G.R. No.

L-49623 June 29, 1982

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE LORENLIANA CA!TRO-"ARTOLOME o# $%e Cou&$ o# '&($ In($)n*e o# R'+),, M)-)$' "&)n*% ./, )n0
REPU"LIC O T1E P1ILIPPINE!,
respondent-appellees.

A2UINO, J.:p
This case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that "no private coporation or associaiton may hold
alienable lands of the public domain ecept by lease not to eceed on ethousand hectares in area". 3 That prohibition is not found in
the 1!"# Constitution.
The $anila %lectric Company, a domestic corporation or&ani'ed under (hilippine la)s, more than sity percent of )hose capital
stoc* is o)ned by +ilipino citi'ens, in its application filed on ,ecember 1, 1!-. in the $a*ati branch of the Court of +irst Instance
of /i'al, prayed for the confirmation of its title to t)o lots )ith a total area of one hundred sity-five s0uare meters, located at
Tanay, /i'al )ith an assessed value of (",1-2 34/C Case 5o. 5-!67#, 4/C 5o. 5-#27218.
The /epublic of the (hilippines opposed theh application on the &rounds that the applicant, as a private corporation,is dis0ualified
to hold alienable public lands and that the applicant and its prredecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous,
eclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately precedin& the filin& of the
application 3pp. .#-.., Rollo8.
After the trial had commenced, the (rovince of ri'al and the $unicipality of Tanay filed a 9oint opposition to the application on the
&round that one of the lots, 4ot 5o. 11.# of the Tanay cadastre, )ould be needed for the )idenin& and improvement of :ose Abad
;antos and %.<uirino ;treetsin the to)n of Tanay.
The land )as possessed by =limpia ramos before the (acific )ar )hich bro*e out in 1!61. =n :uly ", 1!6-, /amos sold the land to
the spouses /afael (i&uin& and $Inerva Inocencio 3%h. >8. The (i&uin& sapouses constructed a house therereon. ?ecause the
$eralco had installed the "anchor &uy" of its steel post on the land, the (i&uin& spouses sold the lot to the $eralco on Au&ust 1",
1!-..
The said land )as included in the1!.7 cadastral survey made in Tanacy by the ?ureau of 4ands, (lan A(-26-222!21 3%h. + and
@8 and )as divided into t)o lots, 4ots 5os. 11.6 and 11.#, so as to se&re&ate 4ot 5o. 11.# )hich )ould be used to )iden the t)o
street servin& as the landAs eastern and southern boundaries.
The land )as declared for realty ta purposes since 1!6# and taes had been paid thereon up to 1!--. It is residential in character as
distin&uished from a strictly a&ricultural land. It is not included in any military reservation. ;ince 1!1-, it has formed part of the
alienable portion of the public domain.
After trial, the lo)re court rendered a decision dismissin& the application because in its opinion the $eralco is not 0ualified to
apply for the re&istration of the said land since under section 673b8 of the (ublic 4and 4a) only +ilipino citi'ens or natural persons
can apply for 9udicial confirmationof their imperfect titles to public land. The $eralco is a 9uridical person. The trial court assumed
that the land )hich it see*s to re&ister is public land.
+rom that decision, the $eralco appealed to this Court under /epublic Act 5o. #662.
In contends that the said land, after havin& been possessed in the concept of o)ner by =limpia /amos and the (i&uin& spouses for
more than thirty years, had become private land in the hands of the latter, and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, bannin& a
private corporation from ac0uirin& alienable public land, is not applicable to the said land.
The $eralco further contends that it has invo*e section 673b8 of the (ublic 4and 4a), not for itself, but for the (i&uin& spouses
)ho, as +ilipino citi'ens, could secure a 9udicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land.
In reply to these contentions, the ;olicitor Beneral counters that the said land is not private land because the $eralco and its
predecessors-in-interest have no composition title from the ;panish &overnment nor possessory information title or any other means
for the ac0uisition of public lands such as &rants or patents 3/epublic vs. Court of Appeals and ,e :esus, 4-62!11, ;eptember "2,
1!-., -" ;C/A 16., 1#-C ,irector of 4ands vs. /eyes, 4-1-#!6, 5ovember 17, 1!-#, and Alinsunurin vs. ,irector of 4ands, 4-
17166, 5ovember 17, 1!-#C .7 ;C/A 1--C 1!#C 4ee @on& @o* vs. ,avid, 4-"2"7!, ,ecember 1-, 1!-1, 67 ;C/A "-1, "-7-!C
,irector of 4ands vs. Court of Appeals and /aymundo, 4-1!#-#, April "2, 1!-1, "7 ;C/A ."6, ."!C (adilla vs. /eyes and ,irector
of 4ands, .2 (hil. !.-, !.!C @eirs of ,atu (endatun vs. ,irector of 4ands, #! (hil. .22, .2"8.
The (ublic 4and 4a) providesD
C@A(T%/ VIII. E :udicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

;%C. 67. The follo)in& described citizens of the Philippines, occupyin& lands of the public domain or claimin& to
o)n any such lands or an interest therein, but )hose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of +irst Instance of the province )here the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance
of a certificate of title therefor, under the 4and /e&istration Act, to )itD

3b8 Those )ho by themselves or throu&h their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, eclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of a&ricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
ac0uisition of o)nership, for at least thirty years immediately precedin& the filin& of the application for
confirmation of title ecept )hen prevented by )ar or force ma9eure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Bovernment &rant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. 3As amended by /epublic Act 5o. 1!61, approved on :une 11, 1!#-.8

;%C. 6!. 5o person claimin& title to lands of the public domain not in possession of the 0ualifications specified in
the last precedin& section may apply for the benefits of this chapter.
Fe hold that, as bet)een the ;tate and the $eralco, the said land is still public land. It )ould cease to be public land only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title to any +ilipino citi'en claimin& it under section 673b8. ?ecause it is still public land and the
$eralco, as a 9uridical person, is dis0ualified to apply for its re&istration under section 673b8, $eralcoAs application cannot be &iven
due course or has to be dismissed.
This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in =h Cho vs. ,irector of 4ands, -# (hil. 7!2, 7!1, )hich rule is a
compendious or 0uintessential precis of a pervasive principle of public land la) and land re&istration la), that "all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An eception to the rule )ould be
any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such
possession )ould 9ustify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the ;panish con0uest." 3CariGo vs. Insular Bovernment, 111 H. ;. 66!, #" 4. ed. #!6, 61 (hil. !"# and - (hil.
1"18.
The $eralco relies on the rulin& in ;usi vs. /a'on and ,irector of 4ands, 67 (hil. 616, that "an open, continuous, adverse and
public possession of a land of the public domain from time immemorial by a private individual personally and throu&h his
predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, )hereby the land ceases to be public" and becomes private property.
That rulin& is based on the Cario case )hich is about the possession of land by an I&orot and his ancestors since time immemorial
or even before the ;panish con0uest. The land involved in the usi case )as possessed before 1772 or since a period of time
"beyond the reach of memory". That is not the situation in this case. The $eralco does not pretend that the (i&uin& spouses and
their predecessor had been in possession of the land since time immemorial.
In the usi case, this Court applied section 6#3b8 of Act 5o. 17-6 )hich corresponds to )hat is no) section 673b8. It )as held that
the lon& possession of the land under a bona fide claim of o)nership since :uly 1., 17!6 &ave rise to the conclusive presumption
that the occupant had complied )ith all the conditions essential to a Bovernment &rant and )as thus entitled to a certificate of title.
=n the other hand, in Hy Hn vs. (ere', -1 (hil. #27, #12-11, it )as held that )hile occupants of public land, )ho have applied for
the confirmation of their title, "teian asimismo a su favor la presuncion !uris et de !ure de 0ue habian cumplido con todas las
condiciones necesarias para la concesion del tituloC pero hasta 0ue el titulo se epida no tenian el concepto !uridico de ser los
verdaderos dueos del terreno in este de!o de pertenecer a los terrenos publico del "stado susceptibles de ena!enacion."
That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a pice of land, over )hich an imperfect title is sou&ht to be confirmed, remains
public land. +or that reason in the #y #n case, it )as held that if that land )as attached by a 9ud&ment creditor of the applicant,
)hile his application for confirmation of his imperfect title )as pendin& in the ?ureau of 4ands, the levy and eecution sald of the
land )ere void.
+or that same reason, lands over )hich an imperfect title is sou&ht to be confirmed are &overned by the (ublic 4and 4a). ;uch
lands )ould not be covered by the (ublic 4and 4a) if they )ere already private lands. The occupantsA ri&ht to the said lands is
characteri'ed in the Hy Hn case, not as o)nership in fee simple, but asderecho dominical incoativo.
