Pergamon

Technology In Society, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 225-241. 1994

Copyright 0 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd
Printed in the USA. All rights reserved
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0160-791X(94)E0002-T
Culture and the Development of
Technology in J apan
Arunoday Saha
ABSTRACT Traditional J apanese culture has had a marked impact on that
countrys initial absorption and later development of Western technology. The
development of J apanese machinery and processes is traced from the Meiji
Restoration to the present. The relations to technology of the three components of
indigenous J apanese culture - Zen Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shintoism -
are discussed. Zen has fostered such mental qualities as preference for self-
reliance, the direct approach, and a willingness to work hard and to sacrifice
comforts. Confucianism emphasizes learning and group harmony. Shintoism
encourages the open acceptance of sensual gratification. I t is argued that these
values have shaped the course of modern technology in J apan, a course that both
advanced and developing countries can learn from.
I ntroduction
When examining the phenomenon of technological development in a
society, the concept of culture must be considered. This is especially true
when examining Asian and African countries, the technologies of which
are mostly borrowed from the West. I n these predominantly recipient
nations, preexistent values, beliefs, and institutions impede or, in a few
cases, encourage the adoption of imported machinery and processes.
Therefore, the socio-cultural milieu within which technology operates
assumes considerable importance. 1 I n addition, the introduction of new
Arunoday Saha is currently a professor at the S.P. J ain I nstitute of
Management and Research. He teaches technology management and operations
management to postgraduate students. Saha received a bachelors o!egree and
masters degree in engineering, and a Ph.D. degree in industrial engineering
and management. He has 20 years of teaching and research experience,
including one year as visiting faculty at the Virginia Polytechnic Znsititute and
State University, and three months as visiting faculty at the University of
Leeds. Saha has written 20papers in various international journals.
225
226 A. Saha
hardware gives rise to societal changes that in turn influence the
assimilation of technology; the issues involved can be understood best
when studied from a different angle, one in which culture rather than
technology forms the primary category.2
The term culture has a wide variety of meanings. I n the present paper,
I subscribe to the anthropological definition of culture in its broadest
sense: the way of life of a social group.3 Culture, according to this
perspective, is a complex whole that includes ideas, the framework of
norms, and tools and techniques. A combination of these three
parameters forms a total system different from other systems, even if
both have elements in common. These three categories are by no means
exclusive, but interact with one another. Particularly, philosophy or
ideology underlies both norms and technology. This viewpoint is
supported by the fact that modern machinery and processes are derived
from the principles of rational science and experimental methods, both
dominant ideologies of the present-day West. Thus, technology
constitutes a component of culture and is not really separate from social
forces, and the process of technological change may be viewed as a part
of cultural change.
Though a manifestation of ideology, technology possesses an
important distinguishing characteristic. Originating in one culture, it
can be transferred to another social context more easily than beliefs
and behavioral norms can, because technological products are
completely and unambiguously formulated. For example, a motor car,
which represents the manifestation of a range of highly developed
scientific ideas, remains the same in all parts of the world, irrespective
of social systems. However, technological processes, which lie at the
interface between materials and norms, fall into a slightly different
category. Maintenance and operating procedures, being partly in the
nature of norms, are less completely expressed and, consequently, less
easily transferred.
Since culture, as previously noted, is a system, its components maintain
an overall homeostasis, though dissonance may be present to a greater or
lesser degree, and a disturbance in any part of the system produces
repercussions in other parts. I n modern Western societies, the rapid rate
of technological innovation introduces strains. Since institutions and
ideas do not change quickly, a period of incongruity occurs before they
adjust to altered physical circumstances. This phenomenon, in which
changes in other societal parameters trail technological transformations,
has been termed cultural lag by W. F. Ogburn.4
I t may be further postulated that the congruence between prevalent
values and norms and the introduced technologies provides a favorable
environment for the latters efficient functioning and progress. I n the
case of technology transfers from the West to developing countries, the
variance between the ideological and normative elements and the
processes transferred is often considerable. The cultural lag, if this it can
Culture and the Development of Exhnology in J apan 227
be called, may never be overcome if traditional patterns continue to be
stubbornly held, resulting in an almost permanent state of mismatch
that reduces the efficiency of technology absorption.
Contrary to the trend in most non-Western nations, preexistent
cultural structures in J apan have been congenial to borrowed equipment
and processes. I n many cases, they have been consciously molded to suit
the needs of industrialization. Three components of J apanese tradition
that have relevance to modern machinery and techniques are
Confucianism, Zen Buddhism, and Shintoism. Each of these has
contributed to the growth of certain individual and societal traits that
have affected the course of technological development in J apan.
