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Ruben Gerald V.

Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
Rule 128 Admissibility of Evidence
Reyes v. Court of Appeals
Doctrine: The Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory
character. The quantum of evidence required in such cases is no more than substantial
evidence.
Facts:
Mendoza owned 2 parcels of farm lots. The lots were tenanted by dela Cruz.
When dela Cruz died his wife claimed that she subrogated her husband to the tenancy
rights of her husband.
!owever she was prevented by Reyes "arayao and Mananghaya #petitioners$ from
entering the premises. These people were barangay officials. They were accused of
interfering with the tenancy relationship.
The %grarian Court ordered that the &ufrocina be restored to the possession of the said
farm lots and ordered Reyes "arayao and Mananghaya to pay damages to &ufrocian
solidarily.
ssue:
The petitioners contend that the evidence presented by &ufrocina is insufficient to hold them
accountable. %ccording to them the %ffidavit of &ufrocina is not admissible because the affiant
was not presented in court for cross'e(amination. )s their contention correct*
!eld:
+o. The rules on evidence are entirely not applicable to agrarian cases even in suppletory
character.
We rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of &ufrocina
and &fren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and sub,ected to cross'e(amination.
-ection ./ of ".0. +o. 12/ provides that the 3Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian
cases even in a suppletory character.3 The same provision states that 3)n the bearing
investigation and determination of any question or controversy affidavits and counter'affidavits
may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.3
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
#eople v. $urco
Doctrine: %dmissibility of evidence is different from the probative or weight of evidence.
Rodegelio Turco 4r. #Turco$ was charged for allegedly raping his second cousin .2
year'old &scelea Tabada #Tabada$.
!e lured Tabada from her house then covered her face with a towel and placed his right
hand on her nec5 and too5 her to a grassy area where he forced himself on her.
%fterwards he threated to 5ill her if she told anyone.
The trial court ruled against Turco and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay damages to Tabada.
Turco argued that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt
considering that other than the written statement of Tabada before the "olice -tation
and before the Cler5 of Court of the trial court and her testimony during direct
e(amination no other evidence was presented to conclusively prove that there was ever
raped at all6 that nothing in Tabada7s testimony clearly and convincingly shows that she
was able to identify Turco as her rapist since her face had been covered with a towel6
and that no actual prrof was presented that the rape actually happened since the
medico'legal officer who prepared the medical certificate was not presented in court to
e(plain the same.
ssue:
Turco argued that since the medico'legal officer was not presented the medical certificate
issued by the latter cannot be admitted as evidence. )s his contention correct*
!eld:
+o.
)n "eople vs. 8ernaldez #supra$ the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate
issued by the e(amining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the certificate
could be admitted as an e(ception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records #under
-ection 22 Rule .9: Rules of Court$ constitute e(ceptions to the hearsay evidence rule since
it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an e(pert witness it could not be
given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it could not be given weight or credit unless
the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. We place emphasis on
the distinction between admissibility by evidence and the probative value thereof. &vidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not e(cluded by the law or the law or the rules
#-ection 9 Rule .2; Rules of Court$ or is competent. -ince admissibility of evidence us
determined by its by its relevance and competence admissibility is an affair of logic and law.
<n the other hand the weight to be given to such evidence once admitted depends on ,udicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule .99 and the ,urisprudence laid down with the
Court. thus while evidence may be admissible it may be entitled to or no weight at all .
Conversely evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
special rule forbids its reception #Regalado Remedial =aw Compendium >ol. )) .11; ed. p.
??:$.
Withal although the medical certificate is an e(ception to the hearsay rule hence admissible as
evidence it has very little probative value due to the absence of the e(amining physician.
+evertheless it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate
#stating that there was @AhBymen rupture secondary to penile insertionC as well as @foul'smelling
discharges.C The diagnosis was @ArBuptured hymen secondary to rapeC Ap. /; RecordB$. )n fact
reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which standing alone even without
medical e(amination is sufficient to convict #people vs. Topaguen 9/1 -CR% /:. A.11DB$. )t is
well'settled that a medical e(amination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape #"eople
vs. =acaba E.R. +o. .9:?1. +ovember .D .1116 "eople vs. -alazar 2?; -CR% ?? A.11/B6
"eople vs. >enerable supra$. )t is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that
conviction is proper #"eople vs. %u(tero supra$. )n the instant case the victim7s testimony alone
is credible and sufficient to convict.
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
A%ustin v. Court of Appeals
Doctrine: <rdering a person to undergo 0+% testing is not against that person7s right against
self'incrimination.
Facts:
Respondents Fe %ngela and her son Martin "rollamante sued Martin7s alleged biological
father petitioner %rnel =. %gustin for support and support pendente lite before the
Regional Trial Court #RTC$ of Guezon City 8ranch .:/.A?B
)n their complaint respondents alleged that %rnel courted Fe in .112 after which they
entered into an intimate relationship.
%rnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 92th birthday on +ovember .: .111. 0espite
%rnel7s insistence on abortion Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of
wedloc5 Martin on %ugust .. 2::: at the Capitol Medical !ospital in Guezon City.
The baby7s birth certificate was purportedly signed by %rnel as the father.
%rnel shouldered the pre'natal and hospital e(penses but later refused Fe7s repeated
requests for Martin7s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even
suggested to have the child committed for adoption.
%rnel also denied having fathered the child.
<n 4uly 29 2::2 Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to 0+% paternity testing pursuant to Rule 2; of the Rules of
Court.