The $eralco in its concludin& ar&ument contends that if the (i&uin& spouses could as* for the confirmation of their imperfect title
to the said lands, then )hy should the $eralco, as their transferee, be denied the same ri&ht to re&ister the said land in its name,
there bein& no le&al prohibition for the (i&uin& spouses from sellin& the land to the $eralcoI This Court is disposin& of that same
contention in the =h Cho case saidD
The benefits provided in the (ublic 4and Act 3meanin& the confirmation of an imperfect title under section 67JbK8
for applicantAs immediate predecessors-in-interest are or constitute a &rant or concession by the ;tateC and before
they could ac0uire any ri&ht under such benefits, the applicantAs immediate predecessors-in-interest should comply
)ith the condition precedent for the &rant of such benefits.
The condition precedent is to apply for the re&istration of the land of )hich they had been in possession at least
since :uly 1., 17!6. This the applicantAs immediate predecessors-in-interest 3meanin& the (i&uin& spouses in the
instant case8 failed to do.
$hey did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was transmissible to the applicant . The only
ri&ht, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot )hich, tac*ed to that of their predecessors-in-interest,
may be availed of by a 0ualified person to apply for its re&istration but not by a person as the applicant )ho is
dis0ualified. 3-# (hil. 7!2, 7!".8
+inally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition ma*es no distinction bet)een 3on one hand8 alienable a&ricultural
public lands as to )hich no occupant has an imperfect title and 3on the other hand8 alienable lands of the public domain as to )hich
an occupant has an imperfect title sub9ect to 9udicial confirmation.
;ince section 11 of Article XIV does not distin&uish, )e should not ma*e any distinction or 0ualification. The prohibition applies to
alienable public lands as to )hich a Torrens title may be secured under section 673b8. The proceedin& under section 673b8
"presupposes that the land is public" 3$indanao vs. ,irector of 4ands, 4-1!#"#, :uly "2, 1!.-, 12 ;C/A .61, .668.
The lo)er courtCs 9ud&ment dismissin& $eralcoAs application is affirmed. Costs a&ainst the petitioner-appellant.
;= =/,%/%,.
%arredo, &a'asiar, Guerrero, &elencio()errera, Plana, "scolin, *asquez, Relova and Gutierrez, +r,, ++,, concur,
Concepcion, +r,, +,, is on leave,



!e4)&)$e O4'n'on(

A"AD !ANTO!, J.5 *on*u&&'n65
I concur in the result. I am of the opinion that the lots )hich are sou&ht to be re&istered have ceased to be lands of the public
domain at the time they )ere ac0uired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of ac0uisitive
prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordin&ly, the
constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable.
@o)ever, the petitioner is relyin& on ;ec. 67 of the (ublic 4and Act for the confirmation of its title and $r. :ustice A0uino is
correct in holdin& that said provision cannot be availed by 9uridical entities.
ERNANDO, C.J., concurrin& and dissentin&D
I concur in the rulin& of the Court that $eralco "as a 9uridical person" is dis0ualified to apply for its re&istration under ;ection
673b8.. 1 I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court )ould characteri'e such 9urisdictional defect, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief
sou&ht. I )ould apply by analo&y, althou&h the facts could be distin&uished, the approach follo)ed by us in +rancisco v. City of ,avao, 2 )here the le&al 0uestion raised, instead
of bein& deferred and possibly ta*en up in another case, )as resolved. ?y le&al fiction 3 and in the eercise of our e0uitable 9urisdiction, I
feel that the realistic solution)ould be to decide the matter as if the application under ;ection 673b8 )ere filed by the (i&uin& spouses,
)ho I assume suffer from no such disability.
DE CA!TRO, J., dissentin&D
:ustice Teehan*ee cites in his dissentin& opinion the case of herico vs. ,ar, 1 the decision in )hich I am the ponente, as reiteratin& a
supposedly )ell-established doctrine that lands of the public domain )hich, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a len&th of
time, a &rant by the ;tate to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain, but is se&re&ated
therefrom as to be no lon&er sub9ect to the authority of the ,irector of 4ands to dispose under the public lands la)s or statutes. @e )ould
thus consider said land as no lon&er public land but "private" lands and therefore, not )ithin the prohibition of the 5e) Constitution
a&ainst corporations from ac0uirin& public lands )hich provides that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain ecept by lease not to eceed one thousand hectares." 2
I cannot subscribe to the vie) that the land as above described has become private land, even before title thereto, )hich is, as of
this sta&e, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title," has been fully vested on the occupant, throu&h the prescribed procedure
*no)n as 9udicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. 3 This is the only le&al method by )hich full and absolute title to the
land may be &ranted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure such 9udicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The
,irector of 4ands has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. @is authority is limited to another form of
disposition of public land, referred to as administrative le&ali'ation, resultin& in the issuance of free patents, also based on possession, in
)hich case, as in the issuance of homestead and sales patents, the land involved is undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of
public land )ould have the option to ac0uire title thereto throu&h 9udicial confirmation or administrative le&ali'ation. The difference is
that in the latter case, the area disposable to a citi'en-applicant by the ,irector of 4ands is limited to 16 hectares. There is no limit to the
area sub9ect to 9udicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, ecept possibly the limit fied for a ;tate &rant under old ;panish
la)s and decrees, )hich certainly is much lar&er than that set for free patents.
It is because of the divestiture of authority of the ,irector of 4ands to dispose of the land sub9ect to 9udicial confirmation of
incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many cases, such as those cited by :ustice Teehan*ee, to the effect
that such land has ceased to be a public land. Fhat these statements, ho)ever, really mean is that the land referred to no lon&er
forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the ,irector of 4ands, under the authority &ranted him by the public
land statutes. It, ho)ever, )ould not follo) that the land covered by ;ection 67 of the (ublic 4and Act has itself become private
land. The fact that its disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act )hich deals )ith "public land" &ives rise to the very stron&
implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land. =nly )hen the court ad9udicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title )ould the land become privately o)ned land, for in the same proceedin&, the court may declare it
public land, dependin& on the evidence.
The discussion of the 0uestion of )hether the land involved is still public or already private land is, ho)ever, entirely pointless, or
an idle eercise, if Fe consider the provision of ;ection 16, Article XIV of the Constitution )hich appears to have been lost si&ht
of, )hich provides that Asave in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed ecept to
individuals, corporations, or associations 0ualified to ac0uire or hold lands of the public domain." As previously stated, by epress
provisions of the Constitution, no corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain ecept by lease, not to
eceed, 1,222 hectares in area. 4 @ence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section
prohibits its ac0uisition by the $eralco or I&lesia )hich admittedly are "corporations or association" )ithin the meanin& of the aforecited
provision of the 5e) Constitution. This observation should end all ar&uments on the issue of )hether the land in 0uestion is public or
private land. Althou&h it may further be observed that supposin& a corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the
very be&innin&, may it apply for 9udicial confirmation of the land in 0uestion to ac0uire title to its o)ner after possessin& the land for the
re0uisite len&th of timeI The ans)er is believed obvious E it may not. If its possession is not from the be&innin& but has commenced
only upon the transfer to it by the prior possessor, may the corporation applyI The ans)er is 9ust as obvious E )ith more reason, it may
not.
This separate opinion should have had no need to be )ritten because the ma9ority opinion )ritten by :ustice A0uino is already )ell-
reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. I )as impelled to )rite it only because in the dissentin& opinion of :ustice
Teehan*ee, the case of )erico vs, -ar 3supra8 )hich is my ponencia)as cited in support of his position. This separate opinion then
is more to sho) and eplain that )hatever has been stated by me in the ,ar case should be interpreted in the li&ht of )hat I have
said in this separate opinion, )hich I believe, does not stren&then :ustice Teehan*eeAs position a bit.
TEE1AN7EE, J., dissentin&D
Involved in these t)o cases are the applications of petitioner $eralco, a nationali'ed domestic corporation, in the first case and
respondent I&lesia in Cristo, a reli&ious corporation sole, in the second case 3both admittedly +ilipino corporations 0ualified to hold
and o)n private lands8, for 9udicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as distin&uished
from strictly a&ricultural land, ac0uired by them by purchase or echan&e from private persons publicly recognized as the private
owners 3)ho have been in the open, continuous, eclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands under a bona fide
claim of o)nership for at least thirty J"2K years immediately precedin& the filin& of the applications8.
