ROMEL G TORRES

LLB 4C
DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL
BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO VS PALANCA
Judicial Due Process Requisites
FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security
to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,29.1!. His property is worth "#$ more than what he
owe. %ue to the failure of Engracio to ma$e his payments, El Banco e&ecuted an instrument to
mortgage Engracio's property. Engracio howe(er left for )hina and he ne(er returned till he
died. *ince Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue
him by means of publication using a newspaper. +he lower court further ordered the cler$ of
court to furnish Engracio a copy and that it'd be sent to ,moy, )hina. +he court e(entually
granted El Banco petition to e&ecute Engracio's property. " years thereafter, -icente surfaced
on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. -icente
a(erred that there had been no due process as Engracio ne(er recei(ed the summons.
ISSUE: .hether or not due process was not obser(ed.
HELD: +he *) ruled against Palanca. +he *) ruled that the re/uisites for 0udicial due process
had been met. +he re/uisites are1
1. +here must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with 0udicial power to hear and
decide the matter before it.
2. 2urisdiction must be lawfully ac/uired o(er the person of the defendant or o(er the
property sub0ect of the proceedings.
3. +he defendant must be gi(en the opportunity to be heard.
. 2udgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
Equal Protection Delegation of Powers Administrative Bodies
FACTS4 Pao Ho is a )hinese national employed in the )ity of 5anila. 6n 2" 5arch 1978, then
5anila 5ayor ,ntonio -illegas signed 6rdinance 8o. 7#3". +he said ordinance prohibits foreign
nationals to be employed within the )ity of 5anila without first securing a permit from the 5ayor
of 5anila. +he permit will cost them P#!.!!. Pao Ho, on ! 5ay 1978 filed a petition for
prohibition against the said 6rdinance alleging that as a police power measure, it ma$es no
distinction between useful and non9useful occupations, imposing a fi&ed P#!.!! employment
permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe' any
standard to guide and:or limit the action of the 5ayor, thus, (iolating the fundamental principle
on illegal delegation of legislati(e powers. 2udge ,rca of 5anila );< ruled in fa(or of Pao Ho
and he declared the 6rdinance as being null and (oid.
ISSUE: .hether or not there a (iolation of e/ual protection by (irtue 6rd 7#3".
HELD: +he decision of 2udge ,rca is affirmed. 6rdinance 8o. 7#3" does not lay down any
criterion or standard to guide the 5ayor in the e&ercise of his discretion. Hence an undue
delegation of power.
;urther, the P#!.!! fee is unreasonable not only because it is e&cessi(e but because it fails to
consider (alid substantial differences in situation among indi(idual aliens who are re/uired to
pay it. ,lthough the e/ual protection clause of the )onstitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperati(e that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences ha(ing a
reasonable relation to the sub0ect of the particular legislation. +he same amount of P#!.!! is
being collected from e(ery employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full
time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid e&ecuti(e. =e/uiring a person before he
can be employed to get a permit from the )ity 5ayor of 5anila who may withhold or refuse it at
will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
means of li(elihood. .hile it is true that the Philippines as a *tate is not obliged to admit aliens
within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be depri(ed of life without due process of
law. +his guarantee includes the means of li(elihood. +he shelter of protection under the due
process and e/ual protection clause is gi(en to all persons, both aliens and citi>ens.
ASPECT OF PROCEEDING
Espleta v Avelin !"#$%&
Fa'ts: *hell's counsel Bellaflor forwarded an oral motion for the re(ocation of appearance of
Espleta's witness 5ontano for cross9e&amination and the conclusion of her testimony. *he was
unable to appear in one of the trials due to her an audit for a 0ob in the %epartment of ?ocal
@o(ernment at the day she was supposed to finish her testimony and cross9e&amination. 2udge
,(elino accepted this proposal and e(en allowed *hell to present its rebuttal witness for
Espeleta's testimony. +he 0udge granted this re/uest to the pre0udice of Espeleta. +he
magistrate also did not consider Espeleta's counsel's letter for postponement. +he 0udge told
parties to submit documentary e(idence afterwards but re0ected the ones from 5ontano's
testimony due to her being stric$en from the records.
<n essence, there was partiality on the part of the 0udge.
Iss(e: .hether the concept of fairness that is basic to procedural due process would be
satisfied if the right to be heard of petitioner was re(o$ed by the respondent 2udgeA
Hel): 8o. Petition for certiorari granted
Espeleta presented 5ontano as an accountant to testify for the reduced balance to *hell in the
form of 1,!!! from *hell's proposed amount of 22,!!!. +he deductions included payment for
damage due to gasoline lea$ages.
Bnder the circumstances, the stress on the absence of procedural due process is
understandable for as a result of the order of respondent 2udge now sought to be set aside,
there is more than 0ust a probability that petitioner would be condemned to pay before he had
been fully heard. +he trial didn't satisfy the standard for a 0udicious in/uiry, because there was a
moc$ery of the re/uirement that the litigants should be gi(en full opportunity to sustain their
claims and ha(e their e(idence considered and weighted. +he petitioner can assert due
process.
Peple vs* Tee+an,ee -.* /4# SCRA %40"/%
FACTS: 6n 2uly 1!, 1991 5aureen Hultman, 2ussi ?eino and =oland )hapman while wal$ing
along the corner of )aballero C 5ahogany streets, was approached by the accused +eehan$ee
0r. ,nd after seriesof e(ents, the accused fired his gun $illing )hapman and mortally wounding
Hultman and ?eino, then left. ?eino, though mortally wounded mustered all his strength and
called for help and noticed at least 3 people loo$ing on from outside their house namely -icente
5angubat, %omingo ;lorece and ,gripino )adenas. 5angubat, after the gunman sped away,
ran outside his house, helped the (ictims and reported the incident to the proper authorities.
%uring their <n(estigation the 8B< and the 5a$ati police as$ed 2ussi ?eino twice regarding the
person who shot them1 +he first instance was 6n 2uly 1#, 1991 while ?eino was still in the
hospital, he was shown D3E pictures of different men by the in(estigators. He identified )laudio
+eehan$ee 2r. as the gunman from the pictures. <n order to confirm the identification made by
?eino and other witnesses )adenas and 5angubat who also pointed the accused as the
gunman thru a separate out Fof court identification procedures. +he ,ssistant director of 8B<
Epimaco -elasco, the )hief of 8B<9*pecial operations group *al(ador =anin and 2 othe ragents
brought the accused to ;orbes par$ for further identification by the sur(i(ing (ictim, 2ussi
?eino.?eino has 0ust been discharged from the hospital the day before. *ince his parents were
worried about his safety, they re/uested the 8B< to conduct the in(estigation of the gunman in
;orbes Par$ where the ?einos also li(e. +he 8B< agreed. *o, the security agents from B*
embassy fetched ?eino at his house and his father to a (acant house in ;orbes Par$. ,fter a
couple of minutes, ?eino was brought out of the laws and placed in a car with slightly tinted
windows. +he car was par$ed about # meters away from the house. <nside the car with ?eino
was his ;ather, 8B<9*6@ chief *al(ador =anin and a dri(er. ?eino was instructed to loo$ at
men who will be coming out of the house and identify the gunman from the line up. , group of
fi(e to si& men Dincluding the accusedE then came out of the unoccupied house, into the street.
;rom the group, ?eino identified the accused as the gunman for the second time.3 separate
criminal cases were filed against accused )laudio +eehan$ee, 2r. <nitially, he was charged with4
5B=%E= for the $illing of =6?,8% )H,P5,8, and two D2E ;=B*+=,+E% 5B=%E= for the
shooting and wounding of 2B**< ?E<86 and 5,B=EE8 HB?+5,8. .hen Hultman
subse/uently died after 9" days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial,
the <nformation for ;rustrated 5urder was amended to 5B=%E=. +he trial court con(icted the
accused )laudio +eehan$ee 0r. because the strength of the testimonies of 3eyewitnesses who
positi(ely identified him as the gunman. Howe(er, in his appeal, he (igorously assailed the
(alidity of the out9of9court identification by these eyewitnesses especially the identification of
2ussi ?eino.
ISSUE:
.hether or not the out9of9court identification in this case is a (alid and licit way in the
identification of the accusedA
HELD:
6ut9of9court identification is conducted by the police in (arious ways. <t is done thru show9ups
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. <t is done thru
mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. <t is also done
thru line9ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose. *ince corruption of out9of9court identification contaminates the integrity of in9court
identification during the trial of the case, courts ha(e fashioned out rules to assure its fairness
and its compliance with the re/uirements of constitutional due process. Based on this statement
gi(en by the high court regarding the issue, we can say that out9of the court identification of the
accused is (alid and licit when it is in line with the rules that the *upreme court.
RURAL BAN1 OF BUHI VS* CA
p.'e)(.al )(e p.'ess
FACTS: Buhi Ban$ was a rural ban$. <ts boo$s were e&amined by the =ural Ban$s di(ision of
the )entral Ban$. Howe(er, it refused to be e&amined. ,s a conse/uence, its financial
assistance was suspended ?ater, a general e&amination of the ban$'s affairs and operations
were again conducted. +he rural ban$'s di(ision found out massi(e irregularities in the
operations, gi(ing out loans to un$nown and fictitious borrowers, and sums amounting to
millions past due to the )entral Ban$. +here were also promissory notes rediscounted with the
)entral Ban$ for cash. ,s a result, the Buhi Ban$ became insol(ent. +he di(ision chief, 6dra,
recommended that Buhi be placed under recei(ership. +hus, the 5onetary Board adopted a
=esolution G #83, placing the ban$ under recei(ership. 6dra, the di(ision chief, was made the
recei(er. 6dra thus implemented the resolution, authori>ing deputies to ta$e control and
possession of Buhi's assets and liabilities. %el =osario, the Buhi Ban$ 5anager, filed an
in0unction against the recei(er, arguing that the resolution (iolated the =ural Ban$s ,ct and
constitutes gadale0. +he ban$ claims that there was a (iolation of due process. +hey claim that
the ban$ was not gi(en the chance to deny and dispro(e the claim of insol(ency or the other
grounds and that it was hastily put under recei(ership. ?ater on, the )entral Ban$ 5onetary
Board ordered the li/uidation of the Ban$. +he 0udge ruled in fa(or of the Ban$ and issued a writ
of e&ecution. +he ), howe(er restrained the enforcement of e&ecution, citing that the 2udge did
not follow the orders, and thus re/uired the Ban$ to yield to the )B.
ISSUE: .as due process obser(edA
SC4 HE*. )?6*B=E -,?<%.
Bnder *ec 29 of the =, 27#, on proceedings regarding insol(ency, there is 86
=EIB<=E5E8+ that a hearing be first conducted before a ban$ may be placed under
recei(ership. +he law e&plicitly pro(ides that the 5onetary Board can <55E%<,+E?H forbid a
ban$ing institution from doing business and <55E%<,+E?H appoint a recei(er when4 1E there
has been an e&amination by )B, bE a report to the )B, and cE prima facie showing that the ban$
is insol(ent.