The Court granted such motion.
ssues:
)s the said motion against %gustin7s right to privacy and right against self incrimination*
!eld:
+o.
-ignificantly we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory 0+% testing and the admissibility of
the results thereof as evidence. )n that case 0+% samples from semen recovered from a rape
victim7s vagina were used to positively identify the accused 4oel @HawitC Iatar as the rapist.
Iatar claimed that the compulsory e(traction of his blood sample for 0+% testing as well as the
testing itself violated his right against self'incrimination as embodied in both -ections .2 and
.D of %rticle ))) of the Constitution. We addressed this as followsJ
The contention is untenable. The 5ernel of the right is not against all compulsion but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self'incrimination is simply against the legal process of
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
e(tracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. )t does not apply where the
evidence sought to be e(cluded is not an incrimination but as part of ob,ect evidence.
)n the instant case the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness passion pre,udice or
personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
%ppeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its ,urisdiction in promulgating its decision
and resolution and any error made would have only been an error in ,udgment. %s we have
discussed however the decision of the respondent court being firmly anchored in law and
,urisprudence was correct.
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
&anaan v. ntermediate Appellate Court
Doctrine: &(tension of telephones cannot be considered devices used for wiretaps. Therefore
any evidence obtained through such medium is admissible under R% 22:: provided that it is not
otherwise e(cluded by other laws or the Rules of Court.
Facts:
Kpon coming up with proposed conditions regarding the withdrawal of a complaint for
direct assault filed against =eonardo =aconico by Manuel Montebon Montebon7s lawyer
%tty. Tito "intor called up =aconico.
=aconico requested his own lawyer %tty. Eaanan to secretly listen to the phone
conversation through an e(tension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for
the settlement.
%tty. Eaanan subsequently e(ecuted an affidavit stating that he heard %tty. "intor
demanding an amount for the withdrawal of the case. -uch affidavit was attached to a
complaint for robbery or e(tortion filed against %tty. "intor.
%n entrapment operation was organized and "intor was arrested through it.
%nother case was filed this time against %tty. Eaanan for violation of R.%. +o. 22::.
%tty. Eaanan was held guilty for violation of -ection . of R.%. +o. 22:: the %nti'
Wiretapping =aw.
ssues:
)s the act of %tty. Eaanan of listening to a conversation through a telephone e(tension
considered a violation of the %nti'Wiretapping =aw*
!eld:
+o. &(tensions cannot be considered as one of the devices used in wiretapping.
)n the case of &mpire )nsurance Company v. Rufino #1: -CR% 29D 229'222$ we ruledJ
L=i5ewise %rticle .9D2 of the Civil Code stipulates that Mhowever general the terms of a contract
may be they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are
different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.3 -imilarly %rticle .9D2 of the
same Code provides that 3the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them ta5en ,ointly.3
((( ((( (((
LConsequently the phrase Mall liabilities or obligations of the decedent3 used in paragraph ?#c$
and D#d$ should be then restricted only to those listed in the )nventory and should not be
construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that Mparticularization
followed by a general e(pression will ordinarily be restricted to the former3 is based on the fact in
human e(perience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
particularization and that the generalities though broad enough to comprehend other fields if
they stood alone are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are
centered. #!offman v. &astern Wisconsin R. etc. Co. .92 Wis. /:9 /:D6 ..? +W 9;9 cited in
Francisco Revised Rules of Court #&vidence$ .1D9 ed. pp. .;:'.;..L
!ence the phrase Ldevice or arrangementL in -ection . of R% +o. 22:: although not e(clusive
to that enumerated therein should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or
similar nature that is instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main
line of a telephone. )t refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed
by the party or parties being overheard because by their very nature they are not of common
usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
%n e(tension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the
e(tended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved
from place to place within a radius of a 5ilometer or more. % person should safely presume that
the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an e(tension telephone and he
runs the ris5 of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which
shares its line with another.
LCommon e(perience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to
ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. &ach party to a telephone conversation ta5es
the ris5 that the other party may have an e(tension telephone and may allow another to
overhear the conversation. When such ta5es place there has been no violation of any privacy of
which the parties may complain. Consequently one element of /:? interception has not
occurred.L
)n the same case the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if
instead of repeating the message he held out his hand'set so that another could hear out of it
and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an
e(tension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus in case of doubt as in the case at bar on whether or not an e(tension telephone
is included in the phrase Ldevice or arrangementL the penal statute must be construed as not
including an e(tension telephone.
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
'alcedo()rta*e+ v. Court of Appeals
Doctrine: Knder R.%. 22:: it is unlawful @for any person not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spo5en word to tap any wire or cable or by using any
other device or arrangement to secretly overhear intercept or record such communication or
spo5en word by using a device commonly 5nown as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or wal5ie'tal5ie or tape'recorder or however otherwise described.C The
inadmissibility of such evidence obtained in violation of said %ct is mandatory under the law.
Facts:
Rafael <rtanez filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for annulment of marriage
with damages against Teresita -alcedo'<rtanez on grounds of lac5 of marriage license
andNor psychological incapacity of Teresita.
%mong the evidence orally formally offered by <rtanez were three cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons.
ssues:
Teresita filed an ob,ectionNcomment to Rafael7s oral offer of evidence assailing the admissibility
in evidence of the cassette tapes. Can her ob,ection be sustained*
!eld:
Ies. The evidence presented are inadmissible by virtue of R% 22::.