Self-Reliance and the Direct Approach
Until recently, J apan had been like any other Third World country: I t
borrowed technology from the West. But unlike most developing nations,
which settle into a relationship of permanent dependence,5 the
J apanese, from the time they became aware of the superiority of Western
technology and were convinced of the necessity to learn it, have opted for
the more difficult approach of attaining self-reliance. Since the Meiji
Restoration of 1868, which marked the beginning of massive
industrialization efforts, the J apanese have steadfastly followed a policy
of mastering foreign technologies quickly, then dispensing with the
tutelage. Valentine Chirol wrote at the turn of the century: At first they
no doubt applied themselves merely to copy the products of European
industry, and, as with all beginners, their first attempts were often
clumsy and imperfect, but with unswerving tenacity of purpose, they
kept on plodding away until they had in most cases remedied their
defects and in some even improved upon their models.6 When the
J apanese government bought its first J acquard loom, it engaged
craftsmen to dismantle and reassemble the machine time after time
until they developed a full understanding of the technology behind it.
The craftsmen were then directed to substitute some of the metal parts
for wooden ones.
The flow of scientific and technological knowledge from Europe and the
United States came to a halt after the J apanese suffered some political
adventures in Asia in the early 1930s. This forced the country to become
technologically self-reliant. Massive investment in research and
development (R&D) followed, and factories were soon turning out guns,
tanks, ships, and airplanes capable of challenging the military might of
even the most industrially advanced nation. The experience gained in
producing military hardware benefited the production of civilian
technologies later on. For example, experience gained in the construction
of lenses for field guns and tanks was subsequently used to manufacture
high-quality cameras.
228 A. Saha
Nevertheless, after the wars devastation, the J apanese felt it
necessary to borrow technology extensively from the West. During the
two decades after 1945, the J apanese bought the bulk of a wide spectrum
of new knowledge produced abroad and paid for it in royalties, outright
purchases, and equity participation. But the contracts usually ended
soon after local technicians had mastered all of the patented processes.
J apanese companies then began to invest in R&D to improve production
and product designs; innovations were mostly dictated by the need to
reduce costs and improve quality and marketability. Successes in these
fields gave J apanese firms an edge in international competition. Since
the mid 198Os, the J apanese have directed R&D resources toward
invention and discovery of new products and processes because they
have learned all that they could from the West. Thus, it may be said that
the century-old J apanese quest for technological self-reliance has
reached a successful conclusion.
J apanese manufacturers devote considerable amounts of energy to the
assimilation of tools and techniques produced outside of their
organizations. The underlying conviction is that the mere purchase and
use of machinery hampers progress, since the procured technology
remains frozen, a foreign thing7 that does not become an integral part
of the organization. Most large J apanese firms believe that to develop
ongoing technologies, they should develop the basics themselves. Over
half of the production equipment used by an average J apanese
manufacturer is designed and built by its own engineers and machinists,
a measure that usually costs less because safety margins incorporated
into general-use machines can be eliminated. Moreover, purchased
equipment is extensively modified to meet specific needs (e.g., extra
gadgets may be fitted to stop the machine the moment a defective part is
produced). To a typical manufacturing company in the West, the idea of
making its own machines is not a particularly sound one. The company
would rather buy equipment off-the-shelf.
I n developing new products, industrial designers in J apan prefer the
independent and direct approach and avoid intermediaries. R&D
engineers usually do not rely on formal market research conducted by
marketing specialists to obtain ideas for new products. At Hitachi, for
instance, researchers spend time at sales offices where they come into
contact with customers, study market trends and the needs of customers,
and reexamine the course of a products development. I nformation that
they collect is entered into a marketing card system called HI SMART.
All feedback concerning buyers needs, including proposals for launching
new products, goes through the marketing card project center at Hitachi
headquarters and is disseminated to different business groups and
laboratories.8 Similarly, a Honda R&D team that spent several days at
supermarkets in the United States conversing with customers as they
loaded shopping bags into their cars came away with ideas for a
redesigned hatchback.
Culture and the Development of Technology in Japan 229
The J apanese drive toward technological self-reliance and adoption of
straight-forward methods derives, in all likelihood, from the constituent
of indigenous culture known as Zen Buddhism. I ntroduced into J apan
from China in the 13th century, the Zen sect of Buddhism struck firm
roots in J apanese soil during the Tokugawa era (1600-18671, and
acquired increasing popularity after the Meiji Restoration. I t eventually
became identified with J apanese spiritual culture. A mixture of Chinese
Daoist and I ndian Buddhist teachings, Zen stresses self-dependence,
forthrightness, and exclusion of intermediate means to attain
enlightenment, interpreted as the realization of Buddha nature
inherent in each individual. Zen priests are known for their honest and
rough treatment of disciples. An analogy traditionally used is a finger
pointed toward the moon. There is no need of the finger if a person looks
directly at the moon, explain the priests. I n a typical Zen meditation
session, the personal efforts of the initiates assume utmost importance;
the master merely points in the right direction. This, incidentally,
contrasts with the master-disciple relationship prevalent in I ndia, in
which dependence on the guru is indispensable for the disciples
learning. Zen considers scriptures, relics, and other familiar religious
paraphernalia as useless encumbrances. There is also no dependence on
God or other supernatural agencies.