,s to the claim that the =, 27# (iolates due process, the claim is untenable. +he law could not
ha(e intended to disregard the constitutional re/uirement of due process when it conferred
power to place rural ban$s under recei(ership.
+he closure and li/uidation of the ban$ is considered an e&ercise of P6?<)E P6.E=. <t maybe
sub0ect to 0udicial in/uiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious, discriminatory,
whimsical, arbitrary, etc. +he appointment of a recei(er may be made by the 5onetary Board,
.<+H6B+ 86+<)E ,8% HE,=<8@, but sub0ect to the 2B%<)<,? <8IB<=H, to insure protection
of the ban$ing institution.
%ue process does 86+ necessarily re/uire a P=<6= HE,=<8@. , hearing or an
6PP6=+B8<+H +6 BE HE,=% may be made *BB*EIBE8+ to the closure. 6ne could 0ust
imagine the dire conse/uences of a prior hearing4 ban$ runs would happen, resulting in panic
and hysteria. <n that way, fortunes will be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of
the entire ban$ing industry.
+here is no /uestion that the action of the 5B may be sub0ect to 0udicial re(iew. )ourts may
interfere with the 5B's e&ercise of discretion. Here, the =+) has 0urisdiction to ad0udicate the
/uestion of whether the 5B acted in bad faith when it directed the dissolution of Buhi Ban$.
2EBB VS* PEOPLE
%ue process F =ight +o Be Heard F ;air ,nd <mpartial 2udge
FACTS: .ebb sought the dis/ualification of 0udge ,melita +olentino on the ground that the
0udge allegedly told allegedly told the media that Jfailure of the accused to surrender following
the issuance of the warrant of arrest is an indication of guilt.J =espondent 0udge denied the
motion. ?ater, .ebb filed a second motion to dis/ualify respondent 0udge as the latter allegedly
told the media that the accused Jshould not e&pect the comforts of home,J pending the
resolution of his motion to be committed to Bicutan, Parana/ue. =espondent 0udge again denied
the motion to inhibit. ,gain, Biong filed another motion to dis/ualify respondent 0udge on the
ground of bias and partiality. +his was li$ewise denied by respondent 0udge.,fter arraignment,
.ebb filed an Brgent 5otion for Hospitali>ation. He alleged that he was sic$ of dermatitis or
asthma of the s$in which aggra(ated due to his continuous commitment at the Parana/ue
5unicipal 2ail. +he motion was denied by respondent 0udge.%uring trial, there were other
incidents when during cross e&amination Dregarding 2essica ,lfaro's affida(it, and another
regarding departure for the B*E, whene(er the prosecution ob0ects, 2udge +olentino sustains
the ob0ection. .ebb thus filed another motion to inhibit on ground of bias and pre0udice of
2udge. ,s usual, 2udge +olentino denied it. ,lso, 2udge denied the ta$ing of deposition of
.ebb's witness who was in the B*. ?ater, during formal offer of e(idence, 2udge admitted only
1! out of 12 e&hibits offered by .ebb. ,ccording to .ebb, all these sets irre(ersibly, the
e(entual con(iction of the accused.
ISSUE: *hould 2udge +olentino inhibit herself on the ground of bias and pre0udiceA
HELD: 86. +he Bill of =ights guarantees that JDnEo person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.J19 , critical component of due process is a hearing before
an impartial and disinterested tribunal. .e ha(e ingrained the 0urisprudence that e(ery litigant is
entitled to nothing4 less than the cold neutrality of an impartial 0udge for all the other elements of
due process, li$e notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come
from a partial and biased 0udge. Hence, the =ules of )ourt allows a 0udge to (oluntarily inhibit
himself from hearing a case for J0ust or (alid reasonsJ other than those referring to his pecuniary
interest, relation, pre(ious connection, or pre(ious rulings or decisions.
, party has the right to see$ the inhibition or dis/ualification of a 0udge who does not appear to
be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case. +his right must be
weighed with the duty of a 0udge to decide cases without fear of repression. Hence, to dis/ualify
a 0udge on the ground of bias and pre0udice the mo(ant must pro(e the same by clear and
con(incing e(idence. +his is a hea(y burden and petitioners failed to discharge their burden of
proof. He alleged ad(erse and erroneous rulings of respondent 0udge on their (arious motions.
By themsel(es, howe(er, they do not sufficieritly pro(e bias and pre0udice to dis/ualify
respondent 0udge. +o be dis/ualifying, the bias and pre0udice must be shown to ha(e stemmed
from an e&tra0udicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than
what the 0udge learned from his participation in the case. 6pinions formed in the course of
0udicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the e(idence presented
and conduct obser(ed by the 0udge, do not pro(e personal bias or pre0udice on the part of the
0udge. ,s a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and
(igorously and consistently e&pressed, are not a basis for dis/ualification of a 0udge on grounds
of bias and pre0udice. E&trinsic e(idence is re/uired to establish bias, bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or
order itself. ,lthough the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a
0udgeKs integrity, absent e&trinsic e(idence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a
case against the 0udge.
+he only e&ception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an
ineluctable inference of bad, faith or malice.
ANG TIBAY VS. CIR
administrative due process
Due Process Admin Bodies CIR
FACTS4 +eodoro+oribio owns and operates ,ng +ibay a leather company which supplies the
Philippine ,rmy. %ue to alleged shortage of leather, +oribio caused the layoff of members of
8ational ?abor Bnion <nc. 8?B a(erred that +oribio's act is not (alid as it is not within the )B,.
+hat there are two labor unions in ,ng +ibay1 8?B and 8ational .or$er's Brotherhood. +hat
8.B is dominated by +oribio hence he fa(ors it o(er 8?B. +hat 8?B wishes for a new trial as
they were able to come up with new e(idence:documents that they were not able to obtain
before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the )<=.
ISSUE: .hether or not there has been a due process of law.
HELD: +he *) ruled that there should be a new trial in fa(or of 8?B. +he *) ruled that all
administrati(e bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential re/uirements of
due process. +hey are1
D1E +he right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit e(idence in support thereof.
D2E 8ot only must the party be gi(en an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
e(idence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
e(idence presented.
D3E .hile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of ha(ing something to support its
decision. , decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
DE 8ot only must there be some e(idence to support a finding or conclusion but the e(idence
must be Lsubstantial.M *ubstantial e(idence is more than a mere scintilla <t means such rele(ant
e(idence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade/uate to support a conclusion.
D#E +he decision must be rendered on the e(idence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
D7E +he )ourt of <ndustrial =elations or any of its 0udges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the contro(ersy, and not simply accept the
(iews of a subordinate in arri(ing at a decision.
D"E +he )ourt of <ndustrial =elations should, in all contro(ersial /uestions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can $now the (ario issues in(ol(ed, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. +he performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.

ADMU vs 3()4e Cap(ln4
Constitutional Law Power of School to Dismiss Erring Students
FACTS4 6n ;ebruary 8, 9 and 1! of 1991, a fraternity in ,teneo ?aw *chool named ,guila
?egis conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes. Bnfortunately, one neophyte died as a result
thereof and one was hospitali>ed due to serious physical in0uries. <n a resolution dated 5arch 9,
1991, the %isciplinary Board formed by ,teneo found a certain student guilty of (iolating =ule 3
of the =ules on %iscipline. )onse/uently, he was dismissed together with other students.
Howe(er, on 5ay 1", 1991, 2udge )apulong, upon student's appeal, ordered ,teneo to re(erse
its decision and reinstate the said students.
ISSUE: .hether or not the ,teneo ?aw *chool has competence to issue an order dismissing
such students pursuant to its rules.
HELD: Hes, ,teneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and
therefore it had (alidly e&ercised such power. +he students do not deser(e to claim such a
(enerable institution such as ,teneo as their own a minute longer for they may forseeably cast
a male(olent influence on students currently enrolled as well as those who come after them.
+herefore, the order of 2udge )apulong is hereby re(ersed.
Dis)a) G(56an vs* Natinal Unive.sit7
Fa'ts: Petitioners %iosdado @u>man, Blysses Brbi>tondo and ,riel =amacula, students of
respondent 8ational Bni(ersity, ha(e come to this )ourt to see$ relief from what they describe
as their schoolKs Jcontinued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol.J <n their petition Jfor
e&traordinary legal and e/uitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory in0unctionJ
dated ,ugust ", 198, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were acti(e
participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the Bni(ersity.
+he respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners' failure to enroll for the
first semester of the school year 1989198# is due to their own fault and not because of their
alleged e&ercise of their constitutional and human rights. +hat as regards to @u>man, his
academic showing was poor due to his acti(ities in leading boycotts of classes. +hat @u>man Lis
facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the 5etropolitan +rial )ourt of 5anila in
connection with the destruction of properties of respondent Bni(ersity. +he petitioners ha(e
Lfailures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.M
Hel): <mmediately apparent from a reading of respondentsK comment and memorandum is the
fact that they had ne(er conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not
petitioners9students had indeed led or participated Jin acti(ities within the uni(ersity premises,
conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes
thereinJ 3 or perpetrated acts of J(andalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage
and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of Bni(ersity authority.J Parenthetically, the
pendency of a ci(il case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against
petitioner @u>man, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his e&pulsion or
debarment from re9enrollment. ,lso apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this )ourt to
any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be e&pelled or refused re9enrollment for
poor scholastic standing.
+here are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural
due process1 and these are, that
D1E the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them1
D2E they shag ha(e the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel,
if desired1
D3E they shall be informed of the e(idence against them1
DE they shall ha(e the right to adduce e(idence in their own behalf1 and
D#E the e(idence must be duly considered by the in(estigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
+HE PE+<+<68 .,* @=,8+E% ,8% +HE =E*P68%E8+* ,=E %<=E)+E% +6 ,??6.
+HE PE+<+<68E=* +6 =E9E8=6?? .<+H6B+ P=E2B%<)E +6 ,8H %<*)<P?<8,=H
P=6)EE%<8@*.
MALABANAN vs* RAMENTO
Fa'ts: Petitioners were officers of the *upreme *tudent )ouncil of =espondent Bni(ersity.
+hey sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8am to
12am. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the
-eterinary 5edicine and ,nimal *cience D-5,*E Bas$etball )ourt. +he place indicated in such
permit, not in the bas$etball court as therein stated, but at the second floor lobby. ,t such
gathering, they manifested in (ehement and (igorous language their opposition to the proposed
merger of the <nstitute of ,nimal *cience. +hey continued their language se(erely critical of the
uni(ersity authorities and using megaphones in the process. +here was, as a result, disturbance
of classes being held. ,lso, non academic employees within hearing distance, stopped their
wor$ because of noise created. +hey were as$ed to e&plain why they should not be held liable
for holding an assembly.