Rep. %ct +o. 22:: entitled L%n %ct to "rohibit and "enalize Wire Tapping and <ther Related
>iolations of the "rivacy of Communication and for other purposesL e(pressly ma5es such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. %ct +o. 22:: are as
followsJ
L-ection .. )t shall be unlawful for any person not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spo5en word to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or
arrangement to secretly overhear intercept or record such communication or spo5en word by
using a device commonly 5nown as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or wal5ie'tal5ie
or tape'recorder or however otherwise described. ( ( (L
L-ection 2. %ny communication or spo5en word or the e(istence contents substance purport
or meaning of the same or any par thereof or any information therein contained obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this %ct shall not be admissible
in evidence in any ,udicial quasi',udicial legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.L
Clearly respondents trial court and Court of %ppeals failed consider the afore'quoted provisions
of the law in admitting in the casette tapes in question. %bsent a clear show that both parties to
the telephone conversations allowed recording of the same the inadmissibility of the sub,ect
tapes is mandatory under Rep. %ct +o. 22::.
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
Ramire+ v. Court of Appeals
Doctrine: The term @private communicationC in R% 22:: includes private conversations.
Facts:
Ramirez and Earcia had a confrontation in the latter7s office.
)n the confrontation Earcia allegedly ve(ed insulted and humiliated Ramirez in a
hostile and furious manner and in a manner offensive to the person of Ramirez.
Meanwhile Ramirez intentionally used a tape recorder to record all what Earica said.
Earcia then filed a criminal case for violation of R% 22:: against Ramirez.
ssues:
Ramirez contends that what was recorded was a private conversation and not a private
communication. Therefore R% 22:: is not applicable. )s his contention correct*
!eld:
First legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous the law is applied according to its e(press
terms and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible.. or absurb or would lead to an in,ustice. .2
-ection ) of R.% 22:: entitled L%n %ct to "rohibit and "enalize Wire Tapping and <ther
Related >iolations of "rivate Communication and <ther "urposesL provides J
-ection .. )t shall be unlawfull for any person not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spo5en word to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or
arrangement to secretly overhear intercept or record such communication or spo5en word by
using a device commonly 5nown as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or wal5ie'tal5ie
or tape recorder or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally ma5es it illegal for any person not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law ma5es no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute3s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
to ma5e such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier Lany.L Consequently as
respondent Court of %ppeals correctly concluded Leven a #person$ privy to a communication
who records his private conversation with another without the 5nowledge of the latter #will$
qualify as a violatorL .9 under this provision of R.%. 22::.
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
The unambiguity of the e(press words of the provision ta5en together with the above'quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision see5s to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law ma5es no distinctions one does not distinguish.
-econd the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance
of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.%. 22:: penalizes are
the acts of secretly overhearing intercepting or recording private communications by means of
the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording
of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
under -ection ) of R.%. 22::. %s the -olicitor Eeneral pointed out in his C<MM&+T before the
respondent courtJ L+owhere #in the said law$ is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator the nature of the conversation as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed.L
Finally petitioner3s contention that the phrase Lprivate communicationL in -ection ) of R. %. 22::
does not include private conversationsL narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
LcommunicationL to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word
communicare meaning Lto share or to )mpart.L )n its ordinary signification communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting as in a conversation.? or signifies the Lprocess by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols #as language signs or gestures$.L./ These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non'verbal written or e(pressive communications of Lmeanings or thoughtsL which are
li5ely to include the emotionally'charged e(change on February 22.1;; between petitioner
and private respondent in the privacy of the latter3s office. %ny doubts about the legislative
body3s meaning of the phrase Lprivate communicationL are furthermore put to rest by the fact
that the terms LconversationL and commurucationL were interchangeably used by -enator
TaOada in his &(planatory +ote to the bill quoted belowJ
%t has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being
overheard. 8ut this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well as the
undeniable fact that most if not all. civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not
wish to e(pose. Free conversations are often characterized by e(aggerations obscenity
agreeable falsehoods and the e(pression of anti'social desires of views not intended to be
ta5en seriously. The right to the privacy of Communication among others has e(pressly been
assured by our Constitution +eedless to state here the framers of our Constitution must have
recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man3s
spiritual nature. of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have 5nown that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited and free e(change of
communication between individuals''''' free from every ,ustifiable intrusion by whatever means.L
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
Rule 12, -.at /eed /ot 0e #roved
City of 1anila v. &arcia
Doctrine: The Charter of the City of Manila states that all courts sitting therein are required to
ta5e ,udicial notice of ordinances passed therein.
Facts:
The City of Manila is the owner of parcels of land in Malate Manila. -ometime between
.12? and .12D the defendants entered upon these premises without the City7s
5nowledge and consent.
They built houses of second'class materials again without the City7s 5nowledge and
consent and without building permits.
)n +ovember .12D upon discovery of the presence of defendants they were given by
Mayor >aleriano Fugoso written permits labeled @lease contractC to occupy specific
areas in the property upon conditions set forth therein. They were charged nominal
rental.
&pifanio de los -antos &lementary -chool which was close though not contiguous to
the property had a pressing need to e(pand.
The City &ngineer gave the defendands 9: days each to vacate the premises and to
remove the constructions therein.
This was followed by the City Treasurer7s demand on each defendant for the payment of
the amount due by reason of the occupancy.
The defendants refused alleging that they have acquired the legal status of tenants by
reason of the written permits issued them.
ssue:
)f the certificates showing the need to e(pand &pifanio de los -antos &lementary school is held
inadmissible will this fact help Earcia in this case*
!eld:
+o. The courts in Manila are required to ta5e ,udicial notice of ordinances by the City of Manila.