I nherent in Zen philosophy is the idea that knowledge is acquired
through direct experience and intuition, not through reasoning or
exercise of the intellectual faculties. To obtain mastery of a subject, ones
body and mind should unite with it. The sense of separateness from the
skill sought to be mastered on the part of the individual is detrimental to
achieving perfection.
Throughout history, Zen has been associated with nonreligious
pursuits. I n the Tokugawa period, the Zen priests Takuan and Shozan
Suzuki preached that if a man put his heart and soul into his secular
profession, he was, in fact, serving Buddha.9 I n the modern age, one
finds that ideas and values derived from Zen have filtered into many
aspects of economic life, including the management and development of
technology. One prominent exponent of the application of the religions
philosophy and techniques to manufacturing affairs is Konosuke
Matsushita, founder of Matsushita industries.lo Some companies even
send their new recruits to Zen temples for a short period of training.
This- Worldly Asceticism
Technology can be viewed from the perspectives of the consumer and the
producer. The former standpoint renders life more comfortable, more
enjoyable. Most technological products, except those for military
purposes, cater to that part of human personality that seeks pleasure
and comfort: the Freudian id. The production aspect of technology, on the
230 A. Saha
other hand, demands entirely different qualities. But because of the
narrow specialization and coordination of different experts knowledge,
no genius-like effort is required for most technological innovations. Still,
a substantial degree of application, hard work, and sacrifice of comforts
is called for. These traits are not innate in humans, but are the result of
culture. They are absent in almost all of the developing countries, but
are present in the West and, to a greater extent, in J apan.
I t is significant in this context that monastic life is an important aspect
of the Zen philosophy. The monastery is not meant to be a hiding place
from the worries of the world; on the contrary, it is a training station
where a man equips himself for lifes battlefield, wrote D. T. Suzuki,
Zens most famous modern exponent. l1 The impact of ascetically inclined
Zen Buddhism has been a factor in inducing the J apanese to cultivate
mental qualities appropriate for the production of technology. Contrary
to the tendency common in most Third World countries, J apan refrained
from imitating the more lavish consumption patterns of the West during
the formative stages of its economy. The J apanese concentrated instead
on manufacturing, productivity improvement, technology development,
and exports. This outlook, which may be called this-worldly asceticism,
persists, to a lesser degree, in the present even though, as one might
expect, its relevance has declined with affluence.
Moreover, Zen philosophy places a great value on manual work. Like
the Benedictine monks of medieval Europe, monks in Zen monasteries
are required to perform hard physical labor for part of the day - a
feature that represents a major ideological shift from the main current of
I ndian Buddhism. I dleness is deprecated, and the maxim No work, no
food represents a cardinal tenet of the faith. For followers of Zen, An
idle man in the daylight is an expression of contempt.
That the J apanese are a very diligent and hard working people is
possibly the strongest and most persistent stereotype about them in
other countries. I t also matches the opinion most J apanese hold about
themselves. Despite affluence, employees in J apan continue to work
more hours than those in any other industrialized country. I n 1990, the
average J apanese manufacturing laborer worked five hours per week
more than his counterpart in the United States.12 The J apanese also
surpass the Americans, the Germans, and the British in considering
work as the central interest in their lives.
I n keeping with this general trend, the average R&D engineer in
J apan works harder than colleagues in the United States.ls This
impacts on the speed with which innovations are made, thereby
shortening a products life-cycle. According to a survey conducted by the
consulting firm McKinsey & Co., J apanese manufacturers develop new
products in a third to half the time it takes a Western company. The
moment a new commodity is launched, rival companies rush to produce
their own versions of it, just in case the pioneering model should prove to
be a bestseller. With a finished item on hand, latecomers can concentrate
Culture and the Development of lkchnology in J apan 231
on improving the original design. Reverse engineering - taking a
product apart to see how it works - provides short-cuts. The original
innovator must then be ready to strike back with new features.
Organizations that fail to innovate quickly enough risk being pushed out
of the market.