Iss(e: .hether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was (iolati(e of the
constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speechA
HELD: Hes, necessarily their e&ercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or in(ol(ing
public interest is not sub0ected to pre(ious restraint or subse/uent punishment unless there be a
showing of clear and present danger to a substanti(e e(il that the *tate has a right to pre(ent.
+he peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, howe(er, by an ad(ocacy or disorder. <f
assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities
who are de(oid to deny such re/uest. <n granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the
time and place of an assembly to a(oid disruption of classes or stoppage of wor$ of non9
academic personnel. Howe(er, in (iolation of terms, penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS TELAN
FACTS: +HE BP Board of =egents imposed on 8adal the penalties of suspension for one year,
non9issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and:or as long as
8adal has not reimbursed the *+;,P benefits he had recei(ed with 12N interest per annum
and non issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the
uni(ersity. +he disciplinary action is meted after finally rendering a guilty (erdict on 8adal's
alleged willfull withholding of the following information in his application for scholarship
tantamount to acts of dishonesty, (i>4 D1E that he has and maintains a car and D2E the income of
his mother in the B*, in support of the studies of his brothers. 8adal complained that he was
not afforded due process when, after the Board 5eeting on his case on 5arch 28, 1993 that
resulted in a decision of L86+ @B<?+HM in his fa(or, the )hairman of the BP Board of =egents,
without notice to the petitioner, called another meeting the following day to deliberate on the
)hairman's 5otion for =econsideration, which this time resulted in a decision of L@B<?+H.M
Bpon petition, 8adal was granted his action for mandamus with preliminary in0unction.
ISSUE: .68 8adal was denied due process.
HELD: 8o. <t is gross error to e/uate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice
of the 5arch 29, 1993 B6= meeting. Bni(ersity rules do not re/uire the attendance in B6=
meetings of indi(iduals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. ,t no
time did respondent complain of lac$ of notice gi(en to him to attend any of the regular and
special B6= meetings where his case was up for deliberation. ?et it not be forgotten that
respondent aspires to 0oin the ran$s of professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that
0ustice may pre(ail. 8adal has sufficiently pro(en to ha(e (iolated his underta$ing to di(ulge all
information needed when he applied for the benefits of the *+;,P. Bnli$e in criminal cases
which re/uire proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a 0udgment, in administrati(e or
/uasi90udiciall proceedings, only substantial e(idence is re/uired, that which means a
reasonable mind might accept a rele(ant e(idence as ade/uate to support a conclusion.
PHILCOMSAT vs* Al'(a5
Political Law Delegation of Power Administratie Bodies

FACTS4 By (irtue of =, ##1, Philippine )ommunications *atellite )orporation was granted La
franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the
grantee may select, station or stations and associated e/uipment and facilities for international
satellite communications.M Bnder this franchise, it was li$ewise granted the authority to
Lconstruct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deli(er telecommunications ser(ices
from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals.M Bnder *ec # of the
same law, Phil)om*at was e&empt from the 0urisdiction, control and regulation of the Public
*er(ice )ommission later $nown as the 8ational +elecommunications )ommission. Howe(er,
E6 197 was later proclaimed and the same has placed Phil)om*at under the 0urisdiction of
8+). )onse/uently, Phil)om*at has to ac/uire permit to operate from 8+) in order to continue
operating its e&isting satellites. 8+) ga(e the necessary permit but it howe(er directed
Phil)om*at to reduce its current rates by 1#N. 8+) based its power to fi& the rates on E6 #7.
Phil)om*at assailed the said directi(e and holds that the enabling act DE6 #7E of respondent
8+) empowering it to fi& rates for public ser(ice communications does not pro(ide the
necessary standards constitutionally re/uired hence there is an undue delegation of legislati(e
power, particularly the ad0udicatory powers of 8+). Phil)om*at asserts that nowhere in the
pro(isions of E6 #7, pro(iding for the creation of respondent 8+) and granting its rate9fi&ing
powers, nor of E6 197, placing petitioner under the 0urisdiction of respondent 8+), can it be
inferred that respondent 8+) is guided by any standard in the e&ercise of its rate9fi&ing and
ad0udicatory powers. Phil)om*at subse/uently clarified its said submission to mean that the
order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislati(e but of /uasi9
0udicial power to respondent 8+), the e&ercise of which allegedly re/uires an e&press
conferment by the legislati(e body.
ISSUE: .hether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: ;undamental is the rule that delegation of legislati(e power may be sustained only upon
the ground that some standard for its e&ercise is pro(ided and that the legislature in ma$ing the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the e&ercise of the delegated power. +herefore, when
the administrati(e agency concerned, 8+) in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be
non9confiscatory and must ha(e been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature1
otherwise, in the absence of a fi&ed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. <n case of a delegation of rate9fi&ing power, the only standard which the
legislature is re/uired to prescribe for the guidance of the administrati(e authority is that the rate
be reasonable and 0ust. Howe(er, it has been held that e(en in the absence of an e&press
re/uirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. <n the case at bar, the fi&ed
rate is found to be of merit and reasonable.

ESTRADA VS* SANDIGAN BA8AN
*ubstanti(e due process
FACTS4 Erap assails the constitutionality of the Plunder ?aw D=, "!8! : =, "7#9E, on 3
grounds4 DaE it suffers from the (ice of (agueness1 DbE it dispenses with the Jreasonable doubtJ
standard in criminal prosecutions1 and, DcE it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under RPC, all of which are purportedly clear (iolations of the fundamental
rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. +he Plunder ?aw pro(ides, An! "u#lic officer who$ #! himself or in
conniance with mem#ers of his famil!$ relaties #! affinit! or consanguinit!$ #usiness
associates$ su#ordinates or other "ersons$ amasses$ accumulates or acquires ill%gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as descri#ed in Section & 'd(
hereof$ in the aggregate amount or total alue of at least fift! million "esos 'P)*$***$***+**(
shall #e guilt! of the crime of "lunder and shall #e "unished #! reclusion "er"etua to death+
Erap, howe(er, bewails the failure of the law to pro(ide for the statutory definition of the terms
LcombinationM and LseriesJ in the $ey phrase Ja combination or series of o(ert or criminal actsJ
found in *ec. 1, par. DdE, and *ec. 2, and the word LpatternM in *ec. . +hese omissions,
according to petitioner, render the Plunder ?aw unconstitutional for being impermissibly (ague
and o(erbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence, (iolati(e of his fundamental right to due process.
ISSUE4 .68 the contention of the respondent is (alidA
HELD4 -,?<%.
,s it is written, the Plunder ?aw contains ascertainable standards and well9defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his (iolation. *ection 2 is
sufficiently e&plicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions re/uired or forbidden,
and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. +hus 9
&+ ,hat the offender is a "u#lic officer who acts #! himself or in conniance with mem#ers of his
famil!$ relaties #! affinit! or consanguinit!$ #usiness associates$ su#ordinates or other
"ersons-
.+ ,hat he amassed$ accumulated or acquired ill%gotten wealth through a com#ination or series
of the following oert or criminal acts/ 'a( through misa""ro"riation$ conersion$ misuse$ or
malersation of "u#lic funds or raids on the "u#lic treasur!- '#( #! receiing$ directl! or
indirectl!$ an! commission$ gift$ share$ "ercentage$ 0ic0#ac0 or an! other form of "ecuniar!
#enefits from an! "erson and1or entit! in connection with an! goernment contract or "ro2ect or
#! reason of the office or "osition of the "u#lic officer- 'c( #! the illegal or fraudulent
cone!ance or dis"osition of assets #elonging to the 3ational 4oernment or an! of its
su#diisions$ agencies or instrumentalities of 4oernment owned or controlled cor"orations or
their su#sidiaries- 'd( #! o#taining$ receiing or acce"ting directl! or indirectl! an! shares of
stoc0$ equit! or an! other form of interest or "artici"ation including the "romise of future
em"lo!ment in an! #usiness enter"rise or underta0ing- 'e( #! esta#lishing agricultural$ industrial
or commercial mono"olies or other com#inations and1or im"lementation of decrees and orders
intended to #enefit "articular "ersons or s"ecial interests- or 'f( #! ta0ing adantage of official
"osition$ authorit!$ relationshi"$ connection or influence to un2ustl! enrich himself or themseles
at the e5"ense and to the damage and "re2udice of the 6ili"ino "eo"le and the Re"u#lic of the
Phili""ines- and$
7+ ,hat the aggregate amount or total alue of the ill%gotten wealth amassed$ accumulated or
acquired is at least P)*$***$***+**+
,s long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
sub0ect to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its (alidity will be sustained.
<t must sufficiently guide the 0udge in its application1 the counsel, in defending one charged with
its (iolation1 and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. <ndeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes
is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill9gotten wealth of at least
P#!,!!!,!!!.!! through a series or combination of acts enumerated in *ec. 1, par. DdE, of the
Plunder ?aw. .e discern nothing in the foregoing that is (ague or ambiguous 9 as there is
ob(iously none 9 that will confuse petitioner in his defense. ,lthough sub0ect to proof, these
factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and pro(ide
ade/uate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Bpon such une/ui(ocal
assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to
prepare for an intelligent defense.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
US vs T.i9i
FACTS4 *ometime in the 19!!s, +oribio applied for a license to ha(e his carabao be
slaughtered. His re/uest was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for wor$. He
ne(ertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was e(entually sued
and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law
mandating that one should ac/uire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a (alid e&ercise of
police power.
ISSUE: .hether or not the said law is (alid.
HELD: +he *) ruled against +oribio. +he *) e&plained that it Lis not a ta$ing of the property for
public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a 0ust and legitimate e&ercise of the
power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be
inconsistent with or in0urious to the rights of the public. ,ll property is ac/uired and held under
the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to in0ure the e/ual rights of others or greatly
impair the public rights and interests of the community.
C+(.'+ill : Tait v* Ra;;e.t7
</ P+il* %=> !"#"%&
Police power of the *tate, ?awful *ub0ect of police power
+his is an a""eal from a 0udgment of the )ourt of ;irst <nstance of 5anila. +he case in(ol(es a
dual /uestion one in(ol(ing the power of the court to restrain by in0unction the collection of the
ta& in /uestion and the other relating to the power of the )ollector of <nternal =e(enue to
remo(e any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensi(e to the sight
or is otherwise a nuisance.
+he focus of this digest is to highlight the cases' latter aspect as correlated to the police power
of the *tate.