We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court properly found that
the city needs the premises for school purposes.
The city3s evidence on this point is &(hibit & the certification of the Chairman Committee on
%ppropriations of the Municipal 8oard. That document recites that the amount of ".:::::.::
had been set aside in <rdinance 2?// the .1/2'.1/9 Manila City 8udget for the construction
of an additional building of the &pifanio de los -antos &lementary -chool. )t is indeed correct to
say that the court below at the hearing ruled out the admissibility of said document. 8ut then in
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
the decision under review the trial ,udge obviously revised his views. !e there declared that
there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school e(pansion6 he cited the very
document &(hibit & aforesaid.
)t is beyond debate that a court of ,ustice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power to
ma5e it formable to law and ,ustice. -uch was done here. 0efendants3 remedy was to bring to
the attention of the court its contradictory stance. +ot having done so this Court will not reopen
the case solely for this purpose.
%nyway elimination of the certification &(hibit & as evidence would not profit defendants. For
in reversing his stand the trial ,udge could well have ta5en'because he was duty bound to ta5e'
,udicial notice of <rdinance 2?//. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all
courts sitting therein to ta5e ,udicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of
Manila. %nd <rdinance 2?// itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of
".:::::.:: was set aside for the Lconstruction of additional buildingL of the &pifanio de los
-antos &lementary -chool.
Furthermore defendants3 position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction. 0efendants
have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The e(cuse that they have permits from the
mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are revocable on thirty day3s notice. They have
been as5ed to leave6 they refused to heed. )t is in this factual bac5ground that we say that the
city3s need for the premises is unimportant. The city3s right to throw defendants out of the area
cannot be gainsaid. The city3s dominical right to possession is paramount. )f error there was in
the finding that the city needs the land such error is harmless and will not ,ustify reversal of the
,udgment below.
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
0a%uio v. 2da. De 3ala%at
Doctrine: % court may ta5e ,udicial cognizance of the finality of ,udgment rendered by the same
court in a different case.
Facts:
The case started with a complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by Eabriel
8aguio.
Teofila 4alagat et al. filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by prior ,udgment being identical to a civil case filed by 8aguio against Melecio
Malagat now deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the very
defendants in the instant complaint.
8aguio alleged that for prior ,udgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it
must be apparent on the fact of the complaint. There was nothing in the complaint from
which such a conclusion may be inferred.
ssues:
)n ruling that there is res ,udicata in this case the court too5 ,udicial cognizance of the fact that
its ,udgment in another case involving the same parties issues and causes of action has
become final and e(ecutory. )s the court correct in ta5ing ,udicial cognizance*
!eld:
Ies. % court may ta5e ,udicial cognizance of the finality of ,udgment rendered by the same court
in a different case.
)t ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances the lower court certainly
could ta5e ,udicial notice of the finality of a ,udgment in a case that was previously pending and
thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the
dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. % citation from the comments of former
Chief 4ustice Moran is relevant. ThusJ LCourts have also ta5en ,udicial notice of previous cases
to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling
is applicable in the case under consideration.L
There is another equally compelling consideration. %ppellant undoubtedly had recourse to a
remedy which under the law then in force could be availed of. )t would have served the cause of
,ustice better not to mention the avoidance of needless e(pense on his part and the ve(ation to
which appellees were sub,ected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable
time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a useless and hopeless appeal. )t
has ever been the guiding principle from %lonso v. >illamor a .1.: decision that a litigant
should not be allowed to worship at the altar of technicality.
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
#rieto v. Arroyo
Doctrine: %s a general rule courts are not authorized to ta5e ,udicial notice of the cases
pending before them or the contents of other cases even when such cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same ,udge.
Facts:
%rroyo -r. Filed a petition for registration of several parcels of land in .12;. %s a result
<CT no. 91 was issued in his name. That same year "rieto filed a petition for
registration of an ad,oining parcel of land.
When %rroyos -r. died <CT 91 was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of his
heirs.
Thereafter the heirs filed a case to correct the technical descriptions of the land covered
by the TCT.
The court granted the said petition.
"rieto then sought to annul the aforesaid decision however this was dismissed by the
court on the ground of res ,udicata.
ssue:
"rieto contends that the court should not have dismissed his first case for annulment because
no @paroleC evidence need be ta5en to support it the matters therein alleged being part of the
records of the cases which are well within the ,udicial notice and cognizance of the court. !e
also contends that there is no res ,udicata in this case. )s his contention correct*
!eld:
+o.
)n the first place as a general rule courts are not authorized to ta5e ,udicial notice in the
ad,udication of cases pending before them of the contents of other cases even when such
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same ,udge #Municipal Council of
-an "edro =aguna et al. vs. Colegio de -an 4ose et al. /? "hil. 9.;$. -econdly if appellant
had really wanted the court to ta5e ,udicial notice of such records he should have presented the
proper request or manifestation to that effect instead of sending by counsel a telegraphic
motion for postponement of hearing which the court correctly denied. Finally the point raised
by counsel is now academic as no appeal was ta5en from the order dismissing his first petition
and said order had long become final when the complaint in the present action was filed.
The contention that the causes of action in the two suits are different is untenable.
