Report on Combatting Terrorism

Genesis and Different types of Terrorism

Terrorists are motivated by different goals and objectives. Depending on the objectives
of the group/groups, the nature of terrorism also differs. The major types of terrorist
operations commonly identified globally include:
1. Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism
Terrorism motivated by ethno-nationalist and separatist aspirations became prominent
only after the Second World War and dominated the terrorist agenda around the orld
for more than !" years until religious terrorism came to occupy the centre stage. #thnic
terrorism can be defined, as deliberate violence by a subnational ethnic group to
advance its cause. Such violence usually focuses either on the creation of a separate
State or on the elevation of the status of one ethnic group over others. Tamil $ationalist
groups in Sri %an&a and insurgent groups in $orth #ast 'ndia are e(amples of ethno-
nationalist terrorist activities.

2. Religios Terrorism
)resent day terrorist activities around the orld are motivated largely by religious
imperatives. The practitioners of terrorism motivated either in hole or in part by a
religious imperative consider violence as a divine duty or a sacramental act. 't embraces
different means of legitimisation and justification compared to other terrorist groups, and
these distinguishing factors ma&e religious terrorism more destructive in nature.
*eligious terrorism can be initiated by both a minority and a majority religion or sect of a
nation.
!. "deology #riented Terrorism
+ny ideology can be used to support the use of violence and terrorism. 'deology
oriented terrorism is generally classified into to: %eft-ing and *ight-ing terrorism.
,a- %eft-ing Terrorism- .iolence against the ruling elite mostly by the
peasant class motivated by hat is called leftist ideologies have occurred
time and again in history. /oever, a concrete ideological base for the left
and subse0uent violent movements as inspired by the ritings of 1ar(
and #ngels. This as supported by the ritings and speeches of later
communists li&e %enin and 1ao Tse-tung ,1ao 2edong-. %eftist ideologies
believe that all the e(isting social relations and state structures in the
capitalist society are e(ploitative in character and a revolutionary change
through violent means is essential. #(amples of leftist ideologies that
have resorted to the use of terror are numerous. These include3 the *ed
+rmy 4action or 5aader 1einhof 6ang in the former West 6ermany, the
*ed 5rigades in 'taly, the 78 $ovember 1ovement in 6reece, the Shining
)ath of )eru, )eoples *evolutionary +rmy and the 1otoneros of
+rgentina and the 1aoist groups in 'ndia and $epal are the most easily
identifiable groups closer home.
,b- *ight -ing Terrorism- *ight-ing groups generally see& to maintain
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the status-0uo or to return to some past situation that they feel should
have been conserved. Sometimes groups espousing rightist ideologies
might assume ethnic/racist character too. They may force the government
to ac0uire a territory or to intervene to protect the rights of an 9oppressed:
minority in a neighboring country, ,i.e : the $a;i )arty in 6ermany-.
.iolence against migrant communities also comes under this category of
terrorist violence. #(amples of these are: $a;ism in 6ermany, 4ascists in
'taly, hite supremacy movements in the <S &non as =u =lu( =lan
,===-, the 6reen >ac&ets of Denmar& in the 7?@"s etc.
$. %tate-sponsored Terrorism
State-sponsored terrorism or arfare by pro(y is as old as the history of military conflict.
/oever, state-sponsored terrorism on a massive scale reappeared in international
politics in the 7?A"s and 7?8"s, and today along ith religious terrorism, state
sponsored terrorism has considerably altered the nature of terrorist activities around the
orld.
'n recent times, some countries have embraced terrorism as a deliberate instrument of
foreign policy. Bne distinction of state sponsored terrorism from other forms of terrorist
activity is that it is initiated to obtain certain clearly defined foreign policy objectives
rather than grabbing media attention or targeting the potential audience. 'n a cost-
benefit analysis, state-sponsored terrorism is the most effective means of terrorism from
the perspective of the perpetrator.

State-sponsored terrorism as idely employed in Central +sia in the nineteenth
century. *ussians supported their fello Slavs in the 5al&ans. 5ulgaria used the
1acedonian revolutionary terrorists against Dugoslavia after World War '. The Western
poers under the auspices of the <S supported all &inds of nationalist and anti-
communist rebels throughout the Cold War. The Soviet <nion as no different in its
operations during this period. Countries li&e 'ran, 'ra0, Sudan, %ibya $orth =orea have
been engaged in sponsorship of political violence of different nature in their 9enemy:
countries. 'ndia has been facing this problem from )a&istan since 'ndependence.