This dissent is based on the failure of the ma9ority to adhere to established doctrine since the 1!2! case of Cario and the 1!1# case
of usi do)n to the 1!72 case of )erico, infra, pursuant to the (ublic 4and Act, as amended, that )here a possessor has held the
open, eclusive and unchallen&ed possession of alienable public land for the statutory period provided by la) 3"2 years no) under
amendatory /ep. Act 5o. 1!61 approved on :une 11, 1!#-8, the la) itself mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Bovernment &rant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and "by
legal fictionJthe landK has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private property." Accordin&ly, the prohibition
of the 1!-" Constitution and of the (ublic 4and Act a&ainst private corporation holdin& lands of the public domain has no
applicability in the present cases. Fhat $eralco and I&lesia have ac0uired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to
be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to them and therefore their applicatins for
confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-interestA vested ri&ht and title may be duly &ranted.
The land covered by the $eralco application of 5ovember 1., 1!-. consists of t)o 318 small lots )ith a total area of 1.# s0uare
meters located at Tanay, /i'al )ith an assessed value of (",1-2.22. This land )as possessed by =limpia /amos before Forld Farr
II )hich bro*e out in the (acific in 1!61. =limpia /amos sold the land on :uly ", 1!6- to the spouses /afael (i&uin& and $inerva
Inocencio )ho constructed a house thereon. ?ut because the $eralco had instealled the "anchor &uy" of its stell posts on the land,
the (i&uin& spouses sold the land to the $eralco on Au&ust 1", 1!-.. The land had been declared for realty ta. purposes since
/012 and realty taes )ere re&ularly paid thereon. It is residential in character as distin&uished from strictly a&ricultural land. It is
li*e)ise established that it is not included in any military reservation and that since 1!1- it had been certified as part of the
alienable or disposable portion of the public domain.
The land covered by the I&lesia application of ;eptember ", 1!-- li*e)ise consists of t)o 318 small lots located in ?arrio ,ampol,
(laridel, ?ulacan )ith a total area of "1" s0uare meters and )ith an assessed value of (1,"#2.22. The land )as ac0uired by the
I&lesia on :anuary !, 1!#" from Andres (ere' in echan&e for a lot o)ned by the I&lesia )ith an area of 16- s0uare meters. The
land )as already possessed by (ere' in 1!"". Admittedly also it is not included in any military reservation and is inside an area
)hich )as certified since 1!1- as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the I&lesia stands on
the said land. It had been duly declared for realty ta. purposes in the name of the I&lesia and realty taes )ere regularly
paidthereon.
/espondent 9ud&e in the $eralco case sustained the /epublicAs opposition and dismissed the application, holdin& that under both
the provisions of the ne) Constitution and the (ublic 4and Act, $eralco, bein& a corporation and not a natural person, is not
0ualified to apply for the re&istration of title over the public land.
=n the other hand, in the I&lesia case, the /epublic presented no evidence in support of its opposition but epressly "submitted the
case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant." /espondent 9ud&e in the case accordin&ly &ranted the
application for re&istration of the land in the name of the I&lesia, holdin& that it had been "satisfactorily established that applicant K
I&lesiaK and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, public and adverse possession of the land . . . under a bona
fide claim of o)nership for more than thirty 3"28 years prior to the filin& of the application" and is therefore entitled to the
re&istration applied for under the (ublic 4and Act, as amended.
?oth decisions are no) )ith the Court for revie). I hold that both applications for re&istration should be &ranted by virtue of the
prevailin& principle as enunciated since the 1!1# case of usi vs, Razon and -irector of 3ands 1and reaffirmed in a lon& line of cases
do)n to the 1!72 case of )erico vs, -ar 2 that the lands in 0uestion ceased, ipso !ure, or by operation of la), to be lands of the public
domain upon completion of the statutory period of open, continuous, eclusive, notorious and unchallen&ed possession thereof by the
applicantsA predecessors-in-interest )ho )ere 0ualified natural persons and entitled to re&istration by ri&ht of ac0uisitive prescription
under the provisions of the (ublic 4and Act, and that accordin&ly the 9ud&ment in the $eralco case should be reversed and a ne)
9ud&ment entered &rantin& $eralcoAs application, )hile the 9ud&ment in the I&lesia case should stand affirmed.
The principal issue at bar may thus be statedD
It is epressly provided in section 67, par. 3b8 of the (ublic 4and Act 3Common)ealth Act 5o. 161, as amended by /ep. Act 5o.
1!61, approved on :une 11, 1!#-8 that citi'ens of the (hilippines )ho are natural persons )ho have occupied lands of the public
domain but )hose titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the correspondin& court of first instance for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under the 4and /e&istration Act in cases )here they
"by themselves or through their predecessors(in(interest have been in the open, continuous, eclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of a&ricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ac0uisition of o)nership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title ecept )hen prevented by )ar or force ma!eure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Bovernment &rant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." 3 In such cases, is the land ipso 9ure or by operation of la) converted into
private land upon completion of the "2th year of continuous and unchallen&ed occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private
land, it may be duly transferred to and o)ned by private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent 9ud&e in the $eralco case,
remain part of the public domain and does not become private land until after actual 9udicial confirmation proceedin&s and the formal
court order for the issuance of the certificate of titleI
1. This issue has been s0uarely resolved by this Court since the 1!1# case of usi vs, Razon 3and a lon& line of cases, infra8. It is
established doctrine as first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for
the period provided in the (ublic 4and Act provision in force at the time 3from :uly 1., 17!6 in ;usi under the old la)8 by a private
individual personally and throu&h his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, )hereby the land ceases to be land of
the public domain and becomes private property.
3At that time in 1!1# in the usi case, such possession )as re0uired "from +uly 45, /601" as then provided for in section 6#3b8 of
the old (ublic 4and Act 5o. 17-6, amendin& Act 5o. !1.C )hereas at present, as provided for in the correspondin& section 67, par.
3b8 of the later and subsistin& (ublic 4and Act, Common)ealth Act 5o. 161, as amended by /ep. Act 5o. 1!61 approved on +une
44, /027, in force since 1!#-, the period of open and unchallen&ed possession )as reduced to "at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is admitted
in the main opinion of $r. :ustice A0uino, )herein it is stated that "3I8n the usi case, this Court applied section 6# 3b8 of Act 5o.
17-6 )hich corresponds to )hat is now section 168b9. It )as held that the lon& possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
o)nership since :uly 1., 17!6 &ave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions
essential to a Bovernment &rant and )as thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4 The tet of the correspondin& section 673b8, as
amended by /ep. Act 1!61 referred to is reproducedverbatim in $r. :ustice A0uinoAs opinion 8 and 0uotes the reduced statutory period of
open and unchallen&ed possession of "at least thirty years immediately precedin& the filin& of the application."8
Accordin&ly, the Court held that usi, as the ri&htful possessor of the public land for the statutory period, ac0uired the same by
operation of la) as a &rant from the Government, "not only a right to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the
public domain and had become private property at least by presumption" as epressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed
sale by the ,irector of 4ands of the same land to another person )as void and of no effect and usi as the ri&htful possessor could
recover the land as his private propertyfrom the supposed vendee )ho did not ac0uire any ri&ht thereto since it had ceased to be
land of the public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the case, thatD
. . . In favor of Valentin ;usi, there is, moreover, the presumption !uris et de !ure, established in para&raph 3b8 of section 6# of Act
5o. 17-6, amendin& Act 5o. !1., that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with for he has
been in actual and physical possession, personally and throu&h his predecessors, of an a&ricultural land of the public domain,
openly continuously, eclusively and publicly since :uly 1., 17!6, )ith a ri&ht to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. ;o that )hen An&ela /a'on applied for the &rant in her favor, Valentin ;usi had already
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient , under the
provisions of section 6- of Act 5o. 17-6. :f by a legal function, Valentin ;usi had ac0uired the land in 0uestion by a &rant of the
;tate, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
;usi, beyond the control of the -irector of 3ands. Conse0uently, in sellin& the land in 0uestion to An&ela /a'on, the ,irector of
4ands disposed of a land over )hich he had no lon&er any title or control, and the sa*e thus made )as void and of no effect, and
An&ela /a'on did not thereby ac0uire any ri&ht." 6
1. The above-0uoted rulin& in ;usi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a lon& unbro*en line of cases, as follo)sD
In &esina vs, *da, de onza, 9 the Court held that "3I8n the case of usi vs, Razon, et al,, 67 (hil. 616, it )as observed that )here all the
necessary re0uirements for a &rant by the Bovernment are complied )ith throu&h actual physical possession openly, continuously, and
publicly, )ith a ri&ht to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act 5o. 17-6, amendin& Act 5o. !1.