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2009
8oth are based on the alleged nullity of -pecial "roceedings +o. 1::6 in both appellant see5s
that the order of correction of the title of appellees be set aside. <f no material significance is
the fact that in the complaint in the instant case there is an e(press prayer for reconveyance of
some .?D square meters of land ta5en from appellant as a result of such correction of title. For
that area would necessarily have reverted to appellant had his first petition prospered the relief
as5ed for by him being that Lthe Register of 0eeds of Camarines -ur be ordered to amend
Certificate of Title +o. 992 by incorporating therein only and solely the description of =ot +o. 2
"lan "su'.:/D9: as appearing in the 0ecree +o. ?./? and maintaining consequently the
description limits and area of the ad,oining land of the herein petitioner =ot +o. 9 "lan "su'
..D?22 in accordance with 0ecree +o. 29:. of =and Registration +o. .D9.L The claim for
damages as well as for other additional and alternative reliefs in the present case are not
materially different from his prayer for Lsuch other remedies ,ust and equitable in the premisesL
contained in the former one.
There being identity of parties sub,ect matter and cause of action between the two cases the
order of dismissal issued in the first constitutes a bar to the institution of the second.
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
4ao 5ee v. 'y(&on+ales
Doctrine: To establish a valid foreign law its e(istence as a question of fact and the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence must be proven. )n the absence of such proof the
foreign law is presumed to be the same as "hilippine =aw.
Facts:
-y Hiat died and left properties.
!e was allegedly married to Iao Hee in China through a customary Chinese wedding
ceremony ' they had children.
!e also had illegitimate children with %scuncion Eillego. Eillego7s children filed a petition
for the grant of letters of administration of -y Hiat7s properties.
The Court of First )nstance of Rizal declared all children from both Eillego and Iao Hee
as natural children of -y Hiat. The court did not recognize -y Hiat7s alleged marriage to
Iao Hee.
ssue:
Whether or not the court should ac5nowledge the marriage of -y Hiat and Iao Hee.
!eld :
+o the court should not recognize the said marriage. )t was told that -y Hiat and Iao Hee
married in China. %ccording to %rticle .2 of the Civil Code customs must be proven in order for
it to be admissible as evidence. !owever Iao Hee7s party failed to establish such customs
binding between the relationship of -y Hiat and Iao Hee. Therefore the marriage of -y Hiat and
Iao Hee cannot be recognized for there is no proof of its e(istence.
)n the absence of such proof the foreign law is presumed to be the same as "hilippine law.
Therefore applying "hilippine law Iao Hee7s marriage is void because of non'compliance the
essential and formal requisites of marriage.
./ " " a g e
Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
$abuena v. Court of Appeals
Doctrine: There are e(ceptions to the rule that the court cannot ta5e ,udicial notice of contents
of other cases pending before it.
Facts:
)n .1D9 an action for recovery of ownership of a parcel of residential land in Ma5ato
%5lan was filed in the RTC of %5lan by the estate of %lfredo Tabernilla against 4ose
Tabuena. The trial court found that the lot was sold by 4uan "eralta 4r. to Tabernilla
while they were in the Knited -tates.
"eralta7s mother conveyed the land to Tabernilla upon the latter7s return. %t the same
time she as5ed to be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life.
Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty ta(es on the property which she did.
Kpon her death Tabuena the half'brother of "eralta too5 possession of the property.
!e refused demands made Tabernilla to surrender the property claiming it as his won.
The trial court ruled for the estate and ordered Tabuena to vacate the property.
Tabuena protested that the trial court erred in ta5ing cognizance of documents which
had never been formally submitted in evidence and in considering the proceedings in
another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land in resolving the
ownership of the sub,ect lot.
ssues:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ta5ing ,udicial notice of Tabuena7s testimony in Civil Case
+o. .92D*
!eld:
Ies.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in ta5ing ,udicial
notice of Tabuena3s testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected
with the case before it. )t conceded that as a general rule Lcourts are not authorized to ta5e
,udicial notice in the ad,udication of cases pending before them of the contents of the records
of other cases even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before
the same ,udge.L +evertheless it applied the e(ception thatJ
. . . in the absence of ob,ection and as a matter of convenience to all parties a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the
record of a case pending before it when with the 5nowledge of the opposing party reference is
made to it for that purpose by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated6 or when the original record of the former case or any part of it is actually
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2009
withdrawn from the archives by the court3s direction at the request or with the consent of the
parties and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
)t is clear though that this e(ception is applicable only when Lin the absence of ob,ectionL
Lwith the 5nowledge of the opposing partyL or Lat the request or with the consent of the partiesL
the case is clearly referred to or Lthe original or part of the records of the case are actually
withdrawn from the archivesL and Ladmitted as part of the record of the case then pending.L
These conditions have not been established here. <n the contrary the petitioner was
completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case +o. .92D was being considered by the trial
court in the case then pending before it. %s the petitioner puts it the matter was never ta5en up
at the trial and was Lunfairly sprungC upon him leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
#eople v. &odoy
Doctrine: The Court ta5es ,udicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the "hilippines
young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Ereat caution is
observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. %ny breath of scandal which brings
dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families.
Facts:
Eodoy was charged with rape and 5idnapping with serious illegal detention.
!is defense was that they were lovers as evidenced by the letters wrote by the
complainant to the accused.
ssue:
Can Eodoy be convicted of rape*
!eld:
+o. They were in fact lovers.
)t is basic that for 5idnapping to e(ist there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. )n the present charge for that crime
such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. "rescinding from the fact that the
Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted several
grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution3s evidence thereon and cast
serious doubts on the guilt of appellant.
The Court ta5es ,udicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the "hilippines young ladies
are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Ereat caution is observed so that
their reputations shall remain untainted. %ny breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their
character humiliates their entire families.;: )t could precisely be that complainant3s mother
wanted to save face in the community where everybody 5nows everybody else and in an effort
to conceal her daughter3s indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural
community she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.