&. Nar'o-terrorism
The term as first used in 7?@E by the former )resident of )eru, 5elaunde Terry to
describe campaigns by drug traffic&ers using terrorist methods such as the use of car
bombs, assassinations and &idnapping against the anti-narcotics police in Coloumbia
and )eru. Though initially used in the conte(t of drug traffic&ing related terrorism in
South +merica, the term has come to be associated ith terrorist groups and activities
around the orld and more so in the Central and South-#ast +sia. $arco-terrorism has
been defined as Fthe attempt by narcotics traffic&ers to influence the policies of the
6overnment by systematic threat or use by violence:. /oever, it is also possible to
vie narco-terrorism as a means of terrorism or at any rate as a means of funding
terrorism. +s the term itself suggests, narco-terrorism combines to criminal activities3
drug traffic&ing and terrorist violence. $arco-terrorism is motivated mainly by economic
reasons as it helps the terrorist organi;ations raise huge sums of money ith minimum
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cost for their activities. Thus the political, ideological, religious and the ethno-nationalist
motives generally associated ith terrorism are secondary to the economic gains
associated ith it.
'n a survey conducted by the <nited $ations, lin&s beteen drug traffic&ers and terrorist
groups ere observed in 7? out of E@ countries. These countries include +lgeria,
Colombia, Comoros, #cuador, 6ermany, 6uernsey, 'ndia, 'taly, >apan, =enya,
=yrgy;stan, %ithuania, 1auritius, Saudi +rabia, Tur&ey, the <nited =ingdom, the <nited
States of +merica, <;be&istan and Demen. 1ajor terrorist groups operating on these
lines in these countries are: +l Gaeda, the Colombia-based +<C ,<nited Defences of
Columbia-, #%$ ,$ational %iberation +rmy-, Colombia, and 4+*C ,*evolutionary +rmed
4orces of Colombia-, the tri-border 'slamic 6roup in +rgentina, )araguay and 5ra;il, the
Shining )ath in )eru, the )== ,=urdistan Wor&ers )arty- in Tur&ey, '1< ,'slamic
1ovement of <;be&istan- in <;be&istan, the 'slamic >ihad in )alestine, /i;bollah in
%ebanon, and the *'*+ ,*eal 'rish *epublican +rmy- in $orthern 'reland. 'slamist
terrorist groups in 'ndia supported by the )a&istan 'S' are reported to be active in drug
traffic&ing along the =ashmir .alley and also in other parts of the country.
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(lti-)ronged %trategy
The Commission is of the vie that dealing ith the menace of terrorism ould re0uire
a comprehensive strategy in hich different sta&eholders H the 6overnment, political
parties, security agencies, civil society and media H ould have an important role to
play. The elements of such a strategy ould be:
)olitical consensus : )olitical parties must arrive at a national consensus on the
need for the broad contours of such a planned strategy. 5ased on this national
strategy, each of the States and <nion Territories should dra up its respective
regional strategies, along ith the re0uired tactical components for the
implementation of the strategy. >ust as the <nion 6overnment should have
intensive interactions ith the States and <nion Territories hile draing up the
national strategy, the latter ould be re0uired to do their part in close
consultation ith the nodal ministry of the 6overnment of 'ndia ,possibly the
/ome 1inistry-. While attempting such a national consensus on an issue of
considerable criticality for the nation:s security, integrity an develop-mental
thrusts for the most bac&ard regions, it deserves to be borne in mind that the
people of our country have a right to e(pect that our national as ell as regional
parties ill rise above their sectarian and petty electoral compulsions.
6ood governance and socio-economic development : This ould necessitate high
priority being given to development or& and its actual implementation on the
ground for hich a clean, corruption-free and accountable administration at all
levels is an imperative necessity.
*espect for rule of la : 6overnment agencies must not be alloed to transgress
la even in dealing ith critical situations caused by insurgency or terrorism. 'f
an e(traordinary situation cannot be dealt ith by the e(isting las, ne las
may be enacted so that la enforcement agencies are not provo&ed or tempted
to resort to e(tra-legal or illegal methods. )olice and all other governmental
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forces must adhere to some basic codes of conduct.