3carried over as Chapter VIII of Common)ealth Act 5o. 1618, the possessor is deemed to have already ac0uired by operation of law not
only a ri&ht to a &rant, but a &rant of the Bovernment, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant
may be sanctioned by the courts E an application therefor bein& sufficient under the provisions of ;ection 6- of Act 5o. 17-6
3reproduced as ;ection #2, Common)ealth Act 5o. 1618." and "3C8onsiderin& that this case )as dismissed by the trial court merely on a
motion to dismiss on the &round that plaintiffAs action is already barred by the statute of limitations, )hich apparently is predicated on the
theory that a decree of re&istration can no lon&er be impu&ned on the &round of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree,
)hich theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in natural and has ceased to be part of the public
domain, )e are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissin& the case outri&ht )ithout &ivin& plaintiff a chance to prove his claim."
In 3acaste vs, -irector of 3ands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession, the land in 0uestion became private property on the
stren&th of the usi doctrine.
In &anarpaac vs, Cabanatan, 9 the Court 0uoted )ith favor the tet of the above-0uoted rulin& of ;usi, and its ratio decidendithusD
The ,irector of 4ands contends that the land in 0uestion bein& of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot
maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, that land, the possession of )hich is in dispute, had already become, operation of law, private
property, there is lac'ing only the !udicial sanction of his title, Valentin ;usi has the ri&ht to brin& an action to
recover the possession thereof and hold it.
In &iguel vs, Court of ;ppeals, 1: the Court a&ain held that )here possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in
the concept of an o)ner, there is a presumption !uris et de !ure that all necessary conditions for a &rant by the ;tate have been complied
)ith and he )ould have been by force of law entitled to the re&istration of his title to the land 3citin& Pamintuan vs, :nsular Government, 7
(hil. 67# and ;usi vs. /a'on, 67 (hil. 6168.
In the latest 1!72 case of )erico vs, -ar, 11 the Court once more reiterated the ;usi doctrine that "3A8nother obvious error of the
respondent Court is in holdin& that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no lon&er be reopened to be
declared and void, and has become absolute and indefeasible. . . . ;econdly, under the provisions of /epublic Act 5o. 1!61, )hich the
respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitionerAs case, with the latter<s proven occupation and cultivation for more than => years
since /0/1, by himself and by his predecessors(in(interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no lon&er disposable under the (ublic 4and Act as by free patent. This is as provided in /epublic Act
5o. 1!61, )hich too* effect on :une 11, 1!#-, amendin& ;ection 67-b of Common)ealth Act 5o. 161 )hich providesD . . . As interpreted
in several cases )hen the conditions as specified in the fore&oin& provision are complied )ith, the possessor is deemed to have acquired,
by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. $he land, therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the ,irector of 4ands to dispose of. $he application for confirmation is a
mere formality, the lac' of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as )ould be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title
to be issued upon the stren&th of said patent."
". In fine, since under the CourtAs settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for
no) in section 67, par. 3b8 of the (ublic 4and Act ta*es place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and
becomes private property upon a sho)in& of open and unchallen&ed possession under bona fide claim of o)nership by the
applicantsA predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty years immediately precedin& the filin& of the application and "it
is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said &rant may be sanctioned by the court" )hich ri&ht is
epressly bac*ed up by theconclusive presumption or presumption !uris et de !ure of the statute that the possessor has "performed
all the conditions essential to a Bovernment &rant," the applicant $eralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filin&
the application for re&istration of the private property duly ac0uired by it.
6. It should be noted that respondent 9ud&eAs decision in the $eralco case e.pressly finds as established factsthat the $eralcoAs
predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied as o)ners the land in 0uestion for at least over "# yearsC =limpia /amos
havin& possessed the same since the last )orld )ar in 1!61 and then havin& sold the same on :uly ", 1!6- to the (i&uin& spouses
)ho built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same until they sold the same in turn to the $eralco on Au&ust 1",
1!-., 12 $eralcoAs predecessors-in-interest had therefore ac0uired by operation of the Public 3and Act a Bovernment &rant to the
property, as )ell as ac0uired o)nership thereof by ri&ht of acquisitive prescription over the land )hich thereby became private property.
The very definition of prescription as a mode of ac0uirin& o)nership as set forth in Art. 112. of the Civil Code provides that "?y
prescription one ac0uires o)nership and other real ri&hts throu&h lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid do)n by la)."
The la) does not provide that one ac0uires o)nership of a land by prescription only after his title thereto is !udicially confirmed. To this
same effect is the rulin& inCario vs, :nsular Government 13, )herein the H.;. ;upreme Court spea*in& throu&h :ustice @olmes held that
It is true that the lan&ua&e of Articles 6 and # attributes title to those A)ho may proveA possession for the necessary
time and )e do not overloo* the ar&ument that this means may prove in re&istration proceedin&s. It may be that an
%n&lish conveyancer )ould have recommended an application under the fore&oin& decree, but certainly it )as not
calculated to convey to the mind of an I&orot chief the notion that ancient family possessions )ere in dan&er, if he
had read every )ord of it. The )ords"may prove" 3acrediten8, as )ell, or better, in vie) of the other provisions,
mi&ht be ta'en to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that re&istration )as
epected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost .$he
effect of the proof, )henever made, )as not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier la).
To the same effect is the CourtAs rulin& in 3egarda and Prieto vs, aleeby, "1 (hil. #!2, that "an o)ner does not obtain title by
virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title."
#. ;ince the public land because private property upon completion of the "2th year of continuous, eclusive, and unchallen&ed
possession of the applicant $eralcoAs predecessors-in-interest, particularly the (i&uin& spouses )ho sold the private land to the
$eralco, there is no 9ustification for denyin& the $eralcoAs application for re&istration of its duly ac0uired title to the land.
$eralcoAs predecessors-in-interest had ac0uired o)nership of the land by ac0uisitive prescription as provided by the (ublic 4and
Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private property and $eralco duly ac0uired it by ri&ht of purchase. To deny $eralcoAs
application to re&ister the property because it is not a natural person is un9ustified because neither the ne) constitutional ban under
the 1!-" Constitution a&ainst private corporations o)nin& lands of the public domain or the (ublic 4and ActAs limitation on the
ri&ht of application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invo*ed any lon&er as the land had lon&
ceased to be public land but had become private property. $eralcoAs application in effect see*s confirmation of the ac0uisition of
o)nership of the land )hich had become private property of its predecessors-in-interest, the (i&uin& spouses )ho thru their open
and unchallen&ed possession of the land for over thirty years ac0uired title thereto by ac0uisitive prescription and by conclusive
presumption of the (ublic 4and Act itself. There is no le&al nor constitutional obstacle to such title bein& transferred to the $eralco
by ri&ht of purchase and traditio E for it is not claimed that there is any le&al prohibition a&ainst the (i&uin& spouses transferrin&
the o)nership of the land to others 3)hether natural persons or corporations8 such as the applicant $eralco, even before the formal
issuance of the certificate of title to them.
.. To uphold respondent 9ud&eAs denial of $eralcoAs application on the technicality that the (ublic 4and Act allo)s only citi'ens of
the (hilippines )ho are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title )ould be impractical and )ould 9ust &ive rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assumin& that there )as a technical error in not havin& filed the application for re&istration in the
name of the (i&uin& spouses as the ori&inal o)ners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition a&ainst their sale of
the land to the applicant $eralco and neither is there any prohibition a&ainst the application bein& refiled )ith retroactive effect in
the name of the ori&inal o)ners and vendors 3as such natural persons8 )ith the end result of their application bein& &ranted, because
of their indisputable ac0uisition of o)nership by operation of la) and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It
should not be necessary to &o throu&h all the rituals as the &reat cost of refilin& of all such applications in their names and addin& to
the overcro)ded court doc*ets )hen the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and no). 3;ee +rancisco vs. City of
,avao 148
The ends of 9ustice )ould best be served, therefore, by considerin& the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the
evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the ori&inal persons )ho as natural persons are duly 0ualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had ac0uired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the (ublic 4and Act and )ho thereafter
duly sold to the herein corporations 3both admittedly +ilipino corporations duly 0ualified to hold and o)n private lands8 and
&rantin& the application for confirmation of title to the private lands so ac0uired and sold or echan&ed.