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Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
0an6 of t.e #.ilippine slands v. Court of $a7 Appeals
Doctrine: There are e(ceptions to the rule that the court cannot ta5e ,udicial notice of contents
of other cases pending before it.
Facts:
8") filed a written claim for refund in the amount of "..2::: with the C)R alleging that it
did not apply the .1;1 refundable amoun to f"2D1::: to its .11: %nnual income Ta(
Return or other ta( liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same
year.
ssue:
)s 8") entitled to the claimed refund*
!eld:
Ies.
"etitioner also calls the attention of this Court as it had done before the CT% to a 0ecision
rendered by the Ta( Court in CT% Case +o. 2;1D involving its claim for refund for the year
.11:. )n that case the Ta( Court held that Lpetitioner suffered a net loss for the ta(able year
.11: ( ( (.L.; A0ecision in CT% Case +o. 2;1D p. D6 rollo p. ?1.B Respondent however urges
this Court not to ta5e ,udicial notice of the said case..1 ARespondents7 Memorandum pp. 1'.:.B
%s a rule Lcourts are not authorized to ta5e ,udicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before
the same ,udge.
8e that as it may -ection 2 Rule .21 provides that courts may ta5e ,udicial notice of matters
ought to be 5nown to ,udges because of their ,udicial functions. )n this case the Court notes that
a copy of the 0ecision in CT% Case +o. 2;1D was attached to the "etition for Review filed
before this Court. -ignificantly respondents do not claim at all that the said 0ecision was
fraudulent or none(istent. )ndeed they do not even dispute the contents of the said 0ecision
claiming merely that the Court cannot ta5e ,udicial notice thereof.
To our mind respondents7 reasoning underscores the wea5ness of their case. For if they had
really believed that petitioner is not entitled to a ta( refund they could have easily proved that it
did not suffer any loss in .11:. )ndeed it is noteworthy that respondents opted not to assail the
fact appearing therein '' that petitioner suffered a net loss in .11: ' in the same way that it
refused to controvert the same fact established by petitioner7s other documentary e(hibits.
)n any event the 0ecision in CT% Case +o. 2;1D is not the sole basis of petitioner7s case. )t is
merely one more bit of information showing the star5 truthJ petitioner did not use its .1;1 refund
to pay its ta(es for .11:.
2: " " a g e
Ruben Gerald V. Ricasata III 3B
Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
Calamba 'teel v. CR
Doctrine:
Facts:
"etitioner filed an %mended Corporate %nnual )ncome Ta( Return on 4une 2 .11/
declaring a net ta(able income of "12/.?1D.:: ta( credits of "/2D.22/.:: and ta(
due in the amount of "99..??1.::.
"etitioner also reported quarterly payments for the second and third quarters of .11? in
the amounts of "292;D2D.2/ and ".:;2.:;.:: respectively.
)t is the proposition of the ApBetitioner that for the year .11? several of its clients withheld
ta(es from their income payments to ApBetitioner and remitted the same to the 8ureau of
)nternal Revenue #8)R$ in the sum of "9.?1/;D.::. "etitioner further alleged that due
to its incomeNloss positions for the three quarters of .11/ it was unable to use the
e(cess ta( paid for and in its behalf by the withholding agents.
Thus an administrative claim was filed by the ApBetitioner on %pril .: .11D for the refund
of "9.?1/;D.:: representing e(cess or unused creditable withholding ta(es for the
year .11?. The instant petition was subsequently filed on %pril .; .11D.
ssue:
The sole issue submitted for AoBur determination is whether or not ApBetitioner is entitled to the
refund of "9.?1/;D.:: representing e(cess or overpaid income ta( for the ta(able year .11?.
!eld:
Fifth the C% and CT% could have ta5en ,udicial notice of the .11/ final adjustment return which
had been attached in CT% Case +o. ?D11. @4udicial notice ta5es the place of proof and is of
equal force.C
%s a general rule courts are not authorized to ta5e ,udicial notice of the contents of records in
other cases tried or pending in the same court even when those cases were heard or are
actually pending before the same ,udge. !owever this rule admits of e(ceptions as when
reference to such records is sufficiently made without ob,ection from the opposing partiesJ
P@. . . A)Bn the absence of ob,ection and as a matter of convenience to all parties a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the
record of a case pending before it when with the 5nowledge of the opposing party reference is
made to it for that purpose by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated6 or when the original record of the former case or any part of it is actually
withdrawn from the archives by the court3s direction at the request or with the consent of the
parties and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.7C
"rior to rendering its 0ecision on 4anuary .2 2::: the CT% was already well'aware of the
e(istence of another case pending before it involving the same sub,ect matter parties and
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2009
causes of action. 8ecause of the close connection of that case with the matter in controversy
the CT% could have easily ta5en ,udicial notice of the contested document attached in that other
case.
Furthermore there was no ob,ection raised to the inclusion of the said .11/ final adjustment
return in petitioner7s Reply to Comment before the C%. 0espite clear reference to that return a
reference made with the 5nowledge of respondent the latter still failed to controvert petitioner7s
claim. The appellate court should have cast aside strict technicalities and decided the case on
the basis of such uncontested return. >erily it had the authority to @ta5e ,udicial notice of its
records and of the facts AthatB the record establishes.C
-ection 2 of Rule .21 provides that courts @may ta5e ,udicial notice of matters ( ( ( ought to be
5nown to ,udges because of their ,udicial functions.C )f the lower courts really believed that
petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund they could have easily required respondent to
ascertain its veracity and accuracy and to prove that petitioner did not suffer any net loss in
.11/.