Countering the subversive activities of terrorists : 6overnment must give priority
to defeating political subversions ,e.g. by terrorists and 1aoists-. The emphasis
should be on civil as opposed to military measures to counter terrorism and
insurgency. )sychological 9arfare: or management of information services and
the media, in conjunction ith the intelligence ing of the police, can play an
important role in achieving this objective.
)roviding the appropriate legal frameor& : Terrorism is an e(traordinary crime.
The ordinary las of the land may not be ade0uate to boo& a terrorist. This may
re0uire special las and effective enforcement mechanisms, but ith sufficient
safeguards to prevent its misuse.
5uilding capacity : The capacity building e(ercise should e(tend to the
intelligence gathering machinery, security agencies, civil administration and the
society at large. +s as highlighted in the *eport on Crisis 1anagement, the
strategy should encompass preventive, mitigation, relief and rehabilitative
measures.
5ased on the above, the Commission has recommended various measures hich are
summari;ed belo.
%mmary of Re'ommendations
7. ,)ara I.7.A.?- $eed for a Comprehensive +nti Terrorist %egislation
a. + comprehensive and effective legal frameor& to deal ith all aspects of
terrorism needs to be enacted. The la should have ade0uate safeguards to
prevent its misuse. The legal provisions to deal ith terrorism could be
incorporated in a separate chapter in the $ational Security +ct, 7?@".
J. ,)ara I.J.?- Definition of Terrorism
a. There is need to define more clearly those criminal acts hich can be construed
as being terrorist in nature. The definition should inter alia deal ith the
folloing:
i. use of firearms, e(plosives or any other lethal substance to cause or li&ely
to cause damage to life and property and essential infrastructure including
installations/establishments having military significance.
ii. assassination of ,including attempt thereof- public functionaries ,the intent
should be to threaten the integrity, security and sovereignty of 'ndia or
overae public functionaries or to terrorise people or sections of people-.
iii. Detention of any person or threat to &ill or injure any person to force the
government to act or abstain from acting in a particular manner.
iv. )roviding/facilitating material support, including finances, for the aforesaid
activities.
v. Commission of certain acts or possession of certain arms etc by members
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or supporters of terrorist organi;ations hich cause or are li&ely to cause
loss of life, injury to a person or damage to any property.
E. ,)ara I.E.@- 5ail )rovisions
a. *egarding grant of bail, the la should provide that:
i. $otithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an
offence punishable under this +ct shall, if in custody, be released on bail
or on his on bond unless the Court gives the )ublic )rosecutor an
opportunity of being heard3
ii. Where the )ublic )rosecutor opposes the bail application of accused to
release on bail, no person accused of an offence punishable under this
+ct or any *ule made thereunder shall be released on bail until the Court
is satisfied that there are grounds for believing that the accused is not
guilty of committing such offence.
,provided that after the e(piry of a period of one year from the date of
detention of the accused for an offence under this +ct, the provisions
mentioned above in ,i- shall apply-.
iii. + *evie Committee should revie the case of all detenus periodically
and advise the prosecution about the release of the accused on bail and
the prosecution shall be bound by such advice.
I. ,)ara I.I.!- )eriod of Detention ,*emand- during 'nvestigation
a. 4or terrorist and other related offences, it should be provided that Section 7A8 of
the Cr)C shall apply subject to the modification that in sub-section ,J-, the
references to Kfifteen daysL, Kninety daysL and Ksi(ty daysL, herever they occur,
shall be construed as references to Kthirty daysL, Kninety daysL and Kninety daysL
respectively.
!. ,)ara I.!.7"- Confession before a )olice Bfficer
a. Confession before the police should be made admissible as recommended in the
*eport on )ublic Brder. 5ut this should be done only if comprehensive police
reforms as suggested by the Commission are carried out. Till such time,
confessions should continue to be made before judicial magistrates under
Section 7AI Cr)C.
A. ,)ara I.8.7"- *evie Committee
a. + statutory *evie Committee should be constituted to e(amine each case
registered, ithin E" days of its registration. The *evie Committee should
satisfy itself that a prima facie case has been made out by the investigation
agency. This Committee should revie each case every 0uarter.