Fa'ts: ,ppellees, ;rancis ,. )hurchill and *tewart +ait are in(ol(ed in the ad(ertising business,
particularly in billboard ad(ertising. +heir billboards located upon pri(ate lands in the Pro(ince of
=i>al were remo(ed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant )ollector of <nternal
=e(enue by (irtue of the pro(isions of subsection DbE of section 1!! of ,ct 8o. 2339.
,ppellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the )ollector of
<nternal =e(enue to remo(e any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is
offensi(e to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in /uestion Lin
no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health$ morals$ or general welfare
of the communit!$ or of an! "ersons.M %efendant )ollector of <nternal =e(enue a(ers that after
due in(estigation made upon the complaints of the British and @erman )onsuls, the defendant
Ldecided that the billboard complained of was and still offensi(e to the sight and is otherwise a
nuisance.M
Iss(e: .as the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate e&ercise of the police
power of the @o(ernmentA
Hel): +he High )ourt is of the opinion that unsightly ad(ertisements or signs, signboards, or
billboards which are offensi(e to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the
public. +his is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well9 recogni>ed principle to
further application. 5oreo(er, if the police power may be e&ercised to encourage a healthy
social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and con(enience of the people
are included within those sub0ects, e(erything which encroaches upon such
territory is amenable to the police power. 2udgment reersed.
Peple v Fa-a.) G*R* N* L0"/"$/ A(4(st /#? "#%=
;acts4 ;a0ardo was mayor in Baao, )amrines *ur when the municipal council passed the
ordinance that prohibits the construction of a building that bloc$s the (iew of the town pla>a.
5oreo(er, it redirects the grant of permission to the mayor.
,fter his incumbency, ;a0ardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station
near the town pla>a. His re/uest was repeatedly denied. He continued with
the constructionunder the rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was
destroyed by a typhoon.
He was con(icted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing
(iew.
He appealed to the ),, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the /uestion of the
ordinance's constitutionality.
Iss(e: <s the ordinance constitutionalA
Hel): 8o, petition granted.
+he ordinance doesn't state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. <t is an
arbitrary and unlimited conferment.
6rdinances which thus in(est a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which
may be e&ercised in the interest of a fa(ored few, are unreasonable and in(alid. +he ordinance
should ha(e established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. ,ll of the
authorities cited abo(e sustain this conclusion.
+he ordinance is unreasonable and oppressi(e, in that it operates to permanently depri(e
appellants of the right to use their own property1 hence, it o(ersteps the bounds of police power,
and amounts to a ta$ing of appellants property without 0ust compensation.
.hile property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may
eliminate structures offensi(e to the sight, the state may not permanently di(est owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preser(e or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community.
;a0ardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. +o
do this legally, there must be 0ust compensation and they must be gi(en an opportunity to be
heard.
,n ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recogni>ed as a ta$ing of
the property.
+he (alidity was also refuted by the ,dmin )ode which states4
*E). 223. )ertain legislati(e powers of discretionary character. O +he municipal council shall
ha(e authority to e&ercise the following discretionary powers4
& & & & & & & & &
DcE +o establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the $inds of buildings that may be
constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof,
charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less
than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. +he fees
collected under the pro(isions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
*ince, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either
established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the $ind or $inds of buildings to
be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in /uestion, it is clear that
said ordinance was not concei(ed and promulgated under the e&press authority of sec. 223 DcE
MARANA2 HOTEL VS NLRC
?abor *tandards F .or$ing )onditions and =est Periods F <llegal %ismissal
FACTS4 %amalerio was a roomboy for 5aranaw Hotels. 6ne day, he was cleaning the room of
one of the guests when he saw the pri(ate stuff of the guest scattered all o(er the floor. *o he
too$ it upon him to pic$ those up and put in the guest's bag but then when he was doing so the
guest D2amie @laserE entered the room and saw %amalerio's hand inside @laser's bag. @laser
filed a complaint against %amalerio. %amalerio was dismissed subse/uently.
ISSUE: .hether or not %amalerio was illegally dismissed.
HELD4 Hes. ,lthough it was not completely proper for %amalerio to be touching the things of a
hotel guest while cleaning the hotel rooms, personal belongings of hotel guests being off9limits
to roomboys, under the attendant facts and circumstances, that the dismissal of %amalerio was
unwarranted. +o be sure, the in(estigation held by the hotel security people did not unearth
enough e(idence of culpability. <t bears repeating that @laser lost nothing. ,lbeit 5aranaw
Hotels may ha(e reasons to doubt the honesty and trustworthiness of %amalerio, as a result of
what happened, absent sufficient proof of guilt, %amalerio, who is a ran$9and9file employee,
cannot be legally dismissed.
,s for the ser(ice charges recei(ed by 5aranaw Hotels during the period where he was not able
to wor$ he's entitled to the shares therefrom. But if he chooses not to be reinstated by reason of
the estranged relations with the hotel, he's entitled to separation pay but without the shares from
the ser(ice charges anymore.
MAGTA3AS VS* PR8CE PROPERTIES CORP*? INC
@= G 111!9" 2uly 2!, 199 D)onstitutional ?aw F Police Power, 6rdinance, %elegated
?egislati(e PowerE
FACTS4 Petitioners opposed the opening of a casino in )agayan de 6ro and enacted
6rdinance 8o. 33#3, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling e&isting
business permit to establishment for the operation of casino, and 6rdinance 8o. 33"#993,
prohibiting the operation of casino and pro(iding penalty for its (iolation.
=espondents assailed the (alidity of the ordinances on the ground that both (iolated P.%. 1879,
permitting the operation of casinos centrali>ed and regulated by P,@)6=.
Petitioners contend that pursuant to the ?ocal @o(ernment )ode, they ha(e the police power
authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.
ISSUE: .hether or not 6rdinance 8o. 33#3 and 6rdinance 8o. 33"#993 are (alid e&ercise of
police power.
HELD: 8o. +he ordinances (iolate P.%. 1879, which has the character and force of a statute as
well as the public policy e&pressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of
chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. 6rdinances should not contra(ene a
statute because local councils e&ercise only delegated legislati(e powers conferred to them by
)ongress.
Petition is denied.
E!"TA#!A$ATE vs Cit% of !anila
Police Power Due Process Clause
;,)+*4 6n 13 2une 1973, the 5anila 5unicipal Board enacted 6rd "7! and the same was
appro(ed by then acting mayor ,storga. 6rd "7! sought to regulate hotels and motels. <t
classified them into 1
st
class Dta&ed at 7$:yrE and 2
nd
class Dta&ed at .#$:yrE. <t also compelled
hotels:motels to get the demographics of anyone who chec$s in to their rooms. <t compelled
hotels:motels to ha(e wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons.
Ermita95alate impugned the (alidity of the law a(erring that such is oppressi(e, arbitrary and
against due process. +he lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in fa(or of Ermita9
5alate.
ISSUE: .hether or not 6rd "7! is against the due process clause.
HELD: +he *) ruled in fa(or of ,storga. +here is a presumption that the laws enacted by
)ongress Din this case 5un BoardE is (alid. .:o a showing or a strong foundation of in(alidity,
the presumption stays. ,s in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot
pre(ail o(er the presumption. ;urther, the ordinance is a (alid e&ercise of Police Power. +here
is no /uestion but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimi>e certain
practices hurtful to public morals. +his is to minimi>e prostitution. +he increase in ta&es not only
discourages hotels:motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the re(enue
of the lgu concerned. ,nd ta&ation is a (alid e&ercise of police power as well. +he due process
contention is li$ewise untenable, due process has no e&act definition but has reason as a
standard. <n this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down
prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of
the pro(isions of the said ordinance alleged to be (ague.
3MM P.6tin an) Mana4e6ent vs CA
FACTS: %ue to the death of one 5aricris *ioson in 1991, )ory banned the deployment of
performing artists to 2apan and other destinations. +his was rela&ed howe(er with the
introduction of the Entertainment <ndustry ,d(isory )ouncil which later proposed a plan to
P6E, to screen and train performing artists see$ing to go abroad. <n pursuant to the proposal
P6E, and the secretary of %6?E sought a step plan to reali>e the plan which included an
,rtist's =ecord Boo$ which a performing artist must ac/uire prior to being deployed abroad. +he
;ederation of +alent 5anagers of the Philippines assailed the (alidity of the said regulation as it
(iolated the right to tra(el, abridge e&isting contracts and rights and depri(es artists of their
indi(idual rights. 255 inter(ened to bolster the cause of ;E+56P. +he lower court ruled in
fa(or of E<,).
ISSUE: .hether or not the regulation by E<,) is (alid.
HELD: +he *) ruled in fa(or of the lower court. +he regulation is a (alid e&ercise of police
power. Police power concerns go(ernment enactments which precisely interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. ,s the assailed
%epartment 6rder en0oys a presumed (alidity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to
demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ,=B re/uirement, does not enhance the public
welfare or was e&ercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. +he welfare of ;ilipino performing artists,
particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of %epartment 6rder 8o. 3. *hort of a
total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to Lhigh ris$M destinations, a
measure which would only dri(e recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the (ery
least rationali>es the method of screening performing artists by re/uiring reasonable
educational and artistic s$ills from them and limits deployment to only those indi(iduals
ade/uately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. <t cannot
be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for e&ploitation by unscrupulous
indi(iduals and agencies.

YNOT VS IAC
Police Power 3ot 8alidl! E5ercised
FACTS: +here had been an e&isting law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos DE6
727E. +o strengthen the law, 5arcos issued E6 7279, which not only banned the mo(ement of
carabaos from interpro(incial but as well as the mo(ement of carabeef. 6n 13 2an 198, Hnot
was caught transporting 7 carabaos from 5asbate to <loilo. He was then charged in (iolation of
E6 7279,. Hnot a(erred E6 7279, as unconstitutional for it (iolated his right to be heard or his
right to due process. He said that the authority pro(ided by E6 7279, to out rightly confiscate
carabaos e(en without being heard is unconstitutional. +he lower court ruled against Hnot ruling
that the E6 is a (alid e&ercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb
down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: .hether or not the law is (alid.
HELD: +he *) ruled that the E6 is not (alid as it indeed (iolates due process. E6 7279,
created a presumption based on the 0udgment of the e&ecuti(e. +he mo(ement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not mean a subse/uent slaughter of the same would ensue.
Hnot should be gi(en to defend himself and e&plain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. +he *) found that the challenged measure is an in(alid
e&ercise of the police power because the method employed to conser(e the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressi(e. %ue process
is (iolated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. +he conferment on the administrati(e
authorities of the power to ad0udge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on 0udicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. +here is, finally,
also an in(alid delegation of legislati(e powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily ta$en.