Contrary to the contention of petitioner BPI-Family Savings Bank v. CA #on which it rests its
entire arguments$ is not on all fours with the facts of this case.
While the petitioner in that case also filed a written claim for a tax refund and li5ewise failed to
present its .11: corporate annual income tax return it nonetheless offered in evidence its top'
ran5ing official7s testimony and certification pertaining to only to taxa!le years #.1;1 and
.11:$. The said return was attached only to its Motion for Reconsideration before the CT%.
"etitioner in this case offered documentary and testimonial evidence that e(tended beyond to
taxa!le years because the e(cess credits in the first #.11?$ taxa!le year had not been used up
during the second #.11/$ taxa!le year and because the claim for the refund of those credits
had been filed during the third #.11D$ taxa!le year. )ts final adjustment return was instead
attached to its Reply to Comment filed before the C%.
Moreover in BPI-Family Savings Bank petitioner was able to show @the undisputed factJ that
petitioner had suffered a net loss in .11: ( ( (.C )n the instant case there is no such @undisputed
factC as yet. The mere admission into the records of petitioner7s .11/ final adjustment return is
not a sufficient proof of the truth of the contents of or entries in that return.
)n addition the 8)R in BPI-Family Savings Bank did not controvert the veracity of the return or
file an opposition to the Motion and the return. 0espite the fact that the return was ignored by
both the C% and the CT% the latter even declared in another case #CT% Case +o. 2;1D$ that
petitioner had suffered a net loss for taxa!le year .11:. When attached to the "etition for
Review filed before this Court that 0ecision was not at all claimed by the 8)R to be fraudulent
or none(istent. The 8ureau merely contended that this Court should not ta5e ,udicial notice of
the said 0ecision.
)n this case however the 8)R has not been given the chance to challenge the veracity of
petitioner7s final adjustment return. +either has the CT% decided any other case categorically
declaring a net loss for petitioner in taxa!le year .11/. %fter this return was attached to
petitioner7s Reply to Comment before the C% the appellate court should have required the filing
22 " " a g e
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2009
of other responsive pleadings from respondent as was necessary and proper for it to rule upon
the return.
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2009
8ucido v. Calupitan
Doctrine: The whole modern tendency is to treat pleadings as statements of the real issues in
the cause and hence as admissions of the parties having weight according to the
circumstances in each case.
Facts:
-ome chattels and real estate belonging to =eonardo =ucido were regularly sold at an
e(ecution sale on February .: .1:9 to one Rosales who the ne(t day transferred a Q
interest in the property to Rolaivar.
<n March 9: .1:9 all the parties and Eelasio Calupitan e(ecuted and signed a public
document wherein Rosales and Rolaiver with =ucido7s consent sold all their rights and
obligations over the property to Caluptan for the amount of the purchase price with .S
interest per month up to the time of redemption.
<n the same day =ucido and Calupitan e(ecuted a document whereby Calupitan
certified that he had ceded to =ucido all the irrigated lands until such time as he may
repurchase said lands from Calupitan as well as some of the chattels.
Their agreement is to permit three whole years to elapse from the date of the instrument
before =ucido may repurchase the land.
The trial court held that the document consituted a sale with the right to conventional
redemption and that the redemption period had not e(pired.
)t further found that =ucido had prior to the institution of the action offered the redemption
price to Calupitan who refused it and that this offer was a sufficient compliance with
%rticle .?.9 of the Civil Code.
Calupitan claims that the transaction involved a sale to him of the rights of the e(ecution
purchasers to the property. Therefore the redemption period should only be within one
year from the date of the sale. !o9ever: in .is ori%inal ans9er: .e e7pressly stated
t.at t.e transaction 9as one of sale 9it. t.e ri%.t to repurc.ase.
ssues:
Whether the answer of Calupitan can be considered as an admission*
!eld:
Ies. Considerable doubt might arise as to the correctness of the ruling of the lower court upon
the first question if the document e(ecuted by the e(ecution purchasers and the parties to this
action stood alone. )n that document it appears that Calupitan acquired the rights and
obligations of the e(ecution purchasers pertaining to the property in question. These rights and
obligations are defined in the Code of Civil "rocedure to be the ownership of the property sold
sub,ect only to the right of redemption on the part of the ,udgment debtor or a redemptioner
within one year from the date of the sale. #-ecs. 2/9'2/? Code Civ. "roc.$ Were this the nature
of the transaction between the parties however the intervention of =ucido in the transfer would
22 " " a g e
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2009
be wholly unnecessary. !ence the fact that he intervened as an interested party is at least
some indication that the parties intended something more or different by the document in
question than a simple assignment of the rights and obligations of the e(ecution purchasers to a
third person.
%ny doubt however as to the character of this transaction is removed by the agreement
entered into between =ucido and Calupitan on the same day. )n this document it is distinctly
stipulated that the right to redeem the property is preserved to =ucido to be e(ercised after the
e(piration of three years. The right to repurchase must necessarily imply a former ownership of
the property.
Further indication that Calupitan himself considered this transaction as a sale with the right to
conventional redemption is to be found in his original answer to the complaint. This original
answer was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff over the ob,ection of the defendant. )ts
admission was proper especially in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself who
was at the time acting as his own attorney.