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8. ,)ara I.?.!- Special Courts
a. )rovisions for constitution of Special 4ast Trac& Courts e(clusively for trial of
terrorism related cases may be incorporated in the la on terrorism. Bther
specific provisions related to such Special Courts may also be incorporated.
Such Courts may be set up as and hen re0uired.
@. ,)ara I.77.I- + 4ederal +gency to 'nvestigate Terrorist Bffences
a. The Commission ould li&e to reiterate the recommendations made in its *eport
on 9)ublic Brder: ,paragraph @.E.7I- on the creation of a speciali;ed Division in
the C5' to investigate terror offences.
b. 't should be ensured that this Division of the C5' is staffed by personnel of
proven integrity and ho are professionally competent and have developed the
re0uired e(pertise in investigation of terrorism related offences. The autonomy
and independence of this agency may be ensured through a laid don procedure
of appointment and assured fi(ed tenure for its personnel.
?. ,)ara !.J.I- 1easures against 4inancing of Terrorism H +nti-money %aundering
1easures.
a. The )revention of 1oney-laundering +ct ,)1%+- may be suitably amended at an
early date to e(pand the list of predicate offences to iden its scope and
outreach.
b. 't may be e(amined hether institutional coordination mechanisms beteen the
Directorate of #nforcement and other intelligence collecting and investigating
agencies, could be strengthened and some provisions of the )1%+ delegated to
them by the #nforcement of Directorate.
c. The financial transaction reporting regime under the 4inancial 'ntelligence <nit
,4'<-'$D- may be e(tended to cover high ris& sectors such as real-estate. There
is also need to strengthen the capacity of 4'<-'$D to enable it to meet future
challenges.
7". ,)ara !.E.I- 1easures against 4inancing of Terrorism H 1easures to 5loc& the
4lo of 4unds for 4inancing Terrorist +ctivities
a. The ne legal frameor& on terrorism may incorporate provisions regarding
free;ing of assets, funds, ban& accounts, deposits, cash etc. hen there is
reasonable suspicion of their intended use in terrorist activities. Such actions
may be underta&en by the investigating officer ith the prior approval of a
designated authority, subject to ade0uate safeguards. These provisions may be
incorporated in a separate chapter in the $ational Security +ct, 7?@" as
recommended in paragraph I.7.A.?.
b. + speciali;ed cell may be created in the proposed $ational Counter-terrorism
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Centre draing upon e(pertise from the <nion 1inistries of 4inance and /ome
+ffairs and the Cabinet Secretariat for ta&ing concerted action on the financial
leads provided from information gathered by various sources. 4urther, different
investigation agencies dealing ith financial transactions may set up anti-terrorist
finance cells ithin their organi;ations to augment the efforts of intelligence
agencies involved in counter-terrorism activities.
Re'ommendations made in Earlier Reports
+part from the above, the Commission has made recommendations on certain aspects
relevant for dealing ith terrorism in its earlier *eports also. These are:
a. *eport on )ublic Brder:
i. Whole set of recommendations on 9)olice *eforms: contained in Chapter !
ii. *ecommendations on 9confessions made before the police: ,paragraph
8.!.I.7"-3 9itness protection: ,paragraph 8.8.I-3 9federal crimes: ,paragraph
@.E- and 9role of civil society, media and political parties: ,Chapter ?-
b. *eport on Crisis 1anagement:
i. Whole set of recommendations on 9%egal and 'nstitutional 4rameor& for
Crisis 1anagement: contained in Chapter I
ii. Whole set of recommendations on 9#mergency *esponse System for Crisis
1anagement: contained in Chapter A
c. *eport on 9Capacity 5uilding for Conflict *esolution:
i. Whole set of recommendations on 9Conflict *esolution in the $orth #ast:
contained in Chapter 7J3 specifically, the recommendation on 91ulti-purpose
$ational 'dentity Card: ,paragraph 7J.A.A-
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Re'ommendations made in Report on )bli' #rder
*1+ Confessions before )oli'e
Re'ommendations *paragraph ,.&.$.1-+.
a. Confessions made before the police should be admissible. +ll such statements
should be video-recorded and the tapes produced before the court. $ecessary
amendments should be made in the 'ndian #vidence +ct.
b. The itness/accused should be arned on video tape that any statement he ma&es
is liable to be used against him in a court of la, and he is entitled to the presence of his
layer or a family member hile ma&ing such a statement. 'f the person opts for this,
the presence of the layer/family member should be secured before proceeding ith
recording the statement.