AGUSTIN VS EDU
4enerall! Acce"ted Princi"les of International Law Police Power
FACTS: ,gustin is the owner of a -ol$swagen Beetle )ar. He is assailing the (alidity of ?etter
of <nstruction 8o 229 which re/uires all motor (ehicles to ha(e early warning de(ices particularly
to e/uip them with a pair of Lreflectori>ed triangular early warning de(icesM. ,gustin is arguing
that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. )ars
are already e/uipped with blin$ing lights which is already enough to pro(ide warning to other
motorists. ,nd that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectori>ed early warning
de(ices is redundant and would only ma$e manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: .hether or not the said is E6 is (alid.
HELD: *uch early warning de(ice re/uirement is not an e&pensi(e redundancy, nor oppressi(e,
for car owners whose cars are already e/uipped with 1E Pblin$ing9lights in the fore and aft of said
motor (ehicles,' 2E Pbattery9powered blin$ing lights inside motor (ehicles,' 3E Pbuilt9in
reflectori>ed tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor (ehicles,' or E Pwell9lighted two D2E
petroleum lamps Dthe Qin$eE . . . because4 Being uni(ersal among the signatory countries to the
said 1978 -ienna )on(entions, and (isible e(en under ad(erse conditions at a distance of at
least !! meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectori>ed rectangular early warning de(ice installed on the roads, highways or e&pressways,
will conclude, without thin$ing, that somewhere along the tra(elled portion of that road, highway,
or e&pressway, there is a motor (ehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs
or endangers passing traffic. 6n the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned
other built9in warning de(ices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get ade/uate
ad(ance warning because he will still thin$ what that blin$ing light is all about. <s it an
emergency (ehicleA <s it a law enforcement carA <s it an ambulanceA *uch confusion or
uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision.
3* Bala'(it v* CFI !"#==&
Fa'ts: +he 5unicipal Board of Butuan )ity issued 6rdinance 7! to address the complaint of
parents that it is too financially burdensome for them to pay the full admission price for their
children. +he 6rdinance pro(ided that admission tic$ets for mo(ies, public e&hibitions, games,
contests, and other performances, should be sold at half the price for children between " and 12
years of age. -iolators would be penali>ed with imprisonment and:or a fine. Petitioners are
managers of theaters which were affected by ordinance 7!.+hey claim that it (iolates the due
process clause of the constitution since it is4 6ppressi(e, unfair, un0ust Bndue restraint on trade
-iolates the right of persons to enter into contracts
Iss(e: .:8 6rdinance 7! (iolates the due process clause of the constitution
Hel): +he e(ident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of
parents who ha(e to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children. ,
reduction in the price of admissionwould mean corresponding sa(ings for the parents 1 howe(er,
the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these sa(ings. +he ordinance does not
only ma$e the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it li$ewise penali>es them for failure to
comply with it. +he ordinance does not pro(ide a safeguard against this undesirable practice
and as such, the respondent )ity of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be e&hibited by
mo(ie house patrons to pro(e the age of children. +his is, howe(er, not at all practicable. .e
can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressi(e upon the business
of petitioners. ;urther, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion
of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
L* Bennis v* Mi'+i4an !Ma.' 4? "##@&
FACTS: Petitioner co9owns a car which was used, without her $nowledge, by her husband for
an illegal se&ual acti(ity with a prostitute. He was caught and the (ehicle was then forfeited as a
public nuisance.
Petitioner contends that the forfeiture is unfair because it relie(es prosecutors of the burden of
separating a co9owner guilty of an illegal act from the co9owner who happens to be innocent.
ISSUE4.:8 the petitioner's right to due process under the 1th amendment as well as her right
to be compensated for a property ta$en pro(ided for in the #th amendment were (iolated.
HELD: +he court ruled in fa(or of the respondent. +he 1th and #th amendments of the Bnited
*tates )onstitution were not(iolated.
HE?%4 2urisprudence in this case has reinforced the right of the state to confiscate a public
nuisance e(en though the owner or co9owner of the property was innocent. D*ee. Palmyra1
*hip. %obbin's %istillery1 ,lcohol. -an 6ster1 )ar. )alero9+oledo1 Hacht. Qo$$onen1 Hacht.E
;orfeiture by the go(ernment ser(es as a deterrent against criminal acts since it ma$es it an
unprofitable (enture. +here is no (iolation of the1th and #th amendment in this case.
CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT GR NO "/$#=>
FACTS: <n issuing administrati(e order no. !992 Dppa9ao no. !992E, limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year sub0ect to yearly renewal or cancellation on august 12,
1992, respondents united harbour pilots association and the manila pilots association, through
)apt. ,lberto ). )ompas, /uestioned PP,9ao no. !992 on %ecember 23, 1992, the op issued
an order directing the PP, to hold in abeyance the implementation of ppa9ao no. !992
onmarch 1", 1993, the op, through then assistant e&ecuti(e secretary for legal affairs =enato c.
corona, dismissed the appeal:petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier respondents
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and in0unction with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and damages, before branch 7 of the =egional trial court
ISSUE: .on Ppa9,o9!992 <s )onstitutional
HELD: +he court is con(inced that ppa9ao no. !992 was issued in star$ disregard of
respondentsK right against depri(ation of property without due process of law. +he supreme
court said that in order to fall within the aegis of this pro(ision, two conditions must concur,
namely, that there is a depri(ation and that such depri(ation is done without proper obser(ance
of due process. ,s a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental re/uirements of
procedural due process, are essential only when an administrati(e body e&ercises its /uasi9
0udicial function. <n the performance of its e&ecuti(e or legislati(e functions, such as issuing
rules and regulations, an administrati(e body need not comply with the re/uirements of notice
and hearing

+here is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has ta$en on the nature of a property right. <t is
readily apparent that ppa9ao no. !992 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to en0oy their
profession before their compulsory retirement.
Natinal Develp6ent C6pan7 an) NeA A4.iB vs* P+ilippine Vete.ans Ban,
!"#/ SCRA /%$&
FACTS: ,gri& 5ar$eting e&ecuted in fa(or of respondent a real estate mortgage o(er three
parcels of land. ,gri& later on went ban$rupt. <n order to rehabilitate the
company, then President 5arcos issued Presidential %ecree 1"1" which
mandated, among others, the e&tinguishing of all the mortgages and liens attaching to the
property of ,gri&, and creating a )laims )ommittee to
processclaims against the company to be administered mainly by 8%).
=espondent
thereon filed a claim against the company before the )ommittee. Petitionershowe(er filed a
petition with the =+) of )alamba, ?aguna in(o$ing the pro(ision of the law which cancels all
mortgage liens against it. =espondent too$ measures to e&tra0udicially foreclose which the
petitioners opposed by filing another case in the same court. +hese cases were consolidated.
+he =+) held in fa(or of the respondent on the ground of unconstitutionality of the decree1
mainly (iolation of the separation of powers, impairment of obligation of contracts, and (iolation
of the e/ual protection clause. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: is the respondent estopped from /uestioning the constitutionality of the law since they
first abided by it by filing a claim with the )ommitteeA <s P% 1"1" unconstitutionalA
HELD :6n the issue of estoppel, the )ourt held that it could not apply in the present case since
when the respondent filed his claim, President 5arcos was the supreme ruler of the country and
they could not /uestion his acts e(en before the courts because of his absolute power o(er all
go(ernment institutions when he was the President. +he creation of 8ew ,gri& as mandated by
the decree was also ruled as unconstitutional
since it (iolated the prohibition thatthe Batasang PambansaD)ongressE shall not pro(ide for the f
ormation, organi>ation, or regulation of pri(ate corporations unless such corporations are owne
d or controlled by the go(ernment.
P% 1"1" was held as unconstitutional on the other grounds that it was an in(alid e&ercise of
police power, <t had no lawful sub0ect and no lawful method. <t (iolated due process by
e&tinguishing all mortgages and liens and interests which are property rights un0ustly ta$en. <t
also (iolated the e/ual protection clause
bylumping together all secured and unsecured creditors. <t also impaired theobligation of
contracts, e(en though it only in(ol(ed purely pri(ate interests.
ECUAL PROTECTION OF THE LA2
ICHONG VS HERNANDED
Constitutional Law ,reaties 9a! Be Su"erseded #! 9unici"al Laws in the E5ercise of Police
Power
FACTS: ?ao <chong is a )hinese businessman who entered the country to ta$e ad(antage of
business opportunities herein abound DthenE F particularly in the retail business. ;or some time
he and his fellow )hinese businessmen en0oyed a LmonopolyM in the local mar$et in Pasay. Bntil
in 2une 19# when )ongress passed the =, 118! or the =etail +rade 8ationali>ation ,ct the
purpose of which is to reser(e to ;ilipinos the right to engage in the retail business. <chong then
petitioned for the nullification of the said ,ct on the ground that it contra(ened se(eral treaties
concluded by the =P which, according to him, (iolates the e/ual protection clause Dpacta sund
ser(andaE. He said that as a )hinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country
who helps in the income generation of the country he should be gi(en e/ual opportunity.
ISSUE: .hether or not a law may in(alidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
HELD: Hes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. <n this case, there
is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with =, 118!. +he e/ual
protection of the law clause Ldoes not demand absolute e/uality amongst residents1 it merely
re/uires that all persons shall be treated ali$e, under li$e circumstances and conditions both as
to pri(ileges conferred and liabilities enforcedM1 and, that the e/ual protection clause Lis not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies ali$e to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds e&ist for ma$ing a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.M
;or the sa$e of argument, e(en if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an e&ercise of the police power
which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a
treaty. Hence, <chong can no longer assert his right to operate his mar$et stalls in the Pasay
city mar$et.
PEOPLE vs CA8AT
FACTS: )ayat, who was a nati(e of Baguio and a non9)hristian, was imprisoned for (iolation of
,ct 1739, being a member of a non9)hristian tribe, illegally had in his possession one D1E bottle
of ,1 gin, an into&icating li/uor. Bnder ,ct 1739, <t shall be unlawful for any nati(e of the
Philippine <slands who is a member of a non9)hristian tribe to buy, recei(e, ha(e in his
possession, or drin$ any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or into&icating li/uors of any $ind, other
than the so9called nati(e wines and li/uors which the members of such tribes ha(e been
accustomed themsel(es. )ayat challenges the constitutionality of the ,ct on the following
grounds4
o D1E +hat it is discriminatory and denies the e/ual protection of the laws1
o D2E +hat it is (iolati(e of the due process clause of the )onstitution1 and
o D3E +hat it is an improper e&ercise of the police power of the state.
ISSUE4 <s the law in accordance with e/ual protectionA
HELD: HE*. -,?<%. +he guaranty of the e/ual protection of the laws is not (iolated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. ,nd the classification, to be reasonable,
D1E must rest on substantial distinctions1
D2E must be germane to the purposes of the law1
D3E must not be limited to e&isting conditions only1 and
DE must apply e/ually to all members of the same class.