Pursuit ofPerfection
The psychologist Hiroshi Minami has identified a typical J apanese mind-
set that accounts for the widely observed preoccupation with perfection:
Unhappiness and misfortune are not negatively endured or averted, but
are positively accepted as desirable for self-cultivation. Consequently, a
person experiences a perpetual sense of dissatisfaction with his or her
performance and strives for improvement, but is never satisfied with the
results obtained. I n fact, one dislikes the possibility of becoming
satisfied, a sentiment that reflects the pessimistic view of the world held
by Buddhists, whose main teaching, Life is suffering, has affected
J apanese thinking for centuries. l4
Opinion surveys support the view that the majority of J apanese
remain dissatisfied with their performances at work. J . R. Lincoln, who
conducted a survey of manufacturing employees in J apan and the United
States regarding their attitudes towards work, found large differences in
job satisfaction scores. American employees seem more satisfied with
their jobs than do the J apanese. This may reflect the restless striving
for perfection and ongoing quest for fulfillment of lofty work values on
the part of the J apanese. I n the case of Americans, greater satisfaction
scores possibly reflect low job expectations and a preoccupation with
leisure-time pursuits. l5
Kaizen, a word frequently heard in J apanese establishments, embodies
this notion of a continuous striving for excellence without becoming
complacent upon achieving success. Kaizen implies continuous
improvement in productivity, quality, and product design. Whereas
innovation is normally conceived of as a one-shot affair occurring after
large intervals, kaizen refers to an ongoing activity with cumulative
effects marking a steady progress of performance. I f standards exist,
they will not only be met but surpassed. I n addition, kaizen involves the
efforts of employees from different departments and not just those
specifically assigned to product development. As a result, many new
items marketed by J apanese firms have taken shape on the factory floor
in the form of minor changes in design during the course of production.
The impact of the accumulated small advancements often amounts to a
major breakthrough.16
The development of the video recorder for the consumer market
illustrates the success of the continuous improvement process, as well as
the dangers of becoming complacent. I n 1956, the American corporation
232 A. Saha
Ampex introduced the worlds first video tape recorder. Called
Quadruplex, or Quad, it was developed for use in television broadcasting.
A big machine costing $50,000, the Quad was a major invention that
guaranteed worldwide sales and set the standard for broadcasting
equipment. Ampex, despite competition from RCA, dominated this
market for the next two decades. But, apparently satisfied with its
performance, the American pioneer failed to develop the product further.
I n particular, it did not initiate changes that would render the device
suitable for the potentially large consumer market. Faced with
challenges coming mainly from J apanese manufacturers, Ampex had to
leave the video recorder market.
I n J apan during the 195Os, researchers from Sony and other firms
regularly visited television studios to study the Quad; they pored over
the equipment manuals and conferred among themselves and with
studio engineers. Right from the beginning, efforts were made to
reduce the machines bulk and price. Phillips in Europe and
Matsushita entered the race to produce video recorders for consumers.
I n 1962, the first Sony video recorder appeared on the market. I t was
one-twentieth the size and one-fifth the price of the Quad. I n 1965,
Sony developed an instrument that used half-inch tape instead of the
two-inch tape used by the Quad. After further reductions, Sony
introduced Betamax in the mid 1970s. Matsushita followed with its
own model.17 Sony continued its efforts at miniaturization, and in 1989
launched a palm-sized video camera and recorder.
However, in the areas that are predominantly science-based and
dependant on breakthroughs generated through basic research and
large-scale experimentation, J apanese successes have been less
pronounced. I n the chemical engineering industry, R&D is laboratory
oriented and production changes cannot be easily made. As might be
expected, the capability of the J apanese chemical industry to develop
technology is not in the same league as that of leading Western firms
such as DuPont and Bayer. I n certain areas like fermentation, in which
development is based on gradual accumulation of knowledge, J apanese
firms have done well. 18
Education and Training
A factor contributing to the J apanese achievements in modern
technology has been the remarkably high level of education among the
people. Education is an essential prerequisite for efficient technology
absorption, as well as for innovation. Both the standard of general
learning among workers and the specialized knowledge of the design
engineers are of relevance in this context.
Education has always been valued highly in J apan. R. P. Dore
estimates that even at the time of the Restoration, 40% to 50% of all
Culture and the Development of Technology in J apan 233
J apanese boys and 15% of all girls were getting some form of schooling
outside the home.19 As early as 1920, the proportion of children
attending schools reached 97%. I n present-day J apan, the quality of
education administered by the schools, in which science and
mathematics are stressed, is considered excellent.
This inordinate emphasis on learning arises form the nations
Confucian heritage. I n the vast corpus of beliefs, values, rituals, and
behavioral codes subsumed by the broad title Confucianism is the
prominent idea that there exists an acute difference between the
superior person and the inferior person. The former, apart from
possessing the typical Confucian virtues of sincerity, dignity, frugality,
and benevolence toward inferiors, is essentially an educated man. I n
fact, education constitutes his first and foremost quality; wealth and
family background are less important.
I t should be noted that the Confucian gentleman was a person having
broad interests; he was not a narrow specialist. To be sure, orthodox
Confucianism held technical specialists in contempt, a feature that
adversely influenced the pace of modernization in China. But more
pragmatic J apanese leaders, while upholding Confucian teachings,
ignored this particular aspect of the creed. Even so, a generalists bias
persisted in the education system.