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c. The accused should be produced before a magistrate immediately thereafter, ho
shall confirm by e(amining the accused hether the confession as obtained voluntarily
or under duress.
d. The above-mentioned recommendations should be implemented only if the reforms
mentioned in Chapter ! are accepted.
*2+ /itness )rote'tion
Re'ommendation *paragraph ,.,.$.0+.
a. + statutory programmme for guaranteeing anonymity of itnesses and for itness
protection in specified types of cases, based on the best international models should be
adopted early.
*!+ 1ederal Crimes
Re'ommendations *paragraph 2.!.1$+.
a. There is need to re-e(amine certain offences hich have inter-state or national
ramification and include them in a ne la. The la should also prescribe the
procedure for investigation and trials for such offences. The folloing offences
may be included in the category:
i. Brganised Crime ,e(amined in paragraph @.I-
ii. Terrorism
iii. +cts threatening $ational Security
iv. Traffic&ing in arms and human beings
v. Sedition
vi. 1ajor crimes ith inter-state ramifications
vii. +ssassination of ,including attempts on- major public figures
viii. Serious economic offences
b. + ne la should be enacted to govern the or&ing of the C5'. This la should
also stipulate its jurisdiction including the poer to investigate the ne category
of crimes.
c. The empoered committee recommended in the Commission:s *eport on
9#thics in 6overnance: ,para E.8.7?- ould decide on cases to be ta&en over by
the C5'.
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Ci3il %o'iety
Civil Society could also be of immense help in the prevention of terrorist acts. They
could play an advisory and educative role in ma&ing the community at large aare of
the basic precautions to be ta&en because in most terrorist stri&es, the common citi;ens
8
are the target. 't is therefore necessary that the citi;ens are themselves ell e0uipped
and trained to handle any such incident, as apart from being the victims they are also
often the first responders in any crisis. Civil societies and $6Bs can partner ith la
enforcement agencies to develop targeted programmes for cooperation focusing, for
e(ample, on spreading aareness and understanding of the diversity of local cultures,
religious customs and traditions of certain communities and in developing outreach
activities for healing community rifts and tensions. +n alert citi;enry is perhaps the best
ay to ard off terrorist stri&es. Civil society in conjunction ith the agencies of the
State can help in developing this capability among the citi;ens.
(edia
The Commission has already recommended the folloing in para ?.J.8 of its *eport on
)ublic Brder:
a. The +dministration must ma&e facts available to the media at the earliest about any
major development, particularly activities affecting public order.
b. 'n order to have better appreciation of each other:s vie points there should be
increased interaction beteen the +dministration and the media. This could be inter alia
in the form of joint or&shops and trainings.
c. The +dministration should designate points of contact at appropriate levels ,a
spo&esperson- for the media hich could be accessed during henever re0uired.
d. Bfficers should be imparted training for interaction ith the media.
e. + cell may be constituted at the district level hich may analyse media reports about
matters of public importance.
Ed'ation
The Commission has recommended the folloing in para 8.J.A of its report on
Combatting Terrorism :
a. $C#*T has proposed a scheme to encourage and support institutions,
voluntary agencies and $6Bs etc. engaged ith school education for
promotion of #ducation for )eace ithin the country. These initiatives need
to be encouraged ith necessary funds and other material support.
b. The feasibility of e(tending the scheme to religious schools also needs to be
e(amined.
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145s
*5estion No.1+ /hat 'hanges are re6ired in the internal se'rity regime7
4ns. The Commission has recommended a multi-prong approach. The elements of
such an approach are:
)olitical consensus
6ood governance and socio-economic development
*espect for rule of la
Countering the subversive activities of terrorists
)roviding the appropriate legal frameor&
5uilding capacity
With regard to the legal frameor&, the Commission has recommended that there
should be a ne and a strengthened la to deal ith terrorism hich should be included
in the $S+. The Commission has also recommended that there should be ade0uate
safeguards for preventing the abuse of such a la.