-. All that has been said here applies of course )ith e0ual force to the I&lesia case, save that as already stated at the be&innin&
hereof, the I&lesia application )as &ranted because the /epublic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent
9ud&e held in effect that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property, the title to )hich
could be duly issued in the name of the I&lesia as the transferee of its predecessors-in-interest.
7. It should bear emphasis that )hat are involved here are small parcels of land, of 1.# s0uare meters in the $eralco case used for
installation of an "anchor &uy" for its steel posts in connection )ith its tas*s as a nationali'ed domestic corporation to furnish
electrical service to the consumer public, and of "1" s0uare meters in the I&lesia case used as the site of its church built thereon to
minister to the reli&ious needs of its members. In no )ay, may the letter, intent and spirit of the prohibition of the 1!-" Constitution
a&ainst corporations "holdin& alienable lands of the public domain ecept by lease not to eceed one thousand hectares in area"
3)hich is beamed a&ainst the undue control and eploitation of our public lands and natural resources by corporations, +ilipino and
forei&n-controlled8 be deemed violated or disre&arded by the &rantin& of the applications at bar. The t)o corporations in truth and
in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at bar for their o)n use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public.
!. Fith reference to the separate concurrin& opinion of $r. :ustice ,e Castro )herein he )ould blunt the "supposedly 3sic8 )ell-
established doctrine" 3at pa&e 18 from the 1!2! case of Cario and the 1!1# case of usido)n to the 1!72 case of )erico 3supra, at
pa&es # to 118 and support the contrary pronouncement in $r. :ustice A0uinoAs main opinion that "as bet)een the ;tate and the
$eralco, the said land is still public land. It )ould cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any
+ilipino citi'en claimin& it under section 673b8 Jof the (ublic 4and ActK" 3at pa&e #8, suffice it to cite his o)n pronouncement
in )erico 3reiteratin& the )ell-established and prevailin& doctrine )hich this Court has not overturned, as it cannot overturn the
mandate of the statute that the unchallen&ed possessor for at least "2 years is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a &overnment &rant"8 )herein $r. :ustice ,e Castro cate&orically reiterated for the Court that "As
interpretated in several cases . . . the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued, $he and, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond
the authority of the ,irector of 4ands to dispose of. $he application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lac' of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the titleas )ould be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the stren&th of said
patent."
In only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that $r. :ustice ,e CastroAs seemin&ly 0uerulous
statement that "the discussion of the 0uestion of )hether the land involved is still public or already private land, is, ho)ever,
entirely pointless or an idle e.ercise, if Fe consider the provision of ection /1, ;rticle ?:* of the Constitution )hich appears to
have been lost si&ht of, )hich provides that Asave in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed ecept to individuals, corporations, or associations 0ualified to ac0uire or hold lands of the public domainA" 3at pa&e 18
that "hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its ac0uisition by the
$eralco or I&lesia )hich admittedly are Acorporations or associationsA )ithin the meanin& of the aforecited provisions of the 5e)
Constitution. This observation should end all ar&uments of the issue of )hether the land in 0uestion is public or private land"
3idem8 mi&ht mislead one to the )ron& conclusion that corporations )ith .2L +ilipino o)nership may not o)n private lands )hen
the epress provisions of Art. XIV, section ! 18 and section 16 as 0uoted by himself as )ell as the counterpart provisions of the 1!"#
Constitution have al)ays epressly permitted +ilipino-o)ned corporations to o)n private lands, and the only chan&e effected in the 1!-"
Constitution is section 11 )hich no) prohibits even such +ilipino corporations to o)n or hold lands of the public domain ecept by lease
not to eceed 1,222 hectares in area.
ACC=/,I5B4M, I vote for reversal of respondent courtAs 9ud&ment in the $eralco case and for the entry of a ne) 9ud&ment
&rantin& $eralcoAs application and for affirmance of 9ud&ment in the second case &rantin& the I&lesia application.


!e4)&)$e O4'n'on(
A"AD !ANTO!, J.5 *on*u&&'n65
I concur in the result. I am of the opinion that the lots )hich are sou&ht to be re&istered have ceased to be lands of the public
domain at the time they )ere ac0uired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of ac0uisitive
prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordin&ly, the
constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable.
@o)ever, the petitioner is relyin& on ;ec. 67 of the (ublic 4and Act for the confirmation of its title and $r. :ustice A0uino is
correct in holdin& that said provision cannot be availed by 9uridical entities.
ERNANDO, C.J., concurrin& and dissentin&D
I concur in the rulin& of the Court that $eralco "as a 9uridical person" is dis0ualified to apply for its re&istration under ;ection
673b8.. 1 I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court )ould characteri'e such 9urisdictional defect, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief
sou&ht. I )ould apply by analo&y, althou&h the facts could be distin&uished, the approach follo)ed by us in +rancisco v. City of ,avao, 2 )here the le&al 0uestion raised, instead
of bein& deferred and possibly ta*en up in another case, )as resolved. ?y le&al fiction 3 and in the eercise of our e0uitable 9urisdiction, I
feel that the realistic solution)ould be to decide the matter as if the application under ;ection 673b8 )ere filed by the (i&uin& spouses,
)ho I assume suffer from no such disability.
DE CA!TRO, J., dissentin&D
:ustice Teehan*ee cites in his dissentin& opinion the case of herico vs. ,ar, 1 the decision in )hich I am the ponente, as reiteratin& a
supposedly )ell-established doctrine that lands of the public domain )hich, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a len&th of
time, a &rant by the ;tate to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain, but is se&re&ated
therefrom as to be no lon&er sub9ect to the authority of the ,irector of 4ands to dispose under the public lands la)s or statutes. @e )ould
thus consider said land as no lon&er public land but "private" lands and therefore, not )ithin the prohibition of the 5e) Constitution
a&ainst corporations from ac0uirin& public lands )hich provides that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain ecept by lease not to eceed one thousand hectares." 2
I cannot subscribe to the vie) that the land as above described has become private land, even before title thereto, )hich is, as of
this sta&e, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title," has been fully vested on the occupant, throu&h the prescribed procedure
*no)n as 9udicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. 3 This is the only le&al method by )hich full and absolute title to the
land may be &ranted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure such 9udicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The
,irector of 4ands has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. @is authority is limited to another form of
disposition of public land, referred to as administrative le&ali'ation, resultin& in the issuance of free patents, also based on possession, in
)hich case, as in the issuance of homestead and sales patents, the land involved is undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of
public land )ould have the option to ac0uire title thereto throu&h 9udicial confirmation or administrative le&ali'ation. The difference is
that in the latter case, the area disposable to a citi'en-applicant by the ,irector of 4ands is limited to 16 hectares. There is no limit to the
area sub9ect to 9udicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, ecept possibly the limit fied for a ;tate &rant under old ;panish
la)s and decrees, )hich certainly is much lar&er than that set for free patents.
It is because of the divestiture of authority of the ,irector of 4ands to dispose of the land sub9ect to 9udicial confirmation of
incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many cases, such as those cited by :ustice Teehan*ee, to the effect
that such land has ceased to be a public land. Fhat these statements, ho)ever, really mean is that the land referred to no lon&er
forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the ,irector of 4ands, under the authority &ranted him by the public
land statutes. It, ho)ever, )ould not follo) that the land covered by ;ection 67 of the (ublic 4and Act has itself become private
land. The fact that its disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act )hich deals )ith "public land" &ives rise to the very stron&
implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land. =nly )hen the court ad9udicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title )ould the land become privately o)ned land, for in the same proceedin&, the court may declare it
public land, dependin& on the evidence.
The discussion of the 0uestion of )hether the land involved is still public or already private land is, ho)ever, entirely pointless, or
an idle eercise, if Fe consider the provision of ;ection 16, Article XIV of the Constitution )hich appears to have been lost si&ht
of, )hich provides that Asave in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed ecept to
individuals, corporations, or associations 0ualified to ac0uire or hold lands of the public domain." As previously stated, by epress
provisions of the Constitution, no corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain ecept by lease, not to
eceed, 1,222 hectares in area. 4 @ence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section
prohibits its ac0uisition by the $eralco or I&lesia )hich admittedly are "corporations or association" )ithin the meanin& of the aforecited
provision of the 5e) Constitution. This observation should end all ar&uments on the issue of )hether the land in 0uestion is public or
private land. Althou&h it may further be observed that supposin& a corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the
very be&innin&, may it apply for 9udicial confirmation of the land in 0uestion to ac0uire title to its o)ner after possessin& the land for the
re0uisite len&th of timeI The ans)er is believed obvious E it may not. If its possession is not from the be&innin& but has commenced
only upon the transfer to it by the prior possessor, may the corporation applyI The ans)er is 9ust as obvious E )ith more reason, it may
not.