Higher technical education in J apan differs from that in the West in
certain respects. J apanese engineering colleges aim to impart rounded
instruction, offering few individual options, and expect graduates to
acquire specialized knowledge after joining companies. At the University
of Tokyo, J apans most prestigious engineering school, all students take
essentially the same courses; virtually none opt for specialized higher-
level courses. Grades are based exclusively on written final examinations
that strongly emphasize general theory. 20 Compared to research activity
in similar institutions in the West, research activity in J apanese
universities receives less attention.
True to Confucian tradition, the J apanese education system advocates
absorption of knowledge, along with humility and conformity. Whereas
Western schools encourage individualism, J apanese schools teach the
importance of cooperation and responsibility to peers.21 Fearing
isolation, the individual in J apan tries to be like those around him or her.
I t is not surprising, therefore, that a major drawback of J apanese
research has been a lack of originality. Until the 198Os, investments in
R&D were devoted almost exclusively to product and process
development. Although the bulk of the spending continues to be in the
same areas, substantial expenditure has been incurred in basic
research in recent years. Yet, reports of original findings have hardly
been impressive.
The discouragement of originality and eccentricity in the education
system has had an impact in the area of industrial design. These two
characteristics are increasingly regarded as crucial ingredients for
234 A. Saha
product differentiation. Observes B. J ohnstone: Truly original designs
still tend to come from outside. 22 I n 1984, for example, Canon hired
Luigi Coranni, who is well known for his organic forms, to design a new
camera. Coranni developed a design featuring soft curves molded to fit
the hand, a radical departure from the hard edges of the previous
generations of cameras. After Coranni had shown the way, J apanese
designers responded with a deluge of variations on the theme - and not
just in cameras.
The cultural esteem for knowledge finds expression in the enormous
emphasis J apanese companies place on training. An obsessive concern
for training is a distinctly J apanese ethos, remarked R. T. Pascal and
A. G. Athos.23 All large corporations have elaborate learning programs
through which every employee must pass. The organizations also provide
ample opportunities through job rotation and enrichment to use the
newly acquired knowledge. Workers train not only in their own tasks,
but in allied skills as well, thereby becoming multifunctional. New
technologies are usually introduced in the training session. As a result,
employees cooperate in bringing about technological changes in their
firms instead of resisting them.
After joining a company, engineers go through a number of specialized
courses and continue to train in later years. Usually, J apanese engineers
are assigned courses by their supervisors, instead of choosing their own
areas of study. I n contrast to American and European engineers, who
tend to specialize in definite disciplines, engineers in J apan are
transferred to different departments in which they stay for extended
periods, obtaining knowledge in a broad range of fields. This offers
advantages in design work.
With respect to the technological disciplines, there is hardly any
difference in training levels of design engineers in J apan and in the
West. But J apanese designers acquire some additional experience in the
production department that gives them an understanding of how to
design parts for greater production. Trainee designers also spend time in
marketing departments and perform field service work to become
exposed to the actual conditions of use, the problems of diagnosing field
failures, and the difficulties encountered in making repairs. A third area
of designer training is quality control. Such extensive training
requirements are unusual in the West. As is to be expected, J apanese
product designs tend to be superior with respect to function, reliability,
and ease with which they can be maintained.
Broad-based, intensive training enables R&D personnel to obtain a
deeper and more thorough understanding of the workings of their
products. To illustrate this point, consider the techniques adopted by
American and J apanese automotive engineers to control exhaust gas.
The Americans used catalytic converters to clean up vehicle emissions,
an effective but expensive solution. When Mitsubishi faced this same
problem, researchers went back to the original design. They measured
Culture and the Development of Technology in J apan 235
fuel/air ratios relating to each ignition cycle, and then, with a basic
understanding of the chemistry involved, redesigned the engine to get
maximum combustion with minimum emission. The need for catalytic or
other add-on devices was avoided.
Preference for Up-to-Date Technology
Confucianism decries concern for profits as a mark of an inferior person.
According to the Confucian Analects: The mind of the superior man is
conversant with righteousness, the mind of the mean man is conversant
with gain.24 As a result, merchants in East Asian societies have
traditionally been held in low esteem.
Following the Restoration, the early entrepreneurs, mostly Samurai of
Confucian upbringing, shied away from the idea of profits as the
legitimate goal of a business enterprise. Many of them instead
substituted national prestige for financial gain.
I n the decades after the Second World War, the traditional repudiation
of profits dwindled. I n 1956, Keizai Doyukai, an organization of
managers that had been in the forefront in formulating managerial
ideology since the war, proclaimed that a company should seek a fair
profit through technology innovation and market development.
Business firms concentrated upon strategies involving growth, increase
of market share, and acquisition of modern technology, instead of those
aimed at maximizing short-term returns. Technology policies, in
particular, were characterized by a downgrading of economic rationality.