With regard to institutional arrangements, the Commission has recommended greater
coordination beteen the security and intelligence agencies at the national level.
*5estion No.2+ 8o9 to 'rb 'ommnal terrorism7
4ns. The Commission has considered the issue of communal violence in its *eport on
Capacity 5uilding for Conflict *esolution. The Commission has recommended that
,paragraph ?.A-
A separate law to deal with communal violence is not required. The existing provisions
of the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code need to be strengthened.
This may be achieved by incorporating provisions for
i. !nhanced punishments for communal offences
ii. "etting up of special courts for expeditious trial of cases related to communal
violence
iii. #iving powers of remand to !xecutive $agistrates in cases of communal
offences
iv. Prescription of norms of relief and rehabilitation
%urther& as recommended in para '.(.).* of the Commission+s ,eport on -Public .rder+&
this should be accompanied by the deletion of the provisions contained in "ection (*'
of CrPC requiring prior sanction of the /nion or "tate #overnment or the 0istrict
$agistrate for initiating prosecution for offences under "ections (12A& (123& 4*1A and
sub5sections 6(7 6c 7& 647 and 627 of "ection 181 of IPC9.
10
*5estion No.!+ 8o9 to in3ol3e 'iti:ens in fight against terrorism7
4ns. Civil Society could also be of immense help in the prevention of terrorist acts.
They could play an advisory and educative role in ma&ing the community at large aare
of the basic precautions to be ta&en because in most terrorist stri&es, the common
citi;ens are the target. 't is therefore necessary that the citi;ens are themselves ell
e0uipped and trained to handle any such incident, as apart from being the victims they
are also often the first responders in any crisis. Civil societies and $6Bs can partner
ith la enforcement agencies to develop targeted programmes for cooperation
focusing, for e(ample, on spreading aareness and understanding of the diversity of
local cultures, religious customs and traditions of certain communities and in developing
outreach activities for healing community rifts and tensions. +n alert citi;enry is
perhaps the best ay to ard off terrorist stri&es. Civil society in conjunction ith the
agencies of the State can help in developing this capability among the citi;ens.
*5estion No.$+ "s the Go3ernment soft on terror7 8o9 do yo see; to address
this7
4ns. 6overnment is not soft on terror. 5ut situations involving terrorist activities are
dynamic in nature and &eep on evolving. The Commission has recommended a legal
and institutional frameor& to deal ith these issues.
*5estion No.&+ %hold ea'h %tate ha3e an anti-terror la97
4ns. The Commission is of the vie that increasingly terrorist activities are having inter-
state and international dimensions. Therefore there should be a national la to deal
ith terrorism.
*5estion No.0+ "s terrorism in "ndia home gro9n7
4ns. Terrorism in 'ndia is both international and home gron.
*5estion No.,+ Does 'ommnal tension help terrorism7
4ns. Communal tensions help terrorist outfits in influencing people and increasing their
base.
*5estion No.2+ 8o9 to arrest the trend of ed'ated people helping terrorist7
4ns. The Commission is of the vie that good governance and socio-economic
development ould arrest this trend.
*5estion No.<+ %hold there be a nified intelligen'e set p7
4ns: The Commission has recommended that there should be convergence and
coordination in the intelligence set up at the national level.
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*5estion No.1-+ "s there need for a definition of =1ederal Crimes> in'lding
terrorism7
4ns. Due to the gravity and comple(ity of offences such as organi;ed crime, terrorism,
acts threatening $ational Security, traffic&ing in arms and human beings, sedition, major
crimes ith inter-state ramifications, assassination of ,including attempts on- major
public figures, serious economic offences, the Commission is of the vie that it ould
be necessary to put in place appropriate procedures for dealing ith such offences.
1ost of these offences are of a relatively recent origin and the State police ith its
restricted territorial jurisdiction and limited resources is li&ely to find it difficult to
investigate such crimes effectively. #ven though K)olice: and 9)ublic Brder: figure in the
State %ist in the Constitution, it is felt that this category of crimes ith inter-state and
national ramifications ould fall under the 9residuary: poers of the <nion.