This separate opinion should have had no need to be )ritten because the ma9ority opinion )ritten by :ustice A0uino is already )ell-
reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. I )as impelled to )rite it only because in the dissentin& opinion of :ustice
Teehan*ee, the case of )erico vs, -ar 3supra8 )hich is my ponencia)as cited in support of his position. This separate opinion then
is more to sho) and eplain that )hatever has been stated by me in the ,ar case should be interpreted in the li&ht of )hat I have
said in this separate opinion, )hich I believe, does not stren&then :ustice Teehan*eeAs position a bit.
TEE1AN7EE, J., dissentin&D
Involved in these t)o cases are the applications of petitioner $eralco, a nationali'ed domestic corporation, in the first case and
respondent I&lesia in Cristo, a reli&ious corporation sole, in the second case 3both admittedly +ilipino corporations 0ualified to hold
and o)n private lands8, for 9udicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as distin&uished
from strictly a&ricultural land, ac0uired by them by purchase or echan&e from private persons publicly recognized as the private
owners 3)ho have been in the open, continuous, eclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands under a bona fide
claim of o)nership for at least thirty J"2K years immediately precedin& the filin& of the applications8.
This dissent is based on the failure of the ma9ority to adhere to established doctrine since the 1!2! case ofCario and the 1!1# case
of usi do)n to the 1!72 case of )erico, infra, pursuant to the (ublic 4and Act, as amended, that )here a possessor has held the
open, eclusive and unchallen&ed possession of alienable public land for the statutory period provided by la) 3"2 years no) under
amendatory /ep. Act 5o. 1!61 approved on :une 11, 1!#-8, the la) itself mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Bovernment &rant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and "by
legal fictionJthe landK has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private property." Accordin&ly, the prohibition
of the 1!-" Constitution and of the (ublic 4and Act a&ainst private corporation holdin& lands of the public domain has no
applicability in the present cases. Fhat $eralco and I&lesia have ac0uired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to
be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to them and therefore their applicatins for
confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-interestA vested ri&ht and title may be duly &ranted.
The land covered by the $eralco application of 5ovember 1., 1!-. consists of t)o 318 small lots )ith a total area of 1.# s0uare
meters located at Tanay, /i'al )ith an assessed value of (",1-2.22. This land )as possessed by =limpia /amos before Forld Farr
II )hich bro*e out in the (acific in 1!61. =limpia /amos sold the land on :uly ", 1!6- to the spouses /afael (i&uin& and $inerva
Inocencio )ho constructed a house thereon. ?ut because the $eralco had instealled the "anchor &uy" of its stell posts on the land,
the (i&uin& spouses sold the land to the $eralco on Au&ust 1", 1!-.. The land had been declared for realty ta. purposes since
/012 and realty taes )ere re&ularly paid thereon. It is residential in character as distin&uished from strictly a&ricultural land. It is
li*e)ise established that it is not included in any military reservation and that since 1!1- it had been certified as part of the
alienable or disposable portion of the public domain.
The land covered by the I&lesia application of ;eptember ", 1!-- li*e)ise consists of t)o 318 small lots located in ?arrio ,ampol,
(laridel, ?ulacan )ith a total area of "1" s0uare meters and )ith an assessed value of (1,"#2.22. The land )as ac0uired by the
I&lesia on :anuary !, 1!#" from Andres (ere' in echan&e for a lot o)ned by the I&lesia )ith an area of 16- s0uare meters. The
land )as already possessed by (ere' in 1!"". Admittedly also it is not included in any military reservation and is inside an area
)hich )as certified since 1!1- as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the I&lesia stands on
the said land. It had been duly declared for realty ta. purposes in the name of the I&lesia and realty taes )ere regularly
paidthereon.
/espondent 9ud&e in the $eralco case sustained the /epublicAs opposition and dismissed the application, holdin& that under both
the provisions of the ne) Constitution and the (ublic 4and Act, $eralco, bein& a corporation and not a natural person, is not
0ualified to apply for the re&istration of title over the public land.
=n the other hand, in the I&lesia case, the /epublic presented no evidence in support of its opposition but epressly "submitted the
case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant." /espondent 9ud&e in the case accordin&ly &ranted the
application for re&istration of the land in the name of the I&lesia, holdin& that it had been "satisfactorily established that applicant K
I&lesiaK and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, public and adverse possession of the land . . . under a bona
fide claim of o)nership for more than thirty 3"28 years prior to the filin& of the application" and is therefore entitled to the
re&istration applied for under the (ublic 4and Act, as amended.
?oth decisions are no) )ith the Court for revie). I hold that both applications for re&istration should be &ranted by virtue of the
prevailin& principle as enunciated since the 1!1# case of usi vs, Razon and -irector of 3ands 1and reaffirmed in a lon& line of cases
do)n to the 1!72 case of )erico vs, -ar 2 that the lands in 0uestion ceased, ipso !ure, or by operation of la), to be lands of the public
domain upon completion of the statutory period of open, continuous, eclusive, notorious and unchallen&ed possession thereof by the
applicantsA predecessors-in-interest )ho )ere 0ualified natural persons and entitled to re&istration by ri&ht of ac0uisitive prescription
under the provisions of the (ublic 4and Act, and that accordin&ly the 9ud&ment in the $eralco case should be reversed and a ne)
9ud&ment entered &rantin& $eralcoAs application, )hile the 9ud&ment in the I&lesia case should stand affirmed.
The principal issue at bar may thus be statedD
It is epressly provided in section 67, par. 3b8 of the (ublic 4and Act 3Common)ealth Act 5o. 161, as amended by /ep. Act 5o.
1!61, approved on :une 11, 1!#-8 that citi'ens of the (hilippines )ho are natural persons )ho have occupied lands of the public
domain but )hose titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the correspondin& court of first instance for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under the 4and /e&istration Act in cases )here they
"by themselves or through their predecessors(in(interest have been in the open, continuous, eclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of a&ricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ac0uisition of o)nership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title ecept )hen prevented by )ar or force ma!eure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Bovernment &rant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." 3 In such cases, is the land ipso 9ure or by operation of la) converted into
private land upon completion of the "2th year of continuous and unchallen&ed occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private
land, it may be duly transferred to and o)ned by private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent 9ud&e in the $eralco case,
remain part of the public domain and does not become private land until after actual 9udicial confirmation proceedin&s and the formal
court order for the issuance of the certificate of titleI
1. This issue has been s0uarely resolved by this Court since the 1!1# case of usi vs, Razon 3and a lon& line of cases, infra8. It is
established doctrine as first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for
the period provided in the (ublic 4and Act provision in force at the time 3from :uly 1., 17!6 in ;usi under the old la)8 by a private
individual personally and throu&h his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, )hereby the land ceases to be land of
the public domain and becomes private property.
3At that time in 1!1# in the usi case, such possession )as re0uired "from +uly 45, /601" as then provided for in section 6#3b8 of
the old (ublic 4and Act 5o. 17-6, amendin& Act 5o. !1.C )hereas at present, as provided for in the correspondin& section 67, par.
3b8 of the later and subsistin& (ublic 4and Act, Common)ealth Act 5o. 161, as amended by /ep. Act 5o. 1!61 approved on +une
44, /027, in force since 1!#-, the period of open and unchallen&ed possession )as reduced to "at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is admitted
in the main opinion of $r. :ustice A0uino, )herein it is stated that "3I8n the usi case, this Court applied section 6# 3b8 of Act 5o.