Ozawa points out that during the early stages of postwar reconstruction,
J apanese experience in absorbing foreign technology was founded on
what may be called inappropriate technology. A large number of the
processes J apan imported at the time appeared inappropriate because
they were highly capital-intensive and resource-consuming, features
incongruous with the factor endowments of early postwar J apan. Yet, in
this period, the forces of technological momentum were released,
creating forward and backward technological linkages throughout
J apanese industry.25
Observers note that a typical J apanese firm, once convinced of the
superiority of a new technique, will opt for it irrespective of short-term
economic considerations. L. Lynn cites the case of the adoption of the
basic oxygen furnace (BOF) by the J apanese steel industry. The BOF was
first put into commercial operation in Austria in late 1952. By the early
197Os, it replaced the open hearth furnace as the most widely used steel-
making process. But not all countries had been equally quick to change
over to the new method. J apanese steel manufacturers put their first
BOF into operation in September of 1957, after the steel industries of
Austria, Canada, and the United States had already done so. But once
satisfied with the benefits of the new technology, they adopted it with
236 A. Saha
such speed that all other countries were left behind. By 1962, all six steel
producers in J apan were using BOF, as compared to only one of the
major American steelmakers. 26 And by 1968, the J apanese were
claiming a 30% improvement in productivity, along with an improvement
in quality over the older technology.
Since the early 197Os, J apanese industry has increasingly resorted to
automation. All estimates show that J apan leads the world in the use of
robots. R. J aikumar, who in 1984 conducted a study of 35 flexible
manufacturing systems (FMS) in the United States and 60 in J apan, a
sample representing half the installed systems in both countries, found
that the average number of parts made by an FMS in the United States
was 10, compared to 93 in J apan. He also found that the J apanese
factories had an average of two and a half times as many CNC machines,
four times as many engineers, and four times as many people trained in
the use of these machines.27
Organization for R&D
Collective orientation has deep roots in J apanese culture. The J apanese
people like to work in groups, and have always worked in association
with one another, a tendency the origins of which may be traced to harsh
soil conditions that made close cooperation among members of
premodern village communities imperative for successful agriculture. I n
present times, the average individual views himself or herself, and is
looked upon by others, as a member of a collective unit, such as the
employing organization.
Group propensities are strengthened by Confucian teachings stressing
good interpersonal relationships. Conflicts disturb social harmony and, for
that reason, should be strenuously avoided. Disagreements, when they
arise, should be settled through consensus among members of the
collective. Another important Confucian tenet is that larger social units
should be modelled on the primary social unit: the family. This
recommendation manifests itself in the lifetime employment system, which
is common in almost all large J apanese corporations, though it has come
under strain in recent years. Even in large enterprises, rigid hierarchical
structures and well defined departmental boundaries are normally absent.
A feeling of belonging to the common group exists among all employees.
Functional specialization is downplayed. The practice of frequently
changing the nature of work performed facilitates the transference of
loyalty from ones occupation to the employing organization.28
I n a typical company, R&D is regarded as the responsibility of all
employees and not just that of the R&D department. Small group
activities, comprised of persons drawn from operational as well as
supervisory categories, are widespread throughout J apanese industry.
These groups have initiated many important process and product
Culture and the Development of lkchnology in J apan 237
changes. Many workers also participate enthusiastically in their
companys suggestion programs individually.
Furthermore, R&D personnel in J apan work closely with the
employees in production departments. Most firms have a central
laboratory as well as individual laboratories. The latter are closely
integrated with the manufacturing departments, both in physical
location and communications terms. Designers often omit detailed
specifications on drawings, expecting the manufacturing staff to take
care of them. The responsibility of the design engineer is typically not
considered finished when the final drawings are delivered to production.
I n J apan, R&D scientists routinely travel back and forth from the office
to the factory floor, coordinating changes with operatives and learning
from the problems encountered, so that future designs can be improved.
I n addition to manufacturing, R&D maintains close links with the
marketing department. Engineers at Brother I ndustries, while designing
their lap-sized electronic typewriter, repeatedly sought the advice of the
companys marketing affiliates regarding the products size, shape,
weight, features, and price. Prototypes were circulated throughout the
organizations distribution network, and feedback was obtained. A year
after the product was introduced, Brother had already improved it.
Similar to this is the relationship that exists between a big company
and its smaller suppliers and subcontractors. The practice of
subcontracting is widespread in J apan. A typical large manufacturing
concern subcontracts a major portion of its final product to various
vendors who, in turn, maintain ties with one or more purchasing
organizations. According to a survey of the J apanese manufacturing
industry, 17% of subcontractors deal with a single buyer, and 46% have
two to five customers.29 Mutual trust, confidence, cooperation, and a
joint commitment to the ultimate consumer govern links between
suppliers and purchasers.
Whereas firms in most other countries tend to be secretive about
future products and pass only a minimum of information to their
subcontractors, research personnel from large J apanese firms hold
regular meetings with representatives of their leading subcontractors to
discuss details. This allows the smaller units, which specialize in making
one or two parts, to contribute early in the product development cycle.