4ones on &vidence #secs. 2D2 2D9$ after remar5ing that the earlier cases were not in harmony
on the point saysJ
LMany of the cases holding that pleadings were inadmissible as admissions were based on the
theory that most of the allegations were merely pleader3s matter'fiction stated by counsel and
sanctioned by the courts. The whole modern tendency is to re,ect this view and to treat
pleadings as statements of the real issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties
having weight according to the circumstances of each case. 8ut some of the authorities still hold
that if the pleading is not signed by the party there should be some proof that he has authorized
it.
L<n the same principle where amended pleadings have been filed allegations in the original
pleadings are held admissible but in such case the original pleadings can have no effect
unless formally offered in evidence.L
)n this original answer it was e(pressly stated that the transaction was one of sale with the right
to repurchase governed by the provisions of articles .?:D et seq. of the Civil Code.
)t further appears from the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff that he furnished T.2:
Me(ican of the amount necessary to redeem the property from the e(ecution purchasers. )t
therefore appears beyond dispute that the redemption of the property from the e(ecution
purchasers was made by the plaintiff himself by means of a loan furnished by the defendant
Calupitan who too5 possesion of the ma,or portion of the land as his security for its redemption.
The ruling of the lower court that the transaction between =ucido and Calupitan was one of
purchase and sale with the right to redeem was therefore correct.
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Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
$orres v. Court of Appeals
Doctrine: The amended complaint ta5es place of the original. Therefore the admissions made
in the original pleading superseded by the amended complaint will be considered e(tra,udicial
admission that must be alleged and proven in court.
Facts:
Margarita Torres was married to Claro -antillan and they had two childrenJ >icente and
%ntonina. %ntonina married and had si( children.
%fter the death of her husband Margarita cohabited with =eon %rvisu %rbole without the
benefit of marriage and they had a child Macaria Torres. -ubsequently %rbole and
Margarita were married and Macaria lived with and was reared by her parents.
=ot ??. had been leased temporarily by the Eovernment to Margarita who was the
actual occupant of the lot. <n 0ecember .9 .1.: the 0irector of =ands issued to
Margarita a -ale Certificate over said lot payable in 2: annual installments. 2: years
before his death %rbole sold and transferred in a notarial deed his rights and interest to
the Q portion of the lot in favor of Macaria.
<n 4une / .1?9 about 22 years after the death of Margarita and 2: years after the
death of %rbole >icente -antillan e(ecuted an %ffidavit claiming possession of =ot ??.
and as5ing for the issuance of title in his name. % Transfer Certificate of Title was issued
in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita.
-antillan and the children of %ntonina filed a case of forcible entry against Macaria
alleging that the latter had entered a portion of the lot without their consent constructed
a house thereon and refused to vacate upon demand.
Macaria claimed to be a co'owner of the lot being one of Margarita7s daughters. -he
instituted an action for partition of the lot alleging that said lot was the con,ugal property
of Margarita and %rbole and that she is their legitimated child.
The trial court ruled that the lot was Margarita7s paraphernal property and ad,udicated
2N9 to her heirs by Claro -antillan and .N9 to Macaria. Macaria7s share was later
increased to 2N/ then reduced by the Court of %ppeals to Q. The C% declared that she
is not a legitimated child.
ssues:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct such that the respondent court has
overloo5ed to include in its findings of facts the admissions made by >icente -antilan and the
heirs of %ntonina -antillan*
!eld:
+o. To warrant review petitioner has summarized her submission based on two assignments of
error. The first was e(pressed as followsJ
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2009
%lthough the Court of %ppeals is correct in declaring that Macaria %. Torres is not the
legitimated child of the spouses =eon %rbole and Margarita Torres it has overloo5ed to include
in its findings of facts the admission nude by >icente -antillan and the heirs of %ntonina
-antillan #herein respondents$ that Macaria % Torres and >icente -antillan and %ntonina
-antillan are brother and sisters with a common mother Margarita Torres and they are the legal
heirs and nearest of relatives of Margarita Torres and as a consequence thereof the Court of
%ppeals had drawn an incorrect conclusion in ad,udicating the entire share of Margarita Torres
in the con,ugal property solely to >icente -antillan and the heirs of %ntonina -antillan.L #)talics
ours$
%s we understand it petitioner has conceded with which we concur that without ta5ing account
of the sworn statement of March ? .19: she cannot be considered a legitimated child of her
parents. Continuous possession of the status of a. natural child fact of delivery by the mother
etc. will not amount to automatic recognition but an action for compulsory recognition is still
necessary which action may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents
sub,ect to certain e(ceptions.
The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 9 of private respondents3 original complaint in
the &,ectment Case readingJ
Lthe plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria %. 8autista are the legal heirs and nearest of 5ins of
Margarita Torres who died in Tanza Cavite on 0ecember 2: .19..L
The statement according to petitioner is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in
the determination of her participation in the disputed property.
We are not persuaded. )n the %mended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same
&,ectment Case the underlined portion was deleted so that the statement simply readJ
LThat the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of 5in of Margarita Torres who died at Tanza
Cavite on 0ecember 2: .19.L6
)n virtue thereof the %mended Complaint ta5es the place of the original. The latter is retarded
as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading The original complaint
no longer forms part of the record..9
)f petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence.
!aving been amended the original complaint lost its character as a ,udicial admission which
would have required no proof and became merely an e(tra,udicial admission the admissibility
of which as evidence required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner3s submission therefore
there can be no estoppel by e(tra,udicial admission made in the original complaint for failure to
offer it in evidence..2
)t should also be noted that in the "artition Case private respondents in their %nswer #par. 2$
denied the legitimacy of petitioner.
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Evidence Digests|Bonifacio
2009
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