17-6 )hich corresponds to )hat is now section 168b9. It )as held that the lon& possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
o)nership since :uly 1., 17!6 &ave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions
essential to a Bovernment &rant and )as thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4 The tet of the correspondin& section 673b8, as
amended by /ep. Act 1!61 referred to is reproducedverbatim in $r. :ustice A0uinoAs opinion 8 and 0uotes the reduced statutory period of
open and unchallen&ed possession of "at least thirty years immediately precedin& the filin& of the application."8
Accordin&ly, the Court held that usi, as the ri&htful possessor of the public land for the statutory period, ac0uired the same by
operation of la) as a &rant from the Government, "not only a right to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the
public domain and had become private property at least by presumption" as epressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed
sale by the ,irector of 4ands of the same land to another person )as void and of no effect and usi as the ri&htful possessor could
recover the land as his private propertyfrom the supposed vendee )ho did not ac0uire any ri&ht thereto since it had ceased to be
land of the public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the case, thatD
. . . In favor of Valentin ;usi, there is, moreover, the presumption !uris et de !ure, established in para&raph 3b8 of section 6# of Act
5o. 17-6, amendin& Act 5o. !1., that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with for he has
been in actual and physical possession, personally and throu&h his predecessors, of an a&ricultural land of the public domain,
openly continuously, eclusively and publicly since :uly 1., 17!6, )ith a ri&ht to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. ;o that )hen An&ela /a'on applied for the &rant in her favor, Valentin ;usi had already
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 6- of Act 5o. 17-6. :f by a legal function, Valentin ;usi had ac0uired the land in 0uestion by a &rant of the
;tate, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
;usi, beyond the control of the -irector of 3ands. Conse0uently, in sellin& the land in 0uestion to An&ela /a'on, the ,irector of
4ands disposed of a land over )hich he had no lon&er any title or control, and the sa*e thus made )as void and of no effect, and
An&ela /a'on did not thereby ac0uire any ri&ht." 6
1. The above-0uoted rulin& in ;usi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a lon& unbro*en line of cases, as follo)sD
In &esina vs, *da, de onza, 9 the Court held that "3I8n the case of usi vs, Razon, et al,, 67 (hil. 616, it )as observed that )here all the
necessary re0uirements for a &rant by the Bovernment are complied )ith throu&h actual physical possession openly, continuously, and
publicly, )ith a ri&ht to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act 5o. 17-6, amendin& Act 5o. !1.
3carried over as Chapter VIII of Common)ealth Act 5o. 1618, the possessor is deemed to have already ac0uired by operation of law not
only a ri&ht to a &rant, but a &rant of the Bovernment, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant
may be sanctioned by the courts E an application therefor bein& sufficient under the provisions of ;ection 6- of Act 5o. 17-6
3reproduced as ;ection #2, Common)ealth Act 5o. 1618." and "3C8onsiderin& that this case )as dismissed by the trial court merely on a
motion to dismiss on the &round that plaintiffAs action is already barred by the statute of limitations, )hich apparently is predicated on the
theory that a decree of re&istration can no lon&er be impu&ned on the &round of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree,
)hich theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in natural and has ceased to be part of the public
domain, )e are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissin& the case outri&ht )ithout &ivin& plaintiff a chance to prove his claim."
In 3acaste vs, -irector of 3ands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession, the land in 0uestion became private property on the
stren&th of the usi doctrine.
In &anarpaac vs, Cabanatan, 9 the Court 0uoted )ith favor the tet of the above-0uoted rulin& of ;usi, and its ratio decidendithusD
The ,irector of 4ands contends that the land in 0uestion bein& of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot
maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, that land, the possession of )hich is in dispute, had already become, operation of law, private
property, there is lac'ing only the !udicial sanction of his title, Valentin ;usi has the ri&ht to brin& an action to
recover the possession thereof and hold it.
In &iguel vs, Court of ;ppeals, 1: the Court a&ain held that )here possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in
the concept of an o)ner, there is a presumption !uris et de !ure that all necessary conditions for a &rant by the ;tate have been complied
)ith and he )ould have been by force of law entitled to the re&istration of his title to the land 3citin& Pamintuan vs, :nsular Government, 7
(hil. 67# and ;usi vs. /a'on, 67 (hil. 6168.
In the latest 1!72 case of )erico vs, -ar, 11 the Court once more reiterated the ;usi doctrine that "3A8nother obvious error of the
respondent Court is in holdin& that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no lon&er be reopened to be
declared and void, and has become absolute and indefeasible. . . . ;econdly, under the provisions of /epublic Act 5o. 1!61, )hich the
respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitionerAs case, with the latter<s proven occupation and cultivation for more than => years
since /0/1, by himself and by his predecessors(in(interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no lon&er disposable under the (ublic 4and Act as by free patent. This is as provided in /epublic Act
5o. 1!61, )hich too* effect on :une 11, 1!#-, amendin& ;ection 67-b of Common)ealth Act 5o. 161 )hich providesD . . . As interpreted
in several cases )hen the conditions as specified in the fore&oin& provision are complied )ith, the possessor is deemed to have acquired,
by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. $he land, therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the ,irector of 4ands to dispose of. $he application for confirmation is a
mere formality, the lac' of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as )ould be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title
to be issued upon the stren&th of said patent."
". In fine, since under the CourtAs settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for
no) in section 67, par. 3b8 of the (ublic 4and Act ta*es place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and
becomes private property upon a sho)in& of open and unchallen&ed possession under bona fide claim of o)nership by the
applicantsA predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty years immediately precedin& the filin& of the application and "it
is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said &rant may be sanctioned by the court" )hich ri&ht is
epressly bac*ed up by theconclusive presumption or presumption !uris et de !ure of the statute that the possessor has "performed
all the conditions essential to a Bovernment &rant," the applicant $eralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filin&
the application for re&istration of the private property duly ac0uired by it.
6. It should be noted that respondent 9ud&eAs decision in the $eralco case e.pressly finds as established factsthat the $eralcoAs
predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied as o)ners the land in 0uestion for at least over "# yearsC =limpia /amos
havin& possessed the same since the last )orld )ar in 1!61 and then havin& sold the same on :uly ", 1!6- to the (i&uin& spouses
)ho built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same until they sold the same in turn to the $eralco on Au&ust 1",
1!-., 12 $eralcoAs predecessors-in-interest had therefore ac0uired by operation of the Public 3and Act a Bovernment &rant to the
property, as )ell as ac0uired o)nership thereof by ri&ht of acquisitive prescription over the land )hich thereby became private property.
The very definition of prescription as a mode of ac0uirin& o)nership as set forth in Art. 112. of the Civil Code provides that "?y
prescription one ac0uires o)nership and other real ri&hts throu&h lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid do)n by la)."
The la) does not provide that one ac0uires o)nership of a land by prescription only after his title thereto is !udicially confirmed. To this
same effect is the rulin& inCario vs, :nsular Government 13, )herein the H.;. ;upreme Court spea*in& throu&h :ustice @olmes held that
It is true that the lan&ua&e of Articles 6 and # attributes title to those A)ho may proveA possession for the necessary
time and )e do not overloo* the ar&ument that this means may prove in re&istration proceedin&s. It may be that an
%n&lish conveyancer )ould have recommended an application under the fore&oin& decree, but certainly it )as not
calculated to convey to the mind of an I&orot chief the notion that ancient family possessions )ere in dan&er, if he
had read every )ord of it. The )ords"may prove" 3acrediten8, as )ell, or better, in vie) of the other provisions,
mi&ht be ta'en to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that re&istration )as
epected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.$he
effect of the proof, )henever made, )as not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier la).
To the same effect is the CourtAs rulin& in 3egarda and Prieto vs, aleeby, "1 (hil. #!2, that "an o)ner does not obtain title by
virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title."
#. ;ince the public land because private property upon completion of the "2th year of continuous, eclusive, and unchallen&ed
possession of the applicant $eralcoAs predecessors-in-interest, particularly the (i&uin& spouses )ho sold the private land to the
$eralco, there is no 9ustification for denyin& the $eralcoAs application for re&istration of its duly ac0uired title to the land.
$eralcoAs predecessors-in-interest had ac0uired o)nership of the land by ac0uisitive prescription as provided by the (ublic 4and
Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private property and $eralco duly ac0uired it by ri&ht of purchase. To deny $eralcoAs
application to re&ister the property because it is not a natural person is un9ustified because neither the ne) constitutional ban under
the 1!-" Constitution a&ainst private corporations o)nin& lands of the public domain or the (ublic 4and ActAs limitation on the
ri&ht of application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invo*ed any lon&er as the land had lon&
ceased to be public land but had become private property. $eralcoAs application in effect see*s confirmation of the ac0uisition of
o)nership of the land )hich had become private property of its predecessors-in-interest, the (i&uin& spouses )ho thru their open
and unchallen&ed possession of the land for over thirty years ac0uired title thereto by ac0uisitive prescription and by conclusive
presumption of the (ublic 4and Act itself. There is no le&al nor constitutional obstacle to such title bein& transferred to the $eralco
by ri&ht of purchase and traditio E for it is not claimed that there is any le&al prohibition a&ainst the (i&uin& spouses transferrin&
the o)nership of the land to others 3)hether natural persons or corporations8 such as the applicant $eralco, even before the formal
issuance of the certificate of title to them.