The outcome is shorter development times and higher product quality.
H. Takeuchi and I . Nonaka, describing a new product development
project at Fuji Xerox, state that the company encourages suppliers to
become self-organizing. I t refrains from telling suppliers what to do,
since the latter produce better results when they have the problem
explained to them and are allowed to decide how to furnish parts. 3o
The notion that innovation is engendered by individualism, which
disrupts the prevailing status quo, leading to instability and change is
widely held. Modern technological innovation, however, demands close
cooperation among a fairly large number of individuals. Consequently, a
238 A. Sah.n
social system that encourages competition between one industry group
and another and cooperation within a group seems most favorable to
product and process development. Traditional J apanese culture enhances
the collectivist element inherent in innovation.
Human Orientation
Shinto, J apans indigenous religion, is basically a cheerful religion that
contains no concept of guilt or sin. Stressing the brighter side of life, its
mythology is devoid of stories recounting major catastrophes or the
presence of fearful divinities. Even death does not receive much
attention in Shinto, the rituals of which are used in marriages but not
in funerals.
Shintoists believe that human nature is fundamentally good. Since
people are born of gods (kami), the natural disposition of humanity
cannot be anything but worthy. Left to themselves, men and women will
not do evil. The enjoyment of the senses is heartily approved of, and the
need for external restraints on individual behavior is denied.
As stated earlier, most technological products cater to the aspect of
human personality that craves pleasure and comfort. The cultural
acceptance of sensual gratification may, therefore, be said to aid the
process of technology development. The fact that J apanese product
designs tend to be highly consumer-oriented is significant in this context.
The term kansei engineering has been coined to describe the
development of technology aimed at satisfying the users desires and
inclinations, which are not always obvious. Kansei engineering
stipulates that the selection of a commodity does not depend solely upon
such rational criteria as prices, function, and reliability, but on the
extent to which the kansei, or senses, of the customer are satisfied.
Hence, a product must appeal not only to the reason of the buyer, but to
his or her senses as well.
Mazda has developed an experimental track on which to test drive cars.
Test drivers include both men and women, the young and the old.
Microphones fitted inside the cars record various feelings of comfort, fear,
safety, fun, etc., that the drivers express during the drive. Sensors are also
attached to various places in the vehicle to pick up movements and sounds,
which are then analyzed by a computer. The information gathered allows
Mazda engineers to produce cars that are more consumer-oriented.31
Products that offer trivial conveniences crowd the J apanese
marketplace. Examples include the Kakko razor, which ejects wet
shaving foam from the handle at the push of a button, a brassiere that
returns to the shape of the user no matter how often it is washed or
stretched, and a beer can with a metal strip that changes color
depending on the temperature of the liquid inside.
Culture and the Development of Pxhnology in J apan 239
The process of technological change in J apan has been characterized by
Hajime Karatsu as following a bottom-up trend with emphasis on mass-
consumption merchandise, in contrast to the top-down approach typical
in the West. For instance, when carbon fiber, which has a tensile
strength three times that of regular steel and is lighter than aluminum,
first appeared, European and American firms began considering it for
use in the aircraft industry. I n J apan, the new material was used to
make golf club shafts and fishing rods. After mass production had
established quality and brought down costs, carbon fiber was applied to
larger items. 32 Similarly, large-scale integrated-circuits (LSI s) were
initially used in missile and space vehicles in the United States. I n
J apan, LSI s were first used in pocket calculators and watches. This led
to big differences in production volumes and prices.
The management technique of quality function deployment (QFD) has
revolutionized the perception of product quality throughout the world.
First proposed in J apan in the early 198Os, QFD does not depict quality
in the conventional terms of cost, conformance to specifications, and
machine capabilities; instead, quality is considered, first and foremost,
as an opportunity to please purchasers. QFD incorporates the voice of
the customer throughout the design, process selection, and
manufacturing phases of a product.33
Conclusion
An overview of J apanese experiences in absorbing and contributing to
the progress of modern technology enables one to acquire a deeper
understanding of the phenomenon of technological development itself.
Evidently, the process of technological change can take different paths
depending on the characteristics of the environmental culture. J apan
offers a model of successful technological progress different in a number
of respects from that of the West. Features of indigenous traditions such
as preference for self-reliance, the direct approach, emphasis on
education and training, as well as the qualities of hard work, this-
worldly asceticism, pursuit of perfection, group harmony, and a
transparently human orientation have all contributed to the excellence
of products and equipment made in that country.