,ct 8o. 1739 satisfies these re/uirements. +he classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. <t is not based upon Jaccident of birth or parentage,J
as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of ci(ili>ation and culture. J+he term
Knon9)hristian tribesK refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and,
more directly, to nati(es of the Philippine <slands of a low grade of ci(ili>ation, usually li(ing in
tribal relationship apart from settled communities.J +his distinction is un/uestionably reasonable,
for the ,ct was intended to meet the peculiar conditions e&isting in the non9)hristian tribes.
+hat it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. +he prohibition Jto buy, recei(e,
ha(e in his possession, or drin$ any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or into&icating li/uors of any
$ind, other than the so9called nati(e wines and li/uors which the members of such tribes ha(e
been accustomed themsel(es to ma$e prior to the passage of this ,ct,J is un/uestionably
designed to insure peace and order in and among the non9)hristian tribes. <t has been the sad
e&perience of the past, as the obser(ations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of
highly into&icating li/uors by the non9)hristian tribes ha(e often resulted in lawlessness and
crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the go(ernment to raise their standard of life and
ci(ili>ation.
+he law is not limited in its application to conditions e&isting at the time of its enactment. <t is
intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions e&ist. +he ,ct was not predicated, as
counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non9)hristians are Jimpermeable to
any ci(ili>ing influence.J 6n the contrary, the ?egislature understood that the ci(ili>ation of a
people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and
security.
;inally, that the ,ct applies e/ually to all members of the class is e(ident from a perusal thereof.
+hat it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non9)hristians by reason of
their degree of culture, is not an argument against the e/uality of its application.
DUMLAO vs COMELEC
:Equal Protection; Eligi#ilit! to <ffice after Being =)
;,)+*4 %umlao was the former go(ernor of 8ue(a -i>caya. He has retired from his office and
he has been recei(ing retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for
the 198! local elections. 6n the other hand, BP #2 was passed Dpar 1 thereofE pro(iding
dis/ualification for the li$es of %umlao. %umlao assailed the BP a(erring that it is class
legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was 0oined by ,tty. <got and *alapantan 2r. +hese
two howe(er ha(e different issues. +he suits of <got and *alapantan are more of a ta&payer's
suit assailing the other pro(isions of BP #2 regarding the term of office of the elected officials,
the length of the campaign and the pro(ision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary in(estigation
would already dis/ualify them from office. <n general, %umlao in(o$ed e/ual protection in the
eye of the law.
ISSUE: .hether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD: +he *) pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would ne(er ha(e
been merged. %umlao's cause is different from <got's. +hey ha(e separate issues. ;urther, this
case does not meet all the re/uisites so that it'd be eligible for 0udicial re(iew. +here are
standards that ha(e to be followed in the e&ercise of the function of 0udicial re(iew, namely4 D1E
the e&istence of an appropriate case1 D2E an interest personal and substantial by the party
raising the constitutional /uestion1 D3E the plea that the function be e&ercised at the earliest
opportunity1 and DE the necessity that the constitutional /uestion be passed upon in order to
decide the case. <n this case, only the 3
rd
re/uisite was met. +he *) ruled howe(er that the
pro(ision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of
complaints against them and after preliminary in(estigation would already dis/ualify them from
office as null and (oid.
+he assertion that *ec of BP #2 is contrary to the safeguard of e/ual protection is neither well
ta$en. +he constitutional guarantee of e/ual protection of the laws is sub0ect to rational
classification. <f the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can
be treated and regulated differently from another class. ;or purposes of public ser(ice,
employees 7# years of age, ha(e been (alidly classified differently from younger employees.
Employees attaining that age are sub0ect to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages
are not so compulsorily retirable.
<n respect of election to pro(incial, city, or municipal positions, to re/uire that candidates should
not be more than 7# years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to e(eryone,
might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the *olicitor @eneral has
intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our
political electi(e echelons. 6n the other hand, it might be that persons more than 7# years old
may also be good electi(e local officials.
=etirement from go(ernment ser(ice may or may not be a reasonable dis/ualification for
electi(e local officials. ;or one thing, there can also be retirees from go(ernment ser(ice at
ages, say below 7#. <t may neither be reasonable to dis/ualify retirees, aged 7#, for a 7#9year
old retiree could be a good local official 0ust li$e one, aged 7#, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 7#9year old electi(e local official D%umaloE, who has retired from a
pro(incial, city or municipal office, there is reason to dis/ualify him from running for the same
office from which he had retired, as pro(ided for in the challenged pro(ision.
Gesae.t v* Clea.7? !"#4=&
Fa'ts: , 5ichigan state law pro(ided that no women could obtain a bartender's license
unless she was the wife or daughter of the male owner.
P.'e)(.al Pst(.e: )hallenged under e/ual protection.
Iss(e: .hether the law (iolates e/ual protection1 i.e. whether women ha(e a
constitutionally protected right to choose to be a bartender.
HELD: 8o.
Reasnin4: R;ran$furterS 5ichigan could ban all women from being bartenders if it
wished. +he )onstitution does not re/uire legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or
shifting social standards, any more than it re/uires them to $eep abreast of the latest
scientific standards. *ince there may be a reasonable and (alid desire in the legislature
to protect female bartenders, the court can not second9guess the legislature and decide
that the real purpose here was for male bartenders to monopoli>e the industry.
VILLEGAS VS* HUI CHIONG TSAI PAO HO
E/ual protection
FACTS: +here was an 6rdinance in 5anila, enacted ma$ing it unlawful for any person not a
citi>en of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any
$ind of trade business or occupation within manila without first securing an employment permit
from the mayor's office.
1. Pao, an employee in 5anila, sought an in0unction to restrain the enforcement of 6rdinance
7#3". He argues that4
a. ,s a re(enue measure, the measure imposed on aliens is discriminatory and
(iolati(e of the rule on uniformity of ta&ation.
b. ,s a police power measure, it ma$es no distinction between useful and non9useful
occupations, imposing a fi&ed P#!.!! employment permit, and that it fails to
prescribe any standard to guide or limit the action of the 5ayor
c. <t is arbitrary, oppressi(e and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens, thereby
(iolati(e of e/ual protection clause.
ISSUE4 does it (iolate e/ual protection clauseA
HELD4 HE*.
+he P#!.!! fee is unreasonable not only because it is e&cessi(e but because it fails to consider
(alid substantial differences in situation among indi(idual aliens who are re/uired to pay it.
,lthough the e/ual protection clause of the )onstitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperati(e that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences ha(ing a
reasonable relation to the sub0ect of the particular legislation. +he same amount of P#!.!! is
being collected from e(ery employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full
time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid e&ecuti(e.
+he ordinance in /uestion (iolates the due process of law and e/ual protection rule of the
)onstitution. =e/uiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the )ity 5ayor
of 5anila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the
people in the Philippines to engage in a means of li(elihood. .hile it is true that the Philippines
as a *tate is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot
be depri(ed of life without due process of law. +his guarantee includes the means of li(elihood.
+he shelter of protection under the due process and e/ual protection clause is gi(en to all
persons, both aliens and citi>ens.
6rdinance 8o. 7#3" does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the 5ayor in the
e&ercise of his discretion. <t has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to
state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayorKs action, e&presses no
purpose to be attained by re/uiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal,
and entirely lac$s standard, thus conferring upon the 5ayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is in(alid, being an undefined
and unlimited delegation of power to allow or pre(ent an acti(ity per se lawful.
ORMOC SUGAR VS* TREASURER
E/ual protection
FACTS4 +he municipal Board of 6rmoc )ity, enacted an 6rdinance G, imposing on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the 6rmoc *ugar )ompany, <nc., in 6rmoc )ity a
municipal ta& e/ui(alent to one per centum D1NE 6rmoc *ugar )ompany, <nc. filed a complaint
against the )ity of 6rmoc as well as its +reasurer, 5unicipal Board and 5ayor, alleging that the
ordinance is unconstitutional for being (iolati(e of the e/ual protection clause.
ISSUE4 <s the ordinance (alidA %oes it comply with e/ual protectionA
HELD4 86. .e ruled that the e/ual protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the sub0ect of legislation, and
a classification is reasonable where
D1E it is based on substantial distinctions which ma$e real differences1
D2E these are germane to the purpose of the law1
D3E the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which
are substantially identical to those of the present1
DE the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
, perusal of the re/uisites instantly shows that the /uestioned ordinance does not meet them,
for it ta&es only centrifugal sugar produced and e&ported by the 6rmoc *ugar )ompany, <nc.
and none other. ,t the time of the ta&ing ordinanceKs enactment, 6rmoc *ugar )ompany, <nc., it
is true, was the only sugar central in the city of 6rmoc. *till, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. +he ta&ing ordinance should not be
singular and e&clusi(e as to e&clude any subse/uently established sugar central, of the same
class as plaintiff, from the co(erage of the ta&. ,s it is now, e(en if later a similar company is set
up, it cannot be sub0ect to the ta& because the ordinance e&pressly points only to 6rmoc *ugar
)ompany, <nc. as the entity to be le(ied upon.
HIMAGAN vs PEOPLE
Equal Protection; Sus"ension of P3P 9em#ers Charged with 4rae 6elonies
FACTS4 Himagan is a policeman assigned in )amp )atititgan, %a(ao )ity. He was charged for
the murder of Ben0amin 5achitar 2r and for the attempted murder of Ben0amin's younger
brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to *ec " of =, 79"#, Himagan was placed into suspension
pending the murder case. +he law pro(ides that LBpon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the P8P for gra(e felonies where the
penalty imposed by law is si& D7E years and one D1E day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. *uch case shall be sub0ect to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety D9!E days from arraignment of the
accused. Himagan assailed the suspension a(erring that *ec 2 of P% 8!" of the )i(il *er(ice
%ecree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety D9!E days. He claims that an imposition
of pre(enti(e suspension of o(er 9! days is contrary to the )i(il *er(ice ?aw and would be a
(iolation of his constitutional right to e/ual protection of laws.
ISSUE: .hether or not *ec ", =, 79"# (iolates e/ual protection guaranteed by the
)onstitution.
HELD: +he language of the first sentence of *ec " of =, 79"# is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. <t gi(es no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the
P8P charged with gra(e offense where the penalty is si& years and one day or more shall last
until the termination of the case. +he suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the
case. +he second sentence of the same *ection pro(iding that the trial must be terminated
within ninety D9!E days from arraignment does not /ualify or limit the first sentence. +he two can
stand independently of each other. +he first refers to the period of suspension. +he second
deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.
+he reason why members of the P8P are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administrati(ely insofar as the application of the rule on pre(enti(e
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can
be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislati(e discussions.
<f a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post
while his case is pending, his (ictim and the witnesses against him are ob(iously e&posed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
and armed. the imposition of pre(enti(e suspension for o(er 9! days under *ec " of =, 79"#
does not (iolate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to e/ual protection of the laws.

*uppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension
of accused be liftedA
+he answer is certainly no. .hile the law uses the mandatory word LshallM before the phrase Lbe
terminated within ninety D9!E daysM, there is nothing in =, 79"# that suggests that the
pre(enti(e suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period.
8onetheless, the 2udge who fails to decide the case within the period without 0ustifiable reason
may be sub0ect to administrati(e sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so
warrant, to criminal or ci(il liability. <f the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the
accused such that he is depri(ed of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He
may as$ for the dismissal of the case. *hould the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused
can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas
corpus.
Tele'66(ni'atins An) B.a)'ast Att.ne7s O; T+e P+ils* Vs* COMELEC
/=# SCRA <<$
G*R* N* "</#//
Ap.il /"? "##=
Fa'ts: Petitioner +elecommunications and Broadcast ,ttorneys of the Philippines, <nc.
D+E?EB,PE is an organi>ation of lawyers of radio and tele(ision broadcasting companies. <t was
declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not
able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened in0ury as a result of the sub0ect law.
Petitioner @5, 8etwor$, on the other hand, had the re/uisite standing to bring the constitutional
challenge. Petitioner operates radio and tele(ision broadcast stations in thePhilippines affected
by the enforcement of *ection 92, B.P. 8o. 881.
Petitioners challenge the (alidity of *ection 92, B.P. 8o. 881 which pro(ides4
L)omelec +ime9 +he )ommission shall procure radio and tele(ision time to be $nown as the
L)omelec +imeM which shall be allocated e/ually and impartially among the candidates within
the area of co(erage of all radio and tele(ision stations. ;or this purpose, the franchise of all
radio broadcasting and tele(ision stations are hereby amended so as to pro(ide radio or
tele(ision time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.M
Petitioner contends that while *ection 9! of the same law re/uires )65E?E) to procure print
space in newspapers and maga>ines with payment, *ection 92 pro(ides that air time shall be
procured by )65E?E) free of charge. +hus it contends that *ection 92 singles out radio and
tele(ision stations to pro(ide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to se(eral million pesos in pro(iding )65E?E)
+ime in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 199# senatorial election and that it
stands to suffer e(en more should it be re/uired to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that
the primary source of re(enue of the radio and tele(ision stations is the sale of air time to
ad(ertisers and to re/uire these stations to pro(ide free air time is to authori>e un0ust ta$ing of
pri(ate property. ,ccording to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,98,#7!.!! in pro(iding free air
time for one hour each day and, in this year's elections, it stands to lost P#8,98!,8#!.!! in (iew
of )65E?E)'s re/uirement that it pro(ide at least 3! minutes of prime time daily for such.
Iss(e: .hether of not *ection 92 of B.P. 8o. 881 denies radio and tele(ision broadcast
companies the e/ual protection of the laws.
.hether or not *ection 92 of B.P. 8o. 881 constitutes ta$ing of property without due process of
law and without 0ust compensation.
Hel): Petitioner's argument is without merit. ,ll broadcasting, whether radio or by tele(ision
stations, is licensed by the go(ernment. ,irwa(e fre/uencies ha(e to be allocated as there are
more indi(iduals who want to broadcast that there are fre/uencies to assign. =adio and
tele(ision broadcasting companies, which are gi(en franchises, do not own the airwa(es and
fre/uencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. +hey are merely gi(en
the temporary pri(ilege to use them. +hus, such e&ercise of the pri(ilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public ser(ice. <n granting the
pri(ilege to operate broadcast stations and super(ising radio and tele(ision stations, the state
spends considerable public funds in licensing and super(ising them.
+he argument that the sub0ect law singles out radio and tele(ision stations to pro(ide free air
time as against newspapers and maga>ines which re/uire payment of 0ust compensation for the
print space they may pro(ide is li$ewise without merit. =egulation of the broadcast industry
re/uires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. +o re/uire the
broadcast industry to pro(ide free air time for )65E?E) is a fair e&change for what the
industry gets.
,s radio and tele(ision broadcast stations do not own the airwa(es, no pri(ate property is ta$en
by the re/uirement that they pro(ide air time to the )65E?E).
ALMONTE VS VASCUED
@.=. 8o. 93#7", 5ay 23 199#
Petitioners4 8erio =ogado, )hief ,ccountant1 Elisa =i(era, )hief of the =ecords1 2ose +.
,lmonte, E<<B )ommissioner1 -illamor Pere>, Budget and ;iscal 5anagement %i(ision
)hief1 Res"ondent/ Honorable )onrado 5. -as/ue>
;,)+*4 6mbudsman -as/ue> re/uired =ogado and =i(era of Economic <ntelligence and
<n(estigation Bureau DE<<BE to produce all documents relating to Personal *er(ice ;unds yr.
1988 and all e(idence for the whole plantilla of E<<B for 1988. +he subpoena duces tecum was
issued in connection with the in(estigation of funds representing sa(ings from unfilled positions
in the E<<B which were legally disbursed. ,lmonte and Pere> denied the anomalous acti(ities
that circulate around the E<<B office. +hey mo(ed to /uash the subpoena duces tecum. +hey
claim pri(ilege of an agency of the @o(ernment.
ISSUE: .hether or not an 6mbudsman can oblige the petitioners by (irtue of subpoena duces
tecum to pro(ide documents relating to personal ser(ice and salary (ouchers of E<<B employers.
HELD4 Hes. , go(ernment pri(ilege against disclosure is recogni>ed with respect to state
secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. +his pri(ilege is based upon public
interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the indi(idual interests of
a pri(ate citi>en, e(en though, as a conse/uence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal
rights.
<n the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the E<<B. E<<BKs function is the gathering and
e(aluation of intelligence reports and information regarding Jillegal acti(ities affecting the
national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, ta& e(asion,
dollar salting.J )onse/uently while in cases which in(ol(e state secrets it may be sufficient to
determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
e(idence will e&pose military matters without compelling production, no similar e&cuse can be
made for pri(ilege resting on other considerations.
TUI vs CA
FACTS: Petitioners assail the ), decision and resolution that upheld the constitutionality and
(alidity of E6 9"9,, according to which the grant and en0oyment of the ta& and duty incenti(es
authori>ed under =, "22" DL,n ,ct ,ccelerating the )on(ersion of 5ilitary =eser(ations <nto
6ther Producti(e Bses, )reating the Bases )on(ersion and %e(elopment ,uthority for this
Purpose, Pro(iding ;unds +herefor and for 6ther PurposesME were limited to the business
enterprises and residents within the fenced9in area of the *ubic *pecial Economic Tone
D**ETE.
=espondent )ourt held that Lthere is no substantial difference between the pro(isions of E6 9"9
, and *ection 12 of =, "22". <n both, the P*ecured ,rea' is precise and well9defined as P. . . the
lands occupied by the *ubic 8a(al Base and its contiguous e&tensions as embraced, co(ered
and defined by the 19" 5ilitary Bases ,greement between the Philippines and the Bnited
*tates of ,merica, as amended . . .'M +he appellate court concluded that such being the case,
petitioners could not claim that E6 9"9, is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining
the (alidity of =, "22".
+he court a quo also e&plained that the intention of )ongress was to confine the co(erage of the
**ET to the Lsecured areaM and not to include the Lentire 6longapo )ity and other areas
mentioned in *ection 12 of the law.M
+he )ourt of ,ppeals further 0ustified the limited application of the ta& incenti(es as being within
the prerogati(e of the legislature, pursuant to its La(owed purpose Rof ser(ingS some public
benefit or interest.M <t ruled that LE6 9"9, merely implements the legislati(e purpose of R=,
"22"S.M
%isagreeing, petitioners now see$ before us a re(iew of the aforecited )ourt of ,ppeals
%ecision and =esolution.
ISSUE: .:8 E6 3"9, is constitutional
HELD: HE*. *aid 6rder is not (iolati(e of the e/ual protection clause1 neither is it
discriminatory. +here are real and substanti(e distinctions between the circumstances obtaining
inside and those outside the *ubic 8a(al Base, thereby 0ustifying a (alid and reasonable
classification.
)lassification, to be (alid, must D1E rest on substantial distinctions, D2E begermane to the
purpose of the law, D3E not be limited to e&isting conditions only, and DE apply e/ually to all
members of the same class.
.e belie(e it was reasonable for the President to ha(e delimited the application of some
incenti(es to the confines of the former *ubic military base. <t is this specific area which the
go(ernment intends to transform and de(elop from itsstatus quo ante as an abandoned na(al
facility into a self9sustaining industrial and commercial >one, particularly for big foreign and local
in(estors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries. +he classification is,
therefore, germane to the purposes of the law.
)ertainly, there are substantial differences between the big in(estors who are being lured to
establish and operate their industries in the so9called Lsecured areaM and the present business
operators outside the area. 6n the one hand, we are tal$ing of billion9peso in(estments and
thousands of new, 0obs. 6n the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. <n the first, the
economic impact will be national1 in the second, only local.
<t is well9settled that the e/ual9protection guarantee does not re/uire territorial uniformity
of laws.,s long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no
(iolation of the constitutional clause. ,nd of course, anyone, including the petitioners,
possessing the re/uisite in(estment capital can always a(ail of the same benefits by channelling
his or her resources or business operations into the fenced9off free port >one.
?astly, the classification applies e/ually to all the resident indi(iduals and businesses within the
Lsecured area.M +he residents, being in li$e circumstances or contributing directly to the
achie(ement of the end purpose of the law, are not categori>ed further. <nstead, they are all
similarly treated, both in pri(ileges granted and in obligations re/uired. Petition %E8<E%.
PEOPLE V 3ALOS3OS
;eb. 3, 2!!!
FACTS: +he accused9appellant, =omeo 2alos0os, is a full9fledged member of )ongress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his con(iction for statutory rape and acts of
lasci(iousness is pending appeal. +he accused9appellant filed a motion as$ing that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a )ongressman, including attendance at legislati(e
sessions and committee meetings despite his ha(ing been con(icted in the first instance of a
non9bailable offense on the basis of popular so(ereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented
ISSUE: .hether or not accused9appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member
of House of =epresentati(es
HELD: Election is the e&pression of the so(ereign power of the people. Howe(er, inspite of its
importance, the pri(ileges and rights arising from ha(ing been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
+he immunity from arrest or detention of *enators and members of the House of
=epresentati(es arises from a pro(ision of the )onstitution. +he pri(ilege has always been
granted in a restricti(e sense. +he pro(ision granting an e&emption as a special pri(ilege cannot
be e&tended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. <t may not be e&tended by intendment,
implication or e/uitable considerations.