.. To uphold respondent 9ud&eAs denial of $eralcoAs application on the technicality that the (ublic 4and Act allo)s only citi'ens of
the (hilippines )ho are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title )ould be impractical and )ould 9ust &ive rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assumin& that there )as a technical error in not havin& filed the application for re&istration in the
name of the (i&uin& spouses as the ori&inal o)ners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition a&ainst their sale of
the land to the applicant $eralco and neither is there any prohibition a&ainst the application bein& refiled )ith retroactive effect in
the name of the ori&inal o)ners and vendors 3as such natural persons8 )ith the end result of their application bein& &ranted, because
of their indisputable ac0uisition of o)nership by operation of la) and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It
should not be necessary to &o throu&h all the rituals as the &reat cost of refilin& of all such applications in their names and addin& to
the overcro)ded court doc*ets )hen the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and no). 3;ee +rancisco vs. City of
,avao 148
The ends of 9ustice )ould best be served, therefore, by considerin& the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the
evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the ori&inal persons )ho as natural persons are duly 0ualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had ac0uired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the (ublic 4and Act and )ho thereafter
duly sold to the herein corporations 3both admittedly +ilipino corporations duly 0ualified to hold and o)n private lands8 and
&rantin& the application for confirmation of title to the private lands so ac0uired and sold or echan&ed.
-. All that has been said here applies of course )ith e0ual force to the I&lesia case, save that as already stated at the be&innin&
hereof, the I&lesia application )as &ranted because the /epublic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent
9ud&e held in effect that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property, the title to )hich
could be duly issued in the name of the I&lesia as the transferee of its predecessors-in-interest.
7. It should bear emphasis that )hat are involved here are small parcels of land, of 1.# s0uare meters in the $eralco case used for
installation of an "anchor &uy" for its steel posts in connection )ith its tas*s as a nationali'ed domestic corporation to furnish
electrical service to the consumer public, and of "1" s0uare meters in the I&lesia case used as the site of its church built thereon to
minister to the reli&ious needs of its members. In no )ay, may the letter, intent and spirit of the prohibition of the 1!-" Constitution
a&ainst corporations "holdin& alienable lands of the public domain ecept by lease not to eceed one thousand hectares in area"
3)hich is beamed a&ainst the undue control and eploitation of our public lands and natural resources by corporations, +ilipino and
forei&n-controlled8 be deemed violated or disre&arded by the &rantin& of the applications at bar. The t)o corporations in truth and
in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at bar for their o)n use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public.
!. Fith reference to the separate concurrin& opinion of $r. :ustice ,e Castro )herein he )ould blunt the "supposedly 3sic8 )ell-
established doctrine" 3at pa&e 18 from the 1!2! case of Cario and the 1!1# case of usido)n to the 1!72 case of )erico 3supra, at
pa&es # to 118 and support the contrary pronouncement in $r. :ustice A0uinoAs main opinion that "as bet)een the ;tate and the
$eralco, the said land is still public land. It )ould cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any
+ilipino citi'en claimin& it under section 673b8 Jof the (ublic 4and ActK" 3at pa&e #8, suffice it to cite his o)n pronouncement
in )erico 3reiteratin& the )ell-established and prevailin& doctrine )hich this Court has not overturned, as it cannot overturn the
mandate of the statute that the unchallen&ed possessor for at least "2 years is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a &overnment &rant"8 )herein $r. :ustice ,e Castro cate&orically reiterated for the Court that "As
interpretated in several cases . . . the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued, $he and, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond
the authority of the ,irector of 4ands to dispose of. $he application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lac' of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the titleas )ould be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the stren&th of said
patent."
In only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that $r. :ustice ,e CastroAs seemin&ly 0uerulous
statement that "the discussion of the 0uestion of )hether the land involved is still public oralready private land, is, ho)ever,
entirely pointless or an idle e.ercise, if Fe consider the provision of ection /1, ;rticle ?:* of the Constitution )hich appears to
have been lost si&ht of, )hich provides that Asave in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed ecept to individuals, corporations, or associations 0ualified to ac0uire or hold lands of the public domainA" 3at pa&e 18
that "hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its ac0uisition by the
$eralco or I&lesia )hich admittedly are Acorporations or associationsA )ithin the meanin& of the aforecited provisions of the 5e)
Constitution. This observation should end all ar&uments of the issue of )hether the land in 0uestion is public or private land"
3idem8 mi&ht mislead one to the )ron& conclusion that corporations )ith .2L +ilipino o)nership may not o)n private lands )hen
the epress provisions of Art. XIV, section ! 18 and section 16 as 0uoted by himself as )ell as the counterpart provisions of the 1!"#
Constitution have al)ays epressly permitted +ilipino-o)ned corporations to o)n private lands, and the only chan&e effected in the 1!-"
Constitution is section 11 )hich no) prohibits even such +ilipino corporations to o)n or hold lands of the public domain ecept by lease
not to eceed 1,222 hectares in area.
ACC=/,I5B4M, I vote for reversal of respondent courtAs 9ud&ment in the $eralco case and for the entry of a ne) 9ud&ment
&rantin& $eralcoAs application and for affirmance of 9ud&ment in the second case &rantin& the I&lesia application.
oo$no$e(
N The same issue is involved in the follo)in& fourteen pendin& cases. 318 B./. 5o. #1-#., I&lesia ni Cristo vs.
,irector of 4ands, et al.C 318 B./. 5o #626#, ,irector of 4ands vs. ,ynamarine Corporation, et al.C 3"8 B./. 5o.
#61-., ,irector of 4ands vs. I&lesia ni Cristo, et al.C 368 B./. 5o. #6!#1, ,irector of 4ands vs. @on. Babriel
Valley, :r., et al.C 3#8 B./. 5o. ##1-1, ,irector of 4ands vs. @on. :ob ?. $adaya&, et al.C 3.8 B./. 5o. ##17!.
,irector of 4ands vs. @on. Candido Villanueva, et al.,C 3-8 B./. 5o. #.21#. /epublic vs. @on. Arsenio Bonon&, et
al.C 378 B./. 5o. #..1", ,irector of 4ands vs. I&lesia ni Cristo, et al.C 3!8 B./. 5o. #-1-1, ,irector of 4ands vs.
Valen'uela Tannery Corporation, et al.C 318 B./. 5o. #-6.1, ,irector of 4ands vs. $anila %lectric Company, et al.C
3118 B./. 5o. #72--, ,irector of 4ands vs. @ermanos y @ermanas de ;ta. Cru' de $ayo, Inc., et al.C 3118 B./. 5o.
#727!, ,irector of 4ands vs. Continental 4eaf Tobacco 3(hil.8, et al.C 31"8 B./. 5o. #711-, ,irector of 4ands vs.
@on. %mmanuel Cleto, et al., and 3168 B./. 5o. #7!2., ,irector of 4ands vs. Hnited Church of Christ in the (hil.,
et al.
1 ,ecision, ..
1 112 (hil. 161- 31!.68 3per Concepcion, :.8
" Cf. +uller, 4e&al +ictions 31!.-8.
;%(A/AT% =(I5I=5
1 6# ;C/A 6"-.
1 ;ection 11, Article XIV, Constitution.
" ;ee ;ection 67 of the (ublic 4and Act.
6 ;ection 11, Article XIV, Constitution
T%%@A5>%%
1 67 (hil. 616.
1 !# ;C/A 6"- 3:an. 11, 1!728, citin& ;usi vs. /a'on, 67 (hil. 616C $esina vs. Vda. de ;on'a, 127 (hil. 1#1
31!.28.
" %mphasis supplied.
6 At pa&e .C emphasis supplied.
# At pa&es 6 and # thereof.
. %mphasis supplied.
- 127 (hil. 1#1, 1#" O 1## 31!.28.
7 ." (hil. .#6 .## 31!."8, citin& ,e 4os /eyes vs. /a'on, "7 (hil. 672C ;usi vs. /a'on, supra, and (5? vs. 4uis,
#" (hil. .6!. ;ee also ?alboa vs. +arrales, #1 (hil. 6!7, #2" 31!178.
! 11 ;C/A -6", -6---67 31!.-8.
12 1! ;C/A -.2, --! 31!.!8
11 !# ;C/A 6"-, 66"-666, per ,e Castro, :.
11 /ecord, p. 11
1" 61 (hil. !"# 31!2!8, 111 H.;. 66!, #" 4a)yers ed. #!6C 12 emphasis supplied.
16 11 ;C/A .17, ."6.
1# ";ec. !. The disposition, development, eploitation, or utili'ation of any of the natural resources of the
(hilippines shall be limited to citi'ens of the (hilippines, or to corporations or associations at least sity per
centum, of the capital of )hich is o)ned by such citi'ens." 3Art. XIV, 1!-" Constitution8.