J apanese technological achievements contain lessons for both
advanced and developing countries. The recent decades are more
relevant to the former, whereas Third World nations can benefit from
studying J apans earlier period of industrialization. Managers wishing to
emulate J apanese accomplishments should first analyze their own
cultures and identify elements that support or challenge growth of
technology. The J apanese system of values, including transformations
effected during the course of modernization, provides useful guidelines in
240 A. Saha
this respect. Features congenial to machinery should be strengthened
and the opposite tendencies discouraged to a feasible extent. Normally,
industrial managers are not in a position to shape popular values, a task
for statesmen and policy makers. The role of managers consists of
educating the opinion leaders and actually implementing changes in
their organizations. A planned, systematic approach, with emphasis on
cultural factors, is likely to yield such results.
Notes
1. E. Baark and A. J amison, The Technology and Culture Problematique, in E. Baark and
A. J amison (eds.), Technology Development in China, I ndia and J apan (London: Macmillan,
1986), pp. l-13.
2. C. N. Madu, Transferring Technology to Developing Countries - Critical Factors for Success,
Long Range Planning, Vol. 22, no. 4 (1989), pp. 115-124.
3. R. Bierstedt, The Social Order (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), p. 159.
4. W. F. Ogburn, On Culture and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964),
pp. 88-95.
5. A. Saha, Cultural I mpediments to Technology Development in I ndia, I nternational J ournal of
Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 10, no. 8 (19901, pp. 25-53.
6. Quoted in J . P Lehmann, The I muge of J apan (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), p. 134.
7. The Honda Way, Time I nternational, (Sep. 8, 1986), pp. 55-62.
8. E. Herbert, How the J apanese Companies Set R&D Directions, Research-Technology
Management, Vol. 33, no. 3 (1990), pp. 22-33.
9. H. Nakamura, Ways of Thinking of the Eastern Peoples (Honolulu: East-West Center Press,
1964), p. 64.
10. Matsushita: The Sacred Mission of Business, World Executive Digest, (Feb. 1990), p. 38.
11. W. Barrett (ed.), Zen Buddhism, Selected Writings of D. I : Suzuki (New York: Doubleday
Anchor, 1956), p. 274.
12. Tb World Competitiveness Report (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 1992), p. 626.
13. D. E. Westney and K. Sakakibara, Designing the Designers, Zkhnology Review, Vol. 89, no. 3
(1986), pp. 25-32.
14. H. Minami, Psychology of the J apanese People (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1971),
pp. 49-50.
15. J . R. Lincoln, Employee Work Attitudes and Management Practices in the U.S. and J apan,
California Management Review, (Fall 1989), pp. 89-106.
16. M. I mai, Kaizen (New York: Random House, 1986).
17. W. J . Abernathy and R. S. Rosenbloom, The I nstitutional Climate for I nnovation in I ndustry,
in A. H. I bich and R. Thornton (eds.), Science, lbchnology, and I ssues of the Eighties (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 27-53.
18. K. I mai, I ndustrial Policy and Technological I nnovation, in R. Komiya et al. (eds.), I ndustrial
Policy of J apan (Tokyo: Academic Press, 1988), pp. 205-229.
19. R. P. Dore, Education in Tokugawa J apan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 19651, p. 156.
20. Westney and Sakakibara, op. cit.
21. J apans Schools, The Economist, (April 21, 1990), pp. 19-21.
22. B. J ohnstone, Sold on the Looks, Far Eastern Economic Reuiew, (Feb. 20, 1990), pp. 34-35.
23. R. T. Pascale and A. G. Athos, The Art of J apanese Management (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
19811, p. 52.
24. Confucius: Confucian Anulects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, (New York:
Dover, 1971), ch. 4:ll.
25. T. Ozawa, Technology Transfer and Control Systems: The J apanese Experience, in T. Sagafi-
nejad et al. (eds.), Controlling I nternational lkchnology 7kansfer (New York: Pergamon Press,
19811, pp. 376-426.
Culture and the Development of Technology in J apan 241
26. L. Lynn, J apan Adopts a New Technology, Columbia J ournal of World Business, (Winter
1984), pp. 39-44.
27. R. J aikumar, Post-industrial Manufacturing, Harvard Business Review, (Nov.-Dec. 1986),
pp. 69-76.
28. J . R. Lincoln and A. L. Kalleberg, Culture, Control, and Commitment (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990).
29. J . McMillan, Managing Suppliers: I ncentive Systems in J apanese and U.S. I ndustry,
California Management Review, (Summer 1990), pp. 38-55.
30. H. Takeuchi and I . Nonaka, The New New Product Development Game, Harvard Business
Review, (J an-Feb. 1986), pp. 137-146.
31. K. Yamamoto, Customer-Oriented Management Policy, in 7bp Management Forum (Tokyo:
Asian Productivity Organization, 1990), pp. 29-35.
32. H. Karatsu, Should COCOM Ban the Bra?, PHP I ntersect, (February, 1986), pp. 14-16.
33. F. M. Fortuna, Beyond Quality: Taking SPC Upstream, Quality Progress, (J une 19881,
pp. 23-28.