LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

QUALIFICATIONS: 6, 3
Nat. born citizen
@ least 35(S)/25(HR) on day of election
Able to read and write
Registered voter
Resident of Ph not <2y
*qualifications not expandable or amenable for w/c it is destroying the
supremacy of consti

Registered Voter has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications; is found on Election Registry and whom only left to
do is to vote.

9, 10c qualified candidate shall be free from
harassment/discrimination

Nuval vs. Guray
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The term residence as so used is synonymous with domicile, which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. (People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)

The domicile or legal residence has been define as the place where a
person has a principal house or habitation, or where he kepts his
family and his chief place of business.

It is evident that bodily presence in a place, accompanied by the
intention to live therein forever, establishes domicile or residence.

Aquino vs. COMELEC
KAPUNAN, J.:
Clearly, the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile,
is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for
the purposes of election law.

ANIMUS REVERTENDI intention to return

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
KAPUNAN, J.:
Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his
domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of
birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of ones birth must
be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.

Maquerra vs. Borra
That said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and
essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the
principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system
is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn,
implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not
be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas
social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike,
and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied
the chance to be elected to public office.



2 kinds of Citizenship: Art. 4, 2
Natural Born (including repatriates) doesnt have to do anything to
perfect citizenship
Naturalized

Bengson III vs. HRET
KAPUNAN, J.:
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by
those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II;

(3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political
economic necessity.


Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Caasi vs. CA
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have
waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country. Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office
in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run
for any elective office (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).

Terms: commences at noon of June 30
6, 4 Senate 6 y, 2 terms/ 12 y
6, 7.2 3 y, 3 terms/ 9 y

Salary:
6, 10 - may increase but after term of those who enacted it
*Allowance may increase during term

PhilConsA vs. Mathay
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the plain
spirit of the restriction has not been altered. From the first proposal of
the committee on the legislative power of the 1934 Convention down
to the present, the intendment of the clause has been to require
expiration of the full term of all members of the Legislature that
approved the higher compensation, whether the Legislature be
unicameral or bicameral, in order to circumvent, as far as possible, the
influence of self-interest in its adoption.

PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST on civ/crim w/penalties not >6m
6, 11 priv from arrest on offenses not >6y, while in session

Martinez vs. Morfe
FERNANDO, J.:
Privilege from arrest may only be invoked while Congress is in session

PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY privilege from being questioned

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang
Concepcion, C.J.:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress,
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or
debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
(Article VI, Section 15.)

Vera vs. Avelino
BENGZON, J.:
No one may prevent them from performing the duties of their office,
such as attending the meetings of the Senate or of any of its
committees or subcommitees, or from expressing their vites, without
being criminally guilty of a violation of parliamentary immunity, a
criminal offense punished by the Penal Code with prision mayor.

and the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who shall, while the Assembly (Congress is
in regular or special session, arrest or search any member thereof,
expect this Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.

Antonino vs. Valencia
TEEHANKEE, J.:
As defendant's imputations against plaintiff were not made privately
nor officially as to be qualifiedly privilege under Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code, the trial court correctly held that by virtue of their
defamatory and libelous nature against the honor, integrity and
reputation of plaintiff, malice in law was presumed.
7
It further
correctly ruled that defendant had not overcome such presumption of
malice, not having shown the truth thereof, or that they were
published with good intentions and with justifiable motive or even from
the most liberal standpoint that they were made in the exercise of the
right of fair comment on the character, good faith, ability and sincerity
of public officials.

LEGISLATIVE PROHIBITIONS
6, 13 not allowed to hold any office w/out forfeiting his seat; no
appointment to office increasing his term
6, 14 not appear as counsel to any court; not allowed to enter a
contract with govt/agencies/corp during term; no intervention for
pecuniary benefit

INCOMPATIBILITY OF OFFICE/CONFLICT OF INTEREST
members of Congress may hold office as Cabinet after expiration of
term

Punsalan vs. Mendoza
TEEHANKEE, dissenting: perpetual disqualification
The broader test holds that "incompatibility of offices exists where
there is conflict in the duties of the offices, so that the performance of
the duties of the one interferes with the performance of the duties of
the other. They are generally considered incompatible where such
duties and functions are inherently inconsistent and repugnant, so that
because of the contrariety and antagonism which would result from
the attempt of one person to discharge faithfully, impartially and
efficiently the duties of both offices, considerations of public policy
render it improper for an incumbent to retain both.

CONGRESSIONAL SESSION
6, 15 - starts on 4
th
Mon of Jul; P may call for special session

US vs. Pons
TRENT, J.:
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other
things, in section 7, that the Philippine Assembly "shall keep in journal
of its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In obedience to this
mandate, the journal of the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of
1914 was duly published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that
the Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February
28, 1914.

Quorum 6.16, 2 majority of each house

Avelino vs. Cuenco
PERFECTO, J.:
A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,
but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel
the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such
penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Article VI.)

FERIA, concurring:
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that "the
majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute
a quorum to do business" and the fact that said provision was
amended in the Constitution of 1939,so as to read "a majority of each
House shall constitute a quorum to do business," shows the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the
number fixed or provided for the Constitution, but on actual members
or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are
not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death,
incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other
causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible,
even through coercive process which each house is empowered to
issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to
constitute a quorum.

6, 16.3 punish members for disorderly behavior, suspend (not
>60d)/expel (2/3 of majority)

Osmena vs. Pendatun
BENGZON, J.:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech
or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This
section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the
Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has
always been understood to mean that although exempt from
prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the
members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress
itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place"
than Congress.

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress
have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, even expelled
by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply
attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and
the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary
action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or
expulsion.

JOURNAL official record of proceedings; repository of business
activities; in case of misprint, it cannot be corrected by order of
judiciary because it is a violation of separation of powers
Office of the Journal definite/conclusive evidence of undertaken
actions

6, 16.4 - Y/N of proceedings
6, 26.2 Y/N of last reading
6, 27.1 Y/N on veto and overriding it

Astorga vs. Villegas
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no
ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the
journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.


Primicias & Gardner vs. Paredes & Clarin
MALCOLM, J:
This plainly we are not authorized to do, for it would constitute in
inquisition into the conduct of members and officers of the Legislature
and would do violence to the rights of a coordinate body. Under the
conditions existing in this case, it suffices to say that the judiciary, by
means of a writ of mandamus operating upon the heads of a legislative
body, cannot supervise the making up of a record of the proceedings
of that body.

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 6, 17

HRET and SET not part of Congress; sole judge on elections, returns,
qualification of its members
Legislative 6 members (either house), based on proportional
representation
Judicial 3 SC justices, S J is chair

Abbas vs. SET
GANCAYCO, J.:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be
staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and
'legislative' components commonly share the duty and authority of
deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of Senators.
Said intent is even more clearly signaled by the fact that the
proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication that the
"legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from participation
in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence
to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
Lazatin vs. HRET
CORTES, J.:
Thus, the question may well be asked whether the rules governing the
exercise of the Tribunals' constitutional functions may be prescribed by
statute.

The Court is of the considered view that it may not.

The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to
matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election
protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power
necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the
Constitution.

*Case being tried by SET may reach SC thru certiorari