into colonies for
internal industrialisation. This also
created a situation wherein
factories and other institutions set
up in the name of development, came
to be unilaterally welcomed. But the
experiences of the years to follow
began to radically question these
assumptions. The industrial
exploitation of resources destroyed
many ecosystems and the livelihoods
of people which were dependent on
these ecosystems. Moreover, since by-
products generated by this industrial
system led to both environmental and
health problems, there industries (as
we see in the case of Grasim) became
the sites of peoples criticism and
protest.

Factories such as Grasim came up
at a time when the government assumed
regulatory functions to ensure the
welfare of the people. We need to
note that this was much before the
coming of the WTO, and common
trading system such as EEC, where the
government apparently withdraws and
the markets take over regulatory
functions.

Factories such as Grasim became a
burden for the people due to the
ineffectiveness of the government and
the greed of the management. Now, in
the WTO era, when governments openly
give up their regulatory functions
and when markets seemingly take the
responsibility of everything
including environmental protection
and human health, it is only the
continuous vigil of the people that
can ensure environmental protection
and human survival.
Mavoor also sends out the same
message.