This ould necessitate the enactment of a ne la to deal ith a category of offences
hich have inter-state and national ramifications. We have already recommended this in
paragraph @.E.7I in our *eport on )ublic Brder.
*5estion No.11+ %hold there be an e?'lsi3e 1ederal 4gen'y to in3estigate
terrorist 'rimes7
4ns. The Commission is of the vie that having a la on 9federal crimes: ould lead to
their investigation by a specialised State or Central agency. The enactment of a la
using the 9residuary poers: and #ntry @, %ist ', to define the constitution of C5', its
structure and jurisdiction is overdue and has to be enacted e(peditiously. The changes
made in the Delhi Special )olice #stablishment +ct in J""E should also be incorporated
in the ne la. The Commission has already recommended in its *eport on 9)ublic
Brder: that there should be enacted a ne la to govern the or&ing of the C5'. This
la should also stipulate its jurisdiction including the poer to investigate the ne
category of federal crimes.
*5estion No.12+ 8o9 9ill the system operate7
4ns. <nder the ne la, the State )olice as ell as the C5' could be given concurrent
jurisdiction over investigation of all such crimes. The empoered committee
recommended for monitoring serious economic offences in this Commission:s *eport on
9#thics in 6overnance: ,para E.8.7?- may decide on the transfer of such cases to the
C5'. ,The Committee has been proposed to be headed by the Cabinet Secretary, ith
the Chief .igilance Commissioner, /ome Secretary,, 4inance Secretary, Secretary
5an&ing 4inancial Sector, Deputy 6overnor of *5', Secretary, Department of Company
+ffairs, %a Secretary, Chairman S#5' etc. as members-. Bnce the C5' ta&es over a
case, investigation by the State police ould cease but the latter ill re0uired to provide
assistance to the C5' as may be needed. These offences should be tried by specially
designated courts.
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*5estion No.1!+ 8o9 are pro3isions of (C#C4 different from 9hat has been
sggested by 4RC7
4ns. 1CBC+ does not define 9Terrorist +ct:. 't only defines 9Brganised Crime:. +*C
has recommended a comprehensive definition of 9terrorist acts:.
1CBC+ definition of organi;ed crime:
6e7 :organised crime: means any continuing unlawful activity by an
individual& singly or ;ointly& either as a member of an organised crime
syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate& by use of violence or threat of
violence or intimidation or coercion& or other unlawful means& with the
ob;ective of gaining pecuniary benefits& or gaining undue economic or
other advantage for himself or any person or promoting insurgency<
+*C is of the vie that there is need to define more clearly those criminal acts hich
can be construed as being terrorist in nature. The definition should inter alia deal ith
the folloing:
i. use of firearms, e(plosives or any other lethal substance to cause or li&ely to
cause damage to life and property and essential infrastructure including
installations/establishments having military significance.
ii. assassination of ,including attempt thereof- public functionaries ,the intent
should be to threaten the integrity, security and sovereignty of 'ndia or overae
public functionaries or to terrorise people or sections of people-.
iii. Detention of any person or threat to &ill or injure any person to force the
government to act or abstain from acting in a particular manner.
iv. )roviding/facilitating material support, including finances, for the aforesaid
activities.
v. Commission of certain acts or possession of certain arms etc by members or
supporters of terrorist organi;ations hich cause or are li&ely to cause loss of
life, injury to a person or damage to any property.
$oreover $C.CA does not provide adequate safeguards to prevent abuse. "ection 42
of this Act provides that
23. Cognizance of, and investigation into, an offence.
6(7 =otwithstanding anything contained in the Code
6a7 no information about the commission of an offence of organised crime under
this Act& shall be recorded by a police officer without the prior approval of the
police officer not below the ran> of the 0eputy Inspector #eneral of Police<
6b7 no investigation of an offence under the provisions of this Act shall be carried
our by a police officer below the ran> of the 0eputy "uperintendent of Police.
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647 =. "pecial Court shall ta>e cogni?ance of any offence under this Act without
the precious& sanction of the police officer not below the ran> of Additional
0irector #eneral of Police.
+*C has recommended that there should be a 9*evie Committee: to e(amine each
registered case ithin E" days of registration to assess hether a prima facie case has
been made out by the investigative agency.
Thirdly, 1CBC+ being a State la, cannot address inter-state ramifications of terrorism.
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