+he accused9appellant has not gi(en any reason why he should be e&empted from the
operation of *ec. 11, ,rt. -< of the )onstitution. +he members of )ongress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. +he
confinement of a )ongressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
si& years is not merely authori>ed by law, it has constitutional foundations. +o allow accused9
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for # days or more in a
wee$ will (irtually ma$e him a free man with all the pri(ileges appurtenant to his position. *uch
an aberrant situation not only ele(ates accused9appellant's status to that of a special class, it
also would be a moc$ery of the purposes of the correction system.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES?
plainti;;0appellee
vs* CAROL M* DELA PIEDRA?
a''(se)0appellant
G*R* N* "/"$$$
!<%> SCRA "@<&
FACTS: 6n the afternoon of 2anuary 3!, 199, 5aria ?ourdes 5odesto and 8ancy
,raneta together with her friends 2ennelyn Bae>, and *andra ,/uino went to the house of
2asmine ,le0andro, after ha(ing learned that a woman is there to recruit 0ob applicants
for *ingapore. )arol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arri(ed. 2asmine,
on the other hand, welcomed and as$ed them to sit
down. +hey listened to the LrecruiterM who was then tal$ing about thebrea$down of the fees
in(ol(ed4 P3!,!!! for the (isa and the round trip tic$et, and P#,!!! as placement fee and for the
processing of the papers. +he initial payment was P2,!!!, while P3!,!!! will be by salary
deduction. +he recruiter said that she was LrecruitingM nurses for *ingapore. ,raneta, her friends
and ?ourdes then filled up bio9data forms and were re/uired to submit pictures and a transcript
of records. ,fter the inter(iew, ?ourdes ga(e the initial payment of P2,!!! to 2asmine, who
assured her that she was authori>ed to recei(e the money. 5eanwhile, in the morning of the
said date, Erlie =amos, ,ttorney << of the Philippine 6(erseas Employment ,gency DP6E,E,
recei(ed a telephone call
froman unidentified woman in/uiring about the legitimacy of the recruitmentconducted by a
certain 5rs. )arol ;igueroa.

=amos, whose duties include the sur(eillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately
contacted a friend, acertain 5ayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the
recruitment was reportedly being underta$en
.
Bpon arri(ing at the reported area at around 4!! p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and
pretended to be an applicant. =amos remained outside and stood on the pa(ement, from where
he was able to see around si& D7E persons in the sala. =amos e(en heard a woman, identified
as )arol ;igueroa, tal$ about the possible employment she has to pro(ide in *ingapore and the
documents that the applicants ha(e to comply with. ;ifteen D1#E minutes later, Bellotindos came
out with a bio9data form in hand. +hereafter, =amos conferred with a certain )apt. 5endo>a of
the )riminal <n(estigation *er(ice D)<*E to organi>e the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. ,
sur(eillance team was then organi>ed to confirm the report. ,fter which, afraid was
e&ecuted.)onse/uently, )arol was charged and con(icted by the trial court of illegal
recruitment.
Bpon appeal, accused /uestions her con(iction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails,
as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penali>ing said crime
ISSUES: D1E .hether or not sec. 13 DbE of P.%. 2, as amended, otherwise $nown as the
illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it (iolates the due process clause.
D2E .hether or not accused was denied e/ual protection and therefore should be e&culpated
HE?%4
D1E ;or the ;irst issue, dela Piedra submits that ,rticle 13 DbE of the ?abor )ode defining
Lrecruitment and placementM is (oid for (agueness and, thus, (iolates the due process clause.
%ue process re/uires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently e&plicit to inform
those who are sub0ect to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.<n
support of her submission, dela Piedra in(o$es People (s. Panis, where the *upreme )ourt
Lcritici>edM the definition of Lrecruitment and placement.M +he )ourt ruled, howe(er, that her
reliance on the said case was misplaced. +he issue in Panis was whether, under the pro(iso of
,rticle 13 DbE, the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only Lwhene(er two or more
persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.M <n this case,
the )ourt merely bemoaned the lac$ of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the
pro(iso. +he absence
of such records notwithstanding, the )ourt was able to arri(e at areasonable interpretation of
the pro(iso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of
the law itself. *ection 13DbE, therefore, is not a Lperfectly (ague actM whose obscurity is e(ident
on its face. <f at all, the pro(iso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that
was sal(aged by proper construction. <t is not (oid for (agueness.
Dela Pie).a ;(.t+e. a.4(es t+at t+e a'ts t+at 'nstit(teE.e'.(it6ent an) pla'e6entF
s(;;e. ;.6 ve. 9.ea)t+ sin'e 97 6e.el7 E.e;e..in4F a pe.sn ;. e6pl76ent? a pe.sn
6a7 9e 'nvi'te) ; ille4al .e'.(it6ent*
+hat *ection 13 DbE encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and
harmless acts such as Llabor or employment referralMDLreferringM an applicant, according to
appellant, for employment to
aprospecti(e employerE does not render the law o(erbroad. E(idently, %ela Piedra
misapprehends concept of o(er breadth. , statute may be said to be o(erbroad where it
operates to inhibit
thee&ercise of indi(idual freedoms affirmati(ely guaranteed by the)onstitution, such as the free
dom of speech or religion. , generallyworded statute, when construed to punish conduct which
cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally (ague to the e&tent that
itfails to gi(e ade/uate warning of the boundary between theconstitutionally permissible and the
constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.
D2EAnent t+e se'n) iss(e? Dela Pie).a inv,es t+e eG(alp.te'tin 'la(se in +e. )e;ense
*
*he points out that although thee(idence purportedly shows that 2asmine ,le0andro handed out
applicationforms and e(en recei(ed ?ourdes 5odesto's payment, appellant was the
onlyone criminally charged. ,le0andro, on the other hand, remained scot9free.;rom this, she
concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional
origins. ,ppellant is a )ebuana while ,le0andro is a TamboangueUa, and the alleged crime too$
place in Tamboanga )ity. +he *upreme )ourt held that the argument has no merit. +he
prosecution of one guilty person while others e/ually guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a
denial of the e/ual protection of the laws. +he unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair
on its face, resulting in its une/ual application to those who are entitled to be treated ali$e, is not
a denial of e/ual protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or
purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be
a showing of Lclear and intentional discrimination.M<n the case at bar, %ela Piedra has failed to
show that, in charging her, there was a Lclear and intentional discriminationM on the part of the
prosecuting officials.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF MANILA vs CUISUMBING
FACTS: +he pri(ate respondent, <nternational *chool, <nc. pursuant to Presidential %ecree "32,
is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents.
+he school grants foreign9hires certain benefits not accorded to local hires. +hese include
housing, transportation, shipping costs, ta&es, and home lea(e tra(el allowance. ;oreign hires
are also paid a salary rate twenty9fi(e percent D2#NE more than local hires. +he *chool 0ustifies
the difference on two Lsignificant economic disad(antagesM foreign9hires ha(e to endure, namely
DaE the Ldislocation factorM and DbE limited tenure.
+he compensation scheme is simply the *chool's adapti(e measure to remain competiti(e on
an international le(el in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international
education.
?ocal hires filed a petition claiming that point9of9hire classification employed by the *chool is
discriminatory to ;ilipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign9hires constitutes racial
discrimination.
ISSUE: .hether or not the *chool's system of compensation is (iolati(e of the principle of
Le/ual pay for e/ual wor$M
HELD4 %iscrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the ?abor )ode. ,rticle
13#, for e&ample, prohibits and penali>es the payment of lesser compensation to female
employees as against a male employee for wor$ of e/ual (alue. ,rt. 28 declares it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in an labor organi>ation.
Persons who wor$ with substantially e/ual /ualifications, s$ill, effort and responsibility, under
similar conditions, should paid similar salaries. <f an employer accords employees the same
position and ran$, the presumption is that these employees perform e/ual wor$. +his
presumption is borne by logic and human e&perience. <f the employer has discriminated against
an employee, it is for the employer to e&plain why the employee is treated unfairly.
+he employer in this case had failed to do so. +here is no e(idence here that foreign9hires
perform 2#N more efficiently or effecti(ely than local9hires. Both groups ha(e similar functions
and responsibilities, which they perform under similar wor$ing conditions.

Cent.al Ban, E6pl7ees Ass'iatin In'* vs* Ban4, Sent.al n4 Pilipinas !GR"4=/>=? "%
De'e69e. />>4&Cent.al Ban, E6pl7ees Ass'iatin In'* vs* Ban4, Sent.al n4
PilipinasHGR "4=/>=? "% De'e69e. />>4IEn Ban'? P(n !3&:
Fa'ts: 6n 3 2uly 1993, =, "7#3 Dthe 8ew )entral Ban$ ,ctE too$ effect. <t abolished the old
)entral Ban$ of the Philippines, and created a new B*P. 6n 8 2une 2!!1, almost 8 years after
the effecti(ity of =, "7#3, the )entral Ban$ Dnow B*PE Employees ,ssociation, <nc., filed a
petition for prohibition against B*P and the E&ecuti(e *ecretary of the 6ffice of the President, to
restrain the Bang$o *entral ng Pilipinas and the E&ecuti(e *ecretary from further implementing
the last pro(iso in *ection 1#DcE, ,rticle << of =, "7#3, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
,rticle <<,*ection 1#DcE of =, "7#3 DE&ercise of ,uthorityE pro(ides that J<n the e&ercise of its
authority, the 5onetary Board shall ... DcE establish a human resource management system
which shall go(ern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all
personnel. *uch system shall aim to establish professionalism and e&cellence at all le(els of
the Bang$o *entral in accordance with sound principles of management. , compensation
structure, based on 0ob e(aluation studies and wage sur(eys and sub0ect to the
BoardVs appro(al, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bang$o *entralVs human
resource de(elopment program4 Pro(ided, +hat the 5onetary Board shall ma$e its own system
conform as closely as possible with the principles pro(ided for under =epublic ,ct 8o. 7"#8
R*alary *tandardi>ation ,ctS. Pro(ided, howe(er, +hat compensation and wage structure
of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with
the rates prescribed under =epublic ,ct 8o. 7"#8.J +he ,ssociation alleges that the pro(iso
ma$es an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the B*P, (i>4 D1E the B*P
officers or those e&empted from the co(erage of the *alary *tandardi>ation ?aw D**?E De&empt
classE1 and D2E the ran$9and9fileD*alary @rade R*@S 19 and belowE, or those not e&empted from
the co(erage of the **? Dnon9e&empt classE. <t is contended that this classification is Wa classic
case of class legislation,X allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which ma$e real
differences, but solely on the *@ of the B*P personnel's position.
Iss(e4 .hether the ran$9and9file employees of the B*P are unduly discriminated upon by
e&empting B*P officers D*@ 2! and abo(eE from the *alary *tandardi>ation ?aw.
Hel)4 )ongress is allowed a wide leeway in pro(iding for a (alid classification. +he e/ual
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within
a specified class. <f the groupings are characteri